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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

VOL. I.—1902-1903

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

L. P. JACKS, M.A.,

AND

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D.

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

EDITORIAL.

THE differences of opinion existing in regard to matters religious, theological, and philosophical are recognised by the Editors of THE HIBBERT JOURNAL in the spirit in which any natural phenomena would be regarded. As Editors of this Journal it is not for us to deplore these differences nor to take measures for their reconciliation. We shall judge of opinions by the seriousness with which they are held and the fairness and ability with which they are maintained. Among extant varieties of religious thought none is selected by us as the type to which the rest should conform.

One possible exception may be found. To *dead* forms of religious thought (if such exist), and to those which have lost the power to outgrow their own limitations, THE HIBBERT JOURNAL does not profess a mission. Its opportunities will be reserved for the thought which lives and moves.

Within the wide area thus indicated we seek to provide a common centre of literary expression for as many as may desire its opportunities.

In a department where such experiments have hitherto been rare we propose to practise the doctrine of the "open door," believing that the co-presence of varied inmates under

one literary roof, while weakening the individuality of none, may strengthen the deeper brotherhood of all.

Further, we are of opinion that truth is to be found not in the conclusions to which any single line of thought may lead but in the totality of conclusions to which all lines have led, and are still leading, the instructed Reason of man. Though separate members of this Totality may appear discordant as between themselves, we imagine that in the vast combination they become elements of some final harmony.

To conduct THE HIBBERT JOURNAL in a spirit consonant with those views is our aim.

In thus describing ourselves we are aware that the principle involved is widely accepted as a theory, while to some the statement of it will seem almost a commonplace. But though accepted theoretically, little has yet been done to translate the principle into fact. THE HIBBERT JOURNAL is offered to the thoughtful public as a contribution to that end, and those who are concerned in the offer believe they are neither in advance of their time nor out of harmony with its present wants.

That such an undertaking will have its value we venture to hope. We trust that it may work together with other agencies of our time in promoting a better understanding between the divided parts of the religious world. For, whatever harm may be associated with the conflict of opinions disappears in proportion as these are brought into intelligent contact. Not that the extent of a difference is necessarily diminished by contact of the differing elements; in some cases it will be rather increased; but misunderstanding (the root of all bitterness) is thereby made less excusable.

Many modes of achieving this object may be imagined. For example, were men of all faiths able to unite in common acts of worship, or were they to meet ecumenically for the

personal discussion of their problems, it is a reasonable conjecture that if some new differences would be created, other and deeper unities would be revealed. But, as to the first mode, this type of the Church Universal has so far found scanty favour in the eyes of men; offered it may have been, but accepted never. The second, again, is practicable only within narrow limits. There still remains, however, the plan of providing a common ground for the literary expression of opinion.

If *persons* cannot meet in either of the first two modes, *opinions* may at least be gathered in the third. We believe that these common meeting-places of written thought are needed. If such exist already, they are either insufficient in number or restricted in character. It is the object of THE HIBBERT JOURNAL to offer to religious thought a genuinely open field.

From this the inference might be drawn that within the large area indicated by its title—Religion, Theology, and Philosophy—THE HIBBERT JOURNAL stands for nothing in particular. Our position would thus be defined in purely negative terms.

But the following considerations will show, we trust, that the aim of the Journal is positive.

1. It will be admitted that, amid all varieties of religious *opinion*, the goal of religious *aspiration* is One. The thoughts of men, though separated at the beginning, and on their own level, by every degree of intellectual difference, have yet a common End, raised by infinity above all human levels, to which, as to a focal point, they inevitably converge. Thus in the last analysis we reach a principle which gives an inner unity to reverent minds. This inner unity THE HIBBERT JOURNAL will seek to represent.

2. As between those who shun inquiry on the ground that

the form of religious thought is already fixed in human language, and those, again, who see in theology a process akin to evolution in nature, the sympathies of the Journal are frankly with the latter. For "advanced" thought we have no special affinity; but thought which advances, it is our mission to represent. In the mode of conducting this Journal the implication will be that movement, in accordance with intellectual law, betokens health and vitality in religion. At the same time, we are on our guard against defining the direction such movement ought to take—whether as a return to old positions or as a departure for new. Carefully avoiding the pre-judgment of that question, our aim must be to reflect the movement of religious thought in its continual approach to firmer ground.

3. The movement of thought aforesaid is promoted by the conflict of forces within itself. Accepting this principle we shall allow the Journal to exhibit the clash of contrary opinions. No attempt will here be made to select the views of concordant minds. Rather will controversy be welcomed, our belief being that the encounter of opposites kindles the spark of truth. We are well aware of the danger the conflict of opinion runs from some of its emotional accompaniments. But these are no necessary part of itself; and when avoided, as they will be here, the end of controversy is not darkness but light.

We stand, then, for three positive truths: that the Goal of thought is One; that thought, striving to reach the Goal, must forever move; that, in the conflict of opinion, the movement is furthered by which the many approach the One. These three principles, which are obviously co-ordinate, express the spirit of THE HIBBERT JOURNAL as a "Review of Religion, Theology, and Philosophy."

Oct. 1st, 1902.

L. P. JACKS.

G. DAWES HICKS.

THE BASIS OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

IT is generally allowed by liberal Churchmen that at the present time there is great need of some reconstruction of doctrine, if doctrine is to occupy in the Christianity of the future a place as important as it has held in the Christianity of the past. But most of them seem to shrink from the attempt at such reconstruction. A very able and liberal theologian writes, "Those who speak most of the reformulation of the Faith do not appear to me to be the men who know the past." Any effort in this direction meets with severe critics and few friends. And what is far worse, it is almost sure to be exceedingly partial and incomplete. Doctrine has been in the past evolved rather by the life of the Church than by the efforts of individuals, and any satisfactory formulation of it is likely to come from those who have acquired a right to express the voice of the Church.

I.

Let me begin a brief discussion of the basis of doctrine by citing a definition of it by one of the greatest of modern Churchmen, Dr Westcott: ¹—

"Christian doctrine is at any time the present intellectual appreciation of certain actual events. It is not based upon a mythology which must fade away in the fuller light. It is not bound up with a philosophy which answers to a special stage in

¹ *Lessons from Work*, p. 77.

the progress of thought. It is an attempt to seize the meaning of occurrences which are part of the history of mankind."

While I should in a general way accept this statement, it seems to me by no means free from ambiguity. Are the events which lie at the roots of doctrine the facts recorded in the Gospels, or the facts of the continuous Christian life? Probably Dr Westcott would include both. But the history contained in the Gospels is certainly largely mixed with mythology. A permanent basis for doctrine can only be found in historic facts the evidence for which is beyond question, the realities of the permanent life of the spirit. And again, in maintaining that doctrine must not be made dependent upon particular schemes of philosophy, Dr Westcott doubtless states a truth. Yet the actual form taken by doctrines in various ages must needs be greatly influenced by the current philosophic views. It is only the spirit or essence of them which is permanent. Yet, taken broadly, Dr Westcott's statement is true. The first and most fundamental point in all reformulation of doctrine seems to be that it must take its start less from historic record, and less from metaphysical principle, than from experience.

In saying that doctrine cannot be primarily based on historic record, I do not of course mean that it is cut loose from the past, or that the history of religion is to us unimportant. On the contrary, as I shall presently insist, history must play an enormous part in any rational form of doctrine. To us history must be of infinitely more account than it could possibly be to those who were unacquainted with historic method and did not discern between fact and fable. To no mind trained in modern methods can any fact, whether of the present or the past, be indifferent or unmeaning: yet to proceed in the time-honoured manner, to take the crude fact or supposed fact of the Christian origins, and to build it into a structure of doctrine, is an illegitimate proceeding. It is illegitimate for two valid reasons: first, because the actual objective fact desiderated is seldom or never to be had. Modern critical methods have dispelled

the notion that it is possible in ancient history to ascertain the simple objective fact, save in certain cases. We can only reach probability, not certainty; we can discover what was believed to have taken place rather than what actually took place. And secondly, even if we could draw up a list of objective facts in religious history, they would be found to be in themselves colourless. They would contain no doctrine: doctrine would have to be added to them by imagination and belief.

This is clear if we take the simplest of examples. That Jesus Christ died on the cross may fairly be considered, in spite of difficulties raised by a few objectors, as a definite fact of history. This fact may serve as an attachment to which doctrine may cling: but in itself it involves no doctrine. "Crucified under Pontius Pilate:" to this Tacitus would subscribe as readily as St Paul. But the fact only becomes related to doctrine when we add to it what is not mere fact of history: "Crucified *for us* under Pontius Pilate." There indeed we have doctrine; and the doctrine conveyed in the words "for us" is not merely detachable from the fact; but it has been so detached by thousands of Christians who have based it rather on spiritual experience than on historic evidence of the nature of which they have been ignorant.

Nothing indeed endures, as possible foundation for doctrinal construction, save observation and experience. And the realm of observation may be readily divided into three main provinces—the physical world, the world of consciousness, and the world of history. In some matters, more especially as regards the being and attributes of the Creator, appeal has from antiquity been made to the testimony of the works which He has created. And in modified ways such appeal still lies open to us, is indeed inevitable in the case of every man of science who has imagination and conscience. The Founder of Christianity was very fond of appealing to processes and phenomena of the visible world as being a mirror in which we may trace the action and the love of the Father in Heaven; and the example which He set is one specially attractive to an age so bent as ours towards

the pursuit of physical and biological studies. Yet, after all, the visible world can throw but little light on the deeper phases of religion, can but furnish us with hints and suggestions. Far more important, with a view to the formulation of doctrine, is that psychology which studies the mind and heart of man. It is here that we most completely differ from the early founders of the Christian religion. The world of sense lay open to them; and though they did not see so far beneath its surface as we, yet they necessarily discerned much. But in the ancient world man had scarcely learned to turn the eyes of observation inwards, to study himself not merely as a part of the visible world but as a microcosm in many ways reacting against that world, as not merely contained in that world but in turn containing it. For good or for evil, mankind has become self-conscious. What the ancients did by an inner impulse we do of set purpose; what they knew confusedly in regard to human nature we know methodically, or at least we are studying by method. To use a bold phrase, God is committing to man more and more every year the rule of the world and the guidance of society; and man is obliged to try to discover what are the limits of his own powers and what the laws of his own development.

In introspective psychology there inhere very great dangers. It cannot be completely successful. But there are methods by which the weaknesses which cannot be wholly removed from it may be lessened. I speak at present of psychology in relation to religion, though the same observations would apply to other aspects of psychology. Religious psychology, then, may be extended in scope, and made far safer in its results, if with the analytic method we combine those of anthropology and of history. We have to correct or to confirm the psychologic views drawn from the phenomena of our own church or our own country by extending our observation to the lands where other religions prevail. And we have to draw largely upon the reservoirs of spiritual experience stored up in the memoirs and the writings of persons of unusual insight and genius in matters

of religion. Above all, we have the history of the Christian Church, from the day when the Apostles were called to become fishers of men, down to our own days. That history is no random collocation of events, but an orderly development, though sometimes, it must be confessed, periods of materialism and retrogression intervene between the brighter patches. But the spirit of the Founder has never wholly deserted the Society. A hundred times the flame of the spiritual life has burned low, but it has always revived. Thus to every Christian, the history of Christianity becomes a vast storehouse of truth and of wisdom, mingled of course with baser elements. As Plato in his *Republic* tried to make clear the nature of man by studying the working of an ideal society, so in the history of the Church the main facts of the spiritual life are set out on a nobler scale and with clearer lessons for us all. Particular facts in the history of the Church may be very doubtful: their acceptance or rejection depends upon evidence; but about the main lines and tendencies of that history we can safely assure ourselves.

II.

It appears to me that the whole complexion of doctrine in our days must be essentially psychologic, must take its start from facts of human nature. Doctrine consists mainly of three sections: the doctrine of God, or Theology proper; the doctrine of Christ, or Christology; the doctrine of man, or Soteriology. Now a system of doctrine which starts from the records of history will put Christology in the first place; a system of doctrine which starts from the facts of the visible world will put Theology in the first place; a system of doctrine which starts from the facts of human nature, and man as a religious being, will put Soteriology in the first place. These three species of doctrine have each in turn held supremacy in the Christian Church, none of them ever to the exclusion of the others. To speak quite roughly and generally, Christology, which often passed into *Theology*, mainly occupied the Christian society,

and particularly the Greek section of it, down to the fourth century. Soteriology was later in development, and belonged mainly to the Western branch of the Church, and was again dominant at the time of the Reformation. Theology proper has usually been less prominent; but everywhere in the eighteenth century, for example, it overshadowed the other species of doctrine.

Probably, under modern conditions, Soteriology must hold the pre-eminence. I am not sure that if we look round us we should at once feel this to be the case. The Church, at all events in our country, is far more fully occupied with attention to the temporal and social needs of men than with their spiritual health. This is, however, a temporary secularisation of religion. And the more enthusiastic forces of Christianity, such as the Methodists, certainly concern themselves largely with matters of Soteriology. However that be, it seems clear that the spiritual nature of man will be the primary subject of religious doctrine in the century which has but lately begun for us.

It is our business, in the broader, whiter light which floods the twentieth century, clearly to discern, and methodically to arrange, elements of life which by our ancestors were rather felt than known, but which often lie deep, near the very roots of our being. In order that we may do this, we must needs use critical methods; but we must beware of thinking that criticism necessarily leads to negation. There is a rationalist criticism which examines everything from the lofty height of its own conceit, rejecting all that does not happen to have an obvious reason and an immediate justification. And there is a scientific or historic criticism which is full of caution and of reverence, which recognises that for all phenomena which have appeared in the world there must be a justification of some sort, and that what has been nobly thought and strongly felt in the past is almost sure to have roots going down to what is best and most durable in man.

One may cite a recent example suggested by events going

on in the world. Few of the superstitions of the Middle Ages seem to us more degrading, few more indefensible, than those connected with the earnest desire to possess the actual bodies of saints and martyrs. Undoubtedly this desire has led to deeds which cannot but be condemned, and to gross materialism in religion. Yet quite recently, when the body of Mr Rhodes was laid to rest among the rocks of the Matoppo hills, in the midst of the land which he saved for Britain, none could fail to feel that the interment, though of a dead and decaying body, had real meaning, and that the dead hand of the great statesman would guard the Matoppo hills more securely than thousands of soldiers. For no view of human nature could be more faulty or more shallow than the view which regards it as swayed only by material advantages, and moving only on the lines of reason. Feeling, sentiment, imagination, the ghosts of dead beliefs, sway us often far more than the things which can be seen and measured.

In the eighteenth century the theistic rationalism of writers like Gibbon and Voltaire rejected with contempt what they regarded as the exploded superstitions of popular Christianity. But before long, the progress of philosophy revealed the fact that the doctrines which refined theism guarded as based on reason really rested on a base hardly more solid than that which upheld the doctrines which they scouted as irrational. In these days any man who wishes to proceed reasonably moves with infinitely more caution, and knows better than to set aside ancient beliefs merely on subjective or rationalistic grounds.

As examples of the cautious and appreciative studies which must lie at the basis of any satisfactory criticism of the doctrines of Soteriology, I would cite two books which have recently appeared, both of which seem to me to be of value. One is Mr Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion*, a work not very profound, but containing interesting statistics which seem to prove that the phenomena of sorrow for sin, of conversion, and of the second birth are as natural and normal in the life of men

and women as are the gladness which arises in us at the time of spring, or the yearnings which accompany the change from youth to manhood. The other work, Mr Granger's *Soul of a Christian*, is far more profound and valuable, for the author, instead of merely observing the phenomena of the somewhat shallow religious life of the Methodists and Presbyterians of America, has betaken himself to the vast reservoirs of spiritual experience contained in the works of Augustine and Bunyan, of St Theresa and St John of the Cross. He has tried to arrange and classify those facts of the spiritual life to which those great saints bear testimony, and has thus done a great service to all students of religion.¹

If I venture, working on much the same lines as Mr Granger, to speak briefly of the doctrines of Soteriology as based on fact, I would do so with all humility, as one merely trying to arrange facts in a particular light.

The great and essential realities which lie at the roots of all Soteriologic doctrines are three: First, that man has a natural sense of sin, which may be in individuals stronger or weaker, but which tends to be very keen in those who are most alive to spiritual realities. Second, that the load of sin can only be removed by a change of heart, the change which by Christians is commonly called conversion, but which may be either sudden or gradual. Third, that no man by his own strivings can bring about this change, but that it is wrought in him, not in defiance of his own will, but by a kind of absorption of it by a higher Power.

I am aware that there are among us some writers who regard these primary facts as not fact but fancy. I cannot at present attempt to confute them. I can but refer them to statistics like those of Mr Starbuck, or to the remarkable lectures on the Gifford foundation recently delivered at Edinburgh by one of the first of psychologists, Professor William

¹ This paper was written before the appearance of Mr James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, which must now take its place as by far the ablest and most authoritative work on the religion of experience.

James. To prove the reality of spiritual fact is indeed almost as difficult a task as to prove to a blind man that the material world is full of colour. Victor Hugo has observed: "Some men deny the infinite; some, too, deny the sun; they are the blind." When we find certain moral conditions existing in a rudimentary form among savages, clearly seen in civilised nations, strongly marked in the noblest of human beings who have ever lived, I do not think that we need pause to prove that they are natural to man as man.

When we investigate the phenomena of the life of religion in a spirit of observation, we see that the divine power revealed in conduct touches the will sooner than the understanding, passes through the will to the understanding. Thus while, from the philosophic point of view, the question, What is right conduct? precedes the question, How shall I do what is right? religion reverses the order of these questions. The will is first inspired, and then by following the divine guidance one by degrees learns to know good and evil. I do not say that intellect is of no use in the inquiry as to right and wrong, but I say that intellect has often to be helped by the insight which comes of inspiration. The man who follows the divine will often learns what it is sooner than the philosopher, though the latter soon finds a function in harmonising, in watching the results of deeds, in making clear and articulate the often obscure tendencies which move individuals and societies. Philosophy and reason are lamps which light up our paths and show us whither each tends. When the lamp shows that one path leads to ruin, we may say that the lamp helps us to avoid it; but the phrase is scarcely correct: it is we who choose; and if we choose the road to ruin, the lamp would help us to walk in it as readily as it would help us in the path which leads to good.

If this brief sketch of the root-facts of the religious life be at all accurate, we shall see that some of the great doctrines of Christian Soteriology have profound roots in human nature. They may be revealed doctrine; indeed, all true doctrine is

revealed: but they can be justified in their essence by an appeal to fact. I say in their essence, because as they stand in our Creeds and Confessions and Articles of Religion they are mixed up with a great deal of mythic history and abandoned philosophy. The ninth, tenth and eleventh Articles of the Prayer Book might be regarded almost as an abstract of what I have said. But they add a setting, some parts of which are disputable. They assume that Adam was historic, and the progenitor of mankind;—that is a Jewish element. They assume that the *phronêma sarkos*, as the Article puts it, is opposed to the divine influence, which is an element mainly taken from the mystic religion of Greece. And further, they give to the teaching a Christian form, holding that the grace of God is given to men in consequence of the obedience and death of the Founder of Christianity. No doubt in the past this essentially Christian element has been inseparable from the doctrine of divine grace, and to the great mass of Christians is still inseparable from it. Yet there can be no doubt that separation is from the logical and psychological view possible, whether or not it be possible in the practical life of the Church. Into these matters I cannot at present go further; they would involve Christologic discussions which are excluded by the plan of the present paper.

Let us pass to a doctrine taught in another Article of the Church, that of Election. This teaching is somewhat archaic in form, and probably few even of those who enter the ministry really accept it. But the noteworthy thing about it is that it has but a veneer of Christianity. The Article speaks of election in Christ, but the phrase does not go deep. The doctrine, as taught by St Paul, is taken straight, metaphors and all, from the writings of Jeremiah. It is Jewish in origin. But though its pedigree is thus Jewish, it has parallels among all peoples. The notion of divine predestination plays a very important part in the theology of Islâm. Belief in fate in Greece sometimes quite overshadowed the belief in the gods. And very many of the men who have made the greatest name

in the world,—Cæsar, Napoleon, Cromwell ; or to come to our own times, Napoleon III., Bismarck, Gordon, Rhodes,—have accepted in some form the doctrine of destiny or predestination.

Of course the doctrine, in passing through the brain of St Paul into Christianity, took definite colour and form. He teaches not merely that men are destined to success and failure, to happiness and misery, in this world, but that eternal happiness is only for those who are chosen in the eternal purpose of God. At least, this is the belief expressed in some passages in the Pauline letters. But it does not dwell in the Apostle's mind, or really tincture his theology. He never tells his converts that it is useless for them to attempt to lay hold upon life unless they are thereto ordained. It is at bottom only an intense conviction that he himself was called and preordained by divine purpose for certain ends. And what he feels in his own case he feels bound to assume as a general experience.

We cannot hesitate to say that though the doctrine of predestination has—often in the world assumed unlovely and unworthy forms, though it has been to sensitive souls the cause of unmeasured pain and anguish, yet at bottom it is based upon experience and reality. This doctrine, in varied forms, is an attempt or a series of attempts to explain, what is a fact of vast import and sublime majesty, that the destinies of men are arranged and swayed by a Power, mighty beyond our dreams, and wise beyond our imagination, who does place them as chessmen are placed on a board, and makes it impossible for them to move save in certain directions.

The complementary doctrine, that of reprobation, I take to be the result of applying logic where logic is powerless. St Paul did not hold the view that the non-elect were destined to endless punishment ; he only thought that such might fail to grasp the life in Christ, and so altogether lose the future life which belonged only to Christians. But when, later on, it was believed that the dead were divided into two rigid camps of the saved and the lost, then the theologians who held the doctrine of election were driven to believe also in the doctrine

of final reprobation. For us the great day of judgment, that nightmare of the slumber of the Middle Ages, has lost its definite and dramatic character. We reject cataclysmic views, and hold that the future life must have close relations with the life of the present. Thus for us any doctrine of destiny or election must have quite a different setting from that of Augustine and Calvin. We shall not accept the analogy of the clay and the potter, because a vessel of clay is dead, and we are alive. But we may still believe that to every man at birth there is assigned a task, that every life has an ideal aspect interpenetrating its visible manifestations. And we may believe that accordingly as each of us does the allotted task, and succeeds in making the actual life resemble the ideal life, in that degree each of us is partaker of salvation; but yet after all it is not we that can attain the ideal, but the ideal which works itself out in us, shining in our darkness, strengthening our feeble wills and heating our languid desires. This is in reality a modern transcript of the old doctrine of election.

III.

We pass next from the Soteriologic or human side of doctrine to the doctrine of God, or Theology proper. I think it could not be denied by any thinking man that the view of God held by any religiously minded person in our days is in some ways vastly more lofty and severe than any views which were possible to the early Christians. On some sides, those relating to feeling and conduct, it may be that the last words as to the divine nature were uttered in Palestine nineteen hundred years ago. The nature of conduct and of feeling, which is inchoate or truncated conduct, does not greatly vary from age to age. But on the intellectual side we have made enormous progress. Those two artificial senses, the telescope and the microscope, have entirely changed our notion of creation, by introducing us to the immeasurably vast and the inconceivably minute. The world has ceased to be

the centre of the visible universe, and now seems to us, with all its glory and splendour, almost like a mote in the sunbeam. Man on his physical side, while a marvellous production, is yet beyond expression weak and limited. Various recent writers have set forth, perhaps none more ably than the author of *Natural Religion*, the view of God as it slowly impresses itself upon the pious worker in the field of natural science. He becomes a severe, almost a Puritan, Monotheist. "If we will look at things and not merely at words, we shall soon see that the scientific man has a theology and a God, a most impressive theology, a most awful and glorious God. I say that man believes in a God who feels himself in the presence of a Power which is not himself, and is immeasurably above himself, a Power in the contemplation of which he is absorbed, in the knowledge of which he finds safety and happiness."

Thus wrote Professor Seeley. But while we are all in some degree swayed by the severe theism of the astronomer and the chemist, we must not forget that the true revelation of God must always be to the inward rather than to the outward eye. Nature can never by herself give us a full or final revelation of the Creator. The poets of nature, such as Wordsworth and Ruskin, throw over nature an imaginative haze of their own. Many of those who closely study evolution in the world see in it the working of something which, to compare great things with small, may be likened to human choice and purpose. But even the poet of nature and the reader of design in the world would not even look among things visible for traces of the divine, unless they had already found such traces in their own hearts and lives. The final witness to God will always be found in the words of Augustine, "Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless till it find rest in Thee." Reading these words, one may imagine that Augustine had risen above the local and temporal in religion to the essential truth of it. Yet Augustine, in another place, gives a version of the same aspiration which

may serve to show that we have moved since his day. "Our rational nature," he writes, "is so great a good, that there is no good wherein we can be happy save God."

What a bathos we have in these words. And they serve to emphasise the fact that it is not only by our profounder knowledge of nature that our idea of God has been lifted up. The fuller and deeper tide of human life which has flowed, since the world emerged from the swaddling-bands of the Middle Ages, has not only given us truer notions as to human nature and its possibilities, but also has raised and refined our ideas of Him in whose image man was made. If we except the teaching about God uttered by Jesus, and by some of His followers who draw their words straight from the experiences of the spiritual life, we shall find that most views of the divine nature which come down to us from the ancient world, and even from the Middle Ages, are coloured by two false ways of thinking. First, it was the inevitable tendency of all who had been trained in the Platonic philosophy, that is to say of all educated people, to think of God as revealed to reason rather than to will and to love. They often tended to regard the Deity as the sum of thought, to be known only through contemplation and meditation. And second, they were under the sway of that subtle essence of the Hellenic spirit, Greek rhetoric, with its love of balance and contrast, of measure and counter-measure. All literary style, from the days of Thucydides to almost our own times, whether in history or philosophy, art or poetry, has been in a degree rhetorical. And the rhetorical spirit is absolutely and irreconcilably opposed to the spirit of science. Rationalism and rhetoric have been the two chains wherewith the Church has been bound from almost the first, and from which she is only beginning to wish to be loosed.

I would not be misunderstood, as saying that it was a fault in the Church to accept these limitations. Here I think some of those writers with whom I have the closest sympathy, both in England and Germany, have been unjust,—men such as

Harnack and Edwin Hatch and M. Arnold. As a soul cannot work in the world unless it inhabit a body, as the wisest of men cannot speak without using the words of some particular language, so the Church, being obliged to come to terms with people of educated intelligence, was compelled to use the kind of speech with which they were familiar. What I do say is, that since we have cast away the limitations of Greece in other realms,—in physical science, in poetry, in psychology, even in philosophy,—we must be prepared to reject them also in theology, or our theology will remain dead among living studies. Our theology must be prepared to advance and to aspire until it conforms to what is loftiest and most severe in the suggestions of modern science as well as the highest results of the ideal philosophy which Plato founded, and the passionate aspirations of the Hebrew Psalmists and other great religious poets of the past.

On the third great branch of the tree of doctrine, Christology, I clearly cannot enter at the end of an article already sufficiently long. To this subject, the most difficult and dangerous of all, I may perhaps return in another paper.

In conclusion, I wish to make an observation which goes to the root of all doctrinal construction. Doctrine has relations not only to the facts of our environment, physical and spiritual, but also to action amid those facts. And indeed it is more closely related to action, and to feeling which is inchoate action, than to knowledge. Thus although a critical study of history is a necessary preliminary to the formulation of doctrine, and though religious psychology is a corrective constantly applied to doctrine, yet doctrine itself cannot be reached either through history or through psychology. Doctrine is the direct intellectual embodiment of life, and no corollary from any series of observed facts. The soil and the climate condition the growth of the plant, but they do not create the plant, nor furnish it with that inner vitality whereby it grows amid its surroundings, and uses what surrounds it for its own purposes.

Thus we reach a distinction, a far-reaching and essential

distinction, between the study of doctrine and the belief in doctrine. It is the same distinction as exists between science and art in all their phases, between the study of mechanics and the construction of a machine, between the study of painting and the production of a picture.

Science and method will not keep us in the choice of purposes and principles of life; but when we have formed our purposes, they will help us to attain them. The knowledge of religious psychology will not compel us to accept this or that doctrine, but it may help us to ascertain how a particular principle of religion has been embodied in doctrine in the past. And it may even show us how this embodiment must be changed, to fit it to modern intellectual conditions; it may discern between the doctrinal path which ends in a blank wall, and the path which avoids all insuperable obstacles.

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THE CONCEPT OF THE INFINITE.

EVERY student of the deeper problems of theology is familiar with what is often known as "the problem of the Infinite." Under the meaning of this one phrase may be brought a number of distinguishable, but closely connected questions. Some of these questions appear, in a more or less veiled form, even in the background of the discussions of daily life. We all are disposed to regard time as endless, and space as boundless. Problems about what lasts "forever," or about what had "no beginning," are suggested to us by familiar considerations. Even children ask questions that imply the insistence and the interest of this conception of infinite time. The adult mind, in our modern days, is reminded constantly afresh of this conception by the facts of geology, and by the theory of evolution. On the other hand, astronomy just as constantly suggests the problem of the boundlessness of the world in space. And theology knows the problem of the Infinite in the form of well-known questions concerning the infinity of God, and concerning what this infinity, if it is admitted, implies. Even if one regards all such problems as insoluble, there remains, for any student of human nature in general, and of the religious consciousness in particular, the question: What are the deeper motives that make man so disposed to conceive both the universe and God as infinite?

Yet the problem of the Infinite, in any of its forms, is so ancient, and has been so often discussed, that anyone who raises it anew has to meet at once the objection that he can only thresh again the old straw. I may as well say at the outset,

therefore, that the following paper seems to me to be justified by the fact that certain of the "recent discussions of the concept of the Infinite," to which my title refers, have set these ancient problems in a decidedly new light. This paper is in the main, therefore, a report upon what, in France, has of late been called, in philosophical discussion, the "New Infinite." I myself care little for this modern fashion of recommending ideas merely by prefixing the adjective "new." Truth is never essentially new, being always eternal. But if the adjective "new" serves to make a reader patient enough to attend to one more essay on a topic which Aristotle so skilfully outlined, which the Scholastics so patiently elaborated, and which the modern discussions of Kant's Antinomies may seem to some to have long since exhausted, I will not hesitate to employ the so much abused word. As a fact, recent discussion has put the concept of the Infinite in what, to me, seems a decidedly novel light. We seem to be at the beginning of the attainment of quite unexpected insight as to the logic of all discussions about infinite collections, complexities, and magnitudes. While the discussions to which I refer have been begun, and have been, in the main, carried on by certain mathematicians of a somewhat philosophical turn of mind, they have now reached a point where, as I think, the general students of philosophy and of theology should no longer ignore them. In a recent publication of my own,¹ I have endeavoured in several passages to apply the results of these mathematical students of the logic of the Infinite to the consideration of central metaphysical problems. In the present paper, however, I shall attempt little that is original. I shall be content if what I say serves to indicate to any fellow-student that the problem of the Infinite is as living a problem to-day as it was when Aristotle first attacked it, and that new results, of unlooked for exactitude and clearness, have lately been obtained in this ancient field of work.

¹ *The World and the Individual*, 2 vols., London, 1899 and 1901. See especially the *Supplementary Essay* appended to the first volume.

I.

The scope of the present essay must first be briefly indicated. I have mentioned the fact that some rather mysterious motives, lying very deep in human nature, have led many men to believe that the world is infinite, and to assert that God is infinite. Such beliefs and assertions, in their origin, antedate any clear consciousness, on the part of those who first maintain them, both regarding what these motives for such doctrines may be, and regarding what the very concept of infinity itself means. That this unconsciousness about the meaning and the grounds of our belief in the Infinite does go along with our early assurances about the infinity of things can be shown both by the case of Anaximander, and by that of any thoughtful modern child who asks questions that presuppose an idea of the infinity of the universe. Accordingly, when we try to come to clearer insight about the problem of the Infinite, we naturally have to distinguish two questions. The one is a purely logical question:—What do we mean by the concept of the Infinite? The other is a metaphysical question:—What grounds have we, if we have any grounds, for asserting that the real universe, whether divine or material, whether spatial or temporal, is infinite? The rational answer to the latter question presupposes that the first question has been answered. On the other hand, an answer to the first question might leave the second question wholly open.

Now the present essay will be mainly devoted to the *first* of these two questions. I shall discuss, for the most part, the concept of the Infinite. The question whether the real world, or whether God, is actually infinite, will merely be touched upon as I close. It is the logic and not the metaphysic of the problem of the Infinite that will here form my main topic.

Yet I admit, and in fact insist, that the whole interest of the logical issue thus defined lies in its relation to the meta-

physical issue. I am well aware how barren a consideration of the mere concept of the Infinite would be, if it did not help us towards a decision of the problem whether the real world is infinite or not, and nevertheless I feel that, in the present state of philosophical study, we must take the trouble to dwell somewhat carefully upon the merely preliminary problem, even at the risk of being accused of elaborating a mere concept, and of neglecting an appeal to the concrete facts of the real world. For I find, as I look over the history of the problem of the Infinite, that much of the ordinary treatment of the matter has been confined to a certain fatal circle, in which the students of our problem have been led round and round. First, the aforesaid motives, vaguely felt, have forced men to make the hypothesis that the world is infinite. As soon as one has tried to analyse these motives, one has observed that certain aspects of our experience do indeed furnish apparent grounds for believing in the infinity of the universe. But hereupon, becoming critical, one has said: Yet the concept of *what* the Infinite is and means seems to transcend the limits of human intelligence. And so one has refused to consider farther the evidences for the reality of the Infinite, simply because of this supposed incomprehensibility of the conception. On the other hand, any effort to clear up the conception of the Infinite has often met with the objection that a mere analysis of ideas is tedious, and that one wants light as to the facts. Thus, however, the problem of the Infinite has often failed to receive fair treatment from either side. The facts bearing upon the matter are ignored, because the concept is too difficult; and the concept is neglected on the plea that the facts alone can be decisive. I desire anew to break into this fatal circle. Let us make at least our concept of the Infinite clear, and then we shall be prepared to be just to the facts which indicate the infinity of the universe.

In expounding the newer conceptions of the Infinite, I shall follow, as I have already indicated, the lead of certain

mathematicians, in particular of Richard Dedekind and George Cantor.¹ I shall use, however, in part, my own illustrations, and shall try to emphasise in my own way the philosophical, as opposed to the mathematical, significance of the ideas in question. I shall then briefly indicate how the new ideas ought, in my opinion, to modify all future discussion of the evidences regarding the actual existence of infinite beings.

I may also say, at once, that my discussion of the concept of the Infinite will have relation not so much to the concept of infinite *magnitudes* (such as is ordinary Euclidean space when it is viewed as possessing volume), but rather to the concept of *collections*, whose units exceed in number the number of any finite collection of units. The conception of an infinite magnitude, such as an infinite volume or an infinite mass, would require for its statement certain conventions regarding the measurement of magnitude, which do not here need our attention. I shall confine myself to defining infinite collections, and infinitely complex systems of objects. We shall see that the metaphysical, and in particular the theological, applications of our concept of the Infinite are especially related to this aspect of our topic, while the conception of an infinite magnitude, in the narrower sense of that term, has less philosophical interest.

II.

In order to help us towards this new conception of the Infinite, let us begin by reminding ourselves of a very simple

¹ A fuller account of the literature than is here possible I have given in the course of the *Supplementary Essay* just cited. The definition of Dedekind is contained in his now classic essay: *Was Sind und Was Sollen die Zahlen?* This paper has recently been translated into English, and published in a volume entitled *Essays on Number*, by the Open Court Company of Chicago. George Cantor's numerous papers are widely scattered. Their substance has been in part summarised in the admirable book by Louis Couturat: *L'Infini Mathématique* (Paris, 1897). A fuller statement of the technical results has lately been given, from the mathematical point of view, by Schönfliess, in his *Bericht über die Mengenlehre*, in the eighth volume of the Proceedings of the *Deutsche Mathematiker-vereinigung*.

observation, which many of us may have made in these days when advertisements are so constantly before our eyes. It has occasionally occurred to some ingenious manufacturer, when in search of a trade-mark, to use, as such a trade-mark, a picture of one of the packages wherein his own manufactured product is put up for sale. Carrying out this plan, the manufacturer in question accordingly puts upon every package of his goods a label whereon is engraved this trade-mark. We can all recall, I fancy, packages of proprietary articles labelled in this way. Some of us may have noticed, however, in passing, a certain logical consequence which this plan involves, if only we suppose the plan rigidly carried out. Each labelled package is to bear upon itself, in a curiously egotistical fashion, a picture of itself. But the package, thus labelled with its own picture, inevitably requires the picture to contain, for accuracy's sake, as precise a representation as is possible of the appearance, not only of the whole package, but of every visible detail thereof. The label, however, itself is a detail belonging to the appearance that the package presents. Accordingly, the picture that constitutes the label must contain, as part of its own detail, a picture of itself. What we see, then, on the actual package, is a picture of this package; while this represented package has upon itself, in the picture, a second trade-mark label, which again contains a picture of the first package, and so once more of the label itself; and this series of pictures within pictures continues before our eyes as far as the patience or the wages of the engraver of the trade-mark have led him to proceed in the work of drawing the required details. Now it may have occurred to some of us that, if the plan of such a trade-mark as this were to be exhaustively carried out, without any failure in the engraver or in the material to hinder its expression, the pictures within pictures, which the plan demands, would soon become invisibly small. In fact, it is not hard to see how, by means of a single definable plan, viz., by means of the one requirement that the package shall bear upon itself, as label, a perfectly accurate pictorial representation of

itself, including in this representation the label which the package bears, one logically prescribes an undertaking that could not be exhaustively carried out if the label itself contained only a finite series of pictures within pictures, however long that series might be, or however minute the detail. Just as the label would fail to picture the whole package of which itself is a visible part, unless the label contained a picture of itself, so any picture of the label thus contained within a larger picture of the label, and of the package, would be imperfect unless, however small it might be, it contained a picture of itself; and thus there could be no last member of the series of pictures within pictures, which the one plan of making the label a perfect picture of the package would prescribe.

Now this system of the package, the picture of the package, the picture of this picture, and so on, is a system defined by a single, and in one sense, a very simple plan. We may at once give this plan a name. We shall call it a plan of a particular sort of Self-Representation, a plan whereby a whole is to be pictured or represented by one of its own parts. It is a simple plan, because in order to define it you have only to define:—first, the formal conception of a perfect pictorial representation of an object (a conception which, of course, remains for us an ideal, just as any geometrical definition is an ideal, but which is a perfectly comprehensible ideal); and secondly, the equally formal conception that the picture shall be contained in, or laid upon, the object that is pictured, and shall form a part thereof. Put these two purely formal and perfectly definite ideas together, and the proposed plan is exactly defined.

Let us consider the two ideas for a moment separately. We know what it is to conceive that a visible object, O, shall have a picture, R, which shall precisely represent its every visible detail. In order to form this conception apart from the other one that I just combined with it, we are not obliged to conceive that the picture R is to be as large as the object O. That a smaller picture should still be a perfect representation

of a larger object is a perfectly definable ideal. What we mean by this ideal is merely this, that to every variety of detail in the object there shall correspond some precisely similar variety of detail in the picture. Thus, if the object consisted of two lines, arranged in a cross, the picture would simply be another cross. If the object consisted of seven distinct points, arranged in a row, the picture would be a row of seven points. So far there is indeed no requirement that either object or picture should be infinite, or even moderately complex.

And next we may view the other one of our two ideas by itself. That a visible object, R, should be a part of a larger object, this is also a precisely definable idea, and a very simple one. This idea, moreover, is, upon its face, not at all inconsistent with the former idea.

But hereupon, in order to define what we have called the plan of Self-Representation, we have only to suppose these two separately definable ideas, that of the perfect picture, and that of the part contained within and upon the whole, to be combined, so that a visible object should be produced that contained, as a part of itself, a perfect representation of itself. But at once, so soon as, by this combination of two perfectly comprehensible and consistent ideas, we define the plan of self-representation, we observe that no finite degree of complication of object and picture would enable us to conceive the plan perfectly carried out. An object that contained, as part of itself, a perfect picture of itself,—in other words, a self-representative object or system of the type here in question,—would of necessity prove to be an object whose complexity of structure no finite series of details could exhaust; for it would contain a picture of itself, within which there was to be found a picture of this picture, and a picture of this second picture, and so on without end.

III.

The trivial illustration of the nature of a Self-Representative System which we have just used, has thus a deeper meaning

than we should at first suppose. We define a comparatively simple plan; but hereupon we come to see that the plan demands, for its complete expression, an infinite series of details. And we see at once that the self-representative character of the plan is the logical ground for this infinity of the required series. The self-representation of a whole by one of its own parts would, if carried out, imply that the whole in question had an infinitely complex constitution. But hereupon let us turn for a moment from this study of the explicitly self-representative systems to the consideration of an object that we all of us are accustomed to regard as at least a possible object of thought, and that we are all disposed to conceive as, at least potentially, an infinitely complex object. I refer to the mathematical object known as the series of whole numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and the rest. We all agree that, in our conceptions at least, no whole number that you can name can be regarded as the last of the possible whole numbers. Any series of numbers that we can at present write down, or that we can count in a finite time, will be a finite series. But no such a finite series can exhaust the possible whole numbers. On the other hand, what we mean by the objects called whole numbers is something perfectly precise. The possible whole numbers form no *finite* collection; but they do form a perfectly *definite* collection of objects,—definite in the sense that this collection excludes from its own domain all other objects. We have no difficulty in telling, when any object is brought before our notice, whether it is a whole number or not. Thirty is a whole number; but $\frac{1}{3}$ or $\frac{1}{10}$ is not a whole number. A tree or an angel is not a whole number. Thus the collection of possible objects called whole numbers, although, in one perfectly definite sense, it is a boundless collection, having no last term, is still far from being an all-inclusive collection. It is infinite in one sense; but, in another sense, it is strictly limited and exclusive of whatever lies outside of it. Cantor would call such an infinite collection a *well-defined* collection (*wohldefinirte Menge*) of possible objects,—endless, but in no

sense vaguely endless,—since of all possible objects you can exactly say whether they belong to the collection in question or not.

Let us, then, accept for a moment the whole-number-series as a collective object of our thought. Let us regard it as infinite in the merely negative sense of having no last term. I now wish to call attention to an interesting consequence of viewing the number series thus. If you choose, you can, namely, view the whole number series as containing within itself a perfectly definite part of itself, which is, in a precise sense, a complete representation or picture of the whole series. For the series of whole numbers is essentially characterised by the fact that it has a first member, a second member, a third member, and so on without end. Granting this, as the essential character of the series, let us consider a certain perfectly definite portion of the whole number series, namely, the series of even numbers. That series has a first member, 2; a second member, 4; a third member, 6; a fourth member, 8; and so on without end. Now, suppose that under a series of the whole numbers, I write the series of even numbers in order, thus:—

$$\begin{array}{l} 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \dots \\ 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, \dots \end{array}$$

It is plain that, just as I conceive that no number in the upper series is the last of the whole numbers, so I am forced to conceive that no even number in the lower series is the last of the even numbers. It is also plain that, however far I might extend the upper series, by writing in order the whole numbers up to any whole number, n , however large,—I might still extend the series of even numbers by writing them in order up to $2n$. The lower series might thus always remain just as complex and just as well-ordered a series as the whole numbers of the series above it. And thus the lower series would form, as a possible fact, a precise picture of the upper series. Speaking in general terms, I can say that to any whole number n , however large, there always corresponds, in this

way of arranging matters, an even number, viz. $2n$, so that the lower series is able to furnish, from its stores of possible members, the resources for the picture or representation of every whole number, however great, and of every series of whole numbers, however long. The world of the possible even numbers is, so far as the possession of a first, a second, a third, and no last member is concerned, precisely as rich as the whole number series. Thus, then, there is an exact sense in which I can say, the complex object called the totality of the even numbers precisely mirrors, depicts, corresponds in complexity to, the complex object called the totality of the whole numbers.

But, on the other hand, the even numbers form merely a part, and a perfectly definite part, of the whole numbers. For from the totality called the collection of the even numbers, all the odd numbers are excluded. Yet this mere part is as rich in its structure as is the whole.

This illustration of the even numbers, viewed as constituting a part of the whole numbers,—but a part which nevertheless can be made to represent precisely the whole,—has been much used in the recent discussions of the “new Infinite.” A more striking illustration still is furnished, I think, by another series of whole numbers, selected, according to a definite principle, from amongst the totality of the whole numbers. Let us consider, namely, the series of the integral powers of 2, arranged in their natural order, thus :—

$$2^1, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5 \dots$$

Now it is plain, at a glance, that this series of the powers of 2 is infinite in *precisely* the sense in which the series of the whole numbers is infinite. For there is a power of 2 to correspond to *every* whole number without exception, since every whole number can be used as an exponent, indicating a power to which 2 can be raised, nor is any whole number possible which cannot be used as such an exponent. Hence the series of the powers of 2, as here arranged in order, precisely corresponds, member for member, to the series of the whole

numbers. But, on the other hand, every integral power of 2 is itself a whole number. Thus $2^2=4$; $2^3=8$; and so on without end. And the whole numbers that are powers of 2, taken all together, constitute not only a mere part, but in a very exact sense an extremely *small* part, of the entire collection of the whole numbers. For there are infinitely numerous groups of whole numbers which are *not* powers of 2. Thus, all the whole numbers that are powers of 3, and all the powers of 5, as well as all the powers of 7, or of any other prime number, and, in addition, all the *products* of different prime numbers (*i.e.* all numbers such as 3×7 , or 5×11), and finally, all those numbers which are products of powers of different prime numbers (*i.e.* all numbers such as $2^2 \times 7$, or $5^3 \times 11^2$) are *excluded* from amongst those whole numbers which are powers of 2. And, nevertheless, that part of the whole numbers which consists of the powers of 2 has a separate member to correspond to every single whole number without exception. In other words, this part, small as it is, is precisely as rich as the whole.

IV.

But let us hereupon look back. As we saw in case of the trade-mark, the system of pictures defined by the one plan of requiring a given object to contain, as a part of itself, a complete representation of itself, would prove to be an infinitely complex system in case we supposed the plan carried out. Or, in brief: any Self-Representative system of the sort that we before defined is, in plan or ideal, infinitely complex. But, as the whole number system has just illustrated for us, the converse of this proposition also holds true. Any system of possible objects that we already recognise as infinite in the negative sense of having no last member, is inevitably such that we can at pleasure discover within it a part which is, in complexity, fully adequate to represent the whole. Thus Infinity and Self-Representation (using the latter term in the special sense above defined) prove to be inseparably connected

of human knowledge on theological subjects ; and similarly the term "Science," if similarly employed, represents no fetish to be blindly worshipped as absolute truth, but merely the present state of human knowledge on subjects within its grasp, together with the practical consequences deducible from such knowledge in the opinion of the average scientific man : it means what may be called, briefly, orthodox science, the orthodox science of the present day, as set forth by its professed exponents, and as indicated by the general atmosphere or setting in which facts in every branch of knowledge are now regarded by cultivated men. ✓

It may be objected that there is no definite body of doctrine which can be called orthodox science ; and it is true that there is no formulated creed ; but I suggest that there is more nearly an orthodox science than there is an orthodox theology. Professors of theology differ among themselves in a somewhat conspicuous manner ; and even in the branch of it with which alone most Englishmen are familiar, viz., Christian Theology, there are differences of opinion on apparently important issues, as is evidenced by the existence of Sects, ranging from Unitarians on the one side, to Greek and Roman Catholics on the other. In science, sectarianism is less marked, controversies rage chiefly round matters of detail, and on all important issues its professors are agreed. This general consensus of opinion on the part of experts, a general consensus which the public are willing enough to acquiesce in, and adopt as far as they can understand, is what I mean by the term "science as now understood," or, for brevity, "modern science."⁵

Similarly, by religious doctrine we shall mean the general consensus of theologians so far as they are in agreement, especially perhaps the general consensus of Christian theologians ; eliminating as far as possible the presumably minor points on which they differ, and eliminating also everything manifestly below the level of dogma generally accepted at the present day.

Now it must, I think, be admitted that the modern scientific atmosphere, in spite of much that is wholesome and

nutritious, exercises some sort of blighting influence upon religious ardour, and that the great saints or seers have as a rule not been eminent for their acquaintance with exact scientific knowledge, but, on the contrary, have felt a distrust and a dislike of that uncompromising quest for cold hard truth in which the leaders of science are engaged; and on the other hand, that the leaders of science have shown an aloofness from, if not a hostility for, the theoretical aspects of religion. In fact, it may be held that the general drift or atmosphere of modern science is adverse to the highest religious emotion, because hostile to many of the doctrines and beliefs upon which such an exalted state of feeling must be based, if it is to be anything more than a wave of transient enthusiasm.

Nevertheless, we must admit that there have been men of science, there must be many now living, who accept fully the facts and implications of science, who accept also the creeds of the Church, and who do not keep the two sets of ideas in water-tight compartments of their minds, but do distinctly perceive a reconciling and fusing element.

If we proceed to ask what is this reconciling element, we find that it is neither science nor theology, but that it is philosophy, or else it is poetry. By aid of philosophy, or by aid of poetry, a great deal can be accomplished. Mind and matter may be then no longer two, but one; this material universe may then become the living garment of God; gross matter may be regarded as a mere inference, a mode of apprehending an idealistic cosmic reality, in which we live and move and have our being; the whole of existence can become infused and suffused with immanent Deity.

No reconciliation would then be necessary between the spiritual and the material, between the laws of Nature and the will of God, because the two would be but aspects of one all-comprehensive pantheistic entity.

All this may possibly be in some sort true, but it is not science as now understood. It is no more science than are the creeds of the Churches. It is a guess, an intuition,—an

nothing in particular. Nor would it mean to be everything at once. Nor is this exact concept of the infinite one which we cannot grasp. On the contrary, no concept is more precise; and not many important concepts are simpler. To conceive the true nature of the infinite, we have not to think of its vastness, or even negatively of its endlessness. We have merely to think of its self-representative character.

VI.

But if this new concept is simple and exact, it appears to our common-sense unquestionably paradoxical. For we all early learned a certain so-called axiom, used by Euclid, and very generally regarded as a typical case of a fundamental verity. This is the principle that "the part cannot be equal to the whole," or that "the whole must be greater than the part." Now it may appear to some reader that, in the foregoing statements about the even numbers, and their relation to the whole numbers, and in our illustration of the series of the powers of 2, we seem to have come dangerously near to denying the truth of this axiom in its application to infinite or self-representative systems. This seeming is well founded. As a fact, our definition of infinite systems as self-representative depends upon actually denying that this axiom applies to them. It is quite true that the axiom about part and whole applies to all finite systems and collections. But common-sense, in talking about the vaguely appreciated ideas of the infinite which we all form in connection with the notion of infinite space and endless time, has often expressed, in a more or less halting way, its sense that to infinite systems the axiom in question would somehow fail to apply. Subtract a finite from an infinite magnitude, and the remainder, as we sometimes feel, must be as great as ever. But the newer conception of the infinite depends, not upon such a vague sense of failure to apply the old axiom, but upon defining, in a precise way, that property of infinite systems (namely, their property of being self-repre-

sentative) which, as a property, ensures that the axiom of whole and part does not apply to these infinite systems. As a fact, it is perfectly possible to investigate many mathematically defined infinite objects and collections in a very precise fashion to see whether or no they are equal. It is possible to define two infinite collections that are unequal to each other. It is possible to define the sort of equality or of inequality that is, in such instances, in question, with as much precision as you can use in defining the equality of two finite numbers. And nevertheless it is possible, while retaining all the definiteness of one's conceptions, to make the whole investigation of infinite magnitudes and collections depend upon asserting that, in their case, the part may equal the whole.

Escape from a bondage to arbitrary axioms is, in fact, a necessary condition of exact thinking upon fundamental topics. When you assume an arbitrary axiom, as, of course, you have a right to do, in any particular investigation, it is still necessary, if you want to think in thoroughgoing fashion, to know that this axiom is arbitrary so long as its opposite is not self-contradictory. Consequently, in considering the range of possibilities, you can always suppose the contradictory of your originally assumed axiom to hold true for some conceived range of at least possible being. Now, the so-called axiom about whole and part comes to us in the first place not as an absolutely necessary presupposition of thought, but as an empirical generalisation, founded on our experience of finite collections and magnitudes. *Why* this axiom holds true for finite collections we do not ordinarily see. It is something to learn that this axiom applies to them precisely *because* they are finite; and that a realm of equally exact and definite objects of thought is possible, to which this axiom does not apply.

Let me try to show the way in which Dedekind, in his essay on number, and Cantor in his theory of the relationships of infinite assemblages of objects, agree, both as to the exact definition of the concept of the equality of two collections of

objects, and as to the precise sense in which, in case of infinite collections, a part may be equal to a whole.

What do we mean by calling any two collections of objects numerically equal to each other? The answer is easily suggested by an illustration. Suppose us to know that there is a company of soldiers marching along a street, and that every soldier in this company has a gun upon his shoulder. We need not in this case count how many soldiers there are in the company in order to know, with precision, that there are precisely *as many* guns in that company's equipment as there are soldiers in the company. Here the equality of the two collections is defined in terms of what the mathematicians call a relation of one to one correspondence. By hypothesis, the law holds that to every soldier there corresponds one, and only one, musket, while to every musket in question there corresponds one, and only one, soldier, namely, the man who carries it. To know this law is to know the numerical equality of the two collections. Counting is in this case unnecessary. It makes no difference whether the company contains fifty or two hundred soldiers. In any case, if the supposed law holds true, there are as many guns as soldiers.

With the conception of equality thus illustrated, we are free from the necessity of always counting definable collections of objects before we know whether they are equal. We may then define equality in general thus:—If A and B are two collections of objects, and if a general law is known whereby we are able to be sure that to every individual object in A there corresponds, or may be made to correspond, one object, and one object only, in the collection B, and if the inverse relation holds true, then the two collections A and B, by virtue of this one to one correspondence, are equal to each other.

Now Dedekind, in his mentioned essay, first defines the conception of equality in these terms, and then gives to his definition of an infinite collection a more exact form than we have yet used, by combining this conception with one other equally simple and exact notion. This second notion is that of

Whole and Part. The precise definition of the relation of whole and part, as applied to the case of collections of objects, is as follows: Let there be two collections, A and B. Let it be known, either directly through a definition, or otherwise, that every object which belongs to the collection B, belongs to the collection A, while it is also known that there are objects of the collection A, which do *not* belong to the collection B. Then the collection B is to be called a part of the whole collection A.

Premising these two distinct conceptions, that of equality and that of the relation of whole and part, then Dedekind proceeds to his definition of an infinite collection as follows: A collection is infinite if it can be put in *one to one correspondence, or can thus be found equal to, one of its own parts*. This definition Dedekind introduces, in his essay upon the number-concept, in advance of any definition of the whole numbers themselves. He thus defines the infinity of a collection while using *only the two concepts of the one to one correspondence, and of the whole and part relation*. He thus logically expresses his conception of the infinite quite in advance of stating any definite conception of what a finite collection is; and, in the order of his definitions, tells us what the infinite is, before he shows us how to count three, or ten, or any other finite number.

But, as an objector may here say, mere definitions do not of themselves ensure the possibility of their objects. Can Dedekind show us, apart from mere empirical illustrations of the plausibility of his idea,—can he show us, I say, that a collection defined as infinite in his sense is a possible collection? Is not the very notion a contradictory one? How can the whole be equal to the part?

I answer, Dedekind easily shows that his conception of the infinite *can* be applied without any self-contradiction. Or, as he says, he can show that there are possible systems of objects, infinite in his sense of the term. He names at once such a system. "The realm," he says, "of the totality of my possible thoughts" is, in his exact sense, an infinite realm.

For, as Dedekind continues, to any thought of mine,—let us say to the thought as s , for example, to my thought of *my country*,—there may be made to correspond, in the realm of my *possible* thoughts, *another* thought which we shall call s^1 , and which we may suppose to be the thought whose expression would be: “The thought s (viz., the thought of *my country*) is one of my thoughts.” If the world of my *possible* thoughts contains the possible thought s , it certainly also contains the *possible* thought s^1 . Now let us call all thoughts of the form s^1 , *reflective thoughts*. Thoughts of this reflective type are thoughts that consist in thinking, concerning some other possible thought, that “this is one of my thoughts.” Now, to *every* possible thought of mine, without exception, there can be made to correspond, in the realm of my possible thoughts, one and only one distinct thought of the form s^1 , and *vice versa*. Hence, the whole collection of my possible thoughts, and the collection of the possible thoughts of the type s^1 , *i.e.* of the reflective thoughts, are precisely equal, just as the two collections of the muskets and of the soldiers are equal. For the two collections of thoughts correspond to each other, in one to one fashion, precisely as the guns correspond to the soldiers. Yet the collection s^1 is a perfectly definite part, *and is not the whole* of the realm of my possible thoughts. For there are thoughts, such as the simple thought of *my country*, which are not reflective. In this realm of my possible thoughts, a part may, therefore, be equal to the whole, not vaguely, but in a perfectly definable fashion. Hence, by the definition, this realm or collection of the totality of my possible thoughts is infinite. Yet surely the conception of the realm of all my possible thoughts is not a contradictory conception.

VII.

Thus, then, the logical basis for the new concept of the Infinite is, in its outlines, complete. One can define infinite collections without making use, in the definition, of their

merely negative character of being *without* end. One can define them by telling what they *are*, rather than what they are not. One can form a basis for distinguishing such collections, in a definite fashion, both from one another, and from all finite collections. One can, consequently, name a criterion upon which to base arguments regarding the question whether infinite collections exist in the real world. For the question as to the real existence of infinite collections *becomes identical with the problem whether the real world contains facts, or systems of facts, which possess a certain sort of self-representative structure*. Or, in other words, the problem of the reality of the Infinite becomes identical with the problem whether the universe, or any portion of the universe, has the same form or type which we are obliged to attribute to an ideally completed Self.

Whatever considerations make for an idealistic interpretation of reality, thus become considerations which also tend to prove that the universe is an infinitely complex reality, or that a certain infinite system of facts is real. For Idealism, in defining the Being of things as necessarily involving their *existence for some form of knowledge*, is committed to the thesis that whatever is, is *ipso facto* known (*e.g.* to the Absolute). But the knowledge of any fact, if this knowledge exists at all, is itself a fact. Hence the essence of Idealism lies in its thesis that *to every fact corresponds the knowledge of that fact*, while every act of knowledge itself belongs to the world of facts. Since, however, the fact-world, even for Idealism, contains many aspects (such as the aspects called feeling, will, worth, and the like), which are *not* identical with knowledge, although, for an idealist, they all exist as known aspects of the world, it follows that, for an idealist, the facts which constitute the existence of knowledge are themselves but a part, and are not the whole of the world of facts. Yet, by hypothesis, this part, since it contains acts of knowledge corresponding to every real fact, is adequate to the whole, or, in Dedekind's sense, is equal to the whole. Hence the idealist's system of facts must, by Dedekind's definition, be infinite. Or—in brief—for the

idealist, the real world is a self-representative system, and is therefore infinite. But I have myself also endeavoured to show, in my *Supplementary Essay* already cited, that a similar consequence holds for *any* metaphysical system, even if such a system is not idealistic. For, as I have there attempted to explain at length, every metaphysical interpretation of the universe, whatever its character, must imply that the real world is a self-representative, and is consequently an infinite system. In consequence I conceive that Dedekind's definition of the Infinite leads us to the important result of being able for the first time to show explicitly that the real world, whatever else it is, is an infinitely complex system of facts.

The ancient objections to supposing anything real to be infinite in its complexity of structure, the time-honoured arguments against asserting that the infinite is real, have all rested, in the end, upon the supposed *indeterminateness* of the concept of an infinite collection, or of the infinite in general. But the exact definition of Dedekind enables us to conceive the Infinite, in any one of its special instances, as something perfectly precise and determinate. For instance, let us suppose the collection of *all the whole numbers* to exist as a fact in the world. This collection has positive properties, which, as Dedekind has shown, follow necessarily from his definition of the infinity of the collection. Now this collection contains a part, precisely equal in complexity to the whole, namely, the collection before mentioned, of all the powers of 2.

Now, although this part of the whole collection of the whole numbers is an infinite part, whose infinity can also be defined in Dedekind's positive terms, yet it nevertheless is a perfectly determinate part. For, if we ask what whole numbers are *left over*, when, from the infinite collection of all of them, taken together, we remove or subtract the entire infinite collection, or part, called the powers of 2, the answer is perfectly definite. For the whole numbers that are *not* powers of two, themselves form a precisely definable collection. We can even go much further. From the infinite collection of the whole

numbers we can suppose subtracted or removed, in succession, an infinite series of collections of whole numbers, *each* of which collections is infinite; and yet, if the process is exactly defined, we can tell precisely what will be left over *after* all this infinite series of subtractions is carried out. For, to exemplify this fact:—the prime numbers, 2, 3, 5, 7, etc., form of themselves a demonstrably endless series of whole numbers. For there is no last prime number. Now let us suppose that from the collection consisting of all the whole numbers, we first remove or subtract the infinite collection of *all the prime numbers*. Suppose that we *next* remove the infinite collection of *all the squares* of all the prime numbers. Then let us remove the infinite collection of *all the cubes* of the prime numbers; then all the *fourth powers* of all the prime numbers. Let us continue this process without end, each time removing an infinity of whole numbers, but continuing to infinity the process of removing higher and higher powers of each prime number. Will the final result of this entire infinite series of successive subtractions of infinite parts from the originally infinite whole be in the least indeterminate? On the contrary, we know at once what whole numbers will survive the process. For the numbers that will remain over *after* the completion of the infinite series of removals will be those whole numbers which are either the products of different primes, or else the products of powers of different primes. Thus precise may be the results of reckoning with infinite collections, if only we use the right, which Dedekind's view of the positive infinite gives us, to regard every such collection, as soon as it is precisely defined, as an actually possible and given totality, with precise relations to other totalities, finite and infinite.

Nor are such elementary instances of the possible exactness of our conceptions of infinite processes by any means the principal examples of the essential determinateness of the infinite. Cantor, whose researches have wrought such a revolution in our knowledge of infinite collections, has been able to show that, despite the wonderful plasticity which the

foregoing concept of the equality of two infinite collections obviously possesses, the concept, as defined above, nevertheless has an exactly limited range of application. For there are definable collections, infinite in the foregoing sense, which are demonstrably *not* equal to one another. That is, there are cases where we can show that, of two given infinite collections, one so exceeds in complexity the other that a one to one correspondence *cannot* be established between them. In such a case, one of the two collections may indeed be a part of the other, but will then be, in this case, a part which although infinite, is *not* equal to the whole. Our previous definition of the infinite, in fact, while it depended upon pointing out that, in infinite collections, the part *may* equal the whole, did not assert that an infinite collection must be equal to *every* one of its own parts, but asserted only that an infinite collection is equal to *some* of its parts. In case, however, an infinite collection contains certain infinite parts to which it is not equal, but which it exceeds in such fashion that a one to one correspondence between the whole and such a part is impossible, then the greater infinite collection is said by Cantor to be higher in *Mächtigkeit* or in Dignity than is such a lesser part. The concept of the Dignities of the infinite, which Cantor thus introduced, depends upon proving that precisely such gradations of infinity are to be found in case of certain definable collections of possible objects. As a fact, it can be shown that the collection consisting of *all* the possible fractions, *rational and irrational*, between 0 and 1, is of *higher* dignity than is the collection of all the whole numbers. On the other hand, a collection consisting merely of all the *rational* fractions, is of the *same* dignity as is the collection of all the whole numbers. The proof of both these results can be given in a perfectly elementary form, which is indeed too lengthy to be stated here, but which can be made comprehensible to almost any careful student who retains the slightest knowledge of elementary arithmetic and algebra. Yet the first discovery of these Dignities or gradations of the infinite, as made by Cantor, constitutes one

of the most ingenious advances of recent exact thinking. Cantor himself has shown (and independently Mr Charles S. Peirce has done the same), that there is an endless series of these possible Dignities of the infinite.

The result of such researches is, however, to show in a new way how determinate an object an infinite collection, once exactly defined, proves to be. For an infinite collection of a lower Dignity, although unquestionably boundless in its own grade, remains in a perfectly definite sense incomparably small when considered with reference to an infinite collection of a higher Dignity. Infinity, and precise limitation, are thus shown to be perfectly compatible characters. For no process of numerical multiplication, even pursued *ad infinitum*, can directly carry one from an infinity of any lower Dignity to one of a higher Dignity. The transition from one grade to a higher grade can be made only by means of certain precisely definable operations which are not expressible in merely quantitative terms. The lower and the higher Dignities are thus separated by logically sharp boundaries of which earlier speculations upon the infinite gave not the slightest hint. But these boundaries, existing in the realm of what was once the "void and formless infinite," show us that henceforth no one who identifies the infinite with the indeterminate is aware whereof he speaks; and that no one who conceives the infinite merely in terms of the negative "endless process" can be regarded as having grasped the true nature of the problem of the infinite.

Meanwhile, to look in yet another direction, the concept that, in an infinite system, the part *can*, in infinities of the same Dignity, be equal to the whole, throws a wholly new light upon the possible relations of equality which, in a perfected state, might exist between what we now call an Individual, or a Created Self, and God, as the Absolute Self. Perhaps a being, who in one sense appeared infinitely *less* than God, or who at all events was but one of an infinite number of parts *within* the divine whole, might nevertheless justly count it not

robbery to be equal to God, if only this partial being, by virtue of an immortal life, or of a perfected process of self-attainment, received, in the universe, somewhere an infinite expression. The possible value of such a conception for theology seems to make it deserving of a somewhat careful attention.

I conclude, then, by urging the concept of the "New Infinite" upon the attention of students of deeper theological problems. I believe it to be demonstrable that the infinite is, in general, neither something indeterminate, nor something definable only in negative terms, nor something incomprehensible. I believe it to be demonstrable that the real universe is an exactly determinate but actually infinite system, whose structure is that revealed to us in Self-Consciousness. And I believe that the newer researches regarding the infinite have set this truth in a new and welcome light.

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THE OUTSTANDING CONTROVERSY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND FAITH.

IT is widely recognised at the present day that the modern spirit of scientific inquiry has in the main exerted a wholesome influence upon Theology, clearing it of much encumbrance of doubtful doctrine, freeing it from slavery to the literal accuracy of historical records, and reducing the region of the miraculous or the incredible, with which it used to be almost conterminous, to a comparatively small area.

Benefit is likely to continue as true science advances, but it by no means follows that the nature of the benefit will always be that of a clearing and unloading process. There must always come a time when such a process has gone far enough, and when some positive contribution may be expected. Whether such a time has now arrived or not is clearly open to question, but I think it will be admitted that orthodox science at present, though it shows some sign of abstaining from virulent criticism, is still a long way from itself constituting any support of religious creeds; nor are its followers ready to admit that they have as yet gone too far, perhaps not even far enough, in the negative direction. No doubt it must be admitted by both sides that the highest Science and the truest Theology must ultimately be mutually consistent, and may be actually one; but that is far from the case at present. The term "Theology," as ordinarily used, necessarily signifies nothing ultimate or divine; it signifies only the present state

properties of any system of objects that we can precisely define. If a system is to be self-representative in the foregoing sense, it must be infinite; on the other hand, if somehow we already know it to be infinite, we can prove it to be such that in some (yes, in infinitely numerous) definite ways it is self-representative in the foregoing sense of that term.

In view of these facts, it has occurred to Dedekind to offer, as the definition of what we mean by the infinity of a system or of an object, a formula that we may express in our own way thus:—*An object or a system is infinite if it can be rightly regarded as capable of being precisely represented, in complexity of structure, or in number of constituents, by one of its own parts.*

I have to give this definition first in a form that is not yet ideally exact. Dedekind approaches it, in his essay upon the number concept, in a more abstract and exact fashion. But I have said enough to show, I hope, that in this way of looking at the nature of the infinite, there is something worth following up. And as we have here little space for getting a closer acquaintance with these new aspects of our topic, let us at once remind ourselves of what interest a philosophical student may have in such a view of the infinite.

V.

Any self-representative system, if complete, would be infinite. We approached our recognition of that truth by a trivial instance. But the philosophical student knows of one of his own most central and beautiful problems which the formula now reached sets in a somewhat new light. That problem is the problem of the Self. Whatever our view of the psychology of self-consciousness, or of the mental limitations under which we now are forced to live in this world, we must all of us recognise that one characteristic function of the Self is the *effort* reflectively to know itself. Self-consciousness we never fully get, but we aim at it; it is our ethical as well

as our metaphysical goal. Now what would be the conscious state of a being who had attained complete self-consciousness, who reflectively knew precisely what he meant, and did, and was? To such a being we easily ascribe godlike characters. God Himself we often conceive as such a completed Self. If other selves than God are capable of such complete self-consciousness, they are in so far formally similar in nature to the divine. But what our observation of the self-representative systems has shown us is, that in their form, however trivial their content, these systems possess *a structure correspondent to the one that we must ascribe to any ideally complete Self, in so far as it is conceived as self-conscious*. A completely self-conscious being would contain within himself, as a part of his whole consciousness, not, of course, a mere picture, but a complete rational representation of his own nature, and of the whole of this nature. In consequence, as we have now seen, he would be, *ipso facto*, an infinite being. *To define the ideally or formally complete Self, is thus to define the infinite*. Conversely, to define the infinite, is to define an object that inevitably has the formal structure which we must attribute to an ideal Self. The two conceptions are convertible. To question whether the infinite is real, or whether any real being is infinite, is, therefore, simply to ask whether the Self, in its ideal completion, is a concept that stands for any actual entity, or whether, in turn, Reality has the form of the Self. Thus the problem of the infinite becomes central in philosophy in a new sense.

Meanwhile, when once we learn to view the matter thus, the concept of the infinite loses its vagueness, its negative aspect, its appearance of meaning simply what lacks boundary, or has no outlines. The conception of an ideally completed Self may be a hard or even a remote one, but it certainly is not a merely negative, or a vague one. Were you all that as a Self you ideally might be, you would not lose definiteness of outline, or precise character, or distinction from other Selves. Yet, as we now see, you would become, in formal complexity, infinite. Hence, to be thus infinite would not mean to be

inspiration perhaps,—but it is not a link in a chain of assured and reasoned knowledge ; it can no more be clearly formulated in words, or clearly apprehended in thought, than can any of the high and lofty conceptions of religion. It is, in fact, far more akin to religion than to science. It is no solution of the knotty entanglement, but a soaring above it ; it is a reconciliation *in excelsis*.

Minds which can habitually rise to it are, *ipso facto*, essentially religious, and are exercising their religious functions ; they have flown off the dull earth of exact knowledge into an atmosphere of faith.

But if this flight be possible, especially if it be ever possible to minds engaged in a daily round of scientific teaching and investigation, how can it be said that the atmosphere of modern science and the atmosphere of religious faith are incompatible ? Wherein lies the incompatibility ?

My reply briefly is—and this is the kernel of what I have to say—that orthodox modern science shows us a self-contained and self-sufficient universe, not in touch with anything beyond or above itself,—the general trend and outline of it known ;—nothing supernatural or miraculous, no intervention of beings other than ourselves, being conceived possible.

While religion, on the other hand, requires us constantly and consciously to be in touch, even affectionately in touch, with a power, a mind, a being or beings, entirely out of our sphere, entirely beyond our scientific ken ; the universe contemplated by religion is by no means self-contained or self-sufficient, it is dependent for its origin and maintenance, as we for our daily bread and future hopes, upon the power and the goodwill of a being or beings of which science has no knowledge. Science does not indeed always or consistently deny the existence of such transcendent beings, nor does it make any effectual attempt to limit their potential powers, but it definitely disbelieves in their exerting any actual influence on the progress of events, or in their producing or modifying the simplest physical phenomenon.

For instance, it is now considered unscientific to pray for rain, and Professor Tyndall went so far as to say:—

“The principle [of the conservation of energy] teaches us that the Italian wind, gliding over the crest of the Matterhorn, is as firmly ruled as the earth in its orbital revolution round the sun; and that the fall of its vapour into clouds is exactly as much a matter of necessity as the return of the seasons. The dispersion, therefore, of the slightest mist by the special volition of the Eternal, would be as much a miracle as the rolling of the Rhone over the Grimsel precipices, down the valley of Hasli to Meyringen and Brientz. . . .

“Without the disturbance of a natural law, quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse, or the rolling of the river Niagara up the Falls, no act of humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven, or deflect towards us a single beam of the sun.”¹

Certain objections may be made to this statement of Professor Tyndall's, even from the strictly scientific point of view: the law of the conservation of energy is needlessly dragged in when it has nothing really to do with it. We ourselves, for instance, though we have no power, nor hint of any power, to override the conservation of energy, are yet readily able, by a simple physical experiment, or by an engineering operation, to deflect a ray of light, or to dissipate a mist, or divert a wind, or pump water uphill; and further objections may be made to the form of the statement, notably to the word “therefore” as used to connect propositions entirely different in their terms. But the meaning is quite plain nevertheless, and the assertion is that any act, however simple, if achieved by special volition of the Eternal, would be a miracle; and the implied dogma is that the special volition of the Eternal can, or at any rate does, accomplish nothing whatever in the physical world. And this dogma, although not really a deduction from any of the known principles of physical science, and possibly open to objection as a *petitio principii*,

¹ From “Fragments of Science,” *Prayer and Natural Law*.

may nevertheless be taken as a somewhat exuberant statement of the generally accepted inductive teaching of orthodox science on the subject.

It ought, however, to be admitted at once by Natural Philosophers that the unscientific character of prayer for rain depends really not upon its conflict with any known physical law, since it need involve no greater interference with the order of nature than is implied in a request to a gardener to water the garden—it does not really depend upon the impossibility of causing rain to fall when otherwise it might not—but upon the disbelief of science in any power who can and will attend and act. To prove this, let us bethink ourselves that it is not an inconceivable possibility that at some future date mankind may acquire some control over the weather, and be able to influence it; not merely in an indirect manner, as at present they can affect climate, by felling forests or flooding deserts, but in some more direct fashion; in that case prayers for rain would begin again, only the petitions would be addressed, not to heaven, but to the Meteorological Office. We do not at present ask the secretary of that government department to improve our seasons, simply because we do not think that he knows how; if we thought he did, we should have no hesitation, on the score of his possible non-existence, or a doubt lest our letter should never reach him. Professor Tyndall's dogma will, if pressed, be found to embody one of these last alternatives, although superficially it pretends to make the somewhat grotesque suggestion that the alteration requested is so complicated and involved, that really, with the best intentions in the world, the Deity does not know how to do it.

No doubt the line of piety might be taken, that the central Office knew best what it was about, and that petitions were only worrying; but that would be rather a supine and fatalistic attitude if we were in real distress, and certainly, on a higher level, it would be a very unfilial one. Religious people have been told, on what they generally take to be good

authority, that prayer might be a miraculously powerful engine for achievement, even in the physical world, if they would only believe with sufficient vigour; but (I am not here questioning the soundness of their position) they have dramatised or spiritualised away the statement, and act upon it no more. Influenced it is to be presumed by science, they have come definitely to disbelieve in physical interference of any kind whatever on the part of another order of beings, whether more exalted or more depraved than ourselves, although such beings are frequently mentioned in their sacred books.

Whatever they might be able to do if they chose, for all practical purposes such beings are to the average scientific man purely imaginary, and he feels sure that we can never have experiential knowledge of them or their powers. In his view the universe lies before us for investigation, and we perceive that it is complete without them; it is subject to our own partial control if we are willing patiently to learn how to exercise it, but to no other control does it make any pretence of obedience. Even in the most vital concerns of life, it is the doctor, not the priest, who is summoned: a pestilence is no longer attributed to divine jealousy, nor would the threshing-floor of Araunah be used to stay it.

Nor is the terminology of the two subjects commensurate. The death of an archbishop can be stated scientifically in terms not very different from those appropriate to the stoppage of a clock, or the extinction of a fire; but the religious formula for the same event is that it has pleased God in His infinite wisdom to take to Himself the soul of our dear brother, etc. The very words of such a statement are to modern science unmeaning. (In saying this, I trust to be understood as not now in the slightest degree attempting to judge the question which form is the more appropriate.)

Religion may, in fact, be called supernatural or super-scientific, if the term "natural" be limited to that region of which we now believe that we have any direct scientific knowledge.

In disposition also they are opposite. Science aims at a vigorous adult, intelligent, serpent-like wisdom, and active interference with the course of nature; religion aims at a meek, receptive, child-hearted attitude of dovelike resignation to the Divine will.

Take a scientific man who is not something more than a scientific man, one who is not a poet, or a philosopher, or a saint, and place him in the atmosphere habitual to the churches,—and he must starve. He requires solid food, and he finds himself in air. He requires something to touch and define and know; but there everything is ethereal, indefinable, illimitable, incomprehensible, beautiful, and vague. He dies of inanition.

Take a religious man, who has not a multitude of other aptitudes overlaid upon his religion, into the cold dry workings, the gropings and tunnellings of science, where everything must be scrutinised and proved, distinctly conceived and precisely formulated,—and he cannot breathe. He requires air and free space, whereas he finds himself underground, among foundations and masonry, very solid and substantial, but very cabined and confined. He dies of asphyxia.

If a man be able to live in both regions, to be amphibious as it were, able to take short flights occasionally, and able to burrow underground occasionally, accepting the solid work of science and believing its truth, realising the aerial structures of religion, and perceiving their beauty, will such a man be as happily and powerfully and freely at home in the air as if he had no earth adhering to his wings? Is the modern man as happily and powerfully and freely religious as he might have been with less information? Or, I would add parenthetically, as he may yet perhaps again be with more?

II.

Leaving the general, and coming to details, let us look at a few of the simpler religious doctrines, such as are still, I suppose, popularly held in this country.

The creed of the ancient Israelites was well, or at least strikingly, summarised by Mr Huxley in one of his *Nineteenth Century* articles (March 1886). He there says: "The chief articles of the theological creed of the old Israelites, which are made known to us by the direct evidence of the ancient records, . . . are as remarkable for that which they contain as for that which is absent from them. They reveal a firm conviction that, when death takes place, a something termed a soul, or spirit, leaves the body and continues to exist in Sheol for a period of indefinite duration, even though there is no proof of any belief in absolute immortality; that such spirits can return to earth to possess and inspire the living; that they are in appearance and in disposition likenesses of the men to whom they belonged, but that, as spirits, they have larger powers and are freer from physical limitations; that they thus form one of a number of kinds of spiritual existence known as Elohim, of whom Jahveh, the national God of Israel, is one; that, consistently with this view, Jahveh was conceived as a sort of spirit, human in aspect and in sense, and with many human passions, but with immensely greater intelligence and power than any other Elohim, whether human or divine."

The mere calm statement of so preposterous a creed is plainly held by Mr Huxley to be a sufficient refutation.

But we need not limit ourselves to the Old Testament, where doubtless some supposed facts may be abandoned without detriment, as belonging to the legendary or the obscure; we may be constrained by science to go further, and to admit that even fundamental Christian doctrines, such as the Incarnation or non-natural birth, and the Resurrection or non-natural disappearance of the body from the tomb, have, from the scientific point of view, no reasonable likelihood or possibility whatever. It may be, and often has been, asserted that they appear as childish fancies, appropriate to the infancy of civilisation and a pre-scientific credulous age; readily intelligible to the historian and student of folk-lore, but not otherwise interesting. The same has been said of every variety of miracle, and

not merely of such dogmas as the fall of man from an original state of perfection, of the comparatively recent extirpation of the human race down to a single family, and so on.

The whole historical record, wherever it exceeds the commonplace, every act attributed directly to the Deity, whether it be sending fire from heaven, or writing upon stone, or leadings by cloud and fire, or conversations, whether during trance or otherwise, is utterly contrary to the spirit of modern science (let it be clearly remembered how I have defined the phrase "modern science" above); and when considered prosaically, much of the record is summarily discredited, even I think by many theologians now. Nor is this acquiescence in negation confined to the leaders. The general religious world has agreed apparently to throw overboard Jonah and the whale, Joshua and the sun, the three Children and the fiery furnace; it does not seem to take anything in the book of Judges or the book of Daniel very seriously; and though it still clings pathetically to the book of Genesis, it is willing to relegate to poetry, *i.e.* to imagination or fiction, such legends as the creation of the world, Adam and his rib, Eve and the apple, Noah and his ark, language and the tower of Babel, Elijah and the chariot of fire, and many others. The stock reconciling phrase, with regard to the legend of a six-days' creation, or the Levitical mistakes in Natural History, after the strained "day-period" mode of interpretation had been exploded in "Essays and Reviews," used to be, that the Bible was never meant to teach science; and so, whenever it touches upon any branch of natural knowledge, it is to be interpreted in a friendly spirit, *i.e.* it is to be glossed over, and in point of fact disbelieved. But a book which deals with so prodigious a subject as the origin of all things, and the history of the human race, cannot avoid a treatment of natural facts which is really a teaching of science, whether such teaching is *meant* or not; and indeed the whole idea involved in the word "meant" is repugnant to the conceptions of modern science, which has ousted teleology from its arena.

Moreover, if religious people go as far as this, where are they to stop? What, then, do they propose to do with the turning of water into wine, the ejection of devils, the cursing of the fig-tree, the feeding of five thousand, the raising of Lazarus? Or, to go deeper still, what do they make of the scene at the Baptism, of the Transfiguration, of the signs at the Crucifixion, the appearances after Death, the Ascension into heaven? May it not be supposed that neither orthodox religion nor orthodox science has said its last word on these questions?

But it may be urged that even these are but details compared with the one transcendent doctrine of the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient benevolent personal God; the fundamental tenet of nearly all religions. But so far as science has anything to say on this subject, and it has not very much, its tendency is to throw mistrust, not upon the existence of Deity itself, but upon any adjectives applied to the Deity. "Infinite" and "eternal" may pass, and "omnipotent" and "omniscient" may reluctantly be permitted to go with them,—these infinite adjectives relieve the mind, without expressing more than is implicitly contained in the substantive God. But concerning "personal" and "benevolent" and other anthropomorphic adjectives, science is exceedingly dubious; nor is omnipotence itself very easily reconcilable with the actual condition of things as we now experience them. The present state of the world is very far short of perfection. Why are things still imperfect if controlled by a benevolent omnipotence? Why, indeed, does evil or pain at all exist? All very ancient puzzles these, but still alive; and the solution to them so far attempted by science lies in the word Evolution, a word in itself not readily applicable to the work of a God.

Taught by science, we learn that there has been no fall of man, there has been a rise. Through an apelike ancestry, back through a tadpole and fishlike ancestry, away to the early beginnings of life, the origin of man is being traced by science. There was no specific creation of the world such as was conceived appropriate to a geocentric conception of the

universe; the world is a condensation of primeval gas, a congeries of stones and meteors fallen together; still falling together, indeed, in a larger neighbouring mass (the Sun). By the energy of the still persistent falling together, the ether near us is kept constantly agitated, and to the energy of this ethereal agitation all the manifold activity of our planet is due. The whole system has evolved itself from mere moving matter in accordance with the law of gravitation, and there is no certain sign of either beginning or end. Solar systems can by collision or otherwise resolve themselves into nebulae, and nebulae left to themselves can condense into solar systems,—everywhere in the spaces around us we see a part of the process going on; the formation of solar systems from whirling nebulae lies before our eyes, if not in the visible sky itself, yet in the magnified photographs taken of that sky. Even though the whole process of evolution is not completely understood as yet, does anyone doubt that it will become more thoroughly understood in time? and if they do doubt it, would they hope effectively to bolster up religion by such a doubt?

It is difficult to resist yielding to the bent and trend of “modern science,” as well as to its proved conclusions. Its bent and trend may have been wrongly estimated by its present disciples: a large tract of knowledge may have been omitted from its ken, which when included will revolutionise some of their speculative opinions; but, however this may be, there can be no doubt about the tendency of orthodox science at the present time. It suggests to us that the Cosmos is self-explanatory, self-contained, and self-maintaining. From everlasting to everlasting the material universe rolls on, evolving worlds and disintegrating them, evolving vegetable beauty and destroying it, evolving intelligent animal life, developing that into a self-conscious human race, and then plunging it once more into annihilation.

“Thou makest thine appeal to me!
I bring to life, I bring to death,
The spirit does but mean the breath,
I know no more. . . .”

But at this point the theologian happily and eagerly interposes, with a crucial inquiry of science about this same bringing to life. Granted that the blaze of the sun accounts for winds and waves, and hail, and rain, and rivers, and all the myriad activities of the earth, does it account for life? Has it accounted for the life of the lowest animal, the tiniest plant, the simplest cell, hardly visible but self-moving, in the field of a microscope?

And science, in chagrin, has to confess that hitherto in this direction it has failed. It has not yet witnessed the origin of the smallest trace of life from dead matter: all life, so far as has been watched, proceeds from antecedent life. Given the life of a single cell, science would esteem itself competent ultimately to trace its evolution into all the myriad existences of plant and animal and man; but the origin of protoplasmic activity itself as yet eludes it. But will the Theologian triumph in the admission? will he therein detect at last the dam which shall stem the torrent of scepticism? will he base an argument for the direct action of the Deity in mundane affairs on that failure, and entrench himself behind that present incompetence of labouring men? If so, he takes his stand on what may prove a yielding foundation. The present powerlessness of science to explain or originate life is a convenient weapon wherewith to fell a pseudo-scientific antagonist who is dogmatising too loudly out of bounds; but it is not perfectly secure as a permanent support. In an early stage of civilisation it may have been supposed that flame only proceeded from antecedent flame, but the tinder-box and the lucifer-match were invented nevertheless. Theologians have probably learnt by this time that their central tenets should not depend, even partially, upon nescience or upon negations of any kind, lest the placid progress of positive knowledge should once more undermine their position, and another discovery have to be scouted with alarmed and violent anathemas.

Any year, or any century, the physical aspect of the nature of life may become more intelligible, and may perhaps resolve

itself into an action of already known forces acting on the very complex molecule of protoplasm. Already in Germany have inorganic and artificial substances been found to crawl about on glass slides under the action of surface-tension or capillarity, with an appearance which is said to have deceived even a biologist into hastily pronouncing them living amoebæ. Life in its ultimate element and on its material side is such a simple thing, it is but a slight extension of known chemical and physical forces; the cell must be able to respond to stimuli, to assimilate outside materials, and to subdivide. I apprehend that there is not a biologist but believes (perhaps quite erroneously) that sooner or later the discovery will be made, and that a cell having all the essential functions of life will be constructed out of inorganic material. Seventy years ago organic chemistry was the chemistry of vital products, of compounds that could not be made artificially by man. Now there is no such chemistry; the name persists, but its meaning has changed.

It may be conceivably argued that after all *we* are alive, and that if we ever learn how to make animals or plants, they will take their origin from life, just as when we make new species by artificial selection we exercise a control over the forces of nature which in some small way may be akin to the methods of the divine control. And this may possibly be a theme capable of enlargement.

But meanwhile what do we mean by such a phrase as divine control? for, after all, the controversy between religion and science is not so much a controversy as to the being or not being of a God. Science might be willing to concede this as a vague and ineffective hypothesis, but there would still remain a question as to His mode of action, a controversy as to the method of the divine government of the world.

And this is the standing controversy, by no means really dead at the present day. Is the world controlled by a living Person, accessible to prayer, influenced by love, able and willing to foresee, to intervene, to guide, and wistfully to

lead without compulsion spirits in some sort akin to Himself?

Or is the world a self-generated, self-controlling machine, complete and fully organised for movement, either up or down, for progress or degeneration, according to the chances of heredity and the influence of environment? Has the world, as it were, *secreted* or arrived at life and mind and consciousness by the play of natural forces acting on the complexities of highly developed molecular aggregates; at first life-cells, ultimately brain-cells; and these not the organ or instrument, but the very reality and essence of life and of mind?

If there be any other orders of conscious existence in the universe, as probably there are, are they also locked up on their several planets, without the power of communicating or helping or informing, and all working out their own destiny in permanent isolation? Everything in such a world would be not only apparently but really a definite sequence of cause and effect, just as it seems to us here; and prayer, to be effectual in such a world, must be not what theologians mean by prayer, but must be either simple meditation for acquiescence in the inevitable, or else a petition addressed to some other of the dwellers in our time and place, that they may be induced by benevolent acts to ease some of the burdens to which their petitioners are liable.

We thus return to our original thesis, that the root question or outstanding controversy between science and faith rests upon two distinct conceptions of the universe:—the one, that of a self-contained and self-sufficient universe, with no outlook into or links with anything beyond, uninfluenced by any life or mind except such as is connected with a visible and tangible material body; and the other conception, that of a universe lying open to all manner of spiritual influences, permeated through and through with a Divine spirit, guided and watched by living minds, acting through the medium of law indeed, but with intelligence and love behind the law: a universe by no means self-sufficient or self-contained, but with feelers at

every pore groping into another supersensuous order of existence, where reign laws hitherto unimagined by science, but laws as real and as mighty as those by which the material universe is governed.

According to the one conception, faith is childish and prayer absurd; the only individual immortality lies in the memory of descendants; kind actions and cheerful acquiescence in fate are the highest religious attributes possible; and the future of the human race is determined by the law of gravitation and the circumstances of space.

According to the other conception, prayer may be mighty to the removal of mountains, and by faith we may feel ourselves citizens of an eternal and glorious cosmogony of mutual help and co-operation, advancing from lowly stages to even higher states of happy activity, world without end, and may catch in anticipation some glimpses of that "one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves."

The whole controversy hinges, in one sense, on a practical pivot—the efficacy of prayer. Is prayer to hypothetical and supersensuous beings as senseless and useless as it is unscientific? or does prayer pierce through the husk and apparent covering of the sensuous universe, and reach something living, loving, and helpful beyond?

And in another sense the controversy turns upon a question of fact. Do we live in a universe permeated with life and mind: life and mind independent of matter and unlimited in individual duration? Or is life limited, in space to the surface of masses of matter, and in time to the duration of the material envelope essential to its manifestation?

The answer is given in one way by orthodox modern science, and in another way by Religion of all times; and until these opposite answers are made consistent, the reconciliation between Science and Faith is incomplete.

OLIVER LODGE.

MATTHEW ARNOLD—A POET OF FIFTY YEARS AGO.

POETRY has its own world apart from science, philosophy and theology; and it is the better wisdom to write concerning its affairs within its own world alone. But this rigid principle cannot always be observed. At many points the great rivers of philosophy, theology and religion run into the sea of poetry, and mingle with it their waters and the elements with which they are charged. Nor does poetry, which has its own religion and its own philosophy, disdain these rivers, for they bring to it authentic tidings of worlds of thought and aspiration other than its own; different, but related in method and movement, following diverse paths, but with a common goal.

It is best, when one loves poetry, to live in its open sea, where its waters are translucent and unmixed; but to live where its waves and currents near the coast receive the deep streams of religious and philosophic thought, has also its own interest and pleasure. The waters of poetry are not translucent there, nor do they bring as keen a life and pure a joy to men who love beauty as the form of truth as those of her central and lonely deep, but they make an appeal of their own to the reason and the spirit. In these waters, beauty, passion and noble sensuousness are added by the work of the imagination, kindling, shaping, aspiring and creating, to logical thought, steady reasoning, keen analysis, penetrative research and bold speculation. It is in this mingled region that poetry is most interesting to the generality of men, most pleasurable and most

profitable. In it also those who care for the arts alone are often lured to push their way up the full rivers of philosophy and theology; while those who care for these wise sciences alone are in their turn induced to tempt the ocean-paths of poetry, where beauty is supreme, and truth is with beauty interchangeable.

In such a mixed region Matthew Arnold wrote his first volume of poems in 1849. In such a region this article hopes to remain. In such a region many are now living. For though Arnold sent forth his book a little more than fifty years ago, much of it speaks to men and women of the present day. The spiritual and intellectual difficulties of life, their strife, confusion and noise, in which he lived and through which he fought his way, exist still for thousands of persons, though the strife is less heated and the trouble not so deep. He saw and felt the grave beginnings of the war, when authorities long thought to be infallible, and the formulas of creeds consecrated by the obedience of centuries, were boldly challenged; when the history of the Gospels and the Apostolic Church was treated like any other history by disintegrating critics. And the result on his mind of this incursion and siege of historical criticism and physical science upon the fortress of the ancient faith is written in this book. It is full of his cries, his questions, his sorrow; his indignation with the disturbance; his speculations, now wild, now quiet, as to the truth of things; his hopes, his despairs; his stoic conclusions that change from year to year, almost from hour to hour, as he feels more or less, beyond himself, the passion of humanity.

The war of thought which caused this trouble in his soul has continued since his time and still continues. It cannot be said to do more at present than draw to its conclusion. Some have taken refuge from it in quiet infidelity, and are content—hoping and fearing nothing beyond this earth—to fulfil their duties to mankind. Others, laying aside the unnecessary in Christian dogma and history, have won a veteran and simple faith at the point of the sword, and abide in a noble peace above the storm. Both these classes are too liable to think that

they represent the greater number of persons in England who care for the questions at the root of the war. And this is especially true of the unbelievers who think that everyone agrees with them. But the fact is that the greater number of people who think at all on these matters of faith and unfaith are still in much the same condition as Arnold was fifty years ago, still searching, still unquiet, still speculating, still in confusion, still deafened by the noise of conflicting thought in the world and in their own souls. For them the war is forever beginning afresh. New phases of it start up with every great event of the day, with every new book they read, with every change and chance of their personal life. And to these Arnold speaks with sympathy. He reflects them, embodies their passion in luminous phrases, shapes their ill-defined thoughts, and identifies their speculations.

It cannot be without interest, both to those who have found peace in belief or unbelief, and to those who have not found it, to discuss, but only with regard to this first volume of poems, first, Arnold's temper as a poet; secondly, the influence of his time upon him; and lastly, the course and the changes of his thought and his emotion during the ten years which are covered by this book.

He was unfortunate in the time at which he began to be a poet. It is true that no man who has a strong will, a clear aim, a joyous temper and a bold faith can be called unfortunate in his time. But Arnold was not quite such a man. He had a strong will, but it was not now strong enough to master, within himself, the spirit of his age. He grew into a clear aim, but it was too contemptuous of the world in which he lived; and it was not enough illuminated by hope. He had courage, but it was not the courage of faith. He had in these years little firm faith in God or in man or, I may say, in himself. His temper then was not joyous, nor was it in sympathy with the whirling but formative time in which he began and continued to write poetry. I do not say that he was at daggers drawn with the elements of his world. He did

not fight nor care to fight with them in the fierce way Byron and Shelley fought with theirs, but he sat aloof from them in an opposition which, for the most part, brooded against them in indignant silence. When he spoke against them in poetry, it was not so much to attack or vilify them, as to glorify the spirit which was the enemy of their turbulence. At times he could not bear the noise and the anger he felt with it; and fled away, like Sénancour's Obermann, into the solitudes of nature, to commune with his own soul and strengthen it to endure his pain.

His poetry, then, since he and his world were so inharmonious, was, with a few exceptions, too much a poetry of opposition. He could not sufficiently disentangle himself from the pressure of his age, and he hated that pressure. Under it, his poetry protested, contended, mourned and analysed. And it suffered, as poetry, from this perturbing element. Had he had the joyful animation, like that of birds in spring, which marks the great poets, he would have neutralised this. But he had it not; he could not lift himself into that lucid, magnanimous air in whose clearness a poet sees the good as well as the evil, the joy as well as the trouble of humanity; and, so seeing, is able to help, encourage, and love mankind far more than those who rarely emerge from the tumult, doubt, and trouble of the world; who think injustice, falsehood, greed its masters—a class of persons only too common among us; whose work, when they are good men, is spoiled, and when they are evil, is harmful to the world. Arnold, who was good, sat in his youth by the tomb where he thought humanity in England lay dead, and mourned over its shattered hopes. He did not hear the angel of the nation say, "What is best in England has arisen, and has gone before you into Galilee." Only at intervals the clouds lifted for him, and he saw through mist the flush of dawn; but he had not heart enough to follow that into the full morning. He settled down into a stoic sadness, as yet unilluminated by humour. It had a certain moral force, a grim tenacity of duty, a stern resolution to fight on, were the heavens

themselves to fall—and this makes his poetry dear and useful to many of us who may still be in his condition. But the condition did not develop his art, as it might have been developed in a happier world. The absence of joy limited, even maimed, his creative power as a poet, deprived what faith and hope he had of all imaginative fire, and prevented him, all his life long, from being as complete or as great a poet as either Tennyson or Browning. Without the full energy of these powers of faith and hope and joy, his poetry suffers in melody, in charm, in unconsciousness, in natural but not in art-exquisite-ness of expression, in imaginative ardour, in creative power,—except when he was writing mournfully. In the Elegy, where his genius was quite at ease, he is excellent. Nothing better has been done in that way for two centuries than the *Scholar-Gipsy* and *Thyrsis*. Indeed all his best verse, or nearly all, has this Elegiac note. I should like to except *The Strayed Reveller*, into the inconsequence of whose enchanted intoxication I wish he had oftener wandered.

It was a pity, then, he was so unfortunate. For had he not been burdened with the trouble of his time, had he found himself in an age of brightness, sweetness and light, when life was keen and keen for high things, he had been a great poet. He had the poetic nature, and its artistic qualities. Could they have grown up in a kindlier soil, he might have spoken to the universal in man, “seen life steadily and seen it whole,” as he said of Sophocles. He could not; steadily he did see life, but not as a whole. He is the poet of a backwater, of a harbour, of a retired garden; not of the river, not of the open sea, not of the king’s highway. He and his friend Clough are the Hamlets among the modern poets, and with Hamlet’s inefficiency to grasp the nettle so that it should not sting. It is not quite fair, however, to liken Arnold too closely to Hamlet. He had the sad, philosophic, poetic imagination, but he had more moral strength than Hamlet. And he had this strength because he clasped Stoicism, which Hamlet could not do, to his breast.

The power of Stoicism lies in the appeal it makes to the moral endurance of the soul, to its resolute, calm resistance to the attempted tyranny of outward and inward evil. It bids us claim our moral individuality as the victor of fate and of the outward world. The claim is high, and uplifts the character of the claimer. "The fates are hard on me," the Stoic says, "but they shall not subdue my soul. Things are dark as night, but there shall be light within. Pain is here, but it does not touch my real self. It is not I that suffer, but the shell of me. I do not understand why the world is so wrong and so troubled, but one thing I do understand, that I need not be wrong, or troubled, and I will not be. The Furies of the Gods may hunt me down, but my soul remains unconquered, even by the Gods." There is no doubt of the power which is hid in that position, and it has transferred itself to a great deal of Arnold's poetry. It makes his verse resonant, clear; his thought, his matter weighty; and it brings into his poetry a moral passion which at times reaches a lofty exaltation. Moreover, its spirit passes from the poetry (as should be the case with any fine art-work) into the lives of a number of men and women who are battling with what they call destiny; who do not understand why things are so awry; who find no light in life, but whose soul answers with high emotion to the Stoic's appeal to keep themselves, in spite of fate, unsubdued in right, clear in their own thought, and inwardly masters of evil outward. "I am I," they say, "and everything else is indifferent." It is to that class of men and women that Matthew Arnold speaks with the power of poetry; and will continue to speak, it may be for centuries to come.

But in the power of Stoicism there is a weakness mixed. Part of that weakness is that it thinks itself so powerful. Pride in itself grows up swiftly, and where there is pride, weakness is inevitable. In the artist, that weakness shows itself in too great a self-approval of his work, too great a self-consciousness of himself as an artist. There is less of this weakness in Arnold's poetry than one at first imagines, but it

is there; and it lowers the excellence of many of his poems. It helps to place him below those mightier poets who, unconscious, in the rush of their creation, of themselves, and lost in the glory and grief of what they saw, broke into song without knowing why or how they sang; whose work was prideless, for they saw the infinities of that which they tried to express; who left any work they had finished behind them without contemplating it, and passed on, unconcerned, to new creation. Rarely, if ever, does Arnold's poetry make that impression upon us. It has, I repeat, too much pride in itself. It is too self-conscious of its art, and this lowers its imaginative power. It is too conscious of its being moral and teaching morality, and this lowers its influence as art.

Then, again, the Stoic position which gave him the strength I have mentioned, made him weak, on another side, as a poet. It often isolated him too much from the mass of men, very few of whom are Stoics either in philosophy or practice. As a poet, he sat apart from the common herd, and a certain touch of contempt for ordinary humanity entered into his work. His appeal was so far to the few, not to the many. He is then the poet of a class, not of the whole; of the self-centred, not of those who lose their Self in love. Naturally, he became too self-involved, and then the restlessness and noise of the world drove him into the deepest solitudes of his soul. Hence he was rarely swept by any high passion out of himself. He could not feel the greater waves of human emotion (save once perhaps with regard to England's vast imperial toil) breaking upon his heart. Into the infinite hopes, the infinite possibilities of man—into that country where the greater poets live—he entered only at intervals; and then, his sceptical self-consciousness recalled him from it, and bade him consider how little the history of his own soul supported the far-off hopes for man into which he had been momentarily hurried by transcending imagination. The highest, the most inspiring passion which can thrill a poet was therefore not his.

This self-involved isolation from the universal hope of man

is the great weakness of Stoicism, and when it belongs to an artist, it enfeebles his art. Only by drinking at the deep wells of common humanity does a poet win the power and the love to outlast the attacks of depression on his joy, and to continue with undiminished eagerness his creative work. And Arnold, in the end, found his poetic power fail. His vein was exhausted. He took to prose. But the greater men, not isolated from, but intimately mixed with all mankind, if not in life, yet by the imagination of love; not self-involved but self-forgetful—love the whole, even the noise and restlessness of it; appeal to the whole and win the universal love they give; are always impassioned by the divinity which they see everywhere in humanity; think nothing common or unclean, and live, creating, like Tennyson and Browning, to the close of their lives.

However, there is something to say on the other side. Arnold was too human to be the finished Stoic. The Stoic demand for obedience to the eternal laws of right was always with him. It often fills his poetry with an austere beauty. It keeps much of its dignity, even in poems where he winds round and round himself like a serpent round the witch it loves, and saves them from failure. So far he was pure Stoic. But the Stoic demand of indifference to pain and trouble, of the independence of the soul of all the fates of men, Arnold could not fulfil. His Stoicism broke down into sadness for himself and for the world. The pain was too great to be ignored, too great not to wound the heart into a bitter cry which sought expression and found it in his poetry. The Stoic might think this a weakness unworthy of a philosopher. But in a poet, this deep emotion of sadness, felt in himself and for himself, but felt far more for the labouring and laden world, was not a weakness but a strength. A poet may have a philosophy, but poetry which represents all the noble action and feeling of man ought to be the first thing with him. Philosophy may have a room in the house of poetry, but she is not mistress of the house. If she should become so, poetry shakes her celestial pinions and flies

away. And when Arnold kept his philosophy in due subservience in his poetic house, he gained strength as a poet, if he was weak as a philosopher. For then, he came back to high natural act and feeling. In expressing his own pain he did the natural thing—and indeed it is one of the paradoxes of life, the truth of which the Stoic forgets or does not know, that till pain is keenly felt and fully expressed, it cannot be finally conquered. The Stoic who hides it in his breast, or pretends that it does not exist, never really conquers it or its evil. But the poet, expressing it as well as pleasure, becomes at one with all who feel it. He is conscious, that is, in a second way, of his brotherhood with man, and far more conscious of it than he is by sympathy only with man's pleasure. And the moment he is fully conscious of this brotherhood, strength and passion flow into his poetry. What the philosopher would call his weakness is then his power. Men read, and feel themselves explained, reflected, sympathised with, taught and empowered, by the noble representation of their trouble as well as of their delight; and they send back to the poet their gratitude and their sympathy, till he, conscious of their affection, is himself uplifted and inspired. Then his poetic power develops. A fuller emotion, a wider thought, a knowledge of life deepened by imagination into something far more true than any aspect of life derived from intellectual consideration can afford, fills his verse with unsought for, revealing phrases, which seem to express, with strange simplicity, the primary thoughts of Being, to grip at and disclose the centre of the Universe.

The Stoic tends to be un-human; the poet must be human; and the break-down of Arnold's stoicism into sadness for the world, and its expression, was, since he could not express the joy of the world, a progress in him, not a retrogression. Yet, as I have said, the greater poet does not remain, as Arnold did, in this sadness. He lives with it; it is part of his being and art, but he has power also to live beyond it in the pleasure of man.

Glück und Unglück wird Gesang.

And there, in a world which has joy, because of faith and hope,

poetry reaches its full development. Arnold did not reach this higher level of song. But on the lower level on which he sang he produced poetry of a refined excellence and beauty, which, by its self-controlled sentiment, will always engage the interest, and satisfy the silent pleasure of troubled mankind; and by its refined and studied art attract that smaller body of men and women, who, trained in poetry, desire not only the great matters and visions of poetry, but also its technic, its individuality, and its detail.

Moreover, the mingling in this poetry of Stoicism and of the sad crying which denies Stoicism, of the spirit which isolates itself from the crowd of men in lonely endurance, and the spirit which breaks down from that position into sympathy with men, gives to Arnold's verse a strange passion, a stimulating inconsistency, an element of attractive surprise (the atmosphere changing from poem to poem, and within the same poem), and in the midst of its solitary sternness a wild variety. No other poet is built on the same lines. No other is more self-centred; and none pleases us more, whenever we are ourselves in that mood, in which, dividing ourselves from all mankind, we choose to sit still wrapt up in the cherishing of our personality, to reject the Not-me, and to believe that in our own being is the universe. This spirit of the lonely soul is in all his poetry, but when he felt its weariness, he fled from it into sympathy with the sorrow and confusion of men. Then, tormented with their pain and blind tumult, he fled back again into the Stoic solitudes of his inner life. This mingling of two moods in him is seen even in single poems, and gives to all his poetry an uncommon distinction. There is, ringing in it, a human cry, shrill and piercing, as of a soul divided, beating between two states of soul, unable to secure one or the other, and angry with the indecision. It is a mingled cry which even now, after fifty years, rises in the hearts of our society.

These are general considerations concerning his poetry.

We pass to particular considerations when we come to the first volume of Arnold's poems. It belongs to his youth, when he was twenty-seven years old, and it tells the history of his soul in contact with the time at which he wrote it. Of what kind was that time is our first question.

I said that Arnold was unfortunate, his peculiar temper being given, in the time when he began to be a poet. It was a time when the old foundations of the Christian faith were no longer accepted without inquiry. They were now excavated, exposed to the light and to a searching investigation. The criticism of German scholars had thrown the gravest doubt on the history of the Gospels; the work of physical science had begun to shatter that belief in the plenary inspiration of the Bible on which so much of English religion reposed in peace. The stormy waves these investigations awakened had reached Oxford when Arnold and Clough were students; and they were first disturbed, then dismayed, and thrown finally into a scepticism which profoundly troubled them. Their skies were darkened; the old stars had gone out in the heavens, and no new stars had arisen. They staggered blindly on, and at last fell back on their own souls alone, on the unchallengable sense of right they felt therein, on the imperative of duty, and on resolution to obey it. Nothing else was left. But much more had been; and it was with bitter and ineffable regret that they considered the days when they were at peace, when the sun shone upon their way. Clough expressed this trouble with infinite naïveté, and sought its cure in vain. He found at last a kind of peace. With him the trouble was extremely personal.

Arnold generalised it far more; he extended its results over the whole of life; it drove him to consider world-wide questions, the fates and fortunes of the whole race. It made him look at the pressure of trouble at all points on the human family; and to ask why it was, and to what end. And finally, long after youth was over, feeling at last that in faith in God, in a gracious spirit of love which was the secret of Jesus, and in

righteousness of conduct, was the true foundation of life, he devoted himself in prose to set free religion from those forms of it which violated love and intellectual or moral truth; to establish what was eternal in it, beyond controversy, and fitted for God to be, and for man to believe and love. With that, into which he passed from poetry, we have nothing to do here. The poetry of his early trouble is our subject.

Again, Oxford, when he was there, was filled with the noise of controversy between the High Churchmen and their opponents. Both were intolerant one of another, and the battle raged with confused tumult, not only between these two hot-headed parties, but also between both of them united against the Neologians, as the critical school was then called. Clough was not much disturbed by the noise of this contest. He liked the smoke and roar of fighting; it was an atmosphere he breathed with pleasure. But Arnold was of another temper. He hated noise, quarrel, confusion; he loved tranquillity, tolerance, clearness, plainness, moderation, ordered thought, and passions brought under control; especially those passions which belong to intellectual or theological contests. He had much ado to keep down his natural abhorrence of this tempestuous shouting about things which even then seemed to him to have nothing to do with the weightier matters of the law or the gospel. And this loud controversy about things indifferent doubled his inward trouble.

Then, again, the year before he published his first volume of poems, the whole continent was disquieted; and even England shared in that disquiet. France, Italy, Germany, Austria broke into revolution; the Chartist movement threatened revolution in England. The accredited order, which in 1815 had restored so many of the evils the French Revolution had shaken, was again broken into by popular fury, and with a confusion of thought and an ignorance of what was to replace the old which jarred on everything Arnold thought wise and practical. Clough liked it; he wrote rejoicingly from Paris, with whose revolution he lived; he stayed at Rome

when the people set up a republic, and fought the French. But Arnold had no belief in the popular movements. He hated what seemed to him the barren crying of a world which did not know itself, nor with any clearness what it sought. And the political tumult also deepened his personal sadness. We read what he felt about revolutionary Europe in the two sonnets addressed to Clough, entitled *To a Republican Friend*. The first says how far he agreed with his friend, and it would not have been thought worth much by the enthusiasm of Clough; the second says where he parts from his friend, and it is full of suppressed anger with, and disbelief in, the prospect of hope which France proclaimed so loudly.

More impressive than these, more personal, expressing that which he most desired for his soul to be and keep (both now and hereafter, for he chose it as a preface to his third volume), is the Sonnet with which the volume of 1849 opens. I give it as afterwards corrected.

One lesson, Nature, let me learn of thee,
 One lesson which in every wind is blown,
 One lesson of two duties kept as one
 Though the loud world proclaim their enmity—
 Of toil unsevered from tranquillity!
 Of labour, that in lasting fruit outgrows
 Far noisier schemes, accomplish'd in repose,
 Too great for haste, too high for rivalry!
 Yes, while on earth a thousand discords ring,
 Man's fitful uproar mingling with his toil,
 Still do thy sleepless ministers move on,
 Their glorious tasks in silence perfecting;
 Still working, blaming still our vain turmoil,
 Labourers that shall not fail, when man is gone.

To work with Nature's constancy, but without the turbulent passion of revolution—that was his aim. "No blind excitement such as I see in religion and politics be mine. In patience, I will trust my soul; choose one aim, the best—confident that in work for that, I shall work rightly for the whole." It was for that he praised the Duke of Wellington. He had a vision, Arnold thought, of the "general law," and saw what he could and could not do. Serious and firm,

laborious, persevering, he followed the one thing he discerned. This, among all the fret and foam of Europe acting without sight of a clear goal, made the splendour of Wellington's place in history. Another Sonnet, *To a Friend*, expresses the same desire. Who are they that support his mind in these bad days? They are Homer, whose clear soul, though his eyes were blind, saw Achilles, steadfast in vigorous action against opponent circumstances, and Ulysses, in wise and patient wanderings through them—both resolute in soul against inevitable fate;—and for the inner strength of the spirit, Epictetus, whose friendship he had lately won; and for the just and moderate view of life, Sophocles,

whose even balanced soul
From first youth tested up to extreme old age,
Business could not make dull, nor Passion wild:
Who saw life steadily and saw it whole.

But it was not only the temper of his mind which he expressed in this Sonnet on Nature. We can detect in it the influence on him of that scientific conception, already more than half conceived, which declared that all Nature's developments could be correlated under one energy, and were forms of that energy, ourselves included. This made a mighty change in all poetry written by men who were sufficiently educated to realise that conception; and it influenced Arnold's poetry from beginning to end. At one point, however, he rebelled against it—where it subjected man, as only a part of Nature, to its law. He was willing to be taught by the course of Nature. He was not willing to be mingled up with her. The facts, he thought, were against our being enslaved to the rigid laws of her life. We are different. We move on, Nature does not.

One would say, reading this Sonnet, that he would desire to be in harmony with Nature; to be merged in her being. That is not the case; and he repudiated that view with heated indignation. There was an unfortunate Independent preacher who said we should be in harmony with Nature, and Arnold

wrote the following Sonnet against him. I cannot help thinking that if the preacher had been in the Church, Arnold would not have been so hot. He almost hated Nonconformity. However, here is the Sonnet, and it is important to remember it in reading his poetry concerning Nature and man.

“In harmony with Nature?” Restless fool,
 Who with such heat dost preach what were to thee,
 When true, the last impossibility—
 To be like Nature strong, like Nature cool!
 Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more,
 And in that *more* lie all his hopes of good.
 Nature is cruel, man is sick of blood;
 Nature is stubborn, man would fain adore;
 Nature is fickle, man hath need of rest;
 Nature forgives no debt, and fears no grave;
 Man would be mild, and with safe conscience blest.
 Man must begin, know this, where Nature ends;
 Nature and man can never be fast friends.
 Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave.

Thus, the racking problem of man's isolated disobedience to law, his necessary restlessness, and the feebleness, blundering and pain that attended it—in contrast with Nature's obedience, tranquillity and steady toil—now pressed home on him, and the pressure was doubled by the circumstances of his time. He found no solution of it now, none in reasoning, none in warring religions and philosophies. “Listen no more to these foolish things. Fall back on thine own soul; know the worst and endure it austerely,—holding fast to that power within thee, independent of Nature, the power to be righteous. Of being righteous thou mayst be sure. That seed of godlike power is in us. Within, we may be what we will.”

This did not solve the question, but it gave a noble basis for life, and the worry of the question might be laid by. “Let man secure what he can while he can; then wait in quiet, and as the world goes on the question may solve itself. At least, if the solution come, he who waits in patient righteousness obeying the inward law, will be capable of seeing it. Even if we are mixed up with a blind Nature, with matter alone, have ourselves no divine origin, and no end except

atomic motion, there is that in us which is ready for either fate, and which is above both; and we can choose how to meet the one or the other." There is a remarkable poem, *In Utrumque Paratus*, which, on a higher poetic level than most of the other poems in this first volume, puts this aspect before us. It begins by supposing that the universe has its source in God's thought.

If, in the silent mind of One all-pure,
At first imagined lay
The sacred world; and by procession sure
From those still deeps, in form and colour drest,
Seasons alternating, and night and day,
The long-mused thought to north, south, east and west
Took then its all-seen way.

"If this be true, and thou, Man, awaking to the consciousness that the world of Nature is thus caused of God, wishest to know the whole of Life and thine own life in it—oh, beware! Only by pure and solitary thought thou shalt attain, if thou canst attain, and the search will sever thee from the pleasant world of men. Lonelier and lonelier will be thy life." And the verse in which Arnold tells this is so prophetic in its excellence of his best poetry, so full of his distinctive note, that I quote it.

Thin, thin the pleasant human noises grow,
And faint the city gleams;
Rare the lone pastoral huts,—marvel not thou!
The solemn peaks but to the stars are known,
But to the stars, and the cold lunar beams:
Alone the sun arises, and alone
Spring the great streams.

"But if this be not true, and Nature has never known a divine birth, and thou, man, alone wakest to consciousness of a great difference between thyself and Nature—thou the last and radiant birth of Earth's obscure working—oh, beware of pride! think that thou too only seemest,—art, like the rest, a dream! Yet"—and this I believe is Arnold's thought—"since thou canst think that, since thou mayest control thy pride, thou standest clear of Nature."

Yet another way of seeing the problem of life occurred to him, tossed as he was from thought to thought in those days.

It was no uncommon way—the way of indignation with the Gods. Arnold put it into the mouth of an Egyptian king whose story he found in Herodotus; but the wrath and the argument of it, he knew well, have stirred in a host of men, and now they stirred in him; nor is this the only time we meet them in his work. The king's father had been unjust, cruel, a wicked king. He had lived long and happily. The son had believed in justice, kindness and good government, and practised them; yet the Gods condemned him to die in six years. He had governed himself, sacrificed himself, and this was his reward for giving up the joy of life. "It is," Mycerinus cries, "unjust: the Gods are austere; or themselves slaves of a necessity beyond them; or careless, in their leisured pleasure, of mankind. I scorn them,—and, men of Egypt, if you wish to please them, do wrong, indulge in injustice, be like my father—then they will give you length of days. For me, I will give my six years to revel, to youthful joys; and so farewell."

Nor does Arnold, in that passing mood, altogether blame the king. At least he knew his aim and followed it. He was strong to meet his fate. It is curious to read the lines in which Arnold expresses this. He would not have approved the life, but he approved, since the king had deliberately chosen that life, the firmness and clearness of his choice, the settled purpose of his soul.

he, within,
Took measure of his soul, and knew its strength,
And by that silent knowledge, day by day,
Was calmed, ennobled, comforted, sustained.

The poem is a piece of pure humanity, and it is treated with a brief nobility of imaginative and sympathetic thought which is rare in so young a poet. But, that his sympathy with the life the king led was brief, that his steady thought gave no approval to it, is plain. If I understand aright that obscure poem, *The New Sirens*, in itself so unworthy as a piece of art, Arnold has expressed in it the gloom, satiety and sorrow in which mere pleasure, reckless following of impulse after

impulse, are sure to end. Nor, in this connection, is it unwise to read another poem, of far higher quality, called *The Voice*. It seems to record an hour when the ancient cry of youth to fulfil all joy came to him out of a forgotten time; came when his heart had been long sobered by dreary and doubtful thought, by heavy circumstance. Sweet and far, in strange contrast with his present trouble, the voice was borne to him, like a wanderer from the world's extremity, and asked again to be heard and answered. And his answer is given in lovely poetry, in passionate revelation of himself—

In vain, all, all in vain,
 They beat upon my ear again,
 Those melancholy tones so sweet and still.
 Those lute-like tones which in far distant years
 Did steal into mine ear :
 Blew such a thrilling summons to my will,
 Yet could not shake it ;
 Drained all the life my full heart had to spill,
 Yet could not break it.

See, in how many ways he turned the problem of life, and how full of interest and humanity it is! How tossed he was on the seas, how heavily the ship laboured in so many various winds of feeling — coming to many ways in the wanderings of careful thought. One would think that among them there would be, if he were human, a great cry for freedom and salvation, an appeal to the Power who is with us in the night. And so it was with him—once at least and suddenly, out of these depths, and in the mouth of Stagirius—a young monk to whom S. Chrysostom addressed three books in answer to his longing for deliverance—Arnold cried for redemption from man's outward and inward trouble; not from their pressure, which he knew must be, but from their power to enfeeble and enslave the soul. A few of its verses, full of personal passion, will show how, after long-continued inward pain, after trying many diverse ways to escape from the overwhelming problem of life, he fled at last to God. "I do not know thee clearly, but there is that in my heart which bids me take my chance with thee."

From the ingrain'd fashion
 Of this earthly nature
 That mars thy creature ;
 From grief that is but passion,
 From mirth that is but feigning,
 From tears that bring no healing,
 From wild and weak complaining,
 Thine old strength revealing,
 Save, oh ! save.

From doubt where all is double ;
 Where wise men are not strong,
 Where comfort turns to trouble,
 Where just men suffer wrong ;
 Where sorrow treads on joy,
 Where sweet things soonest cloy,
 Where faiths are built on dust,
 Where love is half mistrust,
 Hungry, and barren, and sharp as the sea—
 Oh ! set us free.

Oh let the false dream fly
 Where our sick souls do lie
 Tossing continually !
 Save, oh ! save.

It is not excellent poetry, but it reveals that which lay deep in him—below the surface storms.

Finally, to close this strange eventful history of a soul—a history repeated from generation to generation—there is the poem entitled *Resignation*, with which this weighty little volume closes. It embodies that to which the struggle has brought him, what he thought the wisest manner of life, the groove in which he desired to settle down. He wished it, but in vain. It too was momentary. But it never ceased to be a part of his desire, to be the mood of life in which he would find most strength and pleasure. Yet it was better it should not be continuous. The position of mind it reveals is fitting for age, but not for youth. Resignation is well for the man who has fought in the battles of the world for forty years, but not well for him who goes forth to battle. Another spirit must be his ; and, in spite of Arnold's desire for patient peace, he had a just spirit of impatience and indignation with the evil ideas which were oppressing the world in which

he lived. In this way he was always a fighter. Yet those who fight the most, most desire at times the rest of resignation. And this poem is a record of that desire. It is, I think, the best composed thing in the book. The subject is not one of the great subjects, but it is worthy of poetry. It is pleasantly varied by the illustrations or episodes of the gipsies and the poet, and these enhance the main thought. The verse is flowing, and the scenery is drawn with his distinctive touch and feeling; vividly drawn and seen with clear eyes. Every word tells, and there are not too many. He describes that well-known walk from Wythburn to Watendlath and Rosthwaite, over the hills, with Thirlmere upon the right, and left behind. We follow it with him from point to point; we feel how he loved the scenery of the Lakes.

Ten years before, as a boy of seventeen, he had taken the same walk with Fausta. What ten years had done we read in these verses. I will not analyse them, though they are well worth the trouble, but I will quote the end, in conclusion of this article. It is full of the soul of Arnold at twenty-seven, and has the distinctive quality of his poetry. And its quiet, self-controlled and solitary note, with its love of peace and obedience, and union, not with quarrelsome particulars, but with the still movement of the general life to an ordered and single end, is no unfitting close to the struggle I have endeavoured to describe. "Blame not," he cries, "Fausta, the man who has seen into life, and who has attained tranquillity, but rather thyself pray for some aim

Nobler than this, to fill the day;
 Rather that heart, which burns in thee,
 Ask, not to amuse, but to set free;
 Be passionate hopes not ill resign'd
 For quiet, and a fearless mind.
 And though fate grudge to thee and me
 The poet's rapt security,
 Yet they, believe me, who await
 No gifts from chance, have conquered fate.
 They, winning room to see and hear,
 And to men's business not too near,

Through clouds of individual strife
 Draw homeward to the general life,
 Like leaves by suns not yet uncurled ;
 To the wise, foolish ; to the world,
 Weak ;—yet not weak, I might reply,
 Not foolish, Fausta, in His eye
 To whom each moment in its race,
 Crowd as we will its neutral space,
 Is but a quiet watershed

Whence, equally, the seas of life and death are fed.

Enough, we live !—and if a life,
 With large results so little rife,
 Though bearable, seem hardly worth
 This pomp of worlds, this pain of birth ;
 Yet, Fausta, the mute turf we tread,
 The solemn hills around us spread,
 This stream which falls incessantly,
 The strange-scrawled rocks, the lonely sky,
 If I might lend their life a voice,
 Seem to bear rather than rejoice.
 And even could the intemperate prayer
 Man iterates, while these forbear,
 For movement, for an ampler sphere,
 Pierce Fate's impenetrable ear ;
 Not milder is the general lot
 Because our spirits have forgot,
 In action's dizzying eddy whirled,
 The something that infects the world."

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LONDON.

ON THE MEANING OF "RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD" IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST PAUL.

I.

THE two words, *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* ("righteousness of God"), which at the first glance appear so simple, introduce us to profound and difficult questions, which reach the very heart of Christian theology. We shall see clearly, as we proceed, that the expression cannot denote solely an attribute of God, beginning and ending in Him; and indeed this is apparent, in the passage where the phrase first attracts our attention (Rom. i. 17), from the appeal to Habakkuk ii. 4, for, as Meyer observes, "the righteous" must, from the connection, signify one who is in the condition of the "righteousness of God." Accordingly, a meaning different from that which the words immediately suggest has to be sought for; and theologians have discovered a very precise meaning, which has been accepted by able commentators and critics whom we have no right to charge with undue dogmatic prejudice. In opposition to the particular views which they reject these theologians often appear to be correct; and yet I cannot feel satisfied with their exposition, partly because they seem to me to do violence to the meaning of an important term, and partly because, amid much that is deep and spiritual, some things always strike me as superficial and external.

It will be convenient to begin our investigation by stating

the usual opinion in the form of a clear proposition. Fritzsche affirms that the phrase in question is used in the dogmatic or technical sense of *justification*, and he defines "righteousness," agreeably to this view, as "the condition of a guilty man who, on account of faith (the parent of virtue) reposed in Christ, the expiator of mankind and pledge of the divine clemency, is graciously held by God for innocent, and who, pardon of his sins having been granted, has access to the seats of the blessed." The "righteousness of God" is, then, a condition of this kind which is approved of, or proceeds from, God; and as it could not be attained on the old condition of perfect obedience to the law, it was now freely granted on the condition of faith in Christ and His atonement.¹

This definition expresses the doctrine of imputed or "objective" righteousness, which is the result of God's justifying "forensic" judgment, and implies no ethical quality in the person thus justified.²

We must now proceed to an examination of the terms.

If we are guided by etymological considerations, and by the use of language, there can be no manner of doubt as to the meaning of *δικαιοσύνη*. It is the attribute characteristic of a *δίκαιος*. It is therefore equivalent to the English "righteousness," or, more strictly, "justice," and cannot possibly signify, in and by itself, "justification," for which the proper word is *δικαίωσις*. It might, of course, be used of an imaginary or "imputed" righteousness; but righteousness, whether real or not real, is what the term denotes, and it carries in itself no notion whatever of a forensic act.

In saying this I may seem to be departing from the opinion of the highest authorities, and committing myself to a rash assertion, and it becomes necessary to examine carefully the meaning of our terms.³

¹ *Comment.* I. pp. 45-48.

² "The strictly forensic sense," disengaged "from all ideas of inherent or of attributed moral excellence," is strongly insisted upon by Professor Stevens, in an article in *The American Journal of Theology*, I. pp. 443 sqq.

³ For what follows see ample references in Cremer's *Biblisches-theologisches*

The fundamental word from which we must start is *δίκη*, which originally signified custom, usage, way. Hence arose its meaning of right, considered as established usage. It is distinguished from *δικαιοσύνη* as the ordinance from the exercise of right. By a further extension it denotes the process of law, or lawsuit, by which legal rights are determined, and then the result of the lawsuit in the form of punishment or satisfaction. In the last sense it is found two or perhaps three times in the New Testament, Acts xxv. 15 (where *καταδίκη*ν is preferred by more recent editors), 2 Thes. i. 9, and Jude 7. Once it occurs either in the abstract sense of right or as the designation of the heathen goddess, Acts xxviii. 4.

Δίκαιος, therefore, means “conformable to right,” and carries with it implicitly a reference to a standard. This standard is, in the first instance social usage and expectation, then this usage as embodied in law, and finally the abstract and ideal rule of right.¹ Thus *τὸ δίκαιον*, with the philosophers, signifies the absolutely right; and, if I am not mistaken, this highest sense is implicit in all its uses, for I am not aware that anything is ever called *δίκαιον* which is conformed to an admittedly bad custom or law. It is by

Wörterbuch der neutestamentlichen Gräcität,—a work of solid value, though I take the liberty of differing in an important point from its conclusions on the present subject.

¹ Socrates says, *οἱ τοῖς νόμοις πειθόμενοι, δίκαια οὗτοι ποιοῦσι. . . οἱ γὰρ τὰ δίκαια ποιοῦντες δίκαιοί εἰσιν* (Memor. IV. vi. 5, 6).

Thus in the Nicomachean Ethics *δίκαιον*, in its widest sense, is identified with *τὸ νόμιμον*, and the latter is what is ordained by the legislature; but it is assumed that the law is correctly laid down, *κείμενος ἄρθως* (V. i. 8, 12, 14), thus implying that there is a standard which is above every local and imperfect law. So Lysias commends those who “by law honour the good and punish the bad,” and says it “becomes men to ordain by law that which is right” (*τὸ δίκαιον*. *Oratio funeb.* § 6), implying that the right exists independently of the human law which seeks to define and enforce it. There is the same implication in Plato’s words, *ἄτινι τρόπῳ ποιήσει τις μισῆσαι μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν, στέρεξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ μισεῖν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν, αὐτὸ ἔστι τοῦτο ἔργον τῶν καλλίστων νόμων* (Laws, IX. vi. 862 D). The popular view is seen in the ascription of national laws to the gods as the original legislators, showing that laws were expected to be a declaration of the absolute right.

this reference to an outward standard that *δίκαιος* is distinguished from *ἀγαθός*. A thing is "good" which is properly conformed to its own nature, but that only is "righteous" which answers to certain just demands upon it.

Are we, then, to affirm, with Cremer, that the notion of the *δίκαιον* is "in the first line a forensic notion"? I think not, if we use "forensic" in its proper sense; and it is most important that we should be strict in the employment of our words, or we may easily be led into modes of thought which are not warranted by the terms with which we are dealing. The word forensic at once transports us from the legislature to a court of justice, and we think no longer of the legal standard, but of the judge's decision, no longer of the multitudes of citizens who have kept the law without suspicion, but of the few who have been charged with breaking the law and have been acquitted. Now this notion of innocence or acquittal is involved in *ἀθῶος*, *ἀνεύθυνος*, *ἀναίτιος*, but never, so far as I know, in *δίκαιος*; and accordingly we are not justified either by the origin of the word or by usage in ascribing to it a forensic sense. Like our own "righteous" or "just," it denotes one who is really conformed to the rule of right, and not one whom a judge or a court of law has declared to be so. This distinction suggests the reason why I insist upon its importance. If a man were "righteous" only in a forensic sense, he might be so quite apart from anything in his own character, and there might be some condition, different from the standard of right, through conformity to which the judge had allowed him to pass. Thus men might be objectively, without being subjectively, "righteous," and our attention would be diverted from the field of character to the method of judgment, from the quality of the men judged to the procedure of the judge. Is there a shred of evidence that the term was ever so used in classical Greek?

We must inquire, then, whether this sense is imported into the word when it is used to translate its Hebrew

equivalent. Cremer asserts that the Hebrew root, with its derivatives, conveys a thoroughly forensic notion, almost in a higher degree than the Greek term. Now, even if it be true that the physical notion of straightness has completely passed from the usage of the word, still it cannot be maintained that there is anything in the original sense to carry our minds into a court of law, and the forensic notion, if it be expressed by the word, must have been brought into it through the associations of popular speech. Accordingly, Cremer's one argument is that the words connected with “just” or “righteous”¹ constantly appear as correlative to “judge,” “judgment,”² and he appeals to about ninety passages in support of his thesis. Having examined these passages, not only have I failed to discover the alleged evidence, but the evidence seems to me to point very clearly in the opposite direction. The words “to judge” and “judgment” are undoubtedly forensic terms; but what can be more natural than to associate righteousness or justice with courts and processes of justice? If righteousness did not grow out of courts of law, courts of law grew out of righteousness, and were instituted to enforce it. The association, therefore, does not prove that justice is what a judge pronounces, and is consequently posterior to the judge, for it may be the standard to which the judge is bound to conform, and therefore prior to him. I believe that the latter is the case in every instance where the terms in question are combined with the notion of judicial functions; and the Hebrew sense of the obligations resting on a judge was so high that, instead of the ethical words being dragged down into a forensic meaning, the forensic words were drawn up into an ethical meaning. “Righteousness” and “judgment” are used either in combination or in parallelism a great number of times,³ and it is obvious that they denote certain moral qualities in the person to whom they are ascribed, and

¹ צדק, צדקה, צדק, צדקה.

² משפט, שפוט.

³ I have counted thirty-three among the enumerated passages.

that the forensic sense properly belonging to "judgment" is completely in the background. This is particularly apparent in Ezekiel xviii., where it is said that "if a man be righteous, and do judgment and righteousness" (*v.* 5), he shall live; and, throughout, the righteousness consists in doing certain things, and thereby observing certain "statutes" and "judgments,"—a combination which proves that the latter word has passed (as it might do by a very easy transition) from a judicial into a legislative sense.

Again, there is abundant evidence that righteousness was regarded as a standard, not proceeding from, but imposed upon, the judge. See, for instance, Leviticus xix. 15, "ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour."¹ This righteousness is conceived as a standard of judgment even for God Himself. Thus Moses, having declared that he has given the statutes and judgments which God commanded, asks, "what great nation is there, that hath statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law, which I set before you this day?"² And Solomon appeals to God to judge so as to condemn the wicked and justify the righteous.³ Nothing could show more clearly that the Hebrews conceived of an absolute standard of righteousness, to which legislation and the administration of justice must be conformed, and saw in righteousness and wickedness an unalterable distinction which no judicial verdict, not even that of God Himself, could set aside.⁴ This is what I mean when I affirm that the Hebrew words in question are not forensic, but, like their Greek equivalents, have reference to an absolute standard of right, which it is the duty of courts of justice, not to create, but to declare; and the

¹ See also Deut. xvi. 19, 20, xxv. 1, xxvii. 19; 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, 4; Psalm lxxii. 2, lxxxii. 2, 3; Prov. xxiv. 23-25; Isa. xi. 3, 4.

² Deut. iv. 8.

³ 1 Kings viii. 32.

⁴ See also Ps. vii. 9, xviii. 21, xvi. 13, xviii. 9, cxix. 75.

righteous man is always one who really possesses the character, or performs the actions, which correspond with this standard.

The distinction which has been pointed out may become more apparent if we remark that the Old Testament recognises no difference between legal and ethical righteousness, because the law was believed to be of divine origin, and therefore to be itself the absolute standard of right; but passages which have been quoted show that the difference between juridical and ethical righteousness was clearly perceived, for it was a matter of experience that there were persons who would “justify the wicked for reward, and take away the righteousness of the righteous from him.”¹

It is only consistent with the whole religious character of the Hebrew nation that the righteous man is regarded not simply as one who is just and upright towards his neighbour, but as one who stands in a peculiar relation to God; but the appeal which is sometimes made from human verdicts to the judgment of Him who cannot err does not prove that this relation may be arbitrary, and that the so-called righteous man may be really unrighteous. Surely the appeal is from fallible and hostile decisions to the truth and reality of things. And if Job says that no man is righteous in the sight of God,² and the Psalmist that no one living is righteous before Him,³ this only confirms the meaning which we attribute to the word. On the theory of imputation and mere forensic righteousness, numbers are righteous in the sight of God in spite of their sin, and the introduction of this theory, instead of explaining, only makes more glaring the contradiction between these passages and others in which appeal is confidently made to the divine verdict. If the word “righteous” has its proper meaning, the apparent contradiction disappears; for it is true that no man is righteous before God in the sense that no blot of guilt rests upon him, and that in all respects he has reached the absolute standard, and at the same time it is true that many a man

¹ Isa. v. 23.

² Job ix. 2.

³ Ps. cxliii. 2.

who, in particular instances, is misjudged by his fellow-men may plead his innocence before God, and may honestly feel that the Searcher of hearts will justify him, though the ignorance of enemies condemns.

And so the Israelites, as a whole, might in the same breath bewail their guilt because their obedience was so imperfect, and yet claim in some fashion to have kept the law, and so far to be righteous, in opposition to the heathen, who wholly despised and rejected it. This is a paradox which arises inevitably as soon as appeal is made to a supreme and perfect standard. On the one hand, such a standard condemns all, because it is never attained; and, on the other hand, it justifies all who are condemned only through the falsity of some lower standard. The saint laments his sin, and feels that he has come short of the glory of God; the martyr for truth confidently commits his cause to the same God, and feels that before the bar of heaven he is justified in taking a step for which man condemns him to the flames.

I am unable, then, to find anything in the Old Testament which reduces the word "righteous" to a forensic term; and if there is a tendency to bring it into connection with the judgment of God, this is the Hebrew way of emphasising the fact that righteousness does not depend on the ephemeral decisions of men, but is based in the eternal law of the universe.

Accordingly, *δικαιοσύνη*, the quality of a *δίκαιος*, ought to mean simply "righteousness."

Words, however, as we know, sometimes in actual use deviate from their etymological sense: is this the case with *δικαιοσύνη*? Appeal is very justly made to the LXX, and passages have been collected to show that the word frequently means "justification." In the passages relied upon there is not one which requires any translation but "righteousness." There are undoubtedly some where "justification" would make good sense; but this is no reason for altering the true meaning of a word when that meaning

also makes good sense. What is really established is this, that righteousness is regarded more in its aspect of mercy and kindness than of severe justice. This is only what we should expect at a time when it was difficult to obtain justice in high places, and when the poor and the oppressed owed their rights to the compassion of the powerful.¹ The advent of divine righteousness, therefore, redresses the wrongs of men; and this sufficiently explains the parallelism between the righteousness of God and salvation, without obliging us in any way to modify the meaning of the former term. Righteousness remains righteousness even when it betokens a compassionate and saving love rather than severe and punitive justice.

Cremer, who represents the more recent philology, declares that *δικαιοσύνη*, in the Biblical sense, does not denote the essence of him who is characterised as *δίκαιος*, but the condition of one who has the judgment of God in his favour. These two things appear to me to be identical, for the judgment of God is not precisely the most erroneous that can be found; and we have seen that He was expected to condemn the wicked and justify the righteous. I am not aware of any evidence which sanctions the denial of the former meaning. The frequent reference to the divine presence and favour only shows how profoundly the Israelites realised the eternal and absolute nature of righteousness; and if among them the righteous man was one who habitually lived in the consciousness that a righteous Judge was the witness of his life, this did not alter the ethical meaning of righteousness, but only deepened the roots out of which it grew. Stress is confidently laid upon Isaiah xl. and the following chapters, where the Israelites are represented as a sinful people, and all their righteousness as a polluted garment; and still it is *their* cause, and not that of their oppressors, that is righteous, and therefore they may hope for restoration. Even so; but

¹ See, as illustrative passages, Ps. cxii. 4, 9, cxvi. 5; Prov. xii. 10, xxi. 26; Isa. xlv. 21.

what could more clearly prove that righteousness is a subjective quality, for to speak of the objective relation established by God between Himself and His people as a "polluted garment" would not be exactly pious? These sublime chapters contain penetrating thoughts, which go down to the deepest spiritual foundations of moral life; but this fact does not change the meaning of righteousness. It was for moral offences that a separation took place between the people and their God: their hands were defiled with blood; their lips had spoken lies; their works were works of iniquity, and they made haste to shed innocent blood.¹ But they had received ample punishment for their sins, and in their humility and contrition God would turn to them once more. They must, however, fulfil the necessary condition: they must not merely seek God daily, but they must do the righteousness which He requires; they must loose the bonds of wickedness, and let the oppressed go free; they must deal their bread to the hungry, and bring the poor that were cast out to their house; they must take away the yoke, and satisfy the afflicted soul; and then their light should arise, and the Lord would guide them continually.² Nowhere in Scripture is righteousness more closely conjoined with moral obligation; nowhere is the protest more emphatic against those who would set up some figment—fasting and afflicting the soul, bowing the head as a rush, and spreading sackcloth and ashes under them—as a substitute for the real righteousness which God requires.

The Old Testament, accordingly, lends no sanction to the opinion that "righteousness" denotes a forensic conception, or objective relation between God and man, and not the quality of one who is just or righteous.

Does, then, the New Testament compel us to introduce a change which is not forced upon us by the LXX? Δικαιοσύνη occurs thirty-six times in Romans, sixty times in all the

¹ Isa. lix. 2 sqq.

² lviii.

Pauline epistles together, and thirty-four times in the rest of the New Testament. This is a sufficient basis on which to form a judgment of its meaning. The adjective *δίκαιος* is used by Paul much less frequently, but still often enough to show that he understood it in its usual sense of righteous or just. In the rest of the New Testament it is employed much more copiously. It occurs seven times in Romans, seventeen times in all the Pauline epistles, and eighty-one times in the whole of the New Testament. In the following passages it seems clear that it is used in its proper ethical sense,—Matt. xx. 4; Luke xii. 57; John v. 30, vii. 24; Acts iv. 19; Rom. v. 7, vii. 12; Eph. vi. 1; Philip. i. 7, iv. 8; Col. iv. 1; Titus i. 8; 2 Peter i. 13; 1 John iii. 7; and similarly the adverb *δικαίως* in 1 Thes. ii. 10 and Titus ii. 12. I know not a single passage that contradicts this sense, or that even suggests to any plain mind a different signification. A peculiarly instructive passage is Romans v. 7, because this is in the midst of Paul's most doctrinal conception of atonement and justification, and the word “righteous” is antithetical to “ungodly” and “sinners,” which last again is in contrast with “justified”; and nevertheless the parallelism with “the good man,” and the general sense of the context, show that the term “righteous” is used in its natural and proper meaning.

Appeal is, however, made to Romans ii. 13, “Not the hearers of law are righteous [or, just] in the sight of God,¹ but the doers of law shall be justified,” where “righteous in the sight of God” and “justified” are parallel expressions. And so they are, without in the least altering the meaning of “righteous,” for, if we look upon God as the judge, those who are justified or acquitted are necessarily those who are righteous in His sight; but there is nothing to imply that one who is righteous in the sight of Him whose “judgment is according to truth”² may be really unrighteous, and that “righteous,” therefore, means one who

¹ Δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ.

² Rom. ii. 2.

is so merely through a forensic act. The passage simply affirms that, under a law, those who are legally righteous, by coming up to the required standard of duty, are not the men who only listen to it, but those who do it. Whether this is the highest form of righteousness is not now the question; our point is, that it implies, not a mere imputed condition, but a subjective quality, whether of being or of doing, on the part of men themselves. "Righteous," then, is used here, as it is in every other passage, in its ordinary sense, and Paul, instead of sending us in quest of unreal judgments, is calling us back to the truth and reality of things, from Jewish dreams of a righteousness that might be imputed to people who heard, but broke, the law, to the solemn condition which is implied in the very notion of law, and which alone (under a legal dispensation) can avail in the presence of Him who cannot err.

The expression *δίκαιον παρὰ Θεῶν*, "righteous [or, just] in the sight of God," occurs also in 2 Thessalonians i. 6, where it obviously means righteous or just in the judgment of the highest tribunal, and therefore really and absolutely just. We may compare the similar expression in Acts iv. 19, "whether it be righteous [or, just] before God¹ to hear you rather than God, judge ye." Surely this is an appeal from all false judgments, from all imputing of righteousness or guilt where righteousness or guilt is not, to the eternal reality of things, to the judgment which is infallibly true.²

There is, then, no ground for disturbing the genuine meaning of "righteous." We may add that neither is there any reason for imposing upon it, when used of God, a reference to His punitive justice, as distinguished from His mercy. In the passage cited from 2 Thessalonians it describes the quality which holds the balance evenly, and

¹ *Δίκαιον ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ.*

² Compare also *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, Aser § 4, οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες . . . κἂν νομισθῶσι παρὰ τῶν διπροσώπων ἀμαρτάνειν, δίκαιοί εἰσι παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ.

rewards or punishes as a calm and impartial judgment may require. In 2 Timothy iv. 8, where it is used of Christ coming to judgment, it refers only to that gracious justice which bestows blessings on the good, and redresses the wrongs which they have suffered in the world.

Δικαιοσύνη, then, the quality of a *δίκαιος*, ought to mean, in the New Testament, as in the Old, simply righteousness; and it cannot be denied that in a large number of passages this is its obvious and natural signification. On the other hand, if we put aside for the present the passages containing the phrase which we are considering, there is not one which forces upon us the meaning of justification. If appeal be made to Romans vi. 16, where *δικαιοσύνη* is contrasted with *θάνατος*, we may reply that righteousness forms quite as good an antithesis to death as justification. Righteousness and life are closely related ideas; and certainly he is far more alive who is really righteous than he who is dead in trespasses and sins, and has nothing but an imputed righteousness. I think, therefore, that we are bound to discover, if possible, some meaning for the “righteousness of God” which will at once retain the ordinary sense of the former word and satisfy the use which is made of the phrase by Paul. This will be our task in a second article.

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THREE EARLY DOCTRINAL MODIFICATIONS OF THE TEXT OF THE GOSPELS.

I. MATTHEW, ch. i. verse 16.

“AND Matthan begat Jacob; and Jacob begat Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born (*or* begotten) Jesus, who is called Christ.”

The English revised version here cited faithfully reflects the great majority of the Greek codices of the gospels; yet not all, for there is a considerable group of highly esteemed codices which bear the following sense.

. . . . “Jacob begat Joseph, to whom being betrothed the virgin Mary bore (*or* begat) Jesus who is called Christ.” Note that in these texts the word rendered “born” and “bore” properly means “begotten” and “bare,” and in the other thirty-nine passages of the context where it occurs has this sense and no other.

And this latter form of text is oftenest represented in the most ancient versions.

Thus the oldest Latin represented in codex k runs:—

Cui desponsata virgo Maria genuit Iesum Christum.

And four more of the oldest Latin codices referred to by scholars as d, g, gⁱ, a, have the same form of text though some omit the word *virgo*. Two more, however, called b and c, have this: Cui desponsata erat virgo Maria, virgo autem Maria genuit Iesum Christum.

The Armenian version made about the year 400 has a mixture of both the forms of Greek text, combined or rather botched up together ungrammatically, thus:—

Iacobus genuit Iosephum virum Mariæ, cui desponsata Mariam virginem (*sic*), e qua generatus est Iesus, qui appellatus est Christus.

Cureton's MS. of the older or pre-Peshito Syriac text reads:—

“Jacob begat Joseph, he to whom was espoused Mary a virgin, she who bare Jesus the Messiah.”

The Greek manuscripts all descend from one or the other of two forms of text, of which neither is explicable from the other; and these two forms were long ago seen to be independent modifications of a primitive, but lost, text. And accordingly Dr Swete, Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, wrote as follows in his book on the Apostles' creed (London, 1894), in reference to the variety of readings above adduced:

“These facts involve the ending of verse 16 in some uncertainty, and lend plausibility to the idea that the verse did not originally contain the words which assert the virginity of the Lord's mother. . . . Even if it should appear that in the original Matthew the genealogy ended with the formula ‘Joseph begat Jesus,’ the words would no more be a denial of the miracle than St Luke's references to Joseph as ‘the father’ (Luke ii. 33), and to Joseph and Mary as ‘the parents’ of the Lord (*ib.* xxvii. 41).”

Another scholar, Mr Willoughby C. Allen, wrote to the same effect in the *Academy* for December 8, 1894:

“We have so long been accustomed to phrases like the following: St Matt. i. 19, Joseph *her husband*; i. 20, Mary *thy wife*; i. 24, took unto him *his wife*; Luke ii. 33, his *father* and mother; ii. 41, his *parents*; ii. 48, thy *father* and I; that we find no difficulty in them, nor try to explain them away as Ebionite interpolations. And yet the difficulty in these phrases is not really less than that involved in ‘Joseph begat—Jesus.’”

All will agree with Mr Allen as to the difficulty in which these six texts involve those who believe that Joseph was not the natural father of Jesus, for they are six distinct testimonies which they must set aside in order to retain their faith in the miraculous birth.

They do not, however, exhaust the adverse testimony of the gospels. We yet have for example these texts: Matt. xiii. 55, "Is not this the carpenter's son? is not his mother called Mary? and his brethren James, and Joseph, and Simon, and Judas? And his sisters, are they not all with us?" John vi. 42, "And they said, Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know?"

And if we quit the confines of the gospels and glance at early second century documents we have Ignatius' reference in his epistle to the Magnesians, ch. xiv.:

"Be ye subject to the bishop and to each other, as Jesus Christ to *his father in the flesh*," where Bishop Lightfoot brackets the words "in the flesh" on the insufficient ground that a late Armenian version omits them.

We have also the remarkable attestation of the Acts of Judas Thomas, the earliest surviving monument of Syriac Christianity, that their hero was the uterine twin-brother of Jesus; and that that was why he was called Thomas, which means Didymus or the twin. Such a document as these Acts could neither have been written nor have circulated in Christian circles in which the belief in the miraculous birth was from the first established.

Lastly, we have the persistent testimony of the early Judaeo-Christian believers of Palestine, recorded by Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Hippolytus and later fathers that Jesus was the natural son of Joseph.

Although, therefore, a definite statement in the gospel itself that "Joseph begat Jesus" would in itself "no more be a denial of the miracle" (to use Prof. Swete's words) than the various adverse testimonies which already exist, surely its emergence would enormously confirm them and increase their weight by

cumulation and by a directness of assertion which they lack. This was by most students felt to be the case when in the ancient palimpsest Syriac manuscript discovered at Sinai by Mrs Gibson and Mrs Lewes, and published by them in 1894, Matt. i. 16 was found to run as follows :

“Jacob begat Joseph. Joseph, to whom was espoused Mary the (*or a*) virgin, begat Jesus, who is called Messiah.”

It was a crisis, and critics had to make up their minds whether they would trust a text which in all other respects was allowed to be the most archaic of all texts of the gospels, and in this respect carried the weight of all human experience on its side ; or whether, on the contrary, they would still rely on the Greek and Latin MSS., which made room indeed for the miracle, but by their inner and irreconcilable differences attested a primitive dislocation of the text at Matthew i. 16.

In the *Academy* of Dec. 29, 1894 Prof. Sanday wrote that the newly found Syriac text “could be explained by a simple dittography of the name Joseph, helped by the influence of the structure of the rest of the genealogy.” And he continued :

“But having got back so near to the text of the Greek MSS., it would be natural to ask whether we ought ever to have left them ? . . . So that at the present moment I lean to the opinion that the traditional text need not be altered.”

In 1894 an appeal to the somewhat divided and self-contradictory authority of the Greek MSS. was still possible, because no *Greek* evidence in favour of the naturalistic reading of the Sinaitic Syriac was yet forthcoming. That evidence I was fortunately able myself to supply from an old anti-Jewish “Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila,” published at Oxford in 1898. In this we meet with the following passage :

“The Christian said : Yes, as he (the Lord) willed and knoweth, he is descended from Adam after the flesh.

“The Jew said : How was he begotten ? Relate to me his very generations.

“The Christian said: Thy own lips have declared that thou hast read both old and new covenant, and thou knowest not this ?

“The Jew said: There is indeed a genealogy in the old, and in the new to boot, in the gospel according to Matthew; and it contains the following words: *Jacob begat Joseph, the husband of Mary, out of whom was begotten Jesus who is called Christ, and Joseph begat Jesus who is called Christ*, about whom our discourse now is. He says *begat out of Mary.*”

Here we have the original text which lies behind both families of Greek MS. The ordinary text is obtained by mere omission of the last step of the pedigree: “and Joseph begat Jesus, who is called Christ.” The rival Greek text found in the minority of codices was obtained by obliterating the words “the husband of” down to “and Joseph,” and substituting “to whom being betrothed the virgin Mary.” And this rarer form of text retains the word *egennesen*, which all through the preceding context meant “begat” in as many as 39 cases, and can mean nothing else. So that the result of the botching is the amazing statement that the “virgin Mary *begat* Jesus.”

It cannot be argued that because the author of this dialogue puts this citation into the mouth of the Jew, it is not to be regarded as his own form of citation. Had he known of any other form of text he would assuredly have replied to the Jew thus: “You are misquoting the text of Matthew.” Instead of doing so he merely begs him to go on with his quotation to the pericope beginning at *v. 18*: “Now the birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise.” This pericope he accuses the Jew of concealing, though the Christians were not ignorant of it. We know from Epiphanius that the early text of Matthew used by Cerinthus lacked this pericope. It is evident, therefore, that the dialogue reflects an age when that pericope had already been introduced, but was not yet in all the copies.

I printed the above dialogue from an eleventh century codex in the Vatican. Mr Badham collated for me another copy in the Paris library, and Mr Rendel Harris one at Messina. The Paris copy has the same text as the Vatican; but in the Messina MS. this part of the dialogue has been doctored, and not even the Jew is allowed to quote any but the *textus receptus* of Matthew i. 16. In the Paris and Vatican codices the text has been doctored in two subsequent passages, in which Matthew i. 16 is quoted. But in neither case has the corrector availed himself of either of the forms found in the Greek MSS. of Matthew. For in the one place he has substituted this: "Jacob (begat) Joseph, to whom being betrothed Mary; out of whom was begotten Jesus, called Christ." Here the absence of grammatical nexus betrays hasty botching.

In the other passage we have:

"Jacob begat Joseph who betrothed Mary, out of whom was begotten the Christ the Son of God."

This is a purely fantastic rewriting of the text, and nothing at all like it is found in any other source. At the same time it is proof that when or where the dialogue was corrected, the two revised readings of our Greek MSS. had not yet come into fashion.

We can infer, then, that the naturalistic form of Matthew i. 16 came three times in this dialogue, and that it was corrected in the last two cases by a scribe unfamiliar with either of the rival forms of corrected text found in existing Greek MSS. In the Messina MS. all three passages have been rewritten.

It is noteworthy that the Vatican MS. (edited by Ciasca) of Tatian's Diatessaron in an Arabic version has the same text of Matthew i. 16 as this Greek dialogue as follows: "Jacob begat Joseph, the husband of Mary, *who of her begat* Jesus, the Messiah." Mr Hogg,¹ the translator, points out that "who" in the Arabic is masculine. He also remarks that in passing from Syriac to Arabic, "who of her begat" might arise as a mistranslation of "from whom was begotten": but surely any

¹ See Ante-Nicene Christian Library, add. vol. 1897, p. 45, n. 6.

Christian Arab who, like this one, was translating the Diatesaron as late as the ninth century, would have guarded against such an error, which, moreover, cannot be paralleled in the rest of his version? Taken in conjunction with the reading of the Sinaitic palimpsest, this evidence of the Arabic Diatessaron is of importance.

II. MATTHEW, ch. xxviii. verse 19.

No other text has counted for so much in the dogmatic development of the Church as the text at the end of Matthew, ch. xxviii. verse 19:

“Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptising them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you.”

Prof. Swete, in the work already referred to, p. 18, points out that the triple formula “forms the framework” of the so-called Apostles’ creed. He writes: “Thus the Baptismal creed is seen to rest on the Baptismal words. It was the answer of the Church to the Lord’s final revelation of the Name of God.”

And Prof. Moberly of Oxford in a recent work refers to this verse as ‘a solemn precept to baptise in the name of the holy Trinity, which fell from the divine lips of the newly risen Lord.’ I quote his words from memory.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century the text of the three witnesses 1 John v. 7, 8, shared with Matthew xxviii. 19 the onerous task of furnishing scriptural evidence of the doctrine of the Trinity. This text ran thus: “Three there are that bear witness *in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the holy Spirit. And these three are one. And three are there that bear witness on earth, the spirit, and the water, and the blood, and the three are in the one.*”

The words italicised are now abandoned by all authorities except the Pope of Rome, and are not admitted even margin-

ally into the English revised version. By consequence the entire weight of proving the Trinity has of late come to rest on Matthew xxviii. 19. This is also the sole saying of the Lord in which the duty of baptising is enforced; and divines have also found in it scriptural authority for the innovation of infant baptism.

Thus the late Dean Alford wrote in his Commentary as follows :

“It will be observed that in our Lord’s words, as in the church, the process of ordinary discipleship is *from baptism to instruction*—i.e. is, *admission in infancy to the covenant and growing up into τηρεῖν πάντα κ.τ.λ.*—the *exception* being, what circumstances rendered so frequent in the early church, *instruction before baptism* in the case of *adults*.”

There has been no general inclination on the part of divines to inquire soberly into the authenticity of a text on which they builded superstructures so huge. Nevertheless, an enlightened minority had their doubts. Prof. Gardner, in his *Exploratio Evangelica*, ch. 35, wrote that they were “little in the manner of Jesus.” James Martineau, in his *Seat of Authority*, remarks that “the very account which tells us that at last, after His resurrection, He commissioned His apostles to go and baptise among all nations, betrays itself by speaking in the Trinitarian language of the next century, and compels us to see in it the ecclesiastical editor, and not the evangelist, much less the founder himself.”

Harnack, in his *History of Dogma* (German edit., i. 68), dismisses the text almost contemptuously as being “no word of the Lord.” Lastly, Canon Armitage Robinson, a cautious critic, in his article on Baptism in the *Encyclopedia Biblica*, inclines to the view that Matthew “does not here report the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus, but transfers to him the familiar language of the church of the Evangelist’s own time and locality.”

In the course of my reading I have been able to substantiate these doubts of the authenticity of the text, Matthew xxviii. 19, by adducing patristic evidence against it so weighty

that in future the most conservative of divines will shrink from resting on it any dogmatic fabric at all, while the more enlightened will discard it as completely as they have its fellow-text of the three witnesses.

Of the patristic witnesses to the text of the New Testament as it stood in the Greek MSS. from about 300–340, none is so important as Eusebius of Cæsarea, for he lived in the greatest Christian library of that age, that namely which Origen and Pamphilus had collected. It is no exaggeration to say that from this single collection of manuscripts at Cæsarea derives the larger part of the surviving ante-Nicene literature. In his library, Eusebius must have habitually handled codices of the gospels older by two hundred years than the earliest of the great uncials that we have now in our libraries. He was also familiar with the exegesis of Origen, of Clement of Alexandria, of Pantaenus, and of many another ancient exegete whose works have only come down to us in fragments or in uncertain Latin versions.

It therefore imports to ask how Eusebius read this text. He cites it again and again in works written between 300 and 336, namely in his long commentaries on the Psalms, on Isaiah, his *Demonstratio Evangelica*, his Theophany only preserved in an old Syriac version in a Nitrian codex in the British Museum written in A.D. 411, in his famous history of the Church, and in his panegyric of the emperor Constantine. I have, after a moderate search in these works of Eusebius, found eighteen citations of Matthew xxviii. 19, and always in the following form :

“Go ye and make disciples of all the nations *in my name*, teaching them to observe all things, whatsoever I commanded you.”

I have collected all these passages except one which is in a catena published by Mai in a German magazine, the *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, edited by Dr Erwin Preuschen in Darmstadt in 1901.

And Eusebius is not content merely to cite the verse in this

form, but he more than once comments on it in such a way as to show how much he set store by the words "in my name." Thus in his *Demonstratio Evangelica* he writes thus (col. 240, p. 136):

"For he (*i.e.* J. C.) did not enjoin them 'to make disciples of all the nations' simply and without qualification, but with the essential addition 'in his name.' For so great was the virtue attaching to his appellation that the Apostle says, God bestowed on him the name above every name, that in the name of Jesus every knee shall bow of things in heaven and on earth and under the earth. It was right therefore that he should emphasise the virtue of the power residing in his name but hidden from the many, and therefore say to his Apostles, Go ye and make disciples of all the nations in my name."

The Greek words are: *πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου.*

It is evident that this was the text found by Eusebius in the very ancient codices collected fifty to a hundred and fifty years before his birth by his great predecessors. Of any other form of text he had never heard, and knew nothing until he had visited Constantinople and attended the Council of Nice. Then in two controversial works written in his extreme old age, and entitled, the one "Against Marcellus of Ancyra," the other "About the Theology of the Church," he used the common reading. One other writing of his also contains it, namely a letter written after the Council of Nicea was over to his see of Cæsarea. Socrates the historian preserves this letter, but the portion of it in which the citation of Matthew xxviii. 19 is made does not seem above suspicion.

In the writings of Origen and Clement of Alexandria there is no certain instance of Matthew xxviii. 19 being cited in its usual form. In Origen's works, as preserved in Greek, the first part of the verse is thrice adduced, but his citation always stops short at the words *τὰ ἔθνη*, "the nations"; and that in itself suggests that his text has been censured, and the words which followed "in my name" struck out. In the pages of

Clement of Alexandria a text somewhat similar to Matthew xxviii. 19 is once cited; but as from a gnostic heretic named Theodotus, and not as from the canonical text, as follows (Excerpta, cap. 76, ed. Sylb. p. 987):

“And to the apostles he gives the command. Going around preach ye and baptise those who believe in the name of father and son and holy spirit.”

In Eusebius' citations there is also some trace of περιούτες “going around” having been read for πορευθέντες. And the word explains the title given to the early gnostic romances in which the lives and activity of the Apostles was decked out with miracles and absurd legends. For these romances were called the περιόδοι or “periods,” *i.e.* “goings around” of the Apostles, or “circuits.”

In Justin Martyr, who wrote between A.D. 130 and 140, there is a passage which has been regarded as a citation or echo of Matthew xxviii. 19 by various scholars, *e.g.* Resch in his *Ausser canonische Parallelstellen*, who sees in it an abridgment of the ordinary text. The passage is in Justin's dialogue with Trypho 39, p. 258:

“God hath not yet inflicted nor inflicts the judgment, as knowing of some that still even to-day *are being made disciples in the name of his Christ*, and are abandoning the path of error, who also do receive gifts each as they be worthy, being illumined by the name of this Christ.”

The words italicised are in the Greek:

μαθητευομένους εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ χριστοῦ.

The objection hitherto to these words being recognised as a citation of our text was that they ignored the formula “baptising them in the name of the Father and Son and holy Spirit.” But the discovery of the Eusebian form of text removes this difficulty; and Justin is seen to have had the same text as early as the year 140, which Eusebius regularly found in his manuscripts from 300–340.

That the ordinary text is of great antiquity no one will

deny. We find it twice in Tertullian, in slightly divergent forms, in the treatise on Baptism, ch. xiii., thus :

“Ite, inquit, docete nationes, tinguentes eas in nomen Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti.”

And in the *De Praescriptione haereticorum*, ch. xx., thus :

“Undecim digrediens ad patrem post resurrectionem iussit ire et docere nationes tinguendas in patrem et in filium et in Spiritum Sanctum.”

Here he omits the words *in nomen*, as also in his work against Praxeas, ch. xxvi. :

“Novissime mandans ut tinguerent in Patrem et filium et Spiritum Sanctum.”

We may infer that the text was not quite fixed when Tertullian was writing early in the third century. In the middle of that century Cyprian could insist on the use of the triple formula as essential in the baptism even of the orthodox. The pope Stephen answered him that the baptisms even of heretics were valid, if the name of Jesus alone was invoked. However, this decision did not prevent the popes of the seventh century from excommunicating the entire Celtic Church for its adhesion to the old use of invoking the one name.

In the last half of the fourth century the text “in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the holy Ghost” was used as a battle-cry by the orthodox against the adherents of Macedonius, who were called *pneumato-machi* or fighters against the Holy Spirit, because they declined to include the Spirit in a trinity of persons as co-equal, consubstantial and co-eternal with the Father and Son. They also stoutly denied that any text in the N.T. authorised such a co-ordination of the Spirit with the Father and Son. Whence we infer that their texts agreed with that of Eusebius.

There is one other witness whose testimony we must consider. He is Aphraates the Syriac father who wrote between 337 and 345. He cites our text in a formal manner as follows:

“Make disciples of all nations, *and they shall believe in me.*”

The last words appear to be a gloss on the Eusebian reading

“in my name.” But in any case they preclude the textus receptus with its injunction to baptise in the triune name. Were the reading of Aphraates an isolated fact, we might regard it as a loose citation, but in presence of the Eusebian and Justinian texts this is impossible. It is worth considering, however, whether the original text of the gospel did not end at the word “nations,” and whether the three rival endings of the text were not developed independently, viz. :

- (i.) “in my name,” in Justin, Eusebius, and perhaps Pope Stephen of Rome and the Pneumato-machi.
- (ii.) “and they shall believe in me,” in Aphraates, representing the older Syriac version.
- (iii.) “baptising them in the name of the Father, the Son and the holy Ghost,” or similar in the Greek gnostic Theodotus, Tertullian, Latin version of Irenaeus, and the surviving Greek MSS.

The exclusive survival of (iii.) in all MSS., both Greek and Latin, need not cause surprise. In the only codices which would be even likely to preserve an older reading, namely the Sinaitic Syriac and the oldest Latin MS., the pages are gone which contained the end of Matthew. But in any case the conversion of Eusebius to the longer text after the Council of Nice indicates that it was at that time being introduced as a Shibboleth of orthodoxy into all codices. We have no codex older than the year 400, if so old; and long before that time the question of the inclusion of the holy Spirit on equal terms in the Trinity had been threshed out, and a text so invaluable to the dominant party could not but make its way into every codex, irrespectively of its textual affinities.

III. MATTHEW xix. 17 = MARK x. 18 = LUKE xviii. 19.

Matthew xix. 17, “And he said unto him, Why askest thou me concerning that (*or* him) which is good? One there is, who is good.”

Mark x. 18 = Luke xviii. 19, "And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? None is good save one only, God."

Here Matthew's text challenges reflection.

An ancient corrector who could not bear even the shadow of an insinuation that the Lord was other than "without sin" is caught *flagrante delicto*; and it is the parallel texts of Mark and Luke that convict him. And the bit of botching here revealed to us is very ancient, for it is in the best and oldest manuscripts. It must therefore have been perpetrated before Matthew was joined in one book with the other two gospels; since so bold and radical a corrector would have gone on to Mark and Luke, and have physicked them as well, had he found them in the same volume.

But even Mark and Luke have here been tampered with. For we have it recorded by Epiphanius in two places, p. 315 and p. 339, that at Luke xviii. 19 Marcion, the early second century heresiarch, read:

"Call thou me not good. There is one only good, God the father."

In Greek: *μή με λέγε ἀγαθόν· εἰς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεὸς ὁ πατήρ.*

Marcion's evidence goes back far behind any other. Did he then alter the reading, "Why callest thou me good?" into "Call thou me not good," or "Do not call me good"? And did he add *de suo* the qualification "the Father" after the word "God"?

It is unlikely beforehand that he would introduce the first change, because the whole drift of his dogmatic system was to deny that Jesus Christ was a human being at all except in seeming, and to assert his Godhood at the expense of his manhood. He was therefore not likely to go out of his way to change the gospel text, in order to represent the God-man as peremptorily rejecting the attribute of goodness.

But the question is settled from other sources in favour of Marcion.

In the Clementine Homilies we have an ancient witness to the text of the N.T., and in homily xviii. 3 we read :

“Call thou me not good. For the Good is one alone, the Father who is in heaven.”

μή με λέγε ἀγαθόν ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς εἰς ἐστίν, ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

It is true that this Clementine text in general form seems a citation of Matthew rather than of Mark or Luke ; but if the imperative be restored in Matthew, it must *a fortiori* have originally stood in the parallel passages of Mark and Luke. And I shall now adduce evidence of its having done so.

Among the writings of Athanasius is one called “About the Epiphany in the flesh of the God word and against the Arians,” printed in Migne Patr. Gr., vol. xxvi., col. 984 foll. The text is cited as from Mark or Luke four times, viz., col. 985 c, col. 993 A and B, col. 1012 B. In one only of these passages, 993 B, has the imperative *μή με λέγε ἀγαθόν* survived the efforts both of editor and copyist to keep it out, and won its way into the printed text. But in 985 c the editor, Montfaucon, in his note states that it was so read in the three best MSS. In all the four passages the old Armenian version renders, “Call thou me not good,” so testifying that the Greek MSS. had it. Probably a more accurate editing of these would show that they have it still.

In his treatise on the Trinity (c. 377) Didymus also cites the text in the form “Call thou me not good,” but with condemnation.

If we turn to the Diatessaron, we can infer that Tatian read the text in the same way, from the fact that Ephrem’s commentary preserved in Armenian involves it, though the actual citations have been conformed to the ordinary text. Thus in ch. xv. p. 174 of Moesinger’s Latin translation of that commentary, the verse of Matthew is cited, *Quid me vocas bonum* ; but in the commentary we read,

Et quomodo renunciavit huic nomini is qui de seipso dixit. “Pastor bonus animam suam dat pro ovibus suis” ?

In the text, therefore, commented on, Jesus actually renounced or repudiated the adjective “good” as applied to himself. Therefore He must have used the words, “Call thou me not good.”

And the commentary is repeated on the same page 174 :

Vel quomodo *renunciavit appellationi boni*, et simul aliis in locis divinae dominationis et adorationis participem se ipse fecit ?

And in an earlier passage of the commentary we read (p. 38) :

“As also our Lord said to some: ‘I am not judge,’ although he was judge; and to others he said, ‘I am not good,’ although he was good.”

Such a commentary demands the reading, “Call thou me not good,” rather than “Why callest thou me good?”

And in Origen we have the same reading involved more than once in the commentary, though the text has been conformed either by the scribes or editors of his MSS. For example, in his Greek commentary on John, *tomus 13*, § 25, we read this :

“Let us obey the Saviour when he said, ‘The father who sent me is greater than I,’ and on that account *would not tolerate even the appellation ‘good,’*—the proper and true and perfect appellation tendered to him for acceptance,—but referred it thankfully to the Father, with a reproof to him that desired to over-glorify the Son.”

Similarly in his Greek commentary on Matthew, *tomus 15*, § 10, after citing Matthew’s text “Why askest thou me about the good?” he continues thus :

“But Mark and Luke assert that the Saviour said: ‘Why dost thou call me good? No one is good, except one, God’; indicating that the name ‘good’ being reserved for God *must not be assigned* to anyone else.”

Such comment as the above is more compatible with Marcion’s reading “Call thou me not good” than with the *textus receptus*.

Nevertheless the latter is found in all MSS. whether of the

Greek, Syriac, Armenian, Latin or other texts. And it is easy to divine why the saying of Christ was changed. The conception of the Word of God, mediator between God and man, was anterior to Christianity, and was fully developed by Philo and other Hellenic Jews before it was fitted on to the man of Nazareth. Now an essential attribute of the divine Word, as he is set forth in the pages of Philo, is that he is "without sin." As part of the identification of Jesus with the Word, there supervened the formal ascription to Him of sinlessness. He was human in all things, sin alone excepted. Then at once the *Logion* which we have been examining was felt to be a stumblingblock; although it was only what a really sinless, yet humble, person would say in respect of himself and of God. Accordingly the text of Matthew, even before the canon was formed, was changed into the insipid tag from the peripatetic philosophers: "Why askest thou me about the good?" In Mark and Luke, on the other hand, $\mu\eta\ \mu\epsilon\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon$ was with less violence changed into $\tau\acute{\iota}\ \mu\epsilon\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$.

The lesson to be learned from the history of the three texts above examined is this: First, it is quite erroneous to assert, as Westcott and Hort have in their introduction asserted, that the text of the gospels bears no trace of having been altered anywhere for dogmatic or doctrinal reasons. On the contrary, here are three texts which have been so altered. And, what is more, the interpolated texts have been regularly appealed to for centuries and centuries in defence of the very doctrines in behalf of which they were inserted.

Secondly, it is useless, as a rule, to look for these old texts in manuscripts, for the Church has exercised too vigilant a censorship for them to survive. It is a mere chance that the true or approximately true text of Matthew i. 16 ever came to light. It was in an old codex of which the original text was effaced as early as the eighth century, and written over with tales of the saints.

The best chance of recovering these ancient but discarded

readings is to apply ourselves to the fathers. But even here we are the constant victims of the unconscious and pious fraud of editors and scribes, who in copying and publishing have regularly substituted a form of text with which they were acquainted for one with which they were not. This substitution has occurred in thousands of passages, where the older readings were from a doctrinal standpoint perfectly neutral. How much more must it have occurred where the older text was, as in the three cases examined in the above pages, in glaring contradiction with conceptions and usages long adopted by the Church? It may confidently be predicted that when the Greek and Latin fathers who wrote before 400 have been more carefully edited than hitherto from the best codices, scores of old readings will be restored in the text of the N.T. of which no trace remains in any Greek MS.

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CATASTROPHES AND THE MORAL ORDER.¹

(Martinique and St. Vincent, *May* 1902.)

I.

I AM told that the hint to this group of papers is taken from the recent frightful volcanic disasters in the West Indies, and that the object is to show the bearing of such calamities, such holocausts of human life amid every circumstance of horror and of torture, on the time-worn problem of Evil.

The general title of the papers, "Catastrophes and the Moral Order," implies also that this ancient problem is but another way of raising the question whether the existence of natural evil, at any rate in its more appalling degrees, is reconcilable with the reality of a moral order in the world. And surely the tragedy in the island of Martinique on the morning of the 8th of May adds another crushing blow to that declining faith in the benevolence of the world's administration which has now for half a century been uttering its sighs in our various systems of pessimism. Not since the awful engulfing at Lisbon in 1755 has the professional optimism of the traditional Theodicies suffered so violent a shock. If the Lisbon terror found its natural expression through Voltaire and his *Candide*, what might not one expect as the voice of the doubts inspired by this fresh horror, almost as vast in its slaughter, in some of its tortures so much more heartrending?—following, too, upon

¹ The following three articles have been written independently.—*Ed.*

the despair-breeding doctrines, so widely scattered, of a Schopenhauer, a Hartmann, and, alas, a Fitzgerald adding genius to the blighted lyre of Omar. A *New Candide* would certainly have further confessions to make, and profounder concessions to the evidence that Nature is not considerate of the anguish of sentient beings, nor of the sorrows of beings who think, who plan, who hope, who love, and who yet must undergo thwarting and separation amid a whirlwind of mental and physical agonies unutterable.

It is an instinctive outcry of the pity and justice incarnate in the deeps within us, "Can such things be, and the supposed Author and Ruler of Nature still be merciful and just and good?" How can such horrors—and the chance of them is sowed broadcast in the wide fields of Nature—how can such horrors, from the bare risk of which *our* consciences would start back aghast, be possible if the administration of the universe is animated by a moral purpose? And if the production and the sustaining of the immense Cosmic Process is the act and work of an Eternal Power not ourselves, how dare we say, in the face of such facts, that this Power even "makes for righteousness"?—to leave all mention aside of its being itself righteous, nay, the Eternal Ideal of righteousness. *Tantaene animis coelestibus irae?*

In this outcry we come upon the real burden of the problem of Evil, and discover its source. Its source is the traditional form of our theism, and its burden comes from attributing to God the authorship of Nature, with all its apparatus for cruel torture, as we know these now. To materialism, to sheer naturalism, to atheism, there is no *enigma* of Evil: thinkers of all these types have Evil before them as a *fact* simply; they have no Almighty Intelligence to blame for it; their only business with it is to avoid it so far as man can, and to bar it finally out of life, if perchance that be possible. At the worst, if its exclusion or its reduction to endurable bounds is impossible, they can only end in a naturalistic pessimism, and admit that life has too many woes to leave it worth living; but, for them, the remedy is at hand in the words of the poet whom Professor

James celebrates as "the melancholy Thompson." Since man, the chief victim, is the only high intelligence in question, and of course owes no duty to the unconscious Force which Nature is, he can dissolve all the miseries this imposes upon him by acting on the simple hint, "But, brothers, you can end it when you will!" It is for the idealist, for the theist, and above all for the theologian,—the philosopher of theism,—and for these alone, that any real problem of Evil exists, or any question of its complete solution is open; for it must be admitted that the solution by naturalism or by atheism is, after all, at the cost of confessing that Evil is the master of life.

To these higher representatives of human interests the real question is, Can this deeper problem of Evil in any way be solved? The puzzle is, How can the evil for sentient beings,—above all, for human beings, with their rational aspiration after ideal perfections of every order,—how can this evil, which seems inwrought in the very structure of natural existence, ever be reconciled with even the supreme *control* of existence (to give up the question of its creation and sustentation) by a Being of moral perfections, a Being absolutely perfect in wisdom, in justice, in love, and in every real power?

It is difficult to see how the evil in Nature, at least when it ends in human agony and despair, can be even coexistent with a God who has a controlling relation to the course of the world; difficult, I say, but not beforehand impossible; it is a fair problem, though indeed an obscure one. But for a God, the perfection of all justice and love, literally to produce even the *system* of Nature (not to speak of the revolting view, of late become the leading fashion, that He produces all its *details*, by immediate immanent causation), when death and destruction amid agonies of mind as well as of body are surely involved in it for numberless beings of the highest susceptibility to suffering,—literally to produce it, and to maintain it inexorably,—appears from beforehand incredible. And it seems to me that the results of human thought are now ripe enough for us to say that every attempt, however earnest and laborious, to

view Nature as the direct product of Divine efficiency, and still to regard God as the Sum of all Perfections, the Realisation of all Moral Excellence, has been a failure; nay, that every such attempt must forever remain a failure. To present God as the responsible cause of the enormity of suffering simply in natural existence,—to say nothing of His responsibility for moral evil, which in this series of papers is not in question,—and, at the same time, to present Him as the rightful object of our adoring devotion because He is the perfect impersonation of Justice and of Love, should by this time be seen to involve a hopeless contradiction, the conflict of two principles in irreconcilable antagonism. I am well aware of all the old familiar excuses:—the magisterial talk of “partial evil universal good,” and “all discord harmony not understood”; the cheerful chirping about “all’s well that ends well,” backed up by the solemnities of prophecy concerning “the eternal weight of glory” in reserve for the saints hereafter; the still more solemnising references to God’s “chastening love”; and the lofty Stoic doctrine of the discipline in afflictions, to induce withdrawal from the world and all its “vain shadows.” But all these excuses are void: they all suffer from the same fatal oversight—the evil, if attributed to a conscious and prescient God, is at its worst too great to be consistent with love or mercy, or even justice. Love cannot ignore the individual in behalf of any cause but his own; a harmony not understood, and forever *kept* in concealment, is more than love can endure; the ending well can never atone for injustice, for fury uncontrolled; nor can discipline or chastening go to the pitch of inflicting torture. All these excuses, moreover, ignore the complete confusion, in natural catastrophes, of the saints with the sinners. And, worst of all, they are every one saturated with that fatuous optimism which reduces evil to “good in disguise,” and so begs the whole question by denying that there *is* any evil.

No, we are here in the presence of a true “irrepressible conflict,” and the attempt somehow to evade it has been the

persistent business, certainly earnest and well-meant, of all the Theodicies put forward since a theology with traits distinctively Christian began. Indeed, for its basis we must go even farther back, at any rate to the maturing of Hellenic thought in Plato, and to the utterances of those Hebraic prophets who, declaring God to be compassionate and gracious, still pictured Him as literally the Creator of all things and the Almighty Lord of all worlds.

The doctrines of the older East had not fallen into this contradiction. They had made no pretence that their Eternal was an Ideal of moral perfection: the Eternal was simply the almighty and omnipresent Source of Being; and goodness, the attribute and duty of the emanating creature, consisted purely in submissive obedience by self-abnegation—utter surrender of selfhood into the one and only Reality. The world, and the desire of it, were alike Illusion; and natural evil, suffering, no matter how extreme, was the just punishment of the emanation for its desire to be something for itself, the misery merited for choosing illusion instead of reality, which was the Eternal alone.

Thus the older East might be said to have escaped the bitterest problem of Evil simply by remaining unaware of the real meaning of moral good. Its solution of the enigma, *How can an imperfect world issue from eternal Perfection?* was merely that the world is illusion, and hence that the Eternal remains perfect despite the world's appearing; is changelessly the self-poised One-and-All, immutably self-sufficing, the abiding Unity untroubled by the collisions of any real multiplicity. To this view, the Eternal was Power alone, it was not Justice, much less Love; justice required that it should be served utterly because it *was* Power, and beings in the illusory time-world had no rights, because they had no reality: to be moral meant simply to submit and to obey; belief in their own reality was illusion, and *ipso facto* guilt.

In the younger East, the lack of moral depth in the elder view was in a fashion overcome by Buddhism and by Zoro-

astrianism. The former replaced the divine Eternal by an atheistic everlasting Drift, in which no changeless Cause was responsible for the suffering that existed in it; suffering was owing to the deluded desire for permanent selfhood, and the only problem of evil was how to escape it by the moral discipline of self-abnegation in mutual devotion. Zoroastrianism, on the other hand, remained theistic, but surrendered the infinite and sole Lordship of God: God was, indeed, the absolute Goodness, the sum of all moral perfections, but was confronted by an absolute Foe, the Prince of Darkness, the Eternal Principle of evil. The world was the result of their essential conflict, and so was mixed of good and evil; a real, a moral religion was possible for every spirit in the world who would take the side of God in the everlasting struggle; life could be inspired with the courage of combat for the right, and by the hope of its eventual victory.

Then came the post-exilic Hebraism, asserting with Zoroastrianism the reality of the world, and of man as its culminating member, but returning to the earlier doctrine of the One Sovereign God, the Creator and Ruler Almighty, who, however, called the creature into distinct and real existence *ex nihilo*, by his simple *fiat* or Word. Evil now became the just judgment of the Sovereign Creator upon the disobedience of the creature, over whom the Creator was declared to have the absolute right that any maker has over the thing he makes, quite as the potter maketh as he pleases one vessel of clay unto honour, and another unto dishonour; while who shall gainsay him? "I, the LORD, have done all this: I make good and I create evil." This appalling doctrine of the Awful Majesty, the Jealous God, the reduction of Ormuzd and Ahriman into one, the sole Arbiter and Predestinator of all things, was slow to receive the mitigations of the later prophets, who at length introduced the principle of Love into the conception of God, though still only in the partial form of compassion and condescension.

All these older religions fall under one or other of two principles. They are either religions of Faith (pure fealty), or

of Hope (aspiration despite uncertainty). They are almost all only religions of Faith. Buddhism and Zoroastrianism, and the Hebraism of the later prophets, are alone religions of Hope. But at length came Jesus of Nazareth, and proclaimed the unlimited religion of Love. "Now abideth these three, Faith, Hope, and Love: and the greatest of them is Love." God, Jesus taught, is eternally impersonated Love—the Father, who will not that *any* shall perish, but that *all* shall have life eternal; He proclaimed the Fatherhood of God, and hence the Divine-Sonship of Man. This is the Glad Tidings, the Evangel, the Gospel: there is indeed an Eternal, but He is eternal Love, not simply Power and Majesty and Lordship, but only as they are transfigured and sublated in exhaustless Good-Will to every other spirit; and all spirits are alike inheritors of life eternal, alike invited to share in God's character of universal love: we are won to "love Him *who first loved us.*" A theology—that is, a philosophy of religion—consistent with this teaching of Christ would surely have to agree with Buddhism, with Zoroastrianism, and with Plato, in the doctrine that God, the eternal Love, cannot be the author of evil, but only of good. The religion of Love is, *per se*, the religion of intelligence and conviction: we cannot *love* him who hides his purposes from us. Consistently, the origin of Evil should henceforth be referred to whatever else is real in the world or in the making of the world, not to God; and God should be so conceived, and His relation to sentient beings and to Nature should be so explained, that this result may be realised. It cannot be Eternal Love that bursts forth and scorches and suffocates from a Mont Pélée, engulfing a whole civil community in indiscriminate annihilation.

The fatal burden in our Theodicies, hitherto, has been their inheritance, along with the Gospel, of the dogmatic Creationism of the darker religions that preceded it. Their fatal mistake is the attempt to unite this universal efficient causality of God with His essence as Love. The Hebraic doctrine of dualism, of distinct creation by *fiat*, is a partial improvement on the

older monistic emanative creationism : it moves toward viewing souls as distinct from God, hence toward rendering their freedom less inconceivable, and a true God with a moral order less impossible ; but, so far as solving the problem of Evil is concerned, it is lethal still. And how morally appalling is the recent attempt to escape its miraculist difficulties by the almost universal return of our thinkers to emanation and monism ! The so-called God (really no *God*, but bare Pan, or, at best, a Panlogos) thus becomes the direct author of all suffering, as even the late John Fiske did not hesitate to proclaim Him, and at the same time extinguishes the possibility of that freedom in the individual which is the foundation of any real moral order. Indubitably, we stand in need of a new idealism, which shall be so thoroughly pluralistic as to avoid both forms of literal Creationism—whether the dualism of the Hebrew or the monism of modern thinking—and which, while it refers Nature, and all its woes, derivatively to minds, presents these as the minds other than God, and places God in a purely ideal or final-causal relation to them, and thus to the system of Nature dependent upon them. In no other way am I able to conceive how, at once, God can be good, and there can be in the imperfect and catastrophic world an order really moral ; an order, that is, in which the actions of intelligent beings are verily their own, and in which such beings do right out of their own free reverence for the righteousness in it—righteousness, part of whose aim must be the cure of the misery in life.

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II.

THE problem which I understand to be set to us for discussion here is the reconciliation of Catastrophes so appalling as the recent volcanic disturbances in the West Indies with that faith which in various forms alleges the supreme control of the universe by an Energy primarily beneficent in character,

—a faith with which our conception of the Moral Order is most closely bound up. And the problem is of unsurpassed interest and moment, because if the Moral Order be proved delusive, the total Kosmos is shivered into Chaos.

Such Catastrophes as those which startled the world last spring have indeed in them this quality: that they act as an electric irritant on the spiritual nerve, quickening into vehement life those questionings of Divine Providence which men thought they had already satisfactorily answered, or which at any rate lay quiescent and unaggressive in some hidden cranny of the mind. Yet the destruction of St. Pierre and the concomitant horrors by no means constitute a Catastrophe unparalleled in history. Pompeii and Herculaneum still bear their awful witness. It is but a few years since Krakatoa painted red the sunsets all round the earth. In the autumn of 1891 the waves broke over the islands at the Ganges mouth, and in one night slew 215,000 members of an industrious, inoffensive, agricultural population which cannot be supposed to have awakened the exceptional wrath of God. But on the great scale of the heavens, even these convulsions dwindle into insignificant mishaps. A year and a half ago a new light appeared in the sky, and rose and sank irregularly in illuminative power through a long tale of weeks. Terrestrial astronomers are little able to interpret that sign. But this at least it seems to mean, that a quarter of a millennium ago, just when Stuart and Puritan were girding themselves for the death-struggle, a sun and its attendant planets, a solar system on a scale many thousand times transcending our own, suddenly perished, flashing the message of its death agony to us, to reach us not till we were mourning the death of the eleventh sovereign of Great Britain since that thing befell. The blotting out of our own Earth in a moment would be as nothing compared to that Catastrophe; yet that Catastrophe itself is as nothing in the march of the pageant of the stars of God through space.

And so, after all, it is but because it is in our own time and not so very far away that the lurid tragedy of St. Pierre brings

any fresh shock for our imagination. Such things, and greater things, have happened before, and will happen again. Our reason long ago received the challenge, and has answered it well or ill.

Now the first thing that strikes me in this matter is, that it is only because such Catastrophes are rare within the scope of individual experience that they startle us into fresh importunity with God to justify His ways with men. They seem abnormal, and therefore raise debate that has died down elsewhere. But they are not in fact more terrible or more sad than the normal. If it were the usual way of nature to kill off human beings in batches of thirty thousand at a time, and only occasionally did men die one by one, laggard following laggard to the grave instead of a regiment laying down its arms together, these solitary deaths, with all the agonies of parting, the weeping of survivors, the facing of the arch mystery by each alone, the slow, gradual, long-protracted destruction of families, would seem the tragedy of tragedies, the appalling abnormal procedure of nature contradicting all doctrines of the goodness of God. There in Martinique comrades and friends fell all together. Death the inevitable left mourners few and rare. A multitude were spared the sorrows of orphanage or widowhood. Where for these was death's sting? Nay, they were spared that visible approach of death which so many have dreaded as the horror of horrors. The smile, the jest was in the act. The very muscles of the face had not time to change their pose—mirth to give place to fear—ere death struck and it was over. Allowing all that must be allowed for the abnormal circumstances of pain and terror which accompanied this swift stroke of destiny, I cannot but think that the balance of the account lies the other way, and that we have not to ask "Were these men of Martinique sinners above the rest?"—but rather, "What were these husbands and wives, parents and children, lovers and beloved, of Martinique, that God blessed them thus above the rest, robbing death of its sting, the grave of its victory?"

I am very conscious, indeed, that it is a dangerous argument that I am using—a two-edged tool. To show that a particular tragedy which is felt by some to impugn the goodness of God is in reality no worse than other tragedies most common and familiar to us all is to risk reawakening scepticism all along the line, and laying an extra burden on faith under the plea of relieving it. But it seemed desirable to show that the problem of Catastrophes is not a separate problem loaded with special difficulties, but only one small part of that universal and enduring problem, the existence of pain and suffering in a world alleged to be under the control of infinite Love. Of that problem every man born into the world has to find some working solution or other; and it is something if Krakatoa and Martinique add nothing to his difficulty.

But there are other things to be said in mitigation of judgment when the beneficence of Providence is arraigned on the ground of the wholesale slaughter wrought by great and exceptional convulsions of nature. These convulsions are only abnormal when viewed on the small scale of human history. The volcanic eruption, the earthquake, the flood, on the great scale of the æons, have been normal processes in the preparation of the earth for the sustenance of life. As the planet has spun through space its cooling surface has contracted. Undulatory motions, cracks, fissures, the ejection of the lava-stream have been but local incidents of the vast evolution. The history of man and of life is intercalated in a parenthesis of time during which the globe is passing from one manner of unfitness for their maintenance to another. The lordship of the human race is but the affair of a moment in sidereal time. No doubt, that moment might have been expanded a little or contracted a little. A few million years might have been added to or subtracted from human history. As it is, man appeared on the earth when already the Catastrophes that appal him had become few, local, comparatively small of scope. Who shall say that God should have waited an æon or two longer before opening the human drama? Who shall say

that He should have left a few hundred millions of men unborn that none might look out on hill or sea till all danger of Catastrophe was ended? Who shall say that a kinder Deity would never have caused Babylon and Egypt, Greece and Rome, France and England and America, with all their delight of life and their splendour of achievement, to have been—but would still even now have kept hidden in the womb of the un conjectured future the first tread of human feet upon the sward, the first uplift of human eyes to the solemn stars?

But sound and irrefragable as such considerations are within their sphere, they are only pleas in mitigation of judgment; and the arraignment still lies against an Almighty God that He might have arranged things otherwise than He has. No doubt He might; though he soon suffers inextricable confusion who attempts to edit an expurgated and amended order of creation. But the strength of Theism and of our faith in the Moral Order can never really rest on a demonstration of the flawlessness of the universe. And he whose heart is torn by the spectacle of natural convulsions must seek his healing in those deeper thoughts and sentiments which alone can empty the Problem of Evil, in its other departments, of its power to torment the soul.

One consideration indeed there is for the special comfort of him whose trouble lies in the contemplation of Catastrophes. It is of their very essence that, in human history, they are exceptional. It is by their utter unexpectedness, their contradiction of an even flow of experience through decades, centuries or millenniums, that they shock. And thus the very sentiment they awaken is testimony to the fact that in most parts of the world nature can be trusted to go on with regular pulse from hour to hour and year to year; and that man may with reasonable security make his engagements and his bargains, lay his plans and carry out his designs, relying on an earth-surface on which the roads will continue to lie evenly, an ocean not too tumultuous for his keels to plough, a soil

that will duly yield its fruit, an air whose winds will not rise into any fury which will sweep him off his feet.

But the main trust of Theism must for ever be in the spiritual experience of the individual man. If he know naught by the witness of the Spirit, no cunning of argument will convince him that He who grasps the lightnings and smites by the driving storm is a God of Love whose rule is along the lines of an eternal Moral Order. If the witness of the Spirit be with him, if he has known God working in him in his sorrow, in his temptation, in his remorse, in the blessed experience of reconciliation, the fires of all the volcanoes will not burn nor the waters of all the floods avail to quench his faith. And even he on whom rarely or never flash the great illuminings of the Spirit may learn to see in every awful phenomenon of nature, as in the daily rising and setting of the sun, the demonstration of an everlasting order under the guidance of a universal Energy, tremulous in the blowing of a daisy, welling up in the consciousness of man, and holding him in a vast unity of life and being, to be a constituent part of which gives dignity unspeakable to every creature of the Almighty Power.

RICHARD A. ARMSTRONG.

LIVERPOOL.

III.

IT is a remarkable fact, that though the history of the world is marked by catastrophes, like the recurrent pattern in a woven cloth, the human mind can never accustom itself to them as regular. On every occasion of sudden disaster it feels bound to discuss the question again *ab initio*, to consider whether it can reconcile such events with the idea of God, and to fall into its two camps with renewed convictions,—the camp, I mean, of pious resignation to the inscrutable will of God on the one hand, and the camp of indignant atheism on the other. When Lisbon was overwhelmed in the eighteenth century, Voltaire pointed his satire and justified his derision

of the current theology with the famous line, "Lisbon is engulfed, and Paris dances!"¹ And many people, we are told, gave up their religion as a consequence of the disaster: they refused to have anything to do with Deity, since Deity admitted, or perhaps produced, a convulsion of the crust of the globe. On the other hand, to the Wesleys or to Samuel Johnson, the disaster at Lisbon would seem but a new reason for reverent submission to the Power which alone is great, an added reason for taking refuge in the Rock of Ages which cannot be shaken.

The problem comes before us again in the sudden eruption of Mt. Pelée. The spectacle of 20,000 or 30,000 innocent, and it would seem peculiarly pious, people suddenly wrapped in flames, one struck dead with the fusee raised to the pipe, and another with the cup raised to the lips, has caused again the bewildered cry, "How reconcile this with a beneficent Providence?" and has doubtless confirmed many atheists in the conclusion which they roll under their tongue with so strange a satisfaction, that there is no God.

Now, I will not venture to criticise this childlike surprise and consternation at what, after all, is the admitted order of Nature; but it may be useful to urge that our philosophy of life should take these familiar occurrences into account all along. It is a world in which a Deluge, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the sudden fall of a tower in Siloam or in Venice, may be expected. The inrush of a tidal wave is as much part of the order as the steady rise and fall of the tides; the fierce eruptions of Etna or Cotopaxi are as certain, though not as regular, as the glow of the summer sun. Nay, more, as the Epistle of Peter points out, the whole terrestrial globe will probably pass away some day in a fervent heat far more destructive than the fires of Mt. Pelée; and with a suddenness as complete, and in a point of time as brief, "the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burnt up."

¹ *Lisbonne est abimée, et l'on danse à Paris.*

Our religion, whatever it is, must take account of these facts. Your belief in God may be what you will, but it cannot be affected by what is after all as fixed a principle of the physical order in which we live as the occurrence of birth and death itself. It is surely illogical and childish inconsistent, accepting the fact that 30,000,000 of people perish by old age, disease, accident, or their own fault every year in the ordinary way, to see in that nothing to shake one's faith in Providence; but to fly into revolt against the idea of Divine oversight and care because in one particular year 30,000 of the 30,000,000 are killed suddenly in a striking, though probably painless way.

But the value of such a catastrophe, from an intellectual and spiritual point of view, may be, that it calls our attention to the catastrophic nature of human life, and requires us to settle our accounts with the fact, which is forgotten because it is not regular but intermittent. One may say that a disaster which thus happens in the eyes of the whole world, and rivets the attention (at least for a week or two) of the thinking population of the globe, is a necessary lesson in ethics and religion, given by the Professor of those subjects who holds indisputably the premier chair. Probably the lesson may be learnt by the whole class, but each one may help by repeating the lesson as he has learnt it.

This is my own version of the lesson as it reaches my understanding:—The fact of death is part of the fact of life; and no man lives truly until he has accustomed himself to the idea that life may terminate at any time and in the most unexpected way. The fires of Mt. Pelée write this across the heavens in a way which no human mind can ignore. "In the midst of life we are in death" is as necessary a truth to right living, as the counter-truth which faith achieves "in the midst of death we are in life." The probability of suffering and the certainty of death are constant factors with which the wise man reckons, with which until he reckons he is not wise.

Now we come upon that illuminating idea of James Hinton's, who solves the mystery of pain by the discovery that while pain cannot be removed from human life, it can be, and actually is, transformed by a change in the mind of him who suffers it. To make the most excruciating tortures tolerable, it is only necessary that the sufferer should be convinced that he suffers for a worthy end. Curtius leaps voluntarily into the yawning chasm of the Forum. Say, you thrust criminally a fellow-creature into such a gulf, there is material for bloodcurdling tragedy, and outcries against the sleeping gods. But as Curtius rides gallantly to his chosen doom, the hearts of men are caught up in admiration and ecstasy. The sordid doom of the closing earth is transformed into apotheosis. The suffering of the sufferer is celebrated as the height of sweetness and honour;

Dulce et decorum est pro patriâ mori.

By the neglect or cupidity of others a man is inoculated with the virus of disease, and he dies tragically, let us say of consumption. Who notices the obscure and common ending of his life? But a doctor voluntarily inoculates himself with the same disease. He welcomes the bacillus into his blood: he is determined to prove a curious point about the transmissibility of consumption. He sickens under his self-imposed disease. All the world looks on with wonder and love; this is, as it were, the redemption of humanity. Or take a supreme instance: a runaway slave is nailed to a cross, and surviving the sick tortures of the night, his legs are broken with a mallet in the morning; and if so obscure a fact was noticed, the sentimentalist might writhe over the cruelty of man to man. But behold on a similar cross a prophet from Galilee, his legs not broken by the mallet because his gentle heart has broken under the shock and the shame, the worm-wood and the gall. This death has the aspect of a voluntary sacrifice offered for love's sake and to save the world; and immediately those cruel pains are transformed, and for many ages men desire to fill up the measure of those sufferings, to

imitate them, to have the stigmata of the same nails in hands and feet and wounds in side.

Perhaps at that point in history the principle became plain which we are so slow to learn. Pain and catastrophe are not, in a world like this, to be avoided. But they are susceptible of immediate transformation by the spirit, the sovereign and controlling spirit, of the sufferer. He has but to take them heroically, to embrace them for a worthy object, to assimilate himself, in the bearing of them, with the ultimate will which initiates and controls the travail of the universe, and he makes of loss a glorious gain; of suffering, joy; of death, eternal life.

But this being so, the appeal to the conscience of the individual is, that he arm himself with such a truth, a conviction, a devotion; that he shall forestall all sufferings with the honourable and worthy disposition. He is to joyfully face pain, in a noble and voluntary asceticism, for the service of truth, of man, of God. And when pain comes which he did not choose, it falls into line with his general habit of mind. Suffering according to the will of God, he commits himself joyfully to Him as unto a faithful Creator.

That is to say, we have, if we knew it, the solution of our difficulties in our own hands. The way of release does not lie in the direction of atheism, but in a quite opposite direction. All pains, losses, disappointments, diseases and death are frustrated (or shall we say, fulfilled?), their sting is drawn (or shall we say, their virtue is elicited?), by one simple and sufficient change in the mind of the sufferer. When he says "Thy will be done," his triumph is complete and irreversible.

But, now, carry the same principle up to the solution of the difficulty before us. The catastrophes of the world, which become enigmas, baffling and staggering, on the atheistic hypothesis, so staggering and baffling that the mind is numbed, and the heart perishes under them, become, in the light of what has been said, powerless for evil, and even the very means of leading the mind to the truth which saves, and the disposition which is the universal cure of the trouble of the

world. So far from the fact of the people being at their prayers, when the fire broke from the mountain, proving an addition to the mystery,—a reverse of the doom of Sodom and Gomorrah, a city destroyed not because it was wicked but because it was good,—this fact leads our minds to the moral of the mystery. We should all be always at our prayers, because the uncertain order of the world is such that the catastrophe may come upon us at any time. But being at our prayers, we have no occasion to deprecate the calamity. Where the will lies in the will of God—and nowhere else can it be right or at peace—the sudden death is no terror, but a swifter and surer transition to the Beyond.

I will not enlarge on the Beyond. Obviously, if once the mind sees with Jesus that death is not death, but merely the shuffling off of the mortal coil in order to put on a more effective tabernacle of life, that future life begins for the 30,000 engulfed people of St. Pierre as composedly, as surely, and as effectively as if each had died separately in his bed with all the consolations of religion. It would indeed be foolish, when life and immortality are brought to light, and death is seen to be but the covered way which leads to life, to boggle at the fact that the end comes simultaneously and suddenly to some, in solitude and with lingering pain to others. But I leave the question on this side the grave. For the more effective living of this life, the effective theory of the Divine Will, and the practical acceptance of it, are necessary. By this, and this alone, we are equal to the sufferings and endurances of which life must consist; but by this we are equal to the worst which chance and change can do. The stoic saw half the truth when he knew that the just and resolute man cannot be shaken by the ruins of a falling world. The Christian sees it all when he says, “nevertheless we according to His promise look for new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.”

ROBERT F. HORTON.

REVIEWS

The World and the Individual: being Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen, by Josiah Royce, Ph.D., LL.D.—First Series: *The Four Historical Conceptions of Being*, pp. xvi, 588. Second Series: *Nature, Man, and the Moral Order*, pp. xvi, 588.—New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900, 1901.

THE contribution to philosophical and religious thought which Dr Royce has made in these volumes is notable in several respects, and in none more so than in the contrast it suggests between the author's attitude towards metaphysical speculation and that of most of his contemporaries in this country. For the characteristic note of recent philosophy is its diffidence. Modern science, in revealing the subtlety and complexity of the relations of natural phenomena, has made the philosopher's task seem more adventurous than ever before. And any confidence that might still linger in his power of explaining the nature of reality has been further weakened by the very moderate success which has attended his efforts in the province more specially his own, and especially by the indecision and confusion of his deliverances upon the problems of knowledge, morals and religion. The fact is that philosophy has fallen into pretty general distrust, and philosophers themselves have come to share therein. They now rarely indulge in comprehensive, speculative construction. They are content, as a rule, to issue monographs on special problems; and even these are, for the most part, historical and critical. Above all, they are critical of human knowledge, and confessedly epistemological rather than ontological in purpose. The consciousness of the failure of philosophy to expound the nature of reality has been reflected back upon its methods, and even upon the rational processes of thought in general; so that our knowledge of nature, which is our chief boast, must, according to recent views, be pronounced to be hypothetical as to its ultimate principles, dogmatic as to its data, tentative as to its methods, and merely proximate and relative as to its results. The common mind is bidden to trust the unsifted authority of tradition rather than explicit reasoning; science is warned to recognise and respect the limits within which its principles hold; and philosophy is reduced to apologise for its own existence.

In these circumstances it is a refreshing and inspiring spectacle to witness a writer who is ignorant neither of the complexity of the world nor of the feebleness of man, rise clear above this atmosphere

of sceptical diffidence, revive the old pretensions of philosophy, grapple in the spirit of a Fichte or Hegel with the problem of reality in its extent and depth, and propound a theory which shall comprehend in one constructive whole a doctrine of the nature of the world, of man, and of God. "Philosophy," says Professor Royce, "necessarily involves a good deal of courage; but so does life in general. It is pretentious to wrestle with angels; but there are some blessings you cannot win in any other way."

Professor Royce is led to ask the all-comprehensive question of philosophy in the course of his attempt, as Gifford Lecturer, to investigate the bases and expound the contents of "Natural Religion." He institutes his inquiry into the "nature of things" in order to discover what conception man is entitled to entertain of the reality and character of God, of the nature of the world and of man, and of the relation of man to God. "The central problem of our discussion will be the question: What is reality?" (p. 6). "My precise undertaking is to show what we mean by Being in general, and by the special sorts of reality that we attribute to God, to the world, and to the human individual. These I regard as the problems of the Ontology of religion" (p. 11). To these problems he addresses himself at once in the first of his lectures; and whatever value may be attributed to the final outcome of his endeavour, one cannot but admire the persistence and skill with which throughout the two volumes he concentrates the discussion upon issues that are fundamental both for philosophy and for the ethical and religious interests of man.

He approaches the problem of the nature of reality through the medium of ideas. In other words, his first question is not What is Reality? but "What is an Idea? and How can Ideas stand in any true relation to reality?" (p. 16). To start with reality is to make failure certain. "Begin by accepting . . . the mere brute reality of the world as fact, and there you are, sunk in an ocean of mysteries . . . The world as fact now bewilders you . . . by a chaos of unintelligible fragments and of scattered events; now it lifts up your heart with wondrous glimpses of ineffable goodness, and now it arouses your wrath by frightful signs of cruelty and baseness." "It is a defiant mystery," "persistently baffling, unless we find somewhere else the key to it." And the key to it is found in the way indicated by the masters,—by Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant. We must "assert the primacy of the world as Idea over the world as Fact," and "deal with the problem of reality from the side of the means through which we are supposed to be able to attain reality, that is, from the side of the Ideas" (p. 19).

"What, then, is an Idea? And how can an Idea be related to Reality?" These questions manifestly constitute our first problem, and it is in his attempt to answer them that Dr Royce gives expression to one of the most fundamental and characteristic elements of his theory.

To the ordinary view of the nature of an Idea he can attribute only secondary and partial truth. The essence of an idea does not, in his

opinion, consist in representing a fact existent beyond itself. Its primary and inner character does not lie in its objective reference, in that it images or symbolises, or otherwise stands for or indicates an external fact or event. Relying upon the results attained by recent analytic psychology, he asserts that ideas express the motor or active side of human life, rather than the sensory or receptive. The elements that constitute our ideas have been selected, and the selection is always governed by a purpose, and it is the voluntary purpose that organises the elements of an idea into a unity as well as chooses them. "Your intelligent ideas never consist of mere images of things, but always involve a consciousness of how you propose to act towards the things of which you have ideas" (p. 22). They represent intentions, and are "plans of action." "They have the significance of an act of will." In short, an idea is "Any state of consciousness, whether simple or complex, which, when present, is then and there viewed as at least the partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose" (pp. 22 and 23). A sword, a pin is really defined by its use, the intrinsic meaning of it flows from the purpose of an agent. A melody when sung expresses the intention of the singer; and "it is in this sense that we speak of any artistic idea as present in the creative mind of the artist" (p. 24).

But if ideas are thus primarily revelations of the purpose of an intelligent agent, they are in the second place representative of objects. They have an "external" or objective, as well as an "internal" meaning. And it might well seem that for the purposes of knowledge this external reference is not only the most important aspect of an idea, but the only aspect that can have real significance. An idea cannot be justified as valid or in any way valuable as truth if it only conforms to a purpose and does not indicate the nature of an object. And however much it may depend upon voluntary selection for the constitution and arrangement of its contents, its function is to express the truth and to conform to facts. And facts are stubborn, and, at least, *prima facie*, indifferent to the purposes and intentions of individuals. Indeed, the value of an idea as a vehicle of objective truth seems to be destroyed just in the degree to which it is observed to be subservient to an individual's will.

It would seem, therefore, that the purpose with which we form our conceptions of objects is not relevant to their truth. Our knowledge must conform to facts, not the facts to our desires; and in this respect there is the strongest contrast between the "intrinsic meaning" and the objective reference of an idea.

Now this contrast is in nowise lost sight of by Dr Royce. On the contrary, he would heighten and accentuate it to the utmost. "Here is, indeed, the world-knot," is his somewhat extravagant expression of the difficulty.

How, then, does he propose to solve it? By a device which at first sight may appear to be very simple, but one which really takes his whole work to explain and to justify. The device is that of reducing the external

meaning, *qua external*, into mere appearance; and then representing it as an aspect of the internal meaning. The external meaning is simply the internal meaning imperfectly understood. "Our final result will simply re-absorb the secondary aspect, the external meaning, into the completed primary aspect—the completely embodied internal meaning of the idea. The final meaning of every complete idea, when fully embodied, must be viewed as wholly an internal meaning" (p. 34). If to the ordinary human consciousness objects appear to be independent of man's purposes, and to determine his ideas for him, that arises simply from his imperfect comprehension of what both his will and his objects mean. The more fully he interprets them, that is to say, the more intelligent his purpose becomes, and the better he comprehends objects, the more the purpose and the facts will be found to approach one another. "I shall not only imitate my object as another, and correspond to it from without. I shall become one with it, and so internally possess it" (p. 38). In truth, "the real world is just our whole will embodied" (p. 37). But we only partially know our own will, and, in consequence, we find it obstructed by that which appears to be entirely other and foreign to us—by "brute facts." But the process of comprehending facts strips them of their otherness, explains away their indifference and foreignness, brings them into our own intelligent lives, makes them part of our living experience, and constitutes them into expressions of our conscious purpose. And, on the other hand, the process of explaining the world as our "embodied purpose," is the process of explicating the implicit significance of our own will, till at last we find that it is co-extensive with real being. "Our theory, as you already see, will identify ignorance of reality with finite vagueness of meaning, will assert that the very absolute, in all its fulness of life, is even now the object that you really mean by your fragmentary passing ideas, and that the defect of your present human form of consciousness lies in the fact that you just now do not know precisely what you mean" (p. 39).

If this theory can be made good, it is evident that the most momentous consequences follow. In the first place, to absorb the external meaning of ideas in the internal meaning is to do away with the distinction between external objects and conscious volitions, and to represent the world of reality simply as the expression of an intelligent will. In the second place, to represent "the real world as just our whole will embodied" (p. 37) is straightway to identify man with the Absolute, and to make his finitude a mere appearance, an accident due to his ignorance. It may be an appearance from which he can never entirely free himself, for he may be endlessly engaged in overcoming this ignorance to which the contrast between inner and outer is due; still his destiny, were it fulfilled, is "to face Being," "to become one with it, and so internally to possess it." Further, as Dr Royce proceeds to show later on, this identification of the world with man's will and man's will with the Absolute, is the very means to secure the individuality, the unique personal existence of both man and God. And it is in this respect mainly that our author conceives that his form of Idealism so

greatly exceeds in value all its predecessors. It does not lose man in God, nor, therefore, stultify morals and religion. God becomes the "Individual of Individuals." Man is not dissipated into universal concepts, or thinned away into mere thoughts, as, on Dr Royce's view, was the case under the Panlogistic theory of Hegel. But, seeing that man is will, his individual rational life, in the process of comprehending the world more and more fully, ever deepens within itself into greater inner determinateness and unity with itself. He becomes free of the whole world, for the whole world is his own, and the enactment of his personal intelligent will. His action is "as unique as is the whole divine life, as free as is the whole meaning of which the world is an expression" (p. 469). It is one with the divine life. "When I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who just here *am* God's will" (p. 468). "Arise, then, freeman, stand forth in thy world. It is God's world: It is also thine" (p. 470).

Before we proceed to examine the right of Dr Royce to exult in this somewhat dithyrambic way, we must endeavour to sketch the main lines of the argument by which he endeavours to justify his idealistic and exceedingly triumphant faith. And the briefest and most effective way of arriving at what is fundamental in his theory were to contrast it with the schemes of Hegel or of Fichte. For Dr Royce's effort is manifestly akin with theirs, and such original features as mark his theory are evidently inspired and guided by his desire to remedy the defects he finds in their theories. But our author has not taken this way. His references to Hegel are scanty and unsatisfactory; and he does not mention Fichte. He has preferred to prepare the way for his own constructive efforts by an examination of other theories whose defectiveness, as they are represented by him, will seem all too obvious to careful students of philosophy. These theories he, moreover, regards as, in the last resort, the only possible rivals of his own,—his own, therefore, as it survives their extinction, remains true. This is a somewhat hard saying, I fear; but it is not unjust. [See I. p. 348.]

There are, then, four fundamental conceptions of Being: the first is Realism, the second is Mysticism, the third is Critical Rationalism, the fourth is Dr Royce's own, which he arrives at through the destructive exposure of the logical inconsequences of the former. Dr Royce's statement and criticism of these theories are certainly very interesting, and of Mysticism in particular, which is handled with much sympathy. Whether students of the history of philosophy can accept his statement of these theories as objectively valid, is a further question, which one hesitates to raise against an author who maintains that the truth of ideas depends upon their use.

Realism is represented as a theory which maintains that objects are entirely independent of knowledge. They exist in the same way whether they are known or not. "A real object, in this view, may be a known *or* an unknown object, or it may be sometimes known and sometimes unknown, or, above all, it may be known now by one person and again by another, the two knowing it simultaneously and separately. All that makes no sort

of difference to the object if, in this first sense, it is real. To use this supposed independence as a means of defining reality, is the essence of our first [the realistic] conception of being" (p. 67). As sheer independence of knowledge is the only definition that rigorous Realism has to offer of reality, and as from this point of view objects can have no other quality, it is evident that Realism is not to be identified with Materialism. "It is historically possible for a realist to maintain that his world consists wholly of conscious beings, or even mere states of mind, when taken together with the unconsciously real relationships existent among these beings. . . . One could be a realist in his definition of Being, and still insist that all Being is in its nature entirely psychological" (p. 96). Ignorance, error, or their opposites affect knowledge only; they do not affect Being except in so far as they are parts of it. They might all alike vanish, leaving Being precisely what it was.

The refutation of such a theory as this is sufficiently easy. If the only definition of Reality is that it is independent of all knowledge, then nothing more need or can be said, and we can only regret that Dr Royce has taken so long to say it. Identity, likeness, symbolism, correspondence, all possible relations between objects and ideas are, *ex hypothesi*, impossible. Hence knowledge is the knowledge of nothing real, and reality is nothing known. And yet, even while Realism thus makes the realm of objects empty, it conceives it dualistically, and the dualism, in turn, breaks up into pluralistic atomism. For Realism can only exist by insisting upon the contrast and indifference of objects and ideas. But, in doing so, it makes ideas as well as objects into "existent entities." And they are mutually independent. "They have nothing in common, neither quality nor worth, neither form nor content, neither truth nor meaning" (p. 135). "In brief, the realm of a consistent Realism is not the realm of one nor yet the realm of many, it is the realm of absolutely nothing" (p. 137).

Much more instructive is Dr Royce's discussion of Mysticism. He presents it as "the logically precise and symmetrical correspondent of realism: in its innermost constitution, the mirror-picture of its opponent" (p. 179).

For if the former aims at asserting a reality that is wholly independent of the subject, the latter aims at gaining an experience that is wholly independent of objects. The goal of the one is pure outwardness, of the other the pure inwardness of an experience that is not tainted with the world nor with ideas about it. Mysticism is in its essence a revolt from thought, and an attempt to escape from the vain struggles with the illusory world which thought sets up. For thought has been discovered by the mystic to be endlessly engaged with its own other. Thought must always hold its object over against itself, and present it to itself as something "Beyond." Difference is thus essential to thought, even while it seeks unity. Indeed, it creates difference in seeking unity, and thereby always defeats its own end, and brings neither the satisfaction to the self nor the true experience of the real which come when consciousness is verily at one with itself and the world. The trouble of consciousness can thus be ended only in what

quenches thought, in a region where even the illusion of difference disappears. And this is the region of immediate experience, where the self and the world are merged in indistinguishable oneness, and the last illusion of separation from the absolutely real has vanished. The Absolute or the Real is retracted within, and there is not even a shadow of distinction between within and without. No doubt, the Absolute thus reached in pure immediacy is "ineffable, indescribable," and may appear as if it were "identical with nothing." In truth, however, it is "the very opposite of nothing. For it is fulfilment, attainment, peace, the goal of life, the object of desire, the end of knowledge. . . . It is our finite realm that is falsity, the mere nothing. The Absolute is all truth" (pp. 170, 171).

The destructive criticism of Mysticism is not less easy or definitive than the refutation of Realism. For Mysticism is found to derive all its significance from a "Contrast-Effect." "It is by contrast with our finite seeking that the goal which quenches desires and ideas at once, appears as all truth and life" (p. 171). But a theory that lives only through its opposite must share the fate of its opposite; and in this case the opposite of the mystic's Absolute is found to be mere illusion. Hence what lives *only* to destroy illusion is itself an illusion. When the finite, from whose limitations escape is sought, is found to be vain show, then the need of escape disappears; when the struggle against an unreal world is found to be itself unreal, it is given up — and nothing remains. "What makes his Absolute appear thus glorious is precisely its presented contrast with imperfection. But a zero that is contrasted with nothing at all, has so far not even any contrasting character, and remains thus a genuine and absolute nothing" (p. 181).

But although both Realism and Mysticism are thus proved self-contradictory and nugatory, the element of truth that they each contain points to a third and better conception of Being. This is critical Rationalism, a theory which obtained its first authoritative expression from Kant, and which Dr Royce regards as valid, so far as it goes. For it avoids the error of both Realism and Mysticism, and endeavours to recognise the truths they respectively contain. It maintains both the difference and the unity of knowledge and its objects, and admits both the external and the internal significance of experience. To sever them is impossible on this view. What stands out of relation to ideas is without meaning or reality; and, on the other hand, that of which ideas are valid must be real. Mere subjectivity and mere objectivity, mere ideas and mere things in themselves, are alike mere nothings. "Being essentially implies the validity of ideas." "Validity is an essential aspect of true Being"; "Validity unites reality and idea in one context" (p. 251).

But all ideas are not valid. Where there is truth there must be a distinction between it and error, else the very negation of truth would be true. How, then, is the distinction between valid and invalid ideas to be drawn? How do I know that in any particular case idea and being have come

together? "By actual experience alone," says Dr Royce. "When we verify a valid assertion, it is something that plays a part in our individual process of living and observing" (p. 260). Ideas can be conceived of as forming a realm that is consequent and mutually self-supporting, and still lack all true objectivity, and be merely a "world in our heads." To be valid, ideas must touch ground somewhere; and they do so when they are directly experienced. "The third conception of Being refuses to ignore this conscious, this empirical element, present wherever the assertion of Being is made; for the only possible warrant for any ontological assertion must be found in this element" (p. 245).

The insistence upon this empirical basis constitutes for Dr Royce the essential value of Critical Rationalism, and the source of the radical weakness of this theory is its unfaithfulness to this empirical basis. For while Critical Rationalism rightly begins by making actual direct experience—actual contact with reality, as Mr Bradley would say—the test of truth, it substitutes another test as it proceeds. And from its point of view this substitution is inevitable; for actual experience, although alone and absolutely trustworthy, is "the creature of the instant." "The valid, even the eternally valid, enters our human consciousness through the narrow portals of the instant's experience" (256-7). But in such a momentary actual experience only a mere fragment of reality can be possessed by us; so miserable a fragment, indeed, that our ideas of it could neither be true nor false. To have a rational experience, man must be able to transcend the immediately present. He always does so. "An experience of facts sends you beyond yourselves, to further possible experience for their interpretation" (245). Hence the real is conceived to be that which is essentially capable of being experienced. It is continuous with that which is the object of the instant's actual experience, and real in the same way and for the same reason.

But conformity to the *conditions* of experience, as a test of the reality of objects, is fundamentally different from the *actual* experience of a fact. The conformity itself stands in need of verification. In other words, that the experience is possible has to be tested and proved. And how can a mere possibility be tested? Evidently not by *actual* experience, which was the original test; but only by conformity to general conditions, to universals, to general laws which thought invents. And it is this test which Critical Rationalism employs whenever it deals with objects other than those of momentary consciousness; whenever, in other words, it deals with any principles of universal validity, or any truth conceived as eternal. And "Validity" comes thus, on this theory, to be used ambiguously, and only by this ambiguous use is it able to represent the real as at once individual and universal. On the one side, "the validity of an idea, once seen, tested, presented, gets what we then regard as an individual life and meaning, since it appears in our individual experience"; on the other side, "in the realm of Being in general, this same validity appears universal, formal, a mere general law."

But it is manifest that such a view cannot be final. There cannot be two sorts of Being, "both known to us as valid, but the one individual, the other universal, the one empirical, the other merely ideal, the one present, the other barely possible, the one a concrete life, the other a pure form" (p. 261). "The world must be real in the same general sense in which our life in the world is real. All Being must prove to be pulsating with the same life of concrete experience" (p. 201).

And it is this kind of Being which Dr Royce's own conception is supposed to yield. It unites the immediacy and directness of actual concrete experience with universality; or rather, it presents us with an experience that is at once direct and universal. It is "a completed experience," immediate and all-inclusive. It is an individual life, a system of facts present as a whole, a *totum simul*. This life is more than mere thought, or a mere cognitive consciousness. It is "the completed will, as well as the completed experience, corresponding to the will and experience of any one finite idea. . . . To be, in the final sense, means to be just such a life, complete, present to experience. . . . What is, is for us no longer a mere Form, but a Life; and in our world of what was before mere truth, the light of individuality and of will have finally begun to shine. The sun of true Being has arisen before our eyes" (pp. 341-342).

Now, the task of a metaphysician is, in a manner of speaking, accomplished "when the sun of true Being has arisen before his eyes." He has found the criterion of all truth, and the veritable essence and meaning of all Reality. What remains for him is only the application of the criterion to the problems of experience; or, more accurately perhaps, the evolution of the implications of the Reality which he has reached. Still reserving all criticism, let me indicate, in the bare fashion that the limits allow, how Dr Royce does this, and some of the consequences that seem to follow from his definition of Being.

(1) The first is, manifestly, that all absolute distinctions disappear, and in this sense that the doctrine advanced is a kind of Monism. The fundamental relation between God, Man, and the World is that of homogeneity. They differ from one another only in possessing what Mr Bradley has called, after Hegel, different "degrees of reality." "An eternal consciousness is definable as one for which all the facts of the whole time-stream, just so far as time is a final form of consciousness, have the same type of unity that your present momentary consciousness, even now within its little span, surveys" (I. 425 ff.). God's Life is the absolute fulfilment of our own; "sees the one plan fulfilled through all the manifold lives. . . . No finite view is wholly illusory. Every finite intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in the Absolute" (I. 426-7). And what is thus said of man holds also, in its own degree and fashion, of the External World. "Nature is a realm, as it were, between the Divine, viewed as the Absolute, and the knowing finite subject" (II. 158). It is itself a finite subject. "When you deal with Nature, you deal with a vast realm of finite consciousness of which your own is at once a part and an example" (II. 226).

(2) The second consequence, and one which distinguishes Dr Royce's theory, in his view, from all other forms of Idealism, is that it retains both the Many *and* the One. While Hegel—or the ordinary caricature of Hegel—dissolves all differences into the sameness of mere thought, deprives God of personality, leaves to man the mere semblance of individuality, and makes Nature come to consciousness only in man, the present theory preserves for God, Man, and even for Nature a personality that is unique. Man may be, and is, the expression of the divine meaning. But he is a unique and elsewhere unexampled expression of it. He is an individual, and his individuality is rooted in himself. We have, apparently, willed ourselves into existence! “Nothing whatever beside yourself determines, either causally or otherwise, just what constitutes your individuality.” “It is will, then, in God and in man, that logically determines the consciousness of individuality. The individual is, primarily, the object and expression of an exclusive interest, of a determinate selection” (I. p. 460). And it is this selective character, this exclusiveness of interest, that constitutes the essential character of will, and yields the definition of individuality. God is Will; man is will; even nature is will; for it, too, “is a process wherein goals, ideals are sought in a seemingly endless pursuit, and where new realms of sentient experience are constantly coming into view” (II. 226).

(3) As to the relation in which the One and the Many, the will of God, of nature, and of man, stand to one another, we have to regard it not as that of appearance to reality, or seeming to substance, but of part to the whole:—“every part being unique, filling a place within the whole which nothing else could fill, necessary to the whole, and just as real in its own way as is the whole. Our view leaves all the unique meaning of your finite individual life, just as rich as you find it to be. You are in God; but you are not lost in God” (I. p. 465). “For us the unity of the world is the unity of consciousness. The variety of the world is the internal, but none the less wealthy and genuine, variety of the purposes and embodiments of purpose present within this unity of the one divine consciousness.” Owing to this variety of purposes, every one of them unique, each finite being can say: “I alone, amongst all the different beings of the universe, will this act” (I. 468). “And this is true of the finite being, not in spite of the unity of the divine consciousness, but just because of the very uniqueness of the whole divine life. For all is divine, all expresses meaning. All meaning is uniquely expressed” (469-70). “My act is a part of the divine life.” “God wills in me” (I. 468). “Since the world in its wholeness is unique” [as the embodiment of one complete purpose, of one perfect will], “every portion of this whole life, every fragment of experience, every pulsation of will in the universe . . . is, by virtue of its relation to the unique whole, also unique—but unique precisely in so far as it is related to the whole, and not in so far as you abstract its various features and endowments from their relation to God, and view them in finite relations” (II. 292).

We cannot better sum up these fundamental elements of Dr Royce's doctrine than by quoting from his own summary.

"*To be* means to *fulfil a purpose*, in fact, to fulfil in final, individual expression, the *only* purpose, namely the absolute purpose.

"This absolute purpose is not only One, but also infinitely complex, so that its unity is the unity of many wills, each one of which finds its expression in an individual life.

"*One* is the absolute, because in *mere* multiplicity there would be no finality of insight. *Many* is the absolute, because in the inter-relationships of contrasted expressions of a single will lies the only opportunity for the embodiment of wholeness of life, and for the possession of self-consciousness by the Absolute.

"*Individuals* are all the various expressions of the Absolute, in so far as they are many; just because where the one is individual, every aspect and element of its self-expression is unique.

"*Free*, in its own degree, is every individual will amongst all the wills that the world-life expresses, because every such will, as unique, is in some respect underivable from all the others" (See II. 335-7). And this, "our idealistic realm, is a moral order, wherein any moral agent has his place, his task, his effectiveness, his freedom and his individual work; and has all these by virtue of his unity with all Being and with God. His acts are his own because God's Will is in him at the very heart of his freedom" (II. 376-7).

Such in general outline is Dr Royce's theory of the world, of the human individual and of God. I regret much that the limits of a review do not permit me to follow his more detailed and most interesting explication of his views as to the Natural World, the Nature of the Self, Freedom and Causation, Moral Good and Evil, Time and Eternity, and the Immortality of the Soul. I regret almost more that they preclude me from expressing, except in the most general way and without discussion, the estimate I have formed of the significance of the work as a whole.

On some points Dr Royce's critics must all concur. No recent work on philosophy has offered to English readers so rich and varied a programme. In none known to me have these great topics been discussed more persistently and courageously in the light of a few dominating conceptions. It is a most frank and outspoken and enthusiastic exposition of "Natural Religion," and most admirable in the skill displayed in the manipulation of ideas and in its wealth of phrase. The results attained conform to an unusual extent, in books of this kind, to the demands of the ordinary ethical and religious consciousness; and the discussion ends by restoring practically all the fundamental beliefs generally assumed in a spiritual view of man's life and destiny. To those who can regard the arguments by which Dr Royce arrives at these conclusions as on the whole valid, and who agree with the main conceptions from which he deduces his proofs, the book will appear to be the most significant defence of the fundamental interests of man as a moral and religious being which has

been given to the world for many years. Some of the old puzzles will, no doubt, appear even to them to be only restated and not solved; e.g. the direct identification of the divine and the human will can hardly avoid seeming to carry with it either the reduction of moral evil into mere appearance, or the attribution of it to God, as willing it in the will of man; so that both the freedom of man and the goodness of God will seem to have been left in an ambiguous situation. The scientific thought of the time will find in the theory difficulties of a much weightier character. That the categories which science employs are limited in application, and that the exposition even of the physical world which it offers is abstract in so far as it abstains from considering the relation of the knowledge attained to the principles employed in the attainment, will be readily admitted. But the attempt to assimilate nature to man to the extent of attributing to it a consciousness, an aspiration after ideals, and a will analogous to our own, and differing from it only in "Time-Span," in the meaning of Nature's "Now," in slowness of movement rather than in dignity or fulness, is another affair; especially as Dr Royce's exposition of freedom compels him to deny the invariability and rigid uniformity of nature's processes, and to attribute to natural law only a relative stability (see Bk. II. Lecture v.).

But even these difficulties are minor compared with those which philosophers themselves will discover. I consider it extremely unlikely that any one of the main conceptions most characteristic of Dr Royce's theory, or which would be considered as most original to him, could be conceded without much discussion. Philosophers will question his historical exposition of realism; they will not admit the accuracy of his account of Kant and the "Third Conception"; they will find that he himself alternates between, rather than reconciles, immediate experience and universal validity in a fourth conception of Being as "completed experience"; they will demand a closer analysis of the meaning of "direct experience," of the will as selective, of the possibility of attributing such a will to God. More fundamental still, they will question the method by which he approaches his problem, and demand a justification of the original distinction he institutes between the world of ideas and the world of reality, and of the employment of the former as a medium for arriving at the latter and, above all, they will question his main departure from earlier and greater forms of Idealism in the use he makes of will, the distinction he draws between "the world of description" and the "world of appreciation," and the place he gives in speculative philosophy to the idea of "ought," and to the ethical categories in general. Without disagreeing with some of the main objections he urges against Mr Bradley's conclusions, it seems to me that none of the devices by which he endeavours to escape from Mr Bradley's logic can avail him; for he adopts Mr Bradley's doctrine of thought, and, from that point of view, the substitution of the categories of whole and part for those of appearance and reality is not possible, nor, therefore, a positive defence of *both* the finite and the infinite.

But even a fundamental disagreement with Dr Royce's method, and a conviction that where the discussion becomes crucial the victory is not infrequently gained by rhetoric rather than by reason, by the military bands and standard-bearers rather than by the men-at-arms, should not blind the reader to the suggestiveness of Dr Royce's contribution,—a suggestiveness best evinced by the fact that it will exact the serious discussion of philosophers for a considerable time to come.

My gratitude to him will certainly remain, although convinced that his theory demands radical reconstruction. "They maun hae new tops and bottoms," said the Scotch cobbler, of the old pair of boots, "but the aul' whangs will dae."

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Some Thoughts on Christology.—By the Rev. James Drummond, M.A., LL.D., D. Litt., Principal of Manchester College, Oxford.—The Essex Hall Lecture, 1902, pp. 57.—Philip Green, 5 Essex Street, London, W.C.

I UNDERSTAND that the *Hibbert Journal* is to be a meeting ground for the exchange of views on questions of serious religious interest, and that it is from that point of view that I am invited to consider Dr Drummond's *Thoughts on Christology*, not in any way suppressing what I think myself, but rather stating as frankly as I can the way in which his lecture strikes me, so as by the juxtaposition and comparison of different views, to help others in their search for truth.

I may say at the outset that the task is peculiarly welcome to me, because to us—whom I may describe briefly as Nicene Christians—few or none of those who would deliberately disown that name appeal so warmly as Dr Drummond. Dr Drummond is a writer of whom one is always moved to say, *talis cum sis utinam noster esses*; and he seems to me to reciprocate this feeling, at least in the sense that he desires to approximate to those from whom he differs as nearly as he can.

That is entirely the impression that his little book makes upon me. I should like to help him in this effort; and I believe that I shall do so best, not by minimising our differences, but rather by stating them with all the sharpness and precision that I can command.

If I may for my own purposes analyse Dr Drummond's argument, I should say that it falls into three parts: pp. 7-21 are taken up with a discussion of the standard or criterion to be applied, which Dr Drummond decides to be the Christian consciousness; pp. 21-43 are an examination of the contents of this consciousness, both positively and negatively, as it is expressed in the New Testament, in the subsequent history of the Church,

and at the present day ; pp. 43-57 are an attempt to estimate the permanent value of the titles most conspicuously applied to Christ.

Now the Nicene Christian will, I think, begin by assenting cordially to the main proposition, that it is the duty of the theologian to interpret the Christian consciousness. He will be glad to find Dr Drummond acknowledging that the Christian consciousness needs interpretation, and even a somewhat formal, or at least formulated, interpretation : "It is the business of the theologian to throw into intellectual form the raw material of spiritual experience of thought" (p. 11).

Again : "It is the duty of the theologian to interpret these convictions, and draw forth their implicit contents into explicit thought, and so turn them into truths communicable to the understanding of others" (p. 15).

And yet again : "In our investigation, therefore, we must look not only for the most elementary, but for the most universal form of the Christian consciousness" (p. 20).

But what follows from this? To me, and those who think with me, the obvious comment to make is, that the premisses, so stated, lead straight to the Nicene Creed.

Where is it possible to find a formulated expression of the data of the Christian consciousness that at all approaches this in universality? It is not only that at the time when this creed was adopted (what we call the Nicene Creed, I mean) it was the result of a full half century of very close discussion, really spread over the whole of Christendom ; not only this, but even at the present day it is the one formula which, implicitly or explicitly, has the assent of nearly all Christian Churches.

Next to the Nicene Creed would come that which we call the Apostles' ; and that would answer my purpose almost as well.

Why does Dr Drummond not approve of either of these? He lays down two conditions, the second of which is supposed to exclude them. It is stated thus :

"The forms in which the intellect presents spiritual truth are necessarily affected by the entire intellectual equipment of any given time, and therefore either change with the general advance of culture and thought, or falling out of relation with it, become distasteful, and cease to be vehicles of religious power" (p. 15 f.).

I have no objection to make. I believe that in principle the condition is true, though Dr Drummond would perhaps make it carry rather further than I should.

Let us place the value of the Nicene Creed on the lowest ground possible. Let us regard it merely as a historical document, as the best formulation that the Church of the fourth century could agree upon of the data of its Christian consciousness. If we think only of the fourth century, and say nothing about to-day, even so, it seems to me that, on Dr Drummond's own showing, the document must be one of very considerable importance. The reason why so many Churches still accept it is not because they would be unwilling to restate their belief, but because of the

insuperable practical difficulties in the way of obtaining a restatement which should be equally ecumenical. The Nicene Creed is the only available genuine product of the whole of Christendom.

No doubt allowance has to be made for the transition from the fourth century to the twentieth. The problems of the two ages are different. But are they so different that the data of consciousness in the fourth century can no longer serve for the twentieth? Most of us think not, and because we think not, we are still ready to accept the Nicene Creed. Even supposing that we should make the mental reservation "*mutatis mutandis*," we do not think that that reservation would go so far as to make the acceptance dishonest.

Here, no doubt, lies the real question. Dr Drummond instances certain expressions, "the hypostatic union," *perichoresis*, *communicatio idiomatum*, which he puts aside as beyond discussion. I may remark that not one of these occurs in either the Nicene Creed or the Apostles': comparatively few even of the most orthodox understand what they mean: and those who do understand them would not think of crudely propounding them as an expression of the modern consciousness, but would begin by putting them in their place historically as expressive of the thought of their own time: it would by no means follow that they were fundamentally untrue.

I infer that there is nothing in Dr Drummond's purpose really to prevent those who wish to do so from using the Nicene Creed, in default of anything later, for the purpose which he sets before himself, viz., as a formulation of the data of the Christian consciousness.

To say this is by no means to deprive the rest of the paper of its value for those who are prepared to make this use of the Creed. Much of it really goes behind the language of the Creed, and performs the very laudable function of seeking to draw out the meaning of that language at the present day.

I should much like, if space permitted, to quote a number of passages to which I can gladly assent. But as it is, I must confine myself to two remarks which are rather of the nature of criticism.

There are two expressions on one page (52) which unintentionally misrepresent Nicene doctrine. The first speaks of "a few passages which might possibly refer to a pre-existent being, who, prior to the incarnation, was perfectly distinct from Jesus." No orthodox theologian would write in these terms. The other speaks of "the distinction generally made, which represents Jesus as the Son of God in a totally different sense from that in which the term is applied to other men." The difference cannot be total if, (i.) as we believe, Christ was true Man; and (ii.) it is the same Holy Spirit whose creative act made Him to be what He was, and who also dwells in us men.

My last comment has reference to the way in which Dr Drummond speaks of this Holy Spirit. Sometimes his language is what I could wholly accept: but he has a curious way of using "soul" where I should

naturally use "spirit"—and not only "spirit" but "Spirit" (pp. 2, 31, 34, 37, 57): *e.g.* "they drew into their hearts that great redeeming soul, which changed them into children of God" (p. 37).

By "soul" we usually mean the individual soul. If Dr Drummond means nothing more than this, I should profoundly differ from him: I should say that he was confusing the dead Christ with the living. But if he really gives full value to his own language elsewhere, I should say that he was well upon the road to the Nicene Christology.

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The Principles of Western Civilisation.—By Benjamin Kidd.—
Macmillan & Co., 1902.

THE interest roused by the publication in 1894 of Mr Benjamin Kidd's *Social Evolution* will be fresh in the memory of most of the readers of this Journal. Social Evolution, it was contended, in that brilliant and audacious essay, depends not as is sometimes supposed on the accumulated results of mental and moral culture, but on the accumulation of congenital variations, and the "constant stress of selection which this involves." In order to maintain the condition of things, notably the increase of population, on which such accumulation in turn depends, there must exist, both in individuals and societies, a constant readiness to postpone their unselfish happiness to a distant racial purpose. But as this readiness for sacrifice can only issue from the prevalence and vitality of a religious faith, whose centre and sanction fall outside the present order of things, it follows that we have to look for the characteristic feature of human development not in the growth of intelligence, as is commonly done, but in "the phenomenon of our religions," the function of which is to provide the necessary controlling sanctions in the new circumstances. In the two main chapters of the book these ideas were applied as the key to the meaning of the great movement which is going on about us, and which we sum up in the term Western Civilisation. To understand this movement aright, we must interpret it as the rise and development of new forms of altruistic feeling, issuing in a higher sense of civic responsibility, and making on the whole for a state of things in which individuals are more and more brought "into a rivalry of existence on equal terms, which is thereby raised to the highest degree of efficiency as a cause of progress."

The paradoxical air of these conclusions, the faculty for broad generalisation to which their statement gave scope, and the undoubted literary ability with which they were set forth, aroused at the time a wide-spread interest in the reading public. Those, however, who looked deeper, and had more right to judge, were profoundly dissatisfied with the underlying assumptions of "inherent and inevitable" antagonism between reason

and religion on the one hand, the interests of the individual necessarily concerned with his own welfare" and "the interests of the social organism largely bound up with the welfare of generations yet unborn" on the other. Not only were these assumptions paradoxical in themselves, leading as they did to the depressing and inconceivable conclusion that the progress of civilisation depends on the enthusiastic acceptance of principles of action which it is impossible to justify to the reason; they seemed to be in flagrant opposition to the best attested results of modern philosophy. By assuming a theory of the nature of "reason" which identified it with the clear cut inferences of the logical intelligence, the writer seemed to ignore the existence of that indwelling principle of rationality which it has been the work of the Kantian philosophy, and we might say of the whole Romantic movement, to bring into prominence. Similarly, by assuming a theory of society which depended on the formal antithesis between self and others, he seemed to be endeavouring to reinstate a theory whose reputation had been irretrievably ruined. To his more sympathetic critics, these philosophical anachronisms were the more regrettable in a writer who appeared so rightly convinced of the moral purpose of history, and of the inadequacy of popular theories to express it. True, to have gone back upon them would have blunted the edge of the main paradox, and this might have been distressing to the writer of books, but it would have given solidity to an argument the motive and general purport of which did credit to the philosopher.

Mr Kidd's new book is obviously meant as a sequel to the first, from the two main chapters of which it takes its title. The reader is therefore justified in expecting from it a fuller and clearer statement of his central position, with such modifications of the underlying assumptions as wider reading and maturer judgment may have rendered necessary. Any such expectation, we fear, will be doomed to disappointment. Not only is the main argument neither elucidated nor advanced, but it is stated in a form the fundamental obscurity of which is the despair of its critics. The earlier doctrine of the growth of altruistic feeling, unsupported by reason, however paradoxical, was at least comprehensible, but the new theory expressed in the formula of the control of the evolutionary process by the future, and summed up in the mystical phrase "projected efficiency," fails even of so modest a merit. On the other hand, it is evident at every turn that the writer has made no serious attempt to re-examine the philosophical assumptions upon which he has hitherto relied. It is true, in this latter connection, that we have frequent allusions to the Kantian philosophy distributed throughout the book. It is even claimed for the great idealist that he expressed for the first time with authority the principles to which the modern world pays its deepest homage. But the author's studies in this field have produced no real transformation in his fundamental conception of the meaning of human life and history. Even his style has suffered, and reflects often in a lamentable way the obscurity and confusion of the thought. In place of the comparative restraint and lucidity of the

former work, we have an irritating fervour, passing sometimes into pomposity, and even incoherence, at other times, into a wearisome iteration of stock phrases, almost intolerable to the conscientious reader.

To come to closer quarters with the main argument, Mr Kidd starts with the doctrine that "the determining and controlling end towards which natural selection has operated must have been not simply the benefit of the individual, nor even of his contemporaries, in a mere struggle for existence in the present, but a larger advantage, probably always far in the future, to which the individual and the present alike were subordinated." As his interpretation of this proposition, which he identifies with Weismann's restatement of Darwinism, contains his deepest conviction, and constitutes the central doctrine of his book, it may be well to allow him to state it at length in his own words.

"We see the early Darwinian conception—of the individual in the struggle for existence, and of its relation to advantages secured therein 'profitable to itself'—being overlaid by a larger meaning. It was evident that when we conceived the law of natural selection operating through unlimited periods of time, and concerned with the indefinitely larger interests of numbers, always infinite and always in the future, that we had in view a principle of which there had been no clear conception at first; namely, a principle of inherent necessity in the evolutionary process, compelling ever towards the sacrifice in a vast scale of the present and the individual in the interests of the future and the universal In recent biological thought from this point forward we may be said to be in full view of the characteristic development we have been endeavouring to describe. We see the centre of gravity in the evolutionary hypothesis in process of being definitely shifted out of the present into the future The distinctive feature of the change is the relegation to a secondary place of the interests of the individual and the present, and the emergence into sight of causes associated with the interests of the future and the universal, through the medium of which natural selection, entirely subordinating the former to the latter, dominates the evolutionary process towards particular ends over vast periods of time" (p. 55 f.).

Interpreted in one way, these statements, it must at once be admitted, contain a large measure of truth. If the first of them be taken to mean that, looked at *sub specie aeternitatis*, Nature seems to seek the survival of the race rather than of the individual, no exception can be taken to the doctrine. Nature, said Aristotle, seeks for immortality in the species, and in modern times, even before the publication of the *Origin of Species*, the same doctrine had attained classical statement in Tennyson's well known allusion to her methods in *In Memoriam*. Darwin himself clearly announces it in a passage which Mr Kidd quotes, where the naturalist explains that he uses the term "struggle for existence" "in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is most important) not only the life of the individual, but success in having progeny." So taken, the statement is not only true, but has an important philosophical bearing, indicating

as it does that even from the point of view of biology no hard and fast line can really be drawn between individual and species. The individual must protect itself, but the self which it protects is a being whose individuality is marked by no clear line, but is connected both through instinct and habit alike with the future and the past—reflecting the universal and the infinite within the limits of the particular and the finite. If, turning to the second of the above passages, we might similarly interpret it to mean that as civilisation advances mankind rises to an ever larger ideal of the essentials of individual and social well-being, there would be little to complain of.

The difficulty begins when the attempt is made to follow Mr Kidd in his effort to express this truth in terms of his underlying assumption of a fundamental antithesis between the individual and the universal, the present and the future.

How, for example, in an individual or group in which the instinct or the conscious purpose of self-preservation had been superseded by an instinct or conscious endeavour, which has for its object the welfare of remote posterity, could we suppose survival taking place at all? How, to use a borrowed illustration, if Christians had made it their first duty to turn the right cheek to those who smote them in the left, could there have come to be any Christians left? Like Alice, we may reply, "but they didn't," and this would seem to be Mr Kidd's answer, so far as it is possible to infer his meaning from his illustrations. For he seems to conceive of human evolution as falling into two main periods or stages, united with one another by no underlying unity of purpose. In the first, he seems to conceive of races moved by devotion to present and material good; while in the second this principle is reversed, and a new law is written on the heart of man bidding him transfer his allegiance from the present and particular to the future and the universal. But this only puts the difficulty in a new form. How does this conversion take place? What is the underlying principle of its operation? Mr Kidd is an evolutionist, and presumably does not believe in sudden conversion. To take his own illustration: Why should the reign of the present, after it had once established itself, as in his view it did in the Greek City and in the Roman Empire, or as it might conceivably do again in the "closed state" of an intelligent modern socialism, ever end and the reign of the future begin? From the point of view of a philosophy which admits no hard and fast line between individual and social consciousness, the answer of course is that these forms of society contained the seed of their own dissolution in the inadequacy with which they grasped the ideal of human life. Christianity broke down these "imperia" not because the Christian was prepared to sacrifice himself and his generation to an unknown future, but because of the deeper grasp he had of the meaning of the present. True, his conception of the meaning of life here and now was bound up with a larger conception of his relation to God and the universe, but in the most characteristic utterances of the Christian faith, of which the parable of the mustard seed, and the saying "if a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how shall he love God whom he hath not seen" may be

taken as types, the larger outlook into the eternal is always conceived of as an *outgrowth* from a deeper conception of the mundane and the temporal. But such a solution is not available to a writer who takes his stand upon a hard and fast distinction between the material and the spiritual, the present and the future.

Granting, however, that Mr Kidd can make it comprehensible to us how the "future" may become an end, and thus set bounds to the domination of the present, in whom, we may further ask, does this future become a reality? Who are the heirs of the sacrifices to which the present generation is summoned? The law of evolution, upon the theory before us, secures that human motive shall be more and more concerned with the future, that the present generation shall more and more regard itself as merely a trustee for the coming. The former holds a bond upon life's assets, but it is a bond apparently which is never exchanged into solid coin. The draft is always on the future: "man never is but always to be blessed." As, from the point of view of the previous argument, it is difficult to conceive how the "present" ever ends, from the point of view of this, the difficulty is to conceive where the "future" ever begins. Instead of a concrete purpose, giving unity to life and history, we have the "false infinite" of indefinite progress towards an unrealised and unrealisable ideal.

If further proof of the radical insufficiency of Mr Kidd's formula to express his own deeper meaning were necessary, it would be found in the strained interpretation it requires him to put upon the facts of historical development in order to bring them into line with it. Mr Kidd gives a great deal of attention to ancient civilisation. It stands with him, as we have seen, for the empire of the present over the future, the interests of the individual over those of the race. This view is set forth in many passages, of which the following may be taken as representative. It illustrates incidentally the extent to which in this volume the writer at times permits himself to be carried away by an almost reckless rhetoric.

"The omnipotence of the present was therefore written over all things. It was the present that had lived in Greek art. It was the present that had reasoned in Greek philosophy. It was the ruling present which had made virtue and enlightened self-interest synonymous in the State. It was the present which, conceiving, in the words of one of the noblest of the Romans, that every man's life lies all within it, had found the highest expression for virtue in the egoisms of Roman Stoicism. It was the present which, conceiving the existing world entirely occupied with its own affairs, had found intellectual shelter for its vices under the name of Epicurus. It was the forceful, passionate, dominating present which lived alike in Attic marble, in Greek song, and in the nameless institutions of Roman sensuality."

Now it is of course true, upon the whole, that the State was the highest form of organised society conceived of by the ancient world. It is also true that the State, or at any rate, the nation, was conceived of as a close corpora-

tion, whose privileges were shared only by a limited number even within its own borders, and further that the highest well-being of the State was held by philosophers to consist of a condition of stationary equilibrium, preserving what they valued most against historical forces making for its destruction. But, upon these grounds, to sum up the significance of Greek and Roman civilisation in the formula of the empire of the individual and the present is a total misrepresentation. One part of it may be set aside at once as the very reverse of the truth. There is no intelligible sense in which the ancient state can be identified with the interest of the individual. On the contrary (and this is a truth which Mr Kidd can recognise when it is convenient) ancient civilisation would be much more accurately defined as the subordination of the individual to the State, of the part to the whole. It is on this ground that we can take the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, which gives us the refined essence of ancient thought and feeling, as a wholesome counteractive to all forms of modern individualism, Mr Kidd's among others. But passing this over, it is equally a mistake to look for the characteristic of Greek and Roman civilisation in the domination of the present and the material (in Mr Kidd's phrase, "the material interests of the existing individuals in the present time") over the future and the spiritual. The student of Greek and Roman institutions knows that precisely the opposite was the case. The ancient family, for instance, is always conceived of as a corporation, including the vast company of its dead and the still vaster of those who are to come. So far from being free to seek his present interest, the paterfamilias was bound by the most sacred obligation to treat his life and property, including his sons and daughters, as a trust momentarily confided to him by the unseen powers. This view of the relation of the present to the past and the future, so tellingly illustrated in the story of Herodotus that it was Spartans who had a family to leave, and not those who were wifeless or childless, that were chosen for the forlorn hope of Thermopylæ, is too familiar to be further dwelt upon. Needless to repeat, it stands in express contradiction to Mr Kidd's theory.

What is true of ancient institutions is still more true of ancient literature and philosophy. I have already pointed out how misleading are the deductions from Mr Kidd's hypothesis as to the essential meaning of the political teaching of Plato and Aristotle. The fallacy is equally manifest from the point of view of their ideals of human happiness. Neither in the *Republic* nor in the *Ethics* is there any ground for asserting that in their view the highest form of happiness falls (to use Mr Kidd's stock phrase) within "the limits of mere political consciousness." Both the Platonic "Philosophy" and the Aristotelian "Theoria" carry us beyond these limits, and are expressly defined as a union of the human and divine. In regard to Greek philosophy on the whole, one would have thought that the rise of cosmopolitan feeling, and even of a peculiarly intense and dignified form of "cosmic emotion" in the Stoics, would have given pause to any attempt to represent it as the empire of the finite and the mundane. It is the peculiarity of Mr Kidd's method, however, to make no allowance for change

and development within the lines of his hard and fast divisions. It appears to make no difference that even the words which he quotes from M. Aurelius in the above passage and several pages further on to point the moral of the occupation of the Stoic with the present, occur in a passage the express purport of which is the *nothingness* of time.

It is all the more strange that Mr Kidd should misunderstand the essential import of the Stoic philosophy, seeing that its forecast of a universal brotherhood and an invisible church was precisely the term he required to unite the ancient with the Christian world, and to make the transition from the one to the other seem other than miraculous.

It would carry me beyond the limits of this review to follow Mr Kidd into the detailed application of his theory to the phenomena of modern civilisation. It is interesting, however, to note, in connection with what has just been said, how it has misled him in the interpretation of modern not less seriously than of ancient philosophy. It is only the perversity of historical criticism that can find the essential significance of Hobbes in the superficial allusions in the *Leviathan* to a law of God above the natural and necessary egoism of individuals; that can set aside the whole Hegelian movement, and especially Hegel's theory of the State, as a mere glorification of the political consciousness; and that can treat Utilitarianism, after Carlyle, as a particularly degraded form of materialism. The latter mistake is again the more remarkable, seeing that the inner development of English Utilitarianism, from the barren individualism of the early part of the nineteenth century to the altruistic philosophy of which Mr Kidd himself is an advocate, furnishes an excellent illustration of the transition which, he rightly holds, constitutes the significance of the present time. The defect of latter-day Utilitarianism is not that it puts the individual before society, the few before the many, or even the present before the future, but that it has never entirely put off the mechanical way of conceiving of society as an aggregate of individuals. This, however, is a defect which lies outside Mr Kidd's view for the very good reason that to a large extent he shares it.

It might be urged in extenuation of Mr Kidd's philosophical interpretations, that he is at least at one with the best thinkers of recent times in his demand for a return to Kant. There are, however, it should be remembered, two classes of thinkers who urge us "back to Kant." There are those who do so because they do not understand what has since been done and therefore think that nothing has been done at all, and there are those who do so because they desire to understand it better, and to do it over again for themselves. Moreover, it has to be remembered that when we have got back to Kant, we are apt to find that there are two philosophers of that name between whom we have to choose. There is the Kant whose ideas may be made the starting-point of Agnosticism as in England, of Pessimism as in Germany; and there is the Kant who foreshadows a theory of the human reason which renders the dualistic conceptions that are covered by both of these schemes of thought, henceforth untenable. Our chief complaint of Mr Kidd is, that the assumptions which underlie his

philosophy of history connect him rather with the former than with the latter.

Criticism, however, of this kind is always an ungrateful task, and we gladly return to points on which we find ourselves in substantial agreement with Mr Kidd. Our objection is not that he has no important message to his generation, but that in the attempt to express it he is hampered by presuppositions which are not only untenable in themselves, but are in express contradiction to the doctrine he seeks to establish. On the truth and significance of that doctrine itself most readers of the *Hibbert Journal*, whatever their philosophical views, will find small ground for disagreement. Though expressing himself obscurely, and often contradictorily, Mr Kidd puts forward a plea for the interpretation of history as the evolution of a moral purpose, which we need have no difficulty in accepting. He rightly interprets the significance of the present age as springing from the fact that for the first time in history this purpose has risen into clear consciousness, and promises to become an operative motive in public and private life. In spite of new forms of organised selfishness (of which gigantic trade monopolies are taken as an outstanding type), there is everywhere manifest a new spirit of fellowship and toleration. Alike in explosions of political and industrial rebellion, in the still small voice of individual conscience, and in the prevailing enthusiasm for educational and political reconstruction, we read the signs of a larger ideal of human life—a larger self (to use a phrase which carries us beyond Mr Kidd's philosophy), and a deeper sense of responsibility. If we go a step further, and claim that this new sense of responsibility is at once the product and the guarantee of the divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them as we may in the jostle and competition of the struggle for individual and national existence, we will not, we believe, be going beyond Mr Kidd's meaning, though we have undoubtedly broken away from the strict interpretation of the formula in which he obscurely expresses it.

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Encyclopædia Biblica.—Edited by T. K. Cheyne, D. Litt., D.D., and J. Sutherland Black, M.A., LL.D.—A. & C. Black, Vol. iii., 1902.

I. OLD TESTAMENT.

THE *Encyclopædia Biblica* has been recognised by those most competent to pronounce an opinion as one of the most valuable and stimulating works on the Bible ever published. Brilliantly edited, pressing into its service many of the ablest Biblical scholars of our time, packed with information, much of it nowhere so readily accessible, precise and finished in scholarship,

beautifully produced, it has proved itself a treasured companion to the worker who keeps it in constant use. Yet it would not be possible to speak of it with unmingled praise: however warm the recognition of its merits, it must be tempered with grave reserves. And these have needed to be the more emphatically expressed as each new volume has issued from the press. What the fourth volume may have in store for us remains to be seen, but the third volume presents features that may be fairly called astounding. Naturally, they have attracted great attention, and the less questionable elements in the volume have probably received much less than their due. So far as the Old Testament is concerned, it is mainly in Professor Cheyne's own articles that hostile, and even friendly, criticism will find most to attack. It is not that he has carried the work of disintegrating criticism to unparalleled lengths, though his articles on Isaiah and Job in the second volume pushed analysis to an extreme, nor that his historical scepticism has led him to deny facts generally accepted by critics, even though in this volume Moses disappears and a clan takes his place. Serious though the issues thus raised may be, they pale in comparison with the textual criticism that flourishes unchecked, growing to vaster proportions with each new volume. That the text is often corrupt, few who have worked at the Old Testament will venture to deny. But Professor Cheyne assumes that corruption has been more widespread than any critic has even imagined. If so, the logical position is one of scepticism as to the possibility of recovering the original text. A lucky hit may give us the true text, to the general satisfaction of scholars, when the Hebrew and the versions alike fail us. But at the very best a happy guess can only be practically certain, and such guesses are comparatively rare. Frequently critics may be agreed that a passage needs emendation, but may be wholly at variance as to the correction that should be made. In such cases it is useless to talk of certainty. There are, however, innumerable examples in this volume of emendations of which one can only say not merely that there is no adequate reason for suspecting the accuracy of the text, but that if there were, the correction proposed is anything but felicitous. And the consequence is that a large number of the textual results are dubious in the highest degree, and, what is even more unfortunate, the elaborate historical theories deduced from them are such as no scholar is likely to accept. By this time the points of Canon Cheyne's Jerahmeel theory are probably pretty well known, and I do not propose to illustrate it in detail. It was too much in evidence in the second volume, but there only twenty-three names were enumerated as probably corruptions of Jerahmeel, though it was said that the list was "probably incomplete." In the meantime the theory has developed so rapidly that in the third volume this name is to be found in disguises by the hundred. It is Protean and all-pervasive; and in the light of this text critical discovery, the Hebrew Bible is largely rewritten, and the history altered out of all recognition. Where Jerahmeel is inconvenient, Rehoboth or Zarephath take its place. If the reader asks, What is Jerahmeel? there is some difficulty in answering the question. It plays

many parts. Now it is a country, now a town, sometimes a river, sometimes a mountain, or again it may be a man's name. Wherever Professor Cheyne is on Old Testament ground, it is safe to say that Jerahmeel will not be far away. When it is remembered that the text is freely rewritten in many other respects, the Psalms supplying a striking example, it will be seen on what a risky voyage the critical landsman ventures when he takes the new textual criticism for his compass, and Dr Cheyne sits at the helm. One who has followed his work closely in earlier years with warm admiration for his deep learning, his fertility and suggestiveness, his penetrating and sympathetic exegesis, his brilliance and insight, and who is conscious of owing him much for all he has learnt from him, can express dissent from him only with real distress. But it seems none the less a plain duty to do it. Not, of course, that everything he has contributed to this volume is vitiated by the Jerahmeel theory. But it will be very difficult for those who are not experts to discriminate. He writes a very large number of articles, including those on the Book of Lamentations, on Mizraim, which contains a useful but very revolutionary statement of Winckler's and his own theories as to the two Musris, Moses, Paradise, Psalms, incorporating in this much of Robertson Smith's article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. He has also written part of the article on Prophetic Literature, containing much that is interesting and valuable.

But leaving this aside, it ought to be recognised, and indeed emphasised, that this volume contains a mass of precious information, for which every student who avails himself of it can only be deeply grateful. It was a happy idea to include general articles on classes of literature, in addition to the special articles on individual books. In this volume we have three articles of this kind: Law Literature, Poetical Literature, and Prophetic Literature. The first of these is by Professor G. B. Gray. It exhibits the Jewish theory of the origin of the law, the evidence for early written laws, the object of writing them, and the extent of their circulation, and sketches the history of Hebrew legislation in six periods. The article forms an excellent supplement to Professor Moore's elaborate articles on individual books of the Hexateuch, of which Leviticus and Numbers fall within this volume. Students will turn with great interest to Duhm's article on Poetical Literature. He regards the Song of Deborah as a product of her age; and on the ground that the author was one who was more interested in the marshalling and organising of the forces than in the fight itself, and who had authority to speak in the name of the "mal'ak Yahwè," attributes the poem to Deborah herself. He still, one is relieved to see, accepts the Davidic authorship of the elegy on Saul and Jonathan and that on Abner. The blessing of Jacob he assigns to the time when David was king at Hebron, and suggests Abiathar as the author. The quatrain recovered from the LXX by Wellhausen, and often regarded as a genuine utterance of Solomon at the dedication of the temple, preserved in the Book of Jashar, he regards as "certainly belonging to a later time." No reason is assigned, but probably it is the assertion in the first line that Yahwè set the sun in

the heavens that seems too advanced for Solomon. To this kind of criticism Gunkel's commentary on Genesis supplies a much wanted corrective, and the judgment expressed on certain poems in Genesis, that their subject-matter is not old-Israelitish, "seems sufficiently proved by the fact of Yahwè's being thought of as dwelling in heaven," should be compared with Gunkel's discussion, and probably revised in the light of it. It will come as a surprise to those who specially associate Duhm's name with a predilection for extravagantly late dates, a monomania, as Cornill has justly called it, to find that he not only maintains the dramatic theory of the Song of Songs, but assigns it to the century after Solomon, when the N. Israelite no longer felt sore over his oppression, but "when it was still not unpleasing to give a burlesque description of his character." Specially interesting is the discussion of the prophetic addresses, which "are really not speeches but songs." Several specimens are given. Many readers will be glad to have the brief statement of Duhm's metrical theories, but they should carefully read Budde's very judicious discussion in the corresponding article in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*. The article on Prophetic Literature is long, and in many respects very good. Omitting Canon Robinson's section on Christian Prophets, which does not concern us, the article fills twenty-two pages. Prof. Cheyne has himself contributed largely to it; and apart from those portions which expound or imply the Jerahmeelite theory, his discussion is most thankworthy. Guthe, the author of the article Israel, is responsible for a page which looks as though it had originally belonged to the large article. Volz, who is best known by his radical monograph *Die vorexilische Jahveprophetie und der Messias*, writes excellently on the prophetic consciousness, on which Prof. Cheyne, too, says much that is helpful and suggestive. That Prof. Toy should contribute a thorough and authoritative article on Proverbs will be expected by all who know his valuable commentary, yet it would surely have been better to entrust it to some competent scholar who had not already published a book on the subject. The article on Nahum is from the pen of Budde. He accepts the view that to Nahum's original prophecy an editor prefixed a late alphabetical poem, though this, in its later part, has been so much altered that complete restoration is not to be achieved. The authentic prophecy of Nahum he assigns to a time shortly after the death of Assurbanipal in 626, rejecting Winckler's ingenious suggestion that its historical occasion was the revolt of Samassumukin of Babylon against Assurbanipal soon after 663. The article on Malachi is Robertson Smith's *Britannica* article revised by Prof. Torrey. The latter scholar has also written the articles on the Family and the Books of Maccabees. These are of considerable fulness, and enriched by several editorial notes.

The article on Names fills thirty pages, and is the work of Nöldeke, Gray and Kautzsch. Nöldeke contributes a valuable discussion of Personal Names, which contains what may be a very significant reference to a possible change of view on a question fundamental for Old Testament criticism. He says: "Important contributions have been made quite recently by

various authors, especially by G. B. Gray (*Studies in Hebrew Proper Names*), who carefully and with marked success determines what kind of name-formation prevailed in the various periods. To a very large extent the present writer agrees with his result." This is rather tantalising. Does it mean that the illustrious Semitist, who in his *Untersuchungen* argued against the Grafian theory, has now given in his adhesion to it? Apparently there is no reference to the arguments derived by Mr Gray from animal names in support of the view that the Semites passed through the totem stage. It would seem from a footnote that Nöldeke still adheres to his rejection of Robertson Smith's totem theory. He says, "the many animal names among the inhabitants of Seir (Gen. xxxvi.) have been noticed by W. R. S. (*Kin.* 218). In some points, it must be admitted, he has gone too far, and his explanation of the facts does not appear satisfactory to the writer of the present article" (col. 3298). The current seems to be flowing at present rather strongly against Robertson Smith's theory, though the able pioneering work by Professor Barton, *A Study of Semitic Origins*, has reinforced it with new arguments, and to the present writer it still seems, on the whole, to give the best explanations of the facts. In his section of the article which deals with Place-names, Mr Gray reiterates the view expressed in his *Hebrew Proper Names*, that many should be traced back to a totem stage of society. Of special value to students of the religion of Israel is the concluding section, Divine Names, contributed by Kautzsch. He seems to favour the view that the name Yahwè was borrowed from the Kenites; and though he admits that it "may have had originally another much more concrete signification than that given in Ex. iii. 14," yet argues that while Hebrew was a living language, the people are not likely to have been completely deluded as to its meaning. He thinks that the interpretation in Ex. iii. 14 need not be rejected as a metaphysical subtlety if we do not force into it the abstract idea of self-existence, and think rather of "the great religious idea of the living God who does not change in His actions." Elohim he explains as a plural of majesty, rejecting the view that it is a relic of an earlier polytheism, as finding no support in the usage of the language. As to its meaning, he commits himself to no definite opinion, but seems to incline to the view held among others by Fleischer, that it means object of dread. He regards the meaning of El as equally uncertain, but his sympathies apparently lean to the interpretation "the strong one." On the much disputed question as to the meaning of the name Yahwè Sebaoth, he reaches the conclusion that originally it meant Yahwè of the hosts of Israel, but that the prophets understood it in the sense of Yahwè of the heavenly hosts, though whether these were the angels or the stars, or both, is not clear.

It is needless to say that Archæology gets a very thorough treatment. Benzinger has fitly been entrusted with several topics, both in social and religious archæology. A very instructive article deals with Law and Justice, and embraces a discussion of law and custom, written and oral laws, administration, punishment, and private law. It forms on the social and

historical side an excellent companion to the article on Law Literature. He also writes on Marriage. The levirate marriage, he explains, in common with many scholars, as due to ancestor-worship. This, however, has not yet been proved to have existed among the Hebrews or their progenitors, and it is very doubtful if it ever will be. It seems better to regard it, with Robertson Smith, as a relic of polyandry. In his article on Mourning Customs, he expresses the opinion that while they owed their form originally to worship of the dead, the rise of the religion of Yahwè introduced a new interpretation, according to which the more innocent were explained as expressions of sorrow, the more dangerous, on account of their connection with heathenism, such as mutilation, being forbidden. Benzinger writes also the articles on four religious festivals—New Moon, New Year, Passover and Feast of Unleavened Bread, and Pentecost. He accepts Wellhausen's view that the silence as to the New Moon festival in the Book of the Covenant and Deuteronomy is not to be explained on the theory that it was so widespread that no legal regulation was necessary, but rather as a deliberate neglect, with the intention of depreciating if not abolishing it. It was so deeply rooted, however, that in spite of its heathenish associations, Ezekiel and the Priestly Code had to recognise it. The common view that the Passover was originally a sacrifice of firstlings he rejects, and agrees with Marti that it was a household rite, designed to protect the members from pestilence by establishing blood communion with the Deity. Marti's explanation of the rite seems to fit the facts better than any of the numerous suggestions that have been made. It is suggested by the narrative of its origin, and several parallels may be quoted in support of it. The feast of unleavened bread was originally quite distinct, and borrowed from the Canaanites. Benzinger also contributes the articles on Nethinim and Palace.

The article on Purim is just now of great interest. For the most part it is the work of Mr C. H. W. Johns. He carefully examines the views of Lagarde, Jensen and Zimmern, but reaches no very definite result. He thinks the Purim festival, in its specifically Jewish form, took its rise in connection with the defeat of Nicanor by Judas Maccabæus on the 13th of Adar 161 B.C., but that the book of Esther drew on Babylonian and to some extent Persian material. Mr Frazer has added an outline of his theory, which will be familiar to all readers of the second edition of *The Golden Bough*. Professor Cheyne adds a column, in which he characteristically connects the story with Jerahmeel (Mordecai being one of the innumerable corruptions of that much-enduring name), and supposes that the original Esther referred to the Jerahmeelite captivity. Purim is explained as a corruption of Ephrath, a place of that name being supposed to exist in Jerahmeel. It is rather strange that no reference is made to Andrew Lang's minute and difficult criticism of Frazer in *Magic and Religion*. Professor Cheyne, however, says, with a good deal of justice, "Even from the point of view of a conservative textual criticism, it is difficult to make a connection of Purim with the Babylonian New Year's festival probable" (col. 3982).

The articles on Priests and Levites are Robertson Smith's *Britannica* articles, revised by Bertholet. Professor Prince writes on Music, and Mr J. L. Myres on Pottery, both comprehensive articles, and enriched with numerous illustrations. The article on Number is by Professor Barton. The sacred or symbolical numbers, three, four, seven, ten, twelve, forty, seventy, are treated in a very interesting way. The sacredness of ten may be partly due to the fact that it is the sum of three and seven, but it is not easy to understand why it should be partly due to its being the basis of the decimal system. It is more obvious to connect it with the number of the fingers. The apocalyptic numbers, three and a half, and six hundred and sixty-six, are explained on the lines proposed by Gunkel. The author expresses the view that Daniel is a composite work, and that the section of the Revelation containing the number of the beast was originally written in Hebrew. Several remarkably good archæological articles have been written by Professor A. R. S. Kennedy. That on Meals should be singled out for special mention. Professor Moore continues his learned and exhaustive articles on Heathenism. In this volume we have Masseba, Molech, Nature Worship, with others of less moment. He thinks the sacrifice of children was borrowed from the Phœnicians, and that the victims were offered to Yahwè, the king, the word being properly vocalised *melek*. The article on Nature Worship, while covering less than three pages, is full and illuminating; it should of course be supplemented by that on Idolatry.

Professor Moore also contributes a seven page article on Philistines. He argues that they are to be identified with the Purusati, were neither of Semitic nor Egyptian race, but came from southern Asia Minor and the regions beyond, having reached a fair level of civilisation, and established themselves in Palestine in the twelfth century B.C. Eduard Meyer has greatly enriched the work with an article on Phœnicia: it covers seventeen pages, and it is needless to say is first-rate. Moab has been entrusted to three writers. Professor G. A. Smith gives an excellent account of the country and people; Wellhausen treats of the history, this part being derived from his *Britannica* article, while Professor Cheyne brings the discussion into connection with the new textual criticism and the Jerahmeelite theory. Dr Driver contributes the article on Meshah. It contains a facsimile of the Moabite Stone, with transliteration, translation and notes. Those who know his earlier work on this inscription in his *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel* will be glad to have this latest statement of his results, which embody the fruits of later investigation, especially by Lidzbarski. The article on Palestine is for the most part the work of Socin, but Mr G. C. Shipley and Mr H. H. W. Pearson have contributed to it, while Professor W. Max Müller writes on the pre-Israelite Political Geography, giving the Egyptian lists, with that of Thutmosis III. as basis, and adding identifications. He has also written the Egyptological articles. Mesopotamia was undertaken by Socin, but owing to his death the work of revising his *Britannica* article had to be done without his aid. It has been completed by Winckler.

There is much more that well deserves notice did space permit of it.

But what has been said will perhaps indicate sufficiently how vast are the treasures, even when all deductions have been made, which are here made accessible to the English student.

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II. NEW TESTAMENT.

IN order to avoid a needless amount of discursiveness, the N.T. articles in this volume of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* may be grasped for the purpose of the present review under three classes: (a) personal or geographical, (b) historical or religious, (c) and literary. The third class happens to be the smallest, and the N.T. articles which give rank to the volume occur in the second class.

(a) As in previous volumes, Prof. Woodhouse gives concise, adequate accounts of the geographical matters that fall to him, including here *Laodicea*, *Lycaonia*, *Pergamos*, *Philadelphia*, *Phrygia*, and *Pontus*. But surely the allusion in Rev. ii. 13 covers more than the imperial cultus? The splendid and influential paganism of the place, and the local Asclepius-cult, to say nothing of the giants' frieze, must have been in the prophet's mind as he wrote; and similarly "the sharp two edged sword" of Rev. ii. 12 alludes to physical disease as a punishment for transgression, rather than to official persecution. Antipas, too, seems an individual, not the type of a long series of martyrs; and there is far more to be said for the literal meaning of *Nicolaitans* than Dr Van Manen, in his article on these errorists, allows. The strong point in favour of the early tradition which makes them followers of Nicolas (Acts vi. 5) is that such an idea could hardly have arisen without some basis of fact, since it was altogether against the interests and habits of primitive tradition to connect an apostolic figure with discreditable practices. Even were this theory set aside, however, the symbolical explanation of the term, which is far more than an ingenious guess, would be preferable to the obsolete anti-Pauline interpretation.

Sober and satisfactory contributions upon the *Mount of Olives* by Prof. Gautier, and on *Matthew* and *Matthias* by Mr W. C. Allen, speak for themselves. The latter writer sees no difficulty in the identification of Matthew and Levi, or in the historical situation of Acts i. 23-26. Less conservative are scholarly articles by Dr Schmiedel upon *Luke*, *Lysanias*, *Mark*, and *Philip*, though one must demur to unduly sceptical statements such as (*e.g.*) that no weight attaches to the remark of the presbyter (reported by Papius) that our second gospel reaches back to the oral communications of Peter. Harnack has recently (in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift für die neueste Wissenschaft*, 1902, 163-166) corroborated the view that Mark's gospel originated in Rome, and that the odd epithet "stump-fingered" is, as Schmiedel argues, a title of honour; on becoming a Christian, he thus mutilated himself, "ut sacerdotio reprobis fieret." But Harnack's further sugges-

tion strikes one as more modern and acute than probable, viz., that this title was expressly and aptly conjoined with that of author; mutilated as he was, he put the gospel on paper. Thanks to the courtesy of Dr Sutherland Black, I am able to give the amended form of col. 2962 in Dr Schmiedel's important article on *Mary*, with which his paper in the *Protestant Monatshefte* for March of the present year (pp. 85-95) should be compared. Read in § 14 *d*:—"y. cui desponsata [without erat] Maria, *Maria autem* genuit Jesum. Old Lat. *c.* δ cui desponsata . . . in *d* γ δ . . . *e.* (Jacob autem genuit Joseph) *a.* cui desponsata virgo Maria *peperit* (Christum) Jesum. Old Lat. *d.* β . to whom *was* espoused the virgin Mary, *who* (fem.) bore Jesus. Syr. cur.," etc. The assignation of the magnificat to Elizabeth, not to Mary, has stirred a wider interest than Dr Schmiedel realises; even French Catholic scholars like Morin, Jacobé, Durand, and Lépin are in the field, to say nothing of Bardenhewer, Köstlin, and Spitta recently.

In Prof. Cheyne's article on *Nazareth* the conjectural emendation δ $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\iota\omicron\varsigma$ for $\tau\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{\omicron}\nu$ in John i. 45 is (like his similar attempt to re-write John i. 50, on col. 3338) not convincing. How could the former messianic title ever be flattened down into the latter, even were the textual obstacle less formidable? Nor do the geographical difficulties, however great they may be, much less the discrepancies of the gospels, shut us up to a solution which doubts the very existence of a city called Nazareth in the time of Jesus, reducing the whole tradition to a misunderstanding of the original "Bethlehem-nazareth." For the story of the rejection at Nazareth and Marcion's attitude to it, a reference may be added to Hilgenfeld's essay in his *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft. Theologie* (1902), pp. 127-144. It should be said that Dr E. A. Abbott's biographies of *Lazarus* and *Nicodemus*, like Prof. Cheyne's account of *Nathanael*, reflect lucidly the dominant critical position upon the Fourth gospel, according to which all such figures are more or less symbolical embodiments of some idea or another; literary figures, not historical realities. On the score of literary and psychological probability, one would feel more satisfied to see this view—which has undoubtedly some basis—presented in a manner better fitted to do justice to the element of unconsciousness in the working of later reverence and imagination upon a stratum of historical tradition. As it is often put, it suggests too barely a *tour-de-force* on the part of a semi-philosophic Christian writing a religious romance. Now the Fourth gospel is highly imaginative and idealistic, but this mystic aim is far from being incompatible with the preservation and use of earlier historical narratives in some shape or another. To say this, I know, is to swim against the tide as it runs at present. But one cannot help feeling that the currents will not run permanently in exactly their present direction.

Finally, apropos of the group of articles on *Pilate* (Prof. Woodhouse), *Pavement and Prætorium* (by Mr Maurice A. Canney), it is to be observed that the *Acta Pilati* have just been handled afresh by von Dobschütz and Mommsen in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift* (1902, pp. 89-114, 198-205), and that Phil. i. 13 must be referred to the court of judicial Appeal (as

Mommsen has elsewhere shown). Kreyenbühl in the same *Zeitschrift* (1902, 15–22) agrees with Spiess and Guthe that Jesus was condemned at Herod's palace, not at the fortress of Antonia. Mr Canney concludes that "the tessellated pavement called Gabbatha" (John xix. 13) existed only in the writer's imagination. The form of the word may be artificial, as he argues, but surely it is unthinkable that the writer himself attached no meaning to it. *Credat Judæus Apella!*

(b) Dr Jülicher's four articles on *Logos, Mystery, Parables, Paraclete*, are commendably brief and free from eccentricities. After Jensen's damaging criticism, however, was it worth while to notice Zimmern's precarious analogy between the Paraclete and the Babylonian Gibil? In a review (*Theol. Litteraturzeitung*, 1902, 302–304) of Reitzenstein's monograph, it is worth noticing that Dr Anrich has recently emphasised the traces of an Egyptian exploitation of the Hellenic logos-idea which is not without significance for the later Philonic and Christian usage sketched by Prof. Jülicher. Dr Nestle's treatment of the *Lord's Prayer*, as of *Mammon*, is marked by that wealth and mastery of *minutiæ* which characterises his scholarship; and, in his acute examination of Rom. iii. 25 (article *Mercy Seat*), Dr Deissmann restates his former view that here, as in several other passages (e.g. John vi. 53 f., 1 John i. 7, 1 Cor. x. 16), the blood of Christ is not His blood shed on Calvary, but "the spiritual blood of the exalted Saviour." Also, in a capital survey of the *Lord's Day*, he seems still inclined to favour the analogy of the Augustan day *Sebaste*, a monthly (or weekly) day in the usage of Asia Minor. The force of Rev. i. 10 would then be: "we Christians have our imperial day too on which we celebrate the birthday of *our Lord and Emperor*" (i.e. His resurrection day).

There is an article on *Prayer* by Prof. Cheyne, and Prophecy is accidentally discussed in the joint articles on *Messiah* and *Prophetic Literature* (§§ 30–33). But the two problems of N.T. religion which fall to receive trenchant and expert treatment in this volume are (i.) the Virgin-birth, discussed by Dr Schmiedel (*Mary*) and Dr Usener (*Nativity*), and (ii.) the ecclesiastical organisation of the early church, which is handled by Canon Robinson (*Presbyter*) and Dr Schmiedel (*Ministry*)—the last named article occupying twenty-five pages, which, after a somewhat unpromising start, afford an extreme but masterly survey of the whole discipline, beliefs, and inner constitution of the primitive church. Details apart, it forms an unusually serviceable conspectus of a complex subject. It is not the last word, but it is a real contribution. As to the Virgin-birth, both critics sum up very strongly from independent positions against the historicity of the early narratives in Matthew and Luke. So far as I can observe, the relevant arguments are stated with fulness, proportion, and considerable fairness, although one or two textual points are pressed too sharply, and no comparison is made between the gospel and the apocalyptic origin of Rev. xii. with its fantastic Judaism. Nothing very fresh has been said, but the writers have put their case positively, and stated it with skill—more moderately and effectively at any rate than the ordinary English reader

has been hitherto accustomed to see it presented. The composite nature of Luke i. and the presence there of a redactor's hand are advocated by a recent writer (J. R. Wilkinson) in "A Johannine document in Luke's Gospel" (1902), who regards Luke i. 29-45 as an insertion. Soltau has published also a thorough little pamphlet on the subject, "die Geburtsgeschichte Jesu" (1902), and on the baptism of Jesus (col. 3348) a fresh contribution has appeared from Jacoby, "ein bisher unbeachter apokrypher Bericht über die Taufe Jesu," etc. (1902). Dieterich's new essay on the wise men from the East (in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift*, 1902, pp. 1-14) and Conybeare's note on Luke i.-ii. (*ibid.*, 192-197) amplify one or two points made by Usener, and Barth's *Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu* (pp. 250 f.) is worth study on this problem. But the limitations of space forbid here any detailed discussion of the evidence. Suffice it to direct attention to these articles by Dr Usener and Dr Schmiedel as competent and first-rate essays, which deserve alert recognition. I ought also to chronicle an anonymous article on the *Millennium*, which correctly points back to the Persian background of the belief. But, besides Rabbinic speculation, Hellenic influences lie behind this curious hope in the Apocalypse; a thousand years, Plato's sacred term, meant tenfold the normal length of the ideal human life (*Republic*, 615), and naturally expressed the halcyon period of future bliss.

(c) No one familiar with what is being done upon the N.T. at the present day will be disposed to deny that conservative and liberal critics alike often carry on their work with quite an inadequate recognition of the fact that these documents formed the literature of a society; and further, that this society was Christian, however variously its Christianity found expression. In the present volume this consideration has small scope, owing to the paucity of opportunities for handling the N.T. literature. The main article is by Dr Orello Cone on the Epistles of Peter, assigning 1 Peter to 75-125 A.D. and 2 Peter to the second century. The case for Silvanus as the author or amanuensis of 1 Peter is, however, stronger than he seems to admit; the Trajanic date is no longer held so universally; and some fuller attention should have been given to the modifications involved in the pseudonymous hypothesis as applied to the epistle. Dr Cone ignores more than some recent vagaries of criticism upon 2 Peter. Perhaps lack of space prevented him from offering a more thorough-going discussion of its linguistic features, eschatology, and literary filiations; but it makes one feel rather uncomfortable to read an article on 1 Peter without coming across any reference to Usteri's exhaustive edition. How long, by the way, are we to wait for a really critical English commentary on either or both of the Petrine letters?

If Dr Cone's article is free from caprice and provincialism, the same unfortunately cannot be said of several sections in the articles contributed by Dr van Manen of Leyden upon *Philemon* (epistle to), *Philippians*, and *Old-Christian Literature*, in which, as in part of his article on *Paul*, the Dutch critic agrees with Loman, Steck, and some others in assigning all the Pauline epistles to the fertility of a shamefully unappreciated school in the second

century which occupied its leisure and served its own religious ends by thus transforming the scanty and bare lineaments of a certain plain Christian preacher called Paul. It is needless at this time of day to notice seriously such extravagances of criticism, particularly as Dr Schmiedel himself, in an earlier volume of the *Encyclopædia*, has given one or two of the leading and irrefutable arguments against it. There are features in the Pauline epistles, as any practised scholar is aware, which are just sufficient to float this leaky hypothesis, but they will not launch it through the surf of scientific proof; indeed it lies wrecked and riddled with shot. In the history of literature it is paralleled by the hypothesis constructed out of equally real and equally subordinate phenomena in the Shakesperian dramas, which have given rise to the fond delusion that Francis Bacon has for too long been defrauded of a dramatic crown. Most of what Dr van Manen urges on behalf of thoroughness in criticism, therefore, is entirely irrelevant. He should know that the almost complete rejection of his views, as of those advocated by similar anarchists like Havet and Maurice Vernes upon the O.T., is due to no obscurantism, but to a more scientific and balanced grasp of the whole question at issue by competent judges of evidence. The most regrettable result in the present case is that several pages of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* will either mislead or perplex the ordinary reader, whilst for the trained scholar they will be so much blank paper. It is a pity also that in an article on Paul some of the valuable space at the writer's disposal cannot be spent on his relation to Jesus and on his attitude to contemporary Christianity. Dr van Manen's further remarks on the scientifically indefensible distinction between the N.T. and early Christian literature are all right. But they are not just to Krüger, who himself admits (*das Dogma*, 1896, p. 23 n.) that the distinction previously followed by him in his handbook between *e.g.* the gnostic literature and the early Christian literature is "ein wissenschaftlicher Unding," or to Wrede, whose essay on N.T. theology is totally overlooked. Otherwise the article on *Old-Christian Literature* gives a decent resumé of the subject, though biassed by an unjustifiable scepticism again and again.

In conclusion, it is hardly needful, and yet it is bare justice, to say that this volume of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, like its predecessors, is edited and printed in really splendid style. Clear type, good margins, incessant cross-references, are its material claims to gratitude. The high level of scholarship hitherto displayed is well maintained, and the book forms quite an indispensable equipment for any English reader who addresses himself to the criticism of the N.T. literature. It is a book to work with, and, as a scholar's *vade-mecum*, easily outstrips any theological dictionary before the public. It provokes one—to bad words now and then, some would confess, as well as to good works; for a few of the N.T. articles (as I have already hinted) seem cheerfully oblivious of the critical ideal which, even in a dictionary, is to be like Handel's angels "bright and fair,"—bright if possible, but judicially fair at any cost. Here it is sometimes *vice versa*. Still the large majority of the contributions noticed in this review are serious and

successful attempts to summarise afresh the results and methods of modern criticism upon the N.T. And even when he is obliged to differ, and differ acutely, the reader will generally find he is learning something about historical research. It augurs well for the future of English theology that its students are being equipped for their growingly delicate task with such material as that afforded, for example, in one year by a book like *Contentio Veritatis*—remarkable for its spirit and origin, even more than for its contents—and by the contributions of those scholars who have enriched this volume of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* to their own credit and to the profit, if not always to the comfort, of their readers.

I have noted the following errata: they are scanty and minor.

Column	2962	line	24	from	foot	read	'Ἰησοῦς.
„	3064	„	30	„	top	„	1882 for 1881.
„	3097	„	12	„	„	„	background.
„	3195	„	4	„	foot	„	into.
„	3337	„	33	„	„	„	and was put.
„	3343	„	37	„	top	add	'a' after 'in.'
„	3345	„	23	„	foot	read	(through . . .).
„	3360	„	33	„	„	add	bracket after ἡῶν.
„	3563	„	12	„	top	read	here.
„	3681	„	34	„	foot	„	'2 Tim. iv. 11.'
„	3825	„	24	„	top	„	soul.

Ἰερουσαλήμ is unaccented in column 3627 (line 38 from foot); and in the article *Nativity*, *JPT* is four times misprinted (columns 3341, 3345, 3349, 3351) as *ZPT*. Some allusion to Rev. xviii. 12 might also have been expected under the title *Marble*.

JAMES MOFFATT.

DUNDONALD, N.B.

*Schmiedel on Primitive Organisation: A Criticism.*¹

THIS article by Professor Schmiedel is the most important contribution to the knowledge of the organisation of the Primitive Church, from its beginning down to the close of the second century, that has appeared in this country since the publication of the late Dr Hatch's *Bampton Lectures* in 1881. The translation of these lectures by Professor Adolf Harnack of Berlin, and the notes which the translator added, formed the starting-point of a new and searching investigation and discussion of *sources* on the part of German ecclesiastical historians and jurists, to which the discovery of the *Didache*, and its publication in 1883, gave a great impetus. Harnack himself, founding on the investigations of Hatch and on the

¹ *Encyclopædia Biblica*. . . . Article, "Ministry," by Professor Paul W. Schmiedel of Zurich.

Didache, constructed a theory of the origin and growth of the Primitive Christian organisation which was at once adopted by such distinguished scholars as Weizsäcker and Sohm, and which has influenced most men since. It was, however, opposed by Loening, Seyerlen, and Loofs, and that with reason. Echoes of these discussions appeared in an interesting series of articles in the *Expositor* (1887, Jan.-June); but they were almost entirely occupied with what is called in Germany the Hatch-Harnack theory, and little reference was made to the work of other German scholars. Professor Schmiedel's article gives a complete summary of all these investigations and discussions, embodied in his own vigorous and erudite account of the growth of the earliest Christian institutions.

Professor Schmiedel's article, so far as it concerns the apostolic age, is based on critical methods and results which I do not accept. These results have been stated in his articles on the *Gospels* and on the *Acts of the Apostles* published in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. They are applied to various problems suggested in the article on the *Ministry*. It is obvious that it is impossible to discuss so large a problem in space allotted to me here, and I trust that the simple statement of the different point of view may not be thought uncourteous.

This difference of critical standpoint makes it impossible for me to agree with a very great deal that is said in paragraphs 1-7, and with many statements made throughout the article. Let me take one illustration. It is said that the passage in Matt. xvi. about the Church could not have come as it stands from the lips of our Lord, and in particular that He *could* not have used the word "ecclesia"; and the main reason given is that our Lord sought to reform hearts, and not external conditions. To argue from that statement, however true it may be, that Jesus had no intention to found a religious community, and could not have used the word "church," seems to me to be purely subjective, and *therefore* untrustworthy reasoning. Besides, while the word "church" has "its home in the Pauline literature," Weizsäcker seems to be correct when he says that its use in Gal. i. 13 shows that St Paul found the word existing within Christian circles when he embraced the new faith; and to find the word in common use at so early a date means, to my mind, to trace it back to Jesus Himself. The trend of modern criticism has been to put St Paul's conversion much closer to the crucifixion than it was formerly held to be. St Paul implies that the words of the eucharistic formula (Mark xiv. 22-24, Matt. xxvi. 26-28) came from Jesus; he takes it for granted that everyone who becomes a Christian (himself included) must be baptised. We have thus, quite independently of the Gospels or of the Acts of the Apostles, "church," "baptism" "the eucharist," all implying a religious community, all in common use, in word and thought, at a time scarcely two years after the death of our Lord. That means to me that they are to be attributed to Jesus Himself.

But while our critical standpoints are so different that Professor Schmiedel may perhaps think me incompetent to discuss his article, the

difference does not prevent my recognising the excellence of the article taken as a whole.

Among its many excellent features these ought to be mentioned:—

(1) The investigation begins with the true historical starting-point—the Epistles of St Paul. The more one examines what is said in the Acts of the Apostles, the more indefinite the information there given seems to be. The Epistle to the Corinthians gives clearer pictures of the worship and organisation of the Primitive Church than any other document till we reach the *Canons of Hippolytus* in the beginning of the third century. The description of ecclesiastical organisation in the Acts of the Apostles is so indefinite that it is possible for an Episcopalian, a Congregationalist or a Presbyterian to discover his own system of Church Government portrayed there, and this not because the Acts is unauthentic or untrustworthy, but simply because it gives no minute information. No such party use can be made of the Epistle to the Corinthians.

(2) The freedom in organisation which St Paul permitted to his converts is clearly recognised, and the information collected and condensed in paragraphs 8–16 is particularly valuable. Not that I can agree to all that is deduced from the evidence presented. Loofs has well remarked that we know absolutely nothing about the house-churches save that they existed. We do not know whether there was a general assembly of the brethren in the places where they existed, nor, if there was, what was the relation of these house-churches to that common meeting. Professor Schmiedel seems to speak as if we had that knowledge. Then while Professor Schmiedel is quite right in declaring that the internal organisation of the Christian communities owed very little to the Jewish Synagogal system, I question whether he can attribute so much as he does to imitation of the pagan societies for the practice of the cult of particular deities. It must be kept in mind that we know little more about the organisation of these confraternities than a few general principles; that this information comes from Italy and the West; that the information about the Greek Societies collected by Foucart and Ziebarth refers almost entirely to pre-Christian times; and that the constitutions of the confraternities, especially in the East, were entirely altered, in what way we do not know, under the imperial rule during the first century and a half of the Christian era. All that we can safely say, even after the interesting investigations of Heinrici and of Hatch, is that there was a certain *external* resemblance between the Christian societies and the pagan confraternities, and that, as Professor Schmiedel points out, it was for the advantage of the Christians to make the most of this. I do not think that Professor Schmiedel notices what seems to me to be a strong confirmation of his idea that the Christian societies owed little to the synagogal system, that the Judaising Christians, as opposed to the Gentile and non-Ebionite Jewish Christians, were organised on the model of the synagogue, with elders, archons and an archisynagogos (Epiphanius, *Her.* xxx. 18), *i.e.* in a way different from any Christian church.

(3) The paragraphs (17–20) which discuss the apostolate are also in-

teresting and valuable. I entirely agree with the remark that the word "apostle" was used during the first century in a wider and in a narrower sense, and that the exact meaning of the word in the wider sense is to be found, not in what the man was, but in what he did—the apostle was one who had for his life-work to be a missionary of the Gospel. This applies as strictly to the Twelve as to the "apostles" of the *Didache* and of *Clement*. They therefore cannot be compared with the officials of any long established church. The only safe modern analogy is with the missionary of modern times, especially with those whose work lies among peoples of an ancient civilisation. Their work had the curious double character which is a feature of that of the modern missionary, on the one hand highly autocratic, and on the other purely personal and depending entirely on persuasion. If Professor Schmiedel had the same thorough acquaintance with the weekly work of a missionary in India or in China that he has with the literature of Primitive Christianity, it is possible that he would modify some of his conclusions—such as that the organisation in the pastoral epistles represents an advanced stage, or that the warning addressed to elders in 1st Peter implies a late date in the early history of the Church. There is, however, one remark of our author which shows that he has risen higher above the associations of modern church life than Harnack has done. He tells us (par. 12, d.) that it is possible that such men as Stephanas were *elected* office-bearers, and that although Paul wrote directly to the whole Church, that does not necessarily prove that no office-bearers existed,—remarks which the experience of every mission-field will corroborate.

(4) The criticism of the Hatch-Harnack theory is extremely able and convincing, and is of more value than Seyerlen's (*Ztsch. f. prakt. Theol.* pp. 97 ff., 201 ff., 297 ff.), or even that of Loofs (*Stud. u. Krit.*, 1890, pp. 619 ff.). Loening is almost discredited by his derivation of the episcopate from Simeon through Ignatius (*Gemeindeverfassung des Urchristenthums*). Professor Schmiedel seizes the central point of the whole theory—the letter of the Roman community to that of Corinth, which is commonly called the *First Epistle of Clement*. The one passage on which Harnack builds is:—"Submitting yourselves to your *rulers* and rendering to the *elders* among you the honour which is their due" (1 Clem. i. 3). Harnack sees in this passage a clear separation between "elders" and "rulers," and uses it to explain away the effect of 1 Clem. xlv., xlvii., liv., and lvii. If readers will only compare the exegesis of the passages given by Harnack and by Schmiedel respectively with the original texts, they will prefer that of the latter scholar. It is impossible to follow Professor Schmiedel into the details of his argument; the proofs are marshalled in a very masterly and scholarly way. He altogether denies that the office of *episcopus* as distinct from *presbyter* was an original one, specially connected with the administration of the charity of the congregation. His thought—which lack of space, doubtless, prevented him proving in detail—is that the function of almoners belonged to such church members as were marked out for it by their Christian experience and worth. It has always appeared to me

that this theory is the correct one, and that a clear proof for it is given in the organisation shown in the ancient document which Harnack calls the *Sources of the Apostolic Canons* (*Texte, &c.*, V. ii. 13-15). There the "elders" superintend the pastor or bishop when he distributes the alms to the poor; and this condition of things appears to show the transition stage, when the duties of almoner are in the act of passing over from the elders to the bishop or pastor.

(5) The only remaining portion of this able and interesting article which space permits me to refer to is the concluding paragraphs, where Professor Schmiedel gives his reasons for refusing to believe in the early rise of what is called the "monarchical episcopate." He insists on a much later origin than Dr Lightfoot pled for. Again I find myself in substantial harmony with the general results arrived at by the author, and in almost complete disagreement with his critical methods as applied to the *Pastoral Epistles* and to the *Epistles of Ignatius*.

The phrases "apostolic succession" and "monarchical episcopate," which can scarcely help appearing in these paragraphs, are very ambiguous and need careful definition. The former, "apostolic succession," may mean one of several things:—(1) the simple matter of fact that in almost every congregation there had been since its foundation by a missionary or apostle in the widest sense of the word—the apostle or apostolic man of Tertullian, (*De Præsc.* 32),—a succession of office-bearers; or (2) it may mean this simple matter of fact succession made the basis of a guarantee that the teaching of the Church was correct, while, to make the assurance doubly sure, and to invent a short and easy method of dealing with the Gnostics, the postulate was added that such leaders were vouchsafed a *charisma veritatis*; the succession might be in the bishops and elders, as in Irenæus, or in the bishops, as in Tertullian; and there was this minimum of fact in the postulate that many of the leaders were esteemed to be prophets (Polycarp, Ignatius, Melito, etc.); or (3) a succession of "gnostical teachers," not chosen by man, but sent by God (as in Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, vi. 13); or (4) successions of "elders" who, in the "disciple company," which is the church, represent the apostles as in Ignatius (*Magn.* 6) and in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (ii. 28); or (5) the idea that God appoints directly in every generation men who are the representatives of Christ, as the apostles were in the first generation, and on whom He bestows the power to forgive sins, which was the main idea with Calixtus (Tertullian, *De Pud.* 1, 21) and with Cyprian; or (6) such a modern hybrid theory as Bishop Gore has exhibited in his *Church and the Ministry*. Professor Schmiedel has not defined his use of the word.

The phrase "monarchical episcopate" is as misleading. Modern associations, hard to be got rid of, lead us to associate certain ideas with the word "bishop"; and when "monarchical" is added, confusion of thought is almost inevitable. These "monarchs" were in the overwhelming majority of cases the pastors of a few score of Christian families; and a rule of the early Church provided that, even when the little

community consisted of fewer than twelve families, they were nevertheless to organise themselves into a church and select a *bishop* (*Texte, etc.*, II. v. 7, 8) to be their leader. What was the status of this bishop or pastor (for the terms are synonymous down to the time of Cyprian at least (*Ep.* lxvi. 5; Eusebius, H.E. VII., xxviii. 1)? Professor Schmiedel rightly distinguishes two stages. (1) The bishop was chief among several "elders," either because he represented the Church to outsiders (*Hermas, Vis.* ii. 4) or because he had prominent prophetic gifts which the others had not, or for some other reason. (2) Next, the difference was recognised in a definite way, when the privilege of one special seat in the church and of ordaining all subordinate office-bearers was reserved to one man; this gives us a distinctly "three-fold ministry"; it must have existed earlier, but we do not find the exact difference stated till the third century. (3) Then the *episcopus* became an autocrat, deeming himself able to supersede his session of "elders" if they disagreed with him, as did Cyprian, and having as his distinctive mark that he alone could impart the Holy Spirit and announce the forgiveness of sins; this was Cyprian's idea, though it was probably a creation of the Roman Church.

Professor Schmiedel distinguishes between the first and the second, but not between the second and the third. All three were congregational as opposed to diocesan bishops, for the latter did not appear till the sixth century. He further thinks that the "acme of episcopal idea" is to be found in the *Epistles of Ignatius*; and he can hardly believe that the ideas he finds in these letters could be in the Church as early as the first quarter of the second century. He finds also a preparation for these conceptions in the *Pastoral Epistles*, whose date, he thinks, for a variety of reasons, must be late.

Here I am compelled to dissent from the author's views. I believe in the authenticity of the seven Epistles of Ignatius, but they do not appear to me to exhibit the episcopal idea at its acme. This acme was not reached till the time of Cyprian. He has surely overlooked that discipline, in the Ignatian Epistles, is in the hands of the congregational meeting. This appears from *Ephes.* 7; *Magn.* 11; *Phil.* 6; *Smyrn.* 4; where advice to deal with heretics is addressed to the congregation and not to the bishop and office-bearers. It was the congregational meeting that appointed delegates and messengers, and had power to send their bishop to represent them (*Smyrn.* 11; *Polyc.* 7; *Phil.* 10; *Eph.* 1, 2; *Magn.* 2, 6; *Trall.* i.). In short, the powers of the congregational meeting are not much less than they appear to be in the Epistles of St Paul to the Corinthians. We must also remember that the writer is in a high state of tension, and that an oriental, like Ignatius the Syrian, uses very extravagant language when in such a condition.

As for the *Pastoral Epistles*, if it be accepted that an apostle was above all things a missionary, if it be admitted that such men as Stephanas and other early converts might have been elected by the congregations they led, there does not seem to me to be much difficulty in supposing that the Epistles represent an organisation only a little more developed than what

the early Epistles of St Paul exhibit. A missionary—and Timothy and Titus were missionaries—has to do much in the way of advice and guidance, even while the infant churches that he is guiding are being trained to independent action. If one takes the living picture that modern missions in India or China present, it can be easily seen that a missionary does not need to be the official president of a court of “elders” in order to give rebukes to office-bearers, whether in public or in private. The living picture would also inform the critic that there may be an incipient Gnosticism long before it takes such shape as to appear in organised form, and that it has to be carefully watched long before it has reached that stage. We may quite accept the statement of Epiphanius, that Gnosticism did not trouble the Church until the time of Trajan (Eusebius, H.E. iii. 22, 7), and yet understand that incipient Gnosticism had to be watched by the missionaries from a very much earlier date. The differences in language between the Pastoral Epistles and those of St Paul present a more serious problem; but to use the words of a distinguished French critic—“Tous ceux qui ont l’expérience de la parole en publique ne savent ils pas que le ton n’est plus le même quand on parle à une assemblée que lorsqu’ on s’adresse à une personne en particulier.”

Perhaps I have dwelt too much on the points on which one must differ from Professor Schmiedel; but I trust that this will be taken as a proof of my sense of the importance of the article. So important is it, so rich in information carefully gleaned from every literary relic of primitive Christian times, that if it were expanded into a book where Professor Schmiedel had room enough to state his facts and expound his deductions it would form a welcome addition to the literature which deals with a subject of perpetual interest.

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GLASGOW.

The Philosophy of the Christian Religion.—By A. M. Fairbairn, D.D., LL.D.—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1902.

DR FAIRBAIRN is probably, on the whole, our foremost English theologian. We have among us a few scholars who have won even higher distinction in some department of theology,—who have done more original work in Old Testament criticism, in New Testament criticism, or in some branch of ecclesiastical history. There are a few Englishmen who may compare with him in their mastery of all that belongs to the province of ecclesiastical learning in its narrower sense. But we have no one who unites such a vast range of strictly ecclesiastical knowledge with so solid a grasp of those wider sciences without which no knowledge of Christian antiquity can enable the student to grapple effectively with the difficulties of Christian belief for modern men. Dr Fairbairn possesses a knowledge of the history of thought which would be remarkable in a pure philosopher, as well as that

wide knowledge of other religions and their history without which it is impossible to place *a priori* philosophical theories of the universe in their due relation to the historical religions, and in particular to historical Christianity. He has a grasp of the idea of theology as a whole in that noblest sense of the term which has largely dropped out of sight since the days of the great mediæval schoolmen, to whom theology was the queen of sciences, building up upon the data supplied by the special sciences a general theory of the universe—of God and man and nature, and the relations between them. This task of co-ordination is perhaps the special intellectual need of our times. It is comparatively easy to find competent guidance in each of the departments of this comprehensive master-science. But for those whose object is to construct for themselves a theory of the universe which shall also be a faith to live by, the help which they can get from any one of them is too often seriously diminished by the limitations of the specialist. We have philosophers who will show the way to a philosophic theism, but even when this theism is of a kind thoroughly in harmony with Christian conceptions of God and His relation to the world, the philosophic guidance usually fails us just where we leave the conceptions common to all theism and enter upon those which are peculiar to Christian theology—the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement. Or if these conceptions are touched on, we often feel that the Christ of the philosopher has very little connection with the Christ of history; the Christ who appeals to the affections, to the imagination, to the devotion of the Christian, and at least to the reverence and the admiration of the Agnostic. Sometimes, indeed, the Christ of the philosopher—even of philosophers by no means destitute of personal religious feeling—seems to be little more than a metaphysical abstraction, an ingenious device by means of which Christianity has succeeded better than other religions in reconciling “the universal and the particular,” or in steering between a naturalistic Pantheism and a cold and unphilosophical Deism. And if we turn from the more orthodox to the less orthodox philosophers, we often find an equal aloofness from historical fact. Their allusions to historical Christianity are often hardly more than little petulant outbursts of personal anti-Christian bias, or if they do condescend to touch upon the facts of the Christian origins, they often display either an ignorant acquiescence in some conventional popular theology, or the scarcely less ignorant assumption that the latest piece of work turned out from the German theological laboratory is the final result of “criticism.” Then, again, when we turn to the writings of the professed theologians, we find much help—though more help is urgently needed—in construing the ideas of the Pauline and Johannine writers; but the interpreters too seldom tell us how far these ideas are those which they themselves accept, and, in so far as they do accept them, in what relation they stand to such conceptions of God, of the moral ideal, of the process of salvation, of the eschatological hope as may be derived from the best modern philosophy. Too frequently, even when the writer is himself not unversed in modern philosophy, we feel

that we are passing into a different world when he turns from his general theistic apologetic to his treatment of Christian dogma. In part of course that arises from the necessity of the case. The world of Plato or of Kant is a different world from the world of St Paul or St Thomas, but we want a guide to bridge over the gulf between them, to tell us when the Christian thought has really corrected and supplemented the philosophy, and when the theologian, whether Apostolic, Patristic, scholastic or modern, needs to be corrected, limited, supplemented in the light of a philosophy which ignores the results of metaphysical reflection as little as the facts of religious history and the needs of the human soul.

German thought has done more than English towards the sort of co-ordination which we desire, but unfortunately just now the dominant school in German theology is one whose weakest point is its tendency to emphasise and exaggerate the antagonism between philosophy and the Christian revelation. Healthy as may be the reaction against the Hegelian disposition to present Christianity as an abstract philosophy which has nothing but an accidental connection with the facts of the Christian history, those who believe that theism is ultimately grounded upon reason will at least demand a more satisfactory account than is given by the Ritschlians of the relation between the religion of reason and the personal experience of the devout Christian soul enlightened by the Christian revelation. The attempt to base Christianity wholly and exclusively upon personal feeling or intuition is pretty sure to end, as it has always ended in the past, in obscurantism or superstition for the few, and scepticism for the many.

In these reflections I may seem to be wandering somewhat far from Dr Fairbairn and his book. But in stating this theological need of our time, I am probably describing the task which Dr Fairbairn has set before himself as his life's work. The present volume is, of course, not his first contribution to this great work, nor, I trust, will it be his last. But this book is the one in which he has most distinctly and directly approached this supreme problem. To say that he has greatly helped towards its solution is the most that can well be said of any man. The task is one which cannot be completely carried out by any one mind. For not only must the thought of many minds contribute to build up the Christian theology of the future, but that thought must be differently expressed for different readers, and what commends a work to one mind will diminish its usefulness to another. Dr Fairbairn writes more for the student of theology than for the student of philosophy (though the book would be immensely helpful to the latter), and more perhaps for the general reader of education and culture than for either. He is a master of a vigorous and manly style, which frequently rises to the height of real eloquence. He enters into the different problems of thought with just that degree of detail and ἀκριβεια which is possible in a sermon or a lecture to an educated audience. In reading the book we seem generally to be listening to the cultivated preacher or the consummate lecturer. Such a style necessarily involves some generality and allusiveness, at times, it may be, a little vagueness. While Dr

Fairbairn never descends to the level at which rhetoric does duty for thought, the reader will occasionally wish for a little more exactness of statement than is compatible with the literary manner which Dr Fairbairn has adopted. But lest I should be misunderstood, let me add that nothing is more remarkable than the thoroughgoing rationality of Dr Fairbairn's position. Religion for him rests upon a basis of reason—a reason which includes the moral reason, and which allows to the emotions their proper place in life and in religion, while it refuses to surrender to them the supreme direction of thought and of conduct. While he recognises (some perhaps will think not quite adequately) the authority of the Christian consciousness as it has expressed itself in the Church, he refuses to abase the claims of the individual reason and conscience either before an infallible Bible or an infallible Church, or before some mysterious faculty of faith—of faith interpreted as something independent of, opposed to or transcending the light of that human intellect which to Dr Fairbairn is illumined by (while it is not identical with) the divine. There is no claim for a superior faculty or inner light which can dispense with evidence in matters of fact, which can transcend the law of contradiction in matters of speculation, or get “beyond good and evil” in matters of conduct. The appeal is everywhere to reason without any of the disguises and subterfuges which are so popular alike in the schools of philosophy and of theology. If we occasionally feel in the enormous range of subjects covered by the book before us that the appeal is not quite followed out to the bitter end, it would perhaps be sufficient defence of Dr Fairbairn to say that his book is limited to a single volume of 568 pages.

The first part of the book is devoted to what we may call the philosophical prolegomena of theology. Dr Fairbairn's statement of the case for theism is one which will be accepted as sound and satisfactory by most idealists—at least by idealists who are not very Hegelian. Dr Fairbairn is in full sympathy with the growing tendency—so essential to genuine theism—to emphasise the will. “The idea of causation in Nature is a clear, or even inevitable, deduction from will” (p. 34). “The real world of the intellect is of course the intelligible, and neither could exist without the other; *i.e.* there could be no intellect without an intelligible; no intelligible apart from the intellect.” “Since there is this correlation between the intelligible world and the interpretative intellect, they must embody one and the same intelligence” (p. 35). Evolution does not dispense with the necessity of mind as not merely a “first cause,” but a cause which is “immediate, continuous, universal” (p. 39). “It would be hard to set man a severer or a less soluble problem than this: to imagine or discover within Nature as known to him a physical substance, or any concourse or combination of physical elements or qualities, that could, within a universe that knew no life, cause life to begin to be. The frankest terms are here the soberest and the truest; the thing is inconceivable. It is not simply that the primary generation would have to be spontaneous, *i.e.* self-caused, *i.e.* miraculous in the superlative degree—for spontaneous generation is a thing

unknown to experimental science and to biological observation, and is, at best, but a form under which the operation of an unknown cause is disguised, but also because matter cannot be defined save in terms that imply mind" (p. 49). If matter cannot be without mind, that unknown cause must be mind: if the idea of causality is one that is satisfied only by a rational will, nothing but mind can be a cause. "In the strictest sense, matter has no independent being, but spirit has" (p. 57). "The will of God is the energy of the universe" (p. 59).

Then follows a chapter on Morality considered as a revelation of God, and on the difficulty presented by the existence of evil. It is all very sober and sensible, if we do sometimes feel (as in whose treatment of it do we not feel?) that the difficulty is hardly probed to the bottom. The argument turns very largely upon the necessity of freedom for real goodness. And here some of those who will follow Dr Fairbairn's argument with most sympathy would have liked to know Dr Fairbairn's mind more clearly than he has revealed it to us on these three points: (1) To what extent is evil really due to free choice — the sufferings of animals, for instance, or the sins of men brought up in an unfavourable environment? (2) How far does not the necessity of taking means in themselves evil to achieve the end which justifies those means imply a limitation of power in the creative spirit? (3) What is meant by freedom?

"The natural forces that now and then work so disastrously for man are among his most beneficent educators" (p. 137). Yes, upon the supposition that the same end could not be attained without the education; but does not this imply that there is a nature of things, not indeed outside and independent of the divine mind, but still of necessity immanent in the divine nature which limits the good that the divine will can achieve, and makes it impossible to achieve that good without the evil involved in the means?

"Impossibilities must exist to God as well as to men; possible things Omnipotence may achieve, impossible things not even Omnipotence can accomplish. To be Almighty is not to be able to perform what is, in the nature of the case, incapable of performance." This statement of Dr Fairbairn will seem to some of us more evident than the conclusion of his sentence: "and this inability does not in any respect limit the might, it only helps to define its province" (p. 153). Surely this inability to achieve a good end, except by means which are in themselves evil, does involve a limit in a sense in which that limit is constantly denied by many theologians who would not like to be called popular, and still more often by the optimistic philosophy which insists that, from the point of view of the whole, the suffering and the sin which appear to us bad are seen to be not only justified as a means to an end which is good, but to be positively good in themselves. Dr Fairbairn is, indeed, singularly free from the besetting sin of philosophies of history, which tend to justify the Universe by the amusement it affords to the philosophic spectator, and the Deity whom they represent likewise as the spectator of a philosophic world-drama. But he still shrinks from a full recognition of the extent to which theologians have allowed themselves to play

with the term "Infinite," oblivious of the opportunities which they give to the pantheising philosopher. Doubtless there is a sense in which God is rightly called the Infinite, but we wish Dr Fairbairn had told us more distinctly in what sense that term can, and in what sense it cannot, be applied to Him by anyone to whom God is not merely a whole of which human souls are merely parts.

And then again the student of philosophy will feel constrained to ask "What does Dr Fairbairn mean by freedom of the will? Does he mean by freedom 'self-determination,' or does he mean 'indeterminism'; is it freedom in the sense of Bp. Butler or Dr Martineau, or freedom in the sense of Hegel and Green? Does he mean merely that the act to have moral value must really spring from the character; that human acts are not events determined by an impulse *ab extra* like the motions of a billiard-ball in accordance with a mechanical uniformity of succession, but are really the effects of a permanent spirit whose nature is revealed in each of them?" In that sense few indeed will dispute with Dr Fairbairn that freedom is "necessary to morality" and to any spiritualistic theory of the universe whatever. Or does he mean that the particular act must stand in no intelligible relation either to preceding acts or to the character as a whole, so that no conceivable knowledge of the universe as it is now would enable him to predict how any man will act a minute hence? In that case Dr Fairbairn's view is opposed to the prevailing tendency of the most spiritualistic and ethical modern philosophy. We are far from suggesting that the controversy is closed. However much thinkers of the Hegelian type may demonstrate the inconceivability of the hypothesis, the continual reappearance of the refuted "Indeterminism" in men such as Lotze, Renouvier, Howison, James should give pause to the most convinced self-determinist. Dr Fairbairn would not be a solitary exception to the tendency of modern thought if he should desire (as he probably does) definitely to enrol himself on the indeterminist side, but we might have expected him to tell us whether he intends to do so or not; and in view of the immense difficulties of the conception, of its impossibility to so many minds not destitute of strong moral and religious conviction, an apologist, whether for morality or for Christianity, should hesitate before he absolutely commits himself to a view of the question of which indeterminism is an indispensable presupposition.

Then we enter upon the portion of the work in which, I venture to think, Dr Fairbairn's learning and his power of using learning are displayed to the best advantage. Dr Fairbairn here gives us a short review of the history of religion, making it his special object to differentiate Christianity from the other religions of the world, to show what it has in common with them and what is peculiar to itself; and finally, wherein lies the claim of Christianity to be the sole universal religion. It is needless to say that Dr Fairbairn fully recognises the claim of other religions to represent partial aspects of truth and to contain in a sense a divine revelation, a divine preparation for *the* revelation. In all of them "the living heart of the belief

is the theistic idea ; the form in which he expresses it is the accident of time and place, marking the stage and quality of his culture, and connoting the conditions—climatic, geographical, ethnical, and political—under which he has trod” (p. 211). But ample and interesting as is Dr Fairbairn’s commentary on this text, the highest and most permanent value of the book probably lies in its exposure of the shallow and ignorant stuff which often passes for a philosophy of religion, of the vague popular assumption that all the religions (when you have separated from them a removable accident which is contemptuously spoken of as dogma) are simply varying expressions of the same idea, and that it is consequently useless and unphilosophical to persuade a man of a lower religion to accept Christianity ; and again, of the less ignorant but still half-informed assumption that because the founder of Buddhism was not a theist in the sense of Western philosophical theology, his religion has in its essence nothing to do with theology or “ the supernatural.”

“ If the idea of a sovereign moral order, too inexorable to allow the evildoer to escape out of its hands, and too incorruptible to be bribed by sacrifices into connivance at sin, be a theistic idea, then Buddha was a transcendent theist. But his people could not stand where he did ; his philosophy could not become a religion without a person to be worshipped, and thus by a sublime inconsistency of logic, rose in the region of the imagination and the heart to a higher consistency, and deified the denier of the divine” (p. 243). But though Dr Fairbairn fully admits what there is in common between the apotheosis of Buddha and the Christian doctrine about the person of Christ, he is eminently alive to differences between them. There is no space to indicate even in outline Dr Fairbairn’s account of this difference. We might perhaps express it by saying that the position which Buddhism assigns to its founder, and by which alone it became a religion instead of a philosophy, or an ethic, was in fundamental contradiction with its founder’s characteristic ideas, while in Christianity the position assigned to the Founder was, though undoubtedly going beyond any words which are even attributed to Him in the gospels, in fundamental agreement with His ideas, with His own consciousness of Himself, and of His relation to the Father. Such is Dr Fairbairn’s thesis. It is here that he nears the heart of all Christian apologetics. It is in his general statement of the position which Christian theology claims for Christ, of the position which these claims (if they are accepted) assign Christianity in relation to other religions, and his vindication of those claims, that there lies the gist of Dr Fairbairn’s book.

Dr Fairbairn realises that any apologetic which is to be at once philosophical and true to facts must insist with equal strength upon two truths, each of which is apt to be translated into a denial of the other. On the one hand, it must be maintained that the Christ of Christianity was no myth—that it was by virtue of what He actually was that Christ created Christianity. On the other, it must be equally strongly affirmed that it was not by what He actually taught that the creation took place, but by

what His followers came to feel about Him. It was the religious consciousness of His followers that created Christianity, but that consciousness was only made possible by the existence of a unique historical person. "Without the historical Person the ideal would never have existed; but without the ideal, the historical would never have been the source of a universal religion" (p. 477).

The Evangelists, Dr Fairbairn tells us, "are full of the feeling for the time: they understand its men, schools, classes, parties; they know the thoughts that are in the air, the rumours that run along the street; they are familiar with the catchwords and phrases of the period, its conventions, questions, modes of discussion, and style of argument. And all is presented with the utmost realism, so grouped round the central figure as to form a perfect historical picture, He and His setting being so built together as to constitute a single organic whole. Now this appears a feat which the mythical imagination, working with material derived from the Old Testament, could not have performed. It could not have made its hero mythical without making the conditions under which He lived and the persons with whom He lived the same. The realism of these conditions and persons is incompatible with the mythical idealism of Him through whom they are, and whose environment they constitute. The organic unity of person and history seems to involve the reality of both" (pp. 328-329).

It would be scarcely possible, in general terms, without reference to details, better to state the case for the historicity of the gospel picture. That historical picture includes a miraculous element. "The miraculous acts which are ascribed to Jesus have qualities which curiously correspond to His character, or, in other words, they so duplicate and reflect it that the moral attributes which are most distinctive of Him reappear in His acts. When they seem most supernatural, they most completely externalize His nature. The common quality which distinguishes them all may be described as sanity or sobriety" (p. 332). That an exceptional influence of mind upon matter is a feature which cannot be expelled by sober criticism from the narratives of our Lord's life, the present reviewer has no inclination to deny. But he desiderates some attempt to suggest what a miracle means, and what were the limits of this exceptional power. For many minds, Dr Fairbairn's apologetic would have only gained in persuasiveness if he had admitted (as no doubt he would admit) that these narratives do not all stand or fall together. Are the "nature-miracles" as easy to reconcile with philosophical ideas of causality, as difficult to account for as the results of mere misunderstanding or "aftermath," as the spiritual treatment of bodily disease? Does the sending of devils into the herd of swine¹ "correspond with His character" as completely as the healing of a lame man on the Sabbath-day? Is the evidence for the miraculous birth on a level with the evidence for the Resurrection? Is the revivification of the body laid in the tomb on a level in point of evidence with, or as much in accordance with

¹ On p. 443 Dr Fairbairn admits that our reason is "perplexed" by this incident, as by the narrative of the supernatural birth.

reasonably attested analogies as, the appearance of a vision of the risen Lord to the Apostles? Is such a miracle as the appearing of the bodies of the Saints, or the rending of the veil of the Temple, as much characterised by "sanity" and "sobriety" as the cures attributed to the personal agency of Christ Himself? Such are some of the questions which naturally arise in our minds as we read Dr Fairbairn's pages. There is no man living more qualified to help the religious thought of his age towards a reasonable solution of such problems. Dr Fairbairn may well have assumed that a detailed discussion of them would be beyond the scope of the present work; and some of them he has certainly dealt with in other books. If we confine ourselves to the present work, we can only say that in Dr Fairbairn's view, though the very appearance of such a character as Christ's is in a sense "miraculous," no doctrine about His person rests upon the historical evidence for particular miraculous events. Certainly no stress is laid upon the miraculous birth. Dr Fairbairn's personal attitude towards it we are left to infer from such statements as this: "The supernatural birth is touched with a most delicate hand, and has no essential feature in common with the mythical theogonies which earlier ages had known. The marvellous thing is not that we have two birth stories, but that we have only two; and that they occupy so small, so incidental, so almost negligible a place in the New Testament as a whole" (p. 349).

The Jesus of the Evangelists is then an historical person, and in the main historically represented, and without that historical personality Christianity could not have been. On the other hand, Dr Fairbairn insists with equal emphasis that the "interpretation" of this character was equally essential to the genesis and is equally essential to the continued life of the religion. "One thing is certain: the teaching by itself could not have created Christianity or achieved universal significance." "The programme of the religion lies in the person of the Founder rather than in His words, in what He was more than in what He said" (p. 391). "In the strict sense, Jesus did not so much create the Christian religion as cause it to be created" (p. 305). The essential interpretation "must not be inconsistent with His idea of Himself" (*ib.*), but it goes beyond anything actually taught by Him. This work of interpretation was begun in the Fourth Gospel and the Apostolical Epistles. "Jesus is a symbol which the Epistles explicate for human belief, and oppose to human experience, individual and collective" (p. 438). It is impossible even to summarise Dr Fairbairn's account of this interpretation—by St Paul, by the Epistle to the Hebrews, by the Fourth Gospel. It is full of insight and valuable suggestion; and here again, the only criticism which I feel impelled to make upon it is that it leaves so many difficulties unresolved. We do not quite gather how far, in his account of the Apostolic writers' views, Dr Fairbairn identifies himself with them. He dwells much, for instance, upon the doctrine of the Atonement as set forth in St Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews; and it is evident that in the main Dr Fairbairn believes his own view of the matter to be in harmony with that of St Paul. But surely to

many the interpretation itself requires some interpretation or re-interpretation. And when we ask how Dr Fairbairn himself interpretes the interpretation, we are left in some uncertainty. "The cross has in a perfectly real sense done more than any other agency to convince the world of sin; one may say it has created in man, both as person and as race, the conscience for sin" (p. 433). "Whatever the death of Christ may signify, it does not mean an expedient for quenching the wrath of God, or for buying off man from His vengeance. This was a gain for religion greater than mind can calculate" (p. 500). Such passages seem to suggest the view that the death (or rather, though Dr Fairbairn tends to isolate and emphasise the death, the whole work) of Christ "saves from sin" by its actual effect on human hearts and consciences and wills. On the other hand, we find passages which, if they stood alone, would suggest another theory. St Paul's statement about Christ being made a curse for us is quoted as though it contained no difficulty for the modern mind. "Christ's death has a retrospective and a prospective significance." "In the most authentic and sublime of the Apocalyptic discourses He affirms what we may call the vicarious principle. The good or ill of His people is His; they are one with Him and He with them. The smallest beneficence of the least of His brethren is done to Him; the good refused to them is denied to Him. And, we may add, this idea implies its converse: if their sufferings are His, His are theirs; what He endures and what He achieves, man achieves and endures" (p. 417). In not a few such passages Dr Fairbairn seems to evince a certain over-eagerness to use the language of substitutionary or forensic theories, which, if stated in black and white, he would doubtless be the first to repudiate.

When we turn from the Atonement to his general view of the Person of Christ, Dr Fairbairn is full of passages which are a real help towards the re-interpretation of such doctrines as those of the Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation for the modern time. Such passages as the following explain, while they cannot well be accused of explaining away: Christ is "a Person who is an embodied moral law, with this to distinguish Him from all ethical standards man had ever imagined; that He not only humanized duty, but supplied the matter that determined its fulfilment" (p. 459).

"As he impersonated the race before God, He also so personalized man to His Church that to live unto Him was to live for all mankind" (p. 531).

"This discussion leaves us with a question we must ask, though we shall not attempt to give it the answer it deserves and requires: What precisely did Christ, by these ideas and the conditions of their realization, accomplish for religion? It is a small thing to say He made a universal religion possible; it is a greater thing to add, The religion He made possible is one that ought to be universal, for its ideal is the humanest and the most beneficent that has ever come to man. He completely moralized Deity, and therefore religion; and so made it possible—nay, obligatory and imperative—to moralize the whole life of man, individual and collective. His moral ideal expressed the beneficence of an infinite will, yet as imper-

sonated in what we may term an actual yet universal Man. It was transcendental as God, it was immanent as mind, and, as incarnated in a religion, it concentrated the energies of the eternal for realization in the modes of time. If this can be said of Christ, what higher work could be ascribed to God?" (p. 550).

Such passages and many others make us wish that Dr Fairbairn would complete the task which he has begun. We cannot perhaps better express our sense of what Dr Fairbairn has done, and of what he has left undone, than by saying that the book presents itself to us rather as a collection of most admirable prolegomena to a "Philosophy of the Christian Religion," than as that Philosophy itself. We still want to know more as to the relations between the biblical "interpretation" of Christ's personality and that of the later Church, and we want both of these interpretations re-interpreted in the language of our time. No more valuable contribution towards this work has been made in recent years by an English theologian; and if we look abroad, we shall find but a very few works of equal importance. In not a few ways Dr Fairbairn has given us just the supplement and correction which many of us have desiderated in reading Harnack. Harnack and Dr Fairbairn should be read together by anyone who wishes to enter into the best theological thought of the present day. But still we feel (and this is rather a compliment than a criticism on such a book as the present) that Dr Fairbairn has more to tell us as to the ultimate meaning of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and the permanent value of the various and successive attempts to define them. If Dr Fairbairn should plead that this would involve not so much a Philosophy of the Christian Religion as a philosophic history of dogma, I need only reply that there could be no undertaking so exactly suited to Dr Fairbairn's vast and varied learning, his vigorous powers of expression, and his keen and sympathetic spiritual insight.

H. RASHDALL.

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The Varieties of Religious Experience: being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902, by William James, LL.D.

THIS volume, containing Professor James' notable lectures on the Gifford foundation, is the most valuable contribution yet made to religious psychology. The relations of human nature to man's spiritual environment, the way in which religious practice and belief meet our needs and tend to the furtherance of our life, had never until comparatively recent times been studied in the true comparative and scientific spirit. Controversy had raged interminably as to the truth and the value of the Christian faith, but it had

not occurred to psychologists to examine in the dry light of science the facts and the faculties which lay behind the affirmations and negations of religious controversy.

But in recent years, the methods of observational science have begun to be exercised in this new field. Three works in particular call for mention. In Mr Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* the statistical method was applied to the phenomena of conversion, and a great mass of documents arranged and analysed, from the study of which it seems to result that the ordinary phenomena of the religious life have little in them that is abnormal or capricious, but arise out of the ground of human nature as readily as the emotion of love or the sense of obligation. Mr Starbuck's documents have been of great service to Mr James. Next may be mentioned Mr Granger's *Soul of a Christian*, a very interesting attempt to bring order and method into the many accounts which have been left us by notable Christian saints of their spiritual experiences, whence the general conformity of that experience to fixed types becomes clear.

That Mr James works at a higher level than his predecessors is natural. He is not only one of the first of psychologists, but also a writer of remarkable force and originality, a man with a real genius for his subject. The appreciative reader finds his breath taken away by the rapidity and mastery of Mr James' discourse, and the eyes of his understanding dazzled by frequent flashes of brilliant light. If we attempt to give in brief space the main views set forth by Mr James, we cannot hope to add either clearness or point to anything he has said.

He begins by laying strong emphasis on the absurdity of condemning the higher lights of religious passion as unhealthy, because they are often associated with abnormal physical and psychical phenomena. We must judge, he insists, by fruits. Genius in all its forms is somewhat akin to madness, and every kind of human excellence in extreme is apt to upset the balance of normal health. The question is not whether the bodies of great saints are healthy, but whether there is reality in their communion with spiritual powers, and whether the result of this communion tends on the whole to the furtherance of virtuous life.

On such grounds Mr James defends the truth and the worth of the religious life, with its phenomena of prayer and trust, of religious depression and ecstasy, of passionate self-abandonment and absorption in a spiritual existence. The phenomena of which he speaks are personal and individual; but whatever physical science may say, the individual is the most real of things in this living universe. The possibility of communion between the individual soul and the spiritual power is explained by the fact that every personality rests upon a basis of the sub-conscious, upon "the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, is literally and objectively true."

One could have wished that Mr James had more carefully distinguished between the sub-liminal consciousness which belongs to the mute and

instinctive side of human life, and the supra-liminal consciousness which belongs to the higher and ideal world. But passing this objection, is it not a great thing that we can say to one afflicted with deep-going religious doubt, "Here is a thoroughly scientific psychologist, a man in the first rank of world-wide reputation, who declares it to be a real and objective truth that in God we live and move and have our being"? Mr James does not shrink from the consequences of this avowal; he adds, "I suppose that my belief that in communion with the ideal, new force comes into the world, and new departures are made here below, subjects me to being classed among the supernaturalists of the piecemeal or crasser type." It does indeed give a basis broad enough and strong enough to support a fabric of Christian belief, which may not rise into the clouds like the Gothic cathedrals of the Middle Ages, but which yet may protect us and our children from the chilling blasts of Scepticism.

However, we must return to the working-out of Mr James' psychological views, which offer us in every direction brilliant suggestions and new vistas. Mr James at once sets our practical religious attitude on terms with the other activities of our nature by showing how in it as in them everything depends on the relations between impulse and inhibition. In it, as in them, the expulsive power of a higher affection is necessary before the individual can escape from the tyranny of the "everlasting no," and set forward in the higher life. The escape from the spirit which denies is commonly in religious circles called conversion. "Were we writing the story of the mind from the purely natural history point of view, with no religious interest whatever, we should still have to write down man's liability to sudden and complete conversion as one of his most curious peculiarities" (p. 230).

Mr Starbuck has given us an excellent study of conversion, which may be well observed in the Methodist circles of America. But Mr James, with his wider view, has much to add. Among the phenomena of sudden conversion are the feeling of sudden wind, the vision of a dazzling light, the appearance of spiritual beings. Hence some of the statements of the writer of *Acts*, though they may be tinged by imagination and excitement, yet are consistent with ordinary history. Of the deepness and permanence of the change which conversion brings Mr James is fully convinced; and he shows (p. 269) that however miraculous such a change may be from the converted person's own point of view, it is easy to find in biography non-religious examples of a sudden change of purpose and character arising out of the working of sub-liminal influences. Amid the overpowering conventions of the Anglican Church sudden conversion is unusual, but a more gradual change may work to the same end.

Mr James' chapters on saintliness are remarkable both for their force and, what is harder still to attain, for their objectiveness and judicial spirit. To really appreciate the value of the saintly spirit in the world, but at the same time mercilessly to expose its weaknesses and disastrous excesses, this is given to but few. He succeeds at the same time in valuing healthy-

mindedness in religion, and in perceiving that even excesses which may at first have an air of sickliness and want of balance, yet have great value in raising the level of human life, and bringing to bear upon it forces which purify and exalt character. The same rule of judging by fruits, which Mr James has accepted from the highest authority, and used to defend the validity of religious experience in general, again serves him in good stead. Thus he writes of the *Revelations* of S. Gertrude (p. 345): "Intimacies and caresses and compliments of the most absurd and puerile sort, addressed by Christ to Gertrude as an individual, form the tissue of this paltry-minded recital. In reading such a narrative we realise the gap between the thirteenth and the twentieth century, and we feel that saintliness of character may yield almost absolutely worthless fruits if it be associated with such inferior intellectual sympathies." But while venturing on occasion to speak thus boldly, nothing could be much more sympathetic and appreciative than Mr James' treatment of the saintly virtues of charity, tenderness, poverty and asceticism. Far indeed has the modern spirit receded from the hard contempt with which the Protestants of the seventeenth century regarded the merits of the friar and the nun. In regard to poverty Mr James writes (p. 369): "It is certain that the prevalent fear of poverty among the educated classes is the worst moral disease from which our civilisation suffers." In regard to asceticism he writes (p. 362): "In its spiritual meaning asceticism stands for nothing less than for the essence of the twice-born philosophy. It symbolises, lamely enough no doubt, but sincerely, the belief that there is an element of real wrongness in this world, which is neither to be ignored nor evaded, but which must be squarely met and overcome by an appeal to the soul's heroic resources, and neutralised and cleansed away by suffering."

In fact, the breadth of Mr James' sympathy sometimes leads him to utterances which will surprise conventional people (p. 387): "The sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human nature, usually crushed to earth by the cold facts and dry criticisms of the sober hour. Sobriety diminishes, discriminates, and says no; drunkenness expands, unites, and says yes. It is in fact a great exciter of the Yes function in man. It brings a man from the chill periphery of things to the radiant core." Psychologically, there is undoubtedly much truth in these remarks; but of course it is not the whole truth. Mr James is one of those who would give the devil not only his due, but interest to date.

But we must pass on to a part of Mr James' book by no means less powerful, but yet likely to encounter far more violent opposition, the chapters in which he treats of the intellectual equivalents of religious experience. These equivalents, or derivations, as Mr James would rather term them, are mysticism, religious philosophy, and religious doctrine, all three of which may fairly be regarded as alternatives suited to various kinds of minds.

Mr James' account of mysticism is very sympathetic; one can see that

under some circumstances it might have attracted him. He sketches some of its characteristic appearances in the Roman Church, among the Protestants of Northern Europe, and in the classic land of mysticism—India. Mysticism is essentially subjective; the mystical states, though they have usually an irresistible authority over the person who experiences them, are not able to exercise any authority over others. “They break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith” (p. 423).

Mysticism is seldom propagandist. The mystic is content to bask in his own sun, willing enough that others should share its rays, but not feeling any call to drag them into the glow. Better suited for discussion, for exposition and attack, is religious philosophy. And here Mr James takes up a position altogether hostile to that of the Hegelian philosophy, —a way of thinking which, though now abandoned in Germany, is still powerful on the banks of the Clyde and the Isis. He regards philosophy as having no cogent force for proof or discovery, but as a mere restatement in terms of the intellect of what has been otherwise acquired. Principal Caird, he observes (p. 453), “has simply reaffirmed the individual’s experiences in a more generalised vocabulary.” “In all sad sincerity,” he adds, “I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct experience is absolutely hopeless.”

Mr James then accepts the view of the bankruptcy of speculative metaphysics which has been taught in England by Mansel, Herbert Spencer, G. H. Lewes and others. He thinks it time for the philosophy which professes to transcend experience to abdicate in favour of psychology and history. This is a view which in every country has now earnest supporters. Lipsius in Germany and Sabatier in France have worked hard to propagate it. I may be pardoned for adding that I have done my share of the advocacy of such views in my *Exploratio Evangelica*. But there can be no question that, if religious philosophy is to die, it will die hard. Mr James promises (p. 454) another and more detailed work on this subject; and meantime, no doubt, his opponents will be sharpening their weapons.

The third intellectual rendering of religious experience is in doctrine. This is naturally a matter which Mr James is unable to discuss in detail. He is as ready to abandon religious doctrine as religious philosophy. “Modern idealism has said good-bye to this theology forever.” But here, as I think, we must insist on an important distinction. The word “doctrine” is unfortunately used to cover two very different things. It may stand either for the direct rendering in intellectual terms of the contents of religious experience, or for the speculative systems of theology which the intellect of man has built up out of experience and the Bible and revela-

tions of various kinds. If we could call the former of these two "doctrine" and the latter "dogma," it would tend to clearness, though to this use there are philological objections. It is to speculative dogmatic systems of theology that Mr James' words apply. A modest scheme of doctrine, based directly on religious experience, and kept within the limits of the speculative powers of man, is in no way repugnant to the principles which he advocates. The false element in doctrine is the element of metaphysic and logic.

And in fact Mr James may be said to acknowledge this distinction in another way. He regards it as one of the great merits of English thought compared with that of the Continental schools of philosophy that "the guiding principle of British philosophy has been that every difference must *make* a difference, every theoretical difference somewhere issue in a practical difference, and that the best method of discussing points of theory is to begin by ascertaining what practical difference would result from one alternative or the other being true." This Mr James calls the *pragmatical* way of looking at intellectual questions. I would only amend his statement by saying that this is the *English* not the *British* tendency. Mr James frankly avows himself on the side of pragmatism both in philosophy and theology; but he considers that he is in the minority of highly educated men. "I state the matter thus bluntly, because the current of thought in academic circles runs against me, and I feel like a man who must set his back against an open door quickly if he does not wish to see it closed and locked" (p. 523). It is a satisfaction to those of Mr James' way of thinking that so long as his back is against the door, there is little fear that Hegelian or devil will be able to close it.

Of course Mr James is not always right. In a book written with so great freedom, and so full of personality and character, every reader will find many passages in which imperfect knowledge or perverted reasoning has led the writer astray. Several of such passages we had marked for comment. But on the whole we prefer to lay before our readers only a broad sketch of the tendencies of the book. It will surprise English readers that Mr James takes seriously some writers to whom we are not accustomed to give that honour, such as Madame Blavatsky and Mrs Besant. This comes from a certain republican breadth of charity which we should be sorry to miss in a work of which the great merit is its wonderfully sympathetic appreciation of all possible forms of religious experience. All who regard experience as the basis of religious belief must needs value Mr James' book; though many appreciative readers will think it possible to add greatly to the construction which rests on that basis, whether in the way of philosophic theory or of doctrinal system.

P. GARDNER.

The Historical New Testament.—By James Moffatt, D.D.—Second Edition, revised. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1901.

A HEARTY welcome must be extended in the pages of this Review to the admirable volume by Dr Moffatt, probably the most important work of Biblical criticism produced in this country by any single scholar since the new century began. With ample learning and magnificent industry, Dr Moffatt has condensed into a little more than 700 pp. a translation of the books of the New Testament, arranged in what he conceives to be the order of their production, together with introductory dissertations, historical tables, critical notes, and a most valuable appendix (itself a closely packed treatise, pp. 605–708) discussing a series of passages which may with more or less probability be regarded as interpolations, or indications of diversity of source. To attempt to criticise such a vast mass of detail in a page or two is obviously impossible. But the fundamental principle of the whole work commands immediate assent. It has so long been applied to at least one important group of the Old Testament writings that it may seem surprising that it has not earlier secured recognition in the treatment of the New. It is nearly a hundred years since Eichhorn pleaded that the discourses of the Hebrew prophets should be read in connection with the events and tendencies of their time, and arranged them in what he presumed to be their chronological order. No student who has entered into the spirit of Ewald's great work on the Prophets can ever forget the illuminating effect of this conception, as he passed, under the master's inspiring guidance, from century to century. What Eichhorn and Ewald did for Hebrew prophecy, Dr Moffatt essays to do for the literature of the early Christians, from decade to decade, so far as it is comprised in the New Testament.

The attempt at once indicates how far modern research has travelled. Christianity, like every other great product of the human spirit—whatever other factors may have co-operated in it—is an historical phenomenon. It cannot be isolated from the place or time of its origin, as if it sprang up in a vacuum; on every page of its first documents it bears the stamp of the race in which it grew up, and the varieties of hope and belief, of practical need and future expectation, which produced records of the Master's teaching, letters of apostolic counsel, narratives of missionary enterprise, or visions of apocalyptic glory. The books of the New Testament consequently reflect in each case the circumstances and ideas of the writers. They can, indeed, no longer be tested by reference to one single great conflict—that between the Jewish and the Gentile parties. Other elements have claimed and secured recognition since the days of Baur, and it is among Dr Moffatt's numerous merits that he is fully alive to the importance of the eschatology of the early Church. The tendency of modern inquiry has been, as is well known, to contract the range of time for the great movement which the Tübingen School extended far into the

second century. Dr Moffatt's arrangement opens with 1 Thess. about 51 A.D., and closes with 2 Peter, 130-170 A.D. In the century thus indicated every decade is of importance. In the first half of it, the great historical landmark is the fall of Jerusalem in the year 70. All the Synoptic Gospels in their present form bear some relation to this great catastrophe, and Mark is accordingly placed in the period 65-75 A.D.,¹ Matthew 75-90, and Luke 80-95. The Fourth Gospel follows between 95 and 115 (nearer the latter limit than the former, p. 495), with the remark that it is Johannine "in the sense that any historical element throughout its pages may be traced back directly or indirectly to that apostle and his school" (p. 497).

Much more might be said about specific results. In the Book of Acts, the Apocalypse, and the Pastoral Epistles, different strata of materials are indicated by the use of thick type. The "small Apocalypse" in Mark xiii. (and parallels) is distinguished in like manner.² The limits of the book do not permit Dr Moffatt often to display the reasons for his analysis, but the copious references to recent literature will enable the student to follow up any special inquiries. We cannot always sympathise with his critical reconstructions, as when he places John xv.-xvi. between xiii. 31a 31b. Surely xvi. 33 is a definite close. The clue to the difficulty about xiv.-xvi. (as about other difficulties in the Fourth Gospel) seems to lie less in dislocation or transposition than in the recognition of material gathered from different members of a great religious school, and imperfectly fused together in the final product. But no differences of view on such detail can detract from the admiration due to Dr Moffatt for the courage with which he has attacked great problems, the faithful labour which he has applied to them, the skill and judgment with which he has expounded their issue. The ingenuity of the graphic method in some of the numerous tables also deserves notice; the summaries of critical research into the composition of the Apocalypse and the Acts will be found very useful.

Of the translation of the books themselves, the present writer is not qualified to speak except in general terms. The gain appears greatest, as was to be expected, in the apostolic letters. The incisiveness of Dr Moffatt's own style is here pleasantly reflected. Excellent, also, is the frequent suggestion of rhythmic arrangement, both in Gospel and Epistle. But about special words there must always be variety of opinion. Thus for "kingdom" we usually have "reign" ("thy reign come" does not sound agreeably) or "realm"; and "church" becomes "community." Such renderings really need a commentary for fuller justification. It is doubtless pedantic to insist that the same Greek word must always have the same English equivalent; but if the leaven of the Pharisees is admitted to be "hypocrisy," it is not clear why "hypocrites," in the great woes of Matthew xxiii., should give place to "irreligious." "Restoration" seems to miss the

¹ If the earlier date be adopted, xiii. 20 must certainly be relegated to Dr Moffatt's appendix as a subsequent addition (cp. p. 268).

² Matt. xii. 40 might be marked as an addition like v. 18, 19, and xvi. 18. Justin was plainly unacquainted with it; see *Dial.* cvii.

full meaning of *palingenesis*, Matthew xix. 28, though adequate for *apokatastasis* in Acts iii. 21. Above all, it is to be regretted that the adjective *æonian* appears in Matthew xxv. 41 and 46 (as elsewhere) as "eternal." Seeing that in Enoch, for instance, it is equated with so brief a period as five hundred years, it is hard to believe that our modern notions were within the range of contemporary imagination: in the Fourth Gospel, of course, the word is employed on another plane, and belongs to a different order of thought.

In describing the difficulties of his task, Dr Moffatt lamented the lack of an adequate English introduction to the New Testament, alleging that "here, perhaps more than in most branches of historical science, investigation continues to be hampered by the resurrection of the obsolete, the survival of the unfit, and the prominence of the irrelevant" (p. xvii). It may be hoped that he will himself feel encouraged by the reception of his first work to undertake the preparation of an introduction on a corresponding scale. Will any other competent scholars complete the enterprise by a similar treatment of the early literature of the Church, contemporary with the later portions of the New Testament, but not included in it?

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OXFORD.

Religionsphilosophie.—Von Dr Harald Höffding. Aus dem Dänischen übersetzt von F. Bendixen.—Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1901.

PROFESSOR HÖFFDING'S new volume displays much of that originality of thought and wide acquaintance with the best literature on the subject which have given deserved popularity to his earlier works on psychology, ethics, and the history of philosophy. If, as we think, it is not wholly successful as an attempt to effect harmonious relations between religious belief and modern culture, it will certainly prove most helpful to future inquirers, owing to the lucidity with which it restates the problem in the light of the most recent philosophical conceptions.

An introductory chapter explains that in the classical period of the life of great religions the dominant faith so controls and subordinates all scientific theories that a genuine philosophy of religion is then impossible. Such a philosophy can only arise when the study of science and the study of ethics have succeeded in vindicating their right to a foundation and a development independent of the dogmas of the established religion. The rest of the volume consists of three parts, of which (1) expounds and criticises the Epistemological (*erkenntnistheoretische*) philosophy of religion; (2) deals with Psychological religious philosophy; while (3), under the title of the Ethical philosophy of religion, endeavours to establish the true relation between religion and ethics.

The *first* part describes and examines that philosophy of religion which

professes to give a scientific and intellectual account of the cosmos, in harmony with the main principles of theistic belief. Such a philosophy, of which the cosmological side of Dr Martineau's *Study of Religion* may be taken as an example (though, strange to say, Dr Martineau's name does not occur in the work), represents the universe as the effect of a First Cause, and also contends for the ultimate reality of Time and Space. In Höffding's view, this conception of God as the Cause of all finite existences is untenable, because (as he maintains) "science demands that the cause of an event must be sought in other events; which other events, just as much as the event to be explained, are present in experience. . . . The problem, therefore, is to interpret Nature through Nature herself, just as we interpret a passage in a book by comparing it with other passages in the same book" (p. 18). But the philosophers whose position Höffding here assails consider his conception of causation to be fundamentally erroneous, and assert that the true causes of the phenomena of nature cannot be reached by any mere study of these phenomena themselves, but must be sought in those metaphysical or noumenal realities to whose invisible activity the human mind intuitively ascribes the causation of all natural events.

In connection with this subject, the theistic conception of God as a greater and higher Person is considered and proved to be unsatisfactory; while the view of C. H. Weisse and H. Lotze, that only of a self-existent and infinite Being can real and complete personality be predicated, is rejected on the ground that the personality here ascribed to God is essentially different from any experience of personality possessed by man. The materialistic, idealistic, and agnostic theories of the ultimate reality are then criticised and found to be all defective in some respects, and in place of them Höffding expounds his own *Weltanschauung*, which he terms Critical Monism. This theory has some points of contact and sympathy with fundamental Christian conceptions; but its thoroughly deterministic view of human nature prevents it, in our opinion, from giving any wholly satisfactory account of moral responsibility and of the soul's real relation to God.

The *second* part of the work, which is by far the largest portion, contains most interesting and elaborate analyses of the chief forms of religious experience and belief, and the conclusion which it is the main purpose of this section of the book to unfold and establish is that "Religion is belief in the persistence or conservation of value" (*der Glaube an die Erhaltung des Werthes*). It would require far more space than can be afforded here to give an outline of this long discussion; and we are not sure that even then we could make clear to our readers what Professor Höffding means by this expression "conservation of value." He attempts an elucidation of his doctrine by asserting that there is a close analogy between the "conservation of value" and the scientific doctrine of the "conservation of energy"; for this value, he says, persists through all its changes of form; but we must confess that we quite fail to discern any real analogy between the ethical and the scientific doctrine.

All feelings, he tells us, which involve pleasure or pain possess value. Thus there is one kind of value in the gratification of all our egoistic desires; there is another kind of value in those emotional, intellectual, æsthetic and ethical sentiments, which arise out of our felt relations with persons and ideals beyond our own individual self and its interests. But the question is, How does it come about that we form our relative estimate of these ethical values? When we say, for instance, that a life of sensuality or selfishness has a lower value than a life of devotion to principle and to high ideals, do we simply mean (as Höffding appears to think we do) that the latter has been found by experience to give fuller and more unalloyed satisfaction than the former; or do we not rather mean further, that the former is relatively valueless because it involves felt discord between the soul and the conscience, or the immanent-God, while the latter derives its worth to a great extent from the fact that it is accompanied by the consciousness of harmony between the individual soul and the Eternal? If the view we have just expressed be sound, it is seen to be intrinsically impossible to adequately assess ethical values apart from a reference to the state of the religious belief; for it is evident that as man's spiritual insight becomes clearer and deeper, so will his ethical estimate of the relative worth of his several satisfactions be revised and enlarged.

In his *third* part Höffding expresses his dissent from this conception of the function of religion. The business of religion is, in his view, merely to awaken faith in the persistence or conservation of ethical values. As we have said, it seems to us that religion plays also a very important part in influencing the determination of these values. In the course of this concluding section there is a very suggestive comparison made between the Christian and the Greek ideal of life; and though Höffding fully admits that each of these ideals is by itself defective and needs to be supplemented by elements from the other, it is evident that his own sympathies are predominantly in accord with the Greek type of thought. This is especially manifest in his treatment of the ethical worth of a belief in personal immortality. While expressing himself as undecided as to the validity of this belief, he vigorously contends that the belief has not necessarily any ethical significance. Every "period of life," he says, "has or should have its importance in and for itself, and ought not to be regarded only as a preparation or introduction to a following one. As childhood is an independent life-period, which has its value and its purpose in and for itself, and is more than a preparation for adult age, so also has human life as a totality its independent worth; and so much the more so because experience teaches us nothing about a continuance of the same" (p. 345). On this it may be remarked, that the estimate of the value of childhood and our mode of training youth are very largely influenced and modified by the expectation that the germs of possibility present in the child's mind will, if duly fostered, fructify in the mind of the adult; and there can be little doubt, we think, that the devotion to the ideal side of human life is and will be much affected by the hope and the faith that the demand for

infinite development, which is implicit in all man's higher affections, aspirations, and ideals, is a demand which the reality of the universe will not fail to respond to and to satisfy.

As is to be expected from the foregoing, Prof. Höffding does not think it possible to express in definite intellectual propositions the nature and character of the Supreme Reality which awakens and corresponds to our religious sentiments. Poetry is, in his view, the least inadequate mode of describing the Ultimate Being, but it must be understood that such poetry has its root not simply in the human imagination, but in the eternal spiritual reality which inspires the individual mind. "Strictly speaking," he says, "it is false to say that our expressions for the ultimate reality have 'only' poetic value. For perhaps the real state of the case is that poetry is a more perfect expression of the highest than any intellectual (*wissenschaftlicher*) conception could be. Under 'poetry' is here to be understood not mere moods of mind and fancies, but the involuntary and vivid form with which actual mental experiences invest themselves in moments of great spiritual excitement. Such a process of investment lies at the basis of all myths and legends, all dogmas and symbols; that is, if we consider them at the time of their origin (*in statu nascenti*). There is a poetry of life which springs forth like a spark during our work; a spark which is kindled only when the individual will collides with the hard flint of reality" (p. 339).

Some of the ablest writers on the philosophy of religion, such as Auguste Sabatier, emphatically assert that human conceptions of God must be in part symbolical; but they assert at the same time that such a term as "Father" when applied to God is not wholly symbolical, but connotes some element of real fact in the nature of God. The experience of communion between the soul and the indwelling God is one of the absolute truths which the word "Father" serves to express. But it is vain to seek in Prof. Höffding's work for any clear idea of God as He really exists. The poetry, as he conceives it, does not at all admit of being translated into any literal prose which can be made intelligible enough to satisfy the religious craving for truth and spiritual reality. Where there is nothing but poetry and symbol, and no possibility of any positive and valid thought at all about God, religion cannot live; and hence we have no expectation that Critical Monism will, in the struggle for existence among competing theories, ever become a widely accepted philosophy of religion.

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Handleiding voor de Oudchristelijke Letterkunde.—Door Dr W. C. Van Manen.—Leiden: L. Van Nifterik, Hz. 1900.

DR W. C. VAN MANEN, Professor of Theology in the University of Leiden, coëditor with Oort of the *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, the most conspicuous

representative of the Dutch School of Radical New Testament Criticism, upon whom the mantle with a double portion of the spirit of Loman has fallen, is accustomed in his regular lectures to treat minutely some portion or portions of early Christian literature from his advanced view-point, but is of course unable in one year, or even two or three years, to compass satisfactorily in this manner the whole circuit of that literature. Though he may presume Holtzmann and Krüger, Jülicher and Baljon, Zahn and Harnack to be in the hands of the student, yet so far removed is his own standpoint from any of theirs that the study of them will contribute little to the comprehension of his own theories. It is to meet this difficulty that he has written this volume, which presents a conspectus of the whole body of Christian Scripture down to Tertullian and Irenæus, as seen from the most advanced position of the Radical criticism. The work attempts nothing more than to present this connected view of the whole field of controversy; it does not profess to ground adequately the conclusion set forth, though in the more important cases it points out clearly the paths that have led to the results; in a word, it is a clew, not a manual, a *Handleiding*, not a *Handboek*.

The subject is unfolded in six chapters on *Gospels, Acts, Epistles, Revelations, Apologies, Didactics*; these words, taken in their widest sense and application, including very much that is uncanonical. The Gospels are said to bear a double character, historical and edifying-dogmatic. They are not simply memorials, but rather treatises intended to establish the dogma of *Jesus the Christ*.

The peculiar relationship of all points to the existence of an *original Gospel*, now irrecoverably lost. It arose in sub-apostolic times, and was an attempt to combine a highly speculative and even phantastic Christology with a half-trustworthy tradition of Jesus.

It appeared anonymously, probably in Greek, and is not to be confounded with any Aramaic or other redaction; nor with any collection of Logia, by Matthew; nor with a lost Gospel of John Mark, Peter's interpreter. It was revised in two principal editions, Synoptic and Johannine, representing three main tendencies, Original or Jewish-Christian, Pauline or Gentile-Christian, and Gnostic. The oldest recensions are lost, save as taken up in later books. They arose on the left out of the felt need of a fuller life of Jesus, on the right out of desire to bring the written Gospel into harmony with unwritten tradition. First in time was the Aramaic recension, whereon all that belong to the Synoptic group builded. The Gospel according to *Hebrews* was probably originally nearly the same, was professedly written by Matthew, was independent of our Canonical Gospels, and in its original form older than they. The Gospel of the *Twelve Apostles* was probably the same work, the Gospel of the *Ebionites* was probably a freer recension of the Aramean text.

The Gospel according to *Peter*, partly brought to light in 1892, was in its original form closer than our Canonical Gospels to the first Aramean interpretation of the original Gospel. At first in high favour, it fell under

suspicion towards the middle of the second century, and its use was forbidden by Serapion.

The Gospel according to the *Ægyptians* dates probably from the middle of the second century, apparently an edition of the Gospel revised in encratic-ascetic sense for Christians in Egypt, where it was supplanted by our Canonicals towards the year 200. Fragments survive in Clement of Alexandria, Theodotus, and others, perhaps in the Second Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, and in recently discovered *Λογια Ιησου*. Of many other such Evangelic writings we know only the names.

The best representatives of this great group are our present Gospels according to *Matthew* and *Mark*. The solution of the Synoptic question of the relations of these two with each other and with *Luke* is vainly sought in the assumption that two of the three revised and amended each his predecessors' work with great freedom. All three must have drunk at the same fountain: not an unwritten though fixed tradition, but a book, probably a Greek recension of the Aramaic form of the oldest Gospel. Strictly *Luke* is not one of the Synoptists, but represents another type.

Our Canonic *Matthew* has a double introduction, two or three main sections, and a conclusion. It is not purely historic, probably not so in the mind of the writer, but rather an argument to show that Jesus was the great Son of Man. In a certain sense and degree it is a unit, but bears plainly the stamp of a compilation from older sources. These were of Jewish and of Christian origin; the last were editions of the oldest Gospel, including one according to *Matthew*, a Greek translation of the Aramaic recension. The author was a Greek-speaking Christian of the East, not far from Palestine. His standpoint is that of *nascent Catholicism*, lifting itself above parties both right and left, liberal, conciliatory, placing different doctrines side by side, but making no choice. The date is the first half of the second century, not later than 140. Besides ethic-religious virtue, the work has great historic worth. Not as an authentic account of the life and work of Jesus, but as most rich in testimony to particulars touching them, though this be often clouded and impossible to distinguish from later additions; still more, however, as showing what in those days (of the authors) men understood by the Gospel, what ideas and expectations they cherished concerning Jesus Christ, His past, His future, what moral ideas were theirs,—in a word, what was Christianity then and there as an historic religion.

Our *Mark* has also a double introduction, two or three main divisions, and a conclusion in place of the original conclusion now lost. It is no history in the strict sense, but a prose-epic, to characterise the life and work of Jesus viewed as Messiah and Son of God. The writer, of greater talent than Matthew, drew from various sources, now more now less freely. He knew Matthew's Gospel, though not in the present but in a slightly different form, and aims everywhere at improvement in various ways, as by conforming closer to the oldest Gospel, introducing other data, smoothing away contradictions, clearing up obscurities, unifying the various contributions. He is not to be identified with John Mark, Peter's

interpreter (Papias), and wrote not long after Matthew, presumably in Rome. He too represents nascent Catholicism, but less perfectly than Matthew; he is less irenic, less inclined to give each what he wants, but will rather break with Jewry; he writes for Gentile-Christians. Only æsthetically his work outranks Matthew's; in other regards it has similar value but not so high.

Although *Luke* professes to have traced all accurately from the beginning, thus warning against later representations, yet his work is not the fruit of pure historic investigation. He has made use of books then extant and perhaps of oral tradition, taking now more now less liberties. He collected, sifted, rearranged, at times corrected, and used commonly his own language, more rarely that of his authorities. He knew the oldest Gospel, if not in original form, yet in the redaction that lay at the basis of *Marcion's* Gospel, a liberal one, written in the spirit of Paulinism, and penetrated with contempt for the world and aversion to its pleasures; besides a Greek version of the Aramaic version, the common source of Matthew and Mark, these Gospels themselves, along with other documents. He was a Greek-speaking Christian of Asia Minor or Rome, at least not of Palestine. His standpoint is also that of the nascent Catholicism, of freedom from the law, with broad outlook on the world-historic significance of Christianity, without grudge against Jewry, nor unwilling to make concessions to their notions and prejudices; he is no radical, but rather belongs to the left centre; a champion of apostolic tradition, but adapting it to suit the times. His name is unknown; he has been called *Luke* because his work was named *Κατὰ Λουκᾶν*, a name that was perhaps connected with the liberal Gospel which he used and introduced to a wider circle. His work dates from the first half of the second century, not long after Matthew and Mark. Its æsthetic value must not be overrated: some parts are well written, the depiction is at times vivid and realistic, but other parts bear the stamp of clumsy compilation. In ethical-religious treasures it surpasses both Matthew and Mark, and occasionally its relations appear to have a more trustworthy historic form than theirs.

The Gospel used by *Marcion* is only partly known to us. It bore no author's name, and began with the statement that Jesus Christ in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius appeared in the Galilean city of Capernaum, came forward there in the synagogue, and afterward in Nazareth, etc. It had much in common with Luke, but fewer "words of the Lord." Some recognise in it a mutilated "Luke," others in Luke a catholicising of "Marcion." Both are wrong. Whether the word of Marcion or Cerdo or Appelles, or whom else, it was a return towards the earliest written oldest Gospel, of which it might be called, directly or indirectly, a liberal recension. Marcion declared the Gospel, as in his days men read it, to be "*interpolatum a protectoribus Judaismi ad concorporationem legis et prophetarum, qua etiam Christum inde confingerent.*" This Gospel resembles Luke, both being based on a common original

written in Pauline spirit. The two belong to the Pauline group, whereto belong also the liberal elements incorporated in Matthew and Mark.

The third current in the development of the written Gospel was the *Gnostic*. This branch of Christian thought was prolific of Gospels, of which we know only the names. The main source of our information concerning it is our Canonic Fourth Gospel, "according to John." Though historic in form, this book is not history either in aim or in matter, but is dogmatic and argumentative. The sketch of the life and work of Jesus agrees broadly with the Synoptic, but the traces of a second non-synoptic current which John prefers to follow are quite unmistakable. This non-synoptic redaction of the oldest Gospel, which we may call Johannine, and which may have borne the title *Κατα Ιωαννην*, the main well-head of our Canonic Fourth Gospel, bore a strongly developed spiritual character nearly related to the *Gnosis*. The author also made use of one or more Synoptical Gospels, whether our Canonics in their present or older forms, whether the older source of our Canonics, must remain uncertain. The work as extant is essentially a unit, excepting of course the *Wanderstelle*, vii. 53 to viii. 11.

The author is alternately free and fettered in his use of his sources, and often artificial in his arrangement. He is neither the Apostle nor the Presbyter John, but a Gentile-Christian, striving to lift himself above partisan conceptions both left and right, and to unify them from a higher point of view. He belongs to the nascent Catholicism, but leans visibly towards the left, and will not suffer it that the treasures of the *Gnosis* be lost for the Church. The work was probably written in Asia Minor about 140.

Its artistic worth is not small, though often overrated; quite as important is its contribution to our knowledge of the course taken by tradition touching Jesus of Nazareth, and of the growth of the conceptions concerning Jesus the Christ the Son of God, as well as of the history of Christianity and its development as a religion.

We pass over much of interest anent the *Λογια Ιησου*, Tatian's Diatessaron, Apocryphal Gospels, and the like, to come to the subject of *Acts* (*Handelingen*). Of these the oldest were lost; the very earliest arose probably, like the oldest Gospel, in a circle of progressive Christians who did not hold themselves fast bound by apostolic traditions. As much is indicated by the reflection that the friends of tradition had no need for biographies so long as their opponents wrote none; by the course of evolution of the written Gospel; by the results of criticism of the New Testament Acts; and by the circumstance that Gnostic *Περιοδοι* lie at the base of Catholic Apocryphal *Πραξεις*.

The Canonical *Acts* is neither a true and trustworthy account of what actually happened, nor the ripe fruit of earnest historic research, but is in part legendary-historic, in part edifying and apologetic. Its essential unity cannot be doubted, still less the use of older documents, at the head of which stand *Acts of Paul* and *Acts of Peter*. The former was the elder,

the work of progressive Christians; it contained a redaction of a diary, perhaps of Luke, the companion of Paul. The latter was written in competition with the former by some more conservative friend of tradition. Besides these and oral traditions, the author (of Acts) had also at command other authorities, especially Josephus, and may have taken this or that but not much from Pauline Epistles. His spirit is that of nascent Catholicism, his name unknown, his date the second quarter of the second century, his place probably Rome, possibly Asia Minor. Besides æsthetic and religious worth, this second book of *Luke* has especial historic value, as much underrated of late as formerly it was overrated.

Other writings of this stamp we must pass by unmentioned.

Chapter iii. deals with *Epistles*. These formed a large part of early Christian literature, but were never real Letters; on the contrary, were memoirs of edification and doctrine, witnesses as to the character, struggles, experiences, adventures of persons, opinions, tendencies, in the form of letters written to these or those in a tone of authority by men of fame, conceived as still living though belonging to a former generation. Hence even to their first readers they sounded like voices from the past. They are from unknown authors, intended for all that will read them, and especially to be read aloud in the public assembly for edification and instruction. The use of the epistolary form for such purposes is ancient. No one saw anything reprehensible in it, let alone any "forgery" or "deception" or "playing of a false rôle." The writer troubled himself little about address (Eph.), proper openings (Heb.), or fitting conclusion (James), or both (1 John). At first, readers concerned themselves not so much about the authorship as about the contents of the "Letters." Gradually this was altered. Since Irenæus, the old notion has been lost, and the "Letters" have been accepted as such literally. Recent times have restored largely the original idea. Most resistant has been the traditional view respecting the Four Chief Letters ascribed to Paul, but even here it is gradually yielding.

The early Christian "Epistle" appeared first among progressive Paulinists. The earliest essays were lost, save in so far as preserved and taken up in the Canonic Paulines. Of the latter, thirteen seem to have proceeded from the same circle, about the same time, but from different persons, under different circumstances.

We know not who made the first collection, nor its influence on the then existent text. But we may assume that alterations were made, that the collection was not the work of one time or one person, but came gradually into being. The oldest account speaks of a collection of Ten Letters used by Marcion and his followers.

Unto Romans is not a Letter, nor was ever sent as such, but is a *Treatise* in epistolary form, a sermon on the theme: *The Gospel a power of God unto salvation to every believer whether Jew or Greek*. The essential unity is beyond doubt, still more its character as a compilation of already existent materials, such as older letters, memoirs, and sayings, handed down,

whether orally or in writing. The composer is not the Apostle Paul. This follows from what is already said. Besides, it is antecedently improbable he would write such a letter to Rome, and various indicia point to a date later than A.D. 64. Such are the dogmatism, unintelligible so early; the assumed acquaintance of the readers with Paulinism; the relationship with the Gnosis; the representation of the Church as long existent and persecuted; the question of the rejection of the Jews; the use of written Gospels and Acts. The writer is a Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking Christian, Pauline, yet not an extremist, but leaning towards Catholicism, struggling to birth. The East, in particular Syria, perhaps Antioch, must be regarded as the cradle of Paulinism, but the finishing touch may have been put to this "Letter" in Rome.

The conception of it as a pronunciamento of conservative Paulinism is bound up with the conception of the latter as a thorough-going reformation of primitive Christianity, having its origin in Gnostic or quasi-Gnostic circles in Syria, whence it passed over to the heads and hearts and hands of the forerunners and founders of the nascent Catholicism. The date of the composition is not far from the year 120. Its æsthetic worth is not great; its religious and ethical, at least in part, is considerable; its historical, it would be hard to overrate; for no other work of Christian antiquity contributes so much to our knowledge of the early Paulinism.

On the two *Corinthians* we cannot dwell: neither is from Paul; both were written in the second quarter of the second century.

Galatians, a violent plea for more advanced Paulinism, betrays acquaintance with *Acts*, *Romans*, *Corinthians*, in original or in canonical form; it is the redaction of an earlier work written in Syria, perhaps in Antioch, and was itself perhaps composed in Rome, not far from 150. As basis of a knowledge of Paul's life it has no value; but for the history of primitive Christianity in the days of militant and defensive Paulinism its significance is great.

Enough anent the "Epistles." We pass to the "Apocalypses." Chiefest of them is the famous canonical *Ἀποκάλυψις Ἰωαννου*. Its form is artificial extremely, it is almost Pythagorean in its love of numerical symbolism. The notion that it is a true and credible account of what *John* saw cannot be entertained for a moment. Its present unity, though doubted since Grotius, is yet undeniable. Nevertheless, the composer has made abundant use of pre-existent material, but a separation of elements is no longer feasible. The only possible understanding of the work is the simple grammatical-historical. Now and then only may we follow Gunkel, we must break completely with *Zeitgeschichtliche* explanations. The writer was not thinking of Nero or Rome, he was an Apocalypticist *pur sang*, a believer of the primitive die, eagerly and confidently expecting the imminent coming of the Messiah. Of his identity we know nothing. His residence was Asia Minor perhaps; his date is near 140. The work has no little value for the light it throws on the temper and ideas and

methods, and especially the eschatological expectations of its author's circle, but otherwise not much.

As already stated, our author does not pretend to give adequate reasons for these conclusions, though often he suggests very plausible ones; any satisfactory exposition would require volumes. But he does present a complete and consistent theory of Early Christian Literature, which, in a measure, accepts Harnack's challenge in the preface to his *Chronologie*, and must certainly deserve the consideration of all earnest students of those mysterious first centuries. While such critics as Van Manen are thinking along such boldly divergent lines, with such determination and persistence and confidence and ingenuity, and attaining results that wear such an unquestionable air of *vraisemblance*, we cannot understand the frame of mind that rests contented in the results of Baur or Ritschl, or Zahn or Volkmar, or Holtzmann; that thinks the last word has been spoken by Tübingen or Göttingen or Erlangen, and that the deeper probings of Amsterdam and Leyden may pass unheeded. Surely, it has not been forgotten that it was the Dutch Master, Kuenen, who led the hosts of Old Testament criticism to their splendid victory. Why, then, should we be unwilling to receive from Holland some hints for the solution of the subtler New Testament riddle?

This work of Van Manen's cannot satisfy, it does not pretend to satisfy, but it should and must open the minds of its readers to new and surprising possibilities, and whet their curiosity to discover what reason there may be for such conclusions, and stimulate them to more penetrating scrutiny of the dark questions at issue. To these ends it is invaluable, and we commend it unreservedly.

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NEW ORLEANS.

Philosophy and Life, and other Essays.—By J. H. Muirhead, M.A., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Birmingham.—Pp. 274. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1902.

THIS volume consists of nine papers described as "Ethical," all of which were "written in the first instance as lectures for more or less popular societies," and of four papers described as "Logical," which were read before the Aristotelian Society. Although the contents of the book are thus somewhat varied in origin and in character, the title of the first lecture, "Philosophy and Life," serves very well to indicate the connecting link. Professor Muirhead proposes to define "Philosophy" as "a lifelong conflict with one-sided ideas" (p. 13). The same conception is worked out in the paper entitled "Abstract and Practical Ethics," where it is explained that such a philosophical method of approaching the problems of life means something more than the flabby attitude of mind which will go a certain way with the advocates of any doctrines, but not too far. "It is

possible to look at both sides of the shield without seeing them both as sides of the same shield, and it is possible to see many aspects of a question, and to see how people might differ upon it, without seeing how the different aspects complement one another in the whole that is broken up between them. It is this *comprehensive* view for which I have been putting in a plea. In this view we not only see the various sides, we *unite* them. In order to do so we must not merely go round and round, we must take our stand at the centre, and this centre, in morals and politics, as I have tried to show, is nothing else than human character itself" (p. 77). This passage admirably expresses the "comprehensive" judicial spirit in which the writer deals with practical questions that are too generally disposed of under very "abstract" and narrowly partisan formulas—questions such as those of "Imperialism," "Poor-Law Relief," "Temperance Reform," "A Liberal Education," and the relations between "Psychology and Education." On all these questions Professor Muirhead has something to say that needed saying, on all of them he is scientifically "objective," and therefore more thoroughly practical than those "abstract thinkers," the so-called "practical men," who claim to know at once what is right and wrong without any philosophic doubts about their dogmas.

Of most interest to the general reader are the account of the late Professor William Wallace (which appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* in 1897)—an admirable appreciation of the philosopher, the writer, and the man; and the sympathetic paper on "the philosophy of life" of that great unprofessional moralist, Robert Louis Stevenson. Of one of Stevenson's weighty sentences, Professor Muirhead rightly says that it might have been written by Burke: "You can make no one understand that his bargain is anything more than a bargain, whereas in point of fact it is a link in the policy of mankind, and either a good or an evil to the world." In the paper on "What Imperialism means," Professor Muirhead has shown in an interesting way how the new idea that "this poor nation means to keep its colonies," as "the first, the dearest, the most delicate objects of the internal policy of this empire," may be traced to Carlyle and to Burke (from whom these phrases respectively come), and was not wanting in John Stuart Mill, who in so many matters rose beyond the narrowness of his Benthamist creed.

Of the "Logical" papers, the first is a plea for beginning logical doctrine with the concept instead of with the judgment (as in most recent treatises of the more philosophical kind). Professor Muirhead's plea requires him, however, to take the word "concept" in a very vague sense, which would introduce some confusion into logical terminology. The "concept," if it means "reality as an intellectual possession," is "prior" only in the sense of what is highest, not in the sense of what is rudimentary—as is admitted (p. 201, top). The paper on "The Goal of Knowledge" contains some important criticisms of the deviations from Hegel which are to be found in Mr Bradley's and Mr M'Taggart's treatment of knowledge. "As Mr Bradley assumes that the unity of which knowledge is in search

is incompatible with its differences, Mr M'Taggart conversely assumes that the differences by which we seek to know the thing are incompatible with its unity" (p. 222). "These two (complete differentiation and complete unification) are not two different ideals, but different sides of the same" (228). The remaining papers are discussions of the place of hypothesis in science, and of the question "Is the knowledge of space *a priori*?" as affected by recent psychological theories such as those of Professor James.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

(1) *Theological.*

JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, Vol. III. No. 12, July 1902.

A. E. BURN, *The Textus Receptus of the Apostles' Creed*.—The Textus Receptus (T) is an enlarged form of the old Roman Creed (R), which has been traced back to beginning of second century. Kattenbusch thinks T was in use in the Church of Burgundy possibly from end of fifth century. Older view, supported by Sanday, connects origin of T with some literary centre, such as the School of Lérins. Author's view is that T is a revision of R made in Rome itself, and substituted for it sometime before 700. F. C. BURKITT, *The Date of Codex Bezae*.—Textual critics accept Scrivener's view that it belongs to sixth century. Author is of opinion that it may be assigned to the fifth, to the generation after death of Augustine. J. HOPE MOULTON, *It is his Angel*.—Biblical passages examined in which "angel" denotes not God's messenger to men, but a representative of men dwelling in heavenly world (e.g. Dan. x. 13 and Matt. xviii. 10). The belief is attributed to Zoroastrian influence, the *Fravashis* of Parsism exactly answering to what is desiderated as original hint. F. F. URQUHART, *The Church of France in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century*.—Account of the two clerical parties led by Montalembert and Veuillot respectively. DOCUMENTS:—J. A. F. GREGG, *Origen's Commentary upon Ephesians iv. 27 to vi. 24*. C. H. TURNER, *A Newly Discovered Leaf of Fifth Century MS. of Cyprian*. NOTES AND STUDIES:—C. H. TURNER and D. RAMSAY, *Our Oldest MSS. of Cyprian*. A MS. note on εὐχαριστία—εὐχαριστεῖν, by HORT, edited by J. O. F. MURRAY. A. J. MASON, *Tertullian and Purgatory*. A. E. BROOKE and N. M'LEAN, *Cambridge Septuagint*. REVIEWS.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol. VI. No. 3, July 1902.

A. C. M'GIFFERT, *The Origin of High Church Episcopacy*.—Pauline theory of Church, as body of Christ, gives no warrant for assumption of an institution in and of itself, and separate from its members. Causes which led to growth of Church organisation are examined, and it is shown that

in primitive Church no special priest class existed, endowed with sacerdotal powers. A. O. LOVEJOY, *Religion and the Time Process*.—Two modes of religious thought in reference to conception of temporal change discussed: (1) that which regards time process as appearance or negation; (2) that which lays stress upon it as in itself the main purpose of existence, and holds that the chief end of God is to glorify man and enjoy him for ever. Theology of future will assign a place and value to idea of becoming very different from that assigned to it in the past. T. A. HOBEN, *The Virgin Birth*.—History and use of story of the Virgin birth in ante-Nicene literature traced, and a treatment of N.T. material prefixed as introductory to article. Critical Notes on *Intuitionist Criticism*, by C. M. MEADE, on Jer. i. 4–19, by J. A. BEWER, and on *The Eastern Creeds and the Old Roman Symbol*, by W. W. BISHOP.—Review of theological literature (pp. 529–640).

EXPOSITOR, 6th Series. No. 31, July 1902. C. J. VAUGHAN, *At the Spring of the Waters*, a sermon preached at Oxford. J. B. MAYOR, *A Puritan and a Broad Churchman in the Second Century*.—Account of Clement of Alexandria, depicted as a man of loftiest spirituality and fervent faith, combined with speculative boldness and freedom. V. BARTLET, *Barnabas and his genuine Epistle*.—Raises the question of a visit of Barnabas to Rome. B. W. BACON, *Elias and the Men of Violence*.—Fresh interpretation of obscure phrase in Matt. xi. 12–15, Luke xvi. 16. The “men of violence” are probably scribes and pharisees, who violently seize the kingdom, admitting and excluding whom they will. Rabbinical tradition gives to Elias, as fore-runner of Messiah, the duty of rejecting those who had entered by violence, and of admitting those who had been rejected by violence. Hence Elias will put an end to usurped authority of scribes and pharisees. Author places Matt. xi. 12–15 after Matt. xxi. 32, and the passage thus becomes reply of Jesus to the questioners of his authority to cleanse the temple, and is followed by parable of usurping husbandmen. A. E. GARVIE, *The Early Self-Disclosure*.—Suggests an early declaration by Jesus of his Messianic office. R. A. FALCONER, *Is 2 Peter a genuine Epistle to the Churches of Samaria? ii.*—Considers the relation of 2 Peter to 1 Peter, and finds their teaching, in spite of differences, fundamentally of same type and distinct within N.T. M. KAUFMANN, *Psalms of the East and West, ii.*—Comparison of two widely different types of devotional song, with summing up decidedly in favour of Hebrew Psalter. G. ST CLAIR, *Tartaros not Hades*. Tartaros occurs in 2 Peter ii. 4, because writer is speaking of fallen angels, not of deceased men. Tartaros is the nether heaven, the abode of fallen angels; Hades, the underworld peopled by the spirits of dead men.

No. 32, August 1902. W. M. RAMSAY, *St Paul*.—Attempt to explain the fascination of the Apostle’s personality. In large part, it is due to the fact that his career was full of situations and difficulties such as the ordinary man has to face. Although he often stands on Christ’s plane of eternity, he does not live in it, but only strives towards it. This element of striving keeps him on the level of humanity. W. O. E. OESTERLY, *The Development of Monotheism in Israel*.—Comparison of conceptions of Jahwe in Elijah and in Amos. The gulf that divides them is so great that it is necessary to assume divine intervention to explain doctrine of divine unity in Amos. A. E. GARVIE, *The Surrender of Home*.—A study of the “inner life” of Jesus in reference to the relationships of family and home. R. A. FALCONER, *Is 2 Peter a genuine Epistle to the Churches of Samaria? iii.*—Destination of Epistle discussed. It may have been a circular letter to the Church throughout Samaria. Its probable date, about 60 A.D., when synoptic groundwork was taking form. S. I. CURTISS, *Discoveries of*

a *Vicarious Element in Primitive Semitic Sacrifice*.—The discoveries in question were made by author and J. S. Crawford, during three visits to Northern Syria, and as result of investigating Arab and Fellahin tradition. E. KOENIG, *On Meaning and Scope of Jer. vii. 22, 23*. MARCUS DODS, *Hastings' Dictionary of Bible*, very appreciatory notice. M. GUY PEARSE, *Brother Anthony*, a poem.

No. 33, September 1902. A. M. FAIRBAIRN, *The Governing Idea of the Fourth Gospel*, John i. 18, sums up meaning of prologue, xiv. 8-9, the moral of the history. Prologue must be used to construe the history, the history to illustrate the prologue. It is argued that God is not an abstract simplicity, but a concrete society; that if He were an Eternal Solitary, He could not be essential love. W. M. RAMSAY, *Shall we hear Evidence or not?*—The vision near Damascus is the critical point in the interpretation of the life of St Paul. Paul's claim to have received a divine revelation ought not to be set aside as irrational, but deserves scrutiny and testing. Author answers preliminary question as to whether the event, in the form described, is possible or no, in affirmative. No divine communication, except through the senses, could have appealed to Saul: his sudden consciousness of Christ's function may well have come in this way. A. E. GARVIE, *The Judgment of Religious Rulers and Teachers*.—In this eighth study of the "inner life" of Jesus, the author deals especially with the two incidents, the cleansing of the Temple, and the talk with Nicodemus. E. KOENIG, *On Meaning and Scope of Jer. vii. 22, 23*.—Continuation of article in No. 32. R. A. FALCONER, *Is 2 Peter a genuine Epistle to the Churches of Samaria?* iv.—Discusses external attestation, and attempts to show dependence of Jude on 2 Peter. H. J. GIBBINS, *The Second Epistle of St John*.—In this epistle, as in 1 Peter, the prophetic figure of a woman to represent a community has been transferred to a Christian Church, to whom the letter was addressed (*ἐκλεκτῆς*, in ver. 1). T. H. WEIR, *Notes on the Text of the Psalms*.

REVUE BIBLIQUE, Vol. xi. No. 2, April 1902. M. A. VAN HOONACKER, *Les Chapitres ix.-xiv. du livre de Zacharie*, i.—Close commentary, verse by verse, of last six chapters of Zech., with different renderings from existing text, and reasons given for rejecting readings of Stade, Wellhausen, etc. G. MERCATI, *Frammenti urbinati d'un antica versione latina del libro ii de' Maccabei*. Text of 2 Macc. iv. 39-44, 46-52; v. 3-14; x. 12-26; x. 27 to xi. 1, given with comments and discussions by author. R. P. LAGRANGE, *Etudes sur les religions sémitiques*.—*Les Morts*.—Author seeks to disprove theory that Semitic peoples worshipped the dead as gods. He examines this theory under the heads, "The names of the dead," "Funeral Customs," "Burials," "Duties paid to the dead," "The other life," and comes to the conclusion that, although certain exceptional human beings might be deified, the fact of being dead did not confer such distinction. As a rule the dead were prayed for, and not to. MELANGES: J. P. VAN KASTEREN, *L'épilogue canonique du second évangile*.—A study of the authenticity of Mark xvi. 9-20, in the light of N.T. introductions of Zahn and Belser. Author inclines to opinion of Belser that the verses in question were added later, but by St Mark himself, after appearance of third gospel. M. J. LAGRANGE, *La controverse minéasabéo biblique*. S. RONZEVILLE, *Restitution d'une inscription grecque*.—Text of inscription engraved on altar of masonry dedicated to Semiramis, and recently discovered by M. Poche in Syria. CHRONIQUE: H. VINCENT, *Les fouilles du Cénacle; un nouvel ossuaire juif; Le tombeau à ossuaires du mont des Oliviers*. RECENSIONS. BULLETIN.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE ET DE LITTÉRATURE RELIGIEUSES, Vol. vii. No. 4, July–August, 1902. J. TURMEL, *Le dogme du péché original après Saint Augustin dans l'Eglise latine*:—i. *La condition primitive de l'homme et la notion de sa chute*.—Since fifth century, the dogma of the fall has occupied foremost place in Christian belief, and has preserved intact the general form given to it by Augustine in *De Genesi ad Lit.* Author dwells upon points of difference from Augustine in later writings, and upon subsequent surmises as to what would have happened to Adam's posterity if Adam had not sinned, as to whether Paradise could have lodged all human kind, etc. The theological problems raised by the story of the Fall are touched upon, reference being made to the writings of Suarez, Pierre Lombard, etc. C. CALLEWAERT, *Le Codex Fuldensis*.—A careful examination of this text of Tertullian's *Apologeticum*, which the author considers the best MS. of the work in existence. Ancienne philologie chrétienne. P. LEJAY, *17 Liturgie* (continuation): D. *Cycle festal et culte des saints*. A. LOISY, *Chronique biblique* (continuation): iii. *Exégèse*; iv. *Histoire biblique*.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE THEOLOGIE, Vol. xlv. No. 2, April 1902. F. MATTHIÄ, *Die Frage ist eine religionslose Moral möglich? theologisch beantwortet*.—The development of conscience, whether in the individual or the community, is possible without any religious motive. Religion, in contrast to mere morality, is essentially the consciousness of dependence upon God, and is unworthily conceived when regarded as only a useful instrument for ethical purposes. But, in addition to an autonomy, it is permissible to speak of a theonomy of the will, through which the first is supplemented and referred to its ultimate ground. Pure knowledge of the ethical ideal and full power of actualising it cannot be attained except on the basis of Christianity and in the spirit of divine sonship. W. WAGNER, *Die griechische Bildung nach Clemens von Alexandrien*.—An exhaustive treatment of Clement's attitude to Greek culture as a means of defending, broadening and deepening Christianity. J. DRÄSEKE, *Zur Refutatio omnium haeresium des Hippolytos*.—An exposition of the work of Volkmar and Cruice as interpreters of Hippolytus, discussing also Bunsen's emendations of the text of the *Refutatio*. A. HILGENFELD, *Die Versuchung Jesu*.—A criticism of Holtzmann's treatment of the Temptation, designed to show that his theory of the priority of Mark's account is untenable.—ANZEIGEN.

JEWISH QUARTERLY REVIEW, Vol. xiv. No. 56, July 1902. H. S. Q. HENRIQUES, *The Jews and English Law*, iv.—Historical survey of the laws concerning the civil and political status of the Jews up to the time of the negotiations with Cromwell for their re-admission into the country. E. N. ADLER, *Auto de Fé and Jew* (continued).—The story of José Diaz Pimienta, burnt at Seville in 1720 for having apostatised to Judaism, is related. Two tables follow, one of Autos de Fé in Spain, the other of those celebrated in Portugal and her colonies. J. GOLDZIHNER, *Bemerkungen zur Neuhebräischen Poesie*.—Stress is laid on the evidence of Arabic influence and examples adduced, showing the effect of this influence on the phraseology, form, and ideas of Neo-Hebrew poetry. J. JACOBS, *Earliest Representation of the Ark of the Law*. W. BACHER, *Die von Schechter edirten Saadyana*.—A number of critical notes. W. BACHER, *Aus einer alten Poetik*.—Translation of Arabic fragments of the Saadyana. S. KRAUSS, *Zur Topographie von Caesarea*. S. POZNÁNSKI, *Zum Schrifttum der Südarabischen Juden*. CRITICAL NOTICES: Review by C. H. Toy of Jastrow's "Study of Religion."

(2) *Philosophical.*

MIND, N.S., Vol. xi. No. 43, July 1902. F. H. BRADLEY, *On Mental Conflict and Imputation*.—Volition is the realisation of itself by an idea, with which the self here and now is identified. Against this definition, objection has been urged that two ideas may be present at once to the mind, moving us towards two incompatible actions, each idea being felt as mine and identified with myself. But even if such conflict of ideas be admitted, the self need not be identified with them alike and equally. In all regions of our nature there is a distinction between the self which is essential and the self which is accidental, and this distinction can and does come before us as a difference in kind between mine and not mine. The alleged case, however, of an idea realising itself openly in the face of its opposite cannot be admitted: if two ideas each contain simply and unconditionally the negation of the other, they cannot each at the same time be identified with myself. One must banish the other, or they will oscillate in a wavering alternation. Theory of an inexplicable Will choosing between them is dismissed as an absurdity. W. M'DOUGALL, *The Physiological Factors of the Attention Process*, i. H. MACCOLL, *Symbolic Logic*, iv. J. A. STEWART, *The Attitude of Speculative Idealism to Natural Science*. Speculative idealists oppose scientific naturalism on the ground that unless a "spiritual principle" be posited, ethical conduct and consequently interest in truth would be excluded. But the opposition is nullified by the vagueness of the idea of "spiritual principle." If it be an Impersonal Something, which differentiates itself into persons, how does it differ from the matter of the scientists, and become capable of supplying an ideal, which the latter can not. CRITICAL NOTICES, amongst which are reviews of Howison's *Limits of Evolution*, by J. E. M'TAGGART, and of M'Taggart's *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, by R. R. MARETT. OBITUARY NOTICE of the late Professor Adamson, by HENRY JONES.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. xi. No. 64, July 1902. E. B. M'GILVARY, *The Consciousness of Obligation*.—The Kantian distinction between two types of the consciousness of obligation is justified by introspective analysis. Corresponding to Kant's hypothetical imperative is the consciousness of conditional obligation, and corresponding to his categorical imperative is the consciousness of absolute obligation. The first, as dependent upon the existence of a desire for a certain end, is teleological; the second, as necessary in itself, without any other end, is non-teleological. The moral law as a categorical imperative is our schoolmaster to control the unchartered freedom of chance desire, but makes way, in the mature mind, for the law of the conditional, reasonable imperative, which is the law of freedom. J. DEWEY, *The Evolutionary Method as applied to Morality*.—In this, the second of two papers, author considers the influence upon practical conduct, or morality as such, of an evolutionary treatment of ethics. W. SMITH, *The Metaphysics of Time*.—There is not anything which begins to be and ceases to be; whatever is, is eternal. Past and future exist in an eternal now. But the eternity is not the eternity of Eleatic being; it is the eternity of the fulness, of all the concrete experiences, of the universe. All experience is part of the eternal consciousness. Time is a representation made up of space and certain sense factors by means of which we picture the order in experience which is not temporal; the truth of change is to be found not in the transition from being to nothing, but in the infinite diversity of finite experiences. REVIEWS OF BOOKS, including Royce's *Gifford Lectures*, vol. ii., by J. DEWEY. NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS. NOTES.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. xii. No. 4, July 1902.

M. E. ROBINSON, *Originality*.—Society is suffering at present from a deadening formality; we live more for appearances than for inner realities. Such untruthfulness is fatal to originality. Honesty and independence are its characteristics, and the task of this age is the creation of a human atmosphere in which these characteristics can thrive.

J. MARTIN, *The Social Value of Trade Unionism*.—T.U. not cause of class divisions, but result of them; strikes not desired by T.U., because dead loss to employed and employer; T.U. trains its members in the art of self-government, cultivates co-operation and the subordination of self to good of others.

J. M'CAE, *The Conversion of St Augustine*.—Contents that it was not a conversion at all, in the ethical meaning of the word.

A. J. JENKINSON, *The Problem of Conduct*.—An adverse criticism of the recent work of A. E. Taylor.

A. H. LLOYD, *Scholars of the Cloister: a Defence*.—Cloister schools founded by Charlemagne developed into places for thinkers and philosophers as well as priests. Scholasticism was the forerunner of modern science.

F. THILLY, *Intuitionism and Teleology*.—There is no contradiction between the thought that conscience is innate and the notion that the ultimate criterion of morality lies in the end which it realises. The first means that we can distinguish between right and wrong without having acquired that knowledge; the second means that the realisation of a certain purpose is the ultimate reason of the rightness of an act, and this statement does not affect the truth of the former.

J. D. LOGAN, *The Optimistic Implications of Idealism*.—BOOK REVIEWS.

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE, 10^e année. No. 4, July 1902.

M. HÉBERT, *La dernière Idole*.—To speak of the *divine* instead of *God* is to sacrifice an image in order to save an idea. The term "God" has become an anthropomorphic idol, the type of arbitrary tyrannical government. Yet there is no need to break with religious forms; for the masses, aspiration towards truth and beauty corresponds to no idea, whereas love for God does. Only we must be careful not to transform religious conceptions into fetishes.

E. CHARTIER, *L'Idée d'Objet*.—A discussion of the parts played by sense and thought in the perception of an object emphasising the importance of reason in ordinary sense experience.

CH. DUNAN, *La responsabilité*.—Moral responsibility implies an eternal reason on the one side, and a reasonable (absolute) free being on the other. It varies in individuals according to times and circumstances. Responsibility is grounded upon a noumenal will in contradistinction to the empirical will which produces actions in phenomenal world. Two things differentiate legal from moral responsibility, obligation and external sanction.

F. EVELLIN, *La dialectique des antinomies Kantiennes*.—A careful discussion of Kant's second antinomy.

A. LANDRY, *L'utilité, sociale de la propriété individuelle*.

P. LAPIE, *Ethologie politique*.

L. COUTURAT, *L'État présent des sciences, d'après M. Picard*.—LIVRES NOUVEAUX.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, Vol. xxvii. No. 7, July 1902.

J. H. LEUBA, *Les Tendances fondamentales des mystiques chrétiens*.—The problem for the mystics is not that of the *summum bonum*: it is a practical volitional problem, not a speculative one. Lives of Mdme. Guyon, of Tauler, etc. are cited in illustration. The attitude of mysticism is not individualistic but pre-eminently social.

J. PHILIPPE, *Qu'est ce qu'une image mentale?* Visual images are analysed by experiments with persons asked to describe precisely what they see of some given object, as, e.g., the page of a book or the Notre Dame at Paris.

C. BOS, *Du plaisir de la douleur*.—The pleasure of pain is a phenomenon confirmed through all time since Homer,

who speaks of enjoying suffering. Numerous examples from literature are given. "Sadness," says Malebranche, "is the most agreeable of feelings to a man who endures misery." *REVUE GÉNÉRALE*, Vernon Lee reviews recent German works on Aesthetics.—ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK, Vol. cxx. No. 1. J. REHMKE, *Zum Lehrbegriff des Wirkens*.—To act means to be the condition of a change in another individual being. No single thing can change in and through itself; at least two individual things required for the possibility of action. The principle of reciprocity is of universal validity in the world of things. F. JODL, *Goethe und Kant*.—Kant's dualism of phenomenal and noumenal altogether foreign to Goethe. For the latter, nature, as given in sensation, is an expression of the highest reality. J. BERGMANN, *Ueber den Begriff der Quantität*. J. LILIENFELD, *Fassung des Begriffes der Mathematischen Wahrscheinlichkeit*. E. SCHWEDLER, *Die Lehre von der Beseeltheit der Atome bei Lotze*.—Lotze's theory of psychical atoms undergoes modification when he comes to regard the world as the manifestation of a single absolute existence. RECENSIONEN.

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, N.S., Vol. viii. No. 2. H. RICKERT, *Ueber die Aufgaben einer Logik der Geschichte*.—Article occasioned by a criticism of Tönnies upon author's theory of historical method. History differs from natural science in using individual or particular notions instead of general or universal laws. Historical events are products of the acts of free individual agents, and cannot, therefore, be treated after the manner of physical occurrences. S. WITASEK, *Wert und Schönheit*.—Aesthetics differs from ethics in that its objects are considered not primarily from the point of view of worth, but from their capacity of producing enjoyment. An object is beautiful not because of its worth; its worth depends upon its beauty. A. DREWS, *Zur Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich*.—Conscious states though actual are phenomenal, not ultimately real. They depend upon a noumenal ego, that in relation to them must be described as unconscious. E. BULLATY, *Das Bewusstseinsproblem*. In this second article, author discusses the meaning of the term experience and the part played by sensation in the process of perception. A. ZUCCA, *La Soluzione del Grande Enigma*. F. TÖNNIES, *Jahresbericht über Erscheinungen des Soziologie, 1897 u. 1898*.

VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE, Vol. xxvi. No. 3. C. VON BROCKDORFF, *Galileis Philosophische Mission*.—A thorough examination of Galileo's labours as scientist, philosopher and social reformer. G. M. GIESSLER, *Ueber den Einfluss von Kälte und Wärme auf das seelische Funktionieren des Menschen*.—For spiritual evolution of man temperate zones are the most favourable. Primitive man must have been a dweller in the tropics, but culture and mental concentration need for their development the influence of external difficulties not to be met with in tropical lands. K. MARBE, *Brömses und Grimsehl's Kritik meiner Schrift, Natur-philosophische Untersuchungen zur Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre*. A. VIERKANDT, *Natur und Kultur im socialen Individuum*. BESPRECHUNGEN ÜBER SCHRIFTEN. SELBSTANZEIGE.

G. D. H.

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND FAITH.

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III.

IT may or may not have been observed, by anyone who has read the earlier portions of my article in the first issue of this Journal,—but in so far as it has been missed, the whole meaning of the article has been misconceived,—that when speaking of the atmosphere or the conclusions, the doctrines or the tendency of “science,” I was careful always to explain that I meant orthodox or present-day science: meaning not the comprehensive grasp of a Newton, but science as now interpreted by its recognised official exponents, by the average Fellow of the Royal Society for instance; just as by “faith” I intended not the ecstatic insight aroused in a seer by some momentary revelation, but the ordinary workaday belief of the average enlightened theologian. And my thesis was that the attitudes of mind appropriate to these two classes were at present fundamentally diverse; that there was still an outstanding controversy, or ground for controversy, between science and faith, although active fighting has been

suspended, and although all bitterness has passed from the conflict, let us hope never to return. But the diversity remains, and for the present it is better so, if it has not achieved its work. Eliminating the bitterness, the conflict has been useful, and it would be far from well even to attempt to bring it to a close prematurely. But yet there must be an end to it some time; reconciliation is bound to lie somewhere in the future; no two parts or aspects of the Universe can permanently and really be discordant. The only question is where the meeting-place may be; whether it is nearest to the orthodox faith or to the orthodox science of the present day. This question is the subject of the present or concluding portion of my article. Let me, greatly daring, presume to enter upon the inquiry into what is really true and essential in the opposing creeds, how much of each has its origin in over-hasty assumption or fancy, and how far the opposing views are merely a natural consequence of imperfect vision of opposite sides of the same veil.

First among the truths that will have to be accepted by both sides, we may take the reign of Law, sometimes called the Uniformity of Nature. The discovery of uniformity must be regarded as mainly the work of Science: it did not come by revelation. In moments of inspiration it was glimpsed,—“the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever,”—but the glimpse was only momentary, the Hebrew “atmosphere” was saturated with the mists of cataclysm, visible judgments, and conspicuous interferences. We used to be told that the Creator’s methods were adapted to the stage of His creatures, and varied from age to age: that it was really His actions, and not their mode of regarding them, that varied. The doctrine of uniformity first took root and grew in scientific soil.

At first sight this doctrine of uniformity excludes Divine control, excludes anything in the nature of personal will, of intention, of guidance, of adaptation, of management. The law of evolution proceeds still further in the same direction; it shows that things change and how they change, and it

attempts to show why they change. The Darwinian form of it attempts to account for the origin of species by inevitable necessity, free from artificial selection or operations analogous to those of the breeder. Teleology has gone, and guidance and purpose appear to have gone with it.

At first sight, but at first sight only. So might a spectator, witnessing some great and perfect factory, with machines constantly weaving patterns, some beautiful, some ugly, conclude, or permit himself to dream at least, after some hours' watching, during which everything proceeded without a hitch, driven as it were by inexorable fate, that everything went of itself, controlled by cold dreary necessity. And if his inspection could be continued for weeks or years, and it still presented the same aspect, the dream would begin to seem to be true: the perfection of mechanism would weary the observer: his human weakness would long for something to go wrong, so that someone from an upper office might step down and set it right again. Humanity is accustomed to such interventions and breaks in a ceaseless sequence, and, when no such breaks and interventions occur, may conclude hastily that the scheme is self-originating, self-sustained, that it works to no ultimate and foreseen destiny.

So sometimes, looking at the east end of London, or many another only smaller city, has the feeling of despair seized men: they wonder what it can all mean. So, on the other hand, looking at the loom of nature, has the feeling, not of despair, but of what has been called atheism, one ingredient of atheism, arisen: atheism never fully realised, and wrongly so-called; recently it has been called severe Theism indeed; for it is joyful sometimes, interested and placid always, exultant at the strange splendour of the spectacle which its intellect has laid bare to contemplation, satisfied with the perfection of the mechanism, content to be a part of the self-generated organism, and endeavouring to think that the feelings of duty, of earnest effort, and of faithful service, which conspicuously persist in spite of all discouragement, are on this view intel-

ligible as well as instinctive, and sure that nothing less than unrepining, unfaltering, unswerving acquiescence is worthy of our dignity as man.

The law of evolution not only studies change and progress, it seeks to trace sequences back to antecedents: it strains after the origin of all things. But ultimate origins are inscrutable. Let us admit, as scientific men, that of real origin, even of the simplest thing, we know nothing; not even of a pebble. Sand is the debris of rocks, and fresh rocks can be formed of compacted sand; but this suggests infinity, not origin. Infinity is non-human and we shrink from it, yet what else can there be in space? And if in space, why not in time also? Much to be said here, perhaps, but let it pass. We must admit that science knows nothing of ultimate origins. Which first, the hen or the egg? is a trivial form of a very real puzzle. That the world, in the sense of this planet, this homely lump of matter we call the earth—that this had an origin, a history, a past, intelligible more or less, growingly intelligible to the eye of science, is true enough. The date when it was molten can be roughly estimated; the manner and mechanism of the birth of the moon has been guessed: the earth and moon then *originated* in one sense; before that they were part of a nebula, like the rest of the solar system; and some day the solar system may again be part of a nebula, by reason of collision with some at present tremendously distant mass. But all that is nothing to the Universe; nothing even to the visible universe. The collisions there take place every now and again before our eyes. The Universe is full of lumps of matter of every imaginable size: the history of a solar system may be written—its birth and also its death, separated may be by millions of millions of years; but what of that? It is but an episode, a moment in the eternal cosmogony, and the eye of history looks to what happened before the birth and after the death of any particular aggregate; just as a child may trace the origin and the destruction of a soap bubble,

the form of which is evanescent, the material of which is permanent.

While the soap bubble lived it was the scene of much beauty and of a kind of law and order impossible to the mere water and soap out of which it was made, and into which again it has collapsed. The history of the soap bubble can be written, but there is a before and an after. So it is with the solar system ; so with any assigned collocation of matter in the universe. No point in space can be thought of "at which if a man stand it shall be impossible for him to cast a javelin into the beyond" ; nor can any epoch be conceived in time at which the mind will not instantly and automatically inquire, "and what before," or "what after" ?

Yet does the human mind pine for something finite : it longs for a beginning, even if it could dispense with an end. It has tried of late to imagine that the law of dissipation of energy was a heaven-sent message of the finite duration of the Universe, so that before everything was, it could seek a Great First Cause ; and after everything had been, could take refuge once more in Him.

Seen more closely, these are childish notions. They would be no real help if they were true ; they cannot be true, no more than any other fairy tale suitable for children.

In the dawn of civilisation, God walked in the garden in the cool of the day. Down to say the middle of the nineteenth century He brought things into existence by a creative *Fiat*, and looked on His work for a time with approbation ; only to step down and destroy a good deal of it before many years had elapsed, and to patch it up and try to mend it from time to time.

All very human : the endless rumble of the machinery is distressing, perfection is intolerable. Still more intolerable is imperfection not attended to ; the machinery groans, lacks oil, shows signs of wear, some of the fabrics it is weaving are hideous ; why, why, does no one care ? Surely the manager will step down and put one of the looms to rights, or

scold a workman, or tell us what it is all for, and why he needs the woven fabric, *der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid*, before long.

We see that he does not now interfere, not even when things go very wrong; the "hands" are left to put things right as best they can, nothing mysterious ever happens now, it is all commonplace and semi-intelligible; we ourselves could easily throw a machine out of gear; we do, sometimes; we ourselves, if we are clever enough and patient enough, could even perform the far harder task of putting one right again; we could even suggest fresh patterns; we seem to be more than onlookers—as musicians and artists we can create—perhaps we are foremen; and if ideas occur to us, why should we not throw them into the common stock? There is no head manager at all, this thing has been always running; as the hands die off, others take their places; they have not been selected or appointed to the job; they are only here as the fittest of a large number which have not survived; even the looms seem to have a self-mending, self-regenerative power; and we ourselves, we are not looking at it or assisting in it for long. When we go, other brilliantly-endowed and inventive spectators or helpers will take our places. We understand the whole arrangement now; it is simpler than at first we thought.

Is it, then, so simple? Does the uniformity and the eternity and the self-sustainedness of it make it the easier to understand? Are we so sure that the guidance and control are not really continuous, instead of being, as we expected, intermittent? May we be not looking at the working of the Manager all the time, and at nothing else? Why should He step down and interfere with Himself?

That is the lesson science has to teach theology—to look for the action of the Deity, if at all, then always; not in the past alone, nor only in the future, but equally in the present. If His action is not visible now, it never will be, and never has been visible.

Shall we look for it in toy eruptions in the West Indies?

As well look for it in the fall of a child's box of bricks! Shall we hope to see the Deity some day step out of Himself and display His might or His love or some other attribute? We can see Him now if we look; if we cannot see, it is only that our eyes are shut.

“Closer is He than breathing, nearer than hands or feet:”—

poetry, yes—but also science; the real trend and meaning of Science, whether of orthodox “science” or not.

IV.

There is nothing new in Pantheism:—indeed no! But there are different kinds of pantheism. That the All is a manifestation, a revelation of God,—that it is in a manner, a dim and ungraspable manner, in some sort God Himself,—may be readily granted; but what does the All include? It were a strange kind of All that included mountains and trees, the forces of nature, and the visible material universe only, and excluded the intelligence, the will, the emotions, the individuality or personality, of which we ourselves are immediately conscious. Shall we possess these things and God not possess them? That would be no pantheism at all. Any power, any love, of which we ourselves are conscious does thereby certainly exist; and so it must exist in highly intensified and nobler form in the totality of things,—unless we make the grotesque assumption that in all the infinite universe we denizens of planet Earth are the highest. Let no worthy human attribute be denied to the Deity. There are many errors, but there is one truth, in Anthropomorphism. Whatever worthy attribute belongs to man, be it personality or any other, its existence in the Universe is thereby admitted; we can deny it no more.

The only conceivable way of denying personality, and effort, and failure, and renewed effort, and consciousness, and love, and hate too, for that matter, in the real *whole* of things, is to regard them as illusory,—physiological and purely material

illusions in ourselves. Even so, they are in some sense *there*; they are not unreal, however they are to be accounted for. We must blink nothing; evolution is a truth, a strange and puzzling truth; "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together"; and the most perfect of all the sons of men, the likest God this planet ever saw, He to whom many look for their idea of what God is, surely He taught us that suffering, and sacrifice, and wistful yearning for something not yet attainable were not to be regarded as human attributes alone.

Must we not admit the evil attributes also? In the Whole, yes; but one of our experiences is that there are grades of existence. We recognise that in ourselves the ape and tiger are dying out, that the germs of higher faculties have made their appearance; it is an intensification of the higher that we may infer in the more advanced grades of existence; intensification of the lower lies behind and beneath us.

The inference or deduction of some of the attributes of Deity, from that which we can recognise as "the likest God within the soul," is a legitimate deduction, if properly carried out; and it is in close correspondence with the methods of physical science. It has been said that from the properties of a drop of water the possibility of a Niagara or an Atlantic might be inferred by a man who had seen or heard of neither.¹ And it is true that by experiment on a small quantity of water a man with the brain of Newton and the mathematical power and knowledge of Sir G. G. Stokes could deduce by pure reasoning most if not all of the inorganic phenomena of an ocean; and that not vaguely but definitely; the existence of waves on its surface, the rate at which they would travel as dependent upon distance from crest to crest, their maximum height, their length as depending on depth of sea; the existence of ripples also, going at a different pace and following a different law; the breaking of waves upon a shore; the tides also; the ocean currents caused by inequalities of temperature, and many other properties which are realised in an actual

¹ Sir Conan Doyle, *A Study in Scarlet*.

ocean :—not as topographical realities indeed, but as necessary theoretical consequences of the hypothetical existence of so great a mass of water. Reasoning from the small to the great is legitimate reasoning, notwithstanding that by increase of size phenomena wholly different and at first sight unexpected come into being. No one not a mathematician looking at a drop of water could infer the Atlantic billows or the tides : but they are all there in embryo, given gravitation ; and yet not there in actuality in even the smallest degree. People sometimes think that increase of size is mere magnification, and introduces no new property. They are mistaken. Waves *could not* be on a drop, nor tides either, nor waterspouts, nor storms. The simple fact that the earth is *large* makes it retain an atmosphere ; and the existence of an atmosphere enhances the importance of a globe beyond all comparison, and renders possible plant and animal life. The simple fact that the sun is *very* large makes it hot, *i.e.* enables it to generate heat, and so fits it to be the centre and source of energy to worlds of habitable activity.

To suppose that the deduction of divine attributes by intensification of our own attributes must necessarily result in a “ magnified non-natural man ” is to forget these facts of physical science. If the reasoning is bad, or the data insufficient, the result is worthless, but the method is legitimate, though far from easy ; and it is hardly to be expected that the science of theology has yet had its Newton, or even its Copernicus.¹ At present it is safest to walk by faith and inspiration ; and it is the saint and prophet rather than the theologian whom humanity would prefer to trust.

¹ Theologians may differ from this estimate ; and if so, I defer to their opinion. It is well known that the topics slightly glanced at in the first half of this section have been profoundly studied by them ; but the subject is so difficult that an outsider can hardly assume that as much progress has been made in Theology as in the physical sciences. Not so much progress has been made even in the biological sciences as in the more specifically physical. It is sometimes said that biology has had its Newton, but it is not so : Darwin was its Copernicus, and revolutionised ideas as the era of Copernicus did. Newton did not revolutionise ideas : his was a synthetic and deductive era.

V.

Now let us go back to our groping inquiry—to the series of questions left unanswered in the latter portion of Part II. of this article (pp. 59–61, October issue), and ask, what then of prayer, regarded scientifically; of miracle, if we like to call it miracle; of the region not only of emotion and intelligence, but of active work, guidance, and interference? Are these, after all, so rigorously excluded by the reign of law? Are not these also parts of its kingdom? Shall law apply only to the inorganic and the non-living? Shall it not rule the domain of life and of mind too? Speaking or thinking of the Universe, we must exclude no part;

“All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul;”

“For as the reasonable soul and human flesh is one man”—

glimpses of truth, poor distorted glimpses, even as this essay: what more can be expected of us?

Let us take this question of *guidance*. We must see it in action now or never. Do we see it now? Orthodox theology vaguely assumes it; orthodox science sees it not at all. What is the truth? Is the blindness of science subjective or objective? Is the vision absent because there is nothing to see, or because we have shut our eyes, and have declined to contemplate a region of dim and misty fact?

Take the origin of species by the persistence of favourable variations, how is the appearance of those same favourable variations accounted for? Except by artificial selection, not at all. Given their appearance, their development by struggle and inheritance and survival can be explained; but that they arose spontaneously, by random change without purpose, is an assertion which cannot be made. Does anyone think that the skill of the beaver, the instinct of the bee, the genius of a man, arose by chance, and that its presence is accounted for by handing down and by survival? What struggle for existence will explain the

advent of Beethoven? What pitiful necessity for earning a living as a dramatist will educe for us Shakespeare? These things are beyond science of the orthodox type; then let it be silent and deny nothing in the Universe till it has at least made an honest effort to grasp the whole.

Genius, however, science *has* made an effort not wholly to ignore; but take other human faculties—Premonition, Inspiration, Prevision, Telepathy—what is the meaning of these things? Orthodox science refuses to contemplate them, orthodox theology also looks at some of them askance. Many philosophers have relegated them to the region of the unconscious, or the subconscious, where dwell things of nothing worth. A few Psychologists are beginning to attend.

Men of religion can hold aloof or not as they please: probably they had better hold aloof until the scientific basis of these things has been rendered more secure. At present they are beyond the pale of science, but they are some of them inside the Universe of fact,—all of them, as I now begin to believe,—and their meaning must be extracted. So long as this region is ignored, dogmatic science should be silent. It has a right to its own adopted region, it has no right to be heard outside. It cannot see guidance, it cannot recognise the meaning of the whole trend of things, the constant leadings, the control, the help, the revelations, the beckonings, beyond our normal bodily and mental powers. No, for it will not look. What becomes of an intelligence which has left this earth? Whence comes the nascent intelligence which arrives? What is the meaning of our human personality and individuality? Did we spring into existence a few years ago? Do we cease to exist a few years hence? It does not know. It does not want to know.

Does theology seek enlightenment any more energetically? No; it is satisfied with its present information, which some people mistake for divine knowledge on these subjects. Divine knowledge is perhaps not obtained so easily.

At present, in the cosmic scheme we strangely draw the

line at man. We know of every grade of life from the amoeba upwards, with some slight missing link here and there,—and these led up to by plants, and perhaps, though doubtfully, by crystals,—but the series terminates with man. From man the scale of existence is supposed to step to God. Is it not somewhat sudden? The step in the other direction, from man to the amoeba, is as nothing to it. Yet that is a wide gap; wide, but not infinite. Why this sudden jump from the altitude of man into infinity? Are there no intermediate states of existence?

Perhaps on other planets,—yes, bodily existence on other planets is probable, not necessarily on any planet of our solar system, but that is a trifle in the visible universe; it is as our little five-roomed house among all the dwellings of mankind. But why on other planets only? Why bodily existence only? Why think solely of those incarnate personalities from whom, by reason of bodily location, we are most isolated? Because we feel more akin to such, and we know of no others. A good answer so far, and a true. But do we wish to learn? Have we our minds open? A few men of science have adduced evidence of intelligence not wholly inaccessible and yet not familiarly accessible, intelligence perhaps a part of ourselves, perhaps a part of others, intelligence which seems closely connected with the region of genius, of telepathy, of clairvoyance, to which I have briefly referred.

Suppose for a moment that there were a God. Science has never really attempted to deny His existence. Conceive a scientific God. How would He work? Surely not by speech or by intermittent personal interference. He would be in, and among, and of, the whole scheme of things. The universe is governed by law; effect is connected with cause;¹ if a thing moves it is because something moves it;² effects are due and only due to agents. If there be guidance or control,

¹ If this involves controversy, then sequent with antecedent.

² This I wish to maintain in spite of controversy.

it must be by agents that it is exerted. Then what in the scheme of things would be His agents ?

Surely among such agents we must recognise ourselves : we can at least consider how we and other animals work. Watch the bird teaching its young to fly, the mother teaching a child to read, the statesman nursing the destiny of a new-born nation. Is there no guidance there ?

What is the meaning of legislation and municipal government, and acts of reform, and all the struggle after better lives for ourselves and others ?

Pure automatism, say some ; an illusion of free will. Possibly ; but even a dream is not an absolute nonentity ; the effort, however it be expressed or accounted for, exists.

What is all the effort—regarded scientifically—but the action of the totality of things trying to improve itself, striving still to evolve something higher, holier, and happier out of an inchoate mass ? There may be many other ways of regarding it, but this is one. Failures, mistakes, sins,—yes, they exist ; evolution would be meaningless if perfection were already attained ; but surely even now we see some progress, surely the effort of our saints is bearing fruit. This planet has laboured long and patiently for the advent of a human race, for millions of years it was the abode of strange beasts, and now recently it has become the abode of man. What but imperfection would you expect ? May it not be suggested that conscious evil or vice looms rather large in our eyes, oppresses us with a somewhat exaggerated sense of its cosmic importance, because it is peculiarly characteristic of the *human* stage of development : the lower animals know little or nothing of it ; they may indeed do things which in men would be vicious, but that is just what vice is—reversion to a lower type after perception of a higher. The consciousness of crime, the active pursuit of degradation, does not arise till something like human intelligence is reached ; and only a little higher up it ceases again. It appears to be a stage rather rapidly passed through in the cosmic scheme. Greed, for instance, greed in

the widest sense, accumulation for accumulation's sake : it is a human defect, and one responsible for much misery to-day ; but it arose recently, and already it is felt to be below the standard of the race. A stage very little above present humanity, not at all above the higher grades of present humanity, and we shall be free from it again.

Let us be thankful we have got thus far, and struggle on a little further. It is our destiny, and whether here or elsewhere it will be accomplished.

We are God's agents, visible and tangible agents, and we can help ; we ourselves can answer some kinds of prayer, so it be articulate ; we ourselves can interfere with the course of inanimate nature, can make waste places habitable, and habitable places waste. Not by breaking laws do we ever influence nature—we cannot break a law of nature, it is not brittle, we only break ourselves if we try—but by obeying them. In accordance with law we have to act, but act we can and do, and through us acts the Deity.

And perhaps not alone through us. We are the highest bodily organisms on this material planet, and the material control of it belongs to us. It is subject to the laws of Physics and to the laws of our minds operating through our bodies. If there are other beings near us they do not trespass. It is our sphere, so far as Physics are concerned. If there are exceptions to this statement, stringent proof must be forthcoming.

Assertions are made that under certain strange conditions *physical* interference does occur ; but there is always a person present in an unusual state when these things happen, and until we know more of the power of the unconscious human personality, it is simplest to assume that these physical acts are due, whether consciously or unconsciously, to that person.

But what about our mental acts ? We can operate on each other's minds through our physical envelope, by speech and writing and in other ways, but we can do more : it appears that we can operate at a distance, by no apparent physical

organ or medium; if by mechanism at all, then by mechanism at any rate unknown to us.

If we are open to influence from each other by non-corporeal methods, may we not be open to influence from beings in another region or of another order? And if so, may we not be aided, inspired, guided, by a cloud of witnesses,—not witnesses only, but helpers, agents like ourselves of the immanent God?

How do we know that in the mental sphere these cannot answer prayer, as we in the physical? It is not a speculation only, it is a question for experience to decide. Are we conscious of guidance? do we feel that prayers are answered? that power to do, and to will, and to think is given us? Many there are who with devout thankfulness will say yes.

They attribute it to the Deity; so can we attribute everything to the Deity, from thunder and lightning down to daily bread; but is it direct action? Does He work without agents? That is what our feelings tell us, but it is difficult to discriminate; and fortunately it is not necessary; the whole is linked together,

“Bound by gold chains about the feet of God,”

and through it all His energising Spirit runs. On any hypothesis it must be to the Lord that we pray—to the highest we know or can conceive; but the answer shall come in ways we do not know, and there must always be a far Higher than ever we can conceive.

Religious people seem to be losing some of their faith in prayer: they think it scientific not to pray in the sense of simple petition. They may be right: it may be the highest attitude never to ask for anything specific, only for acquiescence. If saints feel it so, they are doubtless right, but, so far as ordinary science has anything to say to the contrary, a more childlike attitude might turn out truer, more in accordance with the total scheme. Prayer for a fancied good that might really be an injury, would be foolish; prayer for breach of law would be not foolish only but profane; but who are we to dogmatise too positively concerning law? A martyr may have prayed that he

should not feel the fire. Can it be doubted that, whether through what we call hypnotic suggestion or by some other name, the granting of it was at least possible? Prayer, we have been told, is a mighty engine of achievement, but we have ceased to believe it. Why should we be so incredulous? Even in medicine, for instance, it is not really absurd to suggest that drugs and no prayer may be almost as foolish as prayer and no drugs.¹ Mental and physical are interlocked. The crudities of "faith-healing" have a germ of truth, perhaps as much truth as can be claimed by those who condemn them. How do we know that each is not ignoring one side, that each is but half educated, each only adopting half measures? The whole truth may be completer and saner than the sectaries dream: more things may be

"wrought by prayer
Than this world dreams of."

We are not bodies alone, nor spirits alone, but both; our bodies isolate us, our spirits unite us: if I may venture on two lines, we are like

Floating lonely icebergs, our crests above the ocean,
With deeply submerged portions united by the sea.

The conscious part is knowing, the subconscious part is ignorant: yet the subconscious can achieve results the conscious can by no means either understand or perform. Witness the physical operations of "suggestion" and the occasional lucidity of trance.

¹ Diseases are like weeds; gardening is a bacteriological problem. Some bacteria are good and useful and necessary; they act in digestion, in manures, etc.; others are baleful and mean disease. The gardener, like the physician, has to cultivate the plants and eradicate the weeds. If he ignores the existence of weeds and says they are all plants, he speaks truth as a botanist, but is not a practical gardener. If he says "gardening is all effort on my part, and nothing comes from the sky, I will dig and I will water, I care not for casual rain or for sun," he errs foolishly on one side. If he says "the sun and the rain do everything, there is no need for my exertion," he errs on the other side, and errs more dangerously; because he *can* abstain from action, whereas he cannot exclude rain and sun, however much he presumes to ignore them: he ought to be a part of the agency at work. Sobriety and sanity consist in recognising all the operative causes—spiritual, mental, and material.

Each one of us has a great region of the subconscious, to which we do not and need not attend; only let us not deny it, let us not cut ourselves off from its sustaining power: if we have instinct for worship, for prayer, for communion with saints or with Deity, let us trust that instinct, for there lies the true realm of religion. We may try to raise the subconscious region into the light of day, and study it with our intellect also; but let us not assume that our present conscious intelligence is already so well informed that its knowledge exhausts or determines or bounds the region of the true and the possible.

VI.

As to what is scientifically possible or impossible, anything not self-contradictory or inconsistent with other truth is *possible*. Speaking from our present scientific ignorance, and in spite of the extract from Professor Tyndall quoted in Part I. of this article (p. 50), this statement must be accepted as literally true, for all we know to the contrary. There may be reasons why certain things do not occur: our experience tells us that they do not, and we may judge that there is some reason why they do not; there may be an adaptation, an arrangement among the forces of nature—the forces of nature in their widest sense—which enchains them and screens us from their destructive action, after the same sort of fashion as the atmosphere screens the earth from the furious meteoric buffeting it would otherwise encounter on its portentous journey through ever new and untried depths of space.¹

We may indeed be well protected; we must, else we should not be here; but as to what is *possible*—think of any lower creature, low enough in the scale of existence to ignore us, and to treat us, too, as among the forces of nature, and then let us bethink ourselves of how we may appear, not to God or to any

¹ The earth does not describe anything like a closed curve per annum; she advances rather more than ten miles per second, in what is practically a straight line.

infinite being, but to some personified influence high above us in the scale of existence. Consider a colony of ants, and conceive them conscious at their level; what know they of fate and of the future? Much what we know. They may think themselves governed by uniform law—uniform, that is, even to their understanding—the march of the seasons, the struggle for existence, the weight of the soil, the properties of matter as they encounter it—no more. For centuries they may have continued thus; when one day, quite unexpectedly, a shipwrecked sailor strolling round kicks their ant-hill over. To and fro they run, overwhelmed with the catastrophe. What shall hinder his crushing them with his heel? *Laborare est orare* in their case. Let him watch them and see, or fancy that he sees, in their movements the signs of industry, of system, of struggle against untoward circumstance; let him note the moving of eggs, the trying to save and to repair:—the act of destruction may by that means be averted.

Just as our earth is midway among the lumps of matter, neither small like a meteoric stone, nor gigantic like a sun, so may be the place we, the human race, occupy in the scale of existence. All our ordinary views are based on the notion that we are highest in the scale; upset that notion and anything is possible. Possible, but we have to ascertain the facts, not what might, but what does occur. Into the lives of the lower creatures caprice assuredly seems to enter; the treatment of a fly by a child is capricious, and may be regarded as puzzling to the fly. As we rise in the scale of existence we hope that things get better; we have experience that they do. It may be said that up to a point in the scale of life vice and caprice increase; that the lower organisms and the plant world know nothing of them, and that man has been most wicked of all; but they reach a maximum at a certain stage—a stage the best of the human race have already passed—and we need not postulate either vice or caprice in our far superiors. Men have thought themselves the sport of the gods before now, but let us hope they were mistaken. Such thoughts would lead

to madness and despair. We do not know the laws which govern the interaction of different orders of intelligence, nor do we know how much may depend on our own attitude and conduct. It may be that prayer is an instrument which can control or influence higher agencies, and by its neglect we may be losing the use of a mighty engine to help on our lives and those of others.

The Universe is huge and awful every way, we might so easily be crushed by it; we need the help of every agency available, and if we had no helpers we should stand a poor chance. The loneliness of it when we leave the planet would be appalling; sometimes even here the loneliness is great.

What the "protecting atmosphere" for our disembodied souls may be, I know not. Some may liken the protection to the care of a man for a dog, of a woman for a child, of a far-seeing minister for a race of bewildered slaves; while others may dash aside the contemplation of all intermediaries and agencies, and feel themselves safe and enfolded in the protecting love of God Himself.

The region of Religion and the region of a completer Science are one.

OLIVER LODGE.

THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF REFLECTIVE THOUGHT TOWARDS RELIGION.

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THE rational nature of man brings upon him the necessity of undertaking tasks which he cannot finally accomplish. For reason is the faculty of ideals; and ideals, whether practical or theoretical, grow with man's progress: a duty performed generates other duties that are more comprehensive, and intellectual solutions become the premisses for further inquiry and the source of new problems.

Amongst the problems which are also duties, and which man can never altogether avoid or completely solve, is that of interpreting his own times. It is the condition of leading an effective life that he comprehends to some degree the multitudinous forces which play upon him; and his usefulness is very fairly measured by the accuracy and comprehensiveness of his interpretation.

That this task is at present more difficult than it ever was before will be readily conceded by anyone who considers how, during the last century, human interests,—moral, intellectual, social and religious,—have multiplied and deepened. The world of the intelligent man has grown very large; and, what is perhaps even more important, the elements which constitute it are much more closely interwoven. The old parochialism has

passed away in ethical as well as in commercial matters, influences from all the world travel everywhere, and every change is everywhere felt. The interpreter of human character can no longer rely on the old individualism: he must study it in relation to the social life, of which it is both cause and effect, both the expression and the product. He can ignore neither the psychical nor the physical antecedents of development; he must *derive* the conscience and will, however authoritative the former or autonomous the latter; and to derive them is to trace them back along innumerable relations, for the object of his search is connected by subtle filaments to all the world.

It is only the inevitableness of the task, then, that can excuse the attempt to perform it; and so great is the difficulty that hardly any failure can lack its apology.

But there is one aspect of the general life of the present that is at once so important and so obtrusive as to justify the view that it is characteristic of our times; and I venture to lay stress upon it as upon a matter that calls for reflection.

The century which has just closed has handed down to us a most rich inheritance—a variety of spiritual interests that is inexhaustibly suggestive, possibilities of ethical welfare that are as far-reaching as they are at present ill-defined. But the inheritance is infected with a contradiction which almost threatens our possession of it. The contradiction lies in this:—that while this age is more fully committed to intellectual inquiry, and on the whole more successfully engaged therein than any of its predecessors, it is at the same time more prone to doubt, and even to deny, that intellectual inquiry can have any real value in precisely those matters which are best worth knowing. Taking “reason” in its ordinary (and on the whole in its truest) sense as equivalent to “the intelligence,” and not as a mere logic-chopping faculty, it may be said that no age has employed reason more, nor trusted it less, than our own. In almost every sphere of our life, theory and practice have come into conflict; and, as was to be expected, the battle rages

hottest around the most fundamental of all our concerns, namely, the principles of our moral and religious life. We are not able to do without a code of conduct and a creed, but we do not know how to justify them. And our failure to justify the faith that founds our practice has been reflected back upon other departments of knowledge, and even upon the intelligence itself. Thus, side by side with the boldest adventurousness in all the sciences, including the sciences of man, there has grown up an intellectual diffidence which is distinguishable from utter scepticism only by the fact that it has not, as yet, ripened into its results. What these results will be if the scepticism remains unrefuted it is not difficult to predict; for history gives the clue. There can be no doubt that principles which are questioned by the intelligence, or deemed incapable of rational defence, whether owing to their own uncertainty or to the impotence of human reason, cannot continue to be effective in practice.

Now, it may be maintained in a sense that this intellectual scepticism is not peculiar to our times, but chronic and endemic to the human race. The problem of the trustworthiness of the human mind and the limitations of its use is almost as old as reflection. One of the first things which the philosophers of Greece did, after they had discovered the mind, was to throw doubt upon its veracity; and from the time of the Sophists until the present it has furnished occupation to a certain kind of metaphysician (though not, perhaps, to any one of the greatest) to inquire not *how* but *whether* we can know. But it may be argued, not without some reason, that the world has gone on all the same seeking the truth, and never shown any inclination to suspend the use of reason, pending the close of the philosopher's inquiry into its trustworthiness. Abstract discussions as to the validity of human knowledge do not signify much; the battles of the metaphysicians are bloodless as well as interminable. The world will go on, as it has done in the past, employing such intelligence as it has as best it can, just as if it were trustworthy, and finding out by actual trial what can, and what can not be known.

But this argument, although it has some truth, proves too much, and refutes itself. To add to the statement that "we cannot know" the further statement that "it does not matter," is not to show that scepticism is of no consequence, but to admit that it brings intellectual indifference, paralysis of thought. And it is a significant fact that this aspect of scepticism has received its most telling expression in our own day. We do wrong, we are told, in concerning ourselves much about the speculations of philosophers upon final issues. Nay, we should go further, and refuse to regard the operations of the ratiocinative or logical intelligence, even when taken in the most general sense, as of much real consequence; for they have had far less to do with the rise and fall of the institutions of civilisation than is ordinarily assumed. It is the "heart" and not the "head" which has built up the world of human relations. Man is not guided or inspired by what he reasons out, and his destiny does not lie in his conscious thought; rather, it lives below the threshold of his consciousness, and moves amongst traditions which he has inherited he knows not whence, and adopted he knows not why. "The causes of belief," Mr Balfour tells us, "are not reasons." "It is Authority rather than Reason to which, in the main, we owe, not religion only, but ethics and politics: it is Authority which supplies us with essential elements in the premisses of science: it is Authority rather than Reason which lays deep the foundations of social life: it is Authority rather than Reason which cements its superstructure."¹

One of the main errors of our times, we are told, is "to overrate the rôle played by reason in human affairs." The same error was committed by the age of Plato and Aristotle when Greek civilisation was leaning to its fall, and theoretical speculation failed so signally to set it up again. But a little observation will suffice to dissipate it. For it can be shown that reason, which is regarded as creative and originative, is really dependent and secondary; so far from being constructive and

¹ *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 243.

progressive, it is analytic, disintegrating, destructive. It is a formal manipulator of borrowed materials, and, at the best, can only order what is given, rearrange elements furnished to it from without, and catalogue our possessions.

Even Truth itself we have esteemed too highly, making it an end in itself, as did also the Greeks. For what, in the last resort, is Truth, even were it considered as attained? It is only "a reflection of the world as it exists," "a vain repetition," "an imitation within the soul of what exists without it." And "what significance could there be in this barren rehearsal"?¹ What intrinsic worth can there be in an unsubstantial image of reality thrown upon a shifting mental mirror, or in a world of ideas which at the best can only be a languid substitute for that true contact with facts which "living experience" brings? Truth is not an end for man, but only means. "Taking truth as a whole, we are not justified in treating it as a self-centred splendour": "we strive to know, only in order to learn what to do and what to hope." The "true" derives all its value from the "good," and even finds therein the criterion of its validity: in itself it is a mere abstraction, a hollow echo of reality, incapable of satisfying the spiritual needs of man.

This view of the limitations of the intelligence and of the subordinate worth of its products is now maintained in some form or other by all kinds of philosophical sects. Ethical Idealists, Personal Idealists, Pluralists, however little they may agree otherwise with each other, or with the older school of Positivists and Agnostics, are all united in a revolt against what they deem the extravagant claims of the mere intellect.² And the consequences of this view are showing themselves in all the great departments of human knowledge. Except in the hands of the older school of English Idealists, philosophy, in this country, is no longer an attempt to interpret the world of

¹ See Lotze's *Mikrocosmos*, vol. i., Pref. pp. vii-ix.

² See Royce's *The World and the Individual*. James's *Will to Believe* and *Varieties of Religious Experience*. *Personal Idealism*, edited by Henry Sturt. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*.

reality as an inter-related whole, but an examination of human knowledge ; constructive metaphysics has sunk into Epistemology. Theology and Ethics, the next of kin to philosophy, are assiduously engaged in cutting themselves free from its endless questionings, and either appeal to " Authority " or are content to be hypothetical. Even Natural Science now acknowledges that its province is limited, and that within that province itself its premisses are assumptions and its conclusions only proximately valid. In a word, if the variety and the voluminousness of the literature devoted at present to the exposure of the weakness and dependence of human reason affords a valid clue to the trend of the public mind, there can be no doubt that we are entering upon a period of scepticism : scepticism, not merely as regards the validity of the knowledge we have acquired, but as regards the possibility of any knowledge which can command our confidence as true of real existence. For it is manifest that when doubt is cast upon the intelligence itself, it must extend to all its products.

But if a general survey of the abstract thought of the present age leads to one conclusion, an examination of its actual experience, which it is the business of abstract thought to interpret, leads to quite another. If, on the one hand, the great mass of the " expert evidence " of philosophers, psychologists and theologians is condemnatory of human reason, the practical confidence of the day in the uses of the intelligence remains, on the other hand, quite unshaken. Over against the theoretical confession of impotence and necessary ignorance, the popular instinct persists in placing the solid worth of our growing knowledge. This is particularly true of modern science. No doubt the ordinary mind is quite unable to refute the charges that are levelled by philosophers and theologians against the ratiocinative use of the intelligence ; and scientific men themselves are unable to deny that their premisses are only " working hypotheses," and their whole procedure, in the last resort, only tentative. But the latter do not relax their efforts, nor do the former abate their confidence.

Science moves onwards with a stately power that seems irresistible, revealing the order of nature, ameliorating the practical conditions of human life, and changing the very foundations of civilisation in so far as they depend upon a physical basis. In its dealing with physical phenomena, in its discovery and co-ordination of their laws and its linking of these laws to human purposes, the general mind finds a proof of the practical value of the operations of human reason, which is indefinitely more massive and cogent than all the fine-drawn theories of abstract critics.

In this respect, at least, the present age cannot be regarded as sceptical. Not one of the signs by which Scepticism is known can be anywhere seen—outside of the purely theoretical and epistemological province. There is not the least practical evidence of a disposition on the part of scientific men to defer to “Authority,” to give precedence to tradition over reason or to the subconscious over the conscious, or to appeal against experimental and logical investigation to “immediate assurance,” or “direct intuition,” or “the feelings of the heart,” or “common-sense,” or to any other of the substitutes for the slow labour of research by the methods of observation and reason—“unaided,” except by facts. In one word, the popular consciousness of the day, to say nothing of scientific men themselves, would not sell for a great price the privilege of free inquiry, at least in this region. It is more than questionable if the theoretical sceptics themselves would do so; rather, they would unite with their neighbours, ignore their own theories, and refuse to set any limit to inquiry, or barter for aught else the promise of public good that lies in the unprejudiced and impersonal methods of scientific research.

Thus, at the very moment when human reason is charged in the high places of abstract thought with every weakness, it is believed to be bringing in a richer harvest of practically valid truth than the world has seen at any other period of its history. And the question that thus arises is, “Whom should we believe?” Is the confidence thus put in human reason mis-

placed, or have the philosophers (and the theologians) calumniated the human intellect in insisting that its operations are necessarily subject to the blind rule of authority and tradition, that thought is only formal and secondary, and that its results are only relatively true and of mere phenomena? Are we in practice devoting ourselves to the pursuit of impossible ends, and are all our intellectual gains unreal; or is it the distrust of reason which is itself to be distrusted?

Now, it may be maintained, and with some truth, that it is only in the field of physical inquiry that man's natural powers have unequivocally proved their strength. The supra-physical sciences, such as Biology, Physiology, Psychology, Anthropology, Political Economy—not to mention Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Theology and Metaphysics—lack the demonstrative security and the predictive power of the Mathematical and Physical sciences. Shall we then make these higher provinces over to the sceptic, and, foregoing the uses of reason, trust to tradition, or intuition, or emotion, or the "will-to-believe"? On the contrary, the ardour of the pursuit of truth in these more complex regions is not less; and a comparison of the condition of these sciences at the end and at the beginning of the nineteenth century shows that their advance is not less real. It is proved by the number and significance of the discoveries that have been made. It is shown even more convincingly by the change which has come over the intellectual temper of the age. For modern science has not only been splendidly successful in its own field, but, by a kind of reflection and rebound, it has brought the hope of order and the aspiration after articulated system into other provinces of knowledge. The very methods of inquiry have been modified. Modern thought has parted from venerable presuppositions, turned away from a merely descriptive empiricism, and is now everywhere seeking to systematise phenomena under principles, and to interpret particulars in the light of universal laws. So far from feeling itself baffled in its scrutiny of these more complex phenomena, from being flung back upon itself in con-

sequence into self-inquiry and self-distrust, modern thought is steadily pressing forward, under the secure conviction that it has, at last, hit upon a road which will lead to a more comprehensive grasp of the meaning of the world of Nature, and a more orderly and significant comprehension of its phenomena than has been vouchsafed to any previous age.

Of recent years the more sober and eminent devotees of natural science have shown less disposition to apply their principles indiscriminately to all provinces of fact, and they do not now offer a physical or naturalistic explanation of ethics and religion, or a complete theory of the world. But a clearer insight into the essential relation of the interpreting principles to the facts has not led them to distrust these principles in their own proper province. On the contrary, in spite of their fuller consciousness of the limits within which they work, there is no practical evidence of the sceptical weakness and the intellectual diffidence which afflict the philosophers and theologians. And once more the question arises, are we to distrust human reason, or are we to distrust its sceptical critics?

A similar line of argument would lead to analogous conclusions regarding the sciences of man. Psychology, Logic, Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy deal with a material which is indefinitely more complex, and they require far more concrete categories than the physical sciences. But the investigation is pursued in the same spirit and by methods that are fundamentally identical: there is the same conviction of the uniformity of nature and the universality of law, the same confidence that the unprejudiced use of reason upon the facts will bring the truth, and, in the case of Logic and Psychology at least, the same progress.

But I turn to the province in which scepticism has been most in evidence, and where intellectual diffidence has to many seemed most just, namely, the province of religion.

It cannot be denied that the present age cares little for theology, and hopes even less from metaphysics. Its effective

creed is reducible to a very small compass, and such spiritual beliefs as it still entertains it would fain not define. Reflective men are prone to be intolerant of sharp definitions in morals and religion, and to fortify themselves against both definition and discussion in theological matters, within an inexpugnable indifferentism. Many have ceased to hope to solve, and refuse to be troubled with, problems which they believe to transcend their powers, to refer to facts (or fictions) that lie beyond experience.

Nevertheless, this age of faith in natural science is also an age which believes in God and in the immortal realities of the world of spirit. It is not sceptical of morals and religion, even if it does despair of a theory of them. If there are any speculations to which it would listen with even less patience than it can bring to pretentious theological or metaphysical systems, they are those which would nullify religion or stultify ethical distinctions, and represent the difference between honour and interest, virtue and vice, morality and expediency as social artifices or conventional contrivances which have no root in the nature of things.

Such genuinely atheistical conclusions might meet some psychical need and obtain some currency in the eighteenth century. In ours they have ceased to interest earnest men. The moral and religious experience of the century just closed has been far too rich, the operation of spiritual convictions too powerful, the expansion of man's ethical horizon too obvious, to give any plausibility to this kind of scepticism. "I think," said Mr Huxley, in one of his controversial essays, "it would puzzle Mr Lilly, or anyone else, to adduce convincing evidence that at any period of the world's history there was a more widespread sense of social duty, or a greater sense of justice, or of the obligations of mutual help, than in this England of ours."¹

And if, on the one hand, it must be acknowledged that the official exponents of religion exercise less authority over men's

¹ *Science and Morals*, p. 234.

minds than in the past, it may be maintained, on the other, that this age is pre-eminently willing to listen to its poets, and that it is pre-eminently characteristic of these poets to dwell upon the profoundest convictions regarding the spiritual life of man. It is no formal difference that divides the inspired spiritualism of Wordsworth, the melodious piety of Tennyson, and the strenuous ardour of Browning's religious faith, from the pert secularism of the age of Pope. And there is no surer index to the spirit of a people than its imaginative literature. The poets are the best exponents of their time, they give utterance, as no others can, to the dim thoughts that blindly move around the public heart. And men to whom the official theology has come to seem the empty sound of hollow ignorance, listen to these poets not without reverence, and find in their melodious thoughts what moves them to believe that the voice which spoke of old by Job and Isaiah still speaks in the spirit of man, and still reveals itself in the loveliness of nature and the confused grandeur of human history.

It must, no doubt, be admitted that an age which is receptive of religious truths only if they come in the impassioned way of poetry has no secure hold of its convictions. For if the imagination, the most free of man's faculties and the most royal in its wealth of suggestion, is in some ways the best fitted to express this sense of the mystery of his life and destiny, it is at the same time the least capable of withstanding the shocks of criticism. And those who value poetry for the light it seems to throw upon the graver issues of life, would do well to seek in the calmer way of reasoned contemplation a second line of defence.

Still, the very fact that our greatest poets dwelt upon these themes and find nature and human life not secular but sacred, and God not far away but immanent in His world, proves that our times are not sceptical in spirit. And if thoughtful men who find in poetry the spiritual support for which their nature craves are aware of the defenceless condition of their beliefs, and are repelled by dogmatic creeds which seem to be touched

with every weakness—based on no secure principles, scanty in content, and inwardly incoherent—they nevertheless show no tendency to relinquish anything that is essential to the higher life.

But if we judge the age not merely by its faith but also by its works, the strength of its spiritual convictions becomes still more evident. For it confronts the deepening problems of an intricate social life, which is in process of reconstruction on a scale never known before, in that spirit of reliance upon the order of the world, of trust in the destiny of man and in the growing purpose of the ages, which is the very essence of religion. What it distrusts is not religion, but theology; and theology is, at best, only the theoretical exposition of this most marvellous and baffling element of human experience. So that, once more, we come upon a fundamental contradiction between the theory and the practice of the times; and we are, once more, constrained to ask whether it is the practice itself that is at fault, and religion only an emotional glamour spread over the surface of a world secular at heart, or whether, on the other hand, the human intellect is radically incompetent to deal with this element of human experience. Or is there still another alternative? May it not be that the discrepancy springs from the very growth and vigour of the practical religion and morality of the age, rendering the old speculative formulæ into which they are forced inadequate and unconvincing, and convicting theology and philosophy of so falling behind the times as to become untruthful exponents of our spiritual experience and insecure guides to truth? But in whatever way we explain this phenomenon, it is not possible to doubt that it is pre-eminently characteristic of our times, and of the most far-reaching practical significance.

We must, however, endeavour to observe this contradiction more closely, and ask what consequences flow from this fundamental discrepancy between our practical life and the theoretical reconstruction of it. Is the suspicion that has fallen upon human reason, especially in its employment upon the ultimate hypo-

theses of our ethical and religious life, really of deep import? What, if any, are the practical effects of the diffidence and scepticism of the philosophers and the misology of the theologians?

As already indicated, the influence of this intellectual scepticism upon the pursuit of *natural* knowledge is hardly felt. An occasional philosopher¹ is driven by his conception of the supremacy of the will over the speculative intellect to explain the world in terms of human purpose, and to cast doubt upon the uniformity of Natural Law; and some Pluralists² go even further, and predicate real discontinuities, uncaused beginnings, and alogical occurrences in the objective world. But their theorising, in this respect, are of not much account. Scientific men cannot yield the hypothesis of the orderly continuity of nature, which is the presupposition of all their endeavour. They are aware that their ultimate conceptions are hypothetical; that the field of their inquiry is limited; and that their work does not lie amongst final issues. But their hypotheses "work," and they themselves are sustained in their endeavour by the unbroken success of their methods; they employ the ordinary processes of reasoning thought without hesitation, and only lament that they are not able to observe more closely and reason better. They meet the deepening problems of expanding knowledge without casting a thought upon the sceptics, and exhibit that courageous candour which springs from a silent conviction that the reason of man and the world in which he lives are, by their very make and structure, fitted to hold harmonious converse.

But with regard to the phenomena of man's spiritual life the case is far other: in this province the prevalent scepticism of the intellect is already bringing about its natural consequences. If, on the one hand, there is a strong conviction of the reality of spiritual things, and the greatest reluctance to seek abiding satisfaction in Materialism, or Naturalism, or Agnosticism, there

¹ See Royce, *The World and the Individual*.

² See James, *The Will to Believe*.

is, on the other hand, a growing disposition to regard the facts of religion as not explicable, or, at the best, not explicable by the methods of inquiry which are elsewhere so fruitful in results. If we do not claim, with Romanes, that religion demands "the sacrifice of the intellect," nor predicate a fundamental disparity between spiritual facts and human reason, we still do not expect a "Science" of them, if science is to mean a body of systematic and assured knowledge, reached by the candid employment of reason upon observed facts. We are not convinced that these facts are open to this kind of observation; we do not seem to have the necessary data for dealing, by way of the intellect, with the problems of God, Freedom, and Immortality. The consciousness of our indefeasible ignorance of these subjects is so pressing, our aspiration after assured knowledge of them is so immediately rebuked by our failure, that we cease to employ our reasoning powers upon them. Inquiry is paralysed. We try to believe although we cannot know; or we strive to put our trust in tradition, or in some other unsifted "authority."

But it is very difficult for man to continue to believe what he dare not question, or to forbear from thinking about those things which concern him most deeply. For thinking, too, is a part of man's nature, and to renounce his nature is not easy for him, and can hardly be said to be his duty. Hence, reflective men in these days are much embarrassed as to the whole realm of religious truth. They are neither able to give a reason for their faith, nor to forego the seeking of it. Their minds are uneasily poised between alternatives, neither of which they can adopt with any satisfaction: they hesitate between rejecting reason because it is inadequate to the demands of faith, and rejecting the faith because it seems incapable of meeting the demands of reason. Seeking to avoid both of these undesirable issues, they take refuge in compromise; they would fain believe that religion is not irrational although it is not intelligible, and that reason is not futile, although it is weak and fallible. It is, however, impossible to maintain such a compromise.

Devout men, to whom religious interests are paramount, are extremely chary of exposing their beliefs to intellectual scrutiny, and their faith, in the last resort, becomes a mere sedative to the emotions, a truth, if truth it be, held in the way of superstition.¹ And, on the other hand, men to whom the first concern is intellectual clearness are able to maintain only a most exiguous and halting faith, and drift unwillingly and inevitably towards indifferentism and negation. Slowly but surely there is growing a tendency on the part of the former to snatch the whole sphere of faith out of the secular if not sacrilegious hands of a rationalising intellect; ² and on the part of the latter, to regard religious dogma as inexplicable simply because it is unreasonable.³ And although most men endeavour to halt short of both of these extremes, there is no doubt that a most ominous schism divides the religious consciousness of the time, and that the forces of reason and religion, thus set in rivalry, are slowly defining the issue and ranging themselves for battle.

Now, it is not necessary to conclude that man is a logical animal because he is a rational animal, or to ignore his intellectual inertia and radical disinclination to heroic measures. But, nevertheless, there is a limit to his power of harbouring contradictions. There are necessities, as Burke said, "which choose, and are not chosen"; and amongst these must be reckoned that of harmonising principles of conduct with intellectual convictions. History is no doubt a continuous record of compromises between reason and religion; but history also proves that all these compromises are unstable and unsatisfactory. For it is a fact of paramount importance that *both* reason and religion claim dominion over the whole extent of man's nature, and to attempt to temporise between them is to be disloyal to both. Vital elements of one life should not require to be

¹ See Milton's *Areopagitica*.

² The Ritschlian School.

³ The whole ethical movement, as understood by such exponents of it as Mr Stanton Coit.

coerced into an unnatural union by compromise; after every attempt at such compromise, they fly asunder again in a rivalry that is still more bitter. No age of the world was ever strong except when faith and reason went hand in hand, and when man's practical ideals were also his surest truths.

Taking these facts into consideration in surveying the general disposition of these times, the conclusion seems to be inevitable that the present attitude of thought towards religion is essentially transitory. The contradiction has, in some way or other, to be worked out. If the attempts to delimit the territories of religion and reason or bring about an armed truce have failed in the past, much more must they fail in our day. For the spirit of the times is fundamentally antagonistic to such a course. If either our religious faith or our practical trust in intellectual inquiry were shallow, there might be some possibility of temporising. But if we have read our times rightly, both the religious and the intellectual spirit of the age are sincere, and therefore, by necessity, intolerant of compromise. In the eighteenth century, at least as ordinarily conceived, it was comparatively easy for men to drift away from their religious convictions. That age could part from them at a comparatively small cost; for the God of its shallow deism was far away, its morality was hedonistic, its world was secular and loosely linked to the "other." But, for the present age, religion is much less an affair of another world, and morality less a matter of pleasant sensations, and God dwells in nature and 'in the mind of man.' In a word, both its religious and its moral experience are too rich and real to admit of being explained away by any abstract and negative philosophic or pseudo-philosophic theory. The old sceptical arguments, once so powerful, have lost their cogency, and the very ground of the controversy has shifted,—so deep has been the spiritual change.

But if it be true that our age cannot part easily with its profounder religious convictions, still less can it forego its speculative enterprise. It has bought its intellectual freedom at too great a price, and found its exercise too

profitable in all the fields of human inquiry, to submit again to the old bondage. There are some things on which the world does not go back, and the right to seek the truth is among the number. It is practically certain that the intellectual ardour of the modern world cannot even be damped, far less stifled and extinguished, by any theory, blindly advanced in the service of religion, of the radical insecurity of knowledge, or of the incompetence and untrustworthiness of human reason.

For if, on the one hand, the old scepticism, directed against the religion of the present day, would find itself confronted with the unexpected resistance of a deeper spiritual experience, an analogous scepticism directed against the intelligence would meet with the still stronger resistance of the sciences, flushed with the consciousness of victories, and with all the forces of a new intellectual disposition. For, in spite of the critics of the intelligence, the mental bent of this age is pre-eminently constructive and synthetic. In other words, it is scientific not merely in the narrow sense that it is much interested in comprehending nature, but in the deeper sense that it seeks to systematise its mental content according to universal principles. Where dogmatism and mere empiricism once ruled, we endeavour to bring order and rational concatenation. In the pursuit of this end our age has acquired habits of close observation of facts, of the careful scrutiny of evidence, and the merciless questioning of hypotheses. Even the realm of theology, the most conservative of all the sciences, has been invaded by the scientific spirit, which *must* analyse and seek to rationalise all that it touches. Not long ago, to give one instance, religious thought resisted with all its force the most characteristic and synthetic conception of the age, namely, that of evolution: that idea is now applied to religion itself, to the history of its ceremonies and dogmas, and even to the sacred books. Nor should this change of attitude occasion any surprise. For it is not possible for any age to escape its own dominating conceptions; nor can intellectual habits acquired and fixed in one field of inquiry be laid aside when we enter upon another. The conclusion

is inevitable, that we must continue to employ the great ideas that rule our thinking till we have exhausted their significance, and, therefore, that the methods of critical and reasoned inquiry, so far from being abandoned in favour of any dogmatic faith, or from fear of any scepticism, will in the future receive a still further extension.

But in addition to the fact that an age which sincerely maintains its hold of its convictions, religious and intellectual, cannot brook the attempt at compromise, there is the further consideration that the issues are being defined in such a manner that compromise is impossible.

As regards the claims of reason to deal with the final issues of life, it has been already shown in what a fundamental way they are questioned. The intellectual sceptics have carried the war into the enemy's country. They have denied the competency of reason to acquire *any* truth that can be called unequivocally valid. The hypothetical character of *all* human knowledge, including even the natural sciences, has been exposed; man's mind is, by necessity of structure, held to move amongst uncertainties; finality, whether in knowledge or in morals, does not comport with his finite nature. He must believe where he cannot know, and hold more truth than he can prove, else his life, practical as well as theoretical, will suffer an intolerable impoverishment. For, it is asked, what, after all, can he prove by mere logic? Hardly his own existence. Reason rests on experience, and can only illumine its surface. Experience is wider than thought, which is only one element of human nature, and a secondary and derivative and formal one.

Thus, then, the inmost stronghold of modern thought is being assailed, and with a force and persistence to which there has been no precedent in modern times. But the issue on the side of religion is not less vital, or less incapable of being made a subject of compromise. This will be best seen, perhaps, if reference is made to another aspect of the expansion of the modern outlook upon the natural world which took place during the last century. Its significance, as already indicated,

does not lie in the vast accumulation of natural knowledge, but in the new way of contemplating the facts. I wish now to show that this new method has brought as a consequence a restatement of the whole problem of man's spiritual nature, which renders the solutions hitherto offered incompetent, and even irrelevant.

The main characteristic of modern science is its impersonality; in other words, the scholastic methods have been definitively rejected, and the attempt is made to interpret natural phenomena in their relation to one another, and not to human ends; that is to say, the standpoint of modern scientific thought is no longer anthropo-centric, but cosmo-centric. "Instead of explaining nature from the being of man, we follow the reverse process, and seek to understand human life from the general laws of nature."¹

Now, by seeking to explain man in terms of the world, instead of the world in terms of man, we seem by implication to close the door against the very possibility of a spiritual interpretation of human life.² We have, *prima facie* at least, despoiled him of his uniqueness and independence, dissolved him into physical antecedents, placed him in the flux of natural events, and subjected him to the great uniformities of the natural cosmos.

It is in this respect that the modern conception of Natural Evolution is most significant, and that the alarm created in the religious world on its first enunciation was more than justified. For there is much more involved in this conception than was apparent at first sight, and those who have adopted it, while still maintaining the popular view of religious beliefs, and who have pretended to "reconcile" science and religion *on these terms*, know not what they do. For the real issue at stake is not the truth of a particular view of the descent of man, nor even the conception of evolution itself. That conception may be modified or even refuted without relieving the religious situation

¹ Riehl, *Science and Philosophy*, Eng. trans., p 7.

² See Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*.

in the slightest degree. It may conceivably be shown that, at least as held at present, it is a hypothesis radically vitiated by the demand it makes at every new departure for "an initial variation," of which no account is rendered, and without which the whole movement is arrested. In this respect it seems to be a theory that works only by the aid of miracles, and that carries within it a radical surd. And even apart from this objection, it may be shown that the phenomena of life and consciousness have, so far, resisted all attempts to resolve them into antecedents; and that the evolutionist has either to acknowledge that they rise *ex abrupto* from the natural plane, or deny the "natural" character of his evolution by making life and consciousness into original endowments of matter.

But, what then? What gain would accrue to those who would maintain the spiritual interests of man if evolution turned out to be a hypothesis discredited in its application and vitiated by the looseness of its logic? Its fundamental implication would remain, and the mental attitude of the age would not be changed. Natural science would still occupy the cosmo-centric point of view, and still seek a continuity which included man: it would simply endeavour to express that continuity in some other way. The conception of reality as a single system, in which man occupies his own irrevocable place, has come to stay. It is the principle—or hypothesis, if that word suits better—that inspires and guides all thought which aims at demonstrative security; and to give it up were to give up philosophy as well as science, and reasoning as well as philosophy. We may admit all the defects in our actual knowledge which sceptics urge against it, or say with the Pluralists that from the world, as we know it, "the negative and the alogical is never wholly banished. Something—call it fate, chance, freedom, spontaneity, the devil, what you will—is still wrong, and other, and outside and unincorporated from *your* point of view, even though you be the greatest of philosophers."¹ But if we import a genuine

¹ James, *The Will to Believe*, Pref. viii.

discontinuity into the nature of things, we cease to be philosophers, even though, with Professor James, we call ourselves "Radical Empiricists"; and we ought, in consistency with our theory, to give up thinking :—only, of course, on such a view of "a world of real possibilities, real beginnings, real crises, catastrophes and escapes," of real tag-ends, there is no longer any need or place for consistency ; because, if anything could be true in such circumstances, it would be true that consistent thought about an inconsistent world would be false.

But, in reality, there is not the least chance that modern thought will accept this catastrophic conception of the world. The defence of "spontaneity, freedom, real ends, real evil, a real God and a real moral life" must come in another way, if it is to come at all. Thought cannot establish these or any other truths by committing *felo-de-se*, nor can it demonstrate any truth in an alogical world. Indeed, the situation is such that we cannot any longer seriously ask whether the world is a cosmos, or whether man has his own determinate place within it. What we can and must ask with more and more urgency is : how that cosmos is to be conceived, and *what kind of a place within it* is occupied by man? Are we to regard the natural cosmos as implying man, or man as implying nature? Are we to seek for a natural interpretation of man, or for a spiritual interpretation of nature? That nature and man are in some way continuous, that man is what he is only *in virtue of* his ontological relation to the world, that apart from it he can have neither being nor meaning, neither a moral nor a natural life, cannot now be questioned. All the sciences of man, as a being who builds up knowledge, who draws the principles of his conduct from his conception of a moral order, and who invents or discovers a God whom he can worship and serve, imply that he is vitally united to his fellows in a rational society and rooted in the outer world of natural facts. Set *in vacuo*, with nothing but exclusive relations to the world without, he can compass nothing, for he *is* nothing. On such a presupposition, we can no longer ask intelligent questions about him. Our problem is, what

significance man can have *in* these relations? Do they destroy, or do they constitute, the possibility of his rational and spiritual life? For it is still conceivable that man may be lifted above nature by means of nature, and that consciousness and self-consciousness and the spiritual issues which flow therefrom retain their reality and meaning just *because* there is an intrinsic relation between them and the natural cosmos. What has become impossible is the old theory of detachment and isolation.

But it was on this conception of detachment and isolation that much of the philosophic, and all the ordinary, thought of the past founded its ethical and religious convictions. To be ontologically continuous with nature was to be part of a machine. And, with a reckless heedlessness of the meaning of words, we are now told that we should not be better off were we parts of a "spiritual machine"! There was no defence of man's spiritual life except in making him an exception to the scheme of things. Matter and its laws must stop short at the threshold of self-conscious thought and free will. Man must be regarded as a spiritual being in a physical frame; mind and will, as resident in a natural world, but not of it. If between him and his natural environment action and interaction had to be acknowledged, and if he had to enter into relations with his fellows and the world in order to live, these relations were represented as extrinsic and accidental to his true self. The world could in nowise be allowed to enter into his constitution, or to break the pure self-identity of the "impervious" Ego, and disturb the absolute isolation of the will.

Hence, the refutation of this conception of a self detached from the world by the discovery that such a self is meaningless, and that such a will is impotent both for good and evil, has left the spiritual life of man apparently without defence. And, at the same time, the rival conception of the ontological continuity of man and the physical world, a conception deemed to be fundamentally inconsistent with the possibility of morality and religion, has become effectively dominant. So that, now, the hard option seems to be pressed upon us of either rejecting

the principle from which all our scientific and reflective cognition derives its impulse, or of denying the possibility of those moral and religious ends which give worth and dignity to human life.

It is in this respect, therefore, that the problem of the ethical and religious life has become crucial in our day. Its validity is challenged by an authority which is far superior to that of any particular theory, such as Natural Evolution. The principle of knowledge itself seems to be in antagonism to that of morality and religion, and the fundamental impulses of our rational nature to be in mortal conflict.

Kant had foreseen this collision with clearness ; it inspired the effort which resulted in his great *Critiques* ; and he sought in vain to avert it by dividing man in two with a hatchet, and making him a phenomenon in one world and a noumenon in another. And now at length the difficulty has invaded the common mind. Science has lifted the conception of the universality of law into a conscious postulate of thought, and a return to the old cataclysmic alternative is recognised as the betrayal of the interests of the intelligence. At the same time the constant pressure of the living presence of the moral world is in nowise less felt, and the validity of the conceptions of freedom, personality, duty, responsibility, right and wrong is not more easily denied. We are able to forego neither knowledge nor morality and religion : we are willing to suppress neither rational inquiry nor our aspirations after moral goodness and communion with God. Nor are we able to settle the dispute.

Caught between such conflicting necessities, and fearing the final victory of either side, we try every means of escaping the shock of the collision. Nothing could be more indicative of the fear engendered by the conception of a universal cosmos which shuts man up within its iron framework, than the variety of the ways in which escape is sought. Religion is reduced to welcoming every kind of refuge, and finds every refuge in turn to be vain. With Lotze it confines law to the natural world, and

even provides, in the world of man's intelligence, "surprises for God": or it reduces natural laws into mere conceptual generalisations, not existing in nor even representative of real facts in the outer world. With the followers of Ritschl, it makes religion an affair of the heart, and denies the right of the intelligence to enter into this realm, thus opening the door wide for any superstition. With both it makes the provinces of beauty, truth and goodness mutually exclusive, and insists that as we cannot apply ethical criteria to intellectual truths, so we cannot apply intellectual criteria to ethical truth; as we cannot deny that twice two are four on the ground that it may bring inconvenient moral consequences, so we cannot deny moral facts on the ground that they are intellectually false. It separates meaning from fact, makes the will superior to the intellect with Professor Royce; and, with Professor James and some of the "Personal Idealists," makes belief a matter of resolute volition, constructs the universe of enigmatical atoms dignified by the name of persons, divides the Absolute into aspects, and rushes into polytheism.

It is not possible to read in all this confusion anything but the rout of the speculative defenders of the spiritual interests of man. It is all too obviously an instance of *Sauve qui peut*. Meantime, the new methods of historical research even in religion itself, the closer analysis of the meaning of the human self and its powers, the gradual discovery of the conditions of man's ethical behaviour and intellectual activities, are revealing more and more undeniably his intrinsic and constitutive relations to the frame of things in which he is set, and the great uniformities under which, and in virtue of which, he lives a rational life. The ranks of science are closing, and closing around the spiritual nature of man; and no scepticism arrests their triumphant progress.

What follows? At first sight it would seem that nothing can follow except the decay of religious belief and the undisputed rule of Naturalism. Such a conclusion, however, is rash and, I believe, intellectually false. If it be true, as I have

sought to show, that in our times man's religious and moral interests have deepened *pari passu* with the growth of his intellectual possessions, there seems to be at least a possibility that it is not religion and reason which are in mortal conflict, but the theories of them which are offered by the speculative and theological thinkers of the day. It seems to be easier to believe that the interpreters of human experience have lost their way than to maintain that experience itself is rent in twain, and that the fundamental conditions of human welfare are inconsistent. If such conclusions must follow from the premisses assumed at present, it behoves us to examine these premisses. The religion that can maintain itself only by limiting the uses of reason, and the reason that can make good its rights only by extinguishing religion, may both be the products of abstract thought, falsified by clinging to antiquated presuppositions. What is required, and what I believe is in process of being gained, is a better view of reason than that which represents it as a discursive and analytic power radically at enmity with the great unities of experience, and a better view of religion than that which makes it an exception to man's natural life, and finds no foothold for his spiritual interests except in the interstices of a broken natural world.

But this is a large problem, on which I cannot enter here,—a problem, it seems to me, which must occupy many minds for a long time to come, and to the solution of which, in any case, no individual can make more than a tentative and exiguous contribution.

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JAMES MARTINEAU: A SAINT OF THEISM.

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IT is hazardous to prophesy, from the opinion of his own generation, what may be the final judgment on a thinker and the permanent place he shall obtain in the temple of fame. His arguments which once were irresistible may become futile, because the battle-ground of debate is shifted, or the principles which were only slightly apprehended at the time may be incorporated in the body of philosophy; his style which charmed a single generation like a spell may be wearisome and unreal to their children, or the severe purity which repelled the multitude once may become a passport into the society of the immortals. No one can anticipate what the readers of fifty years hence may think of the writers whom we counted masters; but one may suggest with fair grounds of reason that the critic of 1950, as he examines the department of religion in the nineteenth century, will give a foremost place to the names of Newman and Martineau. They fulfilled their course, these champions, the one of Catholicism and the other of Theism, side by side; and although their orbits were so entirely apart, that while Martineau was an intimate friend of F. W. Newman, and in constant correspondence with him, and while he wrote more than once with appreciation and insight of the greater brother, and declared boldly in the paper

¹ An article on the Philosophy of Martineau, by Professor Pringle Pattison, will appear in the next issue of the *Hibbert Journal*.—ED.

entitled "Personal Influences on Present Theology," published in 1856, that "without an estimate of John Henry Newman's genius and influence only two-thirds of the theological history of contemporary England could be written," Martineau never seems to have met the Cardinal, and, so far as one can judge, the two men had no influence upon one another. They differed in origin and environment, in calling and in service, but they were both favoured children of genius, and endowed with many of the same high qualities. Both by their likeness and unlikeness they associate themselves in one's mind, now by the satisfaction of a complement, now by the piquancy of a contrast. Both came of a serious and spirited stock, in the one case evangelical, and the other intellectual; and ere they had reached their prime, each had emigrated from his intellectual home, the one because the Evangelical school was smitten with barrenness, and Newman had outgrown Romaine and Scott, the other because he had attained unto a deeper view of human nature than the determinism which was the controlling principle in Unitarian philosophy, and Martineau refused longer to be bound by Priestley. Both were masters of an English style drawn from the purest classical springs, which must fill every writing man with an admiration bordering on despair, in the one case severe, delicate, insinuating, musical, "simplex munditiis," in the other elaborate, decorated, illustrative, sonorous, like the clothing of the king's daughter, "of wrought gold." They were alike capable of the most subtle and intricate teaching, tending, however, with the one to a casuistry which is apt to alarm, and in the other to an austerity which is apt to chill; and wherever the light of truth led they were equally willing to follow, the one till he reached Catholicism, tempered by papalism, and the other Theism, illuminated by Christianity. The one obtained light and the ground of his certainty through the Historical Church teaching him from without, and the other from spiritual intuitions guiding from within. It was their fortune, as it must be of all pioneers, to be misunderstood, misrepresented, and persecuted,

the one for reaction, the other for progression. Neither was too obedient to his religious associations or denominational authorities, and neither was in spirit an ecclesiastic, although the one died a Cardinal, and the other was much disappointed because he could not bring Unitarians under the power of Presbytery. Before they died, the dust of battle had settled, and each had come into his kingdom, and was the object of general honour and reverence. Newman and Martineau were also alike in the high distinction of their character, for both were, by general consent of all serious people, accepted as holy men, the one a saint of Catholicism, the other a saint of Theism.

As we part from Newman and go on alone with Martineau, it is with a feeling of pardonable regret that the latter did not, like the former, take us into his confidence, and open to us, so far as might be, the sanctuary of his life. This very regret is akin to ingratitude, for it implies a reflection one would shrink from making on the act of piety which Dr Drummond performed in writing Martineau's Biography. No one can praise too highly the carefulness and thoroughness of the work; its clearness and orderliness, its modesty and self-abnegation, its respect and reverence. The learned writer has from the beginning determined to keep himself in the shadow and to place his subject in the fullest relief. And by one standard, possibly the standard which was in his mind, he has succeeded in his endeavour. Within the two volumes the student will find, and find in its place, every fact in Martineau's life, a note of every article he wrote, with copious extracts from his letters, an account of every controversy in which he was engaged or in which he was interested, and from time to time a valuable exposition of his standpoint, intellectual and spiritual. Perhaps one ought not to ask anything more, and perhaps what one asks more must be given by another hand; but while one pays his willing tribute to the completeness and candour, the perfect good taste and sound choice of material throughout the biography, he must confess to a disappointment. The reader will learn what Martineau was as a student, as a

minister, as a critic, as a philosopher, as a worshipper and as a Christian, but this valuable and elaborate book does not reveal Martineau as a man. Watt's well known portrait is absolutely fascinating and holds your attention as by a charm, for you are looking upon a part of the spiritual world when you gaze into Martineau's eyes. Without the biography the portrait would be incomplete, for it represents the mystic removed from contact with this world and secluded beyond intellectual strife, while Martineau was the keenest of observers, and a most devoted servant of pure reason. On the other hand, the biography would be most misleading without that portrait, for perhaps by the very necessity of its conditions it presents us with a man ever in the full dress of his public appearances, of his finished style, of his critical discussions and his spiritual aspirations, while behind the severity and magnificence there was surely a wealth of humanity. If we only could have had it! His was a faithful and self-denying courtship, with its delays and vicissitudes. Mrs Martineau was the sympathetic companion of his strenuous life till a cloud fell upon her mind, and then it was his "simple and sacred duty to guide her descending steps over whatever grass and flowers we can find, and soothe the last embrace with the inward calm of trust and love." He thought of her departure as but a brief separation: "the emigrant ship will soon be sent for me too, and higher work, as I firmly hope, through all the sadnesses of experiences, be found for us together in another country, even a heavenly." His first child died in infancy, and was buried in a French cemetery at Dublin. Before they quitted Ireland for Liverpool, father and mother visited the grave of their firstborn; and when at the age of eighty-seven, a lonely man, Martineau was attending the tercentenary of Dublin University, he stole away from the public function to stand again beside his child's grave. Upon a Good Friday he tells the story of the crucifixion to his four children, and is deeply impressed by its effect "on my poor Herbert," who was a child of great spiritual promise, and to whom he was deeply attached. "Oh for a

picture of Herbert's little changing face as he heard for the first time the tale of the Crucifixion. It inspired me to tell it better, I think, than I ever did before; and he went to bed in a delicious agitation which I envied from my soul." He was a trustworthy and patient friend, writing the most admirable letters, on the most important subjects, with invariable courtesy and considerable frankness, to men like F. W. Newman and R. H. Hutton. And he had a pleasant wit, rather of the intellectual than popular kind, which might be expected from his cast of mind, introducing us in one letter to a "blustering but not very lucid gentleman who had been credibly informed that ministers should not meddle with politics, but who nevertheless thought it our duty to sign on the other side," and in the same letter to a chairman who had been so horrified at a word in favour of Catholics that "he lifted his spectacles and looked at me transfixed, as a naturalist would look at a live dodo." He tells also with much relish how a landlord in Liverpool let him a house "for the following reason: 'Yes, sir, you shall have it; and then, with the Rev. Mr Hull, the Rev. Dr Raffles, and the Rev. Mr Martineau, it will be strange if we have not a trinity that will keep the devil out of the street.' On the credit of this function I remained there seven years." He was a lover of Scotland and on pleasant terms with many Scotsmen, but he had his experiences in the Highlands, and he once allowed himself to say, "It will take a good deal of soap to undo the too constant anointing of everything with the oil of piety and neglect." Those are tantalising glimpses and pregnant suggestions, and one would have liked to have seen more of Martineau in his home with his wife and children, and having good talks with his friends as he climbed a mountain side or sat with them at eventide. Did he never relax from the grand style of thinking and of writing? Did he never write a note of friendly gossip and good-natured jesting? Had he no amusements and no foibles? His self-control was marvellous, but it is evident that, like other Saints, he was not without temper. Did it never blaze forth without dignified

arrangement or literary expression? No incident could increase one's reverence for Martineau's statuesque character, but one's reverence would have caught a deeper glow of affection if he had only known more of Martineau's humanity.

Apart, however, from personal and intimate traits of character, the materials for a complete study of Martineau as a thinker and leader, and not least as a representative Unitarian, are richly afforded by Dr Drummond's Biography, with the able reinforcement of Professor Upton. While every man of the first order is a surprise and a beginning—a force which cannot be resolved into its constituent elements—yet we can trace certain of the influences which shaped Martineau's character and life. For the work he had to do and the place he had to fill, Martineau began with great advantages, both of heredity and environment. He came of a mixed stock, whose English solidity had been quickened by French vivacity, and in which the Huguenot and Puritan strains had united. A blending of blood where there is intelligence from both sides is almost a pledge of distinguished success, and it is not fantastic to trace Martineau's dialectic skill, his brilliancy of illustration, his literary wit, and his mental keenness to the spirit of France, while his descent from generations of the medical profession contributed devotion to truth and a scientific temper of mind. He was fortunate in his mother, distinguished both for her sparkling talk and her decision in manner, from whom he may have caught the beginnings of his style, and certainly inherited the quality of masterliness. One is not astonished at Martineau's loftiness and elevation above everything sordid when one learns from her son that "Almost her last considerable act was one of the most delicate and fastidious honour, involving resolute and protracted self-denial, and touchingly expressive of her depth of affection and supreme sense of right." His fortune in being the brother of Harriet Martineau was more doubtful, but I suppose it must be put to her credit that when she was five years old, and James was only two, she dragged him out of bed to see a sunrise, and, according to

her own account, "talked very religiously to the child," and through their early years Harriet and James were good friends. If she was unreasonable afterwards in demanding that he should burn the letters which contained so many chapters of the past, he had too rigid a sense of duty when he exposed without mercy a foolish book in which his sister collaborated, and which he was pleased to scarify in the *Prospective Review* under the title of "Mesmeric Atheism." Harriet Martineau was an asset in her brother's capital, and so also to some extent was his uncle, John Rankin, who was a friend of Burns (though not to be confounded with "ready-witted" John Rankine of Adam Hill), who at any rate taught the family to love Burns' poetry and Scotland. Norwich also must be credited with its share in making Martineau, for, like many provincial towns at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it had a circle of reading and thoughtful people, whose influence maintained the love of letters and gave a certain gravity to life. The influence of Dr John Taylor, of the Octagon Chapel, who used to declare, "We are Christians, and only Christians," was still felt in Norwich when Martineau was young, and sowed in his mind that dislike to sectarianism, whether Unitarian or otherwise, which was one of the guiding principles of his public actions, and he was brought up under the Rev. Thomas Madge, a man of much tenderness and spirituality: "the first awakenings of conscience and of spiritual faith came to me," said Martineau, "in the tones of that sweet voice." As a lad he was under the charge of Dr Lant Carpenter, the father of Miss Mary Carpenter, and gratefully acknowledges his extraordinary moral influence, "for I have never seen in any human being the idea of duty held in such visible reverence"; and later, he met Henry Turner, a young Unitarian minister, at Nottingham, whom he describes as "one of the purest, truest, most devoted men," and whose early death haunted him "with a profound and sacred sorrow." He bears a generous testimony to the scholarship and character of the Professors of Manchester New College, where he was training, especially to Charles Well-

beloved, "candid and Catholic, simple and thorough, who set up within us a standard of Christian scholarship to which it must ever exalt us to aspire"; and John Kenrick, "above ambition, incapable of pretence, and assured that the only guide is the unswerving love of truth." Martineau was not swayed by sentiment in his judgments, and he had an unerring eye for moral defects. His impartiality was almost painful, and his candour was sometimes only less trying, as witness, for instance, his description of Carlyle; and therefore one may safely conclude that those ministers who taught him in early days were very much as he described them. We therefore obtain a most favourable idea both of the intellectual and spiritual qualities of Unitarian Christianity during the first half of last century, and I do not know there is any reason to believe that it has declined since that day. The impression left upon the mind by Martineau's life is, that if he stood higher than his brethren in holding a sounder philosophy and in having a broader outlook, as well as presenting a character of quite peculiar elevation, that the ministers and people of his denomination are partakers in measure of the same intellectual culture, and followers of the same lofty ideals. It is said that the Unitarian denomination is decreasing, and the idea is conveyed that they do not desire to increase as an organised body; there are those who prophesy that within a measurable time they will cease to exist. If so, it is earnestly to be hoped that they will not disappear from history before they have made the other churches heirs of their moral integrity and their love of truth.

It is interesting to know that Martineau was apprenticed to a wheelwright, under the idea of becoming an engineer, and very entertaining to read of the lad's disappointment because his master, a self-made man, could not explain the scientific principles of his trade. He was a short time a schoolmaster, and had in him the love of teaching to the very end, but he found his life-work when he was ordained minister at Dublin in Eustace Street Presbyterian Meeting-House. The service

lasted four hours, and he made an elaborate profession of his faith, giving his idea of the primary duties of the Christian ministry, which were "to awaken devotion to God, obedient faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and practical expectation of eternity." He was in F. W. Newman's sense of the word a man "once born," for the Christ without spoke from the beginning to the Christ within him, but in another sense he was born twice again, once before his ordination and once afterwards. Under a stroke of sorrow when that young Unitarian minister died, "the scales fell from his eyes, and he saw for the first time the solemnities of life," and gave himself to the holy ministry. The other turning-point in his spiritual life was when he freed himself from Priestley's doctrine of necessity, and asserted the liberty of human nature. The former was his spiritual and the latter was his intellectual conversion; and as that crisis in a man's life tinges his action and thinking unto the very end, a certain lyric strain of devotion was the chief note in Martineau's ministry, and a firm assertion of the moral freedom of man along with his moral responsibility was the groundwork of his thinking. It is reserved for an eminent philosophical expert to deal with Martineau's philosophy, but everyone who is interested in religion and in morals must be thankful that, as between the two schools of Hegel and Lotze, Martineau for more than half a century was the antagonist of necessity, and in our country the most powerful defender of Personality. And he was profoundly convinced that morals and religion were both affected by the issue, since the ethics of necessity can only tell us "what has been, what is, what probably will be," but the ethics of free will "what ought to be," and that moral freedom is the condition of the "highest and deepest spiritual communion between God and the soul."

The strenuousness of Martineau's life, to recall ourselves again to the man, was amazing and almost depressing, for indeed it seemed as if from the day he entered college at York, on almost to the close of his long life, he never ceased from working. His circumstances were for the greater part of his

life narrow, and were never affluent. He taught pupils and kept boarders during his Dublin days, and he continued teaching for a considerable period of his Liverpool ministry, where he began with a salary of £200. In 1840 he was appointed Professor of Modern Philosophy and Political Economy in Manchester New College, and it appears that he also occasionally taught a class in one of the Manchester suburbs in the evening. During this time he was not only preaching twice every Sunday in his Liverpool church, but also holding various kinds of classes in connection with his congregation, and the following is an almost ghastly record of his ordinary occupations in 1833: "7 a.m., young men's private class twice a week; engagements with seven other classes three days of the week from 11 a.m. to 4.30, except three-quarters of an hour for dinner; 1.30, two Sunday classes; writing Priestley papers; preparation for chemical lectures at Mechanics' Institution; evening visiting two or three times in the week; Friday evening being always reserved for Sunday preparation." Amid this exacting professional work he was sending forth a succession of articles upon philosophical and religious subjects, equally distinguished for their trenchant thinking and their perfect form. One cannot but regret that a man so rarely gifted should have had to toil so hard for his daily bread, but never can the reader detect a single mercenary effort on his part, or even the faintest complaint of his narrow circumstances. Whenever any generosity was shown him he was profoundly grateful, and if for conscience sake he was obliged to face narrower circumstances, he did so with an unmoved heart. One's admiration for Martineau's greatness may be the excuse for one's astonishment that the Unitarian community of Liverpool, which has always been both rich and cultured, did not appreciate in a more practical form and at an earlier date the gift which had been bestowed upon them and upon their city, and make arrangements that would have relieved this high-spirited and self-denying man from every worldly care, and left him free to pursue his profound studies without hindrance.

Apart from the burden of worldly care, for which others, one dares to think, were partly to blame, he passed through struggles which arose from inevitable circumstances. He resigned his charge in Dublin when he was still in debt for the furnishing of his house and had a young wife depending upon him, because he could not in conscience take any longer the Regium donum, and his congregation, to their discredit, accepted the resignation. The controversy with his sister Harriet was a painful episode, and although she was an aggravating person, Martineau was not altogether blameless. Newman and he did not always see eye to eye in their views, and Newman bitterly resented an article in the *Prospective Review*, of which Martineau was an editor. There was a college controversy, which, like every other within the academic sphere, was characterised by extreme keenness and a good deal of orderly foolishness, and Martineau during his early days in London writes of "skirmishes" and "ambuscades," and is not sure whether "the tempest may not yet sweep him away." He does not appear, so far as one can gather, to have ever had an audience either in Liverpool or London worthy of the man or of his message, and there are signs that he was much discouraged, although it only required an affectionate address from those who had been benefited to send him on his way again rejoicing. He had pleasant days in the Highlands, and his letters from "The Polchar" have generally a lighter touch than his other correspondence, but through his long and severe life he had too little ease. His honours came to him at last in University degrees which ought to have been given before, and his recognition by the learned world on his eighty-third birthday was a pleasant incident, when he received an address signed by distinguished men of many lands and departments of knowledge, but to the end it is doubtful whether the English nation and the Christian Church knew how great a prophet God had sent them in James Martineau. Any honour was most humbly received, any note of kindness most gratefully acknowledged, and though towards the end his memory was at a loss for a date or

the title of a book, it ever reproduced the friends who "passed by me in long procession for more than eighty years." And one discovers that through the unceasing labour of his life and its recurring controversies, amid the retirement of study and a natural reserve of disposition, he maintained a heart of simple affection, and was quick to respond with most winning courtesy to any sign of friendliness.

There was, however, in Martineau a certain aloofness, due partly, one imagines, to the cultured reserve characteristic of his religious communion, partly to his exacting habits of study. His correspondence embraces a considerable range, and is in many cases most interesting, but one misses expected names. There is not a letter from Jowett, or Maurice, or Kingsley, or Stanley. He used to meet Jowett in the North, and sometimes he stayed with the Master at Balliol; he had conversations with Stanley, and in the Metaphysical Society he was associated with the leading thinkers of the day. But one does not hear of visits to country-houses where interesting people gather, or dinner parties in London where he was a guest, and the impression is left that he kept himself as much apart from society as Browning threw himself into it. Jowett once said that Martineau had the face of a mediæval monk, and certainly he had the disposition of an ascetic of learning. He was not indifferent to life, and he was a keen student of character; he sympathised intently with the joys or sorrows of his friends, and could write the most understanding letters of consolation: he was most accessible to anyone who called upon him, and most ready to discuss any question of intellectual interest. But he was so absorbed in the pursuit of truth that he failed somewhat, not so much in friendship as in comradeship. No one would have felt it becoming to have intruded on Martineau's high thoughts with even the best of stories; no one would have dropped in on Martineau simply for half an hour's human gossip. It would have been irreverent, as if one had talked about the weather with a Hebrew prophet, or passed a pleasant jest with Marcus Aurelius. A visitor to Martineau with any

sense of decency would have prepared himself to live on the high altitude where Martineau made his home.

His mind breathed the rarest atmosphere, and was never deflected by gusts of intellectual passion. He was capable, therefore, of an impartiality of judgment which was almost too faultless, but of course perfectly admirable. Although he was the child of Unitarian heredity, and held with firm conviction, if in his own way, the distinctive tenet of Unitarian theology, he frankly confessed that he owed more of instruction to Calvin and Luther than to the thinkers of his own school, and had derived more inspiration from Tauler and Wesley than from his own saints, and he frequently owns his debt to the *Theologia Germanica*, a book with which he was in the deepest sympathy. If he judges that the Free Kirk has gravely failed in the Highlands to elevate the habits and advance the temporal well-being of the people, he is greatly pleased with her method of supporting the ministry, and would like to see it introduced to his own communion; and if he prophesies that the Scots people are waiting for a broader theology than that of Knox, he admits that it is to the Scots Kirk the people owe "their escape from utter barbarism into a consciousness of divine relations." He will not join the Metaphysical Society unless distinguished agnostics are allowed to be members, because he desired that opposing parties should be "brought face to face on equal terms as seekers of the truth"; and when, at the age of ninety, he became a member of the Synthetic Society, which did not include members "thoroughly committed to agnostic principles," he only did so because the minds of such men were already closed. While Hegel created in him no conviction, he thought the study of that abstruse German a discipline of great value, "because it disenchanted many beguiling abstractions." He is proud to be associated in anyone's mind with Thomas Carlyle, because he regards Carlyle as a prophet and interpreter of the age, but Carlyle as a philosopher depended simply on "massive Effrontery of Dogma amid a

universal incertitude." While he warmly describes Emerson as a most winning and delightful personality on the side of the affections and conscience, he finds in his writings "many dicta which do not speak to me as true," and much as he loves the man he cannot learn from him. From the moral enthusiasm and insight of Channing, Martineau received an acknowledged stimulus, but he does not judge him capable of producing any great work, and does not think that he will be long read. When Theodore Parker visited him, he estimated that brilliant American as rather a practical reformer than a great thinker; and when Parker died, he declared with careful accuracy of eulogium that "the nerve of natural piety, the arm of righteous reform, the courage of every generous hope are enfeebled." When certain Church of England clergymen in Liverpool gave what was understood to be a challenge to Unitarians to discuss the points of difference between them, Martineau and two of his colleagues not only accepted the challenge, but were careful to attend the lectures of their opponents—sitting in what Martineau describes as the condemned pew; and when Martineau in one of his lectures charged Archbishop Magee with "a mass of abuse of the most coarse, and misrepresentation the most black," which was certainly vigorous language, and Dr Byrth objected to this "outrage on the memory of departed greatness," Martineau proved his statement so completely that Dr Byrth wished the Archbishop's words "obliterated by tears of contrition." Thomas Arnold he loved with a devotion "almost unreserved," but he regarded Dr Arnold's notions of subscription "with astonishment and shame." No warmth of feeling blinded Martineau to defects of character or errors in thinking on the part of a friend, and no admiration for a writer's strength at one point prevented Martineau exposing his weakness at another. He was as ready to criticise the foolishness of those who shared his views, as to acknowledge the greatness of those who differed from him. His impartiality is not due to neutrality of conviction on his own part, nor does it take the

form of colourless prudence in speech. On occasion he lets himself go with considerable force, denouncing "orthodox liars for truth," and repudiating "the noisy devotees and pharisees of party"; and from Martineau's articles and letters one could gather many a polished shaft of invective, but his severity is never that of ignorant prejudice or personal slander. It is always based on intellectual evidence, and usually has the value of a moral judgment. His mind was absolutely uninfluenced by personal attachments, and while acting on the bench, was guided alone and always by his passion for truth.

No one, from the study of his life, could call Martineau unimpassioned, or charge him with holding a wintry creed. More than once he complained of the characteristic coldness of his own communion, and lifts up a warning against it, which, unless the present writer is much mistaken, has been repeated by Mr Stopford Brooke. He was not at home in Hegel's "thinnest and obscurest heaven of metaphysics," and believed that it is the "pure and transparent heart" rather than the "clear and acute intellect" which best discerns God. He describes the Unitarians of his early days as a people "scrupulous of the veracities, but afraid of the fervours of devotion"; and in another place he seems almost to despair of raising his fellow-Christians to the warmth of devotion. Unto the literature of the soul he contributed his immortal *Endeavours after the Christian Life*; and a collection of hymns (in which one may remark in passing, it indicated a slight want of, shall we say, literary humour, to replace "Rock of Ages" with "Rocked in the Cradle of the Deep"), besides many a noble passage scattered up and down his writings. It was his custom to prepare communicants for the Sacrament with great care; and a constant hearer wrote to him, "To your influence exclusively I owe my deep love for our blessed Saviour." Preaching in Manchester, he told the congregation "You do not want less cultivation but more soul," and he protests against the "marble-minded" logician. In his old age he recalled the intense years "when first the real communion of the living God, the same

God that received the cries of Gethsemane and Calvary, broke in upon his mind," and his spiritual attitude was that of Pascal, whom in many ways he closely resembled, who insisted that while in other departments of thought one must know in order to love, in religion one must love in order to know.

There was also another difference between Martineau and the religious body who, in his later years at least, were proud of him, and to whom through all the years he was a conspicuous honour, and that was his breadth of view. While it may sound a paradox to persons not acquainted at first-hand with Unitarianism, it is an interesting fact that many Unitarians in the early part of last century were quite orthodox on everything except the doctrine of our Lord's person, and on that point they were Arians, which may be called semi-orthodoxy, and that indeed there is an approximately orthodox school among Unitarians to this day. While Martineau was always more spiritual than his average hearer, he was distinctly more liberal, and some of his congregation left him in Dublin because he had mildly criticised the Arian doctrine, and one fast friend "wrote an agonised letter of adieu, such as a fallen Lucifer might have received from his most intimate angel." Some of his sermons in Liverpool excited great apprehension, especially one entitled "The God of revelation His own Interpreter," which was severely handled in the *Unitarian Magazine*. He complains of the intellectual fear among the Conservative party in his church, and prophesies that the sweetness of the religious air will be poisoned with unworthy feeling. Martineau's experience proves what even the most honest admirers of the excellent qualities of Unitarianism must have noticed, that that belief does not of necessity create broad and tolerant character; and suggests that the Unitarianism which stands not in the affirmation of the Fatherhood of God but in the denial of the Deity of Christ does not lead the mind into a large and wealthy place, but is apt rather to immure it in a cell from which it only looks on life through a loophole of retreat. As might be expected, Martineau realised this

danger from the beginning, and through his life, in season and out of season, by letter and by article, he protested against the creation of Unitarian dogma, which he considered would be as fettering as any other dogma, and against the organisation of a Unitarian Church, which would hold its members in bondage. While he strongly insisted that every reasonable person should have fixed convictions about truth, and while he regarded such conviction as a bond for union and service, he believed that anything in the shape of a formal creed would only hamper a body of Christian people in their search for truth. He had a horror of sectarianism, and considered that it would be an irony of history if Unitarians, who had protested for liberty of thought in the past, and had suffered at the hand of orthodoxy, should set up an orthodoxy of their own, and bind it more or less firmly upon their members. "I know nothing here in England of any Unitarian Church," he once said, "and if there were such a thing I would not belong to it." He was a Unitarian in a theological sense, but in an ecclesiastical, never. No religious teacher of the nineteenth century was so absolutely delivered from dogmatic bias and denominational prejudices, or followed with a more unwavering and fearless step

"The high white star of truth."

It is a question of delicate and academic criticism whether Martineau ought to be classed as a mystic. Certainly no writer of modern times has so powerfully expounded and enforced that "life with God which is an ascent through simple surrender to the higher region of the soul," where "spirit may meet spirit"; and it is open to believe that when his *Seat of Authority in Religion* is no longer read, his *Endeavours after the Christian Life* will have a place upon the shelf of devotional literature, second only to the *Imitation* and *The Pilgrim's Progress*. He was also so profoundly affected by the ethical and intellectual shapes of knowledge, that it is equally fair to hold that he approached the things of the spirit through the things of the intellect and the conscience, and that he is at his

strongest in the *Types of Ethical Theory*. If a mystic be one whose knowledge of God is the direct vision of the soul, unaided and uncontrolled by the intellect or the conscience—a revelation as in a glass—then Martineau had neither the abandonment nor the directness of the mystical faculty; but if mysticism be communion with God revealed within the soul upon a throne which is high and lifted up among the purest affections, but firmly established upon reason and conscience, one is fain to believe that Martineau was the most profound because the most reasonable mystic of the modern type. Martineau realised beyond most men that certainty of God and that communion with the soul which cannot be touched either by physical science or literary criticism, because it is a spiritual intuition tried and confirmed by reason, and which has been perfectly described,

“Speak to him thou, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet;
Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.”

Whether Martineau is pleading against the theological dogmatism which blinds men to the unity of piety lying beneath all intellectual forms, or whether he is deploring the tendency among certain younger ministers of his own denomination to let the personality of God slip from their teaching and to replace it by moral idealism; whether he is defending those ethics which are founded on the fear of God, or pleading for that spiritual worship which is the breath of the soul returning to its birth, this powerful thinker and fine saint is ever near the hearts of things. He may never have been able to hold the Catholic doctrine of our Lord's person, and he may have latterly made large admissions to criticism on the Gospels, but Christ was ever to him the Prince of Saints, who revealed the highest possibilities of the human soul, and the example of habitual communion between man and God. It was by the spirit of Christ he was led, and in the steps of Christ he followed, and seldom has the Christian life been brought nearer or made more radiant. During his long course there is no trace that he ever once disobeyed the light

God gave him, or did anything which his conscience condemned; that he ever failed to respond to the demand of duty, or that he was ever moved by private ends. His was "the path of the just which is as the shining light which shineth more and more unto the perfect day," and that day came when he entered into the heaven which in its earnest of light and holiness he had so long carried within his soul. And as one turns from a too slight study in the life of this champion of the soul and faithful follower of Christ, and as one thinks of the place where the shadow has lifted from the unsolved mysteries of earth, and holiness has obtained her crown, he is moved to pray "*sit mea anima cum illo.*"

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ON THE MEANING OF "RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD" IN THE THEOLOGY OF ST PAUL. Concluding Article.

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II.

THE expression "the righteousness of God" occurs so seldom outside of the Pauline writings, and indeed outside of the Epistle to the Romans, that we can derive but little assistance from usage; and as it is generally admitted that the special theological sense is peculiar to Paul, we need not dwell upon the few remaining passages in the New Testament where the phrase is found.¹

In Romans the phrase occurs seven times; and in one of these its meaning is confessedly without ambiguity. In iii. 5 it denotes simply an attribute of God, as is evident both from its being antithetical to "our righteousness," and from the fact that the passage deals throughout with subjective conditions. Now, is it reasonable to assume, as is usually done, that Paul employs the phrase here in a sense entirely different from that which he attaches to it elsewhere? Surely we ought to admit such singular looseness of language only in the last resort, and to seek first of all for some meaning which, with no more than reasonable modifications, will suit

¹ See Matt. vi. 33; James i. 20; 2 Peter i. 1.

every passage alike. I venture to think that this meaning is no other than that which the words naturally convey, and that our difficulties arise from our forgetting to adapt ourselves to ancient modes of thought.

Professor Pfleiderer presents the argument on the opposite side clearly and forcibly. He proves, quite to the satisfaction of our modern thinking, that the “righteousness of God” cannot be an attribute either of God or of man. It cannot be the former, for then it could not be called “the righteousness which is of [better, from] God,”¹ as it is in Philippians iii. 9, nor could it be conditioned (as it is in the same passage) by “faith in [of] Christ,”² and least of all could it be said that we men become in Christ “the righteousness of God,” as we read in 2 Corinthians v. 21. All this compels us to think of a gift proceeding from God, and to be received on the human side through faith.³ Nor, on the other hand, can the words indicate a human attribute, man’s moral condition or moral power, for they would be far too strange and misleading a designation of such an attribute. To this, also, the predicate “is revealed,” in Romans i. 17, is unsuitable; for a human attribute may be caused by God, but not revealed; and moreover the “righteousness of God” is opposed to “the wrath of God” in the next verse, and this certainly is an objective power above man, which may indeed be subjectively felt by him, but has not its seat in him. The same conclusion follows from the statement, “they did not subject themselves to the righteousness of God,” in Romans x. 3, for a man may receive and cultivate an attribute in himself, but cannot subject himself to it. Nothing remains but to understand by the phrase “the correct relation between God and man, which, being ordained by God, presents itself to the human consciousness as a new religious principle, as a new standard

¹ Δικαιοσύνη ἐκ Θεοῦ.

² Πίστις χριστοῦ.

³ Compare Romans v. 17, δωρεὰς τῆς δικαιοσύνης, where, however, some doubt rests on the reading τῆς δωρεάς.

of his religious attitude, and to which man has to submit himself by allowing his attitude towards God to be determined through this divinely ordained principle," or, in a briefer definition, "the righteousness imputed to man through justification." It is, then, called the righteousness of God because this correct relation can proceed, not from man, but only from the grace of God, by means of the institution of redemption,¹ and it is received by man through the faith of Christ because faith, as *ὑπακοή χριστοῦ* or *εὐαγγελίου*, submits itself to the gracious will of God as it was revealed in Christ, and enters the relation of reconciliation, of peace with God, ordained by Him. Through this submission of himself to the principle of grace the believer comes to stand in the right relation towards God (*δίκαιος κατασταθήσεται*, Rom. v. 19), the gracious will is completed in his case in the declaration of his righteousness in consequence of his faith (*δικαιοῦται ἐκ πίστεως*, or *πίστις λογίζεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην*), he counts henceforth in the judgment of God as a righteous man, *i.e.* as a man who stands towards God as he ought to stand (*δικαιοῦται ἐνώπιον θεοῦ* or *παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*, Rom. iii. 20, Gal. iii. 11), and this new relation towards God then reflects itself, for the subjective consciousness, in the feeling of peace, of undisturbed harmony with God (*δικαιωθέντες οὖν εἰρήνην ἔχομεν*, Romans v. i).²

¹ See Rom. iii. 24.

² *Der Paulinismus*, pp. 175-6, 1st ed.; translation I. pp. 174-6. I have purposely quoted the argument from the first edition, because it presents with great force and penetration the view which I venture to call in question. Pfeiderer's position is greatly modified in the second edition, published in 1890. He says, for instance, that the righteousness of God "is not the condition of a real righteousness on the ground of the man's *own fulfilment of the law* . . . ; it is also not a condition of *moral perfection* on the ground of the renewing power of the divine Spirit" (the italics are mine),—a position which I fully accept. It therefore consists in the right relation between God and man (p. 183). He admits that by means of faith one enters into the most inward communion of life with Christ, and that in view of this essential subjective condition of faith we cannot call this righteousness purely objective, reckoned to us merely through forensic imputation (p. 184). His interpretation, therefore, while still differing from that which is here proposed, approaches it much more nearly than that contained in his earlier writing.

I have given this exposition of Professor Pfeiderer's at such length both on account of its intrinsic merits and that we may do no injustice to his view. While readily admitting that it contains important elements of truth, I think that it is defective, and that it errs in forcing on *δικαιοσύνη* a meaning which it cannot legitimately bear. The validity of the argument by which he tries to prove that it cannot be an attribute of either God or man depends upon nominalistic philosophy, and on our modern conception of personality, according to which each person is an absolutely separate entity, whose attributes can belong to itself alone. But if we may judge of the philosophy of Paul from the example of Philo, and from his own apparent ascription of reality to abstract ideas, he would regard righteousness not as the mere mode of some individual, but as an eternal essence by participation in which particular men became righteous. This essence would necessarily have its seat in God, and be a form of His unchangeable being; in other words it would be an attribute or predicate of God. Thus it would both reside *in* God and flow forth *from* Him; and its flow into any particular mind might be conditioned by that mind's faith. And though it seems very absurd to speak of men as *becoming* an attribute of God, it is just as absurd to speak of their becoming an imputed righteousness. We must, in any interpretation, make allowance for the brevity and strength of the expression; and when we do so, the argument turns against Professor Pfeiderer's view. For it is still not very clear in what sense men can become an imputed righteousness or a relation between God and man; but if an eternal essence flowing from the depth of the divine nature take complete possession of them and fill them, it is no longer harsh to say that they have become that essence, for it glows in their eyes, vibrates in their speech, and pours its beneficent power through their deeds. Thus I believe that the "righteousness of God" may, after all, denote an attribute of God, but only in the old realistic sense. This

interpretation has the great advantage of applying equally to all the passages where the phrase occurs, and relieves us from the difficulty of inventing two radically different meanings for the same term. In the sense proposed it is equally applicable to an attribute considered as characteristic of God and regulative of His actions, and to the same attribute considered as an essence which flows from God, and constitutes the universal fountain of righteousness at which all who would be righteous must drink. It is obvious that an attribute thus conceived is one that might be revealed, and to which men might become subject.

But why, then, it may be asked, does Paul use the phrase "righteousness of God," instead of the simple word "righteousness"? Is righteousness of two kinds, so that one has to be distinguished from the other? It is even so in the language of Paul, and we must next endeavour to comprehend this particular point. In Romans x. 3 we find "God's righteousness" contrasted with "their own." The Jews, it is said, were ignorant of the former, and sought to establish the latter. Presently (*vs.* 5, 6) these two forms of righteousness, one of which may be known while the other is unknown, are described as "the righteousness which is of [from] the law," and "the righteousness which is of [from] faith"; and, without entering at present into the difficulties of the passage, we may say that the one is attained by *doing*, a mode of external activity (*ὁ ποιήσας*), the other by *being*, a mode of interior life (*ὁ πιστεύων*). We meet with similar expressions in other passages, where the antithesis is implied, though not so clearly expressed. "The righteousness of faith" (*δικαιοσύνη πίστεως*) occurs in Romans iv. 11 and 13, where the context shows that it is opposed to a righteousness which consists in "working" (*ἐργαζομένῳ*, *v.* 4), and thereby *earns* a reward, which is therefore paid as a matter, not of favour, but of debt. In ix. 30 "the righteousness which is of [from] faith" (*δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*) is represented as the righteousness which Gentiles obtained, though

they had not pursued it. The following verse contains an antithesis which lies in the sense rather than the words. Israel, it is said, though pursuing (not, as we should expect, the righteousness of the law, but) a law of righteousness, did not attain unto law. Notwithstanding the want of verbal parallelism, we may derive from these words another important distinction. The one righteousness may simply come to us, though we never cared for it; we may earnestly strive for the other, and yet fail to reach it.

In Galatians we advance yet another step, and learn that legal righteousness is not true righteousness. “If righteousness were through law, then Christ died for nought” (ii. 21); “if a law had been given which could quicken, righteousness would be really in [or from] law” (*ἐν νόμῳ* or *ἐκ νόμου*, iii. 21). These statements can hardly mean that righteousness is never reached by the path of law, merely because, as a fact, men never perfectly obey the law, and that therefore they have to be justified by an imputation of righteousness, but that the most absolute conformity to the law would not be real righteousness, which dwells in the heart, and not in the hand.

This view is confirmed by a very instructive passage which we have still to notice, Philippians iii. 6, 9. Here Paul declares that as regards legal righteousness he had been blameless. But there was something better than this. His desire was that he might be found in Christ, not having as his righteousness¹ that which was from law, but that which was through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which was from God on the condition of his faith.

If we put these passages together, and interpret them in the light of Paul's own arguments, we obtain a sufficiently distinct picture of two kinds of righteousness. First, there is legal righteousness, which consists in the precise conformity of our conduct to a righteous law. This law was for the Jews the Mosaic and Levitical code, believed by Paul to

¹ So, I think, the grammar imperatively requires.

contain the divine standard of human duty. For the Gentiles it was the voice of conscience, so far as this prescribed or prohibited certain lines of action. Under such a law man stands, as it were, over against God, who imposes commands which we are bound to obey, and proclaims the sanction of certain rewards and punishments. Our obedience is left entirely to our own volition, and, when by our own work we have fulfilled the required conditions, we are entitled to demand our reward. It is clear that we might have this righteousness in perfection, and yet be utterly destitute of that divine and eternal essence which pours itself forth from the Holy One. We might be full of spiritual pride and presumption, and, distracted by impure and selfish thoughts and desires, which we kept from rushing into act only by the force of a prudent resolve. It is true that the human will is really inadequate to so heavy a task, and this constitutes another obstacle in the way of justification by law; but in order to judge of a principle we are entitled to assume the fulfilment of its conditions, and we see that, even on this assumption, righteousness does not proceed from law. Nevertheless the condition in question is properly called righteousness by Paul, not only because it answered to the ordinary standard of judgment, but because it corresponded with the true standard of outward conduct. There is, however, another righteousness, the absolute and eternal reality, God's own Spirit of Holiness, Justice, and Love, which does not consist in obedience to a law, but is itself the fountain of law, and the generator of all pure and beneficent activity. Of this unfailling stream man may drink by faith; and then he no longer stands over against God, with reluctant passion and prudential strength, but is on the side of God, with the divine life working in and through him, and yielding with the spontaneous ease of love the righteous acts which formerly were wrung from an unfilial heart.

Our view would not be complete unless we answered the question whether, in respect to this latter righteousness,

there was any room for imputation, any place for the action of a God "who quickens the dead, and calls things that are not as though they were" (Rom. iv. 17). Undoubtedly, there is such room; but the imputation is one which, as soon as we understand it, commends itself to our highest sense of justice. A *law* of righteousness can take account only of overt acts: the law has been broken, and the penalty must be paid; and as the conditions of justification have not been fulfilled, there must be a felt estrangement of heart from the Judge by whom the law is administered. But under the righteousness of faith the heart is all along with God, and, though the law may be often broken owing to the frailty of human purpose and the violence of human passion, yet we may have peace with Him who searches the heart, because we are on His side, and, in spite of every failure, love His will. This peace is an inward testimony that we are accounted righteous at the very moment when our consciences rebuke us and we deplore our sin. How explain this paradox? How is it that in the same instant we feel ourselves infinitely far from God, and yet feel that He is infinitely near to us; that we own ourselves unworthy to catch even a distant glimpse of His beauty, and yet His love is already folding us to itself and soothing us; that we would fain steal in, and quietly and unseen bathe His feet with our tears, and while those tears still blind our eyes we hear His voice saying that our sins are forgiven, and bidding us go in peace? Is it that the judgment of God in such cases is untrue, and that the conditions on which He receives us are arbitrary? Surely not. It is that His righteousness is ever waiting to enter when the heart is not barred against it; and as soon as we cease to strive with Him, and seek Him in the simplicity of faith, His Spirit is already in us, the germ and potency of all holiness; and, however deep may have been our sin, He discerns in us the form of His Son, like a dimly illumined image shaping itself out of the darkness. We may illustrate this view from

the parable of the Prodigal Son. When the wanderer returned home smitten with the consciousness of sin, with nothing to plead except his confidence in his father's goodness, and crying out that he was not worthy to be called a son, did he not become in that very act more worthy than he had ever been before? If his father had judged him by the law, he could only have spurned him from his presence; yet he received him right joyfully, as alive from the dead. Was this owing to an untrue judgment, an arbitrary exercise of mercy which answered to no reality in the offender? Far from it. The prodigal was already bathing himself in the stream of divine righteousness; and though he was doomed to bear for many a day the scars of his sin, and the life of virtuous activity was still in the future; yet the righteousness within him was real, and was already beginning to form the chaotic material of his disordered affections and purposes into a holy temple of God. Thus it is just to receive as righteous one who is not legally so, but who is on the side of righteousness, and of whom the spirit of righteousness, however feebly, has taken possession. This spirit, which is not a forensic imagination, but an eternal reality, is the righteousness of God, which reveals itself in our consciousness, and works within us as a divine leaven to which the reluctant mass of our earthly nature must at last succumb. To this extent, then, the doctrine of imputed righteousness is involved in the teaching of Paul: a man is accepted as righteous, not because he has fulfilled the law of duty, but because, in spite of failure to fulfil it, his heart is right with God, and is an open receptacle of the Divine Spirit.

In regard to the relation between the righteousness of God and faith I fully accept the general opinion that the latter is not the efficient cause of the former, but only a receptive organ. This, indeed, is inevitable if our interpretation has been correct. We can no more create or deserve the divine righteousness than we can the solar beams: we

can only allow it to shine upon us, and warm our cold hearts. It is when the thought of our own merit is farthest from us that God's righteousness is nearest, when we most despair of ourselves that its hope most strongly bears us up. For this reason we are justified through faith. As soon as we go out into the sunshine we receive light and warmth; as soon as we rest in God, and simply commit ourselves to Him, we are within the realm of righteousness, and have passed from the mere show and counterfeit exhibited by legal works to the eternal reality of the Spirit. This transition may be made once for all, and therefore justification is a single act and not a continuous process; but the resulting transformation of moral habits, and the complete incorporation of the spirit of holiness, may require an indefinite time for its fulfilment. Whence, then, it may be asked, comes faith itself? Is it a human work? Paul's answer must be gathered from the general course of his arguments; and at present we can only say that faith is a spiritual disposition, and not something wrought by the will. The initiative is from God. Faith comes and claims us; and though we may be unfaithful, and mar the divine gift, we never, by any strife of will, can create the ideal that woos us.

The importance of this subject in its bearing on the interpretation of Paul's thought renders it desirable that, even at the risk of some repetition, we should examine the principal arguments, not yet discussed, which are adduced in favour of what I conceive to be an erroneous explanation of "righteousness." We shall thus place the matter in a clearer light, and see more accurately the point at which views diverge.¹

In support of the opinion that "righteousness," in the

¹ The textual arguments are well stated by Pfeiderer in an article, *Die paulinische Rechtfertigung. Eine exegetisch-dogmatische Studie*, in the *Zeitschr. für wiss. Theologie*, 1872, § I., pp. 162-176. I shall follow his order; but the texts in question are relied upon by other writers as well.

Pauline sense, is an objective condition, dependent on a judicial act of God, and having no relation to any subjective state in man, appeal is made to 2 Corinthians v. 21, "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf; that we might become the righteousness of God in him." Now, it is urged, the statement that Christ was made sin for us can be meant only in an ideal sense: God has *regarded* Christ as a sinner, and treated Him accordingly. Consequently the latter clause must be understood in a similar way, that God *regards* us in Christ as righteous, and treats us accordingly, although we are as far from being so in reality as Christ was from being in reality a sinner. This imputative notion of the "righteousness of God" is demanded by its connection with what precedes, for in v. 19 it is negatively paraphrased by the words "not reckoning unto them their trespasses." To this interpretation several objections may be made. We may remark, first of all, that we have to deal with one of those brief and obscure passages in which Paul flashes forth some large and vague idea that is apprehensible by the spirit rather than the understanding; and the very success with which it is brought down to the common level where the logical intellect walks so comfortably, while at the same time, I must add, it is made so repulsive to the spirit, constitutes a preliminary objection. I say "repulsive" advisedly, for the thought that God regarded Christ as a sinner bears this character in a marked degree; and as Paul does not plainly assert that, we ought to hesitate before we thrust it upon him. Again, if we are to translate the word "sin" into "sinner," Paul affirms that God *made* Christ a sinner, not that He regarded Him as such; and the allusion may be to the simple historical fact that Christ was put to death as a malefactor. This interpretation satisfies the passage at least as well as the other, and our attention is thereby diverted from a fiction in the divine judgment to something very real in the arrangements of the world. I cannot but think, however, that Paul's language suggests more than this. He

seems to refer to a contrast within Christ's own consciousness. In its pure solitude He knew no sin; and yet for the sake of man He became sin; He entered, in obedience to His Father's will, into the sinful conditions of earth, and was made conscious of that of which He had no experience in Himself; He felt, as so often His followers must do, the shame and grief which the wicked feel not for themselves; and thus He identified Himself, as it were, with the dark, sad side of humanity, that He might redeem it, and win it to the righteousness of God. In this way there is a true parallel: Christ descended into the realm of sin that we might ascend with Him into the realm of righteousness. The parallel is indeed incomplete; for while Christ passed unsullied through the sinful world, we do not suppose that man can enter the domain of righteousness and not be purified. But it is sufficiently complete for the purpose in hand, and the verbal correspondence fails in precisely the same point as the spiritual; for Paul does not add, after *ἡμεῖς, μὴ γνώσκοντες δικαιοσύνην*. Again, we must observe that exhortations and entreaties to be reconciled to God imply the necessity of a subjective change in men; and reconciliation, or the change from a state of enmity to a state of trust and love towards God, is the most momentous spiritual revolution which it is possible for a man to experience. In regard to the statement that God was not imputing men's trespasses to them, this simply brings out the contrast on which we have insisted between a legal standard of judgment, which is superficial and misleading, and the Divine standard, which measures the heart and its possibilities. Under the law transgressions must be punished; under grace they may be left behind and reckoned no more, for the soul is reconciled to God, and consciously draws its life from the fountains of eternal righteousness. This passage, therefore, does not sustain Pfeiderer's thesis, but suggests a more profound and satisfying doctrine.

Another passage to which appeal is made is contained in Romans v. 12-21, especially 15-19, where, as Pfeiderer con-

ceives, two opposite pictures are presented of the relations between man and God, both alike exhibiting, not the psychology of man, but the determinations of the Divine judgment, which, so far as they have reference to human conditions, regard only the obedience and disobedience of Christ and Adam; in other words, the doctrine of imputed sin and imputed righteousness is laid down in its most developed form. We cannot now enter on a full interpretation of this passage, and must confine ourselves to a few necessary observations. If it were only alleged that Paul here speaks of a sin and righteousness which are quite distinct from the free acts of individuals, of which the law takes cognisance, the allegation could hardly admit of reasonable question. But Pfeiderer and those who agree with him are apparently unable to understand the existence of any real sin and righteousness except those of the legal kind, and thus they are unwittingly judging of Paul's doctrine from the point of view of the law:—the Apostle does not refer to legal righteousness, and therefore he must be speaking of a mere imputation of righteousness. But this does not follow. Though ἀμαρτία is not a voluntary transgression of some commandment, or a general idea of such transgressions, it may nevertheless be a principle of sin actively operative in men, of which transgressions are not the factors, but the symptoms. That something real, and not merely imputed, is meant seems to me obvious from the whole bearing of the passage, which would become absurd if it were possible to suppose that men had not really died and not been really sinful. Sin and death are universal and admitted realities, which men inherit by the mere fact of their being men. Righteousness and life must be equally real: as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly. It is no judicial figment, but a true, Divine power into which we enter when we commit ourselves in faith to God. If this explanation be correct, we must agree with Pfeiderer to this extent, that sin and righteousness are objective conditions, inasmuch as they are

not creations of individual will; but we differ from him in believing that they are not mere forensic relations, but principles which work in the human heart, and, according as one or the other prevails, constitute the sinful and the spiritual man. If it be asked whether there is then no room for the exercise of will, we must be content at present to answer in words which I think are agreeable to Pauline doctrine, that these principles are not generated by the will, but set the problems of the will.

Pfleiderer further relies on the distinction between *δικαιοσύνη* and *ἁγιασμός*, which appears in Romans vi. 19 and 1 Corinthians i. 30, the latter denoting the subjective moral condition, and therefore relegating the former to the objective sphere. In connection with this subject he distinguishes, I think with perfect accuracy, between justification as a single act and sanctification as a prolonged process; and something of this distinction passes over to the substantives referred to. The righteousness of God may be revealed within the consciousness, and we may even submit ourselves to it that it may mould us into its own purity, and yet it may be long before this moulding process is accomplished, and the indwelling righteousness results in a personal sanctification. Two passages (Rom. vi. 16 and Gal. v. 5) in which *δικαιοσύνη* is represented as future, and which might therefore seem opposed to his view, are referred by Pfleiderer to the final judgment. I think, in both passages, Paul's thought goes deeper than that of mere acquittal at the last day, and contemplates that perfect embodiment of the Divine righteousness which is the goal of the Christian's hope. If it be said that this suggests a process, and thus removes the distinction between *δικαιοσύνη* and *ἁγιασμός*, we may reply that the latter refers to the subjective effect upon ourselves, the gradual change in our own quality, the former to the indwelling of that which is higher than ourselves; and though the *δικαιοσύνη* may in an instant claim us, yet we may receive it in ever growing fulness, and look forward to the time when

we shall be its responsive and expressive organs. This explanation saves us from the hazardous expedient of assigning two different meanings to *δικαιοσύνη* within the limits of the same passage, and making it stand now for the justification which we receive at the moment of conversion, and again for that which is expected at the final judgment. It derives further confirmation from Paul's use of another term. We wait in the same way for the *υιοθεσία* (Rom. viii. 23), though we have already received it (see *v.* 15, and Gal. iv. 5). I cannot explain this, with Pfeiderer, by representing our sonship as merely an ideal relation between God and man, to the subjective effects of which we have still to look forward; for the words, "ye received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father" (Rom. viii. 15), imply that subjective effects have been already wrought. Our expectation, therefore, must be directed to a more complete realisation of that which is already begun; and similarly our hope of righteousness anticipates the perfect indwelling of the Divine, of which we have already received the earnest.

We may obtain some further light upon the subject if we briefly examine a different class of arguments, which have been advanced by Holsten. He accepts the interpretation which we are criticising, and endeavours to support it by showing its antithesis to Jewish conceptions.¹ Volkmar, rejecting Luther's explanation, "the righteousness which is valid before God," as totally false, had declared that "the righteousness 'of God' Himself is meant, which makes righteous, as is fully unfolded in iii. 21, which He has and which He gives."² In opposition to this, Holsten defines it as "the new expression for the new principle of salvation revealed in the cross of Christ, for the new religious life-relation between God and man," or, more precisely, "it is the righteousness which by the grace of God is imputed to

¹ See his article, *Der Gedankengang des Römerbriefs*, Cap. I-XI, in the *Jahrb. f. prot. Theol.*, 1879, pp. 104 sqq.

² *Paulus' Römerbrief*, 1875, p. 75.

the man who believes in the grace of God in the cross of Christ, although he is actually still sinful, the *justitia passiva* of the old Protestant Dogmatics, an objective righteousness.” This stands in opposition to the *ἰδία δικαιοσύνη*, which is the principle of salvation of the Old Testament and of the law, the *justitia activa* of the old Protestant Dogmatics, a subjective righteousness. Though it is not stated with the desirable precision, it is apparent from Holsten’s whole treatment of the subject that he understands by Paul’s expression a righteousness which has no existence except in the judicial act of God, and he shares with some other interpreters the inability to recognise any real righteousness except the legal, and thus, amid his antagonism to the Jewish position, unconsciously shuts himself up in its limits, and gives the Jew the advantage of the argument in the minds of all who prefer realities to fictions. If we have been correct in our exposition, Paul’s antithesis is precisely the reverse of this: God’s righteousness is real righteousness, the most inward and potent fact of which man can become conscious, while legal righteousness is only its outward imitation, an external conformity to an external rule, and therefore unreal and illusory.

Holsten proceeds to defend his opinion by analysing the conceptions contained in “the righteousness of God.” “Righteousness,” he says, “remains an expression and principle of the religious relation.” But it is “no more the individual’s subjective conformity to law effected by the actual fulfilment of the work of the law; it is an objective condition of mankind transposed into this condition by an act of God.” In consequence of the crucifixion of the Messiah it is imputed once for all to collective humanity, Jews and Gentiles, in spite of their non-fulfilment of the law of God. After this unconditional statement it seems rather inconsistent to add a human condition; but Holsten is obliged to do so if he would not glaringly depart from Pauline doctrine:—this objective condition, received without

any moral endeavour, belongs even to the sinful Gentile, "provided only he gives God the honour and believes on the omnipotence of God, which can make even the sinner righteous." In this statement the description of legal righteousness is perfectly correct; but the imputation of righteousness is not the only antithesis. The contrast is far truer between outward conformity to a law and inward righteousness, the eternal spirit of the Divine life revealed and active in the soul; and this contrast abolishes the distinction between Jew and Gentile, not by any arbitrary decision to give up reality and have recourse to imputation, but by the necessities of the case, for the possibility of surrendering the heart to God, and admitting the stream of His righteousness, is not dependent on local or temporary circumstances. When Holsten, forgetting for the moment the necessity of faith, represents the righteousness of God as the objective condition of *mankind*, he only formulates the logical result of his doctrine; but in doing so he makes an assertion which is not supported, so far as I know, by anything in the Pauline writings. Pfeiderer is led to exactly the same conclusion, and then has to admit that it is not Paul's. He says, "So far, then, is justification from being a process which advances gradually with the life of faith¹ that it would be much more in accordance with the Apostle's meaning to regard it as an act of God concluded once for all in the atoning death of Christ, and preceding the faith of all individuals. It must, however, be confessed that this view does not exactly correspond with Paul's way of representing it, for he makes justification an act which repeats itself in the case of each individual believer, as is very plainly shown by the expressions, οἷς μέλλει λογίζεσθαι τοῖς πιστεύουσιν (Rom. iv. 24), and δίκαιοι κατασταθήσονται οἱ πολλοί (v. 19), according to which justification is not already actually completed for all immediately in the death of Christ, but the possibility is given for all, while its

¹ In this I fully concur.

realisation depends in each instance on the individual faith, and is therefore at the present time still future for the greater number.”¹ It appears, then, after all, that there must be a subjective change in man, a change too which is far deeper and more radical than the transition from the non-observance to the observance of a law; for the latter might be purely outward and formal, while the other is an abandonment of self, and an entrance into the life of God. The moment we pass into the true sphere of righteousness, the legal measure, by which we were condemned, is removed, our faith is counted for righteousness, and our sanctification begins.

Having explained the meaning which he attaches to “the righteousness of God,” Holsten points out that it includes for the Jewish, Old Testament consciousness a world of unintelligible notions, and there rise up against the Gospel of the “vain man” the metaphysical-religious, the ethical-religious, and the historical-religious consciousness of one who believes in the Messiah and is still a Jew.

The metaphysical-religious consciousness recognises the contradiction of this righteousness of God to the Old Testament view both of the essence of God and His relation to man and of the essence of man and his relation to the Divine law. The Old Testament representation of God was that of the almighty, purposing Will, for which the world and its development form only the unresisting material. In this development of the world God realises the sole purpose of salvation existing in His consciousness from the beginning. This is opposed to a righteousness of God which either replaces an earlier standard for the realising of salvation by a later one, and thereby denies the unchangeableness of God and an unchangeable standard of righteousness, or maintains

¹ *Der Paulinismus*, first ed., pp. 183 sq.; trans. I. p. 183. In the second edition the individual character of justification, which is brought about by faith, a faith which is equivalent “to the dying and living with Christ, to personal regeneration,” is strongly insisted upon, in opposition to Ritschl (p. 188 sq.).

the existence side by side of two contrasted forms of realisation of the saving purpose, namely the justification of the Jews in consequence of legal work, of the Gentiles by means of faith, and thereby annihilates the internal unity of God and an objective and sole standard of righteousness (cf. Rom. iii. 27-31). That the contradiction here described between Judaic and Pauline doctrine occasioned a serious difficulty to Jews may be readily admitted: I would myself go farther, and say that the contradiction presents itself in the common moral consciousness of mankind, so long as that consciousness still remains at the level where the fulfilment of external duties is regarded as the ultimate ethical standard. The principle which Paul combats may be thus expressed,—keep through your own voluntary obedience the Divine requirements of the law, and you will be justified. But this principle is not Jewish only; it is Gentile too. Now the antithesis between Paul's doctrine and this purely ethical conception of our relations to God comes out far more clearly in the interpretation to which we have been led than in Holsten's. According to the latter, unless I have quite misunderstood it, Paul virtually said to the Jews, you have the only real standard of righteousness; but, as nobody can come up to it, God has mercifully made an unreal standard, whereby, since it has nothing to do with Judaism, your prerogative is abolished. This would leave the Jewish objection entirely untouched, and would in effect admit that God was changeable, and had two measures of righteousness, a real and a fictitious. But in the view which we have taken he said, your law is indeed an expression of Divine righteousness, and is therefore the Divine standard of conduct; but the most perfect voluntary obedience to a rule of conduct is not real righteousness; that consists, not in a series of actions, but in an abiding inward principle, and can be attained only by the surrender of the soul to God, and the inflowing of His Spirit; and the moment this Spirit is present in consciousness, the written law is practically obsolete,

and the law of conscience as a mere knowledge of duty ceases to be a burden, for the fountain of eternal law is now springing up within, and seeks its own expression in the free life of the redeemed.

With the next of Holsten's antitheses it is not so easy to agree. He contrasts the view of God as a holy, righteous Will with the indifference of God to the moral condition of man in the imputation of righteousness to the believing sinner (cf. Rom. iii. 25, 26). Paul nowhere speaks of any such indifference, and it is inconceivable that the man who declared that “God is not mocked, for whatsoever a man sows, that shall he also reap” (Gal. vi. 7), ever inculcated so startling a doctrine. This judgment of Holsten's depends, once more, on the un-Pauline notion that real righteousness consisted in keeping the law. On the contrary, Paul perceived, as Christ had perceived before him, that there might be more real righteousness in the penitent sinner, turning in faith to God, than in the self-satisfied keeper of the law, who imagined God to be in debt to him, and that the latter was in a false, the former in the true relation to God.

With the next contrast, between an earned reward and a free gift of grace, we are in full accord. The final opposition, under this head, requires, I think, some modification. It is that between the free will of man, who has the power as well as the duty of fulfilling the law and forsaking sin, and (what is demanded with “the righteousness of God”) the impossibility of fulfilling the Divine law on the part of man, the want of freedom of the human will in sin, and the necessity of sin (cf. Rom. vii. 7-25). There is nothing, so far as I can see, in Holsten's view of the righteousness of God to explain the subjection of the will, and there seems to be here the old confusion between sin and a mere violation of the law. The fundamental Jewish mistake still clings to the Gentile interpreter. I suppose the connection in Holsten's mind between the righteousness of God and the want of free will must be of this kind:—if men were really capable of fulfilling the law,

then they might have real righteousness if they chose, and there would be no occasion for imputed righteousness; but as the latter has been actually instituted in the Gospel, it follows that men must have been unable to observe the law, and were subject to the necessity of sin. In the view which we have adopted the contrast in question appears at once in clear light. Sin was not a mere violation of the law. It was a principle of evil which was manifest throughout the whole of human history. Subjectively considered, it was the aberration of the soul's intrinsic quality from the filial spirit which was its true norm. The will might be free in its preferences, but, so long as sin was in the heart, it was not adequate to shape the outward life in conformity with the strict requirements of the law. The experience of this failure occasioned the revelation of sin within the consciousness, and hence by the law is the knowledge of sin. The function of the law could go no farther; it could turn the eye of the soul upon the sin which was actually there, but could not reveal the eternal spirit of righteousness which had never entered the domain of consciousness. Hence the powerlessness of the will. It cannot, by any force of volition, alter the quality of the soul, or bring into the field of consciousness a righteousness which is not there. Only through the grace of God can His righteousness reveal itself within us, and gradually transform us into the image of His Son.

The opposition between Paul's view and the ethical-religious consciousness of the Jew has been already indicated in what I have just said. The Jewish side of these antagonistic conceptions is correctly stated by Holsten; but when he affirms that Paul's doctrine "annihilates all moral endeavour, and makes man indifferent towards sin, because he knows himself to be the object of Divine grace (cf. Rom. v. 20, vi. 1-vii. 6)," it is almost enough to make the Apostle's bitterest foes rise in triumph from their graves. It is peculiarly strange to appeal, in evidence of this monstrous antinomianism, to the very passage which was written for the express purpose of

refuting it; and the fact that this view follows inevitably from Holsten's interpretation of *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* seems to me conclusive proof that that interpretation is erroneous.

The remaining antithesis, that within the historical-religious consciousness, is unaffected by our difference of opinion. The Jews believed that through circumcision and the law they were separated as a holy Israel from the sinful Gentiles, and had an exclusive or pre-eminent claim, guaranteed by Divine promises, to salvation and the Saviour. The righteousness of God proclaimed by Paul swept away this exclusiveness,—in what way, according to each opinion, has been already explained.

Such, then, are the strongest arguments with which I am acquainted against the view which I have here advocated; and they seem to me, both by what is valid and by what is defective in them, to confirm the conclusion which we had previously reached.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

ASPECTS OF THE MORAL IDEAL— OLD AND NEW.

THE REV. PROFESSOR LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., LL.D.

WE hear it said that the present is an age of prose; of realism in art and literature, of materialism in practical life. A satirist will tell us that to heap up riches, "to make one's pile," is every man's ideal, and that "to have a good time" is the ideal of the majority of women. And yet there are facts which contradict this matter of fact conception. While the spirit of adventure combined with higher motives takes men to distant lands on dangerous errands; while our contemporaries at home are breaking down, one after another, through sheer hard labour, for no material gain; while women are drawn, in pure love for their kind, to spend their lives in alleviating human misery, it cannot be said that Pandora's box is empty;—Hope, at least, is left.

Yet in the region of thought it must be admitted that there are signs of exhaustion, if not of despair. Some prevalent notions tend rather to the negation or contradiction of the ideal. This tendency is more apparent in foreign literatures than in our own. A play has lately been produced in Italy, magnificently acted, with Eleonora Duse in the chief woman's part, and has been much admired. It is called "La Citta Morta"—"The Dead City." The hero, like another Schliemann, discovers Agamemnon in his tomb: Cassandra lies beside him:—beneath the golden masks, amid the rich ornaments, the bodies for a moment retain their form. He sees the beauty of the Trojan princess and the proud mien of

the taker of 'Troy, until exposure to the air reduces them to dust, while the masks of gold remain. A horrible fascination seizes him. The unnatural crimes of the Pelopidæ take possession of his soul, and he becomes the victim of an incestuous passion, which ends in madness and fratricidal murder.

That forms a *recessional* indeed. The genius of Æschylus invested the old tale of horror with grandeur and beauty, making it the vehicle of the contrast in which he gloried between the spirit of equity that inspired his countrymen, and the action and reaction, the "miserable child's-play," of the old world. The genius of D'Annunzio untreads the labyrinth and leads us towards, and not away from, the monstrosity within.

Such ideals as are potent with us to-day are rather political and social than ethical and personal,—Democratic, Imperial, Philanthropic, Cosmopolitan,—Sociological is, I believe, the proper term. Having been told repeatedly that society is an "organism," we think rather of the working of the machine than of our own proper voluntary function as an integral part. We look so far afield that we are apt to ignore the importance of looking first at home, and to forget that if we are to accomplish anything in common, each of us must begin within. The vastness of modern communities, the world-wide relations amidst which we live, seem to daze the mind, so that we cannot concentrate it on a definite purpose, nor act fruitfully within the limits of our proper sphere. The old eighteenth century couplet,

" Let observation with extensive view
Survey the world from China to Peru,"

no longer sounds ironically. The outlines of our daily task are blurred with intrusive cross-lights from all quarters of the globe. Yet even Plato, in introducing his scheme of communism, remarks that national character results from the prevailing type of individual disposition.

" In the individual," he says, " there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; for if they did not pass from one into the other, whence did they come?"

“Take the quality of passion or spirit: it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, which is characteristic of the Thracians, Scythians, and in general of the Northern nations, when formed in States, does not originate in the individuals who compose them; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or the love of money, which may with equal truth be attributed to the Phœnicians and Egyptians” (*Republic*, p. 435: Jowett’s translation).

And Pericles, while encouraging the Athenians to preserve their empire, reminds them that the power which they so valued had been built up by individuals, who, each in fulfilling his proper function, saw clearly what was right, and did it.

“Fix your eyes,” he said, “upon the greatness of Athens, until you have become filled with the love of her; and when you are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that this empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who, in the hour of conflict, had the fear of dishonour always present to them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her, as the fairest offering which they could present at her feet” (Thucydides, ii.).

That is a caution to which we in England will do well to listen. And in touching the mere fringes of a vast subject, I shall dwell rather on views which have a bearing on individual life than on contemporary speculations regarding the future of society.

All ideals are in one sense ethical. For all are applicable to conduct, and only in so far are they worth considering. But the ethical *par excellence* is that which emerges when life is regarded as a whole. Only when this is grasped aright do we obtain a standard of values by which those ideals which are partial and subordinate can be weighed and measured, and assigned their relative positions in the complex many-coloured web of human existence. Some ideals, which for a time have

filled the heavens with a dazzling splendour, have proved to be meteoric visitants, whose transitory radiance eclipsed the guiding star. And yet it must be admitted that "even the light that led astray was light from Heaven." If we glance at human history superficially, it would seem as if the ideals that men have followed continually rose and fell, each one remaining dominant for a period only; when past its bloom it changes, pales, and stiffens or declines, and some reaction supervenes in which a different, perhaps an opposite, ideal prevails.

"The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world."

But in truth, whatever thought has once powerfully moved mankind, remains long afterwards within the bosom of humanity, like the leaven that was hidden within the three measures of meal, or like decaying leaves that fertilise the ground.

The mighty pleadings of the Hebrew prophets have still a voice, although the after-history of the race but partially fulfilled their aspirations.

The Greek ideal of equity is not dead, although the better life of Greece was "lapsed in time and passion." And Roman magnanimity survived to animate noble hearts in other lands when Roman grandeur was no more, and "those great spirits had ceased to be."

The ideal of Christianity also remains, to enlighten, warm, and purify ages to come, although seldom yet received in its entirety by human vision, and repeatedly overclouded through the ignorance and perverted by the passions of men. Each ideal, during the period of its most vivid realisation, is generally exclusive of all besides. The idealist moves onward in his particular groove, following the light which he sees, whilst much in the surrounding world is dark to him. But in doing so he impresses his main or central thought upon mankind, and it lives on long after him, to enlighten other generations, and to contribute to the sum of human good.

Ay, and there also lives on the outward husk of the ideal, if it be not rather a death in life; the empty shell bearing the

image of the time when it arose, and out of harmony with present surroundings. Ancient forms, apparently, retain their force. But, meanwhile, beneath the worn-out bark, another spirit is working, to break forth some day with unexpected issue. The aged trunk over which the creeping plants have grown will marvel, as Virgil puts it, "at the strange foliage and the alien fruit."

We talk of old foes with new faces, but sometimes also a new enemy will masquerade beneath an old familiar face.

Yet it must be acknowledged that the newer life is ever rooted in the old. Reverence for past things may often be a fantastic dream, but it may also be a rational human feeling. It was truly expressed by the great poet of the nineteenth century.

"The past will ever win
A glory from its being far,
And orb into the perfect star
We saw not when we moved therein."

It is good sometimes to dwell on past ideals. When we think of the early struggles of humanity, seeking to rise out of the corruption into which the ancient world had fallen in its decline:—of the Stoic, self-centred and resolute, conforming his life to universal law, with no hope of other reward than the approval of his own best mind; of the neo-Platonist mystic lost in contemplation, or the Hermit of the African desert; when we think of the Christian martyrs or of the asceticism of Origen or St Jerome, if we are not moved to direct imitation, we at least learn something of the latest powers of the human will, and begin to be aware how much it costs mankind to make one step forward in the endless war with evil.

Or when we read of St Francis, making poverty his dowryless bride, and gathering round him a brotherhood of those like-minded, inspired by a divine image of suffering, and also by yearning compassion for sinful men, our hearts go forth in admiration and sympathy, and we have a moving glimpse of one aspect of the higher life. It is through individual personalities that the final aim of human endeavour is gradually

revealed. The mere notion of goodness or of truth is powerless without a living example, and there are long intervals of torpor, when forms of worship and of duty lose all their inward meaning, when an inert crust has overspread the surface of the world, or when ambition and policy assume the mask of sainthood.

“While rank corruption mining all within,
Infects unseen.”

In the reaction from such a state of deadness and oppression arose the two great movements known as the Renaissance and the Reformation. But the deadness had not been universal, else from whence could the new life have sprung? Mediæval mystics, such as the author of the *Imitation* or like Eckhardt and Tauler in Germany, had given evidence of a vital spirit already stirring beneath the monkish cowl. The ideal of quietism may seem to active spirits a barren and fruitless thing. But in times of turbulence and violence the soul that is like a star and dwells apart, that withdraws from fellowship to woo the “cherub contemplation,” is really preaching to the world from which he is withdrawn;

“And when a soul is found sincerely so,
A thousand liveried angels lacquey her,
And in clear dream and solemn vision
Tell her of things that no gross ear can hear.”

Even mystics like Jacob Boehmen caught glimpses of truth that have contributed to the sum of wisdom. And Charles Kingsley spoke not amiss, when in introducing the *Theologia Germanica* to English readers, in Miss Susannah Winckworth's translation, he observed that such abstract meditations might have a useful meaning for men who are immersed in business or in politics; that the most active life might be inspired by thoughts which had been conceived in solitude by a recluse to whom the world of action was unknown. But a different spirit was needed to break up the fallow ground of dry convention, and awake the slumbering earth with the assurance of returning spring. That spirit of awakening was twofold: one source of it arising in the South of Europe, another coming

forth from deeper fountains in the ruder North ; the first prevailing chiefly amongst Latin races, the other mainly Teutonic.

The ascetic ideal which culminated in monasticism had in its origin been allied with genuine human aims, but had either degenerated into superstition, or had become a cloak for hypocrisy and spiritual tyranny. A new sense of sweet human affection, of the joys of life, of the glory of the world, arose one cannot tell how, and was reinforced by the revival of learning, and the re-discovery of Greco-Roman art. It may be said, though the words are not to be understood too grossly, that the rights of the flesh were asserting themselves against spiritual bondage and traditional authority. That widely spreading movement was the Renaissance. It involved an ideal in which higher and lower elements were strangely commingled, but in which the love of intellectual beauty, on the whole, prevailed. Humanism was thenceforward a word of power. The phrase, "I am a human being and count nothing human alien to me," originally, as it occurs in Terence, an excuse for vicious weakness, became a maxim of mild and comprehensive wisdom. The muse of Petrarch and Boccaccio, the rough satyr mask of Rabelais, were vehicles of a mode of thought which thenceforth became a living power in the world.

But in the North arose another reaction, and one really of a higher mood. The rights, not of the flesh, but of the spirit, broke forth with volcanic energy in Luther ; an energy, as one fondly hopes, not yet exhausted, though still resisted by the stubborn inertia of obscurantism. These two ideals have sometimes clashed, sometimes supplanted one another. It is in their mutual harmonious working that the secret of true progress is to be found.

I have touched lightly on a few of the decisive moments in which great personalities, following ideals as yet unrealised, have drawn mankind after them to issues unforeseen. In a less degree and on a lower plane every century has had such moments of its own, and the nineteenth century was certainly

no exception. I say this chiefly with reference to our own country.

The earthquake shock of the great French Revolution, and the European wars which followed it, had the immediate effect of arresting progress in this as in other lands. But the ideas of the Revolution, the ideals of the men of '89, as they had a root in English soil, so in their reflection, inspired in England many ardent minds. It is a significant symptom of approaching change that the pious heart of Cowper, the hermit of Olney, had a fellow-feeling for Jean Jacques Rousseau, and that he deprecated the war of 1793. A revolutionary aspiration had kindled Burns in his most joyous flights of song. In Byron there was an aspect of the same ideal. The head was of gold though the feet were of clay, and clogged with the mire of the Regency. Shelley was of course *par excellence* a poet of revolution; and Wordsworth, in the *Prelude*, has traced retrospectively, with a firm deliberate hand, the impression which the successive stages of that strange epoch produced on his own mind and that of Coleridge.

But the revolutionary ideal was, after all, a negative one. The liberty men sighed for was too often a vacant form; fraternity and equality had more in them of a claim of right than of the love of one's neighbour. After eighty years' experience do not Shelley's splendid lines give rather a hollow sound?—

“The painted veil, by those who were called life,
Which mimicked, as with colours idly spread
All men believed and hoped, is torn aside;
The loathsome mask has fallen. The man remains
Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed, but man
Equal, unclassed, tribeless and nationless,
Exempt from awe, worship, degree, the king
Over himself; just, gentle, wise, but man.”—*Prometheus Unbound*.

Have we not here Matthew Arnold's “ineffectual angel beating gauzy wings in the inane”? The destruction of privilege, the discrediting of conventions, the exposure of shams,—such merely negative ideals were followed for the

time with passionate ardour. Meanwhile poetic imagination was busied in filling up the blank with fresh conceptions, either, as in Keats, through the pensive worship of pure beauty, "Beauty that must die, and joy whose hand is ever at his lips bidding adieu," or, as in Sir Walter Scott, recalling the supposed realities of a former world. This outburst of romanticism was followed by the ecclesiastical revival which has lately been re-revived among us. It is not wonderful that Scott was a favourite with John Henry Newman.

Such was the intellectual food on which our fathers and our mothers fed. Perhaps the ideas of liberty and of the return to nature were those which most attracted them, but side by side with these was a stern conception of duty, traditional amongst our race, exemplified in the famous message that was signalled at Trafalgar, and finely expressed in Wordsworth's *Ode to Duty*. For thoughtful persons, this was further enforced by the Kantian notion of the categorical imperative, which had been familiarised in England through the writings of Coleridge and Carlyle, and made directly accessible through a translation of the *Metaphysic of Ethic* by John William Semple. These differing strains of romantic sentiment and severe obligation might seem opposed and likely to conflict, and yet they were effectually operative in the same persons.

The minor Revolutions of 1830 and of 1848, like their great predecessor, reverberated amongst our countrymen, but not with violence. Some political changes were accelerated, but the effects were more obvious in the world of thought than in the world of action. I remember when a friend in Edinburgh came and told my mother, who was an amateur artist, that a young Oxford graduate had produced a work that would revolutionise art and its interpretation. Those who then read the early chapters of *Modern Painters* little realised the significance of that phenomenon, or that the voice then uplifted in praise of a misunderstood landscape painter, and in condemnation of others of long accepted fame, would sound on through the century, with increasing volume. Nor could Ruskin himself

have anticipated that in blending romanticism with evangelicism, and echoing more harmoniously the rude but vigorous utterances of Carlyle, he was evoking spirits that should hereafter revive that very neo-paganism which he so earnestly condemned.

Both Carlyle and Ruskin were opposed to Utilitarianism, itself an ideal, which, in Bentham and the elder Mill, set a systematic calculation of pleasures in contradiction to the morality of sentiment. Yet, by a strange contrariety, the younger Mill was moved by a *sentiment* of filial obligation to uphold his father's theories, while striving to reconcile them with the socialistic tendencies which another strain of *sentiment* had awakened in him. Utilitarianism has done great things for us in law and politics, but its effect on individual ethics has been more doubtful, for the theory seems to have occasioned a confusion by which reason has been identified with self-love; and some recent thinkers have lost sight of the truth to which experience witnesses, that the highest reason is not self-regarding, and that the highest self is enlarged and amplified by going out of self in acts of human fellowship and lovingkindness. That truth has been embodied in a word of foreign origin, namely, *altruism*. But was it really necessary to go to France in order to learn our duty towards our neighbour, and the golden rule?

Was the English Bible then so unfamiliar that generations nursed upon it had not been taught to bear one another's burdens, or to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how He said, "It is more blessed to give than to receive"? I prefer our native British ideal of *willing service*; the familiar notion that we are each of us sent into this world "not to be ministered unto, but to minister." George Eliot has somewhere said that our race would be nearer to perfection when the impulse to help others became as instinctive as that by which we close our eyes on the approach of hurtful things. It would seem that her experience of life was not a happy one. Surely many of us have known persons in whom such an

instinct was absolutely predominant, in whom native sympathy combined with keen perceptions and an active will had grown to be an inexhaustible fountain of beneficence. And every month that passes gives some instance in which such a temper has risen even to the height of heroism. Whether professing Christianity or not, such persons are essentially Christian. I see no reason why they should not be multiplied.

Another expression with which we were familiar thirty years ago is "the enthusiasm of Humanity." That has shown itself amongst us in many forms, and only needs to be thoroughly enlightened to become a great power for good. And the mention of enlightenment may remind us of another ideal which also has had its martyrs and its heroes, *the love of truth*. When one who sees more clearly than his fellows has compassion on their ignorance, and, not out of obstinacy or contumacy, but in simple zeal, devotes his life to setting forth an unpopular truth, so as to provoke the obloquy and dislike of those who for the time hold the keys of honour and success, he also is maintaining no mean ideal, which is more needed in proportion as the forces of tradition and obscurantism are in the ascendant.

There was a time in the third quarter of the nineteenth century when serious minds were disturbed by the appearance of a sort of minor renaissance. Young persons who had begun to live in earnest, and to devote themselves to some high purpose, all at once gave evidence of what seemed a different spirit. They were still very much in earnest, but about external things. They were nothing if not *intense*, but their intensity was expended on the fashion of a garment, or on some arrangement of forms and colours in the decoration of a room. If you spoke to them of *duty*, of noble aspiration and achievement, of moral obligation, or of making the most of life, they would answer that their chief aim was a succession of gemlike moments, or they would tell you of the charms of a Japanese dressing-gown, or a bit of blue china. In poetry, Tennyson was voted *namby-pamby*, "a poet of languid pulses," (but that phrase has been amply avenged!). In art a kind of *morbidezza* was preferred

to the grand manner of the accepted masters, and almost equally to the simple humanity and piety which Ruskin had preferred. To the conscientious commonplace educator who cared for his charge, to those who were following the traditions of Dr Arnold, all this was a cause of grieved perplexity. We now know that it was due to a group of persons, of great originality and force, in whom the influence of Mr Ruskin had awakened an enthusiasm for art, but whose enthusiasm had culminated in a different ideal. We know also that this, combined with other ideals, has leavened the succeeding generation, and has proved by no means unfruitful, now that its intensity has passed away. If at this hour the middle-class home is less unsightly than in the earlier Victorian era, if the average taste in forms and colours is more refined, if the materialism of the age in things external is less gross than formerly, and if the standard of so-called comfort is modified by simplicity and grace,—this is owing to the leaders of the movement to which I allude.

Their ideal was strangely blended of mediæval romanticism and a refined neo-paganism. And they were also inspired, as it proved, with a kind of philanthropic enthusiasm. One who began by posing as the “idle singer of an empty day,” applied his great powers afterwards to reform our social life after a pattern that was not wholly decorative.

The merely neo-pagan element is more apparent in other countries, where it is more unmingled than in our own; but it is narrow and retrograde, as I said at first, and has no expansive power.

And Théophile Gautier’s cry of “Art for the sake of Art,” which, at the time I speak of, came across the Channel, has only a partial truth.

The spheres of Art and Morality are certainly distinct, and it is an error to confuse them as Ruskin sometimes did. The artist must be free, and he is worth little if he is not wholly absorbed in his art, which is all in all to him. But the moralist also has his rights; he also must be free, and it belongs to him

to observe that there is an art that ennobles and an art that degrades, an art that merely amuses and an art that inspires; and he has a right to think that, in the interest of humanity, the higher is to be preferred to the lower.

And for the lover of poetry it is a serious question whether, as dancing and music have been severally divorced from song, and even songs are not intended to be sung, so poetry is to be separated from life. And yet where else are her fresh springs to be found?

A noble ideal, that of Culture in a comprehensive sense, became operative towards the end of the century. From under a mask of irony there came once more the voice of one who was little less than a prophet. I say less than a prophet, because those sounding phrases about "conduct being three-fourths of life," and even about "the power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness," though they could set us thinking, were hardly sufficient to impel us upon a new course of action. For that we must go back to the fresh and inexhaustible sources of an earlier time: to the Gospels, not as read through the medium of St Francis or of Marcus Aurelius; to the Hebrew prophets, not as explained away; to Æschylus, Plato, Epictetus, the teachers of an earlier world. And we must also listen to the Eternal Voice that calls to us through the events that pass in our own lives and in the course of history. For if we pause now and then to consider the paths through which we individually have been led, not wholly with our own consent, I think that most of us must acknowledge the working of a supreme power, certainly not our own, controlling, correcting, guiding forward, not always to apparent happiness, but to greater good. And those who for the moment feel it otherwise, may find hereafter that the trouble under which they writhe has been the dark porch leading to the sun; a warning, an instruction, a premonition, if rightly taken, that is rich in possibilities of good.

Still more if we look beyond ourselves and beyond the complications of the hour, and try to grasp the movement of

humanity over some great arc of the universal process, will there arise a corresponding conviction. Whatever strange growths are to be deprecated, whatever plants the eternal power hath not planted, to go backward would be to change for the worse. There are recrudescences of evil, roots of bitterness not yet eradicated, that threaten to spring up anew. But the fact that these *are* deprecated, that they awaken indignation, that they are recognised as untoward survivals, is in so far a sign of progress. We ought to make the most of that, and strive, under whatsoever discouragements, to co-operate with the slow-paced onward movement. "Lay hold of the big wheel that is going up hill, and let it drag thee after." There is danger in ignoring the past. For then the old foes with new faces have us at their mercy. And those persons who propose to run the universe anew on their own lines, "as if the world were now but to begin," have an unfair advantage. To anyone who has read Plato's *Gorgias*, for example, what is the *Uebermensch* of Nietzsche but the young lion of Callicles, only taught to roar (or bray) more loudly, and furnished with a shaggier mane? But there is a danger, on the other hand, in falling under the power of the past. For then we throw away indubitable gains. Neo-paganism would take us back into the prison of sense from which Greek thought and Christian feeling have emancipated us. Mediævalism would put our necks again beneath a yoke of bondage which our fathers, somewhat impatiently perhaps, shook off and cast away.

Let us use our liberties to climb upwards into the ampler air. We can afford to deal in affirmatives, and not in negations merely. Self-devotion rather than self-abnegation; affections not renounced, but expanding into universal kindness; that human love which in a higher love endures:—not bare refusal of the gifts of life, but the strong determination to be ever giving more than we receive.

Self-preservation also, but for the sake of others, and personal liberty jealously guarded, but only that we may serve

the more. Not other-worldliness, but an increasing sense that what is best in this world points to a better world beyond; earthly passions not annihilated, but subdued to spiritual aims.

Such are some of the watchwords of religious freedom. If only we can acquire a genuine sense of proportion, so as to be aware when higher purposes claim of right to overbear all lower motives, then we may go forth to action without uneasy scruples, and enjoy without self-reproach. Ourselves standing firmly on the upward path, we may strengthen our brethren and support the weak; combining warm emotion with clear thought and an unwavering will; resolved to live always in the spirit of what is good and beautiful and true. Such an ideal may seem less sublime than some of those to which men of former generations have been impelled. But it is not really lower, if we can but pursue it with an ardour and energy, an inspired devotion, at all comparable to theirs.

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DID PAUL WRITE ROMANS? ¹

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I.

WHY believe the Apostle dictated our extant Romans? The reasons are hard to find, and shine most through absence. Authorities offer little positive argumentation, but content themselves with appeal to general consent, "ein gewisses Einverständniss" (Harnack). Again, these masters allege that no sufficient reasons have been brought *contra*. Our reasons come later, but we note the assumption here tacitly made, that a strong presumption favours the genuineness, a presumption to be borne down only by the weightiest counterpoise. But why and whence this presumption? Among thousands of Christians, or Gnostics as Clement so greatly prefers to call them, who lived A.D. 50-150, why presume that Paul rather than a hundred others wrote Romans? Present the reasons. If these be sound, the presumption is justified; if unsound, it is condemned. Of itself the presumption has no argumentative value, and critics who merely appeal to common consent are derelict in logical duty.

But are there not grounds for this tradition? Certainly: there are grounds for every tradition. But are they rock? or sand? *Imprimis*, we remark that the question is really triple: Is the document an epistle? addressed to Romans? written by

¹ A reply to this Article will appear in the April issue of the *Hibbert Journal* by Professor Paul Schmiedel, of Zürich, who will also deal with the views of Dr Van Manen on the same question.—Ed.

Paul? Plainly the first two questions might be answered yes, and the third one no. But if either be denied, the third could hardly be affirmed. If the document be not a real letter, but epistolary in form only, then it could scarcely have been written by the restless missionary. Such artificiality we should attribute far more naturally to someone not primarily preacher, but rather student and litterateur. Jewish and Christian literature abound in such works of such writers. Again, even if it be a letter, yet addressed not to Romans but "to those in love of God," then it has certainly suffered revision, and is very improbably the work of Paul. For it is hard to think of him as aiming at the air, as talking to "all the beloved of God, elect saints," as written in i. 8-15, or xv. 22 ff. Accordingly, while proof of the original epistolary character and Roman address would leave the question of authorship hardly touched, yet any evidence against the former must tell strongly against the latter. We believe traditionists will defend the three points of attack with equal decision. Moreover, while these questions are distinct in thought, and do not imply each other, yet it would be worse than pedantry to try to keep them apart in discussion: we have no sword to divide soul from body, and both from spirit. Nor need we; for arguments that negative either of the two must militate strongly against the third. We proceed, then, to present all grounds that we can imagine for holding with tradition.

A. The document is superscribed *Προς Ρωμαίους*. But superscriptions are often wrong; it is enough for us that the most uncompromising Zahn concedes that one at least is false: *Προς Εφεσίους*. This reason then is worthless, and perhaps none would insist on it.

B. But there is the address *ἐν Ῥώμῃ* (i. 7), and *τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ* (i. 15). Here we must refer to the *J.B.L.*, Pt. I., 1901, for proof that both phrases are interpolated. Harnack¹ now yields *ἐν Ῥώμῃ* unconditionally in verse 7, and puts little trust

¹ *Preuschen's Zeitschrift*, 1902, I.

in the phrase of verse 15, which "man kann ohne Schwierigkeit missen." Indeed, the same reasons for preferring the G. text in verse 7 hold with even increased strength for verse 15, namely, we can easily derive the recepta from G.; we cannot derive G. from the recepta. Be this as it may, since 'Ρώμη is certainly interpolated in the one verse, and probably in the other (Harnack), it can no longer be produced as evidence in either case.

C. But in xv. 24 ff. the writer speaks of stopping with the addressed on his way to Spain, and Rome was between Spain and Corinth. Here again we must refer to the *J.B.L.*, Pt. II., 1901 and 1902, where we seem to prove conclusively by many independent considerations that this whole Epilogue, xv. and xvi., is a late Addendum, with only the most shadowy claims on Paulinity. Until these arguments are answered, there can be no deduction in favour of tradition from either Prologue or Epilogue; for these have been dissolved from any connection with the main document. But even if some more or less plausible rejoinder be made, raising some doubt of our conclusions, it would still remain that these have been shown to be at least possible; they form a competitive theory, and it will still be necessary for traditionists to produce independent evidence.

D. The Epistle begins with "Paul, servant of Jesus Christ, elect apostle." But are all such designations unerring indications of authorship? Confessedly, no! Does any one question the general fact of pseudonymity in Jewish and early Christian literature? Harnack does indeed try hard to rescue the N.T. from this reproach, if reproach it be, but vainly. In his *Vorrede* he admits only one "pseudonym im strengsten Sinn," II. Peter. For logical purposes this is quite enough. Since there is one such, there may be a dozen or *all such*; the necessary Universal vanishes; it remains to prove the ascription in each particular case. But this "strengsten" will bear the strongest emphasis. On appealing from Harnack in the Preface to Harnack in the volume of the book, we find it written

that I. P. is also pseudonymous, written not by the Pillar Apostle, "nicht als ein eigentlicher Brief, sondern als ein homiletischer Aufsatz," "Petrus der Verfasser nicht sein kann," it is only the author of II. P. "der unser Schriftstück zu einem Petrus brief umgestempelt hat." Precisely so should we say of Romans. It is only a theological tractate, "re-stamped" into an Epistle of Paul. Similarly, Harnack judges James, Jude, the Apocalypse, practically so the Pastorals and Johannines. Quid multa? According to this consummate critic who vaunts his return to traditionalism, practical pseudonymity abounds in the N.T.—it makes no difference whether due to original writer or to reviser. No more do we claim. In our judgment, perhaps every important N.T. writing has undergone repeated redaction, nor can we always distinguish the various hands. Since Harnack avows as much with respect to so many Scriptures, it seems certain that the mere presence of the name Paul cannot guarantee the writing as in whole or in part the work of that Apostle.

Logically, the position of Zahn is harder to deal with than Harnack's, though incomparably less open-minded. Zahn perceives clearly that the tub cannot satisfy the whale; that the least leaven of pseudonymity admitted into the N.T. must leaven the whole lump. Hence he refuses even the most necessary concessions; like the brilliant American politician, he claims everything to save something. Such an adversary must be combated point by point, must be beaten back by countless blows. In our minuter memoirs we wage war upon this noble foe line by line and word by word. This paper, however, is not meant primarily for Zahnians, but for such as have some respect for the surest conquests of the human mind. But even the armour of Zahn discloses here and there a gap. Even he must admit that *Προς Εφεσιους* and *ἐν Εφεσω* are errors. What more do we need? Then may *Προς Ρωμαιοις* and *ἐν Ῥώμῃ* be errors as well. This one exception breaks the charm and carries the question into court, where evidence and not presumption must decide. Moreover, we find in Zahn's

G. d. N. K. a chapter viii. "Unechte Paulusbriefe." Also in 2 Th. ii. 2, iii. 17, we come upon the portentous phrases, "nor by letter *as from us*," and "the salutation of Paul with my (own) hand, which is token in every epistle; so I write." So there were, according to both Zahn and the N.T., spurious Pauline letters in circulation and recognition. Well, then, is this "Unto Romans" like "Unto Ephesians," like "Unto Laodiceans" and "Unto Alexandrians," like other "Untos" hinted at in 2 Thes., and even referred to in Polycarp and Clement Alex.? Even according to tradition itself, this is an open question. It is not closed by superscription or ascription.

E. But we read: "I too am an Israelite, of seed of Abraham, tribe of Benjamin" (xi. 1); "Inasmuch as I am apostle of Gentiles" (xi. 13). We gladly grant that the writer here poses as Paul the Apostle. But what does this prove? Nothing whatever. An impersonator might have written so as naturally as the Apostle, yea, we think, *far more naturally*. For anyone must perceive that these clauses are dragged in by the ears and mar the thought. The first is indeed visibly interpolated. Could Paul have reasoned so childishly as this: "I am an Israelite; God has not cast me off; therefore God has not cast off his people"? Impossible. The thought is this: "Has God cast off his people? Far be it! God has not cast off his people." The proof follows from Scripture, according to rule. So far, then, from establishing Pauline authorship, this passage overthrows it, and discloses a Jewish (Christian?) exhortation, which someone has "umgestempelt" (we thank Harnack for teaching us the word) into a Pauline Epistle.

Similarly verses 13, 14 are senseless in their context, serving only to interrupt the connection between verses 12 and 15, themselves mere doublets. Here, indeed, he that runs may read. The *text-uncertainty* shows clearly that even the ancients perceived that verses 12 and 13 do not connect in thought. Hence authorities are almost equally divided be-

tween $\delta\epsilon$ and $\gamma\rho$ (while some (C.) give $\sigma\nu$). Which is right? Either and neither. Both are unsatisfactory attempts at impossible joinery. Equally uncertain is the following $\sigma\nu$, while neither $\epsilon\gamma\omega$ nor $\delta\omicron\zeta\alpha\zeta\omega$ is sure. *Add that A. omits verse 12, and it becomes evident that we have here to do with a patchwork, not with an original unit. This passage, then, is likewise a boomerang, it makes not for but powerfully against tradition. Here, then, we close the account of indications in Romans of Pauline authorship; and even now the beam tips adversely.*

F. We pass to alleged testimonies found elsewhere in the N.T. (1 Peter, James, Jude, Hebrews) and in the Apostolic Fathers. It is held generally, or universally, that these abound in uses or echoes of Romans. Hence it is inferred that it was early widely known and familiarly cited; that it must have been written still earlier, in the very days of the Apostle; and who, then, but he could have written it?

Such is the strongest defence of Pauline authorship. We must test it carefully. According to wont, we begin with the extremest concessions. Granted that Romans is used in all of these writings. What follows? That Paul wrote it? By no means. For not one date is certainly determinable. James and Jude are placed even by Harnack not earlier than A.D. 120; 1 Peter, with most reason, not before 117; of Hebrews the date is quite uncertain; Ignatius and Polycarp must fall at least after 115; Clement anywhere between 96 and 135. Even if we adopt the earliest dates, there lies a broad interval of about forty years before the earliest use. Admittedly, none of these writings name Romans or refer it to the Apostle. Now in forty years who knows what may happen? Why may not some earlier incomplete form of the Epistle have arisen (according to prevailing Jewish and Christian precedent), have acquired popularity anonymously, and later have received the Apostolic seal, as did 1 P.? Even, then, after the most extravagant concessions, it would remain far from evident that Paul had written our *present Romans*.

Far be it from us, however, really to make any such absurd admissions. We deny that there is *any use whatever* made of Romans down to and including the extant writings of Justin. In *Saeculi Silentium*, a memoir now ready for the press, we have examined minutely every such alleged employment, and with results in every case decisively negative. It is, of course, impossible to repeat that inquisition here. But we may briefly sketch the line of argument, and illustrate it on some striking examples.

The general state of case, then, is this: *till after Justin, no citation from Romans, no mention of the name, nothing of it ascribed to Paul.* But there are certain *assonances*, similarities more or less close in thought, in diction, or in both. Of these by far the most are too faint to meet any ear not especially attuned thereto. Hence many alleged by the one critic are rejected by the other, and conversely. Now what is proved by microscopic scrutiny is this: in general the resemblance is too trivial or even imaginary to suggest the hypothesis of borrowing; in some cases, though more exact, it is perfectly explained by derivation from a known common source, a derivation always probable, and sometimes absolutely necessary; in all the rest it lies between two phrases or ideas that formed a demonstrable part of the common diction or common consciousness of Early Christendom. Such commonplaces were current speech in such religious circles, and the notion that they were borrowed from Romans is superfluous and unwarranted. On the contrary, they were *taken up into that epistle*, which is intelligible only as a concretion of such elements, a precipitate of the collective consciousness of Christendom. Let us illustrate.

Of trivial similitudes, the following may serve as type. In Ephesians i. 3 Ignatius speaks of "Onesimus, the unutterable in love . . . whom I pray you love according to Jesus Christ . . ." Now this, say Sanday and Headlam, refers to Romans xv. 5, "think the same among one another according to Christ Jesus"!

Of the second class the following is by far the strongest instance. Zahn, in fact, tells us we could not prove that Romans was read in sub-apostolic times but for certain imitations by Clement, this being easily chief, and similarly Steck.

R. 1 : 29-30.—πεπληρωμένους πάση ἀδ., πονηρίᾳ, πλ., κακίᾳ, μεστοὺς φθόνου, φόνου, ἔριδος, δολ., κακ., ψι . . . τᾶς, κα . . . ἄλους, θε . . . γεῖς, ὑβριστάς, ὑπε . . . οὺς, ἀ . . . νας, ἐφευρετὰς κακῶν, γονεύσιν ἀπειθεῖς, ἀσυνέτους, ἀσυνθέτους, ἀστόργους, ἀνελεήμονας· οἴτινες, τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγρόντες, ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσ. ἄξιοι θανάτου εἰσίν, οὐ μ. αὐτὰ ποιούσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνεν. τοῖς πράσσουσιν

C. 35 : 5, 6.—ἀπορρίψαντες ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν πᾶσαν ἀδ. καὶ ἀνομίαν, πλ., ἔρεις, κα . . . ἄστε καὶ δόλους, ψι . . . μούστε καὶ κατ ἰάς, θε γίαν, ὑπ νίαν τε καὶ ἀλ ἰαν, κενοδοξίαν τε καὶ ἀφιλοξενίαν. ταῦτα γάρ οἱ πράσ. στυγητῶ τῷ θεῷ ὑπάρχουσιν. ὃν μ. δὲ οἱ πράσ. αὐτά, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ συνεν τες αὐτοῖς.

The agreements are in the emphasised and abbreviated words. Evidently these passages are not unrelated. But is either derived from the other? We deny it. Certainly the supposition that C. is using Romans is inextricably beset with difficulties. For is he quoting from the text before him? Impossible then to account for the 60 per cent. of variation. Or is he quoting from memory? But what could recommend itself less to memory than such a list, in no way superior to many similar? If C. memorised this catalogue, *a fortiori* he would have memorised the whole epistle, which would then have perceptibly affected his thought and diction elsewhere. Moreover, there is the best of reasons for referring both lists to a common original. Such catalogues are frequent. We find them 2 Tim. iii. 2-5; Teaching, v. 1-2; in the Jewish Vidui, the Confession for the Day of Atonement. All these tales of sins and sinners contain about or exactly 22 specifications, one for each letter of the Hebrew alphabet. Without hesitation we accept the very conservative conclusion of Harris (Teaching, p. 86), that some lost list is the probable basis of all. In any case, that the catalogue is not original in R. is abundantly evident. For who in his senses would stop in the course of a heated argument to frame an *artificial* list of 22 sins and sinners? Certainly not Paul the Apostle, whose

throng of thoughts, as critics delight to tell us, sweeps torrent-like onward, and dashes his syntax to wreck so frequently. That the tale has been imported bodily into Romans is further independently manifest in a mass of minute textual and grammatical facts, for which we refer to *Saeculi Silentium*. Hence this "similarity" makes not for, but mightily against the tradition we combat.

As a third type this parallel is incomparably the closest :

R. 14: 10, 12.—πάντες γὰρ παραστή-
σόμεθα τῷ βήματι τοῦ θεοῦ . . . ἄρα
[οὖν] ἕκαστος ἡμῶν περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λόγον
δώσει [τῷ θεῷ].

Pol. 6: 2.—καὶ πάντας δεῖ παραστήναι
τῷ βήματι τοῦ χριστοῦ, καὶ ἕκαστον ὑπὲρ
ἑαυτοῦ λόγον δοῦναι.

Again we grant the passages are near kin. But is either parent of the other? *Non liquet*. The sentiment is a commonplace of that era. The Judgment-throne, the Assembled Nations, the dread Accounting—all were staples of the Judæo-Christian imagination. Bear witness Matt. xii. 36, xxv. 31, 32; 2 Cor. v. 10; 1 P. iv. 5. Here are found all the ideas and phrases of both Romans and Polycarp. Moreover, there is strong evidence, both syntactic and codical, that the passage is far from original in Romans, but is itself an appropriation.¹ For detailed discussion we must again refer to *Saeculi Silentium*, mentioning only the broad patent fact that both xii. and xiv. are compactations of familiar material, the sediment of the general mind; especially xii. is glaringly an ungrammatical collection of moral maxims—facts already measurably recognised by Weiss, Spitta, and others. Thus the firmest central pillars of external evidence crumble into dust.

G. What more can be urged as External Evidence? Zahn replies, there was very early (A.D. 90?) a collection of Paul's Letters, including Romans. It cannot be shown, however, that any one Pauline existed so early. But even if there was an

¹ We surmise there was a watchword among Christians, perhaps rhythmically turned like this: All must appear at the Bar. Each give account of himself. There is no likelihood that Paul originated either expression or idea; the latter is distinctly unpauline, and irreconcilable with the Paulinism of R. itself. Let no one refer to 2 Cor. v. 10, an unpauline interpolation.

“epistle to Corinthians,” that would not imply a collection. And even if there was a collection, there is no indication that Romans was included; for in the most ancient form it is noteworthy that Romans, though the chief Epistle, though supposedly addressed to the chief church, though supposedly among the earliest written, is nevertheless at the very foot of the list (Z.-G. d. N. K. ii. p. 344). The clear indication is that it took its place in this series as the very last, and was afterwards transferred naturally to the first place. Such collections (called *Apostolos*?) undoubtedly, before A.D. 180, *began to be*: it is reasonable, however, to suppose they were at first inchoate, wanting even the most important members. But even if an “Unto Romans” was present in such an early collection, would that imply it was our *present Romans*? Zahn himself does not contend that such an early text agreed precisely with any now deducible from the pell-mell of the MSS. It is only the essential form that he thinks has been preserved. But what is essential? Whole chapters in Romans seem unessential, even alien to the rest. The earliest known form seems to have been Marcion’s. As reported by his bitterest antagonists, it differs immensely from our present or Old Catholic form. *They* said Marcion expunged and mutilated; Marcion made, or certainly would have made, answer that *they* interpolated and expanded. Which was right? Which wrong? Who knows? Perhaps both in some measure. To our minds, Marcion’s contention has the higher probability. In any case the affirmation of Tertullian and Irenæus appears unproved and unprovable, if not improbable, and the argument of Zahn fails hopelessly.

H. But our Romans was *written*, and who could have written it but the great Apostle? We raise no question as to literary or logical worth of this Scripture, but neither implies or suggests Pauline authorship. For Acts is our only source of information touching either thought or style of the Apostle. This one source is far from clear, it is very turbid; but nowhere and in no measure does it reflect Romans. Notoriously, so wide is the chasm between Paul in Acts and Paul in the

Epistles, particularly R. and G., that critics long since despaired of reconciliation, and tried to save the one by surrender of the other: Luke, they say, has softened and smoothed down the sharp antinomianism of his hero. Conservatives, of course, deny this, nor can it be proved, but the contrast remains undeniable. In the "We . . . account," the least suspicious of all sources, though itself strongly interpolated, we find no hint of the distinctive ideas of the chief Letters. In the speeches put into Paul's mouth, we know not in what proportion Paul and Luke are mingled, but certainly they do not read like G. or R. In fact, our notion of Paul has been *formed from these epistles*, without any historical basis whatever. We have reasoned: Paul was so and so, because he wrote such and such epistles; and conversely: Paul wrote such and such epistles, because he was so and so. As a circle, this reasoning must satisfy the most fastidious. If any facts collide with it, so much the worse for them.

We affirm, *au contraire*, that history, such as we have it, lends no countenance to the Paul of the Epistles, and that neither matter nor manner, particularly of Romans, is in any measure self-consistent or admissive of the idea of a single author. Here let suffice the unimpeachable fact that no genius of exposition, not even Holsten, has yet succeeded in presenting Paulinism as an intelligible whole, and that the acknowledged diversities of style, even in this Unto R., are immeasurably great and defy comprehension. How could one man write in so many ways, in one letter, in one chapter, at one sitting? "Why, Paul was not as other men." But how prove him so extraordinary? "Why, he must have been, to write such extraordinary epistles." And again the argument treads the same eternal circle.

I. Lastly, one may say the implied historical situation presumes the early days of Paulinism, and is inconceivable in the second century; and once more, this argument is mere assertion. Where is the only record of Paul's preaching? In Acts. Show us therein the historical situation of Galatians.

Is it not notorious that this Galatia is geographically impossible? Show us the Paul of Galatians, denouncing the religion of his fathers as "Judaism," and imprecating abscission upon his countrymen. *Non est inventus*. Our present concern is with Romans, and here we protest there is exhibited no definite historical situation whatever. In so far as any features at all are recognisable, they show not even vague consistency with anything suggested by Luke. We refer to the *J.B.L.*, Pt. I., 1901, adding only that the fierce hostility of which Acts makes so much is directed against Paul personally, and not against the Christ. Even while the Jews were taking counsel and going about to kill him in Damascus and Jerusalem (ix. 23, 29), the church was everywhere in peace and prosperity, multiplied in the fear of the Lord and the comfort of the spirit (ix. 31). On the face of Acts it is plain that the Gospel was preached everywhere to Jews with notable success years after the traditional date of Romans, and that both Peter and Paul would have been horrified at the suggestion that their countrymen as a body had rejected the Gospel. Moreover, we deny that there is any struggle of Jewish and Pauline Christianity in the book of Acts. The account in xv. is not unnatural, not improbable, nor have we reason to believe that the antagonism arose till many years later. In fine, we deny that Acts presents any fitting historical background for either G. or R.; we call for certainties or probabilities in the life of Paul reflected in either, or even in Corinthians.

As to the dogmas of Romans, they are nowhere found in Luke's record. The controversies about Faith and Works and the Justification of Abraham were centuries old, and fit as well in one decade as in another. They are unheard of in Acts, and *are without purpose even in Romans*. The doctrine is purely academic; it disappears in v. 1 practically for ever. The lines of thought opened up thus far lead no whither, and are abandoned entirely in v. 2 to viii. 36. Weiss recognises this, and is perplexed by it. There is no hint in Acts of *any* chapter of Romans.

On the other hand, we know that the second century did see a struggle between Pauline and Jewish Christianity. Witness Ignatius (Mag. x. 3, viii. 1; Phil. vi. 1). In the days of Marcion the conflict between Law and Gospel became admittedly acute. We deny that it ever reached such acuteness before, that any sharp separation of Jew and Christian was possible until the fall of Jerusalem, or actual until about the time of Barcochab. When counter-proof is presented, we shall examine it with interest.

Such are the considerations that might be thought to favour Paul's authorship of Romans. Not one has any force worth mentioning. Neither is their collective strength greater; for we oppose one and all, not by a series of independent counter-hypotheses, but by one single hypothesis suggested in each case by the same closer analysis.

II.

We now advance to positive disproof, and affirm: *That Romans is visibly, in every chapter, not an original unit, but a compilation of pre-existent materials.* Anything like complete treatment here is out of the question, but we hope to give indications sufficient as the basis of a judgment.

1. The denunciation of Wrath upon Idolatry and consequent Unnatural Vice (i. 18-32) stands unconnected with the Thesis of verses 16, 17. It is universally assumed that here begins an elaborate and majestic argument: Man must be justified; only two ways are conceivable, by works or by faith; the first is impossible, at least not actual, as witness the universal wickedness, both of Jew and of Greek; therefore the second is necessary and actual. This argument is not hard to frame or to understand; if Paul had any such syllogism in mind, it seems he should and would have expressed it clearly, he the logician by nature. *But no such reasoning is to be found in this Scripture.* What indeed follows the announcement of the great Thesis? Why, the Scripture-proof *immediately*: The just by faith shall live. This, in fact, *closes the*

proof as it stood in the mind of the writer of verses 16, 17; everywhere in these "Epistles" such a citation is practically an end of controversy. What follows simply hangs on the word "revealed." Such mechanical attachment is characteristic of this "Letter." The denunciation of unnatural vice as a result of Idolatry is simply itself, a familiar Jewish protest against Paganism, no semblance of proof for the Thesis. It is plainly imported and highly composite. We have already noted its incorporation of a Vidui. The synthesis is betrayed by numerous repetitions: verse 23 in verse 25, verse 24 in verse 26; thrice "God gave them up" unto unnatural immorality, verses 24, 26, 28: note, too, the triple iteration of "knowing God," verses 19, 21, 28. The interruption between verses 28 and 29 is evident. "The unseemly" refers only to odious vices, the burden of the foregoing; but instantly appear iniquities of unrelated type, such even as "murder." All these have nothing to do with the unseemly Lesbianism preceding, while the harsh construction (*πεπληρωμένους* and *μεστούς*) tells plainly that we are on new ground.

Still more, we have even codical testimony to this compilation. In his *Refutation of all Heresies*, v. 7, Hippolytus, discussing the doctrine of the Man-Woman professed by the Naasseni, declares they support it by a *saying of the Logos*: *καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διασαφούσι. Τὰ γ. ἀ. ἀ. ἀ. τῆς κ. τοῖ κ. τ. π. αὐτοῦ ν. κ., ἦ τ. ἀ. ἀ. δ. κ. θ., πρὸς τ. ἐ. ἀ. ἀ. Δ. γ. τ. θ. ὁ. ὦ. θ. ε. ἦ ἦ. ἀ. ἐματαιώθη ἦ ἀ. ἀ. κ. φ. γὰρ ἐ. σ. ἐ. κ. ἦ. τ. δ. τ. α. θ. ἐ. ὁμοιώμασιν ἐ. φ. ἀ. κ. π. κ. τ. κ. ἐ. δ. καὶ π. ἀ. ὁ. θ. ε. π. ἀ. α. τ. γ. θ. ἀ. μ. τ. φ. χ. ἐ. τ. π. φ., ὁ. δὲ κ. ὁ. ἀ. ἀ. τ. φ. χ. τ. θ. ἐ. ἐ. τ. ὁ. ἀ. ε. ἀ., ἄ. ἐ. ἄ. τ. ἀ. κ. κ. τ. ἀ. ἦ. ἔ. τ. π. ἀ. ἐ. ἐ. ἀ.* This agrees precisely with Romans in all words given by initials, but presents a text far nearer original. This may be said even of *τῆς, τοῦ, γάρ, αὐτοῦ*, which Romans omits, still more of *ἐ. ἐ. τ. δ. ἀ. κ. ἐ.*¹ which the N. omit; especially of *δέ* for *τε*; most of all of the omission of verses 24, 25, repeated in verses 26, 27. We note too that in the N version the beginning of

¹ In verse 21

verse 24 (with *καί* supplied) is continued in verse 26. *Everything* indeed recommends this form as the earlier. Now H. does not say the N. quoted this as from Paul, but as "That which is said by the Logos." The saying belonged then to the Literature of the Logos, and *has been absorbed into Romans*.

2. The second chapter is impossibly a continuation of the first. $\Delta\iota\acute{o}$ =*on account of which*; but on account of *what*? And who is "every one that judgeth"? Whoever he be, he has no business here; no preparation has been made for him, no use is made of him. Neither is he justly condemned; for no attempt has been made to prove all Gentiles, much less all Jews, guilty as charged; nay, it is certain the majority were *not* guilty. Verses 7, 10, 11, distinctly imply there *were* such guiltless, God-fearing Jews and Gentiles as *by their works, with no hint of saving faith, would merit and receive eternal life*. Not only then is this chapter ii. inconceivably a continuation of i., but it is inconceivably written in proof of the Thesis; for it does not hint Salvation by Faith; but teaches Salvation by works unequivocally. It is all over, then, with the myth that verses 16, 17 lay down a Thesis to be proved through four chapters!! It is clear that this pericope, ii. 1-16, has nothing to do with the foregoing. It teaches that Jew and Gentile stand alike in the eyes of God, who will judge each *according to his works*—nothing more, nothing less.

3. Now comes ii. 17-29, with a fierce attack on the boastful Jew, doing him huge injustice, but not advancing the argument an inch. The passage is very obscure—the syntax is completely lost at verse 28—but apparently it is a defence of secret converts, devout Gentiles, who yet hesitated to profess Judaism openly and receive the seal of circumcision. It is not "the Jew in the open," but "the Jew in secret" that counts and receives praise, not of men but of God. In any case, what has all this to do with Justification by Faith? (i. 16).

4. The next paragraph (iii. 1-5) corrects the foregoing: "What then the advantage of the Jew? What the profit of circumcision?" The writer of ii. could only reply, "None

whatever." But this new writer, evidently a patriot Jew, declares, "Much every way." Why and how? Because of the Divine promises of national glorification (λόγια = Verheisungen,—Weiss). But will these be kept? Certainly! Though some Jews prove faithless, their unfaith cannot affect God's faith; God will be faithful and keep His promises, even though all men prove liars. Thus only these verses become intelligible, but they have no relation whatever to any justification, either by faith or otherwise.

5. The next verses, 5-8, have no logical attachment to anything either before or after. All attempts to interpret them in their context are futile. One thing is sure, they have no concern with i. 16.

6. Verse 9 can no man translate, nor is the text determinable. But its close affirms, "We have already charged that both Jews and Greeks are all under sin." Where? Certainly not thus far in Romans. Apparently this paragraph has been torn from its context and transplanted here; or perhaps the aorist προητιασάμεθα should be the present (προ)αιτιαόμεθα, required by the proof that follows from Scripture. Here, then, is the first essay to prove Universal Guilt. All between i. 18 to iii. 8 has no bearing on the Thesis, or bears insupportably against it. The Scripture proof here given is precisely what might have been expected. The cento of passages ("Perlenschnur"!—Zahn) is found approximately in Justin. Both Hatch and Vollmer recognise it as taken in both places from some earlier collector, some dictionary of quotations. Hence this notion of universal guilt is not original in Romans, but had already been so argued, perhaps generations before. This proof ends with verse 19. Plainly, no proof can have been given before, else why this paragraph, which covers the whole ground? Accordingly its natural and only proper place is immediately after i. 17, if the argument be as alleged; all between is interpolated, irrelevant, contradictory.

Some one might say this proof applies to Jews only. This we deny, since the citation is expressly made to prove "All,

both Jews and Gentiles, under sin"; the force then of 19^a (if not interpolated) can only be that the Jews share this universal guilt, the whole world is condemned. But in the opposite case we should have to look back for proof of universal Gentile guilt; the only *hint* is in i. 17 32; hence this section would naturally come immediately after i. 32, leaving even in this case ii. 1 to iii. 8 intercalated. There is no escape, then, from conceding a huge interpolation. Moreover, this fact of compilation shines out in "because" (διότι), verse 20. This seems impossible logically, hence our elder translators wrote boldly "*therefore.*"

Now at last in verse 21 the thought returns to i. 16. Precisely how to attach this latter at any point in this pericope, verses 9-26, we may not say. Why should we? The two were never originally one. The gravamen is, that this section presents the only half-way natural continuation of i. 17; what intervenes is intercalation. On this single point we might rest our case. With clear perception thereof must vanish every shadow of doubt that Romans is a compilation.

7. But not only are the five sections, i. 18-32, ii. 1-16, ii. 17-29, iii. 1-4, iii. 5-8 all inserted; *not one is Christian*. Nowhere the slightest hint of Christianity, save in ii. 16, long since recognised, now by Clemen, as interpolated. Whether they be all Jewish, or partly Gentile, we cannot say. There may be in iii. 5-8 some work of a Paulinist—or at least an antinomian.

8. That the whole of iii. 19-26 is patchwork is clearly attested by the uncertainty of the text, which we have not space to discuss, merely alluding to the great variant in verses 25-26, one of the most important in the N.T. (F G et al. omit δ. τ. π. . . . τ. δ. ᾶ., presenting an elder form). Impossible again the connection of verses 23, 24, "all have sinned . . . being justified freely." Equally impossible is verse 28. In general verses 27-31 are incomprehensible.

9. The abrupt termination is inconceivable as original thinking of a rational being. For a mortal objection has just been stated: that we annul law through faith. What is the

answer? "God forbid! but we establish law." Where is the proof? *It is never even remotely hinted.* Immediately we are whirled leagues away into a discussion of Abraham's Justification and Circumcision, and law is heard of no more till verse 13, and then irrelevantly. Here, then, is another chasm unbridgeable. This chapter is non-Christian to 24^a, a fragment of the endless controversy in Jewish schools about Abraham's faith. We take it that Christianisation begins in verse 24^b. Another seam gapes at v. 6. The text is wholly uncertain, not one of the half-dozen forms yield sense: this commissure *the text-framers found it impossible to disguise.*

10. At v. 12 the case is particularly unambiguous. How could interpolation be more evident? "On this account"—On what account? None can say. The pericope (12–21) has no imaginable attachment. It is a remarkable word-play; the thought, such as it is, vibrates between opposites, and finally loses itself in a series of barren polarities. Even the grammatical form fails at last, the sentence (verse 18) lacks nothing but subject and predicate. The loving labour of centuries has made nothing out of this logomachy, nothing whatever. The opening sentence begins a comparison never completed, broken off at ἡμαρτον and never resumed; ἄχρι γάρ starts a new thought that in no way complements but contradicts the preceding. The phrase "Adam, who is type of Him to come" would show the writer still expecting Messiah. The paragraph seems to be purely Jewish, Christianised like the Testaments of Abraham and the Patriarchs, by thrice inserting Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Be this as it may, *Faith has vanished with v. 1* The elaborate doctrine *supposed* to be developed in i.–iv. is never heard of again, a fact that confounds even Bernhard Weiss. The phrase "Death entered into the world" is found in *Wisdom* ii. 24.

11. We have no space to analyse chapter vi. It abounds in grammatical and textual difficulties that forcibly suggest compilation. It especially interests by dark allusions to Christian "mysteries," with which the readers are supposed

familiar. Hence the words ἀγνοεῖτε (3), γινώσκοντες (6), εἰδότες (9), οἴδατε (16). The whole is unintelligible save as addressed to a long-established congregation, well acquainted with all the doctrines in question, whose teaching has already become a *tradition* (εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε τύπον διδαχῆς, verse 17).

12. Chapter vii. begins with a parallel intelligible only on the supposition that the text has suffered extremely in redaction; moreover, it does not connect with the preceding, but harks back at least to vi. 14 (Weiss). The next section vii. 7-25 does not continue the first, but springs a kindred theme: Is the law sin? It seems psychologically impossible as originally one, so full of repetitions, the thought whirling round and round on its track. Thus "Sin having found a fulcrum through the commandment," verses 8, 11; verse 19 repeats verse 15; verse 20 repeats verse 17; verse 12 is impossible in its context; nothing in the foregoing warrants the "So" (ὥστε); quite contrary. Verse 12 declares the law "holy," verse 14 "spiritual," verse 16 "excellent." And who is this "I" that speaks? Certainly not Paul; for "I was alive without the law once." But Paul was surely never "without the law." As a narrative of his personal experience, this section is inconceivable. As a Zealot he "lived in all good conscience," "blameless according to righteousness that is in law." The mental struggle here depicted he never knew. Besides, *the writer has not emerged therefrom*. For he says, "Me, miserable man! Who shall deliver me?" That verse 25^a is intercalated is manifest from its *senselessness* and the *hopeless uncertainty* of the text. How absurd the conclusion in verse 25^b! How impossible for the Apostle! If he thanks God for deliverance from this antinomy, how in the next breath does he still serve with his flesh the law of Sin? How impossible for Paul the Jew this philosophic sense of the word Law!

13. What yawning cleft between verse 25^b and viii. 1! He still "serves the law of Sin"; and immediately, "Therefore (ἀρα) there is now no condemnation"! No rational being could write so originally. Straightway also in verse 2 the well-

authenticated $\sigma\epsilon$ (thee) shows plainly that we are on new ground, and that $\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma \epsilon\nu$ X. I. is interpolated;—this even if we read $\mu\epsilon$ for $\sigma\epsilon$. Transparently the passage originally had no reference to Christianity. The lucubration of a “Pneumatic,” it declared “Therefore (from previous reasoning now lost) no condemnation; for the law of the spirit of life has freed thee from the law of sin and death.” It has been Christianised by two phrases, but $\sigma\epsilon$ betrays the secret. Here is practically the first appearance of the Spirit. That word has indeed been used (i. 4, 9; ii. 29; vii. 6), but incidentally, not as a principle in argument. Now it suddenly steps forward without introduction and controls the discussion through 27 verses, being used 17 times, then as suddenly disappears, to return no more in this character. Plainly this section proceeds from another source, and fits loose in its context. What rational being has ever written thus? Precisely where these discontinuities in thought appear, there the grammatical and often the textual difficulties are excessive.

14. Such phenomena confront us at every turn. All must perceive the impossible chasm between viii. and ix., which our text-framers have shrunk from attempting to span with a particle, the change in style, and the far later atmosphere of what follows. One extraordinary variant we must mention. In ix. 22 the Western text (F G d f g *et al.*) omits HNEΓKEN (endured) and inserts EIC (unto) before CKEYH (vessels). Clearly an older form; for it is derivable from our Receptus *neither by accident nor by design*. It leaves $\acute{o} \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ without predicate, and the sentence quite incomplete. Manifestly the verb belonged to an omitted part of the sentence; hence *the clause has been taken from elsewhere* and very awkwardly broken up and fitted in here. Our Receptus tried to improve it by supplying $\eta\gamma\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\nu$ and dropping $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$; an attempt only half successful; for the protasis “But if” ($E\iota \delta\epsilon$) remains without apodosis—an impossible hiatus. Alien matter appears at verse 23, and refuses to weld with the preceding. Our text-framers were perplexed to introduce it, whether by *iva*

or by καὶ ἴνα. Neither was quite satisfactory, hence the authorities are nearly balanced.¹

But who are these "vessels of wrath"? Isaiah (xiii. 5) and Jeremiah (l. 25) answer: they are the *Heathen*, God's "weapons of indignation," specifically here the *Romans*. The σκεῦή ὀργῆς = כְּלֵי מַלְחָמָה precisely, so the LXX. Verse 22 is therefore pure Jewish, an explanation of Divine forbearance towards the oppressors of Israel; verse 23 is Christianisation. The accepted interpretation identifies them with the Jews! As if a Jew who wrote "All Israel shall be saved," could denounce his own people as "vessels of wrath fitted for destruction"! This variant, one of the most illuminative in the New Testament, is entirely overlooked by the commentators!

15. Space contracts, we hurry on. So wide is the discontinuity between xi. and xii. that even Spitta must suppose two Letters here fused into one. Not even the feeblest link unites this parenetic portion with the doctrines already so elaborately set forth. For the writer of these three chapters, all preceding might as well have been unwritten. But even these are far from forming a consistent intelligible whole. Even Spitta finds the supposition of interpolation unavoidable. The xii. is indeed on its face not a piece of composition proper at all, but a mere bundle of edifying phrases without pretence of syntax. Weiss and others admit the writer appears quoting. That it is Paul dictating a Letter to R. seems extremely improbable. The like may be said of xiii. and xiv., for diverse reasons.

III.

1. But not only does this Epistle exhibit on every page the most indubitable marks of redaction. It is a series of inconsequences from beginning to end ("Bei Paulus macht *γάρ* überhaupt Schwierigkeiten"), of which we cannot think any

¹ Our assurance that Scripture has been made from Dogma, not Dogma from Scripture, is now made double sure by the beautiful researches of F. C. Conybeare.

even ordinary intellect capable ; neither understood nor understandable as a single piece of brain-work—witness the fact that 1700 years of incessant study by the most powerful minds have served only to set its incomprehensibility in clearer light—the most recent translators as Sanday and Headlam and Rutherford despair of translating, and substitute paraphrase, which remains as bewildering as before, even after a second paraphrasing. Such a work is impossibly the single effort of any sane intellect. But as a letter from the Apostle to a stranger-throng of new-fledged Christians at Rome or elsewhere, whether speaking Greek or Latin, it seems absurdly impossible in the second degree. If Holsten, Lipsius, Sanday cannot understand it, how could unlettered craftsmen? Would any reasoning being hurl at simple-hearted saints such a bag of theological and metaphysical nuts, which not even the hammer of Thor could crack?

2. But “The Letter was written at some time by some one; why not at this time by the Apostle?” We answer: Our objection lies not specially against Pauline authorship, but against any unital authorship. It is not hard to imagine how *many* may have written thus at *many* times, but only how any *one* could have written thus at any *one* time. The sections are not unintelligible singly, but only in their unnatural connections. *It is precisely this phenomenon that compels the theory of compilation.*

3. It avails not to reply that we have no right to demand that Paul write as we think he should. We prescribe no Pauline style whatever. But Paul was rational, and the Romans were rational; we *must* assume he would write to them as one rational being to another. Exactly because the “Epistle” is not written in any such rational way, we deny that it is a Letter of Paul to Romans.

4. Let no one say that Romans is amazingly profound, and we too shallow to fathom it. Perhaps we are; but surely Hofmann and Pfeiderer, and above all Holsten, have depth and acumen to spare; but the keener their sagacity, the more im-

possible their contradictory constructions. Far more, however, we deny *in toto* this alleged profundity. Where is anything profound in i. or ii. or iii. or iv.? We think we can understand Justification by Faith, and without great effort. We can follow out the oscillations of v. 12–21. Guided by the notion of “Mysteries,” we seem to thread the gloom of vi. Ovid’s *Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor* does not confound us; why then the reiterations of vii.? Dividing we conquer. Moreover, the trouble is not that we do *not* see clearly how one paragraph follows from another; we *do* see with perfect clearness how one does *not* follow from the other, but often contradicts it. Not to grasp quite firmly the subtleties of a master of Groups or Assemblages is one thing; to discern distinctly the paralogisms of a tyro, who would square a circle or trisect an angle, is another.

IV.

Another type of argument. In *Saec. Sil.* we seem to dissipate all ground for supposing any use of Romans until after the Martyr. But, aside from this demonstration, certainly nowhere down to Irenæus is Romans expressly cited, nowhere ascribed to the Apostle. Moreover, even if there be any earlier reminiscences of Romans (which we confidently deny), yet these are in any case, *et Zahnio teste*, extremely faint, and indicate no considerable influence or high repute of the Epistle. Confessedly, sub-apostolic literature down to A.D. 150 might have been written practically precisely as it is had there never been an Epistle to Romans. Now we ask—and we turn upon such as Jülicher and Schmiedel the full edge of this question—how can this be? What explanation of this silence virtually or actually unbroken? In a remarkable passage the illustrious Bishop of Durham has declared that Ignatius and Clement do not refer to the N.T. explicitly, because they wrote only Letters, in which such reference could not be expected. What finer fallacy adorns the pages of Apology? For who does not know these writings are Letters *in name only*, but in manner and

matter intensely argumentative and controversial? Especially the fiery Ignatius is debating in almost every section; here, there, everywhere, urging his dogmas with vehement insistence. And even when the milder Clement is hortatory, he is continually supporting his exhortations with arguments, and underpinning his arguments with Scripture. Moreover, Clement was writing in Rome, where Romans must have been household words, and worn about the neck of memory; and Ignatius was of Antioch, the stage of Paul and the cradle of Paulinism,—his doctrines, too, are largely Pauline. Why, then, does neither Father ever cite the Epistle or refer it to its author? When there was so much need of authority, why does neither appeal to this august one? Why never say, “Thus writes Paul,” and “So it is written in Romans”? Why does neither ever launch the lightning of an Apostolic word, to blast and annihilate the gainsayers? Who will interpret this sound of a voice that is still? How eloquent the vociferation of Irenæus, Tertullian, the Alexandrines, and Cyprian! These stood not nearly so close to Paul as Clement and Ignatius; yet they cite him on nearly every page! Who will explain this contrast?

A great variety of considerations remain untouched. These call for minute treatment, but here the barest hint must suffice. Thus, diversity of authorship seems implied in the diversity of style, without parallel in any single original work; in the use of different versions of the Hebrew; in contrasted attitudes towards those Scriptures, now quoted profusely, now not at all.¹ The influence of Philo and Seneca or their thought-milieu seems probable, if not certain; the prominence of *Adoption* (*υιοθεσια*) seems to smack of Roman leaven; the sharp antithesis of the Just and the Good (v. 7) appears Marcionitic; the inconsistent use of the term Law seems impossible for Paul the Pharisee, as do also the finer qualities of the Greek style. *The utter absence of allusion to*

¹ Practically no use made of Scripture in the great central Gentile (Gnostic?) Fourth, v.-viii., v. 36 being apparently interpolated.

the Man Jesus, concerning whom (on the prevailing assumption of historicity) the Romans must have felt sovran interest, along with constant use of dogmatic phrases as perfectly understood and constant assumption of esoteric doctrines as too familiar for proof or explanation, excludes the whole historic situation as ordinarily imagined. Here, too, must be added a long array of facts already marshalled in the *J.B.L.* (1901, 1902), and yet unbroken; also another series deployed by Loman, van Manen, and their compatriots, touching which we forbear, not wishing to thrust American sickle into European harvest. Of this multitude the individual strength may vary widely, but the collective weight seems irresistible. The indicia point in no instance towards Paul as author, but in every instance directly away; it cannot be that so much heterogeneous circumstantial evidence converges upon a false conclusion.

We sum up the case, then, as follows:—

1. There is no testimony worthy of the name to the Epistolary character or Roman address or Pauline authorship of this Scripture. On analysis, all such testimony passes away in vapour, or over into its opposite.

2. Under the microscope, every trace of apparent unity disappears, the lines of suture show themselves unmistakably, the highly composite and strongly interpolated texture lies everywhere patent.

3. As a gradual concretion of more or less related moral and religious disquisitions, this Scripture is easily and naturally comprehended; as a single output of a sound mind under any supposable conditions, it is for ever incomprehensible—as witness seventeen centuries of impotent exegesis.

4. The silence of a century, virtually if not actually unbroken, the absence of any ascription to Paul and of any formal citation, where citation as authority was so urgently indicated, is for ever irreconcilable with the notion that this century recognised our extant Epistle as of Paul the Apostle.

5. A multifarious throng of ancillary arguments cor-

roborate the foregoing at every point, and collectively exclude every possibility of Pauline authorship.

These minuter though scarcely less significant considerations we have not here developed, but enough perhaps has been advanced to call for refutation. Great indeed and manifold are the virtues of *Totschweigen*, but the present case would seem to lie beyond the utmost stretch of its power. Unless Conservatism shall produce arguments signally stronger than any thus far discovered, we deem that the case must even now be decided against tradition; but if any unbiased intelligence be yet unconvinced, we hold a far more detailed investigation in reserve.

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JEWISH SCHOLARSHIP AND CHRISTIAN SILENCE.

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Is every piece of truth important ?

Does it, for instance, matter very much whether the general and average New Testament conception of the contemporary Jewish or Rabbinic religion is accurate or not ? After all, the "Pharisees" and the "Scribes" and the "Rabbis" died a long while ago, and if their character and religion are misrepresented by Christian scholars, need a modern Jew vex himself upon the subject ? They themselves have long since passed beyond the reach and realm of our praise or of our blame : perhaps they have lived long enough in another world to forgive and to forget. Perhaps, too, commentaries upon the Bible and histories of Judaism and of Christianity are little read in "another place." Why then trouble ? We are told so often that the Law produced a low, unspiritual religion, that the Rabbis taught a bad and chaffering morality, that they knew nothing of communion with God, that God was their Master, but not their Father, that He was distant and unapproachable, that all they cared and hoped for was material reward, that their law was a bondage, that it prompted to sin, that unchastity, neglect of parents and other crimes flourished under their *régime*, that the poor hated them, and that in their scheme of salvation it was only the rich and well-to-do who would inherit the kingdom of heaven (and a gross material

“heaven” to boot),—we have been told these things so often, they are alluded to and assumed so persistently, that the Jewish scholar is inclined to grow weary and silent. The Christian scholar will have it so: all light is on the one side; all the darkness is on the other. Well, let it be.

But, in truth, it is not the mere repetition of these assertions which causes the weariness, but something different, something in other fields of scholarship and learning unusual, perhaps unknown. This unusual something is the absolute neglect of everything which is said upon the other side.

With very few honourable exceptions, the Christian scholar, and more especially the German Protestant scholar, simply ignores what the Jewish scholars have to say. If he would argue the point, if he would discuss, if he would deign to notice us, there would be some pleasure and interest. But what on earth is the good of returning to the charge when no enemy ever appears? Is it possible that what the Jewish scholars say is so silly, so contemptibly prejudiced, so utterly erroneous, that it is really too much to expect that any Christian scholar can notice it? But, after all, are we necessarily so *much* more prejudiced on our side than the Christian scholars are on theirs? If we write on the New Testament or speak about Jesus and Paul, do we ignore the great Christian divines? And yet the Rabbinic literature is far bigger than the New Testament, far more difficult, far less accessible. Except Dalman, where is the great Christian scholar who is completely at home in it? Who writes a page on the subject without reference to the inevitable Weber?

The policy of silence would be less conspicuous and less significant if, for any reason, Christian scholars never noticed what Jewish scholars had to say about any matter whatever. But this is far from being the case. On any other subject than Rabbinic religion and theology, the Jewish scholars are at once sure of a respectful and intelligent attention. If they write about archæology or geography, or about texts and manuscripts, if they discover the Hebrew original of Sirach,

they have and can ensure almost as wide an audience and as liberal an *entrée* as the best and most distinguished Christian theologians. But theology is taboo. Nothing escapes the marvellous industry of a German scholar like Schürer. If a Jewish writer makes some foolish suggestion as to the size and population of a Palestinian city in the Maccabean era, Schürer will, at all events, do that writer the honour of alluding in a footnote to his suggestion as "*völlig unannehmbar*" or "*haltungslos*." But let the greatest Rabbinic scholar of the age write a series of epoch-making studies on Rabbinic theology, and Schürer will not even deign to mention or contradict them.

The fault (if it be a fault, for perhaps there is an adequate explanation unknown to the present writer) is partly due to the Jewish scholars themselves. They have done far too little to make their historic theology known. If Weber is a bad book, they have produced no better. It is Wuensche the Christian who has translated the Midrash, and not the Jews. Their apologetics have been for the most part feeble, and not always free from disingenuousness. They have attempted too much, and have therefore not achieved the possible. They have failed to realise that half is more than the whole where the half is true and the whole is false. They have not lived enough in Christian society, been sufficiently in touch with Christian life, or adequately versed in Christian literature, to know what was the sort of thing which wanted saying, or the kind of defence which was required. And yet, perhaps, whatever they had said or done would have made no difference. For, in the last ten years, specially good and true things have been said, excellent essays on Rabbinic theology have been written, direct replies to the customary attacks have been put forward, and nevertheless, for all their influence upon the Christian theologians, they might *almost* as well have been left unprinted.¹

Is it, then, worth while to continue so strange a debate,

¹ *Almost* but not *quite*. The honourable exceptions prove the rule.

where the one side never listens to what the other side has to say? One of the greatest Rabbinical scholars of the world is Dr Schechter. He has published in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* a series of articles on Rabbinic theology of extraordinary interest and value.¹ If Schechter is right, the ordinary commonplaces of Christian theologians about Rabbinic Judaism are wrong. But none of these theologians have noticed the articles. It is true that the *Jewish Quarterly* has a very limited circulation, but if Schechter writes in it about a fragment of Sirach, all the great Christian scholars notice it at once. And yet when one of the greatest Rabbinic theologians of the world writes an important series of articles on his own subject,—a subject about which the Christian theologians are confessedly unable to speak at first hand,—obstinate silence is preserved. In spite of all Schechter has to say, the Rabbinic God is still “remote,” the Rabbis do not know what spiritual prayer means, the law is a burden, Rabbinic holiness is “outward” and hypocritical, the only religious motive is the “lust” for reward, and all the rest of the familiar jargon.

Indeed, as regards many German Protestant theologians, the curious thing is that the vehemence of their denunciations of Rabbinism and the Rabbis seems to cover their apparent lack of belief in the dogmas of orthodox and trinitarian Christianity. Delitzsch spoke and Dalman speaks of the Rabbinic religion in very different tones from Holtzmann and Harnack and Schürer. If these last-named scholars fight shy of the miraculous, they are at all events sound as regards Judaism. St Paul might hardly accept their Christology, but he would acquit them from any trace of “Judaising.” So while the situation is of that sort, is it worth while to bother further? Let us go our ways.

But then one reflects that, somehow or other, truth is always worth while. If the Christian theologians are right, then the Jewish scholars must learn the truth from them. And *vice versa*.

¹ *J.Q.R.*, April 1894, July 1894, January 1895, October 1895, April 1896, October 1897, April 1900.

All historic truth is valuable. We cannot be indifferent to any piece of it, however small and insignificant. Far less important matters than Rabbinic theology are worried about persistently. Moreover, there are special reasons why this particular matter cannot be allowed to rest; why Jewish writers *must* continue to press for discussion and for a fair consideration of what they have to say.

After all, Rabbinic theology has *some* relation to the early history of Christianity, and it does make *some* difference whether the Rabbinic religion was good or bad. Is that the real reason why the Christian scholars refuse to listen even when so unique a scholar as Schechter addresses them? If certain views about Sophocles were a necessary prop to their conceptions of the rise of Christianity and the life of Christ, would they even refuse to listen to Jebb, if Jebb disagreed with them? But as Jebb is to Sophocles, so is Schechter to Rabbinic theology.

The greater the darkness, the greater the light. The more lonely Jesus was in his goodness and purity, the more unique that purity and goodness will be. And so with Paul. As against his Jewish adversaries, he *must* always be in the right! The Protestant theologians of Germany are thoroughgoing antagonists of the Law. A legal religion is not *less good* than their own, but it is downright bad. In fact, whereas in every other chapter of history and religion the truth about opposing parties and warring conceptions can only be learnt by "placing oneself above them," and by admitting *a priori* that there is probably much to be said on both sides, in this particular chapter all the good and the truth lie on the one side, all the falsehood and the evil on the other! And if this be so, how great is that evil, how great is that good. It is all so simple, but is it all so true?

The German Protestant theologians occupy a peculiar position. To them by no means every statement contained in the New Testament is accurate, but at least every statement against the "Pharisees" and the Rabbinic religion is accurate.

The inaccurate parts are somehow or other the parts they object to or dislike. This may be a mere coincidence, and there is a great deal to be said for the arguments they use,—even a layman can appreciate their cogency and power,—but if it *is* a mere coincidence, it is at least a lucky one. For instance, the miraculous elements of the Gospels are not to the taste of the critical theologians. They are very glad and ready to diminish these as much as possible. No saying of Jesus delights them more than Matthew xii. 39. Thus the Master is himself upon their side, and thinks little of marvels and miracles: the Rabbis and the Jews “lust” for signs: they have no understanding for anything better, purer and more spiritual! The theologians also dislike a too detailed eschatology: apocalyptic predictions are not sympathetic to them. They are “Judaic”; remnants or incursions of Judaism; old tags or accretions easily discernible, readily dropped. In the Epistles of St Paul the odd result is attained that those “Judaic” elements of his teaching which are most opposed to Judaism and to Jewish theology, are frequently labelled as Jewish and Rabbinic.

This, again, is convenient. All that is best, and that you like best, is new and Christian; all you dislike is Jewish. And it is easy to see that great confusion would be caused in current opinions if the commonplaces of the theologians were wrong. For suppose, after all, that the Law was *not* a burden, that the Sabbath was a day of delight, that ceremonies and spirituality, letter and spirit, could, did and do go together, how very awkward the result might be. *Then*, though Christianity might be a far greater religion than Judaism, there would be *two* good religions instead of one, *two* ways of approaching and *finding* God instead of one. Then though Paul’s doctrine might be great and noble, it would not be the *only* way of salvation: *then* one could be spiritual and commune with God through the Law *as well as* through the Gospel, *then* true prayer, self-sacrifice and disinterested religion might be the possession of Judaism as well as of Christianity, of living ortho-

dox Jews *as well as* of living orthodox Christians. And surely this would never do. Schechter's articles are highly dangerous : leave them alone !

But there is another reason why Jewish writers are bound to call attention to this matter. If every single Jew had been killed in (say) the year 200 A.D., or had been converted to Christianity, the religion of the Rabbis in the first century of the Christian era would be as purely antiquarian and historic a question as, for example, the character of the Greek Sophists. But, for good or for evil, all Jews were not killed in 200 A.D., nor were they converted to Christianity. Judaism still exists, and there are some ten millions of living Jews. When, then, we hear of Jewish narrowness, *Blödsinn*, externalism, hypocrisy, and so on, we have a right to ask what does the adjective "Jewish" mean ? Does it merely apply to the contemporaries of Christ and Paul, or were the Jews of every century after Christ no better as regards religion than their ancestors ? Is legal and orthodox Judaism still narrow, mechanical, unspiritual, outward, and all the rest of it, or not ? Now this question is closely connected with the special subject in hand, and for the following reason.

A tendency may be noticed among some Christian scholars to rely on the apocalyptic literature in their delineations of Jewish theology of the time of Christ. There are three reasons why they do so. The first is that this apocalyptic literature is (they tell us) older than the Talmuds and the Midrashim. The second is that it is not written in difficult and unfamiliar Hebrew and Aramaic, and so they can read it by themselves. We all admit that it is far more *pleasant* to use your authorities at first hand. The third reason is that, on the whole, the apocalyptic literature seems to fit in better with the prepared and preconceived sketch of Rabbinic theology. Now of these apocalypses Schechter has said : "While these writings left a lasting impress on Christianity, they contributed very little towards the formation of Jewish thought. The Rabbis were either wholly ignorant of their very existence, or stig-

matised them as silly, fabulous, or esoteric (a milder expression for heretical), and thus allowed them no permanent influence upon Judaism." That Schechter's opinion is ignored is a matter of course. But the point I want to make now is, that even if the whole Rabbinic literature is far later than the Christian era, it is nevertheless a literature which is entirely dominated by the Law. If anything, the Rabbinical religion ought to have got worse instead of better, because as years went on the opposition to Christianity deepened, and the era of the un-Jewish Psalms and the still more un-Jewish prophets became more and more remote. Surely, then, Jewish literature from A.D. 1 to at least 1000 can be used for the purpose of showing what Rabbinic religion or what life under the Law really were. If they were no better in 1000 than in 1, how can the martyrs, the heroism and the fidelity of centuries be explained? If they *were* better, to what other influence than the Law and the Rabbinic religion is this improvement to be assigned? For better or for worse, the literature of 600 is as trustworthy and as apposite as the literature of 60. I have put forward this argument on several occasions, but, needless to say, nobody has ever deigned to give it the smallest heed.

Let me now take two definite instances of a curious neglect of Jewish learning by Christian theologians. To both of them Mr I. Abrahams has called attention in a remarkable article published in the *Jewish Quarterly* under the title of "Professor Schürer on Life under the Jewish Law." If Abrahams writes an article about the Third Book of the Maccabees, it does not escape the notice of Christian scholars, but when he writes about the Law—a far more important and interesting subject—and directly impugns the accuracy of a great historian upon a crucial point, neither that historian nor any of his compatriots thinks it necessary to make the smallest rejoinder. This silence is magnificent, but is it the right way in which the warfare of science should be waged?

The first of my two definite points is connected with Mark

vii. 11 (Matthew xv. 5). My Hibbert Lectures were published in 1893. As an appendix to these lectures, Schechter wrote a short essay of six pages on "Legal Evasions of the Law." He there sought to show that Mishnah Nedarim ix. 1 "has no relevance whatever to Matthew xv. 5 and Mark vii. 11." Holtzmann in his new edition of the Synoptic Gospels (1901), Menzies in his edition of Mark (1901), the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, *sub voce* Corban—none of them make any reference to this highly important essay. Holtzmann still speaks of the *heillose Theorie*, and still bases the truth of Mark vii. 11 upon Nedarim ix. 1 and v. 9. The *Encyclopædia Biblica* (1899) still says that "Jesus denounced a system which allowed a son, by pronouncing the word 'corban' (and thus vowing a thing to God), to relieve himself of the duty of helping a parent." *A priori*, it would have been an extraordinary thing if this "system" had ever existed. From Talmudic times onwards the loving and intimate relations between parents and child in Jewish homes (legal homes, *bien entendu*) have been exemplary and notorious. Of course it is awkward if Schechter be right. For, in that case, whoever put Mark vii. 11 into the mouth of Jesus made him guilty of a grave error and a groundless charge. But should not the opinion of so pre-eminent a Talmudic scholar as Schechter be at least entitled to attention? Should not the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, at any rate, notice his article among the literature of the subject? It often refers to less important essays by smaller men.

My second example is also connected with a verse in Mark (vii. 4), but it has a far wider bearing. In no other respect is the Law supposed to be a greater burden than in regard to the laws of ritual purity. What Christian scholar does not remember to point out that rabbinical casuistry is here at its worst and deadliest? "The heavy burdens," says Menzies, "imposed on the people in this attempt were what drove publicans and sinners to despair." It is indeed useless to multiply quotations. Any commentary on the Gospels, including Holtzmann's of 1901, could furnish them.

Now, with the help of Schechter, I pointed out in my Hibbert Lectures (1893) that ritual cleanness means "being in a condition to visit the temple, or, at a higher stage, to perform some ceremonial or sacrificial act," that "a layman might contract uncleanness without scruple," and that "the only obligation binding upon all was to be ritually clean before entering the temple." I gave chapter and verse from Talmud, Sifra and Maimonides' codification of the Rabbinical laws, to show "that it is permitted to everyone to touch an unclean thing and thereby to become unclean." I quoted Schürer, who says: "Far deeper was the influence upon daily life of the manifold and far-reaching ordinances concerning cleanness and uncleanness, and the removal of the latter, than that of the law of the Sabbath." I declared, on the contrary, that these ordinances did not apply to the daily life of the ordinary layman at all. The ordinary layman might touch a corpse or a dead mouse. He could rub shoulders with the Gentile. The whole "burden," so eloquently denounced, and for the neglect of which the poor sinners and publicans are so much pitied and applauded, is an absolute myth. It was only obligatory upon priests during their time of service, or upon laymen during the rare and brief occasions when they visited the temple. The country yokel or citizen had no more to bother his head about these laws than Prof. Schürer himself. That is what I, on the authority of Schechter and Maimonides and the Talmud, said in 1893. In the third edition of his great work Schürer does not even think the statements of Maimonides and the Talmud worthy of a word of refutation. He simply repeats his former assertions. Is it conceivable that in any other branch of human knowledge a writer, however great his position and deserts, would venture to pass over so direct a challenge of his accuracy and scholarship? But any stick is good enough for the Rabbis and the Law.

Similar examples could be adduced with regard to other fundamental questions of Rabbinical theology. Thus we are still frequently told that the Sabbath was a "burden," and Prof. Driver has few rivals when, in Hastings' *Dictionary of*

the Bible, he says: "It is only right to observe that, in spite of the rules and restrictions created by the Rabbis, the Sabbath does not seem to have been felt practically to be a day of burden and gloom to those living under them." He then quotes from a remarkable essay of Schechter's, totally ignored by most Christian theologians, called "The Law and Recent Criticism" (*J.Q.R.*, iii., July 1891, pp. 754-766). Prof. Driver is feeling his way, and he is notoriously cautious. But the question must be put to him and to others: If the Sabbath "did not seem to be felt to be" a burden by the very people who have observed it generation after generation, what becomes of the whole "burden" theory? For if there is any part of the Law which, on the one hand, was minutely and casuistically worked out, and, on the other hand, closely affected the life of the people, it is the Sabbath. Yet Cone, in his useful book, *Rich and Poor in the New Testament* (1902), ventures to repeat the amazing statement of Brandt that the "man of slender means, the mechanic, the day labourer, especially the peasant (!) who should venture to make the attempt, must very soon find that such requirements as those concerning the Sabbath and purification bade defiance to the best will." I have dealt with the purification fallacy already. As to the Sabbath, if ever there was a poor man's festival, shedding light and dignity upon sordid and poverty-stricken lives, it was the Sabbath of the *Rabbinical religion*.

So one might proceed. Schechter has shown that the God of the Rabbis was not "remote," that their righteousness was not "hollow," that they knew the highest meaning of prayer, of holiness, of disinterested love of God. These things he, the foremost Rabbinic scholar of his age, has to my thinking shown. But even if he has not shown them, he has produced material so new and large, so interesting, so counter to current conceptions and popular verdicts, that it surely demands consideration. Let it be refuted, if possible, by all means, but do not let it be ignored. I can hardly think that a policy of silence argues for a very excellent case.

The writer of this article is no thick and thin supporter of the Rabbinical Law and of the Rabbinical religion. He does not personally live under that Law or believe in all the dogmas of that religion. He recognises evils and dangers in the Law; he recognises grave lacunæ and inadequacies in the Rabbinical religion. But this does not prevent his desire that justice should be done. He is a passionate believer in the doctrine that there are many pathways which lead to God. One of these pathways is "legal," one is "Pauline"; both are holy, and produce holy men. He wishes that he loved God one quarter so purely and fervently as many a Rabbinic Jew who will not wear a handkerchief in his pocket upon the Sabbath. It does not affect his own personal religion whether Jesus was more or less "unique," or more or less "original," whether the mass of his contemporaries were bad men or good. If Jesus was the only great and good Jew of his day, by all means let it be so. The good elements of his *doctrine* were the legitimate development of Amos, Hosea and Isaiah. If these men taught Judaism, then Jesus taught it too. The writer would only urge that historic truth should not be allowed to suffer by a refusal to hear what the great Rabbinic scholars have to tell. Are there no independent Christian theologians among the younger generation who will be ready to "follow the argument" whithersoever the argument and the facts may lead?

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DISCUSSIONS¹

PROFESSOR GARDNER ON "THE BASIS OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1902, p. 5.)

"A PERMANENT basis for doctrine," says Dr Gardner, "can only be found in historic facts, the evidence for which is beyond question, the realities of the permanent life of the spirit." Quite naturally, therefore, the general tendency of his work is "to transfer the burden of support of Christian doctrine from history to psychology" (*Exploratio Evangelica*, vii.). But what are the realities which Dr Gardner thus makes fundamental?

"The great and essential doctrines," he tells us, "which lie at the roots of all soteriologic doctrines are three: First, that man has a natural sense of sin Second, that the load of sin can only be removed by a change of heart Third, that no man by his own strivings can bring about this change, but that it is wrought in him, not in defiance of his own will, but by a kind of absorption of it by a higher Power."

The question immediately arises, Is this absorption by a higher Power purely and simply a given fact of experience, or is it the interpretation of a fact? If the latter, Dr Gardner has at the foundation of his thought, not a psychological *fact*, but an *inference*. Whether inference or not, this reference to a higher Power is of essential importance, because it is only because of that reference that the experience to which Dr Gardner appeals can be regarded as religious. Religion, however we define it, or whatever its origin, is a doctrine not only of life, but of the world, for its distinctive work is to connect "the realities of the permanent life of the spirit" with those other realities that environ that life, and condition it, and in the midst of which that life has to be lived. Like philosophy, religion aims at unification of thought, and its distinctive problem is to synthesise those contrasted bodies of thought which Professor Sidgwick has distinguished as theoretical and practical philosophy. It has to give or inspire such a view of the natural order that we can embrace that order and the ideal order of human thought and aspiration in one connected doctrine of Reality. Therefore, Religion is primarily, although not exclusively, a doctrine of Nature. No doctrine can properly be called religious that does not implicitly or explicitly tell us something of essential

¹ The contributions under this heading refer exclusively to matters previously treated in the *Hibbert Journal*.—ED.

significance about the ultimate constitution of things, and the relation in which that stands to "the realities of the permanent life of the spirit." Therefore, Dr Gardner's reference to a higher Power is essential. Now, how is that higher Power known to us?—as an immediate datum of experience, or by inference? It seems fair to use *Exploratio Evangelica* as a commentary upon Dr Gardner's latest paper. In that earlier work we find him writing as follows:—

"In the inner world there is also a fundamental contrast, that between the soul and God, between our will and a higher will, between what is and what ought to be. In consciousness we learn to recognise the presence of a Power as much greater than our soul as the forces of the material world are greater than the forces of our bodies. This Power has been spoken of in many ways. In a loyal adhesion to this Power the spiritual life consists. It is the study of our relations with this Power which makes up our religious knowledge" (p. 12).

Now, from this view I entirely dissent. Whatever be the precise content in any given case of the "religious" consciousness, it is probably safe to say that it never includes an immediate knowledge of seemingly independent fact, such as at first appears to the plain man to be given in daily experience through sense-perception. God is probably never, in the strict sense, *known* as a present reality, even if we take Faith's own account of its inner experience. In that experience there may, conceivably, be much to induce belief in God, but probably there is never any immediate presentation of Him to knowledge as a given fact.¹

The higher Power which Dr Gardner finds in religious experience is found there by him only, because he first of all puts it there by an act of interpretation, and this interpretation is either a venture of Faith, which itself needs confirmation, or is the result of lessons learned from "historical" as distinguished from "psychological" religion.

Is, then, the translation from history to psychology, of which Dr Gardner speaks, valueless? By no means, if we re-interpret it. In so far as that transition is an actual process, it means, I imagine, this—nothing more than this, but certainly this—that religion is conceived to be, not a body of belief and observance arbitrarily imposed upon man from without, but something essentially relevant to the facts of human nature and the needs of human life, and that we rightfully judge of any given religion by the degree in which it is thus helpfully relevant. As thus re-interpreted, the transition from history to psychology—which I would prefer to call the transition to humanism—is of course of vital significance, but certainly it does not bring with it the duty of basing our religious doctrine upon psychology. Indeed, in so far as doctrine is distinctively religious, it cannot be thus based, for religion has primary reference to the order of the world, and the "realities of the permanent life of the spirit" are simply facts of inner experience, and, as such, are immediately declaratory of nothing beyond themselves. Granting, however—as, of course, we must—that an

¹ Cf. the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1901-2, p. 84.

appeal must necessarily be made to those realities, it is to be noted that Dr Gardner's account of them is altogether inadequate. The sense of sin is but one of the results of man's reflection in the presence of his ideals. The ultimate question which then arises—a question also suggested by the sense of sin itself—is, how far are those ideals valid? ¹ Obedient to the promptings of his nature, and reaching out after ideals which, as potentialities, are dynamically immanent in his nature, man essays the achievement of truth, of beauty, of goodness. He never wholly succeeds, and the sense of sin is but one token of his failure. His ultimate need is for an assurance that his ideals do not mislead him—most of all for an assurance that the moral ideal which he recognises as sovereign over his life is veritably a practicable ideal, one that can be hopefully striven after, one to which the order of Nature is not invincibly hostile. Now, this assurance it is the characteristic function of Religion to give, and it is one that can come to man only from without—by some declaration to his understanding, his knowledge or his faith from the Reality which encompasses him behind and before, and in the midst of which he has to live out his life. This declaration, whatever form it take, must of necessity be an event or process in history. Christian thought finds such a declaration in the Incarnate Life, and in the sacred ministry of Divine helpfulness that has proceeded from that Life, and from the death in which it culminated, and it is upon these events in the world's outward history that Christianity is necessarily based.

It is, of course, true that events in history can be thus significant, not primarily and directly as mere events that observation can adequately chronicle, but only as *interpreted*. This may seem to throw us back upon inference—upon those very powers and ideals we seek to verify. The position, however, is not a hopeless one, although to deal with it at all adequately would carry us far beyond the scope of the present note, which is written simply as a comment upon Dr Gardner's paper. This, however, may be said at once—that whatever the difficulty of giving a philosophical vindication of religious belief, it remains true that religion is essentially a doctrine of the world, and that its basis must be sought, not in the secret places of man's inner life, but in outward facts ancillary to that life. In other words, the ultimate basis of religion cannot be psychological.

ARTHUR BOUTWOOD.

LONDON.

DR GARDNER, in his article on "The Basis of Christian Doctrine," in the October number of the *Hibbert Journal*, says, "Doctrine" cannot be reached through history and is no corollary from any observed facts; and he closes his article without entering upon the doctrine of Christology.

Dr Gardner says that when it is assumed and believed to be a fact

¹ That is, "objectively valid," as a faulty convenience of speech permits us to say.

that Jesus Christ died on the cross, yet this fact of itself alone involves no doctrine!

On the contrary, I contend that the very assumption and belief that the crucified Jesus was the Christ was of itself alone so stupendous a doctrine that when believed to be true it would thoroughly revolutionise every doctrine of God (or Theology) and every doctrine of man (or Soteriology). And this is the teaching of St Paul when he tells us he was determined to know nought save Jesus Christ and Him crucified.

Belief in the crucified Jesus being the Christ was the germ of true Christian doctrine (or Christology); just as Galileo's discovery that the earth was a sphere worked a revolution in science; and as the discovery of steam-power worked a revolution in carriages; and the discovery of gas and electricity worked a revolution in the illumination of our houses and streets.

According to the teaching of St Paul, a belief in the crucified Jesus being the Christ was also the foundation of what a man's conduct should be; because with the awakening of his conscience to the fact that man, though guilty of shedding Christ's blood, was nevertheless mercifully passed over and spared to find a place of repentance (so that he might commence life afresh as a man new-born or raised from the dead, to live henceforth for Christ), such knowledge ought to influence his every word, thought and deed in his conduct towards his neighbour. But how and why St Paul's conscience was thus quickened to see the true lesson from the story of Jesus Christ and Him crucified, when the others were blind to it, is too great a question to be discussed in this short notice. St Peter and the disciples of the primitive Church in Jerusalem were keenly alive to their brothers' sin, but blind to their own. And how the conscience that is dead is to be awakened was and continues to be the vital question.

Dr Gardner says that the views of God in our day are far more lofty and severe than any views that were possible to the early Christians. But surely this statement is an absolute rejection of all belief in the crucified Jesus being the Christ. Such a statement would be impossible if to know and love Christ were believed to be to know and love God.

T. G. HEADLEY.

PETERSHAM, S.W.

[Mr Headley's objection is based on a slight inaccuracy of expression on my part. That Jesus died on the cross is no matter of doctrine: that Jesus was the Christ is of course a doctrine.—P. G., Oxford.]

PROFESSOR ROYCE ON "THE CONCEPT OF THE INFINITE."

(Hibbert Journal, October 1902, p. 21.)

PART of the conception of what Professor Royce calls a self-representative system was suggested to me in early childhood by a picture hanging on the wall of the nursery, which represented a domestic scene in a room in which there were pictures on the wall; for it occurred to me to consider what would happen if one of those pictures hanging on the wall of the pictured room had itself been the picture I was looking at. Later, I saw what might have been an attempt at such a self-representation on a furniture-moving van, the whole side of which contained a vigorous representation of itself, horses and all.

Any such representation must theoretically have an infinite or singular point in it. To execute such a picture is therefore impossible, but it could be approached, to any desired degree of complexity, by taking successive photographs of an object, each photograph being placed upon the object before the next was taken.

Later again, I came across a somewhat similar phenomenon when investigating problems connected with the flow of electricity in a plane;¹ where the method of images was generally helpful, but where in a certain set of cases the problem became intractable by reason of some of the images becoming "real," *i.e.* encroaching on the space which was given actually free from them, and so refusing to behave properly: a method of indicating a definite, and with a little thought intelligible, negative fact.

Mere infinitude of images gave no trouble. Indeed, a candle between two accurately parallel looking-glasses facing each other has an infinite series of images arranged in regular order in a straight line.

Instead of only two mirrors facing each other, arrange a simple triangle of mirrors with faces turned inward, as in a kaleidoscope, but with three mirrors instead of the usual two; or arrange four, as the four faces of a square, with a luminous point inside the square;—the number of images is now doubly infinite, being dotted in regular order all over a plane instead of being limited to a line. There are now an infinite number of lines, each containing an infinite number of images. Complete a cubical or a prismatic box, by adding two more mirrors as roof and floor, and the images are triply infinite in number, being dotted all over space. There are now an infinite number of planes, each containing an infinite number of lines, each with an infinite number of images. These various orders of infinity are extremely familiar to mathematicians, and constitute no difficulty. Nor does the fact that there are an infinite number of square inches in a plane, and an infinite number of points in a square inch, create any perplexity.

Every imaginable order of infinity can be dealt with, and it is sober

¹ *Philosophical Magazine*, May 1876, p. 377.

common-sense to say that the universe (the universe of our conceptions at any rate) is infinite in an infinite number of ways.

But reading Professor Royce's article, and his treatment of simple numerical series, I feel doubtful if much is gained by the considerations he there brings forward. Some of your readers will excuse a reminder that it would be a great mistake to suppose that all infinities are equal. Not even all zeros are equal, and the beginner who is willing to reason as if $0=0$ always, can be led to prove *with that datum* that $2=1$.

To anyone unfamiliar with the method of limits, the statement that 0 does not always equal 0 may sound puzzling, but the statement that infinity need not equal infinity is surely not puzzling at all. Let i stand for infinity for a moment; then $i+6$ is as regards difference a certain amount greater than i , though as regards ratio they are the same. $2i$ is greater than i even as regards ratio, being in fact twice as great whatever i may be; while as regards differences, which are seldom important, it is infinitely greater; yet it is an infinity of the same *order* as i itself is. i^2 however is infinitely greater than i , since it means $i \times i$, an infinite number of infinities—corresponding to the dots on a plane, for instance, while i are the dots on any line in that plane. i^2 is therefore a different *order* of infinity—not simply bigger, but infinitely bigger. i^3 is of a still higher order, and so on without end. Without end in a superlative degree! for even i^4 , which is an infinite *order* of infinity, does not exhaust our conception or notation, for $2i^4$ is bigger. i^{2^4} is infinitely bigger, and i^{i^4} is out of all whooping.

As to \sqrt{i} and $\log i$, they are infinite, but infinite of an order lower even than i . i° and 1^i need not even be infinite.

This simple treatment is based on the method of limits, and is suited to flowing or continuous quantities; but for dealing with *numbers*, which are essentially discontinuous, some modern pure mathematicians, led by Cantor, have devised somewhat complicated methods which aim at being fundamental from that point of view, and at avoiding the inconsistencies inherent in a method of limits when applied to the development of a theory of pure number.

Return, then, to the consideration of the simple numerical series which Professor Royce brings forward: for instance, the series of natural numbers and the series of even numbers— $1+2+3+4+\text{etc.}$, and $2+4+6+8+\text{etc.}$; both series are infinite, both indefinite, both “divergent,” and it is meaningless to ask if they are equal or not unless some further specification is supplied. We may specify that both shall contain the same number of terms: in that case the second series is precisely twice the first, no matter whether the number of terms is infinite or not. Or we might specify that they shall both be carried to the same numerical value, in which case the number of terms in the second series will be half the number of terms in the first—no matter though both are infinite.

If we speak of one series as *representing* the other, as a map represents a country, or on a system of “point-point correspondence,” the number

of terms must be the same in both; the second series is then double the first, and its terms beyond a certain value do not exist in the first series. Do not exist in it although it is infinite. It is not infinite compared with the second series, it is comparable with it and smaller than it. The first half of the second series is to be found in the first series, but the second half goes beyond it just as far again. We can make the second representative of the first, or we can make the second a part of the first, as we please, but we cannot do both. If we try to do both we lose the definite treatment, and become vague and confused. The whole is infinite, and a part is infinite, but the part is not equal to the whole.

The axiom which has failed is not the axiom about a part and the whole, but another, viz., that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Six times 0 is 0, and three times 0 is 0, but six times 0 and three times 0 are not therefore necessarily equal. $\log i$ is infinity, and i^2 is infinity, but $\log i$ is not equal to i^2 . The two series above considered are both infinite, but they are not equal.

One series can *represent* another series on a smaller or bigger scale, but if smaller or bigger it cannot likewise be equal to it; not even though both are infinite. The points on a map represent the points in a country, and each set of points is infinite in number, but the map is not equal to the country.

This is not the kind of equality which the modern pure mathematician above spoken of has in his mind. It is a theory of pure number which he has developed, and he has shown how to deal with infinite aggregates, and has given a criterion for their infinitude without any actual counting. Two systems with a one-to-one correspondence between the terms of each may be said to be equal or equivalent to each other in a certain sense, viz., the sense that the number of terms are equal; but the corresponding terms themselves need by no means be equal; and accordingly it is a juggling with words to assert that the two series are equal without qualification, and in such a sense that it can be subsequently possible to maintain, on the strength of that admission, that the whole is equal to its part.

A musket to a man is a perfectly definite statement whether for a finite or for an indefinite or for an infinite army, and the muskets can therefore in a sense be said to be equal, *i.e.* equal in number, to the men who are to use them, and may be therefore said to *represent* the army; but he who should say that they—the muskets alone—are equal or equivalent to the army, and that the triggers are equal to the muskets, in anything except in bare number, or who should seek to draw a Philosophical moral from this kind of equality or equivalence or correspondence between the whole and its part, would seem to be on treacherous ground.

It will be observed that I am not venturing to criticise the particular form of idealism favoured by Professor Royce, nor any part of his philosophy, but only some of his illustrations and some of his theses. He will pardon my explaining to some of your readers that a thing can easily

be infinitely subdivisible without being infinite in extent. It was this juggling with two senses of the word "infinite" that constituted the somewhat childish puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise. It now appears that a similar juggle is possible with the word "equals."

Prof. Royce states on page 33 that "An object or a system is infinite if it can be rightly regarded as capable of being precisely represented in complexity of structure, or in number of constituents, by one of its own parts." But the word infinite has here only a technical meaning: it does not mean that such a system must be infinite in extent; for this can be negated by the following example:—

Consider a pair of series which satisfy the criterion:—

viz. the series $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} + \frac{1}{16}$, etc.

and the series $1 + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{64}$, etc.

both continued without limit, *i.e.* to an infinite number of terms. There is in each series, as Prof. Royce would say, a first term, a second term, etc., and no last term; the one *represents* the other on a certain system, and the one is also, in Prof. Royce's sense, *part* of the other; there is no last term in either, one is as infinitely complex as the other, and one is representative of the other. Both, therefore, ought to be infinite, in accordance with his argument; yet the value of the first series is 2, and of the second series $1\frac{1}{3}$, and neither makes the smallest pretence of being infinite.

All that is needed is that each series is an infinite collocation; the terms must be infinitely numerous, but they themselves may be infinitesimal or non-existent. The modern mathematician of the school of Cantor would care nothing for what the sum or value of such a series may happen to be; what he is concerned with are the numerators, not the denominators; he attends to the enumeration, not to the nature of the things enumerated. So long as the things are infinitely numerous, his criterion is satisfied.

But surely no real enhanced value, philosophical or other, attaches to a thing by reason of its being infinitely enumerable or infinitely divisible. Any *continuum* satisfies that condition, if capable of enumeration at all, which may be doubtful. And any part of a *continuum* can be magnified without limit till it is as extensive and as structureless as the whole.

OLIVER LODGE.

MR CONYBEARE'S TEXTUAL THEORIES.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1902, p. 96.)

IN an article entitled "Early Doctrinal Modifications," published in the *Hibbert Journal*, Mr Conybeare has delivered an assault upon the trustworthiness of the received text of the gospels that calls for criticism and discussion of his theory. The purpose of this article is to show that this theory is unfounded, and that his results do not affect the results of textual

criticism, in the ordinary sense of the word ; I mean in this case, the science by which we arrive at the original text of the canonical gospels. I would show also that Mr Conybeare has failed to interpret rightly an important discovery that he has made.

Mr Conybeare discusses at length three texts from the Gospel of St Matthew. I propose to deal with these in the order in which he takes them.

ST MATT. i. 16.

The original form of this text is, says Mr Conybeare, to be found in the dialogue of "Timothy and Aquila." It runs as follows :—

Ἰακώβ ἐγέννησεν τὸν Ἰωσήφ, τὸν ἄνδρα μαρίας ἐξ ἧς ἐγεννήθη ἰς ὁ λεγόμενος χς· καὶ Ἰωσήφ ἐγεννησεν τὸν ἰν τὸν λεγόμενον χν.

(1) Surely if ever a conflated reading existed we have one here. It is simply and absurdly tautologous. Even if we did not know anything of the context in which it occurs (or is supposed by Mr Conybeare to occur), we should at once say that it is derived from two separate readings, giving in different words the same sense ; one reading that which we find in our *Textus Receptus*, the other, "Joseph begat Jesus who was called Christ."¹ I venture to say that the sentence is so awkward and redundant in expression that it is impossible that the original text of even "Timothy and Aquila" contained it in the form Mr Conybeare gives it. I shall deal with this point in a note below ; at present let us close with Mr Conybeare on his own ground.

(2) If, on the other hand, we do take the context of the gospel into consideration, is it not impossible to imagine for a moment that the compiler of the canonical gospel, who has given us the account of the virgin birth, would have allowed the statement "Joseph begat Jesus who is called Christ" to have passed into his text? This statement, and the story of St Matthew i. 18 ff. immediately succeeding it, agree together, Germans would say, "wie die Faust auf's Auge."

Yet we cannot fail to see that, as Mr Conybeare asserts, the words "Joseph begat Jesus" must have formed the concluding clause of the original genealogy. The text of Syrus Sinaiticus alone seems to postulate such a clause ; and is it possible to believe that anyone would have taken the trouble to construct this long line of natural descent if at the last step natural descent were intended to play no part? This inconsistency is best seen in the genealogy given in St Luke, where, as Holtzman² justly remarks, it is absurd to imagine that an evangelist would take the trouble to construct the long genealogy of our Lord through Joseph, and then, as it were, spoil all that he had done by adding that Jesus was only "accounted" or supposed to be the son of Joseph. The construction of such genealogies clearly presupposes natural descent throughout. It is evident that both in St Matthew and St Luke correction has taken place

¹ Cf. Schmiedel, art. "Mary" in *Encyclopædia Biblica*.

² *Hand-kommentar zum N.T.*

(in the case of St Luke very clumsy correction), so as to render these genealogies consistent with the idea of the Virgin Birth.

The question only is—What was the original form of the correction in St Matthew? The original text, I mean, of St Matt. i. 16? Can we, from the context of the gospel, derive any information on this point? We can, I think. For if we examine the story of the birth which is described in St Matt. i. 18 ff., we find that while the assertion of the miraculous conception is the principal motive of the passage, there is yet another secondary but still very prominent motive—the assertion that the birth took place when Mary was Joseph's wife. The angel proclaims indeed to Joseph the wonder that had occurred, but the purpose of his appearance is only completely fulfilled when Joseph's scruples are satisfied and Mary is received into the family of a son of David. We trace in this story the working of a mind that wished to combine the idea of the Virgin Birth with that of the Davidic Messiahship. The narrator suggests in the very story itself that he had discovered a compromise that satisfied him. Our Lord was indeed born of a virgin, but He was nevertheless of the family of David, because at the time of His birth Joseph the son of David was the husband of His mother.

Arguing *a priori*, we should expect therefore that such a narrator, when incorporating the genealogy into his gospel, would correct the original naturalistic clause in accordance with his peculiar view of the Davidic descent. We should expect, I mean, that in place of the clause "Joseph begat Jesus" he would insert words emphasising the fact that Joseph was the husband of Mary. This is exactly what we find in the reading of St Matt. i. 16 in our *Textus Receptus*,¹ "Jacob begat Joseph the husband of Mary, from whom was begotten Jesus who is called Christ." This is the simplest possible correction, which, while not excluding the idea of a virgin birth, preserves the Davidic descent according to the conception of the narrator of i. 18 ff. We are fully justified therefore in regarding our strongly supported received text of the close of the genealogy as the original reading of the canonical gospel.

We have therefore two original forms with which we must deal:—

1. The original reading of the genealogy, "Joseph begat Jesus who was called Christ."
2. The original reading of the canonical gospel, "the husband of Mary, of whom was begotten Jesus who was called Christ."

In opposition to Mr Conybeare and to Professor Schmiedel, I maintain that all known variants were derived from the above two readings under the influence of two *veræ causæ*; one—correction due to dogmatic sensitiveness, the other—corruption from the original sources. The first cause alone is generally taken into consideration by textual critics, to the neglect of the second. And yet, if we consider what happens when we, who are familiar with our Authorised Version of the Bible, read aloud the Revised Version, we must realise that in the early days of the textual history of the

¹ By *Textus Receptus* throughout, I mean such a text as that of Westcott and Hort.

gospels, copyists who were familiar with the old sources must have corrupted their text therefrom.¹ Nor must we expect only unconscious corruption, for there existed most certainly in the church of those days a section of Christians that would consider "the old to be the better."

The testimony of the Old Latin and Old Syriac versions and the Ferrar group of Greek manuscripts points to the existence of a very early variant from the *Textus Receptus*, the so-called Western Reading, ὃ μνηστειθεῖσα (παρθενος) Μαρία ἐγέννησεν Ἰησοῦν τὸν λεγόμενον χριστόν. The history of the origin of this reading may be easily traced. The form of the canonical text of this verse offended the orthodox copyist, to whom the Davidic descent was of infinitely less importance than the virgin birth. Taken by itself, the verse was certainly liable to misconstruction; it did not of itself exclude the fatherhood of Joseph, indeed the word "husband" rather favoured this conception.² Hence the verse was corrected in accordance with verse 18. Joseph is no longer the husband, but he to whom Mary is betrothed. The old inappropriate verb ἐγέννησεν, which may however be used of the mother, was preserved prob-

¹ Many MSS. of the Latin version of Jerome have suffered much from corruption from Old Latin versions.

² I believe an instance of such misconception is to be found in the important passage from "Timothy and Aquila," quoted by Mr Conybeare. The awkwardness of the phraseology of the Jew's supposed extract from the genealogy is so extreme as to make one doubt whether Mr Conybeare has rightly interpreted the text here. He certainly seems to misunderstand the drift of the argument between the Jew and the Christian at this point, for the gist of the Christian's objection to the Jew's genealogy is this—you have spoken neither ὀρθῶς nor κατὰ τάξιν; roughly as we should say—you have quoted wrongly, and you have not considered the context. He corrects first (κατὰ τάξιν) by repeating the whole genealogy from Abraham downwards, and connecting this with Matt. i. 18. He corrects again (ὀρθῶς) by substituting in the genealogy for the Jew's "Jacob begat Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was begotten Jesus who was called the Christ," the words "Jacob begat Joseph, to whom Mary (was) betrothed, of whom was begotten Jesus who was called Christ." The Christian thus distinctly implies that the Jew has given a wrong reading of the genealogy. He recognises as the only true text one of the variants of the widespread Western reading. Hence I feel sure that the text of the Jew's speech has suffered from textual corruption, and that the sentence "and Joseph begat Jesus who was called the Christ" originally belonged to the Jew's comment on the clause of the genealogy which he has quoted. The small correction of καὶ Ἰωσήφ into Ἰωσήφ οὖν is all that is required to make the text satisfactory and the argument clear. Read and punctuate therefore—"There is a genealogy in the old, and new to boot, in the gospel according to Matthew, and it contains the following words: 'Jacob begat Joseph the husband of Mary, out of whom was begotten Jesus who is called Christ.' Joseph then begat Jesus who is called Christ, about whom our discourse now is; it says 'begat out of Mary.'" It would be the most natural thing for a copyist to imagine that Ἰωσήφ οὖν ἐγέννησεν τὸν Ἰησοῦν was part of a Jew's perverted quotation from the canonical genealogy, and in consequence to correct Ἰωσήφ οὖν into καὶ Ἰωσήφ. If this be so, the passage is most interesting as illustrating for us the feeling of dislike with which the author of the dialogue (and no doubt many of his contemporaries) regarded the original reading of the canonical gospel. Mr Conybeare would have been kind had he given us the full reading of the "doctored" passage in the Messina MS. of the dialogue, and of the passage where the clause τοῦ καὶ τῆς παρθενίας occurs. This is most certainly corrupt, and there is not the slightest reference to Joseph in the whole argument of the context.


ably from considerations of symmetry with the rest of the genealogy; at all events the faith was completely guarded. We can trace the influence of this dogmatic sensitiveness still further in the history of the text. In the Curetonian Syriac "her husband" of i. 19 is omitted, "thy wife" of verse 20 becomes "thy betrothed," "his wife" of verse 24 becomes "Mary."¹ We are led therefore to the inference that the original correction was made on Syrian ground, a conclusion which falls into line with Dr Chase's idea that the so-called Western Text took its form in Syria.

It is unnecessary to consider the many variants of this Western Reading. They possess this as their distinctive feature, that they all express the relationship of Joseph to Mary as that of betrothal. They are all due to stylistic or grammatical correction of the Western text or to conflation with the received text. There remain, however, two distinct forms of text to be dealt with—that of Syrus Sinaiticus and that of "Timothy and Aquila," if, which I doubt very much, the reading of Mr Conybeare's edition existed in the original text of the dialogue.

The reading of Syrus Sinaiticus—"Joseph to whom was betrothed Mary the Virgin, begat Jesus who was called the Christ"—is clearly due to a mixture of the Western text with the reading of the original genealogy. It carries us back to the early days when the canonical gospel was competing with the source or sources from which it was derived. We have here perhaps a conscious corruption of the canonical text, for we find that in i. 25 Syrus Sinaiticus agrees with the famous Old Latin manuscript *k* in omitting the words *οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν αὐτὴν ἕως οὗ*. The reading of Syrus Sinaiticus here is, "he took his wife and she bore to him a son, and he called his name Jesus."²

The reading of "Timothy and Aquila" is, as Schmiedel says, a confluence from the *Textus Receptus* and the original genealogy.

The textual history of this verse may be exhibited thus:—



¹ These variants are not all mentioned by Tischendorf.

² I am, however, inclined to think, on grounds of literary criticism, that the story of the birth in St Matthew is based upon an earlier story which existed in the gospel upon which the canonical gospel is founded. The variant of *κ* and Syr. Sin. is perhaps due to the memory of the phrasing of this old gospel.

This little chapter in textual history claims our trust the more in that it reflects the course of doctrinal development that historical criticism would teach us to expect. First we have pictured for us the time at which the Davidic conception of the Messiahship prevailed, then the time when the doctrine of the supernatural birth was combined with that of the Davidic Messiahship, finally the time when the Davidic Messiahship fell into the background as an article of faith. While running concurrently with this doctrinal development, we notice traces of a conservative party which clung tenaciously to the old Davidic idea.

The fault in Mr Conybeare's treatment of St Matt. i. 16 lies in this, that he considers the verse in isolation, and does not realise that the first doctrinal modification of the original reading of the genealogy must have been effected by the canonical evangelist himself, and is bound up with the larger question of the history of the origin of our gospel of St Matthew.

Soltau¹ has made a notable contribution towards the solution of this historical problem. He notices that while, on the one hand, the arrangement of the ancient Logia and their union with the Markan tradition in St Matthew's gospel bear witness to a compiler of considerable literary and artistic ability, many passages, on the other hand, that are peculiar to this gospel are incorporated therein in a most inartistic manner, and interrupt most awkwardly the flow of the narrative. Instances in point are: the story of Judas' death; the story of the appearance of the departed after the resurrection; the verses xxii. 6-7 in the parable of the marriage feast; the commission to the apostles to baptise. Soltau notices besides that these and many other passages peculiar to St Matthew often bear marks of a late date, and adopt a dogmatic standpoint quite distinct from that of the Logia and Markan tradition even as embodied in St Matthew.

Soltau maintains, therefore, that the canonical evangelist was not the original compiler of the Logia and Markan tradition, but that these were already combined in a gospel which served as his principal authority. If this be so, if such a complete gospel existed in the church, a gospel much in favour, seeing that it was accepted as the basis of our canonical St Matthew, we may the more certainly expect that the copyists of the canonical gospel would throughout, both voluntarily and involuntarily, corrupt the text by mixture from the old source. We should expect to find in the history of the text of St Matthew other instances of corruption similar to that of Syrus Sinaiticus in St Matt. i. 16. Can we find one?

(End of PART I.)

J. R. WILKINSON.

ST LUKE'S, MITFORD PLACE, W.

¹ *Eine Lücke in der synoptischen Forschung*, Leipzig, 1899.

CATASTROPHES AND MORAL ORDER.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1902, p. 114.)

BEARING in mind the avowed purpose of the *Hibbert Journal*, that of opening its pages to the "clash of contrary opinions," it seems to me in every way desirable that the articles on the above question should be supplemented by a word of criticism from a definite non-religious point of view. I restrict my criticism to a few brief comments upon the *apologia* of Messrs Armstrong and Horton. I refrain also from quoting the passages criticised, merely indicating their whereabouts by the number of the paragraph and the initial letter of the writer's name.

The Thesis discussed by the participants in this symposium may be briefly expressed as follows:—In a world governed, *ex hypothesi*, by a moral and intelligent Being (I omit all the adjectives usually applied to Deity), some 20,000 or 30,000 human beings, not any worse religiously or morally than their fellows in other parts of the world, are suddenly exterminated. Young and old, evil and good, meet the same fate. How can we harmonise such a catastrophe with a belief in the government of the world by a moral and intelligent Being?

It is certain that if any similar catastrophe had occurred as the result of human action, those responsible would forfeit their right to the description either of moral or intelligent. If we credited them with good intentions, we should strongly question their intelligence; if we admitted their intelligence, we should as strongly doubt their morality. Can, or ought, a change of venue alter our feelings in this matter? Ought our judgment of the morality of actions to be determined with an eye to the position of those who perform them? Unless we resort to a number of jesuitical reservations and qualifications, the condemnation that would follow such conduct on the part of man must also be expressed in the case of Deity. Nay, the case of Deity makes the issue plainer and blacker. For, conceivably, a man might nerve himself to a wholesale destruction of human life, on the grounds that he saw no other method of counteracting certain objectionable aspects of cosmic processes. But Deity has no such excuse; and the offence becomes greater in proportion to the possibility of other methods.

The issue is perfectly clear when we divest the subject of intentional and unintentional verbal ambiguities. There would seem to be no permissible reasoning that can harmonise the current belief in Deity with catastrophes of the kind under consideration. The *apologia* of Messrs Horton and Armstrong does not touch the really vital issue; which is, not whether such catastrophes may not have *some* good results, but why they should occur at all. Both gentlemen are clearly under the impression that unless it can be shown that no good whatever comes out of such happenings, the case against Theistic belief breaks down. The non-Theist, however, is not logically called upon to prove this; it is the duty of the Theist to justify in God a method of working or of instruction that would be condemned in man.

As it stands, the harmonising efforts of these two gentlemen may be summarised as follows. (1) Both assert that there is an element of good in such catastrophes so far as they quicken our appreciation of religious problems (A., par. 2), and may be viewed as a necessary lesson in ethics and religion (H., par. 5). An adequate comment upon this would be to ask how and with what feelings we should regard a teacher of chemistry who asphyxiated some of his pupils to give the remainder a striking lesson in the nature of certain gases, or, say, a member of the Peace Society who proposed butchering a few thousand people in London to impress Englishmen with the criminality of warfare? If we resent the conduct of human teachers who seek to "rivet the attention of the thinking population of the globe" by these methods, why should we applaud Deity for acting in a similar manner?

Dr Horton further asserts (par. 7) that pain ceases to be pain when borne for a worthy purpose; that the world gazes in admiration at a death for a noble end. Let me very earnestly ask Dr Horton if he seriously believes this *very* general consideration to cover the case under discussion. The death of Curtius, or *ex hypothesi* of Jesus, was a voluntary death. The deaths at St Pierre were not. Rome was supposed to have been saved by the death of Curtius, and Dr Horton believes the world was saved by the death of Jesus. Will he, can he, show where the analogy holds in the case of Martinique? Was anyone made better by the destruction of these 30,000 people? Was any lesson in ethics or religion received of sufficient value to adequately balance this immense destruction of life? If Dr Horton thinks this, then would he, if it were within his power, repeat the lesson? If he would not, is he not persuading himself that he believes it? Moreover, against Deity the claims of each individual for comfort, for happiness, for protection are identical; and consequently each individual of these slaughtered thousands of Martinique have a right of protest against an arbitrary caprice that selects them for destruction for the assumed benefit of their fellow-creatures.

(2) Both writers, again, plead that very many worse things than the destruction of St Pierre are constantly occurring. Mr Armstrong points out that in India, in 1891, 215,000 people were drowned in a single night (par. 2), while Dr Horton remarks that as 30,000,000 people die every year from various causes, it is foolish to swallow the larger figure and strain at the smaller (par. 4). The accuracy of the statements must be admitted, although one quite fails to see their relevancy. Certainly if Theism can stand proof against the existence of the larger evils of nature, it does seem gratuitous to boggle at this particular one. Thus far the defence would have some force with such as already believe in Deity, although even here its value as a justificatory plea is dubious. Is a criminal excused because he can point to greater offenders than himself? Can anyone seriously believe that when "Providence" is accused of destroying 30,000 people, an adequate defence is set up by pointing out that the same power destroys annually 30,000,000? The argument *does* show that the Martinique

disaster is in line with the general course of nature ; but this only amounts to saying that if " Providence " is at fault here, it is at fault everywhere else. True as this may be, it is, to say the least of it, a dangerous argument for Christian clergymen to adopt. (3) Mr Armstrong goes further even than Dr Horton, and asserts that inasmuch as in Martinique the people met their death quickly, and were spared the pangs of widowhood, orphanage, etc., they were really to be envied, and this sets us wondering why " God thus blessed them above the rest " (par. 4). This, if admitted, only proves that the cause for complaint against " Providence " still exists, though it is of a different kind. The unkindness of " Providence " is not towards the people in the West Indies but towards others. These others *do* experience all the trials and pains that Mr Armstrong catalogues, and therefore have a legitimate grievance in finding themselves deprived of volcanic outbursts which, according to Mr Armstrong, have the effect of " robbing death of its sting, the grave of its victory." In his anxiety to relieve " Providence " of the charge of cruelty in one direction, Mr Armstrong accuses it of almost criminal partiality in another. It is certainly surprising to find two representatives of widely opposed forms of Christian belief asserting, by implication, that the government of the world by " Providence " is normally such that those people are most blessed and most to be envied who are removed from it as soon as possible, even at the cost of a violent death. I question if any atheist ever drew up a more damning indictment against " Providence " than this.

A word upon Dr Horton's somewhat cryptic statement, that on the Atheistic hypothesis the catastrophes of the world become baffling and staggering enigmas. Dr Howison has rightly pointed out that there is no enigma of evil to Atheism. Good and evil are only aspects of cosmic phenomena in relation to an organism, and measured by standards that are created by the organism itself. The " Problem of Evil " only arises when we are faced by the difficulty of accounting for gratuitous suffering in a world created and governed by a Deity who is assumed to possess wisdom enough to devise a better plan, power enough to carry it out, and enough love for mankind to desire it. This problem has baffled men of marked mental power and keen dialectical skill. There is, therefore, little disgrace in failing where so many others have met disaster ; but there is little credit in adding to the list. Still less is it justifiable to so far outrage the moral sense by championing in Deity conduct that would meet with instant and severe reprobation in man. Unless moral terms are to be emptied of their meaning, it is little short of monstrous to act in this manner. Where a reasonable defence cannot be made, and where an accusation is unpalatable, the wiser course would be—silence.

C. COHEN.

REVIEWS

The Poetry of Robert Browning.—By Stopford A. Brooke.—
London: Isbister & Co. Ltd., 1902.

DEAD at Venice, more than twelve years ago now, with the “proofs” of his last book *Asolando* in his hand, his brave voice with its last word—“greet the unseen with a cheer”—fled into silence, and his keen eye closed for ever to all “Italia’s rare o’er-running beauty,” the body of Robert Browning was brought to England and laid to rest in Westminster Abbey. On the last day of the year 1889,—“at noon-day in the bustle of the work-time,”—he was buried in *Poet’s Corner*. At the feet of Chaucer, in the vacant space where three years later he was to be joined by his great comrade Tennyson, within a few yards of the monuments of Shakespeare, Milton, Drayton, Prior, Johnson, Spencer, Gray, Campbell, Southey, Coleridge, Longfellow, his dust was laid to kindred dust. And although to those who stood by that grave there could have been no temptation to echo Addison’s plaint of two centuries ago concerning that hallowed spot,—“I found that there were poets who had no monuments, and monuments which had no poets,”—yet—yet it did not need, on that December day, the added denseness of the black London fog, shrouding as with a funeral pall the city streets, and deepening into night the dark shadows of the old abbey, to make his mourners wish—the wish finds expression on page 51 of this brilliant and authoritative monograph to his memory by Mr Stopford Brooke—that the poet “had been buried on a mountain top with all Italy below him.” For of him, even more truly than of his own Renaissance Grammarian, those mourners might have said—

“Thither our path lies, wind we up the heights,
Wait ye the warning?
Our low life was the level’s and the night’s,
He’s for the morning.

Here, here’s the platform, here’s the proper place;
Hail to your purlieus
All ye high flyers of the feathered race,
Swallows and curlews!
Here’s the top peak; the multitude below
Live, for they can, there:
This man decided not to live but know—
Bury this man there!

Here lies his place, where meteors shoot, clouds form,
 Lightnings are loosened,
 Stars come and go ! Let joy break with the storm,
 Peace let the dew send !
 Lofty designs must close in like effects ;
 Loftily lying,
 Leave him—still loftier than the world suspects,
 Living and dying.”

If not in grateful Florence, where in the Protestant Cemetery rested the body of his wife, then within sight of Venice, on the hills above Asolo, or at Asolo itself, on the plot of ground adjoining Queen Catharine's Castle, which in the last days of his life he had proposed to buy and there to build a *Pippa's Tower* for the summer sojourn of his old age, would have seemed the fitting place for the burial of a poet, who, in one of the three only poems in which he makes even a reference to the scenery of English town or village, had sung—

“ Italy, my Italy,
 Queen Mary's saying serves for me—
 Open my heart and you will see
 Graved inside of it 'Italy.'
 Such lovers old are I and she,
 So it always was, so shall ever be.”

And yet all the same it is right that his body should lie not in Italy, not at Asolo, but with his English peers in Westminster Abbey. He himself might say carelessly, “I have no kind of concern as to where the old clothes of myself shall be thrown,” but his countrymen had a right to think otherwise. He might not, it is true, have written, as Tennyson, all through the same period of sixty years, had loved to write, of English thought and English ways, of the village wife, of the gardener's daughter, of the miller, the milkmaid, the cobbler, the sailor boy, the shepherd, the plowman, the parson, of the beggar maid and Lady Clare, of English parks and brooks and woods and village greens, of English birds and English flowers, of English heroes in Romance and History, and of their great thoughts and great deeds, of English politics and statesmanship and social questions, and of all the majesties and meannesses of a land of change and progress, and yet of sober-suited use and wont, where “Freedom slowly broadens down from precedent to precedent.” To Browning these things, in his poetry at least, were as though they were not. It is not that as an Englishman he did not love and honour his country, but that as a poet, in his deepest life, he belonged less to England than to the world of man. And of this world of man and of all its multitudinous life, its variety, intensity, complexity, where in the writings of any poet shall we find such a picture, and its interpretation, as in the pages of Browning? “There they are his fifty—nay, five times fifty—*Men and Women*,” and scarcely an Englishman among them. Strafford, Pym, Hampden, Clive, Lord Tresham, Mr Sludge (but he was probably an American), Ned Bratts, Halbert and Hob, Martin Relph, Donald, Christopher Smart, Charles Avison, George Bubb Doddington,—

these are about all in the two volumes of his collected works running to some eight hundred pages of close type, and yet was ever canvas crowded with such a multitude of figures of all nationalities—portraits individual, vivid, set in their own appropriate environment, scenery, time, place, action, which is also vital, intense,—Karshish, Cleon, Norbert and the Fifty,—the work girl at Asolo, the Spanish monk in his garden, the Arab riding through the desert, the Moldavian duchess, the poor painters of Fano and Florence, the threadbare poet of Valladolid, Saul, David, Rabbi ben Ezra, Jochanan Hakkadosh, Paracelsus, Aprile, Sordello, Andrea del Sarto and Abt Vogler, Lippo Lippi and Master Hughes of Saxe Gotha, Pheidippides, Guido, Caponsacchi, the Pope, besides a galaxy of women both good and bad, and among the good, three supreme types of noble womanhood, Pippa, Pompilia, Balaustion? But certainly it was unfortunate, and a source moreover of literary weakness rather than of literary strength, that Browning should have so completely isolated the subject of his poetry from all things English. It was the cause probably, or one of the chief causes, of that unpopularity of his verse among two generations at least of Englishmen, of which he was always so humorously conscious and so perversely disregarding. "Ah, British Public—you who love me not!"

And it was perverse too as well as unfortunate, because no English poet since Shakespeare was, after all, more essentially English in the elements of character than he. "His intellect was English, and had the English faults as well as the English excellences. His optimism was English, his steadfast fighting quality, his unyielding energy, his directness, his desire to get to the roots of things, was English. His religion was the excellent English compromise or rather balance of dogma, practice, and spirituality, which laymen make for their own life. His bold sense of personal freedom was English. His constancy to his theories, whether of faith or art, was English." And English too—I will venture myself to add to this characterisation of Mr Stopford Brooke—was that gift of humorous observation and large-hearted tolerance which so often in reading Browning makes one think of Shakespeare's "Prospero"—the Philosopher Duke, who was surely none other than the Poet-Prophet himself in his old age—the great Mage of the Fortunate Island of the soul of man, that enchanted realm of imagination where its Lord could summon to his service at a moment's notice, every shape of merriment or of passion, every figure in the great tragi-comedy of life, could run easily through the scale of passion or of thought "from Nature's wood-notes wild" or the homely commonplace of existence, the chimney-corner wisdom of "Master Goodman Dull" to the transcendental subtleties of—

"No, Time, thou shalt not boast that I do change,
Thy pyramids built up with newer light
To me are nothing novel, nothing strange,
They are but dressings of a former sight"—

and yet could be always tolerant of the small things of life, despising nothing as common or unclean, curious of all things and of all men, but never

petulant, never contemptuous, never scornful. Was not this also the tone and temper of Browning, who, looking out upon this complex world and all its tragedy, could still always, with wide viewing mind, regard the weaknesses and vanities and faithlessness of the smaller men with that tolerant pity and that kindly humour which has so well been defined as "an invisible tear behind a human smile" ?

I.

I could have wished that Mr Stopford Brooke, in the first chapter of this criticism of the mind and art of Browning, had plotted out his comparison of Browning and Tennyson more on the lines of that masterly study of Saint Beuve in which that supreme critic contrasts the portraits of Mathurin Regnier and André Chénier. Saint Beuve in his picture places one writer over against the other with a view of showing how each presents a type of character which is the counterpart of the other, how each reveals a side of truth which is more or less ignored by the other. "Taking successively the four or five elementary themes of all poetry—God, Nature, Genius, Art, Love, Human Life"—Saint Beuve essays to see how each of these things revealed themselves to the two men he was contrasting, and "under what aspect they endeavoured to reproduce them." Mr Stopford Brooke sets out apparently with the same design and with the same method. But the answers he shortly gets to almost identical questions with those of Saint Beuve, concerning his two poets' individual treatment of these same elementary themes, are not a revelation of the two counterbalancing aspects of the one truth, to which one or other poet was the witness, but rather a revelation of how one poet succeeded in grasping the one truth which the other missed. I almost hesitate to express this criticism, for Mr Stopford Brooke has by his own previous critical work, as indeed again through many pages of this book, laid all lovers of literature under so deep a debt of gratitude, and proved his right to speak with authority; and yet I cannot but feel that in this chapter his skill has somehow missed the mark. It has at least failed to convince one of his readers that his comparison rests on a logical basis, for I must honestly confess that to me the final conclusion of his argument seems to result in this strange paradox—that while *Browning is undoubtedly the greater poet, Tennyson's is the greater poetry*. I have not space to make this plain, but these two passages will at least give a hint as to what I mean.

"This part of the loveliness of form in poetry, along with composition and style—for without them and without noble matter of thought poetry is nothing but pleasant noise—secures also the continuous delight of men and the approving judgment of the future; and in this also Tennyson, who gave to it the steady work of a lifetime, stands above his brother poet. Browning was far too careless of his melody. He frequently sacrificed it, and needlessly, to his thought. He may have imagined that he strengthened the thing he thought by breaking the melody. He did not; he injured it. He injured the melody also by casting into the middle of it, like stones into a clear water, rough

parenthetic sounds to suit his parenthetic phrases. He breaks it sometimes into two with violent clanging words, with discords which he does not resolve, but forgets. And in the pleasure which he took in quaint oddities of sound, in jarring tricks with his metre, in fantastic and difficult arrangement of rhyme, in scientific displays of double rhymes, he only, too often, immolates melody on the altar of his own cleverness" (p. 53).

"But beyond all these matters of form, there is the Poet himself, alone among his fellows in his unique and individual power, who has fastened himself into our hearts, added a new world to our perceptions, developed our lives and enlarged our interests. And there are the separate and distinguished excellences of his work—the virtues which have no defects, the virtues, too, of his defects, all the new wonders of his realm—the many originalities which have justly earned for him that high and lonely seat on Parnassus on which his noble shadow sits to-day, unchallenged in our time save by that other shadow with whom, in reverence and love, we have been perhaps too bold to contrast him" (p. 55).

II.

The two chapters in which Mr Brooke speaks of Browning's "Treatment of Nature" are full of illuminating criticism and penetrative exposition. He rightly emphasises the three distinct periods in Browning's artistic life. His first period was that in which his love of Human Nature was so interwoven with his poetry, that Nature suggested to him Humanity, and Humanity Nature. The two, therefore, as subject of thought and feeling, were, by their intercommunion, uplifted and illustrated and developed. Humanity, it is true, was always first. But Nature was second. And both were linked together in a noble marriage. This was the period of the morning joy of life, in which all the freshness and dewiness and ravishment of Browning's lyric gift was given to the world, the period in which he wrote the poems which, because of this gift, will not die—the period in which he wrote such songs as that in Paracelsus—"Thus the Mayne glideth"—and such verses as these, of which in regard at least to two poignant lines, the first of the last stanza, his great rival, in an excess of generosity, once affirmed that he would have given all his own poetry to have written.

"Oh moment one and infinite !

The water slips o'er stock and stone ;

The West is tender, hardly bright ;

How grey at once is the evening grown—

One star, its chrysolite !

We stood there with never a third,

But each by each, as each knew well ;

The sights we saw and the sounds we heard,

The lights and the shades made up a spell
Till the trouble grew and stirred.

Oh the little more, and how much it is !

And the little less, and what worlds away !

How a sound shall quicken content to bliss,

Or a breath suspend the blood's best play,
And Life be a proof of this !"

Browning's second period was one in which Nature in his poems was pushed out by Human Nature, gradually at first, but more swiftly as the years of middle life went on, until at length Nature became almost non-existent for him. This was the period in which didactic treatises full of surface-psychology, fantastic analysis, fanciful ethics, and cold intellectual sword-play with words, not to say downright prose ugliness, absorbed the poet's energy, and poetry itself practically died. To this period belong such studies as Prince Hohenstiel-Schwangau, Mr Sludge the medium, Red-Cotton-Night-Cap Country, Fifine at the Fair. It is of these so-called poems that Mr Stopford Brooke both acutely and wittily says—"They are the work of my Lord Intelligence—attended by wit and fancy—who sits at the desk of Poetry, and with her pen in his hand. He uses the furniture of Poetry, but the Goddess herself has left the room. Yet something of her influence still fills the chamber. In the midst of the brilliant display that fancy, wit and intellect are making, a soft steady light of pure song burns briefly at intervals and then is quenched, like the light of stars seen for a moment of quiet effulgence among the crackling and dazzling of fireworks."

And lastly, there was the third period during which the love of Nature, returning, though with diminished power, and entering again into communion with the love of Human Nature, renewed once more the passion of Browning's poetry, brought back to it its singing quality, and gave it again that sane and healthy tone which makes true Poetry always a power to strengthen and make happy the human heart, and to lift it into that realm of imagination in which only perfection lives.

With the two admirable chapters in which Mr Stopford Brooke illustrates these two phases of Browning's career, we may usefully associate a passage at a later page of the book in which he speaks of his romantic temper. "Browning"—he truly says—"was in spirit a pure Romantic, not a Classic He has the natural gifts and excellences of the romantic poet, and these elements make him dearer than the mere classic to a multitude of imaginative persons. One of them is endless and impassioned curiosity, for ever unsatisfied, always finding new worlds of thought and feeling into which to make dangerous and thrilling voyages of discovery—voyages that are filled from end to end with incessantly changing adventure, or delight in that adventure. This enchants the world. And it is not only in his subjects that the romantic poet shows his curiosity. He is just as curious of new methods of tragedy, of lyric work, of every mode of poetry; of new ways of expressing old thoughts; new ways of treating old metres; of the invention of new metres and new ways of phrasing; of strange and startling word combinations, to clothe fittingly the strange and startling things discovered in human nature, in one's own soul, or in the souls of others. In ancient days such a temper produced the many tales of invention which filled the romantic cycles."

It was this temper which produced in Browning the Dramatic Lyrics, the Men and Women, the Dramatis Personæ, and such poems as Childe

Roland to the Dark Tower Came, and Christmas Eve and Easter Day. It was this temper also, I suppose, combined with the consciousness of his power to represent a momentary dramatic action, which led Browning to attempt so perseveringly the larger craft of real Drama. Mr Brooke, in a special chapter devoted to the Dramas, explains very convincingly the causes of Browning's failure, and he says many interesting things in the course of it about Strafford, King Victor and King Charles, the Blot on the Scutcheon, Luria, and the Soul's Tragedy, but he probably sums up the general verdict on Browning as a Dramatist when, with a delicious irony, he laments that it had never occurred to the poet to analyse himself in a Dramatic Lyric as "the Poet who would be a Dramatist and could not." "Indeed, it is a pity he did not do this. He was capable of smiling benignly at himself, and sketching himself as if he were another man; a thing which Tennyson, who took himself with awful seriousness, and walked with himself as a Druid might have walked in the sacred grove of Mona, was quite incapable."

III.

I have said that we owe to Browning the picture of three supreme types of womanhood—Pippa, Pompilia, Balaustion. I have no space here to follow Mr Stopford Brooke into his exhaustive analysis of the characters of these three heroines of Browning, though I shall perhaps most fitly close this section by quoting the three brief summaries in which he characterises them. But there is one aspect of Browning's general attitude towards the noble women of his poems noted by Mr Stopford Brooke which is remarkable. Throughout his poems woman is always represented as standing side by side with man on an equality of value, and never with any suggestion even of conscious patronage (as too plainly, perhaps, in Tennyson's Princess), but in the greater poems, pre-eminently in Sordello and Balaustion's Adventure, Browning represents woman as of finer, even stronger intellect than man. Many poets, it is true, have painted woman as of finer intuition than man, of nobler emotional character. Mr Ruskin, for example, long ago pointed out truly that Shakespeare has no heroes—only heroines. And though the lesson of that fact was hardly, perhaps, what Mr Ruskin thought it to be, that is to say, that women were perfect in character—"infallibly faithful and wise counsellors, incorruptibly just and pure examples, strong always to sanctify, even when they cannot save"—in a way which was not possible to man, but rather that Shakespeare himself evidently thought them to be so, and kept through his whole life true to the youthful chivalric ideal of a good woman as "enskied and sainted," yet even Shakespeare hardly represented his heroines, as Browning so often does, as possessing greater and stronger intellectual power than man. Mr Stopford Brooke thinks that this quality in Mr Browning is probably due to the fact that he possessed in his wife a woman of genius who had studied her own sex in herself and in other women, and was also willing frankly to enable her husband to see so much more clearly than other poets the

curious and remote phases of the thoughts and vagaries and passions of woman. This is probably so, and at any rate the point is an interesting one. The chapter in which it is discussed is one of the best in Mr Stopford Brooke's book. I have only space here for the three quotations in which he briefly recalls the outlines of Browning's pictures of Pippa, Pompilia, and Balaustion.

"The world of nature speaks to [Pippa] and loves her. She sees all that is beautiful, feeds on it, and grasps the matter of thought that underlies the beauty, and so much is she at home with nature that she is able to describe with ease in words almost as noble as the thing itself, the advent of the sun. When she leaps out of her bed to meet the leap of the sun, the hymn of description she sings might be sung by the Hours themselves as they dance round the car of the God. She can even play with the great Mother as with an equal, or like her child. The charming gaiety with which she speaks to the sunlights that dance in her room, and to the flowers which are her sisters, prove, however isolated her life may be, that she is never alone. Along with this brightness she has seriousness, the sister of her gaiety: the deep seriousness of imagination, the seriousness also of the evening when meditation broods over the day and its doings before sleep. These, with her sweet humanity, natural piety, instinctive purity, compose her of soft sunshine and soft shadow. Nor does her sadness at the close, which is overcome by her trust in God, make her less but more dear to us. She is a beautiful creation. There are hosts of happy women like her. They are the salt of the earth. But few poets have made so much of them and so happily, or sung about these birds of God so well, as Browning has in *Pippa Passes*."

"Thus pure at heart and sound of head, a natural true woman in her childhood, in her girlhood, and when she is tried in the fire—by nature gay, yet steady in suffering; brave in a hell of fears and shame; clear-sighted in entanglement of villainy; resolute in self-rescue; seeing and claiming the right help, and directing it rightly; rejoicing in her motherhood, and knowing it as her crown of glory, though the child is from her infamous husband; happy in her motherhood for one fortnight; slain like a martyr; loving the true man with immortal love; forgiving all who had injured her, even her murderer; dying in full faith and love of God, though her life had been a crucifixion, Pompilia passes away, and England's men and women will be always grateful to Browning for her creation."

"Balaustion has all the Greek capacity, a thorough education, and that education also which came in the air of that time to those of the Athenian temper. She is born into beauty and the knowledge of it, into high thinking and keen feeling; and she knows well why she thought and how she felt. So finely wrought is she by passion and intelligence alike, with natural genius to make her powers tenfold, that she sweeps her kinsfolk into agreement with her, subdues the sailors to her will, enchants the captain, sings the whole crew into energy, would even, I believe, have awed and enthralled the pirate, conquers the Syracusans, delights the whole city,

draws a talent out of the rich man, which she leaves behind her for the prisoners, is a dear friend of sombre Euripides, lures Aristophanes the mocker into seriousness, mates herself with him in a whole night's conversation, and wrings praise and honour from the nimblest, the most cynical, and the most world-wise intellect in Athens."

IV.

"It is hard to believe in God"—said Lord Tennyson once—"but it is harder not to believe. I believe in God not from what I see in nature, but from what I find in man. . . . God is love, transcendent, all-pervading. But we do not get this faith from Nature or the World. If we look at Nature alone, full of perfection and imperfection, she tells us that God is disease, murder, and rapine. We get this faith from ourselves, from what is highest within us, which recognises that there is not one fruitless pang, just as there is not (as Browning says) 'one lost good.'" The comparison which this last allusion of Lord Tennyson suggests between his own *In Memoriam*, where in cantos liv.-lvi. he has written out large in verse this prose expression of his faith, and Browning's splendid lyric *Abt Vogler*, in which he expresses that hunger for eternity and perfection which is at once the sign of his romantic temper and the basis of his ethical theory of life, serves, I think, to remind us that both Tennyson and Browning are children of a new age in theology. Mr Stopford Brooke, in an early page of his book, specially deprecates any comparison of the theological and ethical basis of the two poets, on the ground that they have little or nothing to do with poetry, and that, with regard to Browning at any rate, they have been "discussed at wearying length for the last ten years, and especially by persons who use his poetry to illustrate from it their own systems of theology, philosophy and ethics." I should deprecate as heartily as he does any such wearisome discussion. But I confess that I regret that he himself should not have devoted a chapter of his own book to the discussion of the theological basis of Browning's poetry, for in the first place I know it would not have been "wearisome," and in the second I am sure it would have been illuminating. I believe I am right in saying that it is from the earlier writings of Mr Brooke himself, following on the lines of Shelley in his *Defence of Poetry*, and Matthew Arnold in his essay on *Poets as the Interpreters of Life*, that so many of us in the present generation have learnt to regard the poets of Christendom as among the truest prophets of God, and to see that it is to their writings rather than to the writings of the theologians that we must go if we would know what real spiritual insight is, if we would feel the true warm religious emotion of men's hearts rather than the cold conventional thoughts of their minds—nay, if we would distinguish often between the religion of Christ and the religion of Christians—in a word, if we would find the very Christ Himself, as He has been known and worshipped from age to age. I cannot therefore but regret exceedingly that Mr Stopford Brooke, for whatever cause, should have ruled as outside

the scope of his present essay any discussion of the theological basis of Browning's poetry.

For to ignore this aspect of Browning's poetry is, as it seems to me at least, to miss the most essential message of the poet to his age. There is no more stirring passage in Mr Stopford Brooke's book than the chapter in which he describes how all the moving scenes of the fourteenth and fifteenth century Renaissance, all the diverse, clashing, productive elements of that morningtide of humanity, throb again with life in the pages of Browning, in such poems as *Fra Lippo Lippi*, *How the Bishop Orders his Tomb at S. Praxed's Church*, and *Andrea del Sarto*. I wish it had been possible for the same brilliant and sympathetic pen to have made us feel how the Renaissance of the nineteenth century, that re-birth of a nobler theology, that re-focussing of Christian truth—marked especially by the change of emphasis in its presentation from the doctrine of the Atonement to the doctrine of the Incarnation, from Latin theories about the Person of Man to Greek theories about the Person of Christ—which we associate more generally, perhaps, with the names of such modern theologians as Frederick Maurice, Bishops Lightfoot and Westcott, and Professor Hort, lives also, and more vividly, more intensely, in the pages of the poet Browning. For this Neo-Greek Theology is at the basis of Browning's theory of human life. The central doctrine of it, *the Immanence of the Divine in Man*, involving a re-consecration through Christ of all human life and thought, and with it the constant appeal to the eternal and spiritual issues of human action, is perhaps for the first time with success in English verse used essentially and avowedly as a motive in Browning's poetry. This it is which makes him, and will more and more, if I mistake not, as the days go on, make him, the poetic exponent of the faiths, hopes, and aspirations of our modern time. It finds, perhaps, its first and fullest expression in his *Paracelsus*, but it underlies all his subsequent poetry. When, at the point of death, Paracelsus has learnt the secret of life, he exclaims—and his cry is also the essential note of Browning himself—

“I knew, I felt, . . . what God is, what we are,
 What life is—how God tastes an infinite joy
 In infinite ways—one everlasting bliss,
 From whom all being emanates, all power
 Proceeds; in whom is life for evermore,
 Yet whom existence in its lowest form
 Includes; where dwells enjoyment there is he;
 With still a flying point of bliss remote,
 A happiness in store afar, a sphere
 Of distant glory in full view
 God renews
 His ancient rapture. Thus he dwells in all
 From life's minute beginnings, up at last
 To man—the consummation of this scheme
 Of being
 In my own heart love had not been made wise
 To trace love's beginnings in mankind,
 To know even hate is but a mask of love's,

carried forward. The present volume from beginning to end shows no lack of these excellent qualities. However much one may disagree with Mr McTaggart, there is little chance of mistaking his meaning. The subjects considered in this volume will also doubtless appeal to a wider circle of readers than was possible in the case of the former "Studies." "Immortality," "Punishment," "Personality," "Sin,"—these and similar subjects are handled with a uniform subtlety that must win admiration. One can only regret that the value of the author's discussion is very much lessened by the apparent lack of direct reference to concrete facts; and perhaps still more by a somewhat trifling intellectual detachment from his subject.

By "cosmology" the author means rendering certain concrete facts of ordinary experience by terms the significance of which has been previously determined by a purely formal and abstract analysis. Thus, for example, the "State" is a concrete "empirical" fact; and on the other hand, the conception of "organism," "organic" can be or has been analysed merely as an idea, as a conception, and its meaning assigned as a notion distinct from and related to other notions. "Cosmology" takes the result of this analysis, and considers whether and in what sense the "State" can be described as an "organism." The content of the former is *a posteriori*, that of the latter purely *a priori*. Cosmology is a process of adapting one to the other without imperilling the special rights of either. It is an attempt to fuse the ideal content of a conceptional world with the empirical elements of everyday fact which may or may not agree with it: a kind of epistemological marriage on the understanding of a probable judicial separation.

Not every form of "subject-matter empirically known" is treated in this way. Only certain facts are considered. These are the permanence, the eternity of the finite self—the question of "Human Immortality"; the nature of the Self or "Personality" of the Absolute; the absolute or "Supreme Good" and its use as a "Moral Criterion" for actual conduct; the annihilation of wrong, "Punishment"; the nature of "Sin" as a fact of spiritual life; the kind of unity which makes a social whole, whether "Society" is an "Organism"; the relation of the principle of "Hegelianism" to the actual doctrines of "Christianity"; and finally, the more concrete nature or "Further Determination" of the Absolute. These form the subjects of the eight chapters which make up the substance of the volume.

The author does not profess to give always Hegel's expressed views on the subjects. This is only done in the case of the chapter on Punishment and in that on Hegel's interpretation of Christianity. In the other chapters he rather proposes to consider what should be held if Hegel's Logic is to be accepted as sound. The distinction is in itself, as the course of the discussion shows, not very important; for the difference between what an author actually stated and what is implied but not stated is in the last result of no significance, provided the implication can be justified.

So much for the purpose and plan of the book. Before passing on,

we may remark that the term "cosmology" is here used in quite an unusual sense. This is not in itself objectionable if consistency is maintained, but it is difficult to suppress surprise at the use of such a term to cover the discussion of theological doctrines and theories of Punishment. What is of more importance, however, is the nature of the discussion itself. It starts from two assumptions, neither of which is proved in this volume; and unless their truth be admitted, the whole procedure is rendered valueless, and in parts hardly intelligible. These are, (1) the validity of the method and system of Hegel's Logic; (2) the absolute separation of the Logic from the content of experience in the sense of "empirical facts." The first Mr M^cTaggart has attempted to establish in his previous "Studies" and elsewhere. That result is accepted here without question. Whether it is admissible is a problem which would take more space to discuss than can be allowed here. We may merely point out that it will be difficult to gain much acceptance for views which rest upon a position so doubtful as the unimpeachable validity of a system of abstract conceptions. But however this may be, there need be no doubt regarding the value of the second assumption. Such a separation as Mr M^cTaggart makes is in itself quite untenable, and is historically unfounded. It is demonstrable beyond dispute that for Hegel the Logic actually arose out of the concrete empirical facts, and refers to them throughout the whole construction. Anyone who considers the relation of the Phenomenology to the Logic, or the significance of the paragraphs that accompany the analysis of the various conceptions in the Logic, will find this unquestionable. And apart from the historical fact, to hold that the system of abstract conceptions can be determined "in vacuo," without the continual presence of actual experience, is surely grotesque.

Mr M^cTaggart admits that Hegel paid little attention to the problem of the "application" of the Logic to empirical fact; and certainly if there is no such separation as Mr M^cTaggart assumes, "cosmology" in this sense would have no meaning for Hegel. According to our author, the first and third parts of the Philosophy of Religion "contain almost the only detailed discussion of cosmological problems to be found in his works." He accounts for this apparent neglect on Hegel's part by saying that probably it was due to Hegel's lack of personal interest in what for most people is the most interesting part of philosophy! Surely such an explanation of so inexplicable a fact may well give any reader pause. The truth really is, as already indicated, that Mr M^cTaggart has misconceived the proper relation between Hegel's Logic and the content of experience, and thence proceeds to accuse Hegel of neglecting to handle a problem which for him would never be admitted to exist. We may see the difference between what Mr M^cTaggart asks for and what Hegel does by taking one of the cases where, according to our author, we have a cosmological problem directly treated—the statement of the content of "Absolute Religion" at the end of the *Philosophy of Religion*. This Mr M^cTaggart considers to be an adaptation to Christianity of the logical conception

called "Absolute Idea" in the Logic. Hegel, however, is there merely analysing from the point of view of the highest religious experience precisely the same reality which, as a pure conception, *i.e.* from the point of view of Logic (or "Absolute Knowledge"), is expressed as "the Absolute Idea." The one is not the application or adaptation of the other, but a treatment of the *same Reality* from another point of view. Exactly the same is true of the relation between the Logic and, for example, the content of the Philosophy of Nature.

Mr M^cTaggart's studies may perhaps be conveniently grouped under three headings—Metaphysical, Ethical, and Theological. To the first belong the chapters on the "Personality of the Absolute" (c. iii.), the "Further Determination of the Absolute" (c. ix.), and, in a way, "Human Immortality" (c. ii.). To the second belong the chapters on "The Supreme Good and the Moral Criterion" (c. iv.), "Punishment" (c. v.), and "The Conception of Society as an Organism" (c. vii.): to the third, those on "Sin" (c. vi.), and on "Hegelianism and Christianity" (c. viii.). We may consider each of those shortly in turn.

The Absolute, Mr M^cTaggart finds, if we take Hegel strictly, is not a person, and therefore should not properly have been spoken of by Hegel as God at all. The Absolute is spiritual, is a unity, and is a harmonious whole, and may be even conscious, yet is still not a person. It is a unity of persons, not a personal unity. It consists of conscious individuals, but is not itself a conscious individual. Mr M^cTaggart finds this conclusion by a somewhat peculiar process of argument. The Absolute being concrete, is a unity of differentiations. But differences may exist in the unity, and the unity may be in and *for* the differences without that unity being personal. For this it is necessary that the differences exist *for the unity*. That is to say, only when a relation of object to subject, the relation of thought or knowledge, is established have we personality. For only then is there a something consciously *for* something else. Now in the Absolute, unity and differences are identical only in the sense that these two aspects are also distinct. If they are not distinct, the one would be the other, and the nature of the Absolute becomes meaningless, because barren and inexpressible. But if the differences exist for the unity as the unity exists for the differences, there is no distinction of content between the two aspects, and hence it is impossible to speak of one being *for* the other at all. In that case not merely the Absolute but the individuals which make it up cease to be intelligible, for they can have no relation unless by being in some way distinct. Thus, says Mr M^cTaggart, while we may, in virtue of the validity of "the category of teleology," assert that the unity exists in and for the differences, we cannot maintain that the differences exist for the unity, and therefore must abandon the claim to regard the Absolute as itself personal.

While this is our author's main argument, based, it will be seen, on an abstract "application" of the conception of "Absolute Idea" found in the Logic, he supplements it by some further considerations. In the course of his criticism of Lotze's view of the personality of the Absolute, he points

out that for personality "as we know it" the consciousness of a non-ego is essential. But a non-ego is in some sense outside the ego—a statement which is evidently true of finite personality; on the other hand, nothing can in any sense be outside the Absolute; it must contain everything within its own compass. Hence for the Absolute there is no non-ego of which it can be conscious, and thus no personality. There *may be* personality in some other way; but this is merely a bare possibility. Again, the Absolute may be a self-determined whole, and yet not personal; for a self-determined whole can be of two kinds. It may be a *system* of differences or a *centre* of differences. The first is impersonal, the second is personal; the Absolute is the former kind of unity; a finite person the latter (pp. 76 ff.). And lastly, for a person to be identical, there must be some kernel of its reality which remains apart from the differences, and independent of them, while related continuously to them. "This element can have no differentiation or multiplicity in it." It "must be therefore absolutely simple and indivisible—a pure unit." This element exists in every finite person; and in it lies the "direct sense of self" to which Lotze refers (p. 83). But such an element cannot be part of the nature of the Absolute; for it cannot exclude its differentiation from itself in any sense (*ibid.*). Hence, again, the Absolute cannot be personal; it has no sense of self. The Absolute then has the spiritual unity, say, of a college or a corporation, but is no more a person than such unities are.

It is hardly possible to criticise this view adequately without examining Mr M^cTaggart's interpretation of the "Absolute Idea," and thereby raising the whole problem of Hegel's Logic. But at least we may say that the above conclusion is not in agreement with Hegel's own express statements. At the end of the larger Logic he declares in a sentence of sweeping comprehensiveness that the supreme consummation of all that is most real is "pure personality." Apart from this, however, the argument seems a singularly circuitous route by which to reach a conclusion of so much importance. The question can hardly be settled by a consideration of the difference between "in" or "for." We can surely come closer to fact than that. The real point is, what is the highest form of unity in which Absolute Reality can be expressed? This seems the way in which the matter was faced both by Hegel and Lotze, whom Mr M^cTaggart criticises. If personality is essentially a fragmentary form to reality, the question as to Absolute Personality is settled at once. But if personality is the very type and ideal of all individual unity, it may surely well be that finite personality, as Lotze suggests, and in a way Hegel also, *e.g.* in the *Phenomenology*, seems to hold, is only finite because it approximates to and never quite realises that ideal, but is not the sole, still less the complete, expression of personality itself. Mr M^cTaggart's conception of the unity is left unsatisfactorily vague. For when he speaks of a unity of persons higher than that expressed by "organism," and finds the unity of the Absolute to lie in the idea of Love, one is left to guess the nature of the former, and is compelled to regard the latter as outside the sphere of metaphysics

altogether. If a detailed examination of his position were permissible here, one could very profitably consider whether his repudiation of the charge of spiritual "atomism" is at all justifiable, or whether there is any real worth in his perpetual reminder that finite personality is all we know. One point, however, we may note before passing on. It is impossible to see what place is to be given in such a view of the Absolute as he holds to the world of nature and history, out of which surely the problem of the meaning of Reality largely arises. To ignore them is inadmissible, while to find in them a "unity of persons" is worse than paradox.

The "further determination" of the Absolute is given in the last chapter. "The assertion of the supremacy of spirit," says Mr McTaggart, "is comparatively empty unless we can determine the fundamental nature of spirit" (p. 252). He considers such an inquiry of practical importance as well as of theoretical interest — which seems curiously out of agreement with what he states on p. 196. And when he speaks of "a knowledge of the goal (*i.e.* the Absolute) to which we are going," and of the time "it may take us to reach the Absolute," one finds it difficult to see what can be meant. We do not make a journey to the Absolute, we sojourn with it: to "reach the Absolute" is as meaningless a phrase as to "reach" our own consciousness. But, these statements apart, the problem he seeks to answer is in what way the finite individuals which "make up" (p. 254) the nature of spirit, will be able to express their own individuality and the unity of the Absolute. Since human consciousness has only three modes, Knowledge, Conation, and Feeling, it must be in one of those ways, or in some kind of combination of them, that the ultimate form of the activity of spirit is to be found. Now, both knowledge and volition postulate a perfection which they can never attain unless by losing themselves in what transcends them. For they are distinct, and as they stand opposed forms of activity; one accepts facts, the other judges them. But no such opposition can exist in absolute perfection. Hence neither knowledge, nor volition, nor the two together, gives us the true nature of spirit,—a conclusion which can also be reached by showing, *e.g.* in the case of Knowledge, that an "immediate" is implied which can never be got rid of, but which at the same time remains unexplained. Similarly, feeling must be rejected as the ultimate mode of spirit, for it is "pure self-reference of the subject": it "has nothing to do with objects," and cannot therefore fully express the nature of spirit, which necessarily implies an "appreciation of an object."¹ The only state left to reveal spirit in its perfection is one which will involve all three elements, Knowledge, Volition, and Feeling. This state is Emotion. This is the "concrete unity" in which spirit is fully realised, and for which those three elements are "abstractions." Now emotion made perfect, *i.e.* in complete harmony, is Love. This, then, is what

¹ Mr McTaggart seems to have forgotten this when discussing personality, where the difference between personality and spirit turned on the fact that while the former involved reference to an object, the latter, it was said, need not.

gives "interest and value to knowledge and volition"; "this resolves their contradictions"; this is the "concrete material of the life of spirit." It is not "benevolence"; nor "Love of Truth or Virtue or Beauty, or anything else whose name can be found in the dictionary. It is passionate, all-absorbing, all-consuming love" (p. 260). It is again not love of God, for love is of persons, and God is not a person (p. 289). Nor is it love of mankind, for the human race is an aggregate, not an organism; and we cannot love "an indefinitely extended post-office directory." And the same is true of nations, churches and families. "The nearest approach to it is the love for which no cause can be given, of which we can only say that two people belong to each other,—the love of the *Vita Nuova*, and of *In Memoriam*" (p. 291).

It will be found that this is not after all the "further determination of the Absolute": for the Absolute is the unity of all finite spirits, whereas love is a state of an individual spirit, and apparently is to be found mainly in relation to one other individual. It will also be noted that in the above view knowledge cannot express the Absolute. If so, by what process, we may ask, does Mr M^cTaggart find out so much about the ultimate nature of the Absolute? If he is really certain that love is the very truth regarding reality, it seems strange to take a short-cut to such omniscience by abandoning knowledge. While, again, one must express some surprise that such a position, which has evidently great value to the writer, should have been taken for metaphysics at all. It is not religion, for it is "more than religion" (p. 290); and it cannot be poetry, nor can it be metaphysics, for this is at least a form of knowledge which has been declared bankrupt when it has to meet the account with the Absolute. The reader is naturally much in doubt to know what, then, it can be. But these, at the best, are merely minor objections to a position which lays itself perhaps too easily open to assault from both the sympathetic and the unsympathetic alike.

The chapter on "Human Immortality" (c. ii.) is in some ways the most original in the book. The author begins by remarking that for Hegel the question of immortality had little "importance," for no special treatment of the subject is to be found in his works. The accusation is unfounded, and the reasons given by Mr M^cTaggart for the apparent neglect seem quite trivial. If we take immortality as an isolated problem, then clearly it will assume an "importance" proportionate to our lack of interest in other aspects of experience. But if we treat it as part of a general problem, then it will find its place as a matter of course in the system we construct, and its importance will be determined, not by subjective emotional interest, but by objective considerations, by its place in the general plan of the universe as systematically arranged. It is in this second way that Hegel considers the question, and he gives it as much attention as its position in his scheme demands, which is at any rate as much as he gives to other elements equally significant. His statements on the matter are quite unambiguous. In an important passage in the *Philosophy of*

Religion (vol. ii. pp. 219 ff., 2nd ed., 1832), to which Mr M^cTaggart does not give any reference in his footnote to p. 5, Hegel shows that in fact immortality is but a deduction from the nature of man as self-conscious, as consciously sharing in universal reason. "That is mortal which can die; immortal which cannot. . . . The truth of the matter is, that man is immortal in virtue of knowledge; for only as thinking is he not subject to mortality . . . to think is the root of his very life." Looked at in this way, Hegel's whole philosophy may be regarded as the extended "proof" of man's immortality; just as, from another point of view, it is the exposition of the nature of Absolute Spirit.

Mr M^cTaggart, however, seeks by much more circuitous processes of argument to establish the same result. He starts from the position that in the Absolute Idea we have given the "content" of Absolute Spirit; this is "necessarily differentiated," and differentiated eternally. If the differentiations can be shown to be each eternal, and if it can further be shown that finite selves are among the "fundamental differentiations" of spirit, immortality will be proved. Even then it will not be immortality in the ordinary sense of the term. For it may include, *e.g.*, the lower animals; and immortality will not be endless existence in time, but "an eternal, *i.e.* timeless, existence" (p. 8).

His problem, then, is first to inquire what is the nature of "the differentiations of spirit," and then, by applying the result to our own finite selves, to find out if we are among these differentiations. The first question is, according to him, to be answered by a consideration of the nature of "pure thought," *i.e.* from the nature of the logical notion called the Absolute Idea; the second by more or less "empirical" considerations. His conclusion is that "the Absolute must be differentiated into persons, because no other differentiations have vitality to stand against a perfect unity, and because a unity which was undifferentiated would not exist" (p. 17). In regard to the second question, his view is that "the self answers to the description of the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute: nothing else we know or can imagine does so" (p. 26); or, as he somewhat quaintly puts it, "the self is so paradoxical that we can find no explanation for it except its absolute reality." And these selves are eternal, because the Absolute has a continuity which cannot be broken by the annihilation of any of its manifestations. "The Absolute requires each self; not to make up a sum or to maintain an average, but in respect of the self's special and unique nature" (p. 31).

Now, however we may differ from Mr M^cTaggart's method of establishing such a conclusion, or even his way of stating it, we cannot but allow that there is a profound truth in the position he tries to make out. Probably few will be found to admit for a moment the unusual and, be it said, extravagant assumptions he makes regarding the validity of certain categories in the Logic which he calls to his aid, or the powers he ascribes to the "dialectic" for the progress of its proof, but the result arrived at is in itself of great significance. That the inexhaustible diversity of indi-

vidual experience does not necessarily alter the permanent value to Reality of each centre of activity can hardly be too much insisted upon. One could have wished, however, that Mr M^cTaggart had faced some of the difficulties his view must certainly encounter. The sweeping statement that Reality consists of individual spirits, and these are all immortal, becomes a hard saying when we try to reconcile it with the teeming world of animate and inanimate existence, which is transparently different from spiritual existence. To say that the latter is the highest and therefore the most real does not meet the difficulty; for the most real is clearly not the only form of reality. While to speak of the inferior reality being "transcended by" and "included in" the higher is doubtless in a sense true, yet this does not allow us to ignore the lower, or to assume that what is true of the higher is straightway true of the lower. One obvious difficulty on his view Mr M^cTaggart mentions,—the difficulty that if all spirits are immortal, and all that this implies, they are thereby considered to be possessed of a perfection which is completely out of harmony with their actual experience. This difficulty might, one would think, have been met perhaps satisfactorily, but Mr M^cTaggart rather unhappily replies that this difficulty is inevitable and inexplicable in any idealistic view, and we must be content that idealism, with all its difficulties, is as good or better than anything else we can get!

Turning more shortly to the ethical essays, Mr M^cTaggart seeks in one to find the nature of the "supreme good and the moral criterion." The reader might naturally suppose that a supreme good could only be a *good* if at the same time it were a moral *criterion*, for a criterion is merely a standard in the same sense as a good. But the two are not quite held by our author to be identical. For the criterion is to be of direct practical use, while the supreme good may be very remote from realisation at present. Hence he argues that the idea of perfection, or supreme reality as supremely good, cannot give any criterion of moral action at all. It is too "far off," contains too much to enable us to say to what extent it would be really attained in any particular case. Pleasure and pain, however, do give a definite criterion which is quite compatible with the admission of perfection as the supreme good; for though we cannot get at perfection, pleasure can enable us to arrive at a state which we know to be nearer to it, because resembling it more than pain can possibly do.

It is well, no doubt, to be compelled by such a vigorous argument as this chapter contains to rethink a position which Sidgwick did so much to undermine by his analysis. But one cannot but be surprised at this attempt to keep the ideal of life simply as a reserve fund, and allow morality to be carried on by a system of credit notes. The supposition of an absolute gulf between the ideal of perfection and the actual details of conduct is purely imaginary. Surely perfection can be and must be realised in different degrees, and yet throughout all degrees there is one standard or "criterion" alone at work. Otherwise the ultimate identity of the stages and the end is an act of fortune. And then again perfection is spiritual, not mechanical; it is a

matter of character in the long run, and this is moulded by the ideal from first to last, because the ideal is ever with it, not a long day's journey away from it.

The chapter on "Punishment" does not call for much remark. It is an attempt to determine Hegel's view of the subject, and the value which it has in practical statecraft. He holds Hegel's conception to be that punishment is pain inflicted because of active rejection of the moral law, and in order that the culprit may be made to recognise as valid the law rejected in sinning, and thus repent of his sin (p. 133). This is at best only one-half of the truth of Hegel's view—it is merely the subjective aspect as found in the criminal.¹ There is another side in which punishment is the explicit realisation of the true will of the state as a unity in the very act of restricting or in any way negating the will of the particular member of the state. It is not necessarily a question of pain at all; nor necessarily of repentance. And again the use of the term "sin" in this connection is misleading; "guilt" or "crime" or "wrong" may be used; but "sin" is primarily a category of religion.

It is somewhat difficult to make consistent Mr McTaggart's statements in the third ethical essay, "The Conception of Society as an Organism." He is no doubt right in contending that if the example of "organism" be a plant or an individual animal, we must have something different in mind when we speak of an "organism" of self-conscious individuals. But in his argument he tries to abandon the principle because of an instance. On the one hand he holds that the unity required by a society of self-conscious beings must be far deeper than that implied in "organism" (p. 178); and yet holds that on Hegel's view "any possible form of the state can only be a means to the welfare of individuals" (pp. 178-193), *i.e.* apparently as individuals, not as forming a unity at all. Again he asserts (p. 189) that "it is true that the *ultimate ideal* is a state of society which is organic"; while for each man who has entertained the ideal of perfection, "Society, as it is or as it can be made under conditions of time and imperfection, can only be external and mechanical" (p. 193). The views expressed in these various statements can hardly be said to hold together. Mr McTaggart's difficulty is of course very simple. He wishes to reconcile the facts that the individual may have ends beyond his immediate society, and that the society of the present may be and generally is not completely organised, with the position, which, in spite of the attempt on pp. 184 f., he cannot abandon, that some form of social union is necessary for self-conscious individuals. He condemns Hegelians such as Professor Mackenzie for making the state supreme for the individual, on the ground that in point of fact it is a discordant and not really an organic unity at all. Yet surely if struggle and discord exist in society, if much requires improvement, this does not prove that the state is not the end, nor that the state is not organic. For obviously there would be no contention and strife unless the unity were implied and presupposed: you do not have disagreement between West-

¹ The statement on p. 164 shows a complete misunderstanding of Hegel's meaning.

minster Abbey and the Board of Trade. You only have hate when you can have love. Again, to deny that Society is organic because much has to be remedied and treated as a means (pp. 191-2), is somewhat astonishing. For in such a view a dog would not be an organism because it had lost an ear or had the mange. While, finally, since Mr M^cTaggart is compelled to hold that some social unity is essential for self-conscious life, by denying that this unity is that of an organism there comes to be little or no difference between the supra-organic unity which he suggests and hyper-individualism.

We have left little space to mention the theological chapters of the book. These are on the whole the least satisfactory. Mr M^cTaggart takes up throughout the attitude merely of an outsider, an attitude which is least likely to be successful in dealing with such questions. The chapter on "Sin" suffers very much from this lack of direct reference to the experience analysed by Hegel, whose firm and masterly grasp of the relevant facts is seen in somewhat painful contrast to that of his expositor. The translation of the passages referred to by Mr M^cTaggart on p. 154-5 is in one or two places not quite accurate, as a comparison with the text will show. The first extract, as translated, from which Mr M^cTaggart starts his discussion of Hegel's meaning, is entirely erroneous, and seems to have led our author away from the real drift of Hegel's argument. Mr M^cTaggart's translation runs, "The primary condition of man which is superficially represented as a state of innocence is the state of nature, the animal state. Man must (soll) be culpable," etc. Hegel, however, is stating, for purposes of criticism and contrast, *other people's* views. His meaning is, "When we have the earliest condition of mankind fancifully pictured as a state of innocence, this condition is (merely) the state of natural existence, the state of the brute. Man (however) has to be answerable for his actions (schuldig)," etc.

The so-called triad which Mr M^cTaggart finds in the extracts he gives—Innocence, Sin, Virtue—is strictly speaking not contained in them at all, nor in the passage of the *Philosophy of Religion* from which they are taken. Hegel is simply stating the spiritual transition from the condition of unconscious unity with the Whole from which man's religious life starts, through the process of conscious separation, isolation from that Whole, with all that this means in religious experience ("loneliness," "desertion," "abandonment by God," and so on), up to the final stage of complete conscious reconciliation with God or "atonement" (Versöhnung). Hegel treats these stages as respectively the state of natural existence, with its two forms of "natural goodness" and "natural badness"; the state of separation, also with its two forms of opposition to God and opposition to the world; and the state of reconciliation or atonement. It will be seen how far this is from Mr M^cTaggart's argument. Throughout, he does not distinguish between the peculiarly religious experience in question and the peculiarly moral experience in some ways allied to it. Hence his identification of Hegel's treatment of "Sin" in religion with the treatment of

"Guilt" in the *Philosophy of Law* (pp. 160 f. and 164)—an identification which quite distorts Hegel's meaning. We need not perhaps criticise in detail the interpretation put by Mr M^cTaggart on the nature of "Sin" and its value for "Virtue." That he maintains that Hegel's view of sin assumes the existence of evil (p. 159), shows how far he has left Hegel's real meaning behind; for it is almost obvious that to Hegel evil is not a something we lay hold of and thus fall into "sin." Sin is a moment in the nature of man's self-conscious life, and evil in the will is just sin. And when Mr M^cTaggart proceeds to point out that in some stages of the moral life there is not and need not be such a triad as the above, we can admit the accuracy of his statement without seeing how it is at all apposite as a correction of Hegel's doctrine.

The chapter on "Hegelianism and Christianity" is rather unhappy, both in the manner in which the argument is carried out and in the subject of the discussion itself. It does not treat of Hegelianism as such, nor of Christianity apart from Hegel; it professes to be simply a historical statement of Hegel's interpretation of certain doctrines of Christian theology. Even this is not quite accurate, as will be seen from a consideration of the somewhat confused sentences on pp. 197-8, where Mr M^cTaggart indicates the purpose of his chapter.

It is only possible to deal with one or two points in the chapter. According to Mr M^cTaggart, Hegel considered the "Holy Spirit" as "the sole reality of the Trinity" (p. 304), "Father" and "Son" being "moments in the nature of the Holy Spirit." This, says Mr M^cTaggart, is "a good way from the ordinary doctrine of the Trinity." Certainly, if this were an accurate rendering of Hegel's meaning. But surely "sole reality" is quite misleading. The Holy Spirit for Hegel is the supreme moment in that Reality which for the religious consciousness is now considered as "Father," and now as "Son," and again as "Holy Spirit." It is supreme simply because the self-consciousness which is the nature of Spirit is therein expressed most completely. To treat this "dialectic process" in the mechanical way indicated on p. 205 can hardly fail to distort the drift of Hegel's thought. Still more is this the case when Mr M^cTaggart goes on to treat the "Holy Spirit" as a "unity of persons," not a "personal unity." Hegel's expressions cease even to be intelligible in such a view.

Mr M^cTaggart's treatment of the Hegelian conception of "original sin" is perhaps the most singular part of his chapter. He takes it to mean that "man in his temporal existence on earth has in his nature a contingent and particular element," and that his nature is bad in respect to this element (p. 232). From this he draws the extraordinary "corollaries," (1) that we cannot trust that a proposition is true or a maxim binding because all or some men have an instinctive conviction regarding it; (2) that we cannot appeal to the unsophisticated natural instincts of the plain man; the old and educated are more likely to be right than the young and ignorant; (3) it is illegitimate to appeal to the opinions of the past as if

it were a golden age ; each generation inherits from its predecessors. How these "corollaries" come from Hegel's statements, and what in any case they have to do with "original sin," it seems impossible to say. And again the interpretation put upon the relevant passage quoted in pp. 230 ff. does not accurately render Hegel's view of "original sin." It is not the "contingent and particular element" from which sin comes. Sin, for Hegel, lies in the will, as he continually reiterates throughout his analysis. Sin is an essential moment of spiritual life, for the simple reason that self-consciousness at once contains, and yet has to rise above, the conditions of natural, *i.e.* purely physical and unconscious, existence. Being essential, it is necessary, and in that sense "original." It is a complete misunderstanding to trace the experience to anything "contingent" or "particular." But to follow out this and other points in the chapter would require more space than can be afforded.

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The Earliest Gospel: a historical study of the Gospel according to Mark, with a text and English version.—By Allan Menzies, M.A., D.D., Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of St Andrews.—Macmillan & Co., 1901.

THE title of this comely and very competent volume exhibits the general standpoint and aim of its author. Dr Menzies has arranged his material in much the same way as, for example, Sir Richard Jebb in his edition of Sophocles: the Greek text and a corresponding English version (often fresh and sometimes most felicitous) face one another upon opposite pages, whilst the commentary, or "historical study," flows continuously in double columns underneath both. Care and pains have been evidently spent upon the text; and it is serviceable to find that the more important Aramaic idioms or expressions are noted from time to time. But the distinctive quality of the volume lies elsewhere. To describe it as efficient rather than exhilarating, sound rather than vivid, would be to miss its essential note. What differentiates it from such commentaries as those by Professor Gould and Dr Swete may be defined as the subordination of the philological element to the historical, or the predominance of interpretation over verbal minutiae and linguistic details. "On the one hand it strives to approach to the original facts handed down by the tradition; on the other to understand those special interests of the age in which the Gospel was written, which necessarily determined in some degree both its contents and its form" (p. v). This combination of aims is surely a welcome feature. As every student is aware, or ought to be aware, the ultimate questions of gospel criticism lie behind philological and textual researches, and such

crucial matters as the genesis and reliability of a writer's sources, the relation of his aim to his authorities, and his own capacity and sincerity, cannot be studied with any hope of a reasonable answer except in the atmosphere of a historical temper, acutely sensitive to the various motives which shaped the evangelic tradition into its extant products. With such sensitiveness to contemporary aspects and interests and to the processes of primitive gospel tradition, Dr Menzies has prepared an edition of Mark's gospel whose novelty and significance lie in its method rather than in its results. It serves to orientate the mind towards the complex factors in the evolution of the gospel into the gospels. It is, in fact, a book of applied criticism. It exhibits historical criticism not simply laying down general principles, but coming forward to exercise its methods upon a complete evangelic text; and although it is inevitable that statements occur which one may be disposed to qualify or to unsay, that sometimes one would go further or less far, and that exception might be taken to one or two particular results, the reader of this volume never fails to meet a guide who affects to be *par negotiis neque supra*, furnished with an exact, sober scholarship, which plays no tricks of cleverness and makes no parade of learning, but is content to press plainly and steadily upon the delicate, fundamental task of estimating the historical value and analysing the historical growth or tendency of any given passage in Mark's gospel. Comments upon an inspired text are apt to be the reverse of inspiring. It is much if they are written by a man who recognises the existence of problems too subtle for the modern philologist or the patristic intellect. It is more if an edition, say, of any gospel is compiled by a scholar who not only recognises but frankly faces such problems. "Out of twelve jurymen," said Gibbon once, in haste and indignation, "I suppose six to be incapable of understanding the question, three afraid of giving offence, and two more who will not take the trouble of thinking. Remains one, who has sense, courage, and application." Nowadays at least, things happily are not at this sad pass among commentators. Many understand, some understand and explain, the crucial problems of their text. But sense, courage, and application, working in a medium of feeling for evidence and tested probability and the gradations of certainty, are not even yet so common in British editions of the synoptic gospels, that one can pass by, without some grateful acknowledgment, this instructive attempt of Dr Menzies to show how the earliest gospel may be regarded as a substantially accurate account of Jesus, and also as a product of the early Christian church; neither a photograph nor a prose epic with some religious tendency, but at once a memory of the past and a series of answers to present-day questions. The great point is to state and illustrate the position that there is such a thing in the gospels as didactic reminiscence, just as in the best poetry there is often unpremeditated art. When that is kept steadily in view, as it is throughout the pages of the present volume; when one is made to feel that a view of Jesus may be obtained from a gospel which has religious views of its own; the profit of the book is by no means confined to those passages

where the reader finds himself in absolute agreement with the author. Perhaps the main desideratum in this volume—apart from the treatment of the “miracles” (a word Dr Menzies refuses to employ, on account of its misleading associations), which occasionally fails to exhibit the author’s usual precision—is a paragraph or two to show in what sense the idealising spirit of the early church was a legitimate outcome of the impression made by Jesus upon faith. The existence of such reflection, in various degrees, is indubitable in the gospels, but its origin and value need to be accounted for in a more subtle manner than some critics seem to realise. Possibly Dr Menzies regarded this as outside his province. Yet one hopes that either he or some equally competent investigator will attempt soon to explain how the rising worship of Jesus was an effect as well as a cause, and how far its literary embodiments were classical and authentic.

After a lucid account of the general tendencies which went to the formation of the gospel tradition in the early church (pp. 1–20), including the ætiological, the apologetic, and the devotional motives, Dr Menzies devotes the remainder of his comprehensive introduction to a candid, sagacious discussion of the special phenomena of Mark. He considers this gospel to have been composed “if not before the year 70, at least not long after it” (p. 40), and composed “not with a view to church use, but for the information of the brethren” (p. 36). The priority of Mark to Matthew and Luke, one of the surest results of criticism, is of course accepted, as is the existence of a small Christian apocalypse in ch. xiii. (5–8, 14–20, 24–27) addressed to the believers in Jerusalem during the seventh decade of the first century, previous to the Roman siege. A favourable verdict is passed on the conjecture that xvi. 9–20 is the work of the presbyter Aristion (pp. 48–49, 292), a position certainly preferable to that occupied afresh by Belsler and J. P. van Kasteren, who have ascribed it to Mark himself, writing at a late period, possibly after the appearance of the third gospel. Upon the other hand, like Wernle and Professor Bacon recently, Dr Menzies believes in the Marcan authorship. He rightly assigns considerable authority to the evidence of Papias, although admitting that, as “the Paulinism of Mark does not amount to very much” (p. 39), neither is it a gospel of Peter (see pp. 47–51). But if the “Matthew-logia” of Papias are not identical with one canonical first gospel, is there not *a priori* a case for the hypothesis that the ill-ordered narrative of Mark, to which Papias alludes, may not have been identical with our second gospel, but with its rough materials? Dr Menzies does not develop the ur-Marcus theory. And yet, with all deference to his judgment, one feels driven sometimes to believe that there are phenomena in the gospel, elucidated by the internal evidence of Mark itself and by comparative criticism, which render some such hypothesis legitimate, even necessary, if the occasional duplicates and dislocations of the narrative are to be cleared up. In its present shape the gospel is of course an original work, not a translation of some Aramaic source; and ample evidence lies upon its pages to prove that it was designed for Western readers (pp. 36–38), perhaps even composed in Rome

itself. The latter thesis has received fresh corroboration recently from an interesting parallel to xiv. 8, adduced by Preuschen in his *Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft*, 1902, 252-3.

Henry Holbeach, with characteristic penetration, once analysed the more influential sources of human misunderstanding into (i.) differences of moral tone and sentiment, (ii.) differences of vocabulary, (iii.) poverty of imagination and downright ignorance, and (iv.) differences in the fulness of people's memories. These operate in all tradition and need to be reckoned with in an examination of the primitive gospel sources (see pp. 20 f.), although wider interests come into play within that sphere. But the central problem raised by such historical criticism relates to the amount of dogmatic or allegorising tendency, conscious as well as unconscious, which can be traced through the narratives and speeches of Jesus in the gospel-tradition. Are these influenced by a type of doctrine, or by various types? And if so, how far? Even in Mark there is, there could not but be, interpretation interwoven with the record. So much is self-evident. The delineation of Jesus proceeds not from a mere annalist, but from an author who, like his circle, was profoundly impressed by the Master, and who wrote for the religious needs of his own age. All scientific investigation, therefore, is bound to handle the question of this factor in its bearings upon the accuracy of the record, to distinguish between invention and interpretation, to assign valid motives for the latter, and to state the criteria of such judgments. Dr Menzies frankly but soberly adopts a position less radical than that advocated previously by Brandt and subsequently by Wrede on this topic. The object of his study is to do something like justice to both elements of the gospel. On the one hand, he essays to appreciate it as a devotional work produced by the early Christian consciousness, written *from faith for faith*, and intended especially to promote Christian piety and to rally belief in Christ by means of a vivid account of his personality and career in this world; on the other hand, his aim is to estimate the large amount of substantially historical matter transmitted by the primitive collections of Christ's sayings and deeds. The latter forms the bulk of our second gospel in the canon, and this book is written (pp. vi and 54) "with a profound conviction that as criticism declares the second gospel to be the porch by which we must go in to find the Saviour as he was and is" [one is not exactly sure about the right or ability of historical criticism to add, "and is"], "the earnest reader of that gospel may indeed find him there," even in a somewhat homely guise. The historical reality of this gospel is indisputable. That the gospel tradition "was formed on actual reminiscences of his life and acts and words is very certain" (p. 19). "The facts were often somewhat too real for the tradition to use." Particularly in those narratives evidently communicated by Peter, "we recognise a very primitive tradition and are on firm historical ground" (p. 77). Thus Mark's account, despite its defects and errors, is "historical in the main" (p. 51) and seldom biassed by doctrinal impulse; his narrative of the entry into Jerusalem (pp. 206 f.) is defended against the suspicions of Wellhausen and Dalman, and

upon the whole "the idealising tendency," while already at work, has not yet gone so far as it has in the case of the later gospels (p. 25). That it has operated even in Mark, however, is frequently recognised, and few will dispute the correctness of most of Dr Menzies' contentions. Traces of (a) material ante-dated are found, *e.g.*, in ii. 1-12, 18-20 (28?), vii. 1 f. The former passages are a well known crux; Wendt and Baldensperger had already transposed ii. 1-iii. 6 to a later period, and Wrede's recent essay deals with such sections in a sufficiently masterful manner. But—to take a single instance—it is a fair question whether, on psychological and historical grounds, the sombre saying about the removal of the bridegroom may not be held to have preceded the open declaration of viii. 27 f. At the later period, as Dr Menzies himself points out (pp. 166-167), when Jesus speaks, "we find that he has already made up his mind"; whilst *παρρησία* is "openly, unenigmatically," rather than "freely" or "confidently" (viii. 31). In view of the brief period covered by the whole ministry, is it not credible that even during its initial stage, when this tragic possibility was looming before his mind, some pregnant hint slipped out, especially when one recollects the recent arrest of John the Baptist (i. 14) and the fact noted in iii. 6? If the alternatives really are to regard the saying of ii. 20 as genuine but misplaced, or to take the passage as a posthumous, reflective comment of the apostolic age, I must confess the latter seems inherently more probable. (b) Traces of such apostolic reflection are found by Dr Menzies, in common with most critics, in *e.g.* the interpretation of the parable of the seeds (iv. 11-12, 13 f.), as in vii. 17 f.; in that predominance of the supernatural which explains most of the so-called "miracles" (pp. 131, 145, etc.), for which our author, like Otto Schmiedel, appeals to modern phenomena in China and Japan; in the account of the disciples' mission (vi. 7 f.) in viii. 38 to ix. 1 (pp. 40, 173); in Christ's predictions of his death, which "cannot have been so detailed as the gospels give them, but must have been filled up from the interpretation the early church learned to place on the Master's sufferings and death" (p. 171, *cf.* pp. 176 f., 198, 218), else the forgetfulness of the disciples afterwards would be unintelligible (but see on this point Oscar Holtzmann in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift*, 1901, pp. 271 f., and Dr Denney's *Death of Christ*, pp. 35 f.); in xiii. 10, etc. (c) Unhappy combinations of logia occur in iv. 21 f., ix. 39 f., xi. 25; whilst (d) unhistorical statements are pointed out, though not always with equal conclusiveness, in xiii. 27 (details of judgment beyond the view of Jesus) the reduplication of viii. 1 f. (simply a variant of the story in vi. 32 f.), the symbolic tale of the transfiguration (ix. 2 f.), Pilate's use of the term *King of the Jews* (xv. 9), and the allusion to the *prætorium* in xv. 16, beside, of course, xv. 33, 38, etc. In these and other details there is ample room for difference of opinion, nor can one always agree to particular points in the exegesis, which is occasionally helpful rather than final. For example, in view of Rev. i. 3, the "reader" of Mark xiii. 14 does seem to be the public reader in the church. Again, the phraseology about the inexpiable sin (iii. 29, 30) needs to be illustrated from the language of

inscriptions in Asia Minor (*Expository Times*, x. 55-56), and *in my name* (xiii. 6) is as likely to denote messianic claims as "in the name of Jesus." However, apart from such *minutiae*, it is but scant justice to say that the general treatment of the gospel is managed upon lines true to the best principles of historical research, although it is inevitable that in determining the limits of apostolic reflection in any particular passage of a gospel, much must depend upon the critic's preconceived ideas of the person of Jesus and of the rôle played, *e.g.*, by Paulinism in the catechetical instruction of the early church. There are some weighty, though incidental, proofs familiar to most students, that the evangelic tradition was substantially insulated at certain points from serious dogmatic contact. No serious attempt is made, for example, in the strata of the resurrection stories, to present anything like a narrative which would be in harmony with 1 Cor. xv. 2 f. Nor is there in the gospels any trace of the circumcision question, which formed so hot a topic of dispute in the age when the early gospel traditions were drawn up; and the significance of this omission is hardly to be overrated. Furthermore, although Mark is the earliest gospel, both Matthew and Luke preserve whole cycles of evangelic material which is undoubtedly as early, if not earlier, whilst Matthew at any rate (see p. 76, etc.) occasionally gives a much more primitive form of Mark's contents. The earliest (chronologically) gospel is not necessarily the most primitive at all points. Such considerations need to be weighed in estimating Mark's witness; they ought to make one pause (see p. 26) before either accepting Mark's graphic account of Jesus as adequate and complete in itself—a sort of irreducible historical minimum or standard—or discovering in its pages repeated and intentional echoes of the age in which and for which it was composed. Finally, it seems to the present writer that larger emphasis might perhaps be laid upon the "supernatural" element presented, often naively enough, in Mark's conception of Jesus, than Dr Menzies has always allowed. In urging this, though not in the conclusion which he draws from it, Wrede has done good service recently. For, whatever be its explanation, a sense of uniqueness and mystery pervades the Marcan delineation of Christ's person. The very eagerness with which the biography hurries *in medias res*, to present Jesus in successful contact with human sin and sorrow, and the realistic emphasis upon his human limitations, seem designed to bring out vividly his messianic or divine commission. The aureole is less radiant than in the later gospels. But it is there.

It is to be hoped that so educative, ripe, and opportune a volume may find an audience wider than that usually secured by commentaries. Here is at last a critical, fresh, readable edition of Mark's gospel, which may be perused by one who has no knowledge of Greek. Now, this equips it for coping with a phase of curious and deplorable provincialism which prevails to-day in certain circles of culture. As the reviews and magazines show almost every year, to say nothing of the *obiter dicta* of scientists upon theology, or of litterateurs writing (for example) on Matthew Arnold's biblical views and kindred topics, there would seem to be many intelligent

people who cherish a cavalier indifference to the historical criticism of the gospels as a whole, oblivious of its delicacy, hardly conscious of its achievements, and practically denying it any right to the title of "scientific." The causes of this unfortunate attitude, which would not be tolerated in any other branch of mental activity, need not be analysed at present. It is a weed with many roots. What one looks for is its removal through the circulation of such works as *The Earliest Gospel*, in which the problem is (like the Aristotelian State) εὐσύνοπτος, the issues and methods of modern research being stated without eccentricity or abstruseness or churchiness or fretfulness. It is specially a matter for congratulation that, in this conscientious, timely contribution to biblical criticism, Dr Menzies has made his processes of argument accessible not simply to professional students but also to all intelligent persons who will recognise that, apart from the religious question altogether, some acquaintance with this subject is essential to a liberal education, and who are intellectually serious enough to admit that the presence of religious tendency and contemporary interest in the gospels does not necessarily invalidate their historical witness to Jesus and his age, any more than the existence of an anti-imperial bias and of a belief in the phoenix would justify the modern reader in discarding or underrating the diamond pages of Tacitus. Outside as well as inside the boundaries of theology and the religious world, mists of prejudice linger still, which prevent people from getting any precise idea of what gospel criticism really is, and of how modern methods are at work solving its problems. The present volume will surely do something towards dissipating these prepossessions. And that will not be the least of its services to faith and common-sense.

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Supernatural Religion: An Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation.
—Popular Edition; carefully revised. [Issued for the Rationalistic Press Association, Limited.]—Watts & Co., 1902.

NOTHING could more strikingly exhibit the amazing change that has come over the field of biblical criticism in the course of a generation than the reappearance of this book, which burst upon the theological world only thirty years ago as an exploding bomb. Those of us who can recollect that sensation of our youth may feel almost like the newly awakened seven sleepers of Ephesus as we look round on the condition of thought and belief in the present day, in contrast with that of the seventies, when Huxley thundered defiance at the theologians, and Tyndall shocked the religious public with his Belfast address, and *Supernatural Religion* threatened to shatter the historic faith of Christendom. To-day that once terrible book comes back to us as an anachronism. Although its author informs us that it has been carefully revised, its spirit and tone and temper

are unchanged, and they are the spirit and tone and temper of an effete Philistine Anti-Christian Crusade. The great change in the method of criticism that has taken place during the interval between the first edition and the new popular edition is a transition from the polemical to the scientific, which amounts to a revolution. Our author belongs to the polemical era, as also did his most vigorous antagonist, Bishop Lightfoot. He goes back to Paley for the Christian apologetics that he undertakes to assail, and his whole style of thought is of the Paley order. It is not too much to say that he and his contemporary opponents were much nearer to the eighteenth century deistic and apologetic writing than they were to the critical inquiries of our own day. These people were for arguing on the platform; their successors are more anxious to seek light in the study. The old method reminds us of a debating society; the new method introduces us to the critical laboratory. Then the whole argument of the book is in keeping with the atmosphere in which it was bred. The author is simply concerned to disprove the miraculous element in Christianity, and accordingly he opens with a general discussion of this question. To indicate its crucial character he says, "The spontaneous offer of miraculous evidence, indeed, has always been advanced as a special characteristic of Christianity, logically entitling it to acceptance in contradistinction to all other religions" (p. 3); and again, "Miracles, it is true, are external to Christianity in so far as they are evidential, but inasmuch as it is admitted that miracles alone can attest the reality of divine revelation, they are still inseparable from it" (p. 5). "*It is admitted that miracles alone can attest the reality of divine revelation*"—what an old-world flavour that clause has for us to-day! In point of fact the change from the Paley position, which is all that *Supernatural Religion* is prepared to recognise as the Christian standpoint, to that of the intelligent believer of our own day, means that the case is entirely reversed, so that the latter, instead of accepting Christianity on the ground of the miracles, accepts it in spite of the miracles. Whether he admits these miracles or rejects them, his attitude towards them is towards difficulties, not helps. *Supernatural Religion* is naïvely unconscious of this tremendous change of front. Then the book's conception of the miracles themselves is no less stale and antiquated. It lumps all so-called supernatural occurrences together and attaches to them the one label "miracle." So did the apologists of the Paley school. But have we not come to see that this is a clumsy proceeding, only possible in the pre-scientific period? It is no longer a question whether we believe in miracles as such, or whether we are prepared to accept or reject *en bloc* all narratives dubbed miraculous. We must be more discriminating. We have seen that some of the events commonly called miraculous are much nearer in kind to some commonly called natural than to others that are assigned to the region of miracle. In a word, there is no one category of the miraculous. A man may be permitted to believe that our Lord cured St Peter's mother-in-law of fever, while he hesitates to admit that Aaron converted a rod into a serpent. But our author makes no allowance for

these differences. And yet he is willing to drag in the silly monstrosities of apocryphal legends in order to discredit the whole idea of the miraculous. He should have seen that the glaring distinction between these absurdities and the sober gospel narratives forbids the common classification of the miraculous that lies at the basis of his argument.

But we are dealing with a carefully revised edition. Space will only permit a brief glance at the principal items of the revision. The first change to strike the eye of the reader is the disappearance of the innumerable references in footnotes that astounded the world on the publication of the two sumptuous volumes of the earlier editions. This was inevitable in the production of a single volume for a popular edition. But there is significance in the omission of those famous notes. It is not too much to say that the book was floated in the first instance on its notes. The reader was to feel something like what we read afterwards of Robert Elsmere, whose faith began to crumble away the moment he was admitted into a certain mysterious library. He was to conclude that this must be a strong case, since it rested on so broad a foundation of learning. But Dr Lightfoot pricked the bubble by a pitiless exposure of the irrelevance of some of the most imposing lists of citations. It was a fine instance of the wisdom of "verifying your references." The author has now discreetly dropped these superfluous appendages.

The additions to the work in the new edition are chiefly with regard to four subjects. 1. "*The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles.*" This work, discovered by Bryennius, now the Patriarch of Nicomedia, in 1873, was not published till ten years later, and therefore was not accessible for the earlier editions of *Supernatural Religion*. Our author argues that its quotation of certain sayings of Jesus is no proof that our gospels were the sources for those sayings, and here he is probably right; but this is only to place the *Didache* in line with other works of the Apostolic Fathers that are equally indefinite in this respect. We are coming to see that citations of sayings found in our gospels are not necessarily taken from those works. The acknowledged fact that Matthew's *Logia* was not the gospel that now bears the name of Matthew—as Dr Lightfoot supposed—must involve this consequence. But the question is not of much moment here, since our author says, "No one would maintain that at the time when this *Didache* was compiled there was no written gospel" (page 155).

2. *Ignatius.* The Ignatian epistles demanded fresh treatment after the exhaustive examination to which they had been subjected in the interval between the earlier editions of *Supernatural Religion* and this new edition. It would have been pleasant if the author had adequately acknowledged his old antagonist's masterly work in vindication of the genuineness of the seven Greek epistles, a work which Harnack welcomed as of primary importance. Instead of doing this, he endeavours to make a point of the statement that "the majority of critics" recognise the three short epistles in the Syriac version as the most ancient form of the letters of Ignatius. This is not a case for counting numbers when three such consummate

scholars as Lightfoot, Zahn, and Harnack, who have made elaborate studies of the subject, take the opposite view.

3. Tatian's *Diatessaron*. The author had argued in his earlier editions that this work could not have been constructed out of our four gospels; it was too ancient for that to be possible on his hypothesis concerning the date of their origin. Unfortunately for his theory, the long-lost book appears to have been discovered in two or three forms, and it has been published and translated; and the book thus produced is constructed out of our gospels, as any reader can see at a glance. But the author of *Supernatural Religion* denies that it is genuine. He was driven to this in sheer desperation; and yet in spite of the difficulties that he raises, while the book has so much that corresponds with what we know of Tatian's work, beginning with the very same sentence, his argument can scarcely be called convincing.

4. *Acts and Josephus*. The discussion of the relation of Acts to Josephus is deserving of close attention. The author of *Supernatural Religion* here follows Holtzmann in arguing for the dependence of the author of Acts on the writings of Josephus, and it is not easy to avoid his conclusions. But it would have been more satisfactory if he had given equal attention to the studies of Prof. Ramsay, which he does not even condescend to mention, although they contain a mine of fresh evidence for the historicity of Acts.

In the last place, the treatment of "the silence of Eusebius" in this new edition is most unsatisfactory. Dr Lightfoot's triumphant exposure of the fallacy of the argument dealing with this subject, in his *Essays on Supernatural Religion* (1889) is really confirmed by our author's own admissions in his *Reply to Dr Lightfoot* (1889). What, then, are we to think of the retention of the discredited argument without any reference to this controversy? The book is based on so much genuine knowledge, and its arguments are stated with such admirable lucidity and force, that this method of procedure is all the more regrettable. May we not construct on it a new argument *a silentio*? But here again we come on the fatal defect. *Supernatural Religion* is not a scientific dissertation; it represents the special pleading of a debater.

W. F. ADENEY.

NEW COLLEGE, LONDON.

Studies in Political and Social Ethics.—By DAVID G. RITCHIE, M.A.,
LL.D.—Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1902.

THE "Ethical Library," edited by Prof. Muirhead, to which the above volume belongs, has provided some excellent manuals for thoughtful and intelligent social workers. Prof. Ritchie's "studies," or "exoteric discourses," as he calls them, have all appeared before in various periodi-

cals, but, collected together, they form a very useful addition to the series, which has been the means of rescuing so many other valuable papers from the fate which usually attends magazine articles. "It seems to me," says the author, "possible and profitable to discuss practical questions of political and social ethics on the basis of what may be called evolutionary utilitarianism, without raising, or at least without discussing, metaphysical questions, provided that one may take for granted that faith in the value and meaning of human society and human history which is implied in all serious political and social effort." He admits that the "faith" spoken of can only be theoretically justified by a metaphysic which can show grounds for the assumption of the ultimate rationality of the world. Many will wish that the metaphysical foundation in question had been made more explicit, especially as "supernatural sanctions" are ruled out of court. But Prof. Ritchie is always stimulating and suggestive, whether the reader agrees with him or not.

Of the eight essays in the book, the two last are of more directly philosophical interest. That on "The Ultimate Value of Social Effort," written from what is named a "humanist position in ethics," based, that is to say, upon "faith in humanity and progress," rather than upon faith in God, endeavours to show that the standard of social well-being, as the end of individual conduct, may be freed from the shadow of pessimism that seems, in some minds, to cling to it. Prof. Ritchie's "faith" rests, in the long run, upon our knowledge of human development in the past, and on the "social instinct," inbred, so to speak, in the very texture of a conscious mind. He would probably allow that a belief in the fundamental rationality of the world was a somewhat massive foundation for so comparatively modest a superstructure, especially as he apparently holds that it is not of much concern to the practical moralist what the ultimate destiny of human society may be. Sufficient is it for the practical moralist, wishing to know, here and now, what to do, to be persuaded that, within the world we know and can affect, there is a worse and a better, and that we should do our best to make it better whilst it lasts. In this contention the author comes dangerously near to making a violent severance in the spiritual life, against which he would presumably be among the first to rebel. It is wholly impossible that any theological or anti-theological belief can be without influence upon the character or conduct of the believer. It is wholly impossible that one set of ideals can exist side by side with another in an individual life, and that there should be no interconnection between them. For example, either the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity or the Christian virtue of humility may be a worthy object of attainment, but no man can possess both. Similarly, the moral duties that commend themselves to the sceptic may be as worthy as those which commend themselves to the theist, but they cannot be the same. "It makes a great practical difference," says Prof. Ritchie, "whether morality is based on the sanctions of heaven and hell, or whether the fact of the incompleteness of the highest moral effort here is used to suggest a hope that nothing good may be altogether lost."

Exactly so ; but the practical difference is no less between the latter view (which Spinoza had in mind when he wrote "sentimus atque experimur nos aeternos esse") and the view that annihilation, whether we will it or no, is to be the end of all moral striving. In the essay on "Free Will and Responsibility," some admirable criticisms are offered of the doctrine of indeterminism, and it is convincingly shown that the power of predicting conduct is not inconsistent with responsibility. "As Mr Bradley has very ingeniously put it, it is a strange way of proving man to be accountable, to make him out to be an altogether unaccountable creature." But there are deeper issues involved in the controversy than Prof. Ritchie is willing to recognise. He is strenuous in insisting that the principle of natural causation is as applicable to the phenomena of the mental life as to the phenomena of material nature. "Fear of pain, inclination towards an object, are causes of our volition, in the same sense in which rain and sunshine are causes of the growth of plants." It is a dictum, this, open at least to grave doubt. Unless we are prepared to maintain that the nature of the facts related in no way influences the kind of relationship subsisting between them, we are entitled to expect that the all-important factor of consciousness will introduce some change in the law according to which the events in question are bound together. If there is to be a science of psychology or of sociology, "the principle of 'Necessity,'" Prof. Ritchie thinks, "must apply to the phenomena of human life *in the same sense* in which it applies to the phenomena of nature." But must it? The causal relation is, after all, but a special case of the wider conception of Ground and Consequent; one form, that is to say, of the ultimate demand for the connectedness of the parts of reality which intelligence carries with it to the interpretation of experience. No doubt the successive stages of conscious existence are related; and if related, then necessarily related; but the necessity need not be the necessity which attaches to physical events, nor to premisses and conclusion in a logical argument. Is it not to form a wholly inadequate notion of the richness of real existence to suppose that it has no more in it than these purely abstract relations? And is it not likely to be from our very tendency of so interpreting "Necessity" that the difficulties coming to the surface in the Free Will problem arise?

The other essays call for no special comment. That on "Social Evolution" contains an excellent refutation of some of Mr Kidd's fallacies; whilst Prof. Ritchie is never happier than when dealing with Herbert Spencer's individualism, as he does in the chapter on "Law and Liberty." The defence of the system of party government in chapter iv., and the discriminative treatment of War in chapter vi., are good illustrations of his sound common-sense; whilst the delightful little exposition of the ideas at the root of the French Revolution in chapter v. is one of the most interesting features of an eminently interesting book.

G. DAWES HICKS.

Contentio Veritatis: Essays in Constructive Theology.—By Six Oxford Tutors. London: J. Murray, 1902.

It may fairly be said that the most important fact in regard to this book is its existence. The authors claim that among the young men with whom they associate there is a pressing demand for the formulation of a broader and more liberal theology, and that they are fairly well agreed among themselves as to the best way of meeting that demand. And the book comes from working Tutors of the University of Oxford, which even in these days mainly gives the tone to Anglican thought. In recent years, Broad Church theology has been in abeyance; and signs of its revival, which are now every year thickening, must be welcome.

The volume before us is in many ways promising. An adequate treatment in one volume of the many difficult questions taken up by the writers is of course impossible, but something is done in the way of breaking ground. The influence of Oxford is strong on the writers; perhaps partly due to this influence is the tendency to treat questions mainly historic rather in a philosophical or rhetorical fashion than in one strictly appropriate. The seven essays contained in the book are, as must always be the case in such compilations, of very various degrees of merit, some showing a bold and hopeful attempt to sketch the lines of a faith suited to the age, some merely departing in a more liberal direction from the ordinary views of Anglican moderate churchmen.

The first paper, by Dr Rashdall, on the Ultimate Basis of Theism, is a piece of keen and clearly expressed philosophical reasoning. Dr Rashdall holds that the only reasonable explanation of the facts of consciousness is an idealism which recognises the existence and goodness of a Deity. Many readers will accept his view, and be grateful to him for the remarkable perspicuousness with which it is set forth. But the writer comes to a difficulty which he can scarcely be said to surmount when he tries to show that "the conception of God to which we are led by the use of our reason . . . is also that which is set before us by Christianity." Dr Rashdall is one of the most liberal of theologians, and he can scarcely mean to say that whoever will be a Christian must needs accept the particular form of Idealism which he advocates. That would indeed be a narrowing of the Church. Nor can he mean that the reasoning powers of man in themselves would lead any clear-headed man to Christianity. That would indeed be an extreme of inverted rationalism. "Our Lord himself," he says, "appealed to the intrinsic reasonableness of what He said as the proof and confirmation of the truth of His doctrine." Certainly St Paul makes that appeal; but the Founder of Christianity does not make His appeal to the reason, at all events not to the philosophic faculty of men. He appeals to the conscience, to feeling, to experience: but His "I say unto you" can scarcely be called an appeal to reason. The fact is that Dr

Rashdall does not clearly distinguish between the teaching of the Founder and that of the Disciples.

The latter part of Dr Rashdall's paper is taken up with a very clear and satisfactory account of the question of miracles, regarded from a philosophic standpoint. He holds that the idea of a suspension of natural law is not *a priori* inadmissible; but at the same time, since such an admission would destroy all the criteria both of scientific and historical reasoning, it could not be accepted without an amount of evidence which is practically unattainable in reference to the events of the distant past. Perhaps this is as far as philosophy can take us in the vexed question of miracle. That the writer stops short of any really historic treatment of the subject is to be regretted, though it is intelligible. For after all, the last word in the matter belongs to anthropology and history. And that word is easily spoken. Coleridge said he had seen too many ghosts to believe in them: in the same way, to anthropology the miracle proper is a thing so familiar that it soon ceases to be taken literally. Unusual psychical phenomena, including the abnormal healing of disease, come, of course, in another category. Modern experience has sufficiently proved that in them there is nothing beyond nature, though there be much beyond the narrow theories of the materialists.

The most attractive of the remaining essays are those by Mr Inge on the Person of Christ, and on the Sacraments. Mr Inge unites in a high degree the qualities of clearness, charm, and courage; and he is desirous to construct, not merely to criticise. In speaking of the Person of Christ he begins with a very slight historic sketch, which is in some degree warped, because he does not allow that the roots of views like those of the Adoptian and Docetic Schools are to be traced just as clearly as are those of the orthodox or victorious doctrines in the writings of St Paul and the Fourth Evangelist. And like Dr Rashdall he is too much disposed to try to create a new orthodoxy by identifying Christianity with the principles of personal idealism. But the whole of this chapter is full of striking and suggestive observations. And when, at p. 83, Mr Inge begins to discuss the relations of doctrine to modern life and thought, he gives us twenty pages which we cannot attempt to discuss or to summarise, but which nearly all thoughtful Christians will find full of suggestion and of help. Their chief fault is their too great brevity.

Mr Inge's other paper, that on the Sacraments, is also interesting reading. It is necessarily in closer relation to history. And Mr Inge strives with some measure of success to work from the historic and comparative point of view. I say "some measure of success," because I do not think that he succeeds entirely, or so well as we may hope that he will succeed hereafter. His narrow limits of space may be partly to blame. But he hardly ever gives authorities for facts: and what is the value of a statement which the reader cannot verify? Again, his statements are often so loose and general as to lose their value. For example, at p. 274 he treats very slightly the difficult question of savage sacrifices of communion.

“ Again, the *whole* tribe must partake ; this is insisted upon in North and South America, and by many African peoples.” No references are given ; but this is a statement of anthropological fact which cannot be passed on a mere *ipse dixit*. It is this want of thoroughness in historic method which has led Mr Inge into such assertions as that our Lord put baptism in the place of the Jewish circumcision. This statement is quite without probability and without defence. Everyone knows that infant baptism was not introduced into the Church until long after the death of the Founder. However, in spite of these defects, Mr Inge’s treatment of the Sacraments is full of interest and value.

Some account of the results of Biblical criticism is given in regard to the Old Testament by Mr Burney, and in regard to the New Testament by Mr Allen. The case is by both writers stated fairly enough, but they can scarcely be said to go far below the surface. Questions of date and of authorship of the Biblical books are in truth only preliminary to their real criticism, which must needs proceed mainly on historic and psychologic grounds. Mr Allen says that this more searching criticism is beyond the range of the ordinary educated Christian. This is doubtful : the clergy are much too fond of assuming a low level of intelligence in the laity ; with the result, it is to be feared, that the intelligent laity are apt to lose confidence in them. One would indeed be tempted to invert Mr Allen’s assertion, and to say that while questions of date and authenticity can be settled only by experts, any person of intelligence can easily be made to understand that in all testimony there is a strong local and subjective element, and that it is a mere blunder to regard documents of religion as colourless narratives.

The remaining papers—that of Mr Wild on the Teaching of Christ, and that of Mr Carlyle on the Church—are so brief and slight in comparison with the importance of their subjects that it is not easy to criticise them. One is glad to see that Mr Wild conforms to the one fundamental condition of his subject in keeping the testimony of the Synoptists apart from that of the Fourth Evangelist, a condition neglected even by some great modern scholars, such as Wendt and Westcott.

On the whole, if *Contentio Veritatis* does not throughout reach a very high standard, it is heartily to be welcomed. It is written in an honest, straightforward, and yet conciliatory spirit. Coming whence it does, it may be very useful in indicating to students the problems which lie before the Clergy and the Christian laity for solution, on the side of the Bible and doctrine. It is very pleasant to find the rudiments of an Anglican school of Broad Church theology at Oxford. Nor can it be said that the intellectual level of the book is lower than that of the more noted *Lux Mundi*.

PERCY GARDNER.

The Problem of Conduct: A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics.—
By Alfred Edward Taylor, Assistant Lecturer in Greek and Philosophy at the Owens College, Manchester.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1902.

WRITTEN with freshness, force, and great ability, uniformly interesting, full of striking and suggestive *obiter dicta*, this book is rather too unsystematic, and touches on too many philosophical problems not directly related to its main subject,—the bases of ethical theory. None the less, we repeat, is the book most interesting and well worth reading.

Mr Taylor approaches the question of the Method of Ethics with a conception of metaphysics similar to that of Avenarius in his *Kritik der Reinen Erfahrung*. In metaphysics, as distinct from science, we study “general characteristics which belong, not to this or that class of facts or to this or that aspect of experience, but to the facts of life or the contents of experience viewed as a whole” (p. 24). Its ideal is “an experience free from all admixture of anything which is not itself experience,” and free from any hypotheses or ideas which may be shown to be self-contradictory. Do these two expressions involve the same principle? The author does not discuss the primary and fundamental question of the place of Reason in experience. Is reason simply a machine for observing and recording facts,—or is it true that no object can be presented to Reason unless Reason is itself present in the object?

Having indicated his conception of metaphysics, the author proceeds in chapter ii. to examine arguments for the metaphysical treatment of Ethics. He maintains justly that the distinction of Ought and Is cannot be an *ultimate* distinction, for in order to know what ought to be, we must know what things are. He examines Green’s conception of the basis of Ethics, as the most important of recent attempts to find a metaphysical basis. Mr Taylor is surely right in distinguishing (p. vi) between Green’s account of moral institutions and the metaphysical assumptions of the earlier chapters of the *Prolegomena to Ethics*. It is the latter that he attacks, maintaining that the theory of the “Eternal Self” is untenable; and if true, would be useless for Ethics. Green’s doctrine seems to him to do away with empirical psychology by its account of the “timeless self,” and its tendency to identify this “self” with the abstract relation of Subject and Object. He objects to regarding the Absolute merely as a kind of logical centre of relations, and does not see how the self of Psychology can be emptied of empirical detail and put outside the time-process. We do not propose to discuss these criticisms; we may, however, venture on the remark that it is scarcely possible that Green’s doctrine can have been satisfactory to himself. He needed a third term between the Eternal Self-consciousness and the empirical contents of the mind; and the difficulties of finding it and of doing without it were equally serious to his theory.

But whatever may be thought of Green’s view, Mr Taylor’s discussion

has not thrown much light on the precise relation between Ethics and Metaphysics. He sums up his position (p. 494) as follows:—"An ethical theory which shall take into account all the phases of the moral life and attempt to group them in order of their increasing depth and complexity,—a metaphysical theory which shall apply its standard of ultimate intelligibility without fear or favour to all our most cherished ideals,—these two can only flourish where neither is allowed to intrude into the province of the other." What is implied by the phrase "intrude into"? Metaphysics cannot indeed be *identified with* Ethics, but Metaphysics must *take account* of Ethics, as Mr Taylor's whole procedure shows. In what sense can it take account of Ethics? From this book we should gather that it is only by way of purely negative and destructive criticism of the characteristic facts of the moral life.

This criticism the author develops in chapters iv., v., and vii., entitled respectively "The Types of Virtue," "Moral Ideals and Moral Progress," and "The Goal of Ethics." He gives an impressive defence of Mr Bradley's view that egoism and altruism are in the end irreconcilable; or—to express it more accurately—that "self-development" and "social justice," though partly harmonious, represent two incompatible ideals, between which an unsatisfying compromise is the best that can be obtained. So far, in our opinion, the author is on safe ground; although the conclusion may be set in a light very different from that in which he regards it. It seems to us that the attempt to prove that self-development and social service are *identical*, by means of the doctrine of "self-realisation," is mere phraseology. A profound metaphysical problem is not to be solved by the persistent reiteration of a formula. But Mr Taylor proceeds to argue that the practical moral ideals of our civilisation are found to be self-contradictory when their implications are fully thought out, and that any attempt to make them intellectually self-consistent would end in making them quite impracticable; the notion of a perfect good, whether for the individual or for society, being a necessary but unthinkable illusion. These conclusions are brilliantly set forth; and some passages manifest an almost evangelical fervour in dwelling on the worthlessness of the merely moral life. From occasional references to Religion in these chapters, we might suppose that the author identifies Religion with that type of it which was represented by Wesley and Whitefield. But Religion is not committed to the view that the life of human morality is worthless. Religion is committed to the view that the moral life is not ultimate reality, and that the ethical theory which endeavours to give an intelligible account of that life is not ultimate truth; and to say this is not to say that Morality and Ethics are self-contradictory illusions. Yet if Mr Taylor really means what he appears to say, his conclusion must be that even the highest form of existence known to us is no more than a transient illusion that "stains the white radiance of Eternity."

Does Mr Taylor adopt this position, common to the Pantheism of the East and the West, that all distinctions are illusory? Again and again

in his concluding chapter on Religion (entitled "Beyond Good and Bad") he seems to adopt it. For example, we find the statement that religious experience arises from "a love of thoroughness and whole-hearted absorption in your pursuit, whatever the pursuit may be" (p. 482). All that is required is singleness and sincerity of aim, and utter devotion to it, whether the aim be bad or good (p. 486). In other words, all distinctions are illusory for Religion; and this may be extended to cover even the distinctions of truth and falsehood, of beauty and ugliness, since the term morality has a wider meaning which applies to all practical life where the presence of an *ideal* can be discerned (p. 467). The same tendency to deny distinctions seems to lead the author to adopt the fundamental fallacy of the Hegelian philosophy of religion,—the view that in religious experience "we are conscious of our own fundamental identity with a universal order, which fulfils itself *no less* in our blunders, mistakes, sins, and ultimately perhaps in our extinction as finite individuals, than in our highest successes":¹ in other words, we are conscious of *ourselves* as perfect. This phraseology is not taken seriously by Mr Taylor any more than by other writers who have used it; and in spite of it, this concluding chapter contains so many original and profound reflections as to make it the most valuable and suggestive part of the book.

We have emphasised the *via negativa* which looms so largely in Mr Taylor's thought. But there is another principle which we believe to be present in his thought, although he appears to have unfortunately taken the statement of it for granted. Let us briefly consider the assertion that in Religion I know *myself* to be perfect. This might mean that I recognise the Absolute as the complete and harmonious realisation of the aspirations which, in a far from harmonious and systematised form, make up my inner life. Or it might express the meeting-point of two opposite extreme views—that in the Absolute Experience the aforesaid aims and purposes still subsist in their confusion and disharmony as they compose what I call my "self," and on the other hand, that they are a pure illusion, perfection in the Absolute meaning annihilation, as in the *via negativa*. These latter views are equally impossible. To maintain the other—that the Absolute is the perfect realisation of our highest tendencies or aspirations—we require the doctrine of Degrees of Reality, which is the principle to which we referred. The small struggling self is *real*, but the Absolute is far *more real*; and to grow in perfection is to grow in reality. Thus, to recognise another character as higher than mine, implies both that my "self" has a positive reality of its own, and that there is a form of life which in itself expresses the nature of the Absolute more truly and deeply than I do now. Thus, again, Evil is real, but Good is far more real; and we may regard Evil as in a sense essential to the Absolute without regarding the Absolute as morally indifferent. For Evil may be essential in that its existence is necessary for the progress of Good, which is everywhere victoriously over-

¹ The italics are ours.

coming it, and grows by these victories. It is to be regretted that this important constructive line of thought was not given a more prominent place in Mr Taylor's book.

S. H. MELLONE.

HOLYWOOD, BELFAST.

Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford. Edited by Henry Sturt.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1902.

THE editor's preface to this very stimulating and suggestive volume of essays tells us that the main object of the book is "to develop and defend the principle of personality. Personality, one would have supposed, ought never to have needed special advocacy in this self-assertive country of ours. And yet by some of the leading thinkers of our day it has been neglected, while by others it has been bitterly attacked. What makes its vindication the more urgent is that attacks have come from two different sides. One adversary tells each of us: 'You are a transitory resultant of physical processes'; and the other, 'You are an unreal appearance of the Absolute.' Naturalism and Absolutism, antagonistic as they seem to be, combine in assuring us that personality is an illusion." When Mr Sturt further states that the views in the book "are a development and not a renunciation of the mode of thought which has dominated Oxford for the last thirty years," this statement seems to us to hold good only of those less important portions of the work which aim to refute Naturalism, but as to the polemic against Absolutism, which forms the pith of the volume, it is manifestly no development of, but rather a vigorous reaction against, the idealistic theory which Hegelian thinkers introduced into Oxford. The essayists continually remind us that *Will* as well as *Thought* must enter into our account of the ultimate nature of things; and though the book is named "Personal Idealism," the idealism that is presented in its pages is much more akin with Berkeleyan Idealism than it is with the doctrine which has given celebrity to the Oxford and Glasgow schools. And with regard to the nature and causality of the Self, though none of the essayists venture to brave the contempt which Mr F. H. Bradley and his followers so lavishly pour on all who profess and call themselves Libertarians, yet, as we shall have to point out, the personality which they are so concerned to defend is largely emptied of its meaning and its worth if its real freedom of choice between alternatives is ignored or denied.

It is only with the more important of the essays that this short notice can deal. In the opening paper Dr G. F. Stout analyses with great acuteness the nature of "Error," and reaches a much more optimistic estimate of the range of man's cognitive faculty than that set forth in Mr Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. He shows that there are limits to the possi-

bility of error, that unexplored conditions can affect the truth of a statement only in so far as they are relevant, and the relevancy in each case depends on the nature of the question raised. Hence he concludes that "in order to attain absolute knowledge, it is by no means necessary to wait until we have attained an adequate knowledge of the absolute. The truth of judgments concerning what is real is not logically dependent on the truth of judgments concerning 'Reality,' with a capital R."

The second essay—the longest, the most daring, and the most original of the series—is from the pen of that dexterous and brilliant free-lance in philosophy, Mr F. C. S. Schiller. It is entitled "Axioms as Postulates," and its object is to establish and extend that view of our intuitive beliefs as being originally rules of action, tentatively adopted in order to meet mental and spiritual needs, which Prof. William James has expounded and defended under the name of "Pragmatism." Mr Schiller's main idea is clearly illustrated in the criticism which he passes on Kant's distinction between the Theoretical and the Practical Reason. If, he argues, Kant is correct in his contention that the Practical Reason has a right to postulate, and that the ethical postulates are really valid, then we are committed to far more than Kant supposed: "Postulation must be admitted to be capable of leading to knowledge, and the thought will readily occur that it lies at the very roots of knowledge. For, of course, postulation cannot be confined to Ethics. The principle, if valid, must be generalised and applied all round to the organising principles of our life. The Theoretic Reason will, in this case, be rendered incapable of contesting the supremacy of the Practical Reason by being absorbed in it and shown to be derivative. Thus postulation is either not valid at all or is the foundation of the whole theoretic superstructure."

This extract will show how revolutionary is the principle which Mr Schiller's most interesting essay propounds; and if his attempt to justify it by applying it to explain the genesis of such ideas as Self-Identity, Space, Time, Causation, etc. is, as in our case, not wholly convincing, it is, at all events, richly suggestive, and incidentally does much towards undermining that excessive intellectualism "which is naturally the besetting sin of philosophers, and a perennial idol of the academic theatre." In a fascinating section, towards the close of the paper, Mr Schiller contends that in the case of the teleological conception of the cosmos we have a belief which is still in the formative stage, but which future experience will probably convert into an axiom. The student of the philosophy of religion will be interested to learn that in Mr Schiller's view the Personality of God should be esteemed an indispensable postulate in a religious conception of the world. With regard to the Immortality of the Soul, it follows from the fundamental principle of the paper that whether belief in a future life is or is not destined to become an established axiom, mainly depends upon the question whether people really desire or ought to desire such a continuance of personal consciousness. Hence the endeavour of the

American Branch of the Society for Psychical Research (with which Mr Schiller is associated) to attain full and accurate statistics on this matter.

The third paper is on "The Problem of Freedom in its relation to Psychology," by Mr W. R. Boyce Gibson. The early portion of this paper encourages the expectation that we are going to have a vigorous defence of the Libertarian position, for the views of Dr Bosanquet on this question and those of the French philosopher Fouillée are rejected as being nothing better than "soft" determinism, and Mr Gibson says "It seems impossible not to agree with Prof. James in saying that once a man's alleged spontaneity is completely at the mercy of its antecedents and concomitants, it is logically indifferent what these determinants may be, whether they be of the crowbar or the velvety type, whether they constitute a nexus of cranial motions and dispositions or a nexus of motives, character, and circumstance. Whether the predetermination be physical or psychical the result is in both cases the same: the act of spirit could not have been other than it was."

The last sentence of this quotation appears to imply precisely what the Libertarian claims to be the fact; but, strange to say, as we proceed with the paper, we find the writer engaged in a polemic against Prof. James's admission of "indeterminateness," and he appears in the end to reach a conclusion diametrically opposite to the position which the above extract asserts, and to contend that each moral decision which a man makes in seasons of temptation, is the only one which he, being what he was, could possibly have made. What the writer is trying to establish in this apparently self-contradictory paper is not quite clear. We suppose it is this, that whereas absolute idealists talk about "self-determination," and yet appear to recognise the existence of no individual first causes possessed of power to perform such an act of self-determination, Mr Gibson believes in the existence of such a separate causal self, but he seems at the same time to agree with the absolute idealist that the acts of this causal self involve no free choice between equally possible alternatives; and in so doing he is apparently quite forgetful of his own assertion at the opening of his paper, that the decisions of the spirit in temptation could have been other than they were. We hear from a friend that Prof. W. James is to review this work in a contemporary journal; it will be interesting to see how that vigorous and independent thinker deals with Mr Gibson's ingenious attempt to secure that real freedom of choice which man's moral consciousness desiderates while eschewing every vestige of that "indeterminateness," the rejection of which Mr Schiller would probably explain as a postulate which has become practically axiomatic in the intellect of the thoroughbred Oxford don.

Of the remaining essays, one of the most interesting is that on "Art and Personality," by the accomplished editor of the series. This paper will well repay careful reading, for it evinces both philosophic insight and a temperament keenly sensitive to all forms of physical and spiritual beauty. The dominating idea appears to be that all works of art, to be adequately

appreciated, must be studied in connection with, and not in abstraction from, the character of the personalities who have created them. We wish our space allowed us to analyse and criticise the rich vein of thought which lends much interest and value to Mr Sturt's elaborate essay. The following passage on the analogy between art, knowledge, and conduct may be taken as a fair sample of the whole :—"The admiring appreciation of personal life, which is the mainspring of art, is the mainspring of knowledge and morality also. There is not room here to justify the parallelism in detail ; but it is important to forestall the notion that art is an anomalous province of our life. Of both knowledge and morality it may be said that they are unselfishly enthusiastic, and that the objects of their enthusiasm are either persons or things with personal qualities."

In the essay on "The Future of Ethics," Dr F. W. Bussell gives a most striking study of the historical characteristics of Oriental and Occidental modes of thought, and draws from it an anticipation of the ideal of human conduct which will become dominant in the twentieth century. Like most of the essays in this volume, this very able paper insists on the significance and value of the individual personality, and disparages all attempts to merge the Individual in the Universal, and to deduce rules for human conduct from certain supposed first principles. The nineteenth century, we are told, is marked by two somewhat opposite tendencies, which, closely considered, are irreconcilable : "the one tendency makes for *practical effort*, the other for *quietism* and *abstention*. The one rests on the conviction of the abiding value of the individual, however difficult to explain, justify, or define, and the relativity of all else ; the other, whether from the side of religious or physical monism, preaches that complete or implicit mysticism which, denying the individual as an illusion, and glozing over his sufferings in advancing the world-purpose for some inscrutable end, proclaims the tyranny of the triumphant One."

It is accordingly to practical effort, and to the *faith* which inspires this personal activity, that Dr Bussell looks for the dominant ethical spirit of the new century. Certainly this essay emphasises, in a most lucid and forcible way, an aspect of human experience which recent culture has too much neglected, but, as appears to us to be the case in other essays in the volume, by its exclusive insistence on the individual personality, it somewhat overlooks that other side of thought and religion which arises out of the felt immanence of the Infinite and the Universal in the finite and the particular, or, as Lotze would express it, of the self-revelation of the Perfect Personality of God in the progressive ideals of mankind.

The last, but certainly not the least weighty of these thought-awakening essays is Dr Rashdall's admirable paper on "Personality, Human and Divine." Though the most important section of the essay, viz., the reply to the objections brought against the Personality of God, is manifestly based on Lotze's ideas, it is nevertheless by no means devoid of originality. The cosmical philosophy which pervades the essay would, in our view, have gained much in consistency and intelligibility if the writer

had adopted the "ideal-realism of Lotze" rather than the resuscitated Berkeleyanism set forth in Prof. Ward's *Gifford Lectures*. The doctrine that only God and conscious souls have any real self-existence starts the insoluble question at what point, vegetable or animal, in organic evolution the sudden and mysterious advent of real self-hood takes place; and, on the other hand, the denial of all independent reality to body and brain compels Dr Rashdall, in his endeavour to explain the action of personalities on each other, to have recourse to something like the intervention of a *Deus ex machina*.

Finally, Dr Rashdall's account of the human personality inevitably suggests, but entirely fails to answer, the question as to the free causality and real responsibility of the spirit of man. No intelligent reader of this essay can avoid applying to Dr Rashdall himself the words which he, in the first number of this Journal, applies to Dr Fairbairn, viz., "Dr Fairbairn would not be a solitary exception to the tendency of modern thought if he should desire definitely to enrol himself on the indeterminist side, but we might have expected him to tell us whether he intends to do so or not." There is not, however, any reason to think that in Dr Rashdall's own case this reasonable expectation will ever be fully realised. So far as can be judged from the recent interesting and powerful utterances of this very thoughtful writer and preacher, the probability is that he, like the late Prof. Sidgwick, will remain to the close of his mortal career in a condition of unstable equilibrium in reference to the Free-will question, being drawn in one direction by the influence of Lotze and his own moral consciousness, and in the other direction by his reverence for the dogma (which, as we have said, appears to be still regarded in most Oxford classrooms as practically axiomatic) that "each particular act of the human spirit must stand in an intelligible [i.e. *necessary*] relation either to preceding acts or the character as a whole."

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Cross-Bench Views of Current Church Questions.—By H. HENSLEY HENSON, B.D., Canon of Westminster.—Edward Arnold, 1902.

IN this volume Mr Henson has recovered certain of his essays and addresses of occasional origin, but of much more than occasional interest. Such literary salvage is not always justified. The reading public is indeed always ready to welcome the aftermath of a prolific mind, or to tolerate the scantiest gleanings from the field which has already yielded it an abundant harvest. But it expects from the literary postulant a unity of subject and a comprehensiveness of treatment which a chance collection of essays but seldom reveals. It may be admitted, however, at once and

without qualification, that Mr Henson possesses a solidity of intellectual and practical judgment and a trenchant vigour of style which must always secure for even his most occasional writings the interest of the judicious and the critical.

This book ranges over most matters of contemporary import in the politics and discipline of the Church of England. It touches two questions of a larger theological scope in the essay on the interpretation and authority of Holy Scripture, and the paper on the Mivart Episode. But the distinction of the book, and that which gives it the intellectual symmetry which such books rarely have, is that all its sections, however accidental their present neighbourhood, testify to a single definite conception in the mind of its author. There is nothing in the treatment of Church questions which is the occasion of so much haziness on the one hand and narrowness on the other as the confusion of the double character of the English Church. It is at once a Church and an Establishment—an organ of national religion, and a religious society constituted in a special way and pledged to the teaching of a particular theology. Mr Henson is guilty of no such confusion. He keeps clear, alike before himself and his readers, the double rôle which the Church has to play, the double claim which, so long as she remains an Establishment, she has somehow to meet. More than that, he has no hesitation about his desire that the Church should remain an Establishment, and therefore none about the conditions on which alone that is possible. Briefly, these conditions are two—that in matters of theology the Church should hold fast by the essential elements of Christianity and sit loose to all merely denominational positions, and that in matters of government she should cordially recognise the national right of control which can only be effectively mediated through Parliament. With regard to the first, Mr Henson thinks that the undoubted difficulties arising from partially obsolete formularies need not be formidable “if the administration of our Church system be vested in the hands of wide-minded, well-educated men.” “Generally,” he says, “I urge the policy of the ‘open door’ with regard to theological opinion within the National Church. I would limit subscription to the two Sacramental Creeds; and with respect to their interpretation, I would certainly desire that so much liberty should be recognised as is consistent with a distinct and operative belief in the Incarnation.

“The Virgin-birth of our Saviour is the traditional Christian notion of the mode of that Supreme Mystery; and bodily resuscitation, in the coarsest sense, was, and I suppose generally is, the traditional Christian notion of the mode of Christ’s Resurrection. Personally, I do not feel the slightest wish to touch the consecrated phrases of the Catholic Creeds, nor do I feel disposed to speculate as to the modes of those Mysteries, which seem to me vital to Christianity itself, but I feel extraordinarily reluctant to shut the door of ordination on men as strongly convinced as I am of the truth of the Incarnation, but more intellectually sensitive about accepting as historic facts traditions which, however probable and morally precious, cannot be truly said to have behind them adequate historic evidence.” This is

a point of view for which, in the interests of vital national religion at a moment of profound theological change, we may well be grateful when we find it adopted by a leading teacher of the National Church.

With regard to the second condition of the continuance of the Anglican denomination as an Establishment, Mr Henson is equally clear. He is, of course, not blind to the inconveniences, or rather to the impossibility, at the present day of a system of regular Parliamentary interference with "properly ecclesiastical functions." But none the less he holds firmly to the only statesmanlike, and indeed honest condition of Establishment—that the control of the National Church must be national, and must therefore be mediated through Parliament as the only really representative national authority. Indeed, the greatest abuses from which the English Church is suffering are abuses with which only Parliament can deal adequately or wisely. Within the last few years the Church has had to thank Parliament for relief from some of her most crying spiritual disabilities, by the Clergy Discipline Act. Again, it is only Parliament that could possibly deal with the proper adjustment to spiritual needs of existing Church endowments. And in the actual condition of theological strife within the borders of the Establishment, only Parliament could be trusted to appoint an authority sufficiently removed from the area of conflict to deal wisely with questions of ritual, to prune extravagances, and to establish something like a uniform standard.

But Mr Henson, as is well known, goes further still. The National Church must not be national merely in name. If it wishes to retain its present representative position, it must seek to become representative in fact of the National Christianity. He sees, as we all see, that it is not so; that probably half the Christians in the nation repudiate its communion. "By some means the National Church must again be brought into spiritual relations with the mass of English Christians. This cannot be secured by an absorption of the denominations; it can in some degree be secured by their recognition." To this end Mr Henson would urge, "under due disciplinary safeguards, the admission of communicants from the orthodox, organised, non-Episcopal Churches to communion in the National Church"; and as the logical consequent of this step, would "recognise frankly the validity of the non-Episcopal ministries." Whether such a course would really justify itself as a successful move in Church politics may be doubted. But many will agree with us that it would vitalise and deepen the religious quality in Anglicanism, and so, whatever its practical result, give the English Church something more of inherent right than it now has to stand forth as a representative expression of the religious consciousness of the nation. It is long since we have come across a writer more gifted with the higher temper of religious statesmanship, and therefore more likely to guide the Church of England to the high ends for which she exists, than Mr Henson.

A. L. LILLEY.

The Gospel according to St John : An Inquiry into its Genesis and Historical Value.—By Dr Hans Heinrich Wendt, Professor of Theology in the University of Jena. Translated by Edward Lummis, M.A.—Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark.

THE Gospel called after the Apostle John is a fact. It has existed for certainly more than 1700 years, and has had a continuous influence in moulding the faith and feelings of devout Christians, second only, if indeed second, to that of the letters ascribed to Paul. As such, it is deserving of profound and reverent investigation, and that this is not wanting among present day scholars we have happily constant assurances. How did the Gospel come into being? By what process of inspiration, or composition, or selection was it formed? This is the main subject of inquiry undertaken by Professor Wendt. The author and his English readers may be alike congratulated on the success of Mr Lummis' effort to give a translation which should read as if it were the author's own expression of his thought. We forget that there is a German version between us and the writer, so smoothly and clearly does the argument run.

Here, then, we have a book which purports to be a selection from the words and works of Jesus, made expressly for the purpose of confirming belief in him as "the Christ, the Son of God" (ch. xx. 31). It may be assumed that it existed in its present shape—shall we say in the year 125 A.D.? It is in the darkness of the previous fifty years that we must feel our way to any solution of the problem of its origin; for, as our author says, the light which comes to us from without has so far been of no avail. "There can hardly be in the extant Christian literature of the second century any direct or indirect references to John and the Fourth Gospel which have not already been considered. But these thorough investigations have not led to any decisive and convincing result." Nor is anything more to be hoped for in this direction, unless the tombs or dustbins of old Egypt should happily give up out of their buried treasures documents which date from this obscurest period of Christian history. If, *e.g.*, we should at any time recover the lost "Oracles" of Papias, we should learn first whether Papias knew of the Gospel and recognised its authenticity; and secondly, whether there was in the old man's reminiscences corroboration for the Johannine story as we have it.

But till some such discovery be made, we must abandon the hope of reaching any trustworthy conclusion by way of external evidence. We are left, therefore, to the document itself. What has it to tell us of its origin or authorship?

For myself, after years of anxious study, I had almost come to the despairing conclusion that the problem of the Fourth Gospel was insoluble, when I for the first time got light upon it by directing my attention to the curious disjointedness of the narrative, which indeed the most casual reader cannot be unaware of. In the year 1892 I read a paper to the Society of

Historical Theology, of which the main thesis was, "that the Gospel shows evident signs of being a compilation from pre-existent material, and not, as a whole, an original work." I am much gratified to find that my general conclusion is ratified by so eminent a scholar as Professor Wendt, and I proceed briefly to state, rather than criticise or even confirm, his particular view of the sources and composition of the Gospel.

First, then, he distinguishes the two elements, Narrative and Discourse, which are well marked from the beginning, when we have verses 6, 7, 8, 15, about the witness of John, intruded, so to speak, into the prologue of the Eternal Word.

The Narrative is certainly the work of one who was acquainted with the Synoptics, though he made comparatively little use of them. From the verse already quoted (xx. 31), "these signs are written that ye might believe," it might be thought that the Gospel was a collection of the wonderful works done by Jesus, but in fact the "signs" are for the most part recorded not for their own sakes but as an introduction or illustration to the discourses. This narrative was no doubt founded on "oral traditions of various nature and origin," and was quite freely treated by the Evangelist for the purpose of making it serve as an historical setting to the priceless logia which, if left disconnected, were in danger of being lost. So, "any hint of an historical event which seemed to him to be given in the source, prompted him to recount that event in the way in which, according to his view of the work of Jesus, it must have happened."

What, then, about these Discourses, for the sake of which the Gospel was constructed? Now it is remarkable that while the writer never claims to have been himself a witness of the events he relates, a distinct claim is made to a personal knowledge of Jesus. (Compare i. 14, "We saw his glory"; and the statement in 2 John i. with xix. 35, "He that hath seen hath borne witness.") In no case is "a sign," though avowedly recorded as an argument for belief, attested by an appeal to the writer's own experience. It is as a hearer, a spectator of the glory of the Hidden Life of Jesus, that he bears his witness. Nor, if we admit so much, does any valid reason remain for questioning the almost contemporary tradition that the Apostle John was the original source whence our Evangelist derived the more valuable and more credible portion of his Gospel.

"It is the sub-apostolic redaction of an apostolic tradition,"—such is Professor Wendt's verdict on the Gospel as a whole. The tradition is mainly Johannine; the editor, who must have belonged to the circle of Asiatic communities who revered the last of the Apostles as a second founder, worked up these discourses, with such other material as was current in the churches, into the connected narrative as it has survived to our times.

That this theory is a full and final solution of the problem will not be maintained by its illustrious author. But every suggestion helps, even if it be only by its subsequent disproof. Assuredly students of the Gospel will find in this work much that will assist them to a better understanding

of the facts, which have hardly as yet been set forth as fully as they need to be, before any agreement can be arrived at among unprejudiced scholars.

CHARLES HARGROVE.

LEEDS.

Criticism of the New Testament: St Margaret's Lectures, 1902.

IN this volume are collected six lectures given in the church of St Margaret, Westminster, by the following scholars, Rev. Prof. Sanday, F. G. Kenyon, Esq., F. C. Burkitt, Esq., Revs. F. H. Chase, A. C. Headlam, J. H. Bernard. They were given by invitation of the Vicar, Canon Hensley Henson, who in a brief preface explains that "the lectures here printed were designed as a first step in a serious effort to awaken popular interest in Biblical Science, and to set out clearly the broad principles on which that criticism proceeds." Canon Henson further remarks that the church of St Margaret "is in many notable respects well suited to be a teaching-centre of that New Learning which is slowly but surely revolutionising Christian thought."

Notwithstanding this preface, there is nothing very revolutionary in the lectures themselves. Prof. Sanday gives a clear and candid summary of modern criticism of the N.T., and declares in favour of the two-document theory as an explanation of the inter-relations of the Synoptic Gospels. Our present Mark he holds to be "the oldest form in which a complete gospel narrative was drawn up." The other primitive document comprised the common matter of Matthew and Luke; perhaps a third such document was in the hands of Luke, which overlapped the second and also supplied him with the group of parables in chaps. x.-xviii. The composition of these three gospels Dr Sanday would refer to the years 60-80 A.D.

This hypothesis of two documents, adds Dr Sanday, "corresponds roughly to the statement of Papias," namely, that Mark wrote down what he remembered of Peter's preaching, and that Matthew's Hebrew *logia* were translated by each of his interpreters to the best of his ability. In his work on the gospels during the second century, Prof. Sanday agreed with the author of *Supernatural Religion*, against Bishop Lightfoot, that our gospels of Mark and Matthew cannot be the gospels referred to by Papias under the same name. As regards Mark, he would now probably retract this statement, though not as regards Matthew. The first two chapters of Matthew and Luke obviously fall outside the two or three primitive documents, as also the last twelve verses of Mark.

Prof. Sanday makes some interesting remarks on the fourth gospel, noting in particular how it "supplements the other gospels both as to time and as to place," not confining the Lord's ministry to Galilee, but dilating on events that occurred at Jerusalem. He inclines to the statement of Clement of Alexandria, that "last of all John, perceiving that the bodily

[or external] facts had been made plain in the gospels, being urged by his friends and inspired by the Spirit, composed a spiritual gospel."

In another essay recently published, Dr Sanday has upheld the apostolic authorship of John, on the cognate ground that no one but an apostle would have ventured to deal so freely with the life and conversations of his Master; and he clearly adopts the old-established comparison of John's representation of Jesus to Plato's of Socrates.

It is evident that such a defence as the above retains the authenticity of John's gospel at the expense of its historical value. If it was a new account of Jesus received by John in the Spirit, it cannot record the real life and teaching of the Man of Nazareth; and this admission is the more serious, because to this gospel has ever lain the appeal of such fathers as Athanasius, who invented the high Christology opposed to Arianism. Dr Sanday's defence does not save this high Christology.

For the rest there is much to be said in favour of Dr Sanday's view. The author of the fourth gospel obviously removed the *venue* from Galilee, because the other gospels detailed the Galilean teaching along such different lines and in so different a spirit. A teacher, whether apostle or not, who broached such an independent gospel, cannot have written for circles that were familiar with the synoptic gospels, and can himself have attached as little importance to the merely human aspects of Christ as Paul himself. These facts are favourable to the date, fifty-three years after the crucifixion, assigned in ancient colophons of this gospel as that of its composition; and it is strange that none of the contributors to this volume mention this colophon, which must surely embody a sound tradition, since the number fifty-three cannot be explained as a piece of symbolic or prophetic symbolism.

Mr Burkitt's essay is perhaps the most important in the book, for he shows that there is an underlying unity between the oldest Latin texts of the gospel (reflected in Cyprian and the codex Bobiensis *k*), and the oldest Syriac text preserved in Cureton's codex and in the Sinai palimpsest. This concord is frequently against the entire mass of nearly 3000 Greek MSS., and is often reinforced by the assent of the codex Bezae. He instances the omission in John xii. 8 of the words: "for the poor ye have always with you, but me ye have not always" (= Mark xiv. 7 and Matt. xxvi. 11). Codex Bezae and the Sinai palimpsest omit these words, and therefore "these two have remained free from a harmonistic interpolation which has invaded the rest of the extant texts of the fourth gospel." Mr Burkitt does not draw the conclusion which is involved in such cases of "united testimony" of old Syriac and Latin texts, but yet he implies it.

Surely it is this, that practically *all* our 3000 odd MSS. of the Greek gospels form but a single witness, and have flowed from a single archetype, which in textual characteristics was often younger or more derivative than the second century Greek texts used by the first Latin and Greek translators.

Mr Kenyon furnishes a scholarly essay on the classification of the MSS.

of the N.T., especially of the gospels, but is precluded by limits of space from characterising the groups into which critics divide them. At the end of his essay he writes thus:—

“One thing alone we need not fear; and that is, that any modifications of text upon MS. authority will affect the fundamental doctrines of our faith.”

I presume he would not reckon as fundamental the dogmas of the Trinity and miraculous birth of Jesus.

The essays of Mr Chase and Mr Headlam are of lesser significance. Both are apologetic, and both either are ignorant of or airily depreciate evidence which tells against the easy optimism of their conclusions.

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Untersuchungen über den Brief des Paulus an die Römer.—Von Friedrich Spitta.—Göttingen, 1901,—being Part I. vol. iii. of *Zur Geschichte und Litteratur des Urchristenthums*.

ENGLISH readers will be apt to approach the work of Spitta with that general attitude of scepticism which we assume toward the proverbial critic who “hears the grass grow.” With all his splendid learning and acumen, one is reminded, in reading some of Spitta’s sweeping conclusions, reached upon almost invisible filaments of evidence, of the rabbinic suspension of mountains upon hairs. Yet any who may be thus deterred from reading his *Zur Geschichte des Urchristenthums* will miss some of the most valuable discussions of current critical problems. Seemingly hopeless chasms have been bridged by the interweaving in sufficient number and right relation of the finest strands of wire; and when such a genuine master of critical method as Spitta is the artisan, really good judgment calls for patient following of every clue to the end. The lucid and logical style will make the road an easy one.

The present contribution resumes the author’s previous effort to show a composite origin for Romans. Not merely the last two chapters are regarded, as by so many critics since Schultz (1829), as of separate origin from the rest, but i. 18 to xi. 10 is regarded as an earlier treatise, written by Paul as a justification of his Gentile gospel for Jewish Christians in the early days of his missionary activity. To adapt this to the requirements of a letter to the Gentile Church at Rome, under the circumstances described in xv. 22–28, Paul expanded it by the insertion of ii. 14–15 (?), iii. 1–8 and vi. 15–23, and the dictation to Tertius of the epistolary framework in i. 1–17, xi. 11–36, xv. 8–33, xvi. 21–27. The rest of our Romans, xii. 1 to xv. 7, xvi. 1–20 was also written by Paul, and to Rome; but dates from after his first imprisonment, and has been combined by a later hand with the earlier letter.

There are well-known problems in the epistle for which this docu-

mentary theory would furnish a solution. Most scholars will admit that the substance of i. 18 to xi. 10 was not written offhand as an ordinary letter, but represents some more or less stereotyped abstract of Paul's "gospel" incorporated in his letter. It is worth while to see what Spitta has to urge in favour of this doctrinal nucleus having had actual written form. So of the admittedly complicated phenomena of chapters xiv. to xvi. Documentary analysis must here have ample opportunity, as well as exegesis and textual criticism.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL AND PHILO- SOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

(1) *Theological.*

THE JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, Vol. iv. No. 13, October 1902. Prof. SANDAY, *Contentio Veritatis*.—Criticism from more conservative standpoint of these essays. Their teaching not representative of Oxford, but only of liberal wing; still they justify their claim to be "constructive." Prof. W. E. BARNES, *Study of the First Lesson for Christmas Day*.—Isaiah ix. 1-7 translated and newly interpreted. כָּעַתָּה (ix. 1), grammatically difficult, is struck out, and verse reads, "As for the former king, he despised the land of Zebulun . . . but the latter king honours it . . ." Former king is Ahaz of Judah, who calls in Assyria to help him against Rezin and Pekah, knowing this must bring about the ruin of the Northern Kingdom. Isaiah disapproves of Ahaz's policy; and sees in vision another king who will reverence and restore Israel. The passage is Isaianic and in its proper context. Dean STRONG, *The History of the theological term "Substance"*.—Describes how mediæval scholasticism conceived the notion "substance," and applied it to the nature of God, and to the Eucharist. C. C. J. WEBB, *Psychology and Religion*.—Writer remarks present defenders of free will are not the idealistic metaphysicians, but the psychologists, and proceeds to examine at length Prof. JAMES' *Varieties of Religious Experience*.—He objects that the phenomena described are too exclusively extravagant and morbid, and thinks Prof. James' implied philosophy inadequate to them. DOCUMENTS:—H. W. CODRINGTON, *The Syrian Liturgies of the Presanctified*. DOM. RAMSAY, *An Uncial Fragment of the "Ad Donatum" of S. Cyprian*. A. SOUTER, *The genuine Prologue to Ambrosiaster on 2 Corinthians*. NOTES AND STUDIES:—A. C. HEADLAM, *Editions and MSS. of Euseb.*, Pt. 1. DOM. CHAPMAN, *Order of Treatises and Letters in MSS. of S. Cyprian*. G. B. GRAY, *A questionable plural in Hebrew* (תוצאות). F. C. BURKITT, *Sarbôy, Shuruppak and Interpretation of Bar Jesus*. Dr C. TAYLOR, *Pericope of the Adulteress and A new LXX Fragment*. E. W. WATSON, *Cyprianica*. REVIEW:—C. H. TURNER, *Pelagius' Commentary on Pauline Epp. and its History*. CHRONICLE:—F. E. BRIGHTMAN, *Liturgica*.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol. vi. No. 4, October 1902. F. B. JEVONS, *The Fundamental Principles of the Science of Religion*.—This science is historical, for it must take account of individuals originating or modifying religious movements; it is scientific because, neglecting small individual differences, the effects produced on the many are general. G. B. STEVENS, *Is there a Self-consistent N.T. Eschatology?*—After examining N.T. passages, the writer says No. From Jesus' words we can only deduce: (1) the certain triumph of his kingdom (his 'coming'), (2) the victory of life over death ("resurrection"), and (3) the judgment—a just recompense in the world to come. Prof. BUDE, *The O.T. and the Excavations*.—Ridicules the conclusions of Winckler, who claims that Babylonian culture dominated Hebrew civilisation and literature from their beginnings; that Israel's primitive history and patriarchal legends are Babylonian myths, and even that its kings are figures of Babylonian solar mythology. Budde affirms that Babylonian influence was late, and never strong enough to divert Israel's independent development. T. ALLAN HOBEN, *The Virgin Birth*.—Continues examination of the references of ante-Nicene Fathers to the Virgin Birth, and shows the sources used and the doctrines deduced by them. CRITICAL NOTES:—S. MACCOMB, *Do we need Dogma?* H. G. SMITH, "Adam" in the Revised Version.—Recent Theological Literature (pp. 762–838).

THE JEWISH QUARTERLY REVIEW, Vol. xv. No. 57, October 1902. HELENA FRANK, *The Jewish May*.—Translation of Yiddish poem of Morris Rosenfeld. J. M. RIGG, *The Jews of England in the 13th Century*.—Historical account, derived from Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews. Prof. J. D. WIJNKOOP, *The Neo-Hebraic Language and its Literature*.—Describes range and character of this literature, and its linguistic differences from classical Hebrew. NINĀ SALAMAN, *Translations from the Hebrew*.—Three poems in English verse. A. M. FRIEDENBERG, *Süsskind of Trimberg*.—An account of the only Jewish Minnesinger. Prof. J. GOLDZIEHER, *Zu Saadyana XLI*.—Historical note. Dr S. POZNĀNSKI, *Ein altes jüdisch-arabisches Bücher-Verzeichnis*. Prof. W. BACHER, *Ein neuerschlossenes Capitel der jüdischen Geschichte: The Gaonate in Palestine, and the Exilarchate in Egypt*.—Historical inquiry into these Jewish institutions of the Middle Ages, based on the Megilla of Ebjathar (Saadyana XL).—J. H. LEVY, *The Tetra (?) grammaton*.—It is argued that Jah is original form, becoming Jahu by adding waw, the old nomin. case ending. The final He is paragogic, and hence Jehovah and not Jahweh represents the true vocalisation. J. FRIEDLÄNDER, *Das hebräische "Sepher" in einer verkannten Bedeutung*.—Compares word in Job xix. 23, and Is. xxx. 8, with Assyrian *siparru*, and translates "brass" or "bronze." G. A. KOHUT, *Abraham's lesson in Tolerance*.—English and Hebrew forms of the legend of Abraham and the Fire-Worshipper. The story is derived from the Būstān of Sa'dī (1184–1291). Dr M. KAYSERLING, *Zur portugiesisch-jüdischen Literatur*. Prof. A. BÜCHLER, ΣΦΡΑΓΙΣ in *Psalm Salomo's II. 6*. Prof. L. BLAU, *Methods of Teaching the Talmud in the Past and in the Present*. Dr H. HIRSCHFELD, *Descriptive Catalogue of Hebrew MSS. of the Montefiore Library*, viii. Prof. W. BACHER, *Die Staatswagen des Patriarchen* (קריית).

THE CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW, Vol. lv. No. 109, October 1902. *Religion in Oxford*.—Unfavourable criticism of religious teaching and influences at Oxford, chiefly as they affect the undergraduate. There is a failure to utilise opportunities. Three great tasks require to be undertaken—to rethink and restate fundamental truths of Christianity, to gain recognition for Christian thought as necessary part of any curriculum of University studies, and to initiate a new preaching, sincere and audacious. *Lamarck*,

Darwin and Weismann.—Account of the growth of the doctrine of organic evolution, and of the controversy as to whether acquired characters are transmitted or not. *The Religious Condition of Italy. The Holy Eucharist: An Historical Enquiry.* Part V.—Deals with the discussions in England during the reigns of Henry VIII. and Edward VI. Cranmer's views in particular are carefully examined. *Missions to Hindus. II. The Problems.*—An elaborate study of the Hindu type of character. This is moulded by an intellectual system of monistic ontology, and by the social system of caste. The former produces in the Hindu mind a deep sense of the unreality of all things, and so destroys all initiative and effort, and stifles moral perception and capacity. Caste, the social embodiment of the philosophy, fetters the practical life by its inflexible system of positive obligations held together by no moral principle. *The Third Order of S. Francis.*—Investigates the beginnings of this Order. This was the first to be founded; the other two were differentiated out of it. *Criticism, Rational and Irrational.*—Review of Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, the Encyclopædia Biblica, and the new volumes of the Encyclopædia Britannica. *Education and Religious Liberty.*—Author approves of the Education Bill as securing religious liberty. *Short Notices.*

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE THEOLOGIE, October 1902.

A. HILGENFELD, *Das Gleichnis von dem verlorenen Sohne Luc xv. 11-32.*—Contests the view of Wendt that the parable is meant to exalt Grace above Law, and especially Jülicher's interpretation, that it teaches the fulness of God's pardoning love. H. maintains that younger son represents Christianised heathendom, and the elder son Judaism. C. HEUSSI, *Die Stromateis des Clemens Alexandrinus und ihr Verhältnis zum Protreptikos und Pädagogos.*—Examines De Faye's hypothesis of the aim of Strom., and their relations with Pr. and Ped. Author agrees that Str. are not third of series of which Pr. and Ped. are first and second, but does not admit they are only Prolegomena to projected third work. He seeks to show order of composition is:—Strom. i.-iv.; Protr.; Ped.; Strom. v.-vii. Object of Pr. is to show step from heathenism to faith; Ped., exhibiting hindrances, etc. to be overcome, is the negative preparation for "Gnosis"; Str. are literary propaganda for "Gnosis." W. KARO, *Das Lindauer Gespräch.*—Account of conference called by the authorities of Lindau (Aug. 1575), at which Rupp and Scheffler dispute with Andreä as to meaning of the doctrine of original sin. The circumstances occasioning conference are given, and the substance of the daily proceedings reported from the Protocol. Practically it was trial of R. and S. for heresy, who were condemned. J. DRÄSEKE, *Noch einmal zum Philosophen Joseph.*—Seeks to explain J.'s title "Rhakendytes." A. HILGENFELD, *Des Chrysostomos Lobrede auf Polykarp.*—Text of Gk. palimpsest (10th or 11th century) of C.'s panegyric of P. ANZEIGEN.

THEOLOGISCHE STUDIEN U. KRITIKEN (1903 *Erstes Heft*). E. KAUTZSCH, *Zum Gedächtniss D. Julius Köstlins.*—Obituary notice. Dr BÖHMER, *Die Eigenart der prophetischen Heilspredigt des Amos.*—Exposition of the prophet's teaching. The genuineness of Amos ix. 11-15 is assumed. P. TSCHACKERT, *Die bisher unerkannte Ulmer Handschrift der deutschen Ausburgischen Konfession.*—Account of MS. of A. C. recently found at Stuttgart; it is a copy of the Reutlinger MS. made June 25th-27th 1530 at the instance of the Ulm delegates to Augsburg. The accompanying letter (June 27th, 1530) of the delegates to the Rat at Ulm is given. E. FUCHS, *Wandlungen in Schleiermachers Denken zwischen der ersten u. zweiten Ausgabe der Reden.*—In 1st ed. religion perceives the God who works, in 2nd, the God who is; in 1st, religion extends itself to what is

without us; in 2nd, it is *in* us, "the immediate, original being of God in us through feeling." But no fundamental change appears, for while in 1st ed. stress is laid on "Anschauung," and in 2nd on "Gefühl," in both S. recognises a necessary interaction of intellect and feeling in religion. AUGUST EBELING, *Über Ehescheidung u. die kirchliche Trauung geschiedener Personen.*—Writer finds no commandment on divorce in N.T., and after describing older ecclesiastical views and practice, urges the churches to accept the grounds of divorce now recognised by the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. GEDANKEN U. BEMERKUNGEN. REZENSIONEN.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR THEOLOGIE U. KIRCHE, November 1902. *Sechstes Heft.* TH. STEINMANN, *Das Bewusstsein der vollen Wirklichkeit Gottes.*—Four problems arise, owing to breakdown of traditional views of God, (i.) God in adjacent heaven and the Copernican universe, (ii.) God's living activity and Nature's fixed law, (iii.) God's creative work and the Evolution process, (iv.) God's revelation, and the historical psychological conception of Religion. The attempt to modify old doctrine to suit new conceptions fails—merely heaping together heterogeneous elements. The solution is found by regarding God as the all-pervading, active Power in Nature and in Man—"a transcendental, non-cosmical Pantheism." Personality can subsist with this view; prayer, which must not be petition, but a seeking for right relation with God, is necessarily answered. FR. TRAUB, *Die Beurteilung der Ritschl'schen Theologie in T. Zeigler's Werk "Die geistigen u. sozialen Strömungen des 19 Jahrhunderts."*—Against charge that R. did not understand mysticism, "without which there can be no religion and no piety," answer is, R. attacked only such mysticism as cut itself off from social relation and neglected the ethical side of religion. Neither was R.'s theology an arbitrarily subjective "Wunschtheologie," which charge springs from false assumption that the R. value-judgment stands in opposition to existence-judgment. With R. the two were inseparable. In religion there is not a mere theoretic recognition of revelation; but on other hand value-judgments are not postulates.

THE EXPOSITOR, 6th Series, No 34, October 1902. Prof. H. B. SWETE, *Matt. xxviii. 16-20.*—An exposition of this passage, regarded as the Church's Commission for her pastoral and missionary work. Writer thinks the Baptismal formula genuine. A. M. FAIRBAIRN, *The Idea of the Fourth Gospel and the Theology of Nature.*—Man has thought, conscience and heart, hence God must be these in perfection—reason, righteousness, grace; therefore, in highest conception, must speak, act, and love. These are personal acts, needing personal forms of expression and personal recipients, and in Christ we find the personal medium of this revelation. From the relations (1) the Father and the Son, (2) the Judging Sovereign and the Redeeming Christ, we obtain standards for appraisalment of Evangelical doctrine. W. M. RAMSAY, *A Lost Chapter of Early Christian History.*—Describes the discoveries of the last few years relating to the Queen, or rich lady Tryphaena, mentioned in the Acts of Paul and Thekla. A. E. GARVIE, *Studies in the "Inner Life" of Christ.* IX. *The Scope of the Ministry.*—Jesus regarded himself as the Jewish Messiah, and sacrificing himself, as such, to Jewish prejudices, limited his ministry to the Jews. ARTHUR CARR, *All things are Yours.*—Exposition of the passage in 1 Cor iii. 22. Prof. CARL CLEMEN, *The First Epistle of Peter and the Book of Enoch.*—Reply to Prof. Rendel Harris. Author rejects Prof. Harris' exegesis of 1 Peter iii. 19, etc., and the alteration he proposes in i. 12.

No. 35, November 1902. S. R. DRIVER, *Specimen of a New Translation of the Prophets.*—Dr Driver states principles which he thinks would secure

accuracy and clearness in biblical translation, in addition to the idiomatic and dignified style which some English versions already possess. He applies these principles in a specimen translation of Jer. ii. 1—iv. 2. JAMES STALKER, *The Basis of Christian Certainty*.—This is threefold—Scripture, Tradition, Personal Experience, all which may justly be subject to criticism, but must survive it if there is to be Christian Certainty. None of the three elements can be dispensed with. A. E. GARVIE, *The Function of the Miracles*.—A further study in the "Inner Life" of Jesus, discussing the purpose and use of the miracles, and the source of Jesus' power. E. KÖNIG, *On the Meaning and scope of Jeremiah vii. 22, 23*.—The passage means that the *fundamental* legislation promulgated at the period of the Exodus did not include instructions as to sacrifice. J. RENDEL HARRIS, *The History of a Conjectural Emendation*.—It appears that Prof. Harris' proposed restoration, ἐν ᾧ καὶ Ἐνώχ (1 Peter iii. 19), is really old. He shows that Blass' restoration (Acts vi. 9), Λιβυστρίων for Λιβερτίων is an early and repeated proposal. In such cases the emendations are of special weight. E. C. SELWYN, *Dialogues on the Christian Prophets*.

No. 36, December 1902. G. S. STREATFIELD, *A Parish Clergyman's Thoughts about the Higher Criticism*.—The soberer criticism affects in surprisingly slight degree the main proofs to which Christians appeal, and cases are discussed where it has proved an aid to faith. Common-sense discredits revolutionary criticism at war with the creed of Christendom. No criticism denying Christ's deity can be admitted. JAMES MOFFATT, *The Bright and Morning Star*.—Exegesis and homiletical development of the passage in Rev. xxii. 16. DAVID SMITH, *Our Lord's Use of Common Proverbs*.—A number of sayings of Jesus are classed as common proverbs and explained in that light; heathen parallels are quoted. S. I. CURTISS, *The Semitic Sacrifice of Reconciliation*.—Relation of personal inquiries in Syria concerning custom of holding a feast in connection with reconciliation of enemies. In every case an animal sacrifice is killed. Often in cases of peace-making after murder, it is expressly recognised that the animal's blood is shed in substitution for the murderer's. This Sacrifice of Reconciliation exists all over Syria, and Prof. Curtiss thinks it a primitive Semitic institution, of which the original element is not the feast of reconciliation, but the blood of substitution. E. C. SELWYN *Dialogues on the Christian Prophets*.

REVUE D'HISTOIRE ET DE LITTÉRATURE RELIGIEUSES, Vol. vii. No. 6, November–December 1902. P. RICHARD, *La Legation Aldobrandini et le traité de Lyon*.—Al.'s mission to France as Papal Legate was undertaken to adjust matters between France and Savoy, and resulted in the Treaty of Lyon. Al. was accompanied by Gianbattista Agucchi, as majordomo and under-secretary. From Ag.'s diary the writer of this article quotes his views on French manners and customs, and his sketches of Aldobrandini, Lesdiguières, Henry IV., and other personages. Other articles are to follow on Clement VIII.'s diplomacy and diplomatic agents. JOSEPH TURMEL, *Le dogme du péché original après S. Augustin*.—Till end of eleventh century Augustine's theory was unquestioned. Then it sustained a series of powerful blows, beginning with Anselm, and continued by Abelard, Alexander de Hales, and S. Thomas. Anselm saw no original sin in concupiscence and physical generation; the fall involved a loss of "primitive justice," i.e. of rectitude of will kept for its own sake. Abelard thought original sin not truly sin, but a state of punishment. Opinion at the Council of Trent was generally anti-Augustinian; and Bellarmine made it his business to adjust the discrepancies and cover up the change of views. ESSAIS ET NOTICES :—A. MEILLET, *Euthyme dernier*

patriarche de Bulgarie.—Chronique d'histoire de la philosophie médiévale. M. DE WULF, *La Mystique orthodoxe et hétérodoxe.*—Ancienne philologie chrétienne. P. LEJAY, 17, *La Liturgie.*—This includes very full notice of *The Prayer Book of Aedelwald the Bishop, commonly called the Book of Cerne* (Camb. Univ. Press, 1902).

REVUE BIBLIQUE, 11th year, No. 4, October 1902. MACRIDY BEY, *Le temple d'Echmoun à Sidon.*—Illustrated account of excavations carried out at Bostan-Ech-Cheikh under the auspices of the Imperial Ottoman Government. R. P. LAGRANGE, *Note sur les inscriptions trouvées par Macridy-Bey.*—The pieces comprise two commemorative stones, a votive inscription, and several smaller fragments. Père Lagrange gives a tentative translation, from which it appears that the two first commemorate dedication of a temple to the god Echmoun by the Sidonian king, Bodachtarte, grandson of King Echmounazar. They are dated between 7th and 4th centuries B.C. M. HACKSPILL, *L'angéologie juive à l'époque néo-testamentaire.*—This first article exhibits different forms and aspects of the doctrine gathered from an examination of the references to angels in canonical, apocryphal and pseudepigraphic literature. M. HYVERNAT, *Petite introduction à l'étude de la Massore.*—First Article. Importance of study for Hebrew text is urged. A facsimile is given of a page of Orient. MS. 4445 of Brit. Museum, containing Lev. xi. 4–21, and the author works through the Massoretic notes verse by verse. MÉLANGES:—ULYSSE CHEVALIER, *Le Saint Suaire de Turin et le N.T.*—Discusses the ceremonies at the burial of Jesus in their bearing on the authenticity of the relic. M. P. LADEUZE, *Les destinataires de l'épître aux Éphésiens.*—A new theory based on text alteration in the dedication. Writer reads, "Paul . . . to the saints that are by the Iris, that are in C.J.," and argues epistle addressed to N.E. parts of Asia Minor, watered by the river Iris. RR. PP. JANSEN ET SAVIGNAC, *Nouvelles inscriptions Nabatéennes de Pétra.*—Descriptions and facsimiles. CHRONIQUE: *Les fouilles allemandes à Ba'albek; Fouilles diverses en Palestine, etc.* RECENSIONS. BULLETIN.

J. H. W.

NANTWICH.

(2) *Philosophical.*

MIND, N.S., Vol. xi. No. 44, October 1902. F. H. BRADLEY, *The Definition of Will*, i.—The first of three articles written to defend author's definition of a volition as the self-realisation of an idea with which the self is identified. One may speak of a standing or permanent will, as of a permanent belief or attention, but there is no actual will except in volitions. In a volition as a whole are following aspects:—(1) existence; (2) the idea of a change; (3) the actual change of the existence by the idea to (4) the idea's content, and (5) in this change the self feels itself realised. Two stages may be distinguished: (1) the mere prevalence of the idea, and (2) the advance beyond its own existence towards its physical or psychical end. The existence, outward or inward, which is to be changed by the idea is, in a special sense, a not-self opposed to my inner self, and it is essential to complete will that the idea should carry itself out beyond itself. Author disputes that a desire must invariably be present, and also that choice is coextensive with will. A man may will that for which he has little or no moral responsibility, and he may be morally responsible for that which he has not formally willed. H. R. MARSHALL, *The Unity of Process in Consciousness.*—A study of the relation of mind and body (1) from attitude proper to the biologist, and (2) from attitude proper to

psychologist. In the individual human body there are certain minor neural systems practically disconnected from the great system of neural systems, which has corresponding with its activity all the psychic processes usually spoken of as consciousness, as the empirical ego and the presentations to that ego. The vast mass of those activities (e.g. "reflexes"), which do not appear to modify consciousness, do, however, affect consciousness, but not sufficiently to induce presentations, *i.e.* they form part of the vast undifferentiated psychic mass called the self. J. E. M'TAGGART, *Hegel's Treatment of the Categories of Quality*. E. T. DIXON, *On the Notion of Order*. Toulouse, Vaschide and Pieron, *Classification of Psychological Phenomena for Experimental Research*. CRITICAL NOTICES, amongst which is review of Royce's *World and Individual*, vol. ii., by J. E. M'TAGGART. NEW BOOKS.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. xi. No. 65, September 1902. M. F. WASHBURN, *Psychological Analysis in System-Making*.—A study of the views of Wundt, Ebbinghaus, and Münsterberg concerning the elementary processes of conscious life and their attributes. For the first, the elements are sensations and feelings; for the second, sensations, ideas and feelings; for the third, sensations, which however probably are themselves complex structures. F. C. FRENCH, *The Aim and Scope of the Philosophy of Religion*.—To point out what is intellectually and morally sound in religion, and thus to furnish a standard of judgment. It takes religion as a fact in human life to be interpreted. H. H. BAWDEN, *The Functional View of the Relation between the Psychological and the Physical*.—Difference between them not one of existence but one simply of use or function in experience. The physical represents the given means, that part of experience which is taken as given; the psychological the ends or values which are to be realised, or which are in process of realisation in and through the means. Reality and experience are one organic whole, in which are no ontological chasms. W. H. SHELDON, *The Concept of the Negative*. REVIEWS OF BOOKS. SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES. NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS. NOTES.

Vol. xi. No. 66, November 1902. A. LEFEVRE, *Epistemology and Ethical Method*.—The demand for the emancipation of ethical science from metaphysical assumptions is itself based upon an interpretation of experience essentially metaphysical, which as such pre-judges the mode of reviewing the facts of morality. This is manifest in Taylor's *Problems of Conduct*. J. A. LEIGHTON, *The Study of Individuality*.—No account of the individual in terms of physical and psychological heredity, or of physical and social environment, can explain the coalescence of inherited and acquired qualities into one indivisible conscious life. The principle of individuation is an immediate state of feeling, which at once constitutes a permanent unity of life and holds a developing and differentiating content of consciousness. R. B. PERRY, *Poetry and Philosophy*.—Philosophical poetry is that which, having made the philosophical point of view its own, expresses itself in poetic form. It finds the universal truth of philosophy in immediate experience and visualises a fundamental interpretation of the world. The supreme instance is to be found in Dante. K. GORDON, *Spencer's Theory of Ethics in its Evolutionary Aspect*.—Spencer's theory is not consistent with the principle of Evolution. He describes activities as developing, but points to an ethical goal which is absolute; thus he gets an evolutionary process with a non-evolutionary result. DISCUSSIONS: H. BARKER and E. ALBEE, *A Recent Criticism of Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics*. REVIEWS OF BOOKS. SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES. NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS. NOTES.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, Vol. xiii. No. 1, October 1902.

W. L. COOK, *Criticism of Public Men*.—Honest criticism must judge the acts of statesmen and of nations by the same ethical code to which the individual citizen is bound to conform. A. FOUILLEE, *The Ethics of Nietzsche and Guyau*.—Nietzsche, like Guyau, takes as principle of morals, intensity of life. But even if the force of life could be measured, it would still be necessary to estimate its direction, upon which the wise use of force depends. Morals can never be a pure question of dynamics, even if the forces be conceived of as intensity of inward power. The "will to be powerful" is a completely indeterminate principle. W. D. MORRISON, *The Treatment of the Criminal in England*.—The only way to prevent the prison from being a nursery of crime is to completely industrialise prison treatment, and to still further extend the scope of conditional liberation. R. BARTON, *The Practical Consciousness of Freedom*.—Freedom means alternative possibilities. For freedom, it is essential that the universe be of such a nature as absolutely to permit either *a*, *b* or *c* becoming actual in the next moment of time. A. E. TAYLOR, *Mind and Nature*.—The men around us are known not to be automata, because their words and acts exhibit intelligent meaning and purpose. What is really purposive action in nature may come to wear for us the appearance of mere mechanical routine, because of our inability to follow any natural process in all the wealth of its individual detail, and because of our treating natural processes *en masse*, as in statistical tables we treat the behaviour of men. The very concept of a pure self-existing and self-directing machine is an intellectual absurdity. For no machine ever made itself, or maintained itself in action. The mechanical theory interprets nature as mechanical in a sense which is the exact antithesis of a machine in every respect, that gives the machine its peculiar character. J. M. METCALF, *The Pampered Children of the Poor*.—A protest against the tendency of making elementary school instruction too pleasant and easy. BOOK REVIEWS.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE, Vol. xxvii. No. 10, October 1902. F. LE DANTEC, *La Place de la Vie dans les Phénomènes naturels*, i.—An investigation of the relation of living phenomena to the non-living forces of nature. In the first part, the properties of brute matter are dealt with, and the essential difference between molar movement, the displacement of visible masses, and molecular movement is emphasised. The apparent spontaneity of life is the result of a transformation of particular or molecular movements into molar movements, exactly as is the case with the flowing of water through the tap of a barrel. Proceeding to an objective study of living matter, the author supports his theory that vitality belongs to the order of molecular, as distinguished from molar, phenomena; it is a process of chemical assimilation. A. BINET, *Le Vocabulaire et d'Idéation*.—Examples of difference in the use of vocabulary, derived as result of experiments upon two girls of same age but of diverse temperature. Gérard-Varet, *Le Langage et la Parole; leurs facteurs sociologiques*.—A consideration of language as a social phenomenon and as a result of social conditions, in view of the first vol. of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie*. F. da Costa Guimarães, *Le Besoin de Prier et ses conditions psychologiques*. The need of prayer is the result of states of feeling, and is a physiological as well as a psychological phenomenon. NOTES ET DISCUSSIONS:—F. PAULHAN, *La Méthode analytique dans la détermination des Caractères*. ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

Vol. xxvii. No. 11, November 1902. H. LEUBA, *Les Tendances religieuses chez les mystiques chrétiens* (2^e et dernier art.).—Continuation of article in July

number. Author enters into a systematic analysis of religious ecstasy as described by St Theresa, Guyon, Francois de Sales, and others. L. DAURIAC, *Des images suggérées par l'audition musicale*.—Music does not simply please or displease; it excites æsthetic admiration and gives rise to a feeling of love as for a living being, not for the composer but for his work. F. LE DANTEC, *La Place de la Vie dans les Phénomènes naturels* (2^e et dernier art.).—The second part of this article deals with the function of knowledge in living beings. We only know material movement, and it is reasonable to conclude that knowledge itself is a result of such movement. Man is a synthesis of molecular activities and molar movements, and one is led to the hypothesis that the material elements of which our organisation is composed contain the elements of knowledge. REVUES CRITIQUE:—TH. FLOURNOY, *Les Variétés de l'expérience religieuse d'après W. James*. ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

Vol. xxvii. No. 12, December 1902. F. PAULHAN, *Sur la Mémoire Affective*.—An attempt to establish the fact that feelings can be reproduced in memory. The difference between remembering a perception and remembering an emotion may easily be exaggerated, because, although the general mechanism of the two processes may be the same, the concrete conditions of their exercise do not always resemble one another. KOZŁOWSKI, *La psychogénèse de l'étendue*.—After discussing various nativistic and empirical theories of space-extendedness, the author attempts to explain the genesis of the notion of extendedness from a consideration of bodily movements. LANNES, *Philosophes russes contemporains: V. Soloviev*. OBSERVATIONS ET DOCUMENTS:—H. PIÉRON, *La Question de la Mémoire Affective*. *Contribution à la Psychologie des Mourants*.—ANALYSES ET COMPTES RENDUS.

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ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE, N.S., Vol. viii. No. 3. J. PETZOLDT, *Die Notwendigkeit und Allgemeinheit des psychophysischen Parallelismus*.—A long defence of the author's view of psychophysical parallelism, as against the critical objections of Schuppe, Cornelius and others. E. BULLATY, *Das Bewusstseinsproblem* (Schluss).—In opposition to empirical and rationalistic systems, author takes his stand upon a theory of knowledge described as critical. According to it, everything claiming to be experienced must exhibit itself as an element of immediate consciousness. To be conscious and to experience are one and the same thing. In the spontaneous functions of our consciousness the real substratum of our phenomenal world in its immediacy comes to light. The same reality as that of which we are aware in consciousness is given to us in the world of objects, with the difference that in consciousness the reality of the phenomenal world in its immediacy is revealed and experienced, whilst in the world of objects it exhibits itself as unexperienced. O. L. UNFRID, *Die Lösung des Welträtsels*.—A contribution to the estimation of the philosophy of Planck. A. GUESON, *Raison pure et Métaphysique*. JAHRESBERICHT ÜBER ERSCHEINUNGEN DER SOZIOLOGIE, 1897 UND 1898 (2^{te} Art.).

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OPTIMISM AND IMMORTALITY.

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WALKING in the spring along the coasts of Cornwall, and meditating on the subject of this paper, on a green cliff overhanging the sea, I came upon a flock of young lambs. Nothing can be imagined more beautiful; nothing, as I thought, more touching. The gay innocence of these young creatures, their movements of instinctive delight, their bleating, leaping, nuzzling, sucking, under the blue sky, testified to a confidence in the benevolence of the world into which they had been born, as characteristic of Nature as it is paradoxical to reason. For the universe they trusted so naïvely, what had it really prepared for them? The butcher's knife; or at best, a slow transformation into mere sheep—stupid, unimaginative, burdened with the weight of years and wool—such creatures as the ewes who watched with a grave, unintelligent disapproval the mad gambols of their disquieting offspring.

The scene was typical; and as I watched it I considered with astonishment the course of Nature—how in every kind, from the lowest up to man, generation after generation flings its children into the world; how these take up existence without misgiving or fear; and whatever disillusionment they may experience, are never for an instant deterred from handing on

the questionable gift of life to others, who receive it as blindly and trustingly as they had done themselves.

It is this attitude of unquestioning confidence in life that I wish to indicate by the word "optimism." In animals it appears to be instinctive; and commonly it is so in men. For we, too, even those of us who profess to be philosophers, are under the dominion of something that is not reason, something which impels us by sheer force to affirm existence, overrides the intellect if it protests, and urges us to live, and to beget life, even though we be convinced that to do so is immoral or absurd. Nay, for the most part, it would, I believe, be true to say that the reason itself, even when it has thought itself most free, has been really a slave to this dominant instinct, and in constructing its systems has been content to assume without proof its main conclusion that the life we live is somehow worth the living.

If that be so, it might seem superfluous to raise the question I am propounding, and inquire into the basis of an optimism which, it may be said, is part of our constitution. But we must not exaggerate the case. Men do, it is true, for the most part, instinctively accept existence; even in their reflection they do tend to assume at the dictation of Nature an axiom which it might be hard for reason to demonstrate; even when they deny it, they are very apt to act none the less as if it were true. But, in spite of all this, reason has its place. It demands that conduct shall harmonise with conviction; it demands that conviction shall be rational; and in spite of failure after failure, will never cease from the endeavour to make it so. And if those who listen to reason are few, if the course of the world is mainly and palpably controlled by what are sometimes called the "life-promoting instincts," yet there have been times in the history of mankind, nay, there have been whole eras, in which these instincts themselves have drooped and flagged under the sense of disillusionment, in which the question as to the worth of life has been nakedly and honestly asked, and in which no answer, or a negative one,

has been forthcoming. Nature, I think, cannot hope permanently to burke inquiry. Already four hundred millions adhere, at least nominally, to a creed whose ideal is the annihilation of the will to live. And if we are inclined to dismiss the Buddhist religion as a mere symptom of the decadence of the East, we may remember with profit the extraordinary, and to us, as I think, instructive crisis through which our own West passed at the beginning of the Christian era. At that time civilisation had, as it seemed exhausted its impulse. The stream of history, immense in its breadth, grew slacker and slacker in its flow. The huge machine moved with reluctant weariness. Habit, no longer passion, was the motive force, and it was a force that grew daily weaker. Not one man or two, here and there, but many men everywhere, were asking that fatal and terrible question—Why? the question that, once it makes itself heard, shatters like the trump of doom the society that cannot give it an answer. Roman society had no answer; and if the West was redeemed, it was only by an influx of barbarians whose brutal passion for life was unable even to understand the question asked by the great civilisation they destroyed. The appeal to reason was checkmated by emotion, and under the dominion of fear and desire grew up the great Catholic scheme which for centuries dominated the human mind. But Reason, in spite of all the efforts of Nature, will not, I believe, permit herself permanently to be silenced. Even now, are there not signs that she is beginning to assert herself? Under the surface of our astonishing activity in the twentieth century, are there not symptoms similar to those which accompanied the downfall of Rome—the decline of religion, the bankruptcy of philosophy, the inroads of pessimism, and the recrudescence of superstition? The question I am asking may, I think, turn out to be one not merely of speculative but of practical importance; it may embody a challenge of intellect to life too urgent to be diverted by sophistry, too vigorous to be shouted down by mobs. However that may be, it is a question, I think, not unworthy

the consideration of philosophers ; and perhaps I need make no further excuse for introducing it to the readers of this Journal. I will proceed, therefore, without more ado, to state more precisely what it is that I propose to discuss.

In using the word "optimism," what I have in view is not a reasoned conviction, but an attitude towards life ; the attitude which, as I think, is natural to men, and which is specially characteristic of the West, and among Westerns, more particularly of Anglo-Saxons. This attitude is unreflective, and is indicated not so much by expressed opinions as by high spirits and active impulses. It is the attitude of "going-ahead," of assuming that things are "worth while," of ambition, enthusiasm, enterprise, confidence, verve. It prompts to action ; not, however, merely from a sense of duty (though that may be present), but primarily from a delighted confidence that the action is going to lead somehow to results that are supremely good. Difficulty and hardship it takes in the spirit, not of the Stoic, but of the adventurer ; they, it feels, are not of the essence of things ; they are mere negative obstacles ; the real thing is benevolent, life-furthering, good. The earth is one which is adapted to our desires, and our desires may be trusted, both as to the nature of the object they seek, and as to its attainability by effort. A belief in all this, not necessarily formulated, but felt, is what I wish to indicate by the word "optimism." And my question is—What hypotheses ought we logically to be able to accept if we are to justify optimism to our reason ? I do not ask whether the hypotheses are true ; I ask merely what they are. And if this seems to be an inversion of the proper order of inquiry, I can only reply that it is the order which strikes me as natural ; and that I find it hard to take a serious interest in any philosophic inquiry until I have grasped the bearing of the inquiry upon life.

I ask, then, what general view of the universe ought, if men were logical, to underly the optimism they express in their temperament and their conduct ? It must, I think, be

one of two views. Either we must hold that the world is eternally perfect, or we must hold that it is a process towards some attainable good end. The first hypothesis is the one I propose to examine first. It is one that has always been a favourite with philosophers, and, for that matter, with poets.

“I am the eye with which the Universe
Beholds itself, and knows itself divine.”

So speaks Shelley's Apollo ; and so, I suppose, might speak the Substance of Spinoza, or the Absolute of Hegel. The world as a whole being good, all parts of it also are somehow good, and all activities, and even all evils,—

“All partial evil universal good,”

as Pope, very accurately from his standpoint, remarks. We may therefore, it seems, on this hypothesis, trust without fear the instinct that bids us co-operate with Nature. Our optimism is a reflection of that of the Eternal Being, and is justified from His point of view, if not from ours.

This philosophy, in its various forms, is to many minds exceedingly alluring. Men do, when they reflect, most keenly desire a world that shall be eternally good, and turn with longing to those who profess to give it them. But, honestly, can we think that such a world is the world of which we have experience? Evil, surely, is too patent and palpable; persists too obstinately in the face of all assertions of eternal good. And, what is more, by the existence of evil our whole activity is conditioned. We act always towards ends in time; and these, however diverse, may be seen, I think, when we consider, to be all included under one. It is an object, somehow or other, in great things or small, by long reaches or short, for ourselves or for others, to destroy or diminish evil, and to create or increase good. If, then, it were really true, and we believed it to be true, that everything somehow is eternally good, we should, I think, for the most part feel that the root of our activity was cut away. This, I know, is a conclusion denied

by those who maintain the position I am considering. For though they hold that evil is not real, they give it a place as Appearance; and against this Appearance, they urge we may still contend. But can we? and even, ought we to? For the existence of this Appearance must somehow be essential to the eternal perfection. If it be not, there is something in perfection which is not perfect; if it be, to destroy it would be to destroy the perfection. So that, on this view, it would seem, not only must the attempt to get rid of evil be vain, it must even be impious; for its only result, if it could be successful, would be to diminish good. "Ah, but," I shall be told, "although it be true that the way in which we conceive of our activity is absurd, yet the activity in itself is right. For really it is the Absolute that is acting in us; and our notion that we are achieving an end is merely his device to keep us in play." We then, it would seem, are dupes of the Eternal Being. And this may be all very well so long as the dupery is successful. But what when our philosophy has exposed it? shall we continue to acquiesce? Not, I think, willingly, and with our reason, though no doubt we may be compelled by the force of instinct. "But," it will be urged, "this Eternal Being is good; we are bound therefore to approve its activity; and therefore our own, which is a part of its." To this I can only reply that for my own part I do not see in what intelligible sense a Being can be good of whose existence evil, whether it be called apparent or real, is an essential constituent. The Substance, or the Absolute, for aught I can see, might just as well be called the Devil as God; and a belief in It seems to me necessarily fatal to any possible justification of our activity in time. The doctrine of apparent evil and of the illusoriness of ends must, I believe, or at least ought to, lead to pessimism. Or does anyone really hold that if you could convince an ordinary man that the evil he eschews, and (I suppose) equally the good he pursues, is mere appearance, and that the point of his activity is not, as he supposes, the attainment of certain temporal ends, but the

maintenance of the eternal life of a Being to whom the appearance of the Evil which he believes himself to be diminishing is as essential as that of the Good he believes himself to be increasing—does anyone hold that such a doctrine could seem to him comforting or inspiring? that he would be inclined to worship such a Being as God? and be satisfied to transfer his allegiance from the temporal issues he has found so dear, to the eternal fact which renders those issues absurd? For my own part, I do not believe either that he would, or that he ought to. On the contrary, I believe that he would experience a sense of weary disillusionment; that the suggested optimism would turn into its opposite; and that the Absolute, if it wished to keep the world going in the old style, would have to invent some new trick less patent to philosophy. That, at least, is how the matter presents itself to me; and though I do not suppose I have convinced anyone who was not convinced before, I should probably advance no further by labouring the point.

I turn, then, from the hypothesis that the world is eternally good, to the more natural one that it is a mixture of Evil and Good, both of which are real. This view has at least the advantage that it gives us a real antagonist; the end we propose—the diminution of Evil and the increase of Good—is not stultified by our primary assumption; and we may pass on to the question—what further assumptions are necessary if our intuitive optimism is to be justified?

And first, is it necessary to take any account of the result of our activity? Or is it enough to believe that there is a real conflict, the conflict being a sufficient end in itself? Some people, I think, especially among Anglo-Saxons, would be inclined, if they cared to entertain this latter question at all, to answer it in the affirmative. Those in whom the fighting instinct is strong love battle for its own sake; and if they can persuade themselves they are fighting for the Good, they have, they feel, all that they need, without raising the question of the result. The question whether or how far Good is attainable

—as well as the even more important one as to what things really are good—are apt to appear to them disturbing and vexatious; they are afraid that their efforts might be paralysed by such considerations; and perhaps they are right. Nevertheless, whatever they might or might not admit, there must, I think, underly their efforts, if their attitude is really optimistic, some assumption about the result of their work. They must believe, surely, in the first place, at least so much, that their efforts towards Good will tend, so far as they go, to produce Good, and not Evil. The contrary assumption clearly must lead straight to pessimism. Similarly, I think, they must believe that Good, not Evil, is, or at least may be, increasing in the long run. It would, of course, be possible, and it might even be noble, to fight on with the consciousness of a losing battle; and to do so in any particular case would be quite compatible with a general optimism about the world as a whole. But a belief that in the world, as a whole, Evil was triumphing—a belief, in Emily Brontë's phrase, in "conquering Ill and conquered Good"—must I think take the heart out of the fight even of the most robust; and though they might still continue to contend, and might have our applause in doing so, their attitude would no longer be the optimist's we are considering. Nay, in the long run, I cannot but think, if such a conviction became general, even the Anglo-Saxon race would cease to contend out of sheer despair; the West, like the East, would turn from the pursuit of life, to the annihilation of the will to live. For take the most active, strenuous and unreflecting man at the season of failure or at the point of death; take him when he is comparatively unpreoccupied with the fun of the fight, with adapting means to ends, and planning or realising schemes; ask him to consider not merely himself but all with whom he has come into contact, and especially those whose dearest aims he has defeated; ask him to review not merely his own age but all the course of history, back and forward, and to suppose that in all time past and in all time to come there never has been and there never will be any diminution of Evil or any increase of

Good ; nay, that the contrary has been the case ; and that the only result of his own efforts, as of all others, has been to delay the inevitable and complete triumph of Bad—make him feel and understand such a supposition, and he will, I think, at once indignantly repudiate it as intolerable ; or, if he could be persuaded to accept it, would miserably feel that the ground had been cut away beneath his feet, and that there remained no justification for his own or for any possible life. Out of habit and obstinacy he might continue to labour, but he would labour in the spirit of a pessimist, not in that of Mr Kipling and Mr Rhodes. He would not be a true Anglo-Saxon ; he would be something very like what we love to conceive of the “decadent” Latins.

And not dissimilar, I think, would be the attitude of one who, while believing in the attainability of this or that particular Good, should be agnostic on the question of any ultimate triumph of Good on the whole. I am aware, of course, that most men pursue particular Goods without any conscious or habitual reference beyond them. But it is one thing not to have reflected on the possibility of an ultimate or general Good ; another, definitely to be sceptical about it. Such definite doubt I think must naturally lead to something more like pessimism than optimism. It need not check activity, though I think it would tend in that direction ; but it would strike at the root of joy and faith. The position may be illustrated by the case of the late Professor Huxley, a man, as I think, of singularly clear and noble ethical insight. He, if I understand him rightly, held that there is no reason to suppose that the Universe is constructed on the lines of Good, or that Good will ever, in any ultimate way, prevail over Bad. But on the other hand, he held it to be proved by experience that it is possible, over a certain limited period of time, to increase Good and diminish Evil ; and that this is a sufficient basis for action. So it is ; but not for optimistic action. The attitude prompted by such a position is rather one of grim determination, devoid of enthusiasm, of delight, of confidence, of all that makes the

morning of the world, the song of the poet, the bleat of the lamb, the blurt of the Anglo-Saxon.

Contrast with this view—which I consider to be as noble as it is depressing—that of the men who in the eighteenth century formulated the doctrine of progress which was the real inspiration of the nineteenth. As they saw it, the whole process of the world, from the beginning of time, was one triumphant march to the goal of Good. To that end nature and man, conscious and unconscious efforts, passion, instinct, reason, all conspired. Blindly, for countless centuries, there had worked at the heart of things that which in these last generations had become conscious of itself—the reason of the whole universe seeking with joy its own perfection. This, surely, is the truly optimistic view; the intellectual position required by the Western world to justify its instinctive pursuit of life; and it is the position adopted without reflection by the philosophers of the nineteenth century, from Kant and Hegel (it is included among Hegel's contradictions), to many of our own contemporaries.

Yet this doctrine of progress, in the form in which it was originally announced, is already, I think, ceasing to hold the field. For this there are various reasons. Partly, I suppose, we see how little support it finds in known facts; how short is the period and how small the area over which even what we call progress has prevailed; insomuch that we can hardly deny the dictum of Sir Henry Maine that progress, so far as our positive knowledge goes, must be regarded rather as an exception than as the rule. Partly, we see how doubtful is even such progress as we think we can recognise; how gains are counterbalanced by losses; and how hard it is to sum up the total result. If, for instance, we have gained in scientific knowledge and practical capacity, have we not lost in imagination, in nobility and spiritual force? Such considerations undoubtedly have damped our belief in progress. They affect, however, rather the fact than the conception, and it is with the latter that we are at present concerned. Is the con-

ception of progress, in the form in which it has become popularised, sufficient to bear the weight of Western optimism? I doubt it; and for this reason. Progress has been commonly conceived as progress not of the individual but of the race. The individual has been thrust into the background, under the influence of biology; and the world process has come to be regarded as a movement towards the perfection not of All, but of some remote generation. The progress of humanity has extruded that of the individual, who has thus been reduced to a mere means towards an end in which he has no participation.

Such a conception, regarded as an ideal, has, I think, palpable defects. Humanity is made up of individuals; and what people call the progress of humanity implies, that of those individuals an indefinite number, who have the misfortune to be born earlier in time, come into existence, suffer, contend, aspire, struggle, acquiesce, experience at the best partial good, at the worst unmitigated evil, and finally are extinguished, ignorant, blind, confused, as they were born, with no result for it all save that they have formed the stepping-stones for others who are to enjoy, for a brief time, the full illumination of Good at some date indefinitely remote.

So stated—and I have stated it, I think, not unfairly—the position ceases to be a possible basis for optimism. It may indeed justify activity directed towards a positive end—though even that may be doubted, since it might, not unreasonably, be held to be better to aim rather at extinguishing existence than at perpetuating it on such miserable terms. But it can hardly justify the confidence and enthusiasm which is an essential characteristic of optimism. Unless indeed it be seriously maintained that for most people life on earth as we know it is so transcendently good that it deserves in itself, without reference to anything beyond, to be supported and perpetuated with delight. That is a view, I suppose, which may be held by some few fortunate and unimaginary souls, but I cannot believe it would commend itself to an enlightened understanding. Too few of us, surely, attain the Good even of

which we are capable ; too many are capable of too little ; and all are capable for so short a time. A Good so precarious, so capriciously distributed, in the course of a life so brief, has seldom, I think, seemed to men, when they have come to reflect, to be a Good very much worth the pursuit. On this point the experience of the East is instructive. Nothing is more striking than the transformation of those early Aryan warriors, who came down from the North like Greeks, active, aggressive, enthusiastic, into the race of mild Hindus, penetrated with the sense of nothingness, desiring only to be re-absorbed into the Universal whence they sprang, and enduring the while, with quiet contempt, the fatuous energies of men who still think it worth while to trade, to govern and to fight. We may attribute the change, if we will, to climate, to institutions, or what not ? But there is something behind all that—the permanent challenge of the reason to the instinct that affirms life—a challenge which the Indian met, and before which he succumbed—a challenge we too must meet, as it was met by Greeks and Romans, and to which we too must succumb, unless we have some better reply than that old saying, not of a Hindu, but of a Greek,—

*πάντα γέλωσ καὶ πάντα κόμισ καὶ πάντα τὸ μηδεῦ
πάντα γὰρ ἔξ ἀλόγων ἔστι τὰ γινόμενα.*

Western optimism, in my belief, is doomed, unless we can believe that there is more significance in individual lives than appears upon the surface ; that there is a destiny reserved for them more august than any to which they can attain in their life of threescore years and ten. On this point I can, of course, only speak my own conviction—the conviction that, at the bottom of every human soul, even of those that deny it, there lurks the insatiate hunger for eternity ; that we desire, in Browning's phrase, something that will

"make time break
And let us pent-up creatures through
Into eternity, our due ;"

and that nothing short of this will ever appear, in the long

run, once men have begun to think and feel, to be a sufficient justification and apology for the life into which we are born.

I conceive, then, that a doctrine of progress which is to be a basis for optimism must comprise at least the possibility of a Good to be attained by individual souls after death. And this brings me to the point of view which up to quite recent times has been, in the West, the support on which men have relied, and the weakening of which is coincident with the inroads of pessimism—I mean the point of view of the Christian Church. The doctrine of the church is, I think, in some of its aspects, the noblest and most satisfactory which men have ever devised for their comfort in their blind, enigmatic pilgrimage. This life, it recognises, is not all; beyond it lies eternity, an eternity either of Good or of Evil; which of these is to be the lot of the individual soul depends upon its conduct while on earth. It is free to choose either Good or Evil; and as it chooses, so will be its reward. I have called this doctrine noble, first because of its recognition that the goal of ultimate satisfaction is eternal life in the contemplation of Good; secondly, because of its implicit assertion of the infinite distinction between Good and Evil, a distinction which our modern mode of thought tends to confuse and blur, inevitably, and certainly not altogether without advantage, considering how imperfect are our notions of either.

But if the doctrine has its noble aspect, it has others which are irrational, and even immoral. It depends, in the first place, in any sense in which we can accept it as satisfactory, upon the belief in free will. I am aware, of course, that it has been, and perhaps still is, held by many who do not accept that belief. But I cannot think that a doctrine will, in the long run, commend itself to the conscience of mankind, still less support an optimistic view of the world, which sends men to an eternal hell, not for any fault of their own, but because they have been once for all created bad. Now, in our time a large and increasing number of people are determinists, if not fatalists; and a conjunction of that mode of thought with a

belief in the Christian theology must, I think, inevitably lead directly to pessimism, as men become, if they do, more intelligent and more humane.

Leaving, however, this point—which might easily land me in a controversy in which I have no desire to be involved—there are few of us who, even if we accept the doctrine of free will, can believe in the righteousness of hell. This, I am aware, may be attributed to mere weakness. If, it may be said, we can deserve an eternal heaven, then surely we can also deserve an eternal hell; and with our modern squeamishness may be contrasted the splendid audacity of Dante, himself the tenderest as well as the sternest of men,—

“ Giustizia mosse il mio alto fattore ;
Fecemi la divina potestate,
La somma sapienza e il primo amore.”

It must be remembered, however, that I am discussing the postulates of optimism; and with optimism I conceive the doctrine of hell to be incompatible; firstly, because, even on the vindictive theory, an eternal punishment is indefinitely excessive for a temporal offence; secondly, because, rightly or wrongly, we have come to demand that any heaven which we can hold to be good, must somehow or other be a heaven for all.

Such a demand may, of course, be represented as weak and sentimental; may be charged with ignoring the distinction between the good and the bad. I would suggest, however, that the distinction between what we call good and bad people is neither so clear nor so fundamental as that between Good and Evil themselves. The best man is not so very good nor the worst so very bad, especially if we take into account all the circumstances and influences which may have helped the one and hindered the other. Is any man so bad as to deserve eternal hell; or, for that matter, so good as to deserve eternal heaven? Few, I think, would answer in the affirmative. And if we are to hold, as we must, I believe, if we are to be optimists, that there is some definite goal to be reached

by all individuals by a temporal process—the notion of a series of successive existences, in the course of which all are gradually purified and made fit for the heaven they are ultimately to attain, would seem to be the one least open to objection. It is also, I think, the one which is gradually popularising itself among those who, without being students of philosophy, feel an intimate interest in its problems, and are not satisfied with the Christian solution; among the readers, for example, of Browning, Whitman and Meredith; among the many devotees of spiritualism; and among those who follow, with an interest that is not merely scientific, the proceedings of the *Psychical Society*.

To sum up, then, my conclusions. The postulates of optimism or some of them, at least, I conceive to be—

- (1) That the world is not eternally good, but embodies a real (not merely an apparent) process in time towards a good end.
- (2) That this end is one in which all individuals will somehow participate.
- (3) That therefore individual souls must be immortal, and must all of them ultimately reach heaven.

Now these postulates, whether or no they may seem credible, are at any rate directly opposed to all the modes of thought that have been or are officially accepted in Christendom. They are opposed to Christianity, for they deny hell.¹ They are opposed to the various philosophies of the Absolute, for they assert a real temporal process. They are opposed to current scientific preconceptions, for they assert a progress which is not of the species but of individuals. On the other hand, among the uneducated and the superstitious, and among those who are not associated by training or environment with any particular school of thought, they are,

¹ I am aware, of course, that many modern people calling themselves Christians do not accept the doctrine of Hell; but it has been an essential doctrine of Christian theology at least from the time of Augustine.

I think, beginning to commend themselves as satisfactory, if not as true. They are at the bottom, for instance, of the interest felt in what is called theosophy; they are at the bottom of spiritualism; they are at the bottom of Browning Societies; they are at the bottom of the Psychological Society. If I am right in my notion that they appeal to the "life-affirming" instinct in man, and that nothing else, when we think the matter out, does so, then I think they have a future, if not in philosophy or science, then in religion or superstition. It is important then, it seems to me, that they should be considered by both science and philosophy, if it is desirable that those who make it their business to think should have some voice in the formation of popular beliefs. Thus, for example, philosophy, I think, should devote a most serious consideration to that concept of the Absolute and the Eternal, which it has accepted, I cannot but think, so uncritically; and to the notion of a substantial person or soul, which is still involved in so much obscurity. And science, on the other hand, should lay aside its prejudices, and be ready to consider with an open mind all evidence, however tainted in its source, which may seem to bear on the question of survival after death. For these, I cannot but think, are the problems with which, more and more, men will begin to concern themselves when the present wave of unreflecting materialism has spent its force.

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MARTINEAU'S PHILOSOPHY.

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IN attempting any estimate of Martineau's work, it is particularly desirable to bear in mind the long period over which his intellectual activity extended. The dates of his life almost coincided with those of the nineteenth century. He was born two years before Hegel published his first volume. When he left college in 1827, Hegel was still teaching in Berlin, and Goethe was still alive at Weimar; in France, Cousin was at the height of his reputation as a philosophical lecturer, and Comte had not yet published the first volume of the *Philosophie Positive*; while, at home, James Mill was leading the Philosophical Radicals to victory in the *Westminster Review*, and his son had just discovered the future designation of the school in a novel of Galt's. The elder Mill's *Analysis of the Human Mind*, and Sir William Hamilton's celebrated article on the *Philosophy of the Unconditioned*, landmarks in the history of two different schools, did not appear till two years later. During the twenties, as Professor Upton says, what philosophical interest existed in the British Isles "was divided between the Hartleyan empirical school and the Scotch school of so-called "common-sense"; and young Martineau was brought up by his college preceptors on Belsham's *Elements of Mental and Moral Philosophy*, which popularised the associationist and necessarian tradition of Hartley and Priestley. Before

he was appointed Professor, however, in 1840, he had already fought his way to the clearly defined ethical position which he ever afterwards occupied. And as the change of view in ethics was necessarily accompanied by a revision of the doctrine of causation, Professor Upton goes the length of saying that "his philosophical teaching remained for the rest of his long life substantially unaltered. The modifications which it underwent were all the outcome of and in harmony with the basal principles which he adopted in 1839." It is not without significance, therefore, that although Martineau's *Study of Religion* was published in 1887, we are told in the first sentence that the word Religion will be used throughout "in the sense which it invariably bore *half a century ago*." The fact is not without significance, I mean, if we are to form a true judgment of the value of Martineau's work. His philosophical *books* all appeared towards the close of the century, but the ideas they contained had been formulated forty or fifty years before, and had, indeed, been operative in English thought for a generation, through the author's college teaching, and numerous important articles and addresses.

His most productive period was during the fifties and sixties. During these decades he contributed to the *Prospective* and *National Review* what Professor Upton justly describes as "a splendid series of articles, as finished in expression as they are powerful in thought, dealing with the chief philosophical thinkers and movements of the time." He appears as the critic impartially of Hamilton and Mill, of Comte and Newman, of the agnosticism of Spencer and Mansel. In these articles, and in the still more celebrated criticisms of modern materialism called forth by Tyndall's Belfast address in the seventies, we may probably recognise his most direct influence on contemporary thought, before the cumulative effect produced by the publication in advanced age of his two systematic treatises and the garnered harvest of his *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*. Now there are imperishable principles which persist through every change of philosophical

dialect, but on other parts of a philosopher's work the time-spirit has his will. The famous battle of the Intuitionists and Sensationalists round Hamilton's body in the sixties no longer tempts us to break a lance on either side. Its very echoes have grown strangely faint. Professor Upton comments aptly on the sudden transformation of philosophical issues which followed these heated encounters. "Just at the time when the followers of Hamilton and those of Mill and Bain were thus vehemently contending with each other, and Dr Martineau was holding his own independently of both, two fresh and quite unexpected claimants for philosophical supremacy appeared upon the scene. Of these, one sprang into birth on British soil, the other was of German extraction. The motto of the former was "Evolution and Heredity," that of the latter the "Absolute Reality of Thought"; but each of them vigorously attacked the fundamental principles both of the Edinburgh intuitionists and of the London sensationalists; and it is one of the most dramatic events in the history of philosophical thought that, in less than twenty years, these newcomers had between them managed to dethrone and dispossess both of the pretenders to philosophic rule, with whom Dr Martineau had, in previous years, such brilliant encounters. From this circumstance it comes about that Dr Martineau's earlier polemics, powerful as they were, have now not much more than a literary and historical interest."¹

The services of Martineau to spiritual philosophy in England during the nineteenth century cannot easily, I think, be overestimated. These services seem to me, however, to be to a large extent independent of the specific form which the fundamental doctrines of such a philosophy assume in his own theory. His peculiar theory of conscience has grave de-

¹ *Life and Letters*, ii. 358. I may take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to Professor Upton's luminous account of Martineau's Philosophy in the second volume of the "Life." Professor Upton not only furnishes all the material for a critical estimate of Martineau's place in English thought, but himself touches with discriminating hand the weak no less than the strong points of his master's system.

fects, and I question whether anyone maintains it at the present day. But his splendid insistence on the moral life and its implications, as furnishing the key to human existence and man's relation to the divine—the massive resistance which he offered to every attempt to explain ethical experience by other than ethical categories, whether baldly physical, or of the metaphysical kind that are but physical in disguise,—these are in the spirit of Butler and of Kant, and greatly helped to raise English thought from its inherited hedonism and necessarianism. Even should his doctrine of Freedom itself be found to require modification, it was ethically true as against the necessarianism from which it emancipated Martineau himself, and all who have listened to his searching and persuasive pleading. So, again, his own doctrine of Cause may be open to serious philosophical criticism, but his distinction between ordered sequence and real agency, and his demonstration of the impossibility of reducing the latter to the former, enabled him to dissect the sophisms which are apt to gather round the term “law.” His exposure of the fundamental absurdity of a mindless universe, his timely reminder of the true scope and meaning of evolution, and his impassioned vindication of moral right as “no local essence,” but allegiance “due to one eternal Perfection which penetrates the moral structure of all worlds,” made his addresses on “Modern Materialism” more effective than any other utterances in stemming the dangerous tide of turbid materialistic speculation to which the Darwinian doctrine at first gave rise. The clearness and beauty of Martineau's style, the rhetorical force of his pleading, the ethical passion and spiritual dignity of the man, combined to make him an ideal champion of the spiritual view of the world in a time of transition and intellectual insecurity. For myself, I cannot but think that it is on such imperishable services to the common cause of Idealism, rather than on the peculiar features which differentiate his own treatment from other systems, that Martineau's place in the history of English thought will ultimately depend.

So that when Professor Upton speaks of "the systems of Hegel, of Lotze, and of James Martineau," as the three philosophical systems which are most likely by their contributions to mould the philosophy of religion of the twentieth century, I feel as if the word System were almost out of place in connection with Martineau's influence, and as if this juxtaposition of the three thinkers suggested claims which it might be difficult to establish. For we find Professor Upton himself acknowledging on important points the defects of his master's "formulated philosophy," the "intellectual framework" of which, he considers, did not do justice to important aspects of truth which, in his less systematic moments, find expression in "some of his divinest utterances." But it is by the adequacy of his "intellectual framework" that the philosopher *qua* philosopher takes a distinctive place in the historic series. It was some perception of this which led R. H. Hutton, another old pupil, to write in his memorial article in the *Spectator*:—"We doubt whether the historian of the English thought of our time will credit Martineau with any distinct modification of the theological and philosophical opinions of this age. It was something that went below opinion; it was a revelation of spiritual character and power." The turn of expression hardly does justice to Martineau's clear-cut thought and great intellectual force; yet in the end this estimate may perhaps be found nearer the mark than any more far-reaching claim.

It is as the vindicator, and one may almost say, as the prophet of Theism, that Martineau is widely honoured. Thus Professor J. E. Carpenter, in an eloquent tribute at the unveiling of a memorial in Little Portland Street Chapel, described his philosophical achievement as essentially a revolt against "the interpretation of the universe by a mechanical Deism." "He discovered a new philosophy and a new religion which brought the human spirit into immediate communion with the living God, placed His authority within the soul, and transformed the infinite spaces of the universe

from lonely immensities into the presence-chamber of the everlasting Mind." Martineau's own characterisation of Deism, in the "Study of Religion," as an imperfect theism, which scarcely passes into a religion, may be accepted as justifying this estimate of his philosophical intention. And, indeed, as regards the external universe, what Martineau did was substantially to substitute Berkeley's conception for Locke's, reducing its ordered sequences of events to the organised expression of continuously active Divine Will, while in the sphere of ethics and religion he insisted on the immediate presence of the Divine to the human soul. But although the intention of his philosophy doubtless is to provide us with a doctrine of Theism, which shall rise above the externalities of Deism, and conserve all that is true in the counter-error of Pantheism, it is only in his deepest religious utterances that he completely emancipates himself from deistic presuppositions. His intellectual scheme of the world was much more under the influence of his individualistic and deistic training than he was himself aware of, and the defects of his "formulated philosophy"—its frequent rigidity and externality, and its exaggerated anthropomorphism—are nearly all traceable to this source. As we have already seen, Professor Upton considers that his main positions had been reached as early as 1839, and that his teaching remained substantially unaltered after that date. The terms in which Martineau himself speaks of the "Annus Mirabilis" which he spent in Germany ten years later do not seem to me inconsistent with this statement. There is no evidence that he experienced "a new intellectual birth" in the sense of a revolution in his own philosophical convictions. He made a careful study of Kant, and also read Plato and Hegel side by side. Ancient and modern philosophy shed light upon one another, and of Greek philosophy especially he got quite a new impression. "I seemed to pierce through what had been words before, into contact with living thought, and the black grammatical text was aglow with luminous philosophy. It was essentially the gift of fresh conceptions

. . . . and, once gained, was more or less available throughout the history of philosophy, and lifted the darkness from the pages of Kant and even Hegel. It was impossible to resist or distrust this gradual widening of apprehension; it was as much a fact as the sight of the Alps I had never visited before The metaphysic of the world had come home to me." He returned, therefore, with a mind indefinitely richer for this companionship with the masters of them that know, and with his own philosophical powers strengthened by the long wrestle with their meaning. He could not have spoken as he afterwards did with the same largeness of utterance and the same confidence of knowledge had he not been lifted by contact with "the metaphysic of the world" above the parochialism of contemporary English thought. But still, the result was comparable, after all, to the enlarging effect of foreign travel. It must be remembered that he was already forty-three years of age; and his fifteen months of study, though they enabled him to base his philosophy more broadly, did not alter the lines on which it was already laid down.

Neither from Kant nor Hegel can he be shown to have assimilated any formative ideas. Trendelenburg was not the best guide to what was really vital in Kant's analysis of knowledge; and Martineau appears in his books to adopt the psychological interpretation of the Kantian theory which makes it substantially a variety of Intuitionism. He is mainly concerned to refute the subjectivism and relativism of the theory; and this is done largely in the spirit of Natural Realism. As for Hegel, he must be said to have remained entirely outside the system so far as sympathy was concerned, and the more intimate understanding that is born of sympathy. In that respect he was unfortunate in the date of his visit. The reaction against Hegel had set in; and though Martineau studied him conscientiously, he may easily have been led to regard him as a spent force. It was quarter of a century later before Hegelianism began to be a power in English thought, and by that time Martineau was close upon his seventieth year.

“Strange to say,” Professor Upton tells us, “he never fully realised the powerful attraction which Absolute Idealism has for many minds, nor at all anticipated the lengthened influence it was destined to exert on both sides of the Atlantic.” This want of sympathy is to some extent an indication of defective speculative insight, and is only explicable by the pronounced individualism of Martineau’s own view, which resulted from the exclusively ethical cast of his mind and the relics of an imperfectly transformed deistic theory. He was, at least, much nearer the deistic than the pantheistic extreme, and had all his life long quite an exaggerated apprehension of anything that could be considered to savour of Pantheism. Even Professor Upton’s modest criticisms and amendments on his own theory, he considered “sometimes came dangerously near to Pantheism.” Now, however valuable Martineau’s “Ethical Individualism” may be as a protest against certain tendencies within the Hegelian school, “the historic pabulum” in Hegel (to use Dr Stirling’s apt phrase) is so rich that to remain entirely outside his “way of ideas” is a voluntary impoverishment of thought, which cannot be made good from any other source.

In issuing his *Study of Religion* in 1887, Martineau remarked with a touch of sadness, in the closing words of his preface, that he was well aware that the volumes were in conflict with the prevailing opinions and tendencies of the time. The same note is heard occasionally in his correspondence. The isolation which he felt was not altogether imaginary, and it arose mainly from the circumstance that the two greatest intellectual influences of the century had left his scheme of thought practically unaffected. Professor Carpenter comments on the significance of the fact that “his essential work as a thinker was done before the production of the *Origin of Species*, and we have just seen his attitude to Hegel and modern Idealism. The result was that when he abandoned the associationism and necessarianism of his youth, the theory he adopted was, in essentials, akin to the Intuitionism of the

Scottish philosophers. In Ethics, it is explicitly to "the writers of the Scottish school, and their editors, critics and disciples in Paris," that he refers as (with Butler) the only faithful adherents of what he calls the "idio-psychological" method. They alone "have declined to betray their science to the physiologist on the one hand and the ontologist on the other." Ethics to him as to them is the science which collects and vindicates "our ethical intuitions," or "the particular averments of the moral consciousness." "Our moral verdicts," he says, "are the enunciation of what is given us ready-made, and has only to pass through us into speech. . . . We have nothing to seek by logical process, but only to give forth what we find." (*Study*, ii. 6.) Martineau's pages, like Hamilton's, abound with appeals to "the veracity of consciousness,"—though, at a pinch, both Martineau and Hamilton are found interpreting the responses of the oracle in a sense which might astonish the ordinary man. In regard to the external world, the doctrine of natural realism is maintained, quite in Hamilton's manner, on the faith of "the intuitive witness borne by consciousness to the presence of a world beyond the contents of that consciousness." (*Study*, i. 133). Martineau, while sympathising with Professor Laurie's supposed "return to Dualism," finds fault with him because he does not "accept the non-ego, as, like the ego, immediately known in the act of perception." (i. 191.) "Our reference of a perception to an object in independent space and time" is "an intuitive apprehension of what is," and to doubt it is a "surrender of the reliance which we inevitably place on the veracity of our own faculties." (i. 77.) In short, "the idealist's superior airs towards the natural postulates and the direct working of the honest understanding are seldom unattended by intellectual error and moral wrong." (i. 80.)

But to present the task of philosophy in this way is surely to demonstrate unwittingly its perfect uselessness; for if we have only to "trust in the *bona fides* of our intuitive witnesses" to find ourselves in possession of truth, why

should we trouble further? The service of metaphysics, Dr Chalmers once wrote,¹ is “not to supply a new, but only to certify and authenticate an old instrument of observation, given ready-made to all men by the hand of nature, and which all men could have confidently and successfully made use of without the necessity of being told so by a right metaphysics, had not a wrong metaphysics cast obscurity on the dictates and disturbed the confidence of nature.” “The child sees an apple on the table and affirms an apple to be there. A Berkeleian philosopher labours to disprove the assertion. A second metaphysician arises and repels the sophistry of the first.” And so the child keeps his apple. It is not often that the position is stated with such charming naiveté, but Martineau comes near saying the same thing when in the preface to his *Study of Religion* he speaks of the metaphysical investigation as winning at last “only the very position which common-sense had assumed at first”; or, again, when he describes metaphysics—his own, be it observed, not any species of what Chalmers calls “wrong metaphysics”—as “but medicine for sickly minds, which the healthy may well fling away as they would ‘apples of Sodom.’” “I believe,” he adds, “in the permanent necessity of the philosophic schools which torment the wits of mankind.” The critical process, however, “gives no new revelation, but *reinstates us where we intuitively stood*, only with certainty secured that the ground is not hollow beneath us.” (*Life*, ii. 217.)

There is, of course, an important truth in the view that, as Tucker put it, philosophy may be likened to Achilles’ spear which healed the wounds itself had made. One great function of good metaphysics is to oust bad metaphysics and disprove its pretensions. In a sense, it is even true that a true philosophy will be found to justify the principles of common-sense, that is to say, the beliefs upon which we all act in practical life. But it vindicates their “veracity” for the purposes of that life, and not as oracles of ultimate truth. The philosophical problem—

¹ *North British Review*, vol. vi. pp. 275-9.

the question, that is, how we may most truly express the ultimate nature of reality—cannot even be stated till we have left the hard and fast distinctions of common-sense far behind us. If the question is to be solved at all, it must be, not by accepting these categories and distinctions as final, but by allowing the free play of reflection upon them to disclose their inadequacy, and to show us the way to a higher truth. In the particular case of Ethics a similar criticism holds. "To interpret, to vindicate and systematise the moral sentiments," says Martineau, "constitutes the business of this department of thought." (*Types*, i. 1.) If to "vindicate" the moral sentiments meant to vindicate our ethical experience as a foundation of inference as to the nature of reality; if to "systematise" meant to investigate, like Sidgwick, what common-sense really believes about morality; and if to "interpret" meant to bring to self-consciousness the principles which have unconsciously guided its formation and progress, and to relate the ethical life to other aspects of reality,—then indeed the definition would be as comprehensive and as unexceptionable as could be desired. But the Intuitional Method, it is obvious, understands by vindication the acceptance of "the particular averments of the moral consciousness" as immediate oracles; and in that case the task of systematisation and interpretation seems to become comparatively unimportant, if not superfluous. It is certain, at least, that Intuitional moralists as a rule devote little attention to this part of their work.

To his Intuitionalism, and to what I have called the survivals of Deism in his thought, the main defects of Martineau's ethical theory are traceable. His volumes abound in passages of keen psychological analysis, of rare moral insight and spiritual beauty; but his specific theory of Conscience as in every case intuitively deciding between two conflicting motives never, I think, made any converts, and is not really maintainable, either on psychological or philosophical grounds. What is true and suggestive in it is that the moral choice is not so much between an absolutely good and an absolutely bad, as

between a better and a worse; though the choice of the better is, in the particular circumstances, the absolutely right for me, and the choice of the worse would be the absolutely bad. We may also, perhaps, arrange the "springs of action," as Martineau does, in an ethical order of merit as "higher" and "lower"; the appetites, for example, coming near the bottom of the scale, the love of power or ambition a good deal higher, the primary affections higher still, and compassion and reverence at the top of the list. Martineau supplies such a list in considerable detail; and his theory is that, whenever any of the propensions, passions, affections or sentiments thus classified comes into conflict with one higher in the scale, right volition consists in choosing the "higher" in preference to the "lower." But Sidgwick conclusively argues that, although this will probably be true as a general rule, and the scale of motives may therefore be useful as serving to "indicate in a rough and general way the kind of desires which it is usually best to encourage and indulge, in comparison with other kinds which are ordinarily likely to compete and collide with them," still it cannot be maintained that any such "universal relation of higher or lower subsists between any pair of impulses as is here affirmed." Common-sense would rather hold "that, in all or most cases, a natural impulse has its proper sphere, within which it should be normally operative, and that the question whether a motive commonly judged higher should yield to a lower, is one that cannot be answered decisively in the general way in which Martineau answers it." "Love of ease and pleasure," for example, comes nearly lowest in Martineau's list, and "love of gain" and "love of culture" much higher; but we often find men prompted by the latter motives to shorten unduly their hours of recreation. The answer must depend in every case on the particular conditions and circumstances of the conflict. And hence it is impossible to evade Sidgwick's general conclusion that the comparison ultimately decisive is "not a comparison between the motives primarily conflicting, but between the effects of the different lines of

conduct to which they respectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end of reasonable action."¹ But if we accept this conclusion, it also disposes of the notion of a special faculty issuing immediate decisions on the moral question at issue. The apprehension of the superior worth of a principle is, according to Martineau, "no mediate discovery of which we can give an account, but is immediately inherent in the very experience of the principles themselves—a revelation inseparable from their appearance side by side. By simply entering the stage together and catching the inner eye, they disclose their respective worth and credentials." Or, as he puts it elsewhere, "there is no analysis or research required; the claims are decided by a glance at their face." To this the reply is, that if by Conscience is understood (what it usually means in ordinary speech) the response of the trained moral nature in view of any ethical alternative, then everyone will admit that conscience acts with much of the swiftness and certainty of an instinct, and furnishes in most cases an infallible touchstone of right and wrong. But apart from experience of the effects of action—as regards the individual apart from moral training and the ethical heritage of humanity—I am totally unable to conceive the existence of such a power of immediate or abstract judgment as Martineau's theory seems to imply.

Martineau's extreme Intuitionism here was, in one sense, a natural consequence of the individualism which so strongly marks his ethical theory. "Ethical Individualism" is the term which Professor Upton uses more than once as giving "the keynote of his moral philosophy." It springs from his intense realisation of the personal character of the moral life, and is one great source of his power as a moral teacher. But in the region of theory, it leaves him committed to untenable abstractions. The idea of conscience as an infallible faculty in each individual is closely connected with the view of man-

¹ *The Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau* (359-61). This conclusion is accepted by Professor Upton,—*Life and Letters*, ii. 395.

kind as a collection of isolated or self-sufficient individuals. Martineau does scant justice to the social aspect of morality—the extent, I mean, to which our actual conscience is the creature of authority, moulded by inherited institutions and customs, the product, in a word, of the age-long “education of the human race.” This view may, it is true, be presented so baldly as to reduce morality to an affair of external sanctions, a sense of punishability—which would mean the elimination of the moral element from conduct altogether—and it is probably in his reaction from this false form of statement that Martineau is carried to the extreme of treating the individual as sufficient unto himself. But it is not really open to doubt that we are men and moral beings at all only as we share in the corporate and inherited life of humanity. We are quite literally members one of another, and the subjective conscience is, in its main contents, the organ of the objective ethos which has shaped itself in human history and lies around us from our infancy. It would be unfair to say that Martineau nowhere recognises this unity of mankind. He could not have been the great religious teacher he was, had he not recognised it. There is a fine passage in the second volume of his *Types of Ethical Theory* which expresses the true view so finely that I will venture to quote it, even at the risk of seeming to cut the ground from under the foregoing criticisms. He is describing the transformation of conscience “into social consensus and religion.”

“This process so implicates together the agent and his fellows, that we can scarce divide the causal factors into individual and social, inner and outer: *bodily*, no doubt, he stands there by himself, while his family are grouped separately round him: but *spiritually*, he is not *himself* without them; and this reveals itself by a kind of moral amputation, if death should snatch them away, and put his *selfdom* to the test of loneliness. It is the same with the larger groups which inclose him in their sympathetic embrace. His *country* is not external to him: he is woven into it by sensitive fibres that answer to all its good or ill; its life-blood courses through his veins, inseparably mingled with his own. The social union is most inadequately represented as a compact or tacit bargain subsisting among separate units, agreeing to combine for specific purposes and for limited times, and then disbanding again to their several isolations. It is no such forensic abstraction, devised as a cement for mechanically conceived com-

ponents; but a concrete though spiritual form of life, penetrating and partly constituting all persons belonging to it, so that only as fractions of it do they become human integers themselves." (ii. 373.)

But it is to be noted that this eloquent acknowledgment only appears as an after-word in the act of passing beyond ethics to a religious standpoint, and though doubtless co-existing with it in the author's mind, is not really harmonised with the exclusive individualism of the formulated ethical theory. Moreover, it can be shown that although he rises above it in the utterances of personal religious feeling, his individualism invades his theory of religion itself. His ethical individualism leads him to an ethical Deism which treats God consistently as "another Person." There is no part of Martineau's theory which is more characteristic, or on which he lays more stress, than his doctrine of Obligation. It is probably his chief contribution to the theistic argument, for in obligation he sees, as it were, the meeting-place of the human and the divine. "In morals it is God and self that stand face to face." But the explanation he offers of the feeling of Obligation is that "the Moral Law is *imposed by an authority foreign to our personality*, and is open, not to be canvassed, but only to be obeyed or disobeyed." (*Study*, ii. 7.) Professor Caldecott justly remarks on this as "an expression so forbidding that were it not for the fact that it is italicised, one would have ignored it as a lapsus."¹ But it is impossible to ignore it, for to Martineau it is just this feature of the ethical consciousness which carries us on to religion, and gives us an immediate certainty of the divine existence. It forms the pivot of his argument, against Sidgwick and Green, that the law cannot be self-imposed. "It takes two," he says, "to establish an obligation. *To whom*, then, is the alleged obligation upon the agent? You will say, perhaps, it is to *himself* that the obligation lies to choose the more fruitful lot. By the hypothesis, however, he is the person that *bears* the obligation, and cannot also be the person whose presence *imposes it*; it is impossible to be at once the upper and the

¹ *Philosophy of Religion in England and America*, 346.

nether millstone. Personality is unitary, and in occupying one side of a given relation is unable to be also in the other." (*Types*, ii. 100.) He concludes, therefore, that "if the sense of authority means anything, it means the discernment of something *higher than we*, having claims on our *self*, therefore no mere part of it. . . . If I rightly interpret this sentiment, I cannot therefore stop within my own limits, but am irresistibly carried on to the recognition of another than I *another Person*, greater and higher and of deeper insight." (*Types*, ii. 97.)

This position is in the sharpest contrast to the Kantian doctrine of the autonomy of the will, which is surely one of Kant's most valuable contributions to modern thought. A man can only be bound by the enactment of his own self-legislative will. So long as the law comes to me from without, I can demand its warrant and evade its claims; but I cannot escape from my own law—from the law which is the expression of my necessary will. Martineau himself follows this more excellent way in the introduction to his *Study of Religion*, where he is discussing the relation of Ethics to Religion. "Without an internal enactment in the soul, to which the external mandate brings its appeal," he says, "the consciousness of Right is impossible, and the human world is susceptible of government only as a menagerie." And it is undeniable, he further admits, that "conscience may act as human before it is discovered to be divine. Ethics, therefore, have practical existence and operation prior to any explicit religious belief: the law of right is inwoven with the very tissue of our nature, and throbs in the movements of our experience; and cannot be escaped by anyone till he can fly from himself." (*Study*, i. 20-1.) But if that is so, then the bindingness of moral rules cannot depend essentially on the fact that they emanate from "another Person"; and consequently Martineau's theological version of the ethical consciousness cannot be true as it stands. He is, of course, absolutely right in insisting on the objective nature of the moral law, and in rejecting the notion that the law is in any way constituted, or made authoritative, by the subjective

act of recognition. Duty may, therefore, not unfitly be spoken of as the law of God revealed in the consciousness of the individual who recognises it. But the difficulties of Martineau's theory all arise from the sheer separation which he appears to make between the self of the moral being and its divine source, conceived in this connection as an objectively legislating Will. This appears from the hypothetical examples to which he has recourse to justify his position. (*Types*, ii. 96-99.) He supposes "the case of one lone man in an atheistic universe," and asks whether there could "really exist any authority of higher over lower within the inclosure of his detached personality"; and he not unreasonably concludes "that an insulated nature," "an absolutely solitary individual," cannot be conceived as the seat of authority at all. But such an individual is a *non-ens*, the creature of a theory, and is certainly improperly spoken of as a self or a person. If any being were shut up, in Martineau's phrase, "within the inclosure of his detached personality," he would be a self-contained universe to himself, or rather he would be one bare point of mere existence. If intelligences were simply mutually exclusive points of subjectivity, then indeed they could not be the seats and depositaries of an objective law; they could not be the subjects of law at all. Consciousness of imperfection, the capacity for progress, and the pursuit of perfection are alike possible to man only through the universal life of thought and goodness in which he shares, and which, at once an indwelling presence and an unattainable ideal, draws him "on and always on." Personality is not "unitary" in Martineau's sense, as occupying one side of a relation and unable to be also on the other. The very capacity of knowledge and morality implies that the person is not so confined, but is capable of regarding himself and all other beings from what Martineau well names "the station of the Father of Spirits."

It is only, therefore, after discarding the intuitionism, and the abstract individualism and deism of the theory, that it can be accepted as a true account of the ethical consciousness and

its implications. These may be the features most distinctive of Martineau, the technical philosopher, but they were not the inspiration of the religious thinker and seer who habitually spoke of God as "the Soul of all souls." Professor Upton has very clearly pointed out the co-existence in Martineau's writings of "two modes of conceiving God, one of which is Deistic or Hebraic, while the other is distinctly and intensely Christian. The first mode represents God as 'another and higher Person'; the second represents Him as 'the Soul of souls.' The former conception rests upon an *inferential* knowledge of God, derived either from the experience of God's resistance to our will through the forces of Nature, or from God's felt restraint upon us in the voice of Conscience. In both cases the Supreme Being is regarded as completely separated from the human soul, and his existence and character are apprehended and demonstrated by a process of reasoning." This rationalistic or deistic view he acknowledges to be mainly in the foreground in the formulated philosophy, but he strongly contends that in the other view—"in the apprehension of God as the Infinite, including all finite existences, as the immanent Absolute who progressively manifests his character in the Ideals of Truth, Beauty, Righteousness and Love, we have the inmost essence of Dr Martineau's religious philosophy," and that without this, "both his philosophy and his sermons would lose much of their characteristic depth and beauty." (*Life*, ii. 475-9.) I most readily believe this, and only regret that this "mystical," or as I should prefer to call it speculative, insight found such inadequate expression in his formal theory. Professor Upton suggests by way of explanation, that although in 1841 Martineau explicitly treats the moral and spiritual affections as "constituting a participation in the Divine nature," he soon afterwards became alarmed by the danger to which such a doctrine is exposed of gliding easily into Pantheism. Certain it is that during the greater part of his life he seems dominated by an almost morbid dread of this particular form of error, and in his professorial and

critical rôle exhibited an almost striking insensibility to the great speculative truth it embodies. His *Study of Spinoza*, for example, contains an admirable "Life," and much acute and incisive criticism of technical doctrine, but the criticism is entirely from the outside. The failure to appreciate the inner motives of Spinoza's thought, and the secret of his power over some greatest modern thinkers and poets, is complete. One cannot help recalling a significant sentence of Hegel's, in which he represents the philosophy of Spinoza as the test of speculative initiation. "When one begins to philosophise, one must first be a Spinozist; the soul must bathe in this æther of the one Substance, in which everything that had been held as true has disappeared." It does not appear as if Martineau, so far as his intellect was concerned, had ever submitted to this immersion.

I am afraid that a somewhat similar line of criticism is forced upon us in regard to his Libertarian interpretation of moral freedom. He is right, in my view, in saying that "the language of Ethics when translated into necessarian formulas, parts with all conceptions distinctly moral, and becomes simply descriptive of phenomena in natural history. It tells us what has been, what is, what probably will be; but not (unless in an altered sense) what *ought to be*." (*Study*, ii. 318.) So far as he insisted on the inadequacy of such a version of moral action, Martineau rendered a service to English thought. Kant has shown once for all that moral action is inseparable from the idea of freedom. Freedom is the category of morality. But he has also indicated in his obscurely expressed distinction between the empirical and the intelligible character that the recognition of this has nothing to do with the question of causality, as that is investigated by science. The simple truth is that *that question is not raised by the ethical consciousness at all*. For the moral agent to entangle himself in questions of this sort would be, *ipso facto*, to lapse from the moral point of view, and as a matter of fact he does not do so. Kant stated the truth in a paradox when he described

the moral act as essentially timeless. The moral agent is, as it were, timelessly face to face with his law or ideal, and the moral consciousness considers only the relation of the will to the law. The very fact that the law can present itself to him is sufficient proof that he possesses the capacity to realise its demands: it could not otherwise be a motive for him at all. As ethical being, there reside in him all the capacities of his race. What he ought to be, that he might be; and he judges and he judges his act accordingly, both while it is in process of contemplation, and when he looks back, it may be remorsefully, upon his choice. Should he really seek to excuse himself in the sequel, by trying to show that it was impossible for a man with his particular antecedents to act otherwise than he did, he is regarding the action entirely from an external and non-moral (which for him, in the circumstances, is an immoral) point of view.

I do not find, therefore, that the unsophisticated conscience, when face to face with a moral alternative, looks either behind, to assert necessity, or before, to assert contingency. It does not seem to me to make any report as to perfectly "open alternatives," if by alternatives we mean events one of which is going to happen. In order to do this, it would be necessary for the agent to give up the personal problem in whose solution he is engaged, and to begin to contemplate himself *ab extra* as a finite object or sum of forces. This is the position which the ordinary necessarian theoriser takes up, and it is the position which science must assume in dealing with the empirical individual as a calculable factor in the production of events. Science, looking at the moral action merely as an event in time, limits itself to the question of its relation to its antecedents. The moral quality of the action is no longer under consideration, and to the scientific question only one answer—that of determinism—is possible. The initial error of Libertarianism is that it accepts battle on the necessarian terms, and then seeks to evade the consequences by a distinction between the character and "the self which has the character," attributing

to the latter a power "at will" to "determine himself to either branch of an alternative." (*Study*, ii. 309.) But a characterless self is an abstraction of which it is impossible to predicate agency ; to regard it as issuing its fiat for the one branch or for the other is to throw us back on the liberty of indifference. A self over and above the concrete self of character is no more a reality than a thing apart from all its qualities ; or, to put it otherwise, it is the abstraction of form without matter, and can do no work in the real world. It is impossible to load the scales in this way ; and by treating the self as abstract will, Libertarianism no less than Determinism, though in a different way, deprives the act of its moral quality. May we not say that the moral consciousness escapes the dilemma of ordinary Libertarianism and Determinism just because it does not, like them, regard the self as an "insulated" or merely finite being with a definite equipment, whose equation may be found in terms of character and environment, and who may therefore be treated as a measurable and definitely calculable force interacting with other forces ? Such a conception belongs entirely to the plane of mechanics, and has all the abstractness of that science. Just because he is not a punctual or self-contained unity, but, in virtue of his reason, a sharer in a universal life, the potentialities of an ethical being are infinite. All things are possible to him—not as a finite individual at any given moment of time (the ethical consciousness guarantees no miracles), but eternally possible to every son of man. The absolute claim of the moral ideal, and its infinitely regenerative power in breaking the yoke of the past, seem to me the real facts to which the moral consciousness testifies. Both Libertarianism and Determinism misrepresent them by insisting in applying to them the categories of mechanism and temporal succession.

I have left myself no space to deal with Martineau's doctrine of Cause and his theory of the material world. But that is perhaps the less to be regretted, seeing that Professor Upton acknowledges that this part of Martineau's system does not "exert the same convincing force" as his more specifically

religious utterances. I will confine myself, therefore, to reminding the reader that the theory is based on the assertion of our own noumenal causality as revealed in the consciousness of effort, and the acknowledgment in the same act of a counter-cause, opposed to and controlling our activity. This is Martineau's Natural Dualism, which, however, he at once proceeds to interpret in a Berkeleian sense. The Cause revealed to me in Nature can only be a Will, for no other real Cause is known to me; phenomenal causation, so called, is relation of events, but not agency. There are no second causes except created spirits like myself; in Nature we have simply the continual forth-putting of the Divine causality, according to certain laws laid down by Him once for all. The theory is thus, in all essentials, Berkeley's short and easy method with the Materialists and Sceptics of his day—the argument that God is immediately present to us in the phenomena of sense, as their efficient and regulating cause. Now there is certainly a perennial attractiveness about Berkeley's theory, from the way in which it seems to bring God near to us, and to make the doctrine of his immanence a reality. But further reflection shows that to represent the divine causality as the direct forth-putting of a force, of which we become aware in the experience of "resistance to our will," is to conceive God on the level of mechanical science merely as a cause of motion—the very error for which Socrates blamed Anaxagoras. We cannot, in truth, without the grossest anthropomorphism, relate physical phenomena directly to God by the category of cause as that is used in dynamics, or conceive God and man as two forces pushing against one another. We must not fly off at once, as Bacon warned us, to the highest generalities. The complete inappropriateness of such a conception in an ultimate metaphysical reference is further seen by the difficulties which Martineau encounters in connection with space. The divine agency, it turns out, requires a datum; for every cause needs "something else in order to work, *i.e.* some *condition* present with it, as constituting

one term of a *relation*, and as being a cause only by reason of its so standing." (*Study*, i. 406.) Martineau, therefore, accepts such a "co-existing datum" in the form of "Space, ready to have forces thrown into any of its points"; and in his college lectures he treats space and time as "the infinite, uncreated, eternal data which constitute the negative conditions of all beings and all phenomena." (*Life*, ii. 284.) But the conception of God as a Being projecting causal energy into space, and as "committing" himself once for all to certain general laws of operation, the unfortunate individual results of which he is thenceforward powerless to obviate, is, I fear, too deistic and anthropomorphic to carry conviction or consolation to the present age.

It seems strangely inconsistent with much of the foregoing criticism to find Martineau himself protesting, "If there is one modern tendency more than another against which I have striven through life with the united earnestness of natural instinct and deliberate conviction, it is the extreme individualism which turns our foremost politics, philosophy, religion into a humiliating caricature." (*Life*, i. 373). For it has been chiefly the relics of individualism and deism in his theory that have been commented on. But that merely shows how far the intellectual framework of a man's beliefs may come short of embodying the animating principle of his thought, and how subtly pervasive is the influence of inherited conceptions which we imagine ourselves to have outgrown and even to be combating. In one of his essays, Martineau distinguishes between the Religion of Causation, the Religion of Conscience, and the Religion of the Spirit as three aspects or stages, of which the third alone presents God and man in their true relations. Man, from this final point of view, is no longer "a spiritual island planted out in the natural deep of things," but lives in a communion where every moral ideal or spiritual affection appears as a movement of "the all-quickening Spirit"—a revelation of "the common essence of God and man, the divine element that spreads its

margin into us." (*Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, iv. 578-80.) Unfortunately, in his formal philosophy, Martineau remains almost entirely on the level of the first and second stages, adopting the defective terminology of contemporary Intuitionism and the Philosophy of Common-sense. Hence the critic of his "system" feels himself in the ungrateful position described in an apt phrase by Martineau himself, of "saying Amen to the faith but picking holes in the dialectic." The deepest expression of his thought is really to be found in his religious writings, and in those passages of his philosophical books which are written under the same inspiration. He was of the lineage of the prophets and the saints rather than that of the great speculative thinkers. Yet it is easy to undervalue his specifically philosophical work, and I should much regret if the criticisms into which I have been led tended to encourage such a view. As a thinker his defects were to a large extent the defects of his qualities. His insistence on the supreme place of the ethical life was like a trumpet-call to rally men from a naturalistic absorption in the world of things and events that happen. His jealous reservation of the personal sphere in man, even from the influx of the Divine, however it may have obscured his own speculative outlook, was a wholesome corrective of panlogistic and purely pantheistic tendencies within the Hegelian school. In a more general reference, his exposure of the futility of "ideals" which are not faiths in "the everlasting Real," his noble confidence in Reason, and his unclouded assurance of the immortal destiny of the spirit, made him a beacon of hope to multitudes in a troubled century. "The true," he writes, "is always the divine; depend upon it, the facts of the universe will not prove profane." And in 1898, at the extreme verge of human life, he writes to a correspondent: "I only know that duty and love look more divine, and the spiritual life more surely immortal, than when I spoke of them with less experience." With what better words can one lay down one's pen?

A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON.

BUDDHISM AS A LIVING FORCE.

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THERE has been so much talk lately of Buddhism that it may seem interesting to consider, quite apart from the question of what it is or was, the single point whether it has or is likely to have any serious power or influence on the future of the world. When, however, one begins to attempt to form any clear views on that one point, it becomes increasingly evident that the other question cannot be left altogether out of account. The power of prophecy is no longer what it was. The flash of genius that, without a knowledge of the details, without a study of the evolution in the past, could illumine the darkness of the future, has grown unaccountably dull. The picture drawn by its poor aid would be blurred and vague at best, perhaps indeed all wrong. We must perforce be humble.

Now Buddhism, once on its career, and for a long continued period, has had a great success, has been a great power. Opinions differ as to whether that success was to the advantage, or not, of the world at large; as to whether the power was for good or for evil. Of the fact itself there can be no dispute. By ascertaining the causes which led to that success in the past, we shall put ourselves in the best position to judge of the probability of any success in the future. The task will not be difficult, and will bring out, incidentally, not a few points of considerable interest.

One very great advantage Buddhism had in its early years

was the absence, over a large extent of country, of any physical or political barriers to intercommunication. The great kingdoms, at first of Kosala, afterwards of Magadha, kept the peace within their wide dominions, and kept apart the smaller monarchies and oligarchies on their borders. Journeys were hampered by nothing worse than imperfect means of transport. Frontier difficulties in the case of travellers are never mentioned. Language differed only in shades of dialect, not too marked to be generally intelligible. And there was no authoritative interference, lay or ecclesiastical, with freedom of religious thought.

Beyond these negatively favourable conditions, there was an opportunity — always pregnant with moral and religious significance, and all but indispensable to any way of intellectual progress — the opportunity which arises out of the mutual contact between differing civilisations. The civilisation, such as it was, of the Aryan had been for centuries pressing, south and east, upon the preceding and more settled civilisation, such as it was, of the Dravidian and Kolarian. We know how great a movement in religion sprang from the contact of the Hellene with the “barbarians” of Syria and Egypt. And we can hardly doubt that adequate traces of the Iberian would go far to explain the Druidism of the Kelt. So in India is the conclusion thrust upon us that the extraordinary revulsion of religious thought manifesting itself in Buddhism had, as its “ground wave,” the mutual interpenetration of the different views of life and religion held by invaders and invaded—an interpenetration largely due to the peaceful conditions of the age in question.

Among the surface effects of this deep-lying cause was the extent to which persons of all classes were possessed by an inquiring spirit, by a deep interest in religious questions, and by a genuine and impartial respect for all who professed to teach truth and demonstrate the higher life. And there was an interesting analogy to the conditions under which Christianity arose in the Near East, in the fact that every-

where, in town and village and the adjacent forests, there dwelt and roamed religious brotherhoods of every description, evincing a strenuous desire "to share in the perfect good" and solve the riddle of existence.¹

Another effect of that ethnic fusion, and possibly an intermediate link in the causation of this religious revival, was the absence of any central and authoritative focus of religious belief and feeling to which the current morality could attach itself, from which it could borrow the quickening power of an ethical sanction as a spring of conduct. The mass of the people held on their simple way of polytheism, seeking "luck" at the haunts of tree-spirits and other less gentle deities, as they had no doubt done in pre-Aryan times, and have done since. The Vedic Pantheon of nature-gods, elaborated by the brahmins, had never so prevailed as to drive these out. For the more educated, too, the Vedic gods were now in process of fading to little more than impressive mythical beings. Brahmā now reigned in mid-heaven, a sphere to which the respectably pious were supposed to aspire as the hour of death drew near. Below, and again above, this heaven dwelt sphere on sphere of devas, graduating vaguely in space and luminance. There were feast-days and fast-days, when ritual oblations and sacrifices were still performed. And it was generally conceded that of these the tradition and celebration, and the love and craft of mystic and magic rites, were the monopoly of brahmin families, and of their colleges of adepts and novices.

Nevertheless, there was no ecclesiastical organisation or church, having authority, on the one hand, to impose conformity, or, on the other, putting forth any systematic propaganda of theology and ethics. The brahmins did not claim to be teachers of ethics. Even their manuals of customary law are later. At that period all religious teaching and moral reform came from without this hereditary corporation of ritualists, namely, from members of one or another of the

¹ Philo, as quoted by G. R. S. Mead in his interesting article, "Some Notes on the Gnostics," *Nineteenth Century, and After*, November 1902, p. 826.

itinerant religious fraternities, and not from brahmins as such. To these “wanderers” a special quarter—usually a park with cells or huts and a meeting-hall—would be assigned outside a town, through the piety of king, people or millionaire. And here they largely forgathered, discussing questions of religion or metaphysics, or practising ascetic or meditative discipline. Here, too, the inquiring laity—princes, brahmins and commoners—resorted for edification or debate with leading *religieux*.

The range and scope of these inquiries and discussions go far to throw light on a more positive stage in the religious upheaval and evolution of the age. The gods as “over-men” were bulking less largely in the general imagination. Gotama was even asked, and by a brahmin, if there were any gods at all. But this was chiefly because, as at the Socratic stage of Greek thought, the educated and thoughtful mind was turning back upon itself, and beginning to ask whether it were not “in this little fathom-long mortal frame, with its thinkings and its notions, that the world itself”¹ and all its gods lay hid. The nature-mystery of the wind was no longer simply the breath of the man-god Varuna. It was the synonym and essence, the “Pneuma Hagion,” of Brahma himself.² And this breath, this Atman, was the soul of man. “The whole world consists of Atman; that is the Real, that is the Soul that art Thou, O man!”³

Now if, throughout the pre-Buddhistic Upanishads, we find “a restless striving to grasp the true nature of the pantheistic Self,”⁴ as at once very God and very Man, the Buddhist Pitakas go to show that there was a great deal of metaphysical speculation and discussion about the soul which was not Pantheistic. It was concerned not with theories of Absorption and Emanation, but with the nature and eternal destiny of the soul as an individual entity. On this point there existed a greatly elaborated variety of dogmatic opinion among the different schools and sects of the religious world.

¹ *Samyutta Nikāya*, i. 62.

² A. Macdonell, *Sanskrit Literature*, p. 219.

³ *Chhândogya Upanishad*, vi. 8 foll.

⁴ Macdonell, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

It was a strained unhealthy condition of thought, and the inevitable reaction against all this sort of animistic speculation, whether pantheistic or individualistic, would constitute a very positive condition of success for the peculiar Buddhist standpoint with respect to the self or soul.

Lastly, the social evolution of Northern India was attaining a stage which constituted an opportunity for a movement such as Buddhism. This was the rise, not so much of caste (which was a much later development), as of the claim put forward by the brahmins, but not yet admitted by the laity, to social pre-eminence.

The institution of Brahminism had not yet the organised efficiency, exclusiveness, and prestige which it was later to acquire. The theory was probably already formulated, that brahmins were not to gain a living in any way except as priests and instructors of youth. But it was still only a theory. Brahmins are met with in Buddhist literature, pursuing, without reproach, a variety of callings, and changing from one to the other.¹ Nor were they lacking in respectful recognition of the claims of Gotama as an eminent teacher. Many came to interview him; some became members of his Order; some professed themselves lay-adherents of his doctrine. In this case no break or loss in social prestige was involved, even though the kinsmen of the convert in some cases evince vexation.

Nevertheless, with all this amount of tolerance and laxity, the solidarity among brahmins was strongly maintained. They forgathered largely, both in settlements and also at different seasons, to keep their Vedic and other unwritten literature intact; they had their sacerdotal monopoly; and in their schools they taught both to their own sons and to those of the laity the divine descent of all brahmins, and their social and spiritual prerogatives over all other classes. Thus organised themselves, they were careful to teach the divine origin and universal prevalence of a graded society all subordinate to the brahmins.

¹ *J.R.A.S.* for Oct. 1901.

It is clear, however, from the evidence of the Pitakas, that the social pre-eminence claimed by the brahmins was not admitted by the lay aristocracy, or Kshatriyas, in the age of Gotama. It was becoming a burning question. But the brahmins were not as yet gaining the upper hand.

Herein lay one more opportunity for success to a doctrine which, founded by a pure-bred noble (Kshatriya), waved aside all brahmin pretensions to social superiority on hereditary grounds, even though it did so solely by an ethical criterion of merit, and not from considerations of political expediency. Kings, princes and nobles are represented as taking interest in the new Buddhist sect, and professing themselves as lay-adherents. This support, which was to culminate, two centuries later, in the patronage of the Buddhist church and doctrine by Asoka, the first emperor of India, is not so hard to account for, if we thus bear in mind how the unworldly ideals of Gotama were invested with a political significance through the social struggles of the time.

Such were some of the conditions which together afforded a specially favourable field for the growth of a new religious ideal adapted to the human soil of the time. A new criterion of truth, a new sanction of morality was needed, which should not only meet such wants as were felt, but which should impress the mind and heart of the peoples, by reaching out to "their own thoughts which they had not yet told." It needed to capture the imagination and affection, on the one hand, of the common people, to whom external religion meant offerings of treasure, and sacrifices of beasts on festivals, and who associated personal religion with the mutilation of human life through the weird doings or not-doings of asceticism. It needed to grip the intelligence of the educated laity, apt and ready to speculate freely and unhindered on questions of man's origin and destiny, and of the nature of good and evil. And it needed to prove the superiority of its logic in level debate with the followers of contemporary ethical schools, such as the Jains, with metaphysical Sophists challenging it with

propositions on causation, existence and the like, and with the special tenets put forth by the brahmin colleges.

Now we know that Buddhism so contrived to meet these conditions and satisfy these demands—more or less—that it surmounted all competition and prospered, till for some centuries it became the paramount creed of India, and spread to all the neighbouring lands. What had it to offer that made it succeed as it then did?

To the general public, in the first place, it preached the current morality of the Five or the Ten Precepts, and the current belief of happy or painful re-births, as the results of previous conduct. But it maintained that these results were to be brought about solely by righteous or unrighteous acts, words and thoughts, and not at all by gods, or the propitiation of gods through sacrifices, and offerings, and invocations. Through the daily lives of its leaders, and all who, as bhikshus of the Order, were training to be teachers and recorders of its doctrine, it offered the spectacle of a strict simplicity of virtuous living, in which ascetic practices were condemned equally with luxury. It preached equal chances of spiritual happiness for all—for the slave equally with the brahmin; independent of any privilege of birth (except in so far as the individual was handicapped through his inherited organisation).

And as to the initial impetus of strong personal influence, there is abundant evidence of the wave of reverent love and devotion inspired by the attractive power of Gotama himself, and by the gifts and character of his leading disciples—Sāriputta, and Moggallāna, and Ānanda and the rest, not omitting his women-disciples, such as Pātāchārā, Uppalavannā and others. This devotion was not to experience the rebound of anguish, terror, and adoration that followed later and elsewhere, on the cruel legal murder of a young Founder. On the other hand, the calmer feeling waxing for years—for nearly half a century—in presence of a pre-eminently wise and gracious personality, wholly devoted to the good of his fellows and the

care of his followers, unfalteringly just and strong, gentle and long-suffering, in sickness and in health, with adherent or with scoffer, with the quick-witted as with the slow, must have had a cumulative effect of high power.

No special reputation of power or will to work miracles seems to have drawn folk after the Buddha. In a country and an age when the conviction was very general that the wisdom and self-mastery of a seer naturally involved the "virtue" of super-normal faculties, the possession of these would not, as such, be noised abroad as something unique. Gotama himself claimed no credit for any such powers, and severely regulated the exercise of them in his disciples. So far as he and they addressed themselves to the uncultured public, or to that portion of it who joined his Order, but were, for a time at least, fit only for the unadulterated milk of the Word (*τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα*),¹ there is no evidence of any bid for cheap popularity. And so far as popularity, thus unbidden, attended their ministry, and was maintained, it arose from the fact that both a special and a chronic demand was met by Gotama. To preach and to live a life of uncompromising and consistent righteousness and active benevolence can never fail to carry weight, whatever be the philosophy and logic of the underlying principles. Greater still is the effect if the moral deeds of the age have hitherto been met, on the side of the current religion, by a ritual of caste-privileges, elaborate, costly, not to say cruel, and in process of becoming mere *jappana*, or hocus-pocus. Later, when the personal magnetism of the founders had passed away with them, the more enduring effect of the stronger doctrine on the more cultured minds would begin to permeate down to the more ignorant, causing them also still to be drawn along.

Gotama did not address himself exclusively or especially to any one section of the public. His discourses are framed to meet every grade of mental calibre. Among these are many which are simply milk for babes—those, for instance,

¹ 1 Peter ii. 1.

which are addressed to villagers, to new or weaker "brethren," or are conversations with ignorant individuals such as kings, princes, wealthy brahmins and others. He disclaimed esotericism. But no one was more discriminating in adapting replies to questioners. It was very exceptional to rehearse the catechism for candidates for Arahatsip to lay patrons, involving, as it did, a statement of such "strong-meat"-principles as Impermanence and the negation of soul.

But there was no question of withholding or evading essential principles and high ideals when the interlocutor or the learner—intelligent and earnest citizen, brahmin student or expert, religious recluse or promising bhikshu—showed intellectual and moral worth. And as the age seems to have been as much given to mutual discussion and instruction as that of Socrates and St Paul, these central tenets of Buddhism must in time, through these more cultured minds, have filtered wide and deep into all social strata. Due weight must therefore be given them in estimating the factors of the success of Buddhism, however unpopular and unpalatable they may on the surface appear to be.

Unpopular and unpalatable, that is to say, to the average educated mind, which would be still much swathed in veils of tradition. It needed some powerful conjuncture of disturbing conditions—such as that ground-wave of upheaval mentioned above—to make such minds ready, in any considerable numbers, to embrace Gotama's central doctrine. For this, as we know, swept away the supports and the consolations by which other creeds attract the thought and the desire of men. It swept away the Permanences which are held to subsist behind the fleeting impermanences of sense, *e.g.* souls and over-souls. And in the world thus laid bare there remained no forgiveness of sin through atonement, propitiation, or faith; no salvation from misery by alteration in the external conditions of an individual, by transference to a different set of conditions in another life; no eternal home, beyond the grave, of peace and rest and joy. Even the anchor of de-

votion to a saving Person was discarded. Disciples were flung back by the teacher, even in the moment of deepest self-renunciation, on themselves. To the newly-won Patâcharâ, prostrating herself in gratitude at his feet with "Master, be thou my protection!" he replied, "Think not thou art come unto one able to be a refuge to thee."

On the site of this tremendous ruin Gotama built the foundations of his new faith. Boldly he recognised the fact that there is no individuality without sorrow, that the current belief in misery being concomitant with life was right. Still more boldly he maintained that man, and man alone (no other being, not even a god) could attain to the destruction of sorrow, in this life, by realising (*a*) the truth about things "as they really have become," (*b*) the perfect life flowing from that insight.

The fact that misery or ill-being was a result of perfectly natural causes, due to cravings, enmity and ignorance, and not a series of specially imposed divine ordeals or punishments, had been already generally established by the Indian theory of Karma. This doctrine (of what may be called the conservation of moral energy) was fully admitted by Gotama. To meet his negation of a permanent persisting self, he added, that personal responsibility was, for the discerning mind, none the less incumbent upon each, even if the consequences of his present conduct could not, in a subsequent life, affect his identical re-embodied self. Farther than this he did not go. Neither the time nor the man was ready either to receive or to develop the concept of responsibility based on solidarity, on duty towards the race, both future and present.¹ Nevertheless, Gotama was so far groping after it that, in his methods of mental training, it becomes, if not an explicit corollary, at least an implicit tendency. For, in the first place, he insists on an analysis of the human person or concrete self into its elements, both physical and mental, so that (in his "fathom-long" self) man might know the universe, and break down

¹ *Hibbert Lectures*, 1881, p. 110.

all sense of *nānatta*, or difference in essence, between himself and all beings. Secondly, on this intellectual adjustment he prescribed the constant cultivation (by increasing extension and intensity) of the broadest altruistic feeling for all living creatures.

That Gotama, in sweeping away the mass of current theories about the Ego or soul, should have substituted this method of psychological analysis, is a fact of extraordinary interest.¹ These analyses, to which historical psychologists will render justice when they come to know them, constitute the earliest scientific formulation of mental processes ever compiled. We have, of course, to read between the lines of the peculiarities in diction imposed by the fact that these analyses were taught and learnt orally, were handed down in a form intended to assist the memory. Having done so, we find a sober regard for accuracy, a sense of orderly sequence, a remarkable mastery of the introspective method. And all this, especially when we recollect that the metaphysical standpoint is throughout rejected, constitutes a strange reaching out, across the seas and across the centuries, to our own experimental philosophy, born relatively of yesterday.

In both cases this new departure met a felt intellectual want, a mental recoil. The situation common to both is that described, without a thought of Buddhism, by a wise psychologist now lost to us:—

“If we turn to history we shall find that every important philosophical reformation, after a time of too highly strained metaphysical dogmatism or unsatisfying scepticism, has been begun by some man who saw the necessity of looking deeper into the mental constitution.”²

The doctrine that salvation from re-births—and therefore from re-deaths—could be gained here and now, must certainly have been palatable then. It was already in the air. It lay at the root of much of the speculation in the pre-Buddhistic

¹ The texts repeatedly state this analysis of the human being as the very keynote of his doctrine.

² From G. Croom Robertson's "*Philosophical Remains*."

Upanishads. To the Indian mind, at that time, immortality meant an infinite series of re-births—celestial perhaps, but also perhaps infernal; human in turn, but also in turn non-human. The dread wheel of life would turn ever, bearing him round in unending cycle, through the æons of the future, as it had done through the æons of the past. To believe that by his (or her) own endeavour and growing insight it was within the reach of everyone, of the lowly born and the woman as well as of the more favoured class and sex, to work the miracle of converting the Infinite into the Finite, of crowning the long travail of nature by the thus far and no farther! of a perfected life—this belief has once, at least, in the world's history found acceptance. More literally perhaps than the later seer might they then have sung, "I Gotama saw the Holy City coming down from God, out of heaven." And less pessimistically too than those Orphic mystics among the Greeks, who implored the gods for release from "the cycle of re-birth, the Wheel of Fate."

We have now seen in outline what were the conditions out of which Buddhism arose and under which it prospered, and also what Buddhism had and had not to offer, to the educated and the uneducated, in view of the demands called forth by those conditions. Whichever it was among its doctrines that "worked most mightily to prevail," that best satisfied the felt wants of the time, we know that the system, as a whole, met with marked success during the first two centuries of its life. As to details, we must be content, after the lapse of so many centuries, with analysing the ascertainable factors in that success:—the ethical revival demanding righteousness of life in place of an unmoral and half-outgrown ritualism; the sanction, to that righteous conduct, of a real present salvation open to all; the recoil of the intellect from dogmatism and speculation and scepticism to investigation of facts; the political protest against sacerdotal and tribal privilege and pretension; the growing sense of sympathy and kinship; the spell of one man's genius.

So great was the development produced by the interworking of these factors that, as is well known, in the third century B.C., the first suzerain over practically the whole of India, Asoka, became the Constantine of Buddhism. And at the council convened during his reign, at his imperial seat, Patna, missionaries were formally sent forth to convert to the new imperial faith the countries of Sind, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Tibet, Nepal, the Dekkan, and the coast cities of Burma and Ceylon. The list is instructive, for it shows that the whole territory from the Indus to the Gulf of Bengal, from the Himalayas to the Godavari river, were already permeated with Buddhism. In the following centuries the missionary propaganda had spread West to the Oxus, North to Mongolia, East to China, Korea and Japan, South to Siam, Java and other islands of the south-east Archipelago. Further tokens of Buddhist influence are claimed, by investigators, in the gnostic thought of Alexandria, and in the remains of ancient cults along the west coast of North America. And it is not impossible that, in the wake of the farthest reaches of commerce from countries that had become Buddhist, Buddhism may really have influenced even these so distant lands.

But the really effective limits had been reached by or before the seventh century A.D. The expansive energy of youth had been resolved through decline at its centre. Gotama himself was under no delusion as to the duration of his system. The emancipation of Nirvana in Arahathship was for him the one permanent thing in a world of transience. But the embodiment of this ideal under successive Buddhas and Sanghas was also an impermanency. And he is said to have prophesied internal disintegration as the chief cause of decline. This proved true. It was a weakened and compromising Buddhism that was finally swept away by Mohammedan conquest and vandalism in the thirteenth and following centuries. The conversion of the secular powers may have ensured thousands of scholars to the Buddhist schools, but it also brought in a flood of nominal converts. Compromise became inevitable, the

thoroughly unworldly attitude prescribed in the first code of the Buddhist Order was relaxed. The margin of difference between Buddhism and other systems (which even in its earlier days was not always patent to inquirers—so much was it in harmony with the ethical thought of its time) faded gradually away.

As it lost strength, the forces opposing it grew strong. We have no chronicles showing the growth of Brahminism during the centuries succeeding the Asokan age. But the series of Dharma, Sutras, and Shastras compiled by various experts entirely in the brahmin interest, on the customs, laws and external religious procedure of the day, are good evidence of advance in organisation and influence. In the Western reformation, with the assumption by civil rulers of States of the headship over the reformed churches, there went *pari passu* a great advance of organisation, discipline and propaganda in the Roman Church. So in India the development of the Kshatriya into the new imperialism of civil and (virtually) religious headship over India, was met by a corresponding consolidation of brahmin tradition and influence. However their gods, and their heavens, and their notions of the soul's destiny may have undergone modification, their religious ritual met a chronic popular demand relatively ignored by Buddhism. It gave ceremonial dignity and sacramental sanction to all the vital features of physical and social life. Hardly may any religion endure that does not recognise and enhance the ordinary life of man in all its aspects. But this usually means polytheism for the masses. And this, together with a growing pantheism among the educated, constituted the Hinduism which superseded both Buddhism and Brahmanism.

Acceptable for a time during an extraordinary social crisis, Buddhism in some essentials outran the development of its day. Too rigidly simple, too purely spiritual to compass the religious needs, materialistic on the one hand, mystic and visionary on the other, of the country of its birth; so icono-

elastic, so rationally irrational over against gods and souls, as to resolve both into transient law-governed phenomena; so based on experience as to abandon all inquiry into the ultimate what, whence and whither, seeking only to know the "this given, that follows" (*idapaccayatā*) of natural cause and effect; so sober, and yet so optimistic, as to substitute for the hope of heaven the joy of human life, made, as it thought, perfect—how could such a creed but stumble and fall? In view of all that has ever appealed most strongly to primitive beliefs, and hopes, and fears in face of the mystery of life and death, how could it maintain its pristine uncompromising stand? Seeing, too, that in so large a measure it poured its new wine into the old bottles of names that had other associations:—*nirvana*, *brahma*, *jhana*, *ātman*, *karma*, and all the current terms connected with re-incarnation and with Vedic lore—it was but natural that the bottles—to vary the metaphor—contaminated the wine.

No creed so much as Buddhism needed to be left severely alone by political patronage, and to work out its slowly permeating and leavening effect undisturbed by ignorance in high places. The evidence as to episodes of ill-treatment of Buddhists by certain native rajas during the first thousand years of the Christian era is too ill-grounded to warrant any positive conclusion. It points, oftener than not, to the plunder and rapine of wars within the disintegrated empire, rather than to suppression through religious intolerance. Nevertheless it does go some way to show that the patronage of Kshatriyas, utterly unfit for the most part to appreciate the austere wisdom and advanced humanity of Buddhism, did not open up a path of continual rose leaves to the gentle doctrine, whether the secular powers were incited by brahmin influence or not.

In India itself the final dispersal and expulsion was brought about by the fire and sword of invading Muhammadanism. Savage hordes, bent chiefly on plunder, but fired also by merciless intolerance, drove back the faith from Khiva and

Bokhara, from Afghanistan and Baluchistan, from Sind and the Punjab, with ruthless destruction of temple and college, till at length, in the lower valley of the Ganges, the shrines of Sarnath and the university of Nalanda, the chief, if not the only centre of unsectarian religious life in Northern India for over a thousand years, were in the fourteenth century laid waste, the libraries burnt, the students murdered.

This last stage was never reached in China. But the previous stages of decline, as we see them in India, were also there discernible. Once disseminated over the wide extent and among the teeming populations of that vast empire, Buddhism came to enjoy the patronage of the court, the favour of the great. The decay of the primitive purity of doctrine, of the inspiring zeal of the early converts, had already made itself felt. Under the corrupting influence of wealth and power it set in apace. The power was lost, the wealth mostly taken away. And now Buddhism in China seems to be thoroughly corrupt, given over to mystic superstition, and of practically no influence in the land.

Thus, like Christianity, rooted out in the land of its birth, and fallen into utter decay in the other empire it seemed about to conquer, Buddhism has survived in several smaller countries, widely scattered and remote—in the islands of Ceylon and of Japan, in Burma, Siam, and Tibet. And now, more than two thousand years after the period of its first missionary zeal, we hear, simultaneously from all these five directions, of its again bestirring itself to new efforts, not only of defence, but ^{of} attack.

Of these movements the one in Tibet is probably of least importance. Isolated missionaries are sent out, from political rather than religious motives, to spy out the land and make known the power and importance of the Grand Lama. No one can yet say how far this is deliberately organised, or what the results have been. But that a system of Ultramontane propaganda has been started is well known, and it would be unwise to ignore the possible results.

The other movements are purely religious.

The Mahā-Bodhi society, founded in 1891 at Colombo, for the propagation of Buddhism abroad, took up at the outset the task of gaining possession of the site of the ancient and most holy shrine of the Mahā-Bodhi temple at Budh-Gayā near Rājgir, built at the spot where the ancient records declare that the Buddha attained the climax of insight. This shrine, to which Buddhists from all parts of the world made pilgrimage in the fifth and following centuries, shared in the Moslem violations of the fourteenth century; and after long lying deserted, was taken possession of in the last century by a Hindu. It was, however, still visited by Buddhist pilgrims, chiefly from Burma, and in 1874 a Burmese king began to restore the temple. On his death, the English Government, on the advice of Sir Ashley Eden, rebuilt it in the interests of archæology. By successful litigation the Buddhists won the right, in 1897, of pilgrimage to the temple. Shrine and society have gained increasing support. A pilgrims' house has been erected at Budh-Gayā. A monastic college is to be built at Calcutta, the headquarters of the Society. According to the Indian census, the number of professing Buddhists in India has increased during the last ten years from seven and a half to nearly nine and a half millions, an increase largely confined to Bengal. Branch societies have been established in north and south India, in Burma and at Chicago; and the society has representatives in this country. It issues a monthly journal, printed in English and distributed in both hemispheres.

Another society, independent of the foregoing but identical in object, has just been started at Mandalay. It has taken the name of the Buddha-sāsana Samāgama (or, for brevity, Samāgama), and has issued in English, from the native press at Rangoon, its manifesto. It is headed by a converted Scottish gentleman of scientific training, and has representatives in the United States and Germany. It proposes to found a Buddhist library and a training-centre for

missionaries of any nationality, who, after ten years have elapsed, are to start on their work in different countries.

These two overtly propagandist organisations are consequent to and concomitant with a very general revival among Buddhist churches, caused by the necessity of defending themselves against encroaching Western methods of civilisation and religious propaganda. *Fas est ab hoste doceri.* Palmleaf manuscripts are being superseded by books, and the canonical scriptures, no longer the monopoly of student recluses, are being printed and circulated at large, both in the original Pali and Sanskrit, and also in the different vernaculars. A notable case is the Siamese edition of the Pali Pitakas. These have been printed during the last few years in thirty-nine volumes, at the expense of the present king, and under the superintendence of his brother, a scholar and member of the Buddhist Order, Prince Vajira-nana. In this edition the sacred Pali or Cambodian characters have been, for the first time, discarded for the current Siamese letters; but the Pali language (a literary form of one of the vernaculars of the Ganges valley at the time when the Pitakes were compiled) has been retained, aiding to give a further impetus to Pali scholarship in Siam. The commentaries on the Canon are being similarly edited.

In Ceylon, Buddhists, aided by American sympathisers, have been inaugurating new schools for both boys and girls, and colleges for advanced studies for intending religious teachers. Thus a college at Colombo, for the education and training of the clergy, is presided over by the distinguished scholar and Honorary Member of the Royal Asiatic Society, Sumangala Mahā Nayaka. And there are other scholars and organisers at these institutions who show themselves keenly alive to the advancing requirements of the day. The revival is given further expression in such organs as *The Buddhist*, published in English, and a Singalese paper, the *Sava Sanda Rasa*, which is widely circulated.

In Japan, as in the case of our own Protestantism, the rivalry of the twelve leading Buddhist sects has led to greater

keenness of propagandist education.¹ The intellectual adaptability of the Japanese has led some of these sects to send students to study Pali and Sanskrit in Europe. And the cause of Buddhist scholarship owes much to, and hopes much from, the works and research of writers like Messrs Bunyu Nanjio, Fujish Ma, Takakusu and Anesaki. The *Orient* is an excellently conducted periodical from the Buddhist standpoint, and publishes English readings of the chief Buddhist texts. This cultured and zealous activity is the more noteworthy in that the military class in Japan, now become through recent wars especially prominent, is, unlike the ancient Indian Kshatriya supporters of Buddhism, almost exclusively of the old pagan or Shinto faith.

Japanese missionary effort is not confined to Japan itself.

A Japanese mission has gained a footing at San Francisco, has already several branches in the neighbourhood, and publishes a Buddhist periodical entitled *The Light of Dharma*. There is no doubt as to the gradually increasing extent to which Buddhism is gaining on the attention of the general public in America. This was largely due to an awakening interest in the comparative study of religious belief, on the one hand, and to confused ideas among and about "Theosophists" on the other. Oriental propagandists of Buddhism protest that Theosophy, a doctrine steeped in "soul-heresy," "pilfers Buddhist terminology to mislead foolish people in England and America." At any rate, one result of this dual impetus has been a shower of popular text-books on Buddhism, which, even if they are the fruits of second-hand and not over-accurate study, are yet helping to break down the appalling self-complacency of the ignorant, and to familiarise men's minds with the startling advance made, long before Christianity, and far from the basin of the Mediterranean, in the deepest problems of life and ethics.

Anyone who has read thus far will have noticed certain resemblances between the conditions of things under which

¹ See *Le Bouddhisme japonais*, by Fujish Ma, Paris, 1889.

these new movements are taking place and the condition of things under which Buddhism gained its first successes.

First there is peace. Secondly, as regards facility of inter-communication, there would seem, at first sight, to be no question—it must be very much greater now than it was then. But here comes in a curious and interesting distinction. In the old times, men interested in religion, and especially the Wanderers, met personally; they discussed in a friendly way, often in public halls provided by the community for that express purpose, their various views. The dignity and courtesy shown in such converse implied a certain capacity of appreciating the other position, of so far putting oneself into the place of the opponent that one could adapt oneself to his phraseology and his point of view. There were no books, no churches, no services. Now each sect has its private buildings, where its own views are expounded to its own adherents. There is some reading of the books, much more of the periodicals, of one's own communion. Courteous attention to the views of one's opponents is not often required, and seldom resorted to. It may be doubted whether, in spite of the steam-engine and the printing-press, there is so large a percentage of real inter-communication, that is, of mind with mind, as there was in the days of old.

But a factor in the rise of a new religion, or the change of an old one, much more effective even than the contact of mind with mind, is the contact, in the same mind, of two or more diverse views of life, different sets of opinion as to religion and ethics. And this factor is the more effective in proportion as the number of minds simultaneously influenced by it is great. We have a striking instance in the movement of Thought in Europe which we call the Reformation, when so many minds were familiar, at the same time, with mediæval Christianity and with pagan ideas. This factor was very powerful during the rise both of Buddhism and of Christianity. It is increasingly powerful now; but more so, I think, in the East, and especially in India, than in the West.

On the other hand, the economic conditions, both in the West and the East, are not so favourable as they were. The pressure of increased population, the complicated competition of commercial rivalry, has brought about a state of things, only temporary no doubt, but as long as it lasts, most opposed to any deep religious movement. Even the unworthy social struggles, the eager craving restlessness, of the West, are being now introduced into the East. But in India at least, and Further India, they have not yet, except in English towns, and perhaps in some native courts, given the dominant tone to life.

We see then that the conditions which led to the first spread of Buddhism are in India again arising. The activity of Christian missions has had no small share in arousing among the Buddhists throughout the world a more earnest study of their own religion. The signs of a real revival are already evident. And it seems quite possible, and even probable, that Buddhism will again become a power in the East.

Of its advance in other countries as a creed one may, without rash prophecy, anticipate that with the advance in the mobility of the individual and the home, as well as of the tolerance of international polity, Buddhism will have its groups of adherents in all countries. But beyond those aspirations in which humanity yearns to stay itself upon a creed, and that need of solidarity which finds relief in church communion, there may be possibilities in Buddhist philosophy and ethics of influencing the thought of the immediate future in the West, and this chiefly through its sympathetic standpoint in certain problems. To give one or two suggestions in outline before we close:—

It is matter of common knowledge how the most famous Pessimist of the last century was attracted by the attitude of Buddhism towards life. But the post-Schopenhauer tendencies are not Pessimistic. They are rather Hedonistic, with a growing faith in "Melioration" that is fairly optimistic. The view of Buddhism, too, concerning life, was to despise mere *quantity*, and to glorify and aspire to the highest human *quality*

of it. Explicit in Buddhism, implicit in our own thought, is the desirability of an escape from pain and misery, an extension of joy for the whole human race, irrespective of class and sex. The one view, at first sight so monastic, the other, at first sight so against the secluded life—both reject equally the ascetic puritan belief in a discipline of pain, and the spirit of hopelessness as regards progress and attainment here, in the world.

Most interesting, again, to the modern age should be the *combination* in Buddhism of a rationalised doctrine of Karma, with insistence on a salvation by individual perfectionism. We see in Buddhism the permanent Ego or *Ātman* disintegrated. Man has within his body no soul which will fly away out of it after death, to an eternity of happiness or the reverse. The qualities which constitute his higher life form no unity. There is nothing whatever in him, or in them, which is permanent. The present being and doing of each individual is ascribed, not, as in the ancient popular parlance, to *its* previous acts, but to those of highly similar personal aggregates in the past. The conservation of moral energy persists. But practically it is the race built of common atoms that had wrought and struggled: it is the race that would reap good or bad in proportion as the individual strove to lift himself, or drifted back. So now also our own psychology and psychiatry is disintegrating the character, the unity, of the Ego; and heredity is devolving the crushing incidence of the causes of present shortcomings and sufferings. We are less self-centred, believing more in corporate and racial effort and power of melioration, less in the *homme nécessaire*. Yet the importance to the race of the highest individual development, in any class and either sex, the personal responsibility for deeds that will tell indefinitely and never be forgiven, was never more felt.

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THE FAILURE OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN INDIA.

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MOST people have heard of what is called "The Failure of Christian Missions in India," and have often wondered how it could be possible for Christianity to fail to fulfil its function of leavening the lump in any land or under any conditions.

From my own study of the problem on the spot, I am led to agree entirely with those who look upon the work in India as a real failure. But it is the missionary and not the mission who has failed!

I came away from India with the full conviction that the Master Jesus would be followed by His millions if He appeared in human form in the great land of Hindustan, and that the missionary Saint of the Gentiles too would be as powerful to transform men's minds in the East as he was to sway the thought of the Western world in his day.

Jesus as the divine teacher, and Paul as the enthusiastic and philosophic exponent of self-sacrifice to win souls, would find in India a waiting world, which to the ordinary Christian missionary is looked upon as a desert waste of obstinate and benighted heathendom.

I do not wish to minimise the devotion and the self-sacrifice, and the zeal and the patience, and the perseverance with which year after year men of all denominations have gone out into the great Indian mission field, but I would like very reverently to bring into view a side of the question which, so far as I know, is seldom or never brought before the English public.

I went to India last year as a physician to visit a patient in one of the first-class Indian States of Kathiawar, and I had opportunities of visiting and making inquiries throughout large parts of the Bombay Presidency, Rajpootana, Punjab, Central Provinces, Indore, and Baroda, so that my inquiries were by no means restricted to one district or to one province, but embraced the views of the most intelligent men in towns and districts extending over thousands of miles.

I went to India full of the joy of believing that Christian missions, wherever they went, were a blessing; and that if they only stayed long enough, they always commanded respect and reverence, even from those who were unable to accept the Gospel of Christ.

It came to me as a shock, as great as it was unexpected, to learn that there was "the other side" of the question, and I felt that honesty required that the people to whom we send missions should be allowed to have their say on our platforms and at our Exeter Hall meetings as well as the missionaries, who only give us the one side of the question.

If I apparently claim to have learned more during my short stay than many missionaries who have spent half a lifetime studying the people, I do so upon three grounds:—(i.) It is possible, *c.g.*, to spend your whole life in a West-end parish in England and to know nothing of the lives of the poor in either villages or slums. (ii.) A missionary is, in a way, a biassed observer, and he looks at life from the particular point of view of one who is as a militant Radical amongst staunch Conservatives. (iii.) I had lived for so many years in my habits almost as a Brahmin lives that I found no difficulty whatever in being at home in Indian high caste houses everywhere, and, as a matter of fact, during my whole stay in India I never once accepted the hospitality of a European, but always—whether it was a village hut, or a village temple, or a merchant's home, or a professional man's residence, or a rajah's guest-house—sojourned in the homes of the people of the land.

From the view, therefore, of the educated and intelligent and highly thoughtful natives of the country, I venture to propound an explanation of "The Failure of Christian Missions in India."

I am not speaking of towns like Bombay, or Madras, or Calcutta, which have a large English population, and for which churches and cathedrals and bishops may be essential; but what I want to emphasise is, that so far as my observations went, the increase in the number of clergy and town churches, and bishops and cathedrals, is no criterion whatever of the effect of Christianity upon the religion of the people of India.

I am speaking of high caste Indian life in places as far distant from each other as Kathiawar and Indore, and among a class of people ranging from prime ministers of Indian States to judges and pleaders, and doctors and village tax-collectors, and college students, in both Indian States and British territory.

Christian missionaries there, in the opinion of the intelligent men of India, *have* failed for various reasons, and *will* fail absolutely so long as the present conditions exist.

In the first place, the Christian missionary takes up the position that Christianity is the *only true* religion, and that all worship of God in any other way is "heathen idolatry."

The Hindu, who has studied the religions and philosophies of the West far more deeply than the average Western, asks at once *which* Christian religion is the only and true one?

He sees Roman Catholics denying salvation to all Protestants, and many Protestants labelling the head of the Christian Church of Rome the "Antichrist," and, as a sound business man, he shrinks from taking such tremendous risks as are held out to him by either party if he joins the other. He sees that, from their own statements, his risk, to take Paley's point of view, is no greater if he joins *neither* than if he joins *either*; and since he cannot join both, he refuses even to consider the question of giving up his ancestral faith for one which is still in the seething pot of Western thought.

Again, all high caste Hindus are alienated by the arrogant condemnation of Hinduism by the missionaries, who are far more ignorant of the Shâstras and the Vedas than the Hindus are of the Bible. The missionaries seem to forget that the sacred books of the East are full of sublime teaching, and lay down precepts as lofty as any which the West are in the habit of practising.

When a missionary, more full of zeal than discretion or knowledge, begins his mission by publicly maligning the heroes of popular veneration; when he considers that Christianity can be advanced by holding up to contempt the stories of intrigues, for example, which have become woven about the life of Krishna, he is only building up against his creed an impenetrable wall of silent pity. It would be as if some missionary came into the market-place of an English town and blasphemed against the Christian faith by gloating over the faults of David or Moses, or Abraham or Jael, or maliciously ridiculed the stories of Jonah and Joshua or Jericho, or repeated the lewd suggestions of profane publications about the Immaculate Conception.

It must never be forgotten that high caste Hindus are as religious, devout, and as conservatively devoted to their religion, and as intellectually acquainted with its teaching, as are Christians in England with theirs; while they are exceedingly sensitive, and feel with a keen sense of being hurt in a tender place any public slight that may be levelled against their creed or against the heroes of their theology.

Again, too, high caste Hindus consider that missionaries are not only ignorant but dishonest, because Hindus read the missionary reports and see that therein they and their religion are maligned. They see that to get funds for missionary work it is necessary nowadays to use startling colours, and lay them on thickly, with the result that to English audiences missionaries frequently paint Indian life in absolutely false colours. They tell tales which are quite true indeed, but which are given as typical illustrations of Indian life, whereas they give

as false a picture as if a Hindu working in our East-end slums, with all their filth and overcrowding, and drunkenness and debauchery, and foul language and immorality, were to go back and relate stories from his work there as if these stories were typical of English life!

Again, one of the most serious allegations against Christian missionaries relates to the men themselves.

I found it admitted on all hands that the real saintly men of high intellectual capacity and childlike charitable faith had always made their mark on the religious convictions of the people; but, as it was pointed out again and again, since all the best English books are widely read in India, the religious thought of India is as much influenced by the religious thinkers of England as is the country parson in England influenced by Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*, or Darwin's *Descent of Man*.

The small-minded English parson reads them with the avowed bias that they are wrong, and that he has to preach them down—in the absence of the author; while the great mind reads them thoughtfully, and endeavours to harmonise their views with his own creeds, and to remain a Christian still. So, too, the narrow-minded Hindu either refuses to touch a Christian book or hear a Christian speak, from the same honest conviction that makes many Roman Catholics refuse to join with or be present at a Protestant's prayers; or he reads and listens with the preconceived idea that they are all wrong. In the same way honest public men in Shrewsbury read Darwin's works, and believed that the spire of St Mary's Church was destroyed by lightning as a judgment upon the town for having erected a statue of the great heretic in front of the town museum!

The wide-minded Hindu reads, and harmonises the new thought with his ancient creed—and remains a Hindu.

The ordinary missionary has very little spiritual influence with the higher classes of the Hindus, and this for personal reasons.

1. He is usually an Anglo-Indian, and no one who has not stayed for some little time in India can quite understand what that means.

The line of social demarcation which is drawn between Indians and Anglo-Indians is as deep as it is sharp. You can hardly be a social comrade of the Indian people and retain social intercourse with the English official class.

A missionary of good class is usually in touch with Anglo-Indian official life; he mixes with the officers and their families, he joins the gymkanas and clubs, and therefore at once he comes on to the other side of the road. However good he may be, however earnest, however charitable, he is looked upon as an Anglo-Indian, and, under the present state of affairs, this puts a barrier in the way of his being a comrade of the people, or getting to understand the inner thought of the people.

Again and again, when I have been sitting at meat in the houses of Brahmins or Vaishyas, they have opened their hearts to me, and have admitted that never before had they spoken openly to an Englishman, for fear that their opinions would be carried to officers, and that some mischief would result to them; for, in spite of all that may be denied, there is the strongest belief throughout India that Indians who are independent thinkers will sooner or later become marked men, and will be made to suffer in some way or other, on the plea that their "loyalty" is doubted.

Thus the mind of the Hindu is a closed book to the Anglo-Indian, to whom he talks, as it were, on the surface, and who, in return, looks upon him as one of a race who are never to be trusted, who say one thing with their mouth and mean another thing with their heart.

2. The habits of the Christian missionary are usually lower in some ways than the habits of the people he is supposed to go out to convert. Again and again, a man in the position of a prime minister, or a judge, or a pleader has said to me, "Would you send an East-end coster to address the members

of the University of Oxford in order to convert them to Christianity? Would you consider that a man who dropped his h's or put them in the wrong place would be a fitting advocate to a county family audience?

"These may appear small things; but if you actually carry them into practice at home, you will understand what sort of an atmosphere your missionaries create around them here.

"We always bathe before we eat; your missionaries do not consider it essential to their ideas of etiquette. We always change our clothes and put on a clean garment to eat in; your missionaries do not mind sitting down to dinner in the clothes in which they have walked the streets. We allow no dead body to touch our hands; your missionaries do not scruple to put them within their lips; and more, too, your missionaries are corrupting our young men, by trying to teach them that the spirit of humaneness is unimportant, and that the sanctity of life is a chimera, and that animals may be slaughtered and eaten, wholly regardless of their sufferings, so long only as the appetite of man is pampered.

"Your St Paul said that he would not eat flesh or drink wine if thereby he made his brother to offend, but your missionaries have set up a lower standard than St Paul; and although they know that thereby they offend our religious ideas, they go on killing and eating, and drinking things that are revolting to our ideas of right and wrong.

"They do these things knowingly, and with a fine contempt for what they call our 'heathen scruples,' in somewhat the same way that your anarchists break every rule of polite society; and both sets of missioners wonder why they can't convert people, blame the barrenness and hypocrisy and obstinacy of the world they live in, and never seem to recognise what grave errors they are themselves making."

This was not said out of mere spite or spleenish invective, but everywhere I found the same deep-seated belief that the *practice* of Christian missioners was so much lower in the matter of actual cleanliness and humaneness in eating and

drinking and bathing, that it was felt that it would be an actual *degradation* to become a Christian. With such deep-rooted ideas gathered from observation of missionaries and English Christians (the soldiers and merchants who go to India) and Indian converts to Christianity, is it any wonder that the aristocratic Hindus of India look upon the adoption of Christianity much in the same way that the scions of English aristocracy would look upon one of their daughters taking up the trade of a barmaid!

3. The spiritual life of the missionaries was generally looked upon as actually lower than the spiritual life of the best Indian priests—it may be the actual Indian priests that some of them knew, or the ideal priests of whom they read.

I well remember a discussion taking place on the verandah of one of the State bungalows, where a number of high officials were gathered.

They all agreed that Christianity was quite an unimportant factor so far as the conversion of the upper classes was concerned. It was, from the point of view of the missionary, “a failure.”

“Now, just tell me why,” I asked.

“Well,” replied one, “the work of the Christian missionaries among the outcasts and famine-stricken is excellent, and cannot but be admired. These poor wretches have nothing to lose and perhaps a little to gain by becoming Christians, and therefore among them the missionaries have some success; but amongst the higher classes, to become Christian means a loss of position, loss of all old safeguards, loss of all family friendships—maybe loss of wife and children and parents—and finally a moral deterioration in general habits of life.”

“Your missionaries,” said another, “are extremely nice fellows; jolly fellows to talk to; courteous, kindly, gentlemanly fellows; but I should no more think of learning *spiritual* truths from them than I should go to an English military officer and ask him to do a surgical operation for me simply because he happened to be courteous and kindly and gentlemanly.

“From our own spiritual teachers we expect a constant de-

votion to spiritual study and spiritual exercises, and earnest communing with the great Spirit of all ; we expect a giving up of the pleasures of the world, which tend to draw away the soul from the most difficult of all gnosis, the knowledge of the mysteries of God and of the hidden things of His will. But your missionaries do not devote themselves either to spiritual studies or spiritual exercises. Your Christ and your St Paul used to fast and be always busied about the things of God, and used to go into the wilderness to commune with God, but your missionaries eat and drink and go to parties, and to tennis and to balls, and live a social life, and therefore we know that they are not very far advanced in spiritual truths, because at the higher levels where men are fitted to become masters and teachers, they have to devote their whole soul and consecrate their whole being to the practice of the higher life. . . . Do you doubt me ? I will wager that if we drive round now to the house of your missionary in this town, we shall find him engaged in what you would call 'worldly pursuits.' ”

“Let us test it,” I answered. My friends gravely arose and ordered the carriage, and four of us drove to the mission station. The boy who came out to us said that the sahib was at the gymkana (club). My friends looked at me, and we drove back ; and in response to a message sent to the gymkana, the missionary was good enough to call in at our bungalow on his way home—in flannels and with his tennis racquet ! In England we expect our spiritual teachers to be good tennis players, and many a story pictures the curate as winning his way to the hearts of his parishioners by means of the dexterity and power of his fists, but in India this is not so. The Hindus expect from their spiritual teachers a constant devotion to the gentler virtues, such as those enumerated by Paul when he was writing to Timothy.

As I look back upon my sojourn in India, and as I mix to-day with numbers of Hindus who are spending years of study in this Christian land of England, I am again impressed with the fact which cannot be gainsayed, that Christianity, as pre-

sented to the Hindus in India by the teaching and habits of life of Christian missionaries, Christian merchants, and Christian soldiers, appears to them a *lower* religion and not a *higher* one than their own Hindu faith, and that the general method of thought, habit of life, social customs, as manifested in our great cities, hardly ever wins over a single Hindu in this land to the belief that Christianity in its fruits produces better virtues than Hinduism.

It is not only that Hindus in India are not converted by Christian missionaries. A seal is put to the accuracy of that statement by the fact that Hindus are not converted to Christianity even when they are brought under the unopposed influence of an entirely Christian environment in England.

It is not enough to point out failures unless one can offer some suggestions for changing failure into victory; and it appears to me that herein we must sooner or later be content to learn the lesson of Jesus when He praised the beautiful teeth, while His disciples could see nothing but the carcase of the dead dog lying in the street of Jerusalem. We must first of all learn what is *good* in Hinduism, and not condemn out of our own mouths the goodness of God by denying that He has revealed Himself to the millions of the East. In a different way, indeed, to that in which He has blessed the West, but none the less to the East as to the West has God revealed something of His glory and beauty and His measureless love.

We must never forget that even our own ancestors were won from their pagan practices by having their festivals hallowed and sanctified with a benediction, instead of having them ridiculed and destroyed by dogmatic arrogance.

In short, therefore, the first lesson to learn must be, that it is better to be a *good* Hindu than a *bad* Christian. The second lesson must be, that men should be sent out who are superior in saintly habits of devotion to the spiritual teachers whom they wish to convert, *and these only*. One ignorant dogmatic man, wanting in spirituality, will do more to lower the prestige of the Christian ideal than ten righteous men will do to raise it.

The early Christian church won its great victories by the growing recognition amongst Greek and Roman pleasure-satiated races that "these Christians are better, are gentler, are more honest, are more truthful, are more self-sacrificing, and live in all things at a *higher* level than we do." But in India to-day, amongst those men of the Hindu faith whom Christianity would like to win, there is a deep-set conviction that "these Christians are less sober, less cleanly, less trustworthy, and live at a *lower* level than we do." And lastly, it is my firm opinion that we are doing incalculable harm to the future of Christianity in India by taking out so-called converts from the lowest classes and teaching them but a smattering of "Sunday School instruction," and sending them out with a hall-mark of "Christians" upon them. From the point of view of the progress of Christianity in India, it would be better to send a dozen spiritual men, who would, living at one place, emulate the saintly lives and ascetic practices of the early fathers of the Christian church, in order to convert intellectually as well as spiritually *one single devout Brahmin of position who had nothing to gain by his conversion*, rather than to send men in scattered units, under all sorts of various administrations, to degenerate into elementary schoolmasters and managers of outcast children's homes and orphanages. The latter in many cases enter into competition with existing charitable agencies, which are not infrequently better administered by Hindu administrators themselves, while the former would raise up an ideal which would in due course be carried from one end of the land to the other, and the spiritual teachers of Hinduism would learn that the kosmic forces of the world beyond were changing their focus, and that it is now through Christianity that the closest kinship to the Divine Centre can be obtained. Then they would themselves become missionaries of the higher faith.

JOSIAH OLDFIELD.

THE DRIFTING OF DOCTRINE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR J. P. MAHAFFY, D.D.

THERE are, in the history of almost every creed, two opposing tendencies, which have caused all the religious wars that the world has seen, so far as these wars were really about religion. The first is the tendency to fix the creed, to crystallise the doctrine, to express it authoritatively as the voice of God, which it is heresy, blasphemy to contradict, and to teach all men that this, and this only, is the true account of God's dealing with men. Hence the immense importance of the defining of creeds, the weighing of the terms in which a doctrine is expressed, and the endless pains taken to show that this is indeed the voice of God, that this is indeed the precise expression of it by the human authorities to whom He has delegated His government. Hence also comes the theory of all great spiritual creeds which the world has seen, that they are final, that they are revealed once for all, so that any novelty is absolutely excluded till a new revelation can be proved to have taken place. The only claim therefore by which a new creed can be established is declared to be a new revelation, and that was the logical ground taken up by the Mormons, who constructed a new Bible to justify their strange doctrines.

But, on the other side, there is an indestructible tendency in human nature, and especially in intellectual societies of men, to question and to criticise, to regard no declaration of dogma as final, and to assert the spiritual liberty of modifying a creed, of taking exception to its evidence, and even of setting up

amended systems of doctrine, which draw men away from the established faith. The plain rude way of dealing with these Dissenters is to slaughter them, and such was the remedy formally recommended by Popes and Pashas. The creeds of Rome and of Mecca only tolerate the existence of unbelievers so long as there is no power to crush them. The Bull of the Pope against the Albigenses is indeed much more sanguinary than the instructions of the Koran, though the interpretations of Mohammed's followers have reduced the latter to the level of the former.

In the following paper I am not concerned with these open conflicts between the conservative and progressive tendencies just stated. What I propose here is the consideration of those tendencies which operate gradually and without open declaration, often without the knowledge of the orthodox, upon their creed, and modify vital doctrines without pretending any influence at all. These hidden forces may be readily observed in the changes undergone by creeds on a large scale, and in the course of centuries. They are perhaps more remarkable when they occur on a small scale, and within the range of a single human life.

Let us, however, take one of the largest cases first. At the time when the books of the Bible were written, and among the people for whom they were written, the highest form of sovranity, nay, the only form of sovranity, was the absolute type, which assumes that not only the property but the lives of all the king's subjects are his property, and that he has a perfect right to dispose of them as he pleases. In these modern days we must go as far as Turkey to find an example of this sort of royalty. We are told that if the Sultan chose any day to take a fancy to the house or wife or property of a loyal subject in Stamboul, he might take off his head and seize his goods without any complaint of *injustice* being raised against him. It might be considered harsh, but still, he is only resuming what he possesses, and dealing with it as he chooses. How completely this idea of sovranity dominates

early writers in their conception of the Deity is plain enough from St Paul's well known ninth chapter of his *Ep. ad Rom.*, where he likens the rights of a human being in the hand of his Creator to the rights of a pot in the hand of the potter that made it. Of course it is well known that this was but one side of the Pharisaic doctrine. Either has been made for some convenience, or amusement, or exaltation of its maker, and has no rights whatever. While, therefore, the absolute sovran deserves the extreme gratitude of all his subjects whom he chooses to treat with kindness, his severities or punishments cannot possibly deserve censure. But as he is absolute, and makes laws for himself, he can be supplicated and induced to change them from benevolence to particular subjects.

With the lapse of centuries a new ideal came into the world—that of a constitutional monarch, far greater and wiser than the legitimate despot. Men came to understand the wisdom and humanity of a fixed code of laws, which even the sovran would not infringe, by which he bound himself voluntarily, and of which a violation, owing to anger or caprice, would be a lowering of his own perfection. Such a monarch was quite ready not only to create subjects, but to give them rights; and the disregarding these rights would not only be harsh or even cruel, it would be positively *unjust*.

As soon as this ideal took the place of the other as regards human kings, it was inevitable that men's ideas as regards the King of kings should undergo a corresponding change; but this change was rather a silent drifting of opinion than a new and conscious heresy. For to the present day pious people read St Paul's inspired writings with the same reverence, and acquiesce in Rom. ix. without stating to themselves its plain inconsistency with their more modern ideals. The old theory told them that a thing was right because God did it; the new holds that God does it because it is right. I know very well that Plato held this modern view; also that even progressive

spirits like Occam, in the Middle Ages, and Descartes held the older and less perfect belief. But the general drift of European opinion is unmistakeable.

The results were more various and reached further than appears at first view. This change of what is perhaps in the case of the Deity a mere abstract question, had great practical consequences in the drifting of opinion. For if the Deity be recognised as a constitutional monarch, who in His wisdom has laid down the best laws for the world to obey, the notion of caprice or special legislation, or exceptions for any particular reasons, becomes more and more inconsistent with the perfection of this wisdom. Hence, even among the most religious people, the importance of miracles as a proof of Divine power, or of special interpositions to please particular people, cannot but wane and pass into the background, as being suited to a ruder age and less developed people, and not perfectly consistent with the establishment of wise laws by an omniscient power. The appeal to miracles becomes less and less frequent, and they no longer play a prominent part in the spiritual life even of those who faithfully receive the truth of the Gospel. The fact that they have disappeared gradually, and are even still asserted among the more superstitious branches of the Christian church, shows that it is not by controversy but by the drifting of opinion that the change has taken place.

It would be easy enough to find other such instances acting through centuries of time, but one example is sufficient to illustrate the large consequences which a silent change may effect without making any noise in the world. I will now turn to the particular instance which has occurred within mine own experience, and state it without commendation or censure, merely as a historical development which those must watch to whom the spiritual training of the age is entrusted.

The Evangelical Church of Ireland has undergone considerable external changes within our own time; it has to some extent modified its formularies, but for the avowed purpose of maintaining the Puritan character of its creed, which has

lasted from the days of Ussher and of Bedell to our own. These great men, taught by Puritans and creating a Puritan ministry which has laid claim to the appellation of Protestant for the Church of Ireland, to the exclusion of Dissenters, were the direct spiritual ancestors of the Evangelical clergy of to-day, who can fairly boast that never was a church more faithful to her traditions for three hundred years. And yet here, too, there has been remarkable drifting of opinion, even within a single generation.

A brief retrospect into the religious society of Dublin as I knew it will be necessary to make the subsequent changes clear. The great Evangelical movement had been working in Dublin ever since the opening of the nineteenth century. It was discountenanced by most of the bishops and fashionable clergy, and did not become dominant till the very tactless rule of Archbishop Whately threw a vast number of the rich laity into the movement, who built free chapels, not under the archbishop's control, and filled them with able popular preachers, who emptied the parish churches, and monopolised all the religious teaching of the Protestant population. The antagonism between the archbishop and the prevailing movement was indeed deplorable. His acute reasoning faculty was shocked by the bad logic of the preachers; their earnestness and good-breeding, for they were thorough gentlemen, were hurt by his extreme rudeness, for he either wanted or affected the want of urbanity. He was said to appoint men who flattered him, at all events he did not appoint Evangelicals, to his parishes. Hence the movement developed without the control or guidance of his master intellect, and there was a kind of aristocratic *imperium in imperio*, for half-a-dozen eminent preachers were the spiritual masters of the diocese. The type of these men was not only quite definite, but corresponded accurately to the type introduced into the Irish Church by the Divinity school of the Irish University from its very commencement. It was the school of the Puritan Provosts Travers and Alvey, who were the teachers and masters of

Jas. Ussher, its brightest star. The popular preachers of Dublin in 1850 were his lineal descendants in doctrine, but differed from the early Puritans in that these thought an accurate knowledge of the original Bible essential, while their descendants were quite content with the Authorised Version. But so convinced were they of the vital importance of Scripture, that I have actually heard a clergyman on a platform assert the verbal inspiration of the English Bible, on the ground that the same influence which guided the pens of the original writers could not have failed to guide in the same manner the translators who were to make known to the English nation the message of the Gospel. Regarding therefore the Bible, as they understood it, the absolute rule of faith, they nevertheless acquiesced in the formularies and ritual of the Church of England. In this they acted just as Ussher had done, though very few of them ever read the history of their church. They never quarrelled with the Book of Common Prayer; they read through the service devoutly every Sunday—even the Athanasian creed received its due place—and always considered themselves a distinct church from their brethren the Presbyterians, with whom they were nevertheless then on very good terms. But the service, however reverently performed, and never curtailed, as it now is by the separation of services, was but a long prelude to the real work of the day—the sermon. For this purpose the minister retired, and reappeared in the lofty pulpit in a black (or Geneva) preaching gown and bands. If he gave an extempore prayer before the sermon, it was not from any desire to violate the rubric, but only because he regarded it as part of his sermon. In this discourse, which often occupied three-quarters of an hour, it was his absolute duty to set forth the whole Gospel (as he understood it), so that any stray person, or any member of the congregation in a contrite condition, might then and there attain conversion (which was always sudden) and find peace. There is no need to recapitulate here the very simple and distinct dogmas which these puritanical people thought

essential to salvation. They were distinctly Calvinists, as their forefathers had been; they were distinctly anti-ritualists. The doctrine of justification by faith was the cardinal point of their teaching. What concerns us here was the tone of this preaching with regard to the condition of the human race in the next world.

They did not hesitate to preach that all those who had not embraced the dogma of justification by faith were doomed to eternal perdition. They believed as strongly as Massillon in "the small number of the elect." They were not afraid to insist upon the eternity of the very maximum of torture. They did not believe in the Epicurean doctrine of pain—*si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis*. On the contrary, the great majority of the human race would be "salted with fire." But on the other hand, they had the firmest belief in the future bliss of those that were saved, and upon their deathbeds looked forward with confidence to an immediate reunion with the saints who had gone before. They even had strong hopes of seeing visions of glory on their deathbeds. These strong and clear convictions gave them a zeal and fervour in their preaching which we look for in vain in the cautious and critical discourses of the present day. The modern preacher in the same church, feeling uncertainties and difficulties himself, and preaching to others of a like critical attitude of mind, is under a grave disadvantage compared with the man who is sure of all his doctrines, and believes firmly that he is speaking under the inspiration of the Divine Spirit. Anyone who can remember that generation of Evangelical preachers cannot but feel sad at the contrast between them and the latter-day pulpit. Their logic was often at fault; they felt no difficulties about the origin of evil, or the reconciling of moral responsibility with necessitarianism. They boldly preached that while man was free to do evil, and therefore responsible for it, he was unable, owing to Adam's transgression, to do any good thing of himself. And yet they never doubted the benevolence of the Deity, though they called every conversion

a miracle. They lived saintly and charitable lives, though they inveighed against the value of good works. They controlled their congregations as spiritual autocrats, though they denied all efficacy in apostolical succession. They were excellent and able men, proclaiming a creed which has over and over again produced great and noble types of men, though most philosophers would denounce it as a cruel and even immoral parody of the teaching of the Founder.

A generation has elapsed, and the whole aspect of the same church is changed. It is indeed still a strictly Evangelical, and even a bigoted church. Any approach to ritual, or any suspected leaning in that direction, is resented by the great body of its members. No young clergyman has a chance of promotion who shows High Church tendencies. The services are not indeed so long or so absolutely simple as they were; in those churches and chapels which were built without chancels, they have been added—a manifest excrescence to the original design. But without any controversy, without any conflict, momentous changes have taken place. In the first place, instead of the service being a long prelude to the sermon, the sermon has become a short appendix to the service. The black gown has vanished. And with the decay in the importance of preaching, preaching itself has decayed. Stirring and passionate eloquence has now no place in the pulpit. Young men with that gift go to some other profession, though the stray orator who does appear in the modern pulpit is hailed with delight by the church-going public. But the age of decided dogma is gone by, and with it the age of bold extempore preaching. Few of our people have discussed, still less rejected the *verbal* inspiration of the Bible, yet by tacit consent it is not enforced from the pulpit. There is a feeling abroad that the doctrine may not be strictly true, or perhaps that a portion of the congregation will not accept it, and so the preacher feels that he will not carry his audience with him if he insists upon it. Many that still accept it in words, dilute it with such exceptions and reservations that as a dogma it

is not worth preaching. For reservations and exceptions have a very chilling effect in an address to the emotions.

Let us now turn to the question of the future life.

I have already stated what the doctrines were which the old Evangelical school preached as the inspired word of God. But there were not wanting signs of a revolt against the Eternity of Punishment among the clergy both in England and in Ireland. It is probably forgotten that in England, some thirty years ago, a clergyman was brought from court to court, with the intention of dismissing him from his cure on the ground of heresy, because he had preached against this doctrine, until Lord Westbury, in the highest court of appeal, dismissed the case with a profane epigram. It is equally forgotten that in Ireland an onslaught was made upon the doctrine by a clergyman of high character for learning, and that an angry reply was produced on the orthodox side by another of at least equal reputation for learning. The matter seemed to rest there. The orthodox who could not follow metaphysical argument were satisfied that a man of acknowledged greatness defended the traditional view, and the other side did not renew the formal attack. Nevertheless, since that day the drifting of opinion in the church has been such that no further controversy seems required. Just as the Athanasian Creed is no longer read in the Irish Church, so this doctrine is no longer preached. There is, indeed, only one church known to me where it is openly attacked, and this attack is not received with much sympathy. It is a question which people seem agreed not to discuss openly. On the other hand, when some preacher who is ignorant of the drift of public opinion, and who takes his sermon from some antiquated book, ventures to put it forward in its naked severity, there is something like a revolt among the congregation. Thus a very prominent dogma has disappeared silently and quietly from the Evangelical preaching of to-day. There is, I suppose, a stratum of religious society where the change has not taken place, and there may be Dissenting

chapels where the eternal punishment of most of the world is still preached with fervour. But concerning this form of Christianity I have no personal knowledge, and I am speaking here strictly from mine own observation.

It is still urged upon rare occasions that the Gospel must be preached not only through love but through fear, and that, as rewards are promised, so punishment must be threatened. But it is not so much the fact as the degree of punishment which is in question. If our forefathers, who inflicted capital punishment for a whole catalogue of offences, had been told that their descendants would mitigate this severity, and even set down as barbarous the penalties formerly inflicted, they would have exclaimed that crime and vice would become rampant and society dissolve by such unheard-of laxity. Nevertheless the change has taken place, and society has not dissolved. In the same way, the disappearance of this dogma of eternal and extreme punishment from the practical creed of most Christians does not seem to have brought with it any corresponding laxity in moral life.

It may be that the recollections of the morning of life assume roseate hues, and that therefore I am wrong in thinking that there existed in Evangelical Dublin forty-five years ago a group of eminent Christians who by their life and preaching showed forth the Gospel very differently from its representatives nowadays. This is nevertheless my strong impression, and it may be due to the fact that the leading spirits among the young men of that day were enlisted for the ministry, whereas now they turn to other paths of life. But even to me, with these strong impressions of the saintly character of the Evangelical leaders of a former generation, it does not appear that the average life of the church is now in any way inferior to that of these puritanical people. Doctrine seems less important, heresies more easily condoned, the external duties of religion not so strictly observed—the whole complexion of the ordinary Christian life has drifted away from the old ideal—but we may believe and trust that this religious world has

not grown really worse. Yet the drifting of doctrine may carry men further than they intend, as will appear from the following considerations.

Parallel with the eternal pains of hell stand the inexpressible joys of heaven. The old Evangelicals had a profound faith in both; and those who have seen their deathbeds can well remember how joyfully they looked forward to meeting not only their Redeemer but their companions in the faith immediately upon their departure from the world. It was the chief consolation administered to the dying, next after the security that they had been redeemed and were going to heaven, that they would there meet the members of their family who had fallen asleep with the same assurance. But now, all this living faith in heaven, in a society of the blessed, in recognition of those we love hereafter, appears to me to be drifting out of the world. The fact is, that with the faith in hell, the faith in heaven was more closely bound up than was suspected; and when the faith in the one has faded, the faith in the other seems to be fading also. I do not hear, as I used to do, pious old people comforting themselves with the hope that very soon they will find again those of their family whose loss was the bitter trial of their lives. They seldom speak about it, they do not disbelieve it, but the faith of the religious world is drifting away from it, to that worst form of despair—

“When I shall meet him in the court of heaven
I shall not know him; therefore, never never
Shall I behold my pretty Arthur more.”

This appears to me the main cause why preaching is now as a rule ineffective. The orthodox preacher is frequently setting forth truths in which his hearers have lost their interest. They may not take the trouble to contradict him, or to engage in controversy about these things, but their faith has drifted away from him; his voice sounds hollow, his arguments antiquated; his views are received with polite acquiescence, but without earnestness or conviction.

It is not for the mere historian of opinion, the observer of the changes in the society around him, to offer remedies for this state of things, even though it be indeed full of danger. But the modern preacher must arm himself not only to meet heresy in controversy; he must meet that far more dangerous *drifting of doctrine* which is so difficult to pin down to definite stages. Whether such a thing as non-miraculous Christianity is a conceivable creed, and not a flat contradiction in terms, is the first thing to be settled; for what we can see threatening us is a vague, indefinite belief in Christianity as a whole, with a refusal to receive it in many particulars. Can this sort of creed be called Christianity at all? The other problem of the highest importance is this: can we maintain Christianity as the highest and noblest rule of life, even for those who do not believe in future rewards and punishments? Is it not, even so, greater and better than worldliness, or selfishness, or idleness? Is it an argument worthy of so great a system of life, to urge it mainly as a security for our future condition, and not as a rule, perfect and noble, for our conduct in this life, of which we feel and know the reality? Or has the Church yet to find a better conception of the future life than that of an extraneous reward—the conception of the mere continuance of the rewards and punishments in this life, implied by a moral government?

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RECENT ASPECTS OF THE JOHANNINE PROBLEM.—I. THE EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

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THE year 1891 marks a new epoch for English-speaking students of this problem, because of the sober, impartial and judicious survey of the whole discussion presented by the most distinguished German historian of the beginnings of Christianity,¹ himself an avowed sympathiser with the school of Weizsäcker, and replied to² by the most distinguished English exegete of our day, as representative of conservative opinion, with a moderation, a courtesy, a magnanimity worthy of himself and his opponent, and well calculated to off-set many an old-time instance of the proverbial *odium theologicum*. Not only was an example set of discussion of a more fruitful kind, but on both sides acknowledgment of mutual approximation was made the point of departure. Said Professor Schürer: "We have not yet advanced so far that the opponents can shake hands, but we are on the way. The defenders of the apostolic origin admit increasingly that the account given in the Fourth Gospel is not strictly historical;³ and the opponents are ready to

¹ Emil Schürer, in the *Contemporary Review*, September 1891.

² Professor Sanday, *ibid.*, October 1891, and more fully in a series of six articles in *The Expositor*, 1891 and 1892.

³ The reference is explained on p. 396 as applying to Luthardt and Grau and even more strongly to Beyschlag and Weiss.

acknowledge the possibility, indeed the probability, that in some degree an independent historical tradition echoes on in it."

Is it possible, after eleven further years of earnest investigation and discussion, to discern something more of real progress,—progress as gauged not by the victory of a party, but by the disengagement, through whatever currents and eddies of alternating tides, of precious fragments of the historic truth? At least let us hope not to decline again from that high plane of scholarly magnanimity and courtesy to which the debate has once been lifted.

With Schürer and Sanday, it may well be admitted that the decisive arguments on the question of Johannine authorship must fall within the field of internal evidence. Nevertheless we may devote our attention first and principally to the external evidence, with especial regard to the discoveries of recent years in the domain of palæography, partly because investigation has here been especially fruitful, partly because of the relatively tangible and concrete nature of the results.

It becomes needful at the very outset to present certain fundamental considerations regarding external evidence in general, since, as even Professor Sanday expresses "surprise to see Dr Schürer repeat an argument which has so often been exploded as that about Papias," it may well be that others, noticing to how large an extent the discussions of recent years involve the argument from silence, will also be surprised, not realising that the explosion referred to is so harmless to the entire school which Dr Schürer represents—in fact to all schools except that "vigorous and rigorous" criticism now happily extinct—that he may well be pardoned for disregarding it. The pulverising essays of Lightfoot on "The Silence of Eusebius" and "Papias" were directed against the author of *Supernatural Religion*, who maintained on these grounds the *non-existence* of the Fourth Gospel before A.D. 160–170.

If anyone imagines Dr Schürer, or any modern critic, to "repeat the argument" of that anonymous author, he cannot

be too promptly undeceived. He should be reminded that in the very article referred to Dr Schürer fixes 130 A.D. as the very *latest*¹ date to which the gospel is assigned by modern critics; whereas that of the 'Εξήγησεις² of Papias is now fixed (by the new fragment published by de Boor) as almost certainly later than 135 (Harnack, A.D. 145–160). He should be referred to Moffat's *Historical New Testament*, or to Harnack's *Chronologie*, where dates between 90 and 110 are strongly insisted on by opponents of the Johannine authorship, or to Holtzmann's *Handcommentar*,³ where acquaintance with the Fourth Gospel is even suggested as a possible reason for Papias' comment on the "order" of Mark.⁴ Better still, if he would appreciate the full width of the chasm which separates modern discussion of the argument *e silentio* against the *apostolicity* of this gospel, from that of the criticism of vigor and rigor antagonised by Lightfoot, he should read Bousset's *Evangelienzeit Justins des Märtyrers*, 1891, or Edwin Abbott's discussion of the same subject, *s.v.* "Gospels" in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*,⁵ where the question is not of the *existence*, but of the *treatment* of this gospel. If possible he should read the elabo-

¹ It seems, however, to have escaped Dr Schürer's attention that O. Pfeiderer had adopted a slightly later date (135–140) in his *Urchristenthum*, 1887 (p. 778).

² I cannot regard it as other than an inaccuracy of far-reaching and deplorable results that the title of Papias' work is almost constantly given, and that by critics such as Lightfoot, Hilgenfeldt and Schmiedel, as if it read 'Εξήγησις. The misunderstanding goes back indeed to Jerome ("explanatio"), but Eusebius is explicit: ἐπιγέγραπται λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις. The work was *not* a commentary like the twenty-four "exegetical books" of Basilides. It was more like the commentaries of the Talmud, *transmitting* (and translating — ταῖς ἐρμηνείαις?) the authoritative explanations of "elders." Thus Lightfoot's argument (*Super. Rel.*, p. 160) as to the nature of the work, as against the "books" (βίβλια), is confirmed.

³ *Synoptiker-Apg.* (ed. 1902), p. 10.

⁴ The very concise and comprehensive statistics of Moffat's invaluable compendium will take the place of further enumeration by us of the resultant dates assigned by modern scholars. See his *Historical N.T.*, 1901, p. 495, where the author deduces, as his own result, "generally between 95 and 115 nearer the latter year in all probability than the former."

⁵ Especially the summary, xviii, 6, col. 1837.

rate work of von der Goltz, *Die Ignatianischen Briefe*,¹ with its minute analysis of the doctrine—particularly the *Logos* doctrine—of Ignatius and Justin, in comparison with the “Johannine,” and note its conclusion, that while Justin betrays more probable traces of acquaintance with our gospel, Ignatius, who betrays no knowledge of it, stands nearer to it in affinity of doctrine. It will then become apparent that the matter of external evidence is not purely and simply a question of the existence or non-existence of our Fourth Gospel, but of a *milieu* of doctrine and tradition, Gnostic and orthodox, out of which the gospel gradually comes to take its place as an authority appealed to on both sides as “Johannine.” Curiously, however, the evidence is decidedly in favour of the step having been taken first on the heretical side.

We must not imagine any disposition on the part of Dr Sanday or his learned associates on the conservative side to discredit the argument from silence, nor to advance the claims, as some have done, on the alleged authority of Lightfoot, that “The silence of Eusebius and his authorities is favourable to the apostolic authorship as well as their utterances.” That would come near to eliminating external evidence altogether. If silence and utterance alike “give consent,” then the external evidence can prove anything; which is about equivalent to saying it can prove nothing. Unless the verdict of external evidence is *always* to be in the affirmative, it *must* be based on silence. We do not expect pre-Shakesperian writers to declare, “The Shakesperian plays do not yet exist.” We are even obliged to discount apparent references to Hamlet and Shylock because of our knowledge that the poet by no means created his characters out of whole cloth. This is recognised in principle, if not in fact, by those who make large claims in behalf of very dubious “Johannine echoes” as certainly implying acquaintance with our present gospel. But it must also be admitted that the emergence, *ca.* 100 A.D., of a work, which, if regarded as apostolic, would possess for Papias and Justin

¹ *Texte u. Unters.*, xii. 3.

superlative importance, would be marked by no mere ripple on the stream of Christian tradition and doctrine. What we have a right to expect from the argument *e silentio* will be apparent from a single illustration, purposely taken from the very centre of our field of inquiry.

A Latin *argumentum*¹ prefixed to a Vatican ninth century MS. of the Vulgate alleges that "one Papias by name, of Hierapolis, has related in his exoteric (a blunder for exegetic), that is, in his last (*extremis*) five books," that "the gospel of John was published and given out to the churches by John while he yet remained in the body." It goes on to declare that Papias himself "wrote down the gospel at the dictation of John." Passing by the absurd anachronism which follows, about an encounter with Marcion, let us see what the argument *e silentio* has to say regarding this alleged utterance of Papias, by one who did not even know correctly the title of his book. Lightfoot² has indeed committed even his great authority, though hesitatingly, to the following as "the most probable explanation of the whole passage." "We may suppose that Papias, having reported some saying of St John on the authority of the elders, went on somewhat as follows: 'And this accords with what we find in his own gospel, which he gave to the churches when he was still in the body (*ἔτι ἐν τῷ σώματι καθεστῶτος*). . . .' If St John's authorship of the gospel had been mentioned in this incidental way, *Eusebius would not have repeated it, unless he departed from his usual practice.*" Lightfoot even comes to the defence of the statement regarding the dictation of the gospel. "Papias may have quoted the gospel delivered by John to the churches, which *they* wrote down (*ἀπέγραφον*) from his lips; and some later writer, mistaking the ambiguous *ἀπέγραφον*, interpreted it 'I wrote down,' thus making Papias himself the amanuensis. . . . *Eusebius would be more likely than not to omit such a statement*

¹ On this *argumentum*, and its derivation and connections, see the interesting Appendix ii. in Burkitt's "Two Lectures on the Gospels," Macmillan, 1901.

² *Essays on Super. Rel.*, p. 214.

if it was made thus casually.” Reserving our judgment of the two very large assumptions here required to be made regarding (1) Papias’ mentioning a matter of such paramount importance only “thus casually,” (2) this conception of “the silence of Eusebius,” what shall we say of *the silence of Irenæus*, passionate advocate of the Johannine authorship against those who were denying that aspect (*speciem*) of the fourfold gospel? Irenæus was well acquainted with Papias through his single quite modest little work, and knew as well as did Eusebius that he must look in it, if anywhere, for the evidence which would utterly silence his opponents.

Almost certainly he was not otherwise acquainted with Papias than through his book; for in quoting from it he declares, “These things Papias, who was a hearer of John and a companion of Polycarp, an ancient worthy, witnesseth in writing in the fourth of his books; for there are five books composed by him.” Eusebius corrects the error of Irenæus in representing Papias to have been, like Polycarp, a hearer of the Apostle, and shows, by citing the preface¹ of Papias himself, that this author, in the “traditions of the Elder John” (*τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου Ἰωάννου παραδόσεις*) which he transmits, is not referring to the Apostle as his authority, but to a contemporary of his own, a John whom he distinguishes from the Apostle in words at once so clear and so familiar that to cite them again is almost an insult to the reader’s intelligence.² Of

¹ Jerome (*De Vir. Illust.*, 18) also informs us that the passage in question was in the *preface* of Papias’ work.

² Since, however, so great a scholar as Zahn can still make it appear to himself compatible with honest exegesis to say that Papias does not distinguish the two, but means one and the same person, we subjoin the passage itself, with Eusebius’ comment, in the translation of Lightfoot: “And again, on any occasion when a person came in my way who had been a follower of the Elder’s, I would inquire about the discourses of the elders—what was said by Andrew, or by Peter, or by Philip, or by Thomas or James, or by John or Matthew, or any other of the Lord’s disciples, and what Aristion and the Elder John [the disciples of the Lord] say. For I did not think that I could get so much profit from the contents of books as from the utterances of a living and abiding voice.” “Here,” adds Eusebius, “it is worth while to observe that he twice enumerates the name of John. The first he mentions in con-

this error of Irenæus in confounding the John of Papias' *paradoses* with the John whom he knew to have been associated with his revered master Polycarp,¹ an error but partially corrected by Eusebius,² and the fruitful source of ages of misunderstanding, we shall have more to say hereafter. Suffice it that Irenæus, knowing him to be a (later) contemporary and near neighbour of Polycarp, assumed (were prefaces then read as carelessly as now?) that his *παραδόσεις Ἰωάννου* were of John the Apostle in Ephesus. He pronounces him accordingly Ἰωάννου ἀκουστής, and the phrase thereafter constantly reappears in later references to Papias. In our *argumentum* it becomes, e.g., *discipulus Johannis carus*. But Irenæus literally "compasses heaven and earth" to find an argument against those who denied the apostolic authorship. Because there are four winds, four elements, four zones of the earth, four pillars of

nection with Peter and James and Matthew and the rest of the Apostles, evidently meaning the Evangelist, but the other John he mentions after an interval, and classes with others outside the number of the Apostles, placing Aristion before him, and he distinctly calls him an Elder," etc. We have also inclosed in [] a clause wanting in some of the MSS., and both textually and intrinsically doubtful. See *Enc. Bibl.*, s.v. "Gospels," col. 1815, and my article in *Journ. Bibl. Lit.*, 1897.

¹ On the correctness of Irenæus' recollection of Polycarp's references to John as the Apostle, see Gwatkin, "Irenæus on the Fourth Gospel," in *Contemp. Rev.*, 1897, i, and Fisher (*op. cit.*, p. 254 ff.), against Réville (*Le Quatrième Evangile*, 1901), Harnack (*Chronologie*, 1897), and M'Giffert (*Apost. Age*, 1897).

² Eusebius tolerates so much of the misunderstanding of Irenæus as accords with his own pet theory of a second John at Ephesus, on whom might be fathered Revelation; for this is his individual improvement upon the theory of Dionysius of Alexandria, who was at a loss to fix upon another John for the (then) obnoxious book. But while Eusebius eagerly seizes on the confusion as proof that Papias was indeed an ἀκουστής Ἰωάννου, though not the John imagined by Irenæus, he is too candid a scholar not to admit that there was no evidence of it in Papias' text; for after repeating Irenæus' phrase as applicable to the Presbyter, he qualifies the statement by adding, "At all events (γούν) he mentions them (Aristion and the Elder John) frequently by name, and besides records their traditions in his writings." In point of fact the passage quoted clearly implies that neither one of the two Johns was accessible to Papias. The Apostle had long since been dead (ἔπεν); the Presbyter, though living, was accessible to Papias only through report of travellers who "came his way." On the true habitat and date of this much-debated John, see Scholten, and Schlatter, *Die Kirche Jerusalems, vom Jahre 70 bis 130*, Gütersloh, 1898.

heaven, four cherubim sustaining the throne of God, the folly is manifest of "those wretched men who wish to set aside that aspect presented by John's Gospel." Is his silence under these circumstances compatible with the existence in Papias of a direct statement, however casual, that "John while yet in the body published and gave out the gospel to the churches," Papias himself or "the churches" (!) having written the gospel at the Apostle's dictation? Careless he doubtless was in mistaking Papias' authority for one much higher, but his carelessness did not go to this extent, nor tend in this direction. The silence of Eusebius alone even a Lightfoot may venture to set aside, but the silence of Eusebius and Irenæus together is absolutely fatal to the claims of the *argumentum*.

This instance can indeed be cited only as an illustration, because those who deny the inference as to the silence of Papias no longer claim with Lightfoot that Papias said anything so explicit, but only *something of this kind*. That he actually paid no attention whatever to the Fourth Gospel is an admission which they probably feel would be fatal to their argument. His mention and use of it must be taken to be just "casual" enough to make the silence of both Irenæus and Eusebius seem reasonable, though both rest on him for their accounts of the first and second gospels, and at the same time not *so* doubtful or *so* casual as to indicate either ignorance or lack of the respect which could not fail to attach to so lofty an authority.

It is just here that the course of recent discovery and research has profoundly altered the nature of the argument on "Papias of Hierapolis," and "The Silence of Eusebius." Lightfoot was far more accurate than his opponent, more accurate than many who borrow his arguments, when he pointed out the fundamental distinction made by Eusebius between "disputed" (*ἀντιλεγόμενα*) or "spurious" (*νόθα*) New Testament writings, and the "acknowledged" (*ὁμολογούμενα*); the four gospels belonging, of course, among the latter. He pointed out the *two* passages in which Eusebius defines his

twofold purpose. This is (1) "to indicate what church writers of various periods have made use of any of the disputed (*ἀντιλεγόμενων*) books." These *employments* (unacknowledged) are carefully identified and trustworthy; they are termed by Lightfoot "testimonies," and their presence or absence is the basis of Eusebius' argument for or against the *ἀντιλεγόμενα*. Of course they are not extended to the *ὁμολογούμενα*, though 1 Peter and 1 John, perhaps as standing on the border line, are covered. In the second place, Eusebius undertook to tell from these same early writers (2) "what has been *said by them concerning* (a) the canonical and acknowledged Scriptures, and (b) anything that they have *said concerning* those which do not belong to this class."¹ He makes still clearer what he means in this second undertaking by reiterating it at the point where he is about to give "the statements of Irenæus in regard to the divine Scriptures," as follows: "Since in the beginning of this work we promised to give, when needful, the words of the ancient presbyters and writers of the Church, in which they have declared those *traditions which came down to them concerning* the canonical books, and since Irenæus was one of them, we will now give his words, and, first, what he says of the sacred gospels." Thereupon follows Irenæus' account of Matthew and Mark, which, although borrowed from Papias, and already once given by Eusebius from Papias directly, is now repeated, and his account of Luke and John. This latter is simply: "And Luke, the attendant of Paul, recorded in a book the gospel which Paul had declared. Afterwards John, the disciple of the Lord, who also reclined on his bosom, published his gospel while staying at Ephesus in Asia."²

Had Lightfoot been able to foresee the light which the closing decade of the nineteenth century would throw upon the debates of the second and third regarding the trustworthiness and authority of the gospel narrative, he would hardly have defined it as the "main object" of Eusebius in regard to the four gospels to "preserve any anecdotes which he may

¹ Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 3.

² Euseb., *H.E.*, v. 8, M'Giffert's trans.

have found illustrating the circumstances under which they were written.”¹ He would have realised that the pre-Eusebian age was almost as familiar as we with the higher criticism in *both* its forms, *historical* as well as literary. He would thus have appreciated that the “statements concerning” the gospels in both Irenæus and Eusebius are only links in a long chain of prologues, or *argumenta*, by which writers of *both orthodox and heretical* circles endeavoured to establish the apostolicity of their traditions of the Lord’s life and teaching. Of these we have had one example in the *argumentum* already cited; for, so far from being a late invention of the scribe himself, it bears not only internal evidence of translation from an early Greek original,² but Wordsworth and White, by the discovery of another version of the same in a MS. which betrays relations with the Old Latin version, have furnished evidence which, in the judgment of Burkitt, must carry its origin back much beyond the time of Jerome.³ The famous Muratorian Fragment, which Professor Sanday now brings down as late as 200 A.D., stands forth in its true light as one more link in this chain, its denial of any discrepancy between the Fourth Gospel and the rest being aimed, as Zahn has seen, at the same Alogi antagonised by Irenæus and Epiphanius. On the heretical side stands another succession, into which P. Corssen has opened the way by his *Monarchianische Prologe*.⁴ Here is a heretical account of the origin of the Fourth Gospel leading back directly to the Gnostic legends of Leucius Charinus and his *Acts of John*. It is true that the new fragment of these *Acts* published by M. R. James in the Cambridge *Texts and Studies* (1897), and the complete edition by Bonnet,⁵ show Corssen to have perhaps inverted the relation of Leucius to the gospel. The dependence may be on his side, if either.⁶ On the

¹ *Essays on Supern. Rel.*, p. 46.

² So Lightfoot, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

³ Burkitt, *Two Lectures on the Gospels*, 1901, p. 90.

⁴ *Texte u. Unters.*, xv. 1.

⁵ *Acta Apost. Apocrypha*, ii. 1, Lipsiæ, 1898.

⁶ The clause specially relied on by Professor James, *νόσσομαι λόγχοις*, when read in the context, is in much closer relation to the interpolated reading of Matt. xxvii. 49 (BCLUT min. vss. Chrys.), which also makes the lance thrust

other hand, it is these Gnostic legends which furnish the key to "Johannine" phraseology; not only the term Logos, but the designation of John as "the disciple whom Jesus loved." But we are now concerned merely with the interest displayed among both orthodox and heretics in the second century (the Monarchian prologues are earlier than Tertullian) to connect our gospel with the Apostle. If we proceed in the reverse direction a similar feeling of the need for authenticating the records displays itself increasingly as rivals multiply. The first two gospels have no prologue, but the third is introduced under the patronage of Theophilus, and with assurances of the author's better qualification for his task than certain rivals. The Revelation of John has both a prologue vouching for the writer, with a blessing on the devout reader, and an epilogue pronouncing a curse on spurious matter. The same purpose of authentication of the record is subserved by the appendix to the Fourth Gospel, whether with Lightfoot¹ we limit the later hand to verses 24-25, or with Zahn and the great majority of critics consider the whole chapter a later attachment. But the question of the appendix and its relation on the one side to the gospel, on the other to the tradition as transmitted through church fathers and *argumenta*, is one which must be treated by itself, falling as it does on the border land between external and internal evidence. Here we have but two things to note: (1) Eusebius' second principal object in reporting the evidence derivable from the earlier writers on part of the soldiers' abuse *before* the death of Christ (*cf.* Clem. v. 1311), than to John. There is therefore at least the possibility of derivation in all three cases from a common source. Hilgenfeld, in a masterly discussion entitled *Der gnostische und der Kanonische Johannes* (*Z. f. v. Theol.*, 1900), at least succeeds in showing that the alleged evidences for Leucius' acquaintance with the Fourth Gospel are inconclusive. Certainly the Gnostic writer relies on synoptic tradition for his facts, his perverted and fanciful elaboration standing for the Docetic application of the Pauline Christology to this tradition, as the Fourth Gospel stands for the anti-Docetic. It *must* be admitted that the Johannine writings presuppose a Docetism of the Leucian type, though probably an older form. It *cannot* be said that the Leucian writings necessarily presuppose the Johannine, least of all as apostolic.

¹ *Biblical Essays*, essay on John xxi.

questions relating to the canon was by no means a mere antiquarian interest, still less an idle curiosity. He had the example of two centuries of effort to *authenticate the gospel record*, and both he and his predecessors give evidence of having searched their authorities with almost the diligence of a modern critic for anything that might tend to prove its close connection with the apostles. To imagine, therefore, that Eusebius would remit the search in such a work as *Papias*, still more to suggest that "Eusebius would be more likely than not to omit" a statement of Papias, such as Lightfoot assumes, is to betray a conception of the external evidence and what it signifies impossible to impute in our day to a scholar of Lightfoot's eminence.¹ Modern discovery forces us to look upon the silence of Eusebius and *Irenæus* as highly significant. Both would eagerly search every nook and corner of the work of Papias for any statement directly connecting the gospel with the Apostle, in fact *anything of the kind* reported by the *argumenta*. Evidence of acquaintance with the gospel in some form they may very well have found. There is not the slightest reason for doubting the statement of Eusebius that he found evidence of acquaintance with 1 John and 1 Peter. It is less easy to account for Eusebius' failure to explicitly acknowledge the use made by Papias of Revelation. For Eusebius is not lightly to be accused of a *suppressio veri*. Yet the testimony of two commentators on Revelation of A.D. 450-500, Andreas of Cæsarea and Arethas, the former quoting a

¹ Lightfoot's reply, when his opponent in a subsequent edition presented the argument from the silence of Eusebius in a form more like the modern, was singularly weak. He replied (*ibid.*, p. 182), "If Papias had merely said of the fourth Evangelist that 'John the disciple of the Lord wished by the publication of the Gospel to root out that error which had been disseminated among men by Cerinthus, and long before by those who are called Nicolaitans,' or language to that effect, it would be no surprise to me if Eusebius did not reproduce it; because Irenæus uses these very words of the Fourth Gospel (*Her.*, iii. 11, 1) and Eusebius does not allude to the fact." As if it were all one to Eusebius whether he found this in *Irenæus*, an anti-Gnostic writer of 180-190 in Gaul, or in Papias, the fountainhead of tradition on the origin of the gospels, the friend of Polycarp in Asia, and the alleged "hearer of John"!

considerable passage, as he says, "word for word," is conclusive on this point. Some even infer from the expression τὸ ἀξιόπιστον ("the trustworthiness"; Lightfoot, "genuineness"), employed by Andreas, that Papias, like his contemporary Justin, was not content with *using* Revelation, but signified his belief in its more or less direct relation to the Apostle.¹ We shall ourselves have later to present evidence probably earlier than Papias for use of the Fourth Gospel, by an orthodox Palestinian writer, though probably in a somewhat different form. But the argument from the silence of Eusebius and Irenæus makes it highly probable, to say the least, that the data of the *argumenta* and all their tribe are not derived, and could not be derived, from Papias.

(1) It is a fact of very direct bearing upon the question, and of no small interest, that a comparative study of these data, whether in the Fathers or in the *argumenta*, gives with a high degree of probability their real derivation. Long since it was conjectured (by Zahn) that the legendary account given by the *Muratorian Fragment* might be derived from the Leucian *Acts of John*, a product of Gnostic romancing and allegory of *ca.* 140-150. The work of Corssen, James and Bonnet goes to show this, on the contrary, to be a source, perhaps the source of the *heretical argumenta*; but the two forms of the *argumentum* above cited, the *Muratorianum*, the statements of Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria, and all traceable forms of orthodox tradition, rest on a different foundation, being connected with the Gnostic legend indirectly through an orthodox recast known as the Prochorus legend. They rest on the appendix to the gospel.² In proof of this

¹ The silence of Eusebius on this point must be subject to the discount that he was almost as strongly prejudiced *against* the apostolic authorship of Revelation as he was *in favour* of that of the gospel. Hilgenfeld (*Einl.*, p. 61) goes too far in claiming that τὰς ἀποστολικὰς διηγήσεις (*H.E.* III., 39, 12) refers specifically to Revelation (*cf.* § 11); but Rev. xx. 3 is probably included in Eusebius' thought, and he may have felt that further acknowledgment was needless. At least he was too candid a scholar to suppress a direct statement of Papias. The very loose expressions of Andreas must be judged in the light of Eusebius' silence.

² See Jülicher, *Einleitung*, edition of 1902, p. 320.

it is only needful to place their expressions side by side. The *argumentum* begins, "The Gospel of John was published and given forth to the churches by John while yet in the body."¹ This is to answer, of course, the objection that it had appeared as a posthumous work; for who ever thought of declaring the work of a given author to have been published "while he was still alive," except in answer to such an opinion? But the opinion is clearly suggested by the appendix, John xxi. 23; and the answer just as clearly rests upon the following verse, probably taken in comparison with the related passage in xix. 35,² where the present "he knoweth" (οἶδεν) takes the place of the "we know" (οἶδαμεν) of xxi. 24. In other words, the question of the relation of the gospel to the Apostle, as a posthumous production or otherwise, was raised and debated, A.D. 175–200, just as it is to-day, with relation on both sides to the appendix. Similarly, the *Muratorianum* insists upon the *direct* Johannine authorship³ by appeal to 1 John i. 1–4. The only other information which the tradition is able to impart is something held in common by the informant of Clement,⁴ by Irenæus, the *Muratorianum*, the prologues and *argumenta*, and all later reporters, viz., that the gospel was written at the close of the Apostle's life in response to the request of his "disciples" (γνώριμοι, Clem.), "fellow-apostles and bishops" (condiscipuli et episcopi, *Mur.*), "bishops of Asia" (*Prologus Toletanus* and Jerome), and that these became jointly responsible with him in various ways (*Muratorianum*, "recognoscentibus omnibus") for the contents.

¹ For the longer form, regarded by Burkitt as the earlier, and as representing the source of Jerome's extract, *De Viris Ill.*, ix, see Burkitt, *op. cit.*, and *Wordsworth and White*, pp. 490, 491. This form has: "Hoc igitur Evangelium post *Apocalypsin* scriptum manifestum et datum est ecclesis in Asia," etc. It should be compared with Corsen's Monarchian prologues.

² Jülicher, *loc. cit.*, suggests i. 14.

³ *Non solum visorem, sed et auditorem, sed et scriptorem . . . [se] profitetur.* Compare John xxi. 24. We shall have occasion hereafter to discuss the argument of Lightfoot, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–190, on the First Epistle as "a commendatory postscript to the gospel."

⁴ Clem. Alex. ap. Eus., *H.E.*, vi. 14.

What have we here but variant interpretations of John xxi. 20–25, and attempts to identify those who in xxi. 24 vouch for the gospel, with or without comparison with Papias? Irenæus identified them with the “elders” of Papias, whom he locates in Asia, as is manifest from the passages quoted by Eusebius from his second and third books.¹ The *Muratorianum* heightens the inspired authority of the writing by making its supplementary authors the apostles (hence in Jerusalem?), and by appending a legend of revelation after fasting.² All forms, so far as as they are not manifestly modified by heretical or orthodox legendary traits and by the passage of Papias (Irenæus), have complete explanation as simple inferences from the appendix. And John xxi. 19–25 not only furnishes a perfectly *adequate* explanation for all that the second century could advance in the way of tradition on the authorship; its very phraseology (verse 20, “the *disciple*—μαθητής—whom Jesus loved, which also leaned back on his breast at the supper,” verse 23, “that disciple *should not die*,” verse 24, “the disciple which *testifieth*—μάρτυρων—these things,” “we know that his *witness* is true”) echoes and reechoes along the whole chain of transmission.

We think it must now be apparent that a failure to distinguish between (1) mere evidence for the *existence* of something identifiable as “Johannine” tradition and doctrine, and (2) evidence connecting the Fourth Gospel in its present form with the son of Zebedee, denotes inability to appreciate the modern attitude toward the external evidence in general.

¹ Euseb., *H.E.*, iii. 23.

² “John, one of the *disciples*, when his fellow-disciples and bishops urged him, said, Fast with me three days, and whatever is revealed to each one, let us relate it to one another. The same night it was revealed to Andrew, one of the *Apostles*, that John should write all in his own name, the rest indorse.” There are here elements of affinity with the heretical argumenta and the orthodox. The dictante Johanne *recte* of the *Argumentum* of Thomasius seems also to be connected with the monarchian declaration that John dictated the entire gospel not “at a sitting” but “*standing erect*.” See also the *Prologus Quattuor Evangeliorum* from Jerome’s *Commentary on Matthew* (Preuschen’s *Analecta*), where the legend is attributed to an *ecclesiastica historia*.

To be abreast of the times in the matter of external evidence to the Johannine writings, one must draw a line at about 170 A.D., and passing backward beyond it, must pursue his inquiry along two divergent lines: (1) What difference is there in the *use* made of material of the Johannine type as we recede? (2) What becomes of the tradition of John as an author?

The continued accumulation of "Johannine" echoes must be expected. Every new find will be greeted with as much delight in one camp as the other; but it adds practically nothing on the question *now* in debate. To-day the argument from silence is an argument from the silence of Eusebius, the silence of Irenæus, the silence of Justin Martyr, the silence of Polycarp and Ignatius, and, as we now venture to add, the silence of Papias. Where there seems to be a disposition to pass over this too easily, as if all these champions of the church had been indifferent to the great problem of *authenticating the records* which agitated *both* church and heretical sects from Papias down, it seems to argue a certain unprogressiveness, a failure to appreciate the changed aspect of the problem since the theory of Baur and Volkmar and the author of *Supernatural Religion* was "exploded."

So also with the argument from utterance. To-day we are not concerned with "testimonies" later than Justin; nor with earlier ones, except with relation to a quite altered problem.

It must, then, be admitted that a sharp line of demarcation is to be drawn at the point where Theophilus of Antioch for the first time distinctly declares this gospel to be the work of "John, one of the vessels of the Spirit," and almost simultaneously Tatian introduces it to a parity with the Synoptics, and Irenæus and Hippolytus and the Muratorian fragment vigorously defend it against the Alogi. These appear to have been orthodox Asiatic opponents of Montanism, conservative in opposition to its excesses, ultra-conservative (in the view of Irenæus and his school) in resisting

the doctrine of a fourfold gospel. In denying the apostolicity of the Johannine writings they did not deny their antiquity, but alleged, perhaps because of the favour the gospel had long enjoyed in the schools of Basilides and Valentinus, that it was the work of Cerinthus, the arch-gnostic.¹ The basis of their argument was its discrepancy with the Synoptics.² But the weak resistance of the Alogi was speedily overcome. As Professor Sanday has put it, "Direct and express ascription to the Apostle begins with Theophilus of Antioch (c. 181 A.D.). . . . From that time it is of course rapidly taken up in a number of the most diverse quarters; it has, perhaps, already had an elaborate commentary written upon it by the Gnostic Heracleon; it has been used by the heathen philosopher Celsus (c. 178); and it has been included in the *Diatessaron* of Tatian [we may now add 'and the Sinaitic Syriac version of about the same date']. We have abundant proof that from the last quarter of the second century the Fourth Gospel is firmly rooted in every branch of the Christian church, with that one exception [of the Alogi]."

This is not put too strongly, nor is it inadvertently that Professor Sanday writes that from the time of direct ascription to the Apostle "*of course*" it was "rapidly taken up." But we have now to pass behind the epoch of rapid dissemination, and put our double question, asking first, however, since the

¹ This allegation has been held up by modern critics as evidence that the Alogi ("senseless") deserved the epithet coined by Epiphanius, whose own house, however, is a genuine crystal palace. In point of fact the evidence is quite the other way. Doubtless they were unpardonably influenced by dogmatic prejudice, but their line of proof was well chosen and consistently carried out; and, while the selection of Cerinthus as forger was doubtless a mere dictate of hatred, recent discovery has now afforded us the proof that the school of Cerinthus *did* engage in the copious manufacture of spurious gospels and Acts of the Apostles, in particular in the production early in the second century, not only of the *Acts of John* above referred to, but of a *Gnostic Gospel of John* as well.

² Cf. the *Muratorianum*, Et ideo licet varia singulis evangeliorum libri principia doceantur, nihil tamen differt credentium fidei. See also Jerome's version of the *Prologus Toletanus* at the end. Quae res et *διαφορίαν* quae videtur Johannis esse cum ceteris tollit.

answer is relatively easy, What becomes of the tradition of John as an author? Unless we greatly mistake the evidence, all that connects him with the Fourth Gospel runs rapidly out in mere legends of the Gnostics. Here appeal is still made to "the disciple whom Jesus loved" *because of his celibacy*, as author of narratives and teachings of the Lord. There is a correspondingly wider use of Johannine gospel material in the schools of Valentinus and Basilides, probably by Basilides himself; though perhaps not without an opposition, of which Corssen thinks he finds traces, anticipating that of the orthodox Alogi. On the orthodox side it is hard to see how the situation differs from what we might expect it to be if not one of the church writers, from Clement of Rome to Justin Martyr, had ever heard of John as an author, except in so far as he is recognised as the *seer* of Revelation. The solitary gleam of light that we can obtain from their *utterance* is the fact that in his list of the Apostles, Papias groups John with Matthew. Lightfoot regarded this as evidence that Papias considered him as in some sense an evangelist. We have only to realise what was the main object of Papias' Expositions of the (principally Matthæan) *logia*, and what writing principally determined his chiliastic views, to reach at once a far more probable explanation. Papias' "expositions" were directed against those whom Lightfoot rightly identifies as the *ἐξηγγήται κακοὶ τῶν καλῶς εἰρημένων*. In the language of his friend and colleague Polycarp, they "perverted the *logia* of the Lord . . . denying that there is either resurrection or judgment." Papias answered them by applying *Revelation* in support of his interpretations of Matthew and Mark. In particular he adduced Rev. xii. 9, probably in explanation of Matt. xii. 25-29. We may also infer with great probability that it is to Papias that Irenæus refers as the interpreter of Rev. xiii. 18 (*Her.*, V. xxx. 1). He certainly took from Papias his doctrine of a physical Paradise, which Papias based on Matt. xiii. 8, 23, interpreted through certain "unwritten traditions," but also, apparently, through Rev. xx. 3. To seek a further reason for his grouping of

Matthew and John is surely superfluous. For the rest, the silence regarding John as an author is simply more marked the nearer we draw to the time and place of origin of the gospel.

(2) But we must also ask, What of the employments of Johannine evangelic material in the years immediately preceding the vehement advocacy of Irenæus? Why is there so sudden and enormous a falling off in the amount, so little importance attached to the minimum that appears, so distant a resemblance to our text? Why does the Fourth Gospel sink at once from the first to the very lowest rank as an authority? Why does Justin Martyr, eager as he is in advocacy of a *Logos* doctrine difficult to distinguish from the Johannine, never appeal to its authority, though in advocacy of his millenarian doctrine he is glad to quote Rev. xx. 3, and to make the most of the tradition that "the revelation was made to a certain man with us whose name was John, *one of the apostles of Christ*"?¹ Why do his quotations from the Synoptic Gospels, which he regards as "memoirs written by Apostles and their followers" (*i.e.* Matthew, Peter, Paul (?), Mark and Luke²), run up into the hundreds and extend over whole paragraphs; while a few lines will contain all that shows even a plausible connection with the Fourth Gospel, even the single brief passage generally made the chief reliance,³ showing so close affinity with 1 Peter i. 3, 23, Matt. xviii. 3, and *Clem. Hom.* xi. 26, and departing so widely from the Johannine form as to lead Bousset and Edwin Abbott to the conclusion that the *logion* at least is taken from an extra-canonical source?⁴

¹ *Dialogue with Trypho*, 81.

² *Dial.* 103 ἄ φημι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκείνους παρακολουθησάντων συντεράχθαι. The quotation here introduced is the interpolation in Luke xxii. 43-44. In 106, where the naming of the sons of Zebedee Boanerges is referred to, the gospel which alone contains the incident is spoken of as "his (*i.e.* Peter's) memoirs." The phrase which Westcott would make to include John cannot fairly be required to include more than the two apostles Matthew and Peter.

³ John iii. 3, 5, in Justin's *Apology*, i. 61.

⁴ See *Enc. Bibl.*, s.v. "Gospels," col. 1833 f.

Answers have indeed been found for these questions. "The gospel had not yet obtained currency." "Justin had no copy with him." "He was prejudiced against it by Gnostic use." "Its esoteric character made it unsuitable for general use."¹ Our own ignorance has been appealed to, and justly. But can it be said that these are *satisfactory* answers? Is there not a startling contrast still to be accounted for between Justin and the generation after in their treatment of this gospel as compared, say, with Matthew? And as regards its claims of apostolicity and those of Revelation? Was Justin ignorant of John xxi. 24, or did he refuse it credence?

And the phenomena which meet us so startlingly in Justin simply increase in cogency as we come nearer to the very spot and date whence the gospel has always been held to emanate. Just *because* Papias and Polycarp betray casually an acquaintance with First John, it is the more surprising that they indicate not a trace of acquaintance with the apostle as an author,² just *because* Ignatius is concerned to refute the same Corinthian type of Docetism antagonised in the First Epistle, and (according to both tradition and internal evidence) in the gospel, just *because* he has recourse to a *Logos* doctrine which is far cruder than the Johannine, and yet resembles it, and *because* his very language has here and there a "Johannine" tinge, and *because* he is writing from the very scene of the Apostle's latest days, it is the more extraordinary that he should pass by the story of the dispelling of Thomas' doubts, John xx. 27, and the scene of post-resurrection eating with the eleven, John xxi. 9-14, and

¹ Prof. Sanday, in the *Expositor*, 1891, even esteemed it altogether the *best* reply that can be made, a reply "sufficient to invalidate Dr Abbott's whole position," to say that "By precisely the same mode of reasoning it might be proved that Justin recognised none, or only one, of St Paul's Epistles, at a time when his opponent, the heretic Marcion, certainly recognised ten of them." But what sort of authority would Paul's epistles have been for Justin in his endeavour to give the heathen a correct idea of the life and teaching of Jesus? And of what use would they have been in persuading a *Jew* that Jesus was the Messiah and taught a *Logos* doctrine similar to Justin's own?

² The possible exception above noted, that Papias, like Justin, may have vouched for the genuineness of *Revelation*, should be remembered.

resort to an apocryphal gospel of unknown origin to prove to the Smyrnæans the reality of the resurrection body against the Docetae.¹

That Hermas,² and the *Διδαχὴ*, and Barnabas, and the Smyrnæans, and Clement of Rome are silent, both as to the Apostle and anything written by him, is scarcely to the point, since nothing was perhaps to be expected. But if any are disposed to find "Johannine" echoes in the eucharistic prayers of *Διδαχὴ*, or elsewhere in these early writings, it simply increases the difficulty of accounting for the two unaccountable things, (1) the general non-employment of the gospel, (2) the apparent universal ignorance of its claims to apostolic authorship.

As the outcome of the changed aspect given to the external evidence by modern phases of the Johannine problem, it appears thus, finally, that Lightfoot was indeed right in declaring both the silence and the utterance of the earliest writers to be eloquent. Only, now that both our knowledge of utterances and our understanding of silences has increased, there is very much to turn the inferences once drawn in almost the opposite direction. Ten years ago Drs Schürer and Sanday were already agreed on the conclusiveness of the external evidence regarding the early existence of the gospel. They were divided in opinion as to whether the balance of this evidence inclined in favour of the Johannine authorship. To-day the agreed point is much more emphatically determined than before; the question is now, What *kind* of existence had the

¹ Ign., *Ad Smyrn.*, iii. 2. See Lightfoot, *Apost. Fathers*, as to the derivation of the quotation.

² The proof of the use of the "sacred quaternion" of the gospels by Hermas, expected by Professor Sanday in 1891 (*Expositor*, iv. 4, p. 419), has by this time, I presume, resolved itself into the simple fact that the four supports of the seat on which Ecclesia sits, which *Irenæus* adopts as an allegorical type of the four gospels, are found in Hermas (*Vis.*, iii. 13). Only, the application is *not* that of *Irenæus*, iii. 11. 8, but simply: "Whereas thou sawest her seated on a couch, the position is a firm one; for the couch has four feet and standeth firmly; for the world too is upheld by means of four elements." If there was more than this, I have failed to hear of it.

Fourth Gospel in the first half of the second century? Did it circulate in its present form, and accompanied by its present "letter of commendation" in the so-called Appendix? Did it circulate, as Lightfoot supposed, with both this and First John besides attached to it as a "commendatory letter"? Or does a use barely sufficient to prove its early existence, even when helped out from Gnostic sources, and by echoes so remote as to suggest something quite unlike our form of the text, accompanied by a silence on the question of authorship, more marked the further we recede from the stalwart claims of Irenæus and the *argumenta* toward the actual time and place of origin,—do these complementary lines of evidence to-day tend to show that the notion of direct apostolic authorship is a later development?

To pronounce judicial decision on such a question would certainly be presumptuous in one whose scholarly equipment cannot be compared with that of either of the great disputants of 1891. But the present writer will have failed in his purpose if he has not shown reasons why the external evidence, so far as known to him, both in the matter of silence and utterance, seems at least as capable of interpretation against as for the Johannine authorship.

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DID PAUL WRITE ROMANS ?¹

A Reply.

PROFESSOR PAUL WILH. SCHMIEDEL

OF ZÜRICH.

BEFORE I undertake, in conformity with the wish of the Editor of the *Hibbert Journal*, to answer the essay published by Professor W. B. Smith of New Orleans in the January issue (pp. 309-334), under the title "Did Paul write Romans?", it may be appropriate to indicate in a few words the point of view from which I propose to do so.

1. Professor Smith names all who defend the genuineness of Romans without distinction "traditionalists." In strict accuracy, only those deserve the name who hold the tradition because it is a tradition, and because they are bound to this tradition by fixed habit, whether or no dogmatic reasons co-operate. If such a scholar were to come forward, Professor Smith would have the right to doubt whether his reasoning were entirely inspired by the earnest wish to test the question objectively and to do full justice to hostile arguments. For my part, I can give the assurance that neither for dogmatic reasons, nor through fixed attachment to my previous conception of the development of early Christianity, am I bound to the view of the genuineness of Romans, or, in general, of the four chief Pauline Epistles. Were the genuineness of those Epistles actually disproved, I should be ready to abandon it, just as many theologians completely changed their view of Old Testament history and literature when, twenty-five years

¹ On the invitation of the Editor, Dr W. C. Van Manen has undertaken to contribute an article, dealing with the foregoing treatment by Professors Smith and Schmiedel respectively, in the July issue of the *Hibbert Journal*.

ago, Wellhausen victoriously established his new theory. In order to concede as much as possible to Professor Smith, I will, consistently from the outset, characterise the view of the genuineness of the chief Paulines as hypothetical, in the same sense as the view of their spuriousness. Tradition shall establish no presumption in favour of genuineness; it shall come forward merely as an argument in the same line with the others, and only with that cogency which intrinsically belongs to it. Thus, I believe, I have placed myself, without reserve, at the point of view which alone renders an understanding probable—the point of view of the historian.

I will endeavour to treat the points under discussion in an order other than that of Professor Smith, whereby the difference of their character will appear as clearly as possible. In addition to his essay mentioned above, I refer to that in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1901, pp. 1–21, and I shall from time to time adduce from Van Manen's articles *Paul* and *Romans* in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*¹ what is of interest for comparison. And now to proceed.

2. To begin with, I must regret that Professor Smith has not, in the fullest sense, taken the standpoint of history. Whenever the historian would offer a fresh view he lies under a primary obligation to lay down a hypothesis fully developed on all sides, and to make known how he conceives the position in every respect. To write on Romans alone would be proper if Professor Smith denied authenticity in regard to that epistle alone. But since, as is plain from various indications in his essay, he holds Corinthians and Galatians also to be unauthentic, I am unable to regard the limitation to Romans as justified. Steck devoted his book in 1888 to Galatians alone; nevertheless he incorporated so much discussion of the other three epistles that his view concerning them was fully disclosed. We learn, for example, the order

¹ This and the following references to Van Manen's article *Romans*, shortly to appear in *Ency. Bib.*, vol. iv., are made with the courteous permission of the author and publishers (Messrs A. & C. Black).

in which he thinks these four epistles arose, and how each time the later used and cited its predecessor or predecessors. Moreover, he names the time at which he places the origin of each epistle; he names the New Testament and extra-canonical writings he finds used in each of them; he names the passages in these epistles in which he perceived other signs of composition in the second century. Indeed, he found it necessary to go yet further. He gave his view on the position which the historical Paul of the first century had taken up, and in general on the course of the development of primitive Christianity, from Judaism to the Antinomianism of Marcion in 140 A.D., and even further on. And in particular, he discussed the claim that this development must have been in a direct line and step by step, in order to show that epistles so distant from the Jewish starting-point of Christianity could not have arisen in the first, and not until the second century.

Now I am well aware that it is not possible to say as much in an essay of twenty-five pages as in a book of four hundred. But Van Manen, in his articles *Paul* and *Romans*, has proved that a far more completely developed hypothesis than that of Professor Smith can be laid down in a narrow space. If the available space was too small for the latter, it merely follows that it was an error to be content with space so small. I cannot withdraw the demand that all the points requiring consideration ought to have been discussed.

But I venture to say that want of room is not alone responsible for the fact that Professor Smith on the questions I have brought forward offers either nothing or only vague indications. The general tone of his language gives me the impression that he feels himself to be not so much an historian as the champion of a cause which he is almost alone in defending, and which he therefore deems to require the more vigorous defence. His attitude has little resemblance to that of a judge who weighs everything impartially, but much to that of an advocate who upholds a side, and declares "I contest whatever the other side asserts, and await its proof." No

expression in his essay recurs more frequently than "we deny," and often without any reason being added. I am far from meaning that Professor Smith takes up this position, as such an advocate may so easily do, in order to provide the opposition with the maximum of difficulties. I fully grasp that the more isolated he feels himself to be, and the more certain he is of being in the right, so much the more easily has he come to this attitude. But it cannot be denied that his way is not the most direct in order to reach a decision resting on objective balancing of all points to be considered.

3. That grave disadvantages attend such an inquiry in consequence of his method will at once be evident when we come to the first of the leading points to be reviewed—that of external testimony. Professor Smith calls it an "absurd admission" "that there is any use whatever made of Romans down to and including the extant writings of Justin" (about 152–155 A.D., *cf.* p. 315). I refrain from summoning Professor Smith's own supporters who admit the use of Romans in Justin, and in writings which he places before Justin, *e.g.* in 1 Peter ("not before 117 A.D."), James ("not earlier than 120"), 1 Clement ("between 96 and 135"; *cf.* p. 314). I also refrain from emphasising the fact that Professor Smith himself recognises, what many of his supporters deny, that Marcion (about 140 A.D.) may have had a form of Romans; for he adds (p. 318), "it differs immensely from our present or Old Catholic form," and "Marcion's contention has the higher probability" that his antagonists—not Marcion—"interpolated and expanded" this document. Rather do I lay stress on this—that the situation becomes entirely different as soon as we take the Epistles to the Corinthians (and Galatians) into the circle of our consideration.

The author of 1 Clement writes to the Corinthians (xlvii. 1–3), "Take up the epistle of the blessed Paul the Apostle. What wrote he first unto you in the beginning of the Gospel? Of a truth he charged you in the spirit concerning himself and Cephas and Apollos, because that even then ye had made

parties." A better quotation one could not wish; the letter is named as a whole, Paul as the author, Corinth as the address, and a portion of the contents is cited. If Professor Smith takes the view that the origin of Romans is out of all connection with that of 1 Cor., then the above does not concern him; but if, like his supporters, he recognises that both epistles, if not from the same author, originate from the same circle, and about the same time, or if he agrees with them even so far that Romans is the older of the two, then his demonstration that Romans is not cited till Justin, nor by Justin, is utterly worthless. It were heartily to be wished that he had given his view on the relation of Romans to 1 Cor. Since he has not done this, it will not cause surprise that I feel under no obligation to test in detail his argument concerning the deficient evidence for the existence of Romans.

At the moment I can only say, as against Loman, Steck, Van Manen and others, what indeed is important enough, that 1 Clement alone is sufficient to exclude the origin of the chief epistles of Paul from the second century. Van Manen, it is true, has no hesitation in dating it (*Old Christian Literature*, section 26, *Encyclopædia Biblica*) "about 140 A.D., especially on account of the author's acquaintance with the Pauline Epistles." But the contents of 1 Clement do not allow Van Manen's date of the Paulines to be taken as a basis. Clement betrays no trace of acquaintance with Gnosticism, and yet than this, which arose under Trajan (98-117 A.D.), nothing could have better suited the author for his theme, for which he offers so many examples (chap. 3 ff.), that the jealousy and envy found among the Corinthians entail the worst consequences. Therefore we are not even in a position to place the epistle, with Professor Smith, somewhere between 96 and 135, but at latest in the beginning of Hadrian's reign (117-138 A.D.), but most probably about 95-97.

Against Professor Smith I add nothing further in reference to the external testimony, because he has a memoir on that subject now ready for the press, with which I must first

become acquainted. One question only I may append: whether he was justified (*Hibbert Journal*, p. 314) in wholly excluding the Epistle to Hebrews from the rank of possible witnesses for the existence of Romans, with the remark "of Hebrews the date is quite uncertain." Yet so much may be said with certainty—that Hebrews is older than 1 Clement and James. Only the Tübingen Catholic Professor Mack, 1836 and 1838, has, so far as I know, turned the relation of Hebrews to 1 Clement the other way. Dependence of James on Hebrews will always be denied by those apologists who put James earlier than the work of Paul, but hardly by a scholar like Professor Smith, for whom James falls "not earlier than 120 A.D."

4. We now proceed to another leading point. In the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1901, 1–21, Professor Smith has already maintained the assertion that the words "in Rome" and "that are in Rome" (ἐν Ῥώμῃ and τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ), i. 7 and 15 respectively, *i.e.* in all places where the local name is mentioned, were originally wanting, and that consequently our document was made into one addressed to Rome only at a later date. In the first passage the name is wanting in Codex G (ninth century), in its Latin translation (g), and in Ambrosiaster (about 370 A.D.), and stands identically in all three witnesses "to all that are in love (instead of 'beloved'—ἐν ἀγάπῃ instead of ἀγαπητοῖς) of God." Further, as we may reasonably infer, the local name seems to be wanting in one passage of Origen (about 240 A.D.), but without the second modification of the text mentioned above. This last alone, without the former, is found in the Latin text in D (the Greek is wanting here), and in the Vulgate codices Amiatinus and Fuldensis. In i. 15 the local name is wanting not in G and g alone, as Professor Smith with all other writers wrongly declares, but also in the Bible Text of Origen (ed. de la Rue, iv. 468 b, D; in the commentary Origen does not touch the matter).

With Professor Smith I reject every attempt, even that of Hort, to explain this omission of "Rome" as an accident. I also reject the explanation that it was designed with reference

to the opinion current already in the second century that the contents of epistles addressed to separate communities were intended for the whole church, for in no other epistle has this opinion led to the striking out of the address. Further, I fully recognise that Professor Smith has endeavoured, in a way to which no objection can be made, to derive the form of i. 7, now commonly accepted, from what he thinks to be the original form as G, etc. present it: after the interpolation of "in Rome (ἐν Ῥώμῃ)," he says, "in love of God (ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ)" must have been changed to "beloved of God (ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ)." But I must assert that the case can just as well be put the other way. Harnack, in the *Zeitschr. für neutest. Wissensch.*, 1902, 83-86, has made good against Professor Smith that Paul himself could easily omit "in Rome," i. 7, because already (verse 6) he had addressed his readers ("among whom are ye also") in a superscription of unusual length before he came, in accordance with the plan of such a superscription, to characterise them by the name of their place of abode. Also, says Harnack, the local name is unnecessary in i. 15. This explanation Professor Smith will not allow to pass, because he does not regard this long superscription as genuine. We also can dispense with it, and accept another which Harnack suggests without adopting.

The place-name may very well have been struck out deliberately by a public reader who wished the text to seem directly addressed to the hearers, so as to increase the edifying effect in the assembled community. Many preachers of today change to some extent the form of words which they find in their church reading-books when this is not entirely to their liking, and not a few of them note these changes in their copy, so as to avoid the risk of reading otherwise than they wish. When the like occurred in ancient times, such a change had a much less serious meaning, it is obvious, than that involved in the former supposition, namely, that all New Testament epistles were destined by the intention of the writers themselves for Christendom as a whole. Hence the fact I myself

have emphasised above, that, in spite of this view, the place-name has been dropped in none of the other epistles, does not tell against our last named hypothesis. We cannot say in how many epistles it was struck out from one copy or another. Such deletions are not revealed to us only because most copyists knew that they were made merely for the public reading, not for the written text. Perhaps, too, there existed a sign similar to our parenthesis, which did not indicate an actual deletion. On the other hand, it is possible also that this deletion or parenthesis was applied only to Romans. In any case we need search for no profound reasons if it is only from Romans that we have become acquainted with copies of reading-books changed in this manner. However, we must refrain, on account of space, from the more detailed development of this hypothesis.

5. We must next consider the consequences which Professor Smith deduces from his supposition that the name "Rome" was only added later. He says, p. 310: "It is hard to think of Paul as aiming at the air, as talking to 'all the beloved of God, elect saints.'" I should not find this unthinkable. If Paul believed that he could accomplish for the spread of the gospel, through such a "catholic" epistle, that which he was unable to do by personal activity, I do not doubt that he would have taken this course. However, we have no occasion to pursue this bare supposition any further, for it is ruled out immediately by the fact that the author thinks only of readers in a definite place when in verses 9-15 he says that he has often wished to visit them, and now has in mind to do so soon. Professor Smith does not raise the objection based on these verses, presumably only because he regards them as unauthentic.

6. Hence, I think, I shall meet the intention of Professor Smith if I here deal at once with his view that Romans is no letter at all, but "only a theological tractate, 'restamped' into an epistle of Paul." "Such artificiality we should attribute, far more naturally" than to "the restless missionary," "to some one not primarily preacher, but rather student and

litterateur" (pp. 312, 310). Van Manen, too, denies the letter to Paul, on account of "the conspicuously methodical way" which the author follows (*Romans*, section 5).

Certainly it is not probable that the author, as orthodoxy believes, intended to write a compendium of Christian dogma. But *Romans* is far from being anything of the kind. Concerning Christology, the Church and Eschatology, it contains extremely little, concerning the Last Supper nothing. In i. 18—xi. 36 it deals exclusively with questions of which the discussion was necessary to a Jewish-Christian standpoint. That the writer does this in a certain order, and does not mix everything indiscriminately, can hardly decide against Pauline authorship. Besides, a well-ordered comprehensive process of thought is, in my opinion, only too frequently lacking. But scholars like Professor Smith and Van Manen rest their assertion of the spuriousness of the epistle upon so frequent complaints about its want of connection, that it is truly hard to say where the "artificiality" and the "methodical way" are to be found. I can pay earnest attention, as will be shown further on, to every discovery of deficient connection or argument in a concrete instance, but I can attach no striking significance to general and vague complaints as to the "artificiality" of *Romans*, which, into the bargain, ascribe to the epistle a quality by no means unattainable by Paul.

Nor do I attach much importance to the thought that the Epistle to *Romans* must have been too hard for the Romans to understand. The problems treated by it are quite familiar, even inevitable, to Jewish-Christian thought. If the mode of treatment is hard to understand, that is a mistake on the part of the author. But the mistake does not prove that Paul cannot be the author; it proves only either that the author was not capable of expounding his case more clearly—an incapacity to which Paul's rabbinical training might contribute—or that he did not pay sufficient regard to the need of writing with perfect lucidity.

The length of the address, i. 1-7, and its wealth of theo-

logical conceptions, which one hardly expects to find there, is certainly surprising. But it does not seem to me just when Professor Smith (*J.B.L.*, p. 20 f.; Van Manen in exactly similar manner, *Romans*, section 7) calls the address "a sheer impossibility," because nearly all ancient letters began on the pattern "Caius to Balbus; Greeting." The epistle addressed to a community ought not to be judged by the standard of a private letter. It is intended for public reading in the congregation, and takes the place of the writer's oral allocution. Besides, it is entirely conceivable in the case of Paul that he took the opportunity to at once fully characterise his own person and position in the address, and that in doing so he found himself involuntarily carried on from idea to idea, and from thought to thought.

Upon the announcement of his visit to Rome on the occasion of the journey to Spain, and other signs of epistolary character (chaps. xv. f.), I do not enter, in view of limited space. These points are not necessary for my purpose. The Tübingen school already regarded both chapters as spurious; but they did not employ this view like Professor Smith, who treats fully of the matter (*J.B.L.*, 1901, 129-157, and 1902, 117-169), as an argument against the rest of our document being a letter of Paul's.

I bestow a glance, on the other hand, on i. 8-15. Professor Smith rejects these verses (*J.B.L.*, 1901, 15-19), among other reasons, because in their "heaped-up intensives" he finds no reality, but only "the exaggeration of fiction." ("How unceasingly I make mention of you, always in my prayers making request if by any means now at length I may be prospered by the will of God to come unto you.") This is a judgment on which grave difference of opinion may be allowed. We readily grant that the same matter might be more simply expressed. But that a missionary, on fire for his task, who regarded his encounter with the world's Capital as one of the most important crises in his activity, should not have written in this manner, is an assertion I would not be responsible for making.

7. We come upon quite different ground when Professor Smith continues that Acts "positively forbids us to attribute to the Apostle the temper and the designs of this passage," in so far, namely, that in Acts (excepting xix. 21) Paul's urgent wish to visit Rome is not apparent. What intimate acquaintance on the part of the author of Acts, not only with the facts of Paul's life, but also with his thoughts and wishes, and—this is almost more wonderful—what accuracy in reporting not only the facts but the thoughts and wishes, does Professor Smith here assume in a book which according to Van Manen was written 130–150, and according to Professor Smith (who gives no definite date) has "dealt very freely with its original sources" (*J.B.L.*, p. 14), and "is far from clear, is very turbid" (*H.J.*, 318)!

Again and again Professor Smith returns to the assertion that Acts "nowhere and in no measure does reflect Romans" (p. 318). In the "we-sections" this is quite intelligible, even if Romans is genuine, for from them we learn in Acts scarcely anything but external incidents of travel. In the other parts of Acts it is equally intelligible, since the author had no sympathy with the theological content of Romans. When we see how he puts into the mouth of Peter and Paul almost the same thoughts, and even the same order of thought (x. 43 = xiii. 38 f. ; iii. 13 f. 17 = xiii. 27 f. ; ii. 25–31 = xiii. 35–37, etc.), it becomes clear, on the one hand, that he composes such speeches with the greatest freedom (from material, naturally, with which he was himself in sympathy), and on the other, that if he knew Romans, he would not have been moved to derive from that source the substance of such speeches. When we see how he always conceives Peter and Paul in perfect harmony, it becomes clear that he would, of necessity, exclude from his picture signs of enmity between them, if he had found such signs in the chief epistles of Paul. That the purpose of Acts is not strictly historical but edifying Professor Smith will not deny, and that the book treats its sources very freely he has already admitted in the words quoted above.

Hence there is no difficulty in explaining why, in the author of Acts, we encounter nothing concerning those many signs of enmity between Paul and the Jewish-Christian tendencies found in Corinthians and Galatians—a circumstance which Professor Smith finds inconsistent with the genuineness of the latter (p. 320). In answer to his explanation, put forth without further reason—"Show us therein (*i.e.* in Acts) the historical situation of Galatians. Is it not notorious that this Galatia is geographically impossible?"—I must content myself with pointing to my article *Galatia* in *Ency. Bib.*

To sum up, I can only say,—from the silence of Acts in regard to many features of the chief epistles the hypothesis of their authenticity cannot be overthrown. I beg the reader to note that, according to my original promise, I speak only of the *hypothesis*.

But this hypothesis is supported positively by the fact that Acts shows traces of acquaintance with these letters. Single echoes of Pauline theology are by no means entirely wanting. That "everyone that believeth is justified" (πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων δικαιούται, xiii. 39) we know only from the Pauline Epistles. Professor Smith may also allow me to adduce the third Gospel (viii. 12, xviii. 8, 14). Perhaps he will say that Justification by Faith was familiar to the Jews before the time of Christ; but see below, 10, end. Moreover, I would ask, how could the charge arise in Jerusalem against Paul that he "teaches all the Jews which are among the Gentiles to forsake Moses, telling them not to circumcise their children, neither to walk after the customs" (xxi. 21; *cf.* xxiv. 5), if Paul did not so teach, as we learn he did from Romans x. 4; Galatians iv. 9, 10, vi. 15? Or does Professor Smith regard Paul's coming to Jerusalem (xxiv. 17) "to bring alms to my nation," *i.e.* both to Christians and non-Christians, to be either history or free invention? Can he, who has so sharp an eye for the improbability of a story, fail to perceive that here, as well as in the case of Simon Magus and Barjesus (viii. 9-24 and xiii. 6-12), there is something

at the bottom of these stories which the mode of presentation has moved into another light? However, I must here be content to refer to my articles *Simon Magus* and *Barjesus* in *Ency. Bib.*

8. But the far-reaching confidence which Professor Smith displays towards the narratives of Acts has a yet deeper basis. Nowhere does he mention this explicitly, but two sentences of his show that it dominates him, (p. 320 f.), "the account in Acts xv. is not unnatural, not improbable," and, "we deny that . . . any sharp separation of Jew and Christian was possible until the fall of Jerusalem, or actual until about the time of Barcochab" (about 135 A.D.). This is the theory of the rectilinear development of Christianity out of Judaism into freedom from the Law and Antinomianism, which I have already touched upon above (sect. 2). Van Manen defends it at length (*Paul*, sect. 40, *Romans*, sect. 16). He rightly dismisses the view that, assuming the genuineness of the chief epistles, a Jewish-Christian period may, despite Galatians i. 15 f., be attributed to Paul, from which period he afterwards passed on to freedom from the Law. But the more I agree with him in this, the more decisively must I dispute his proposition that "a man does not become at one and the same moment the adherent of a new religion and its great reformer."

Let us put the case that a Pharisee was turning to Christianity on the ground that he was conscious of being unable to perfectly fulfil the will of God by means of the strictest observance of the Law, and therefore, according to the principles of Galatians iii. 10 b and James ii. 10, of having, like all men, incurred eternal perdition. All the conditions are then present that he should come to receive the new religion he was accepting in a quite different sense from that of its former followers. He would never have been converted to Christianity if it had laid the yoke of the Law upon him afresh; he could expect salvation from the new religion only in the event of its being bestowed upon him by grace without works.

If he paid little attention to first principles, he could, like

previous Jewish-Christians, continue to observe the Law, but without basing thereon his hope of eternal salvation. But if we further admit that he was a man whose thought was active in drawing inferences, then the teleological view of things which dominated all Judaism would oblige him to come to this conclusion—if the attempt to gain salvation by observance of the whole Law is practically futile, then that attempt cannot be really required by God; and—if God has put His own Son to death to make the salvation of men possible, then His will must be that all shall avail themselves of this way, and that none shall hereafter walk in the way of legal observance.

And finally, if we admit that this man had never seen Jesus during his earthly life, but had had a vision of the risen Christ, and knew in addition that Jesus had lived upon earth in general obedience to the Law, then the last point is made clear that needs explanation, namely, that this man paid little heed to the living Jesus (the death on the Cross excepted), and formed his conception of the Master whom he worshipped from the Heavenly Form revealed to him, and concluded, from the present existence in heaven of Jesus, that he must have had a life in heaven prior to his life on earth.

It remains only to consider whether our four premises are admissible. That such a man could become a Christian without having seen Jesus on earth is obvious. The possibility of a vision Professor Smith will not contest; everyone must be left to determine for himself whether the vision is to be regarded as objective or subjective. That the apostate Pharisee, now turned Christian, applied with full vigour and consistency a logic thoroughly Jewish in nature, will hardly be deemed impossible. Now it is certain that the entire transformation which Paul, according to the epistles, has wrought upon Christianity, is explained by this consistency of his thought, when once he had perceived that it is impossible for man, in spite of all his care and painstaking, to observe the Law as required by God.

The central question is, then, this: Could a Pharisee attain

to this insight at a time when as yet he perceived in Christianity nothing of freedom from Law? Certainly not—if all Pharisees were necessarily of the type represented in the parable in Luke xviii. 9–12. And Professor Smith says of Paul (p. 327), “as a zealot he ‘lived in all good conscience,’ ‘blameless according to the righteousness that is in law.’ The mental struggle here (*i.e.* Rom. vii. 7–24) depicted he never knew.” But to assert that the Pharisees were of this type without exception, would be like laying down the proposition that every man under the influence of the church at the beginning of the sixteenth century was able to successfully silence his consciousness of sin by observing the church’s imposition of penance. But this would mean nothing less than denying the possibility of Luther’s advent. In a word, the demand for rectilinear development cancels the possibility of our understanding the great revolutionary personalities of history—quite irrespective of the fact that it has no psychological basis.

True, this does not yet prove that Paul was such a personality. Professor Smith rightly calls it “a circle” (p. 319) when we argue, “Paul was so-and-so because he wrote such and such epistles; and conversely: Paul wrote such and such epistles because he was so-and-so.” However, a circle is only mischievous when we take it for an actual proof. But I am only speaking of the *hypothesis* of the authenticity of the chief Paulines; and every hypothesis is a circle, and every man who works with a hypothesis knows it is only a circle. It is Professor Smith who neglects scientific caution in his already quoted words: “we deny that any sharp separation of Jew and Christian *was possible* until the fall of Jerusalem.” This “impossible” I challenge as standing in contradiction with psychology and with history outside the New Testament. So far as Paul is concerned, I endeavour only, in a frame of mind as purely objective as possible, to weigh the question which hypothesis is best fitted to explain the given facts—Professor Smith’s or mine.

9. While all his former arguments cause me little disquietude, what follows seems much more fitted to do so. The strength of Professor Smith's position lies in his analysis of the text, and in his assertion that this shows so little connection and order that the whole of Romans must be compiled or conflated from fragments of very various origin.

Coming, then, to the specific arguments, I am wholly unable to test them all, since his essay in some places contains as many assertions as lines. I will try by the few examples to which I must be limited to illustrate different sides of Professor Smith's method.

"The sharp antithesis of the Just and the Good (v. 7) appears Marcionitic" (p. 332). It is Naber, a man of Professor Smith's own way of thinking, who has seen that this verse consists of two glosses combined together (*Mnemosyne*, 1881, p. 287 f.; *Verisimilia*, p. 278), and is wanting in Irenæus (iii. 17, § 9) in the midst of the word for word quotation of Rom. v. 6-10. In order to exhibit the greatness of the thought, verse 6, that Christ died for the ungodly, this marginal note was first made, "For scarcely for a righteous man will one die" (it might even be a parenthesis of the author himself, if it be not unlike Paul, even to put the case that to die for a righteous man might be shown to be necessary). Then, in order further to limit this observation, another writer has added, "peradventure for the good man some one would even dare to die." If this is correct, this verse ought not to be used as an indication of the time at which the whole epistle was composed.

Hence I lay down the proposition, that it is not a just rule to use in this manner any verse or fragment which is explained with some probability by defenders of the authenticity of the whole epistle as having been subsequently added. This rule is not acknowledged by the champions of the other side. Van Manen, for example, says expressly (*Romans*, section 13): "The conclusion of the canonical epistle, xv. 14-xvi. 27, must be accepted as such, notwithstanding the objec-

tions urged by Semler . . . in rejecting chaps. xv. f. as not original constituents of the writing sent by Paul to the Romans." He then continues, "it nevertheless (!) shows many evidences of compilation by the aid of various pieces."

Professor Smith says (p. 326), "a seam gapes at c. v. 6. The text is wholly uncertain, not one of the half-dozen forms yield sense; this commissure the text framers found it impossible to disguise." Elsewhere, also, he follows the principle of concluding from the presence of variants that unrelated elements have been combined. But this is by no means permissible unless independent and absolutely convincing reasons are forthcoming. A simple slip of the pen may occasion a whole multitude of variants. In the case before us they are very simply explained if *εἰ γάρ* were the original beginning of the verse, "for if Christ, while we were yet weak, in due season died for the ungodly." Now comes an interruption. The thought which should properly form the conclusion of v. 6 follows afterwards in v. 9; "much more, being now justified by his blood, shall we be saved from the wrath of God through him." On account of the interruption, the conclusion is now introduced by "then" (*οὐδὲν*), so that the conclusion of verse 6 is entirely wanting. This were reason enough to change the "if" (*εἰ*) at the beginning into another word, and some do this in one way, some in another.

On iii. 31 ("do we then make the law of none effect through faith? God forbid; nay, we establish the law") says Professor Smith (p. 326), "where is the proof? It is never even remotely hinted. Immediately we are whirled leagues away into a discussion of Abraham's justification and circumcision." Plainly, then, he does not acknowledge, what is almost universally acknowledged by others, that here Paul unconsciously changes the conception of law. By introducing the example of Abraham he shows that the book of the law contains the doctrine of Justification by Faith, and through the latter, therefore, is not made of none effect. This proof rests, objectively regarded, on a fallacy; for the law, of which the validity is threatened by

the doctrine of Justification, is that part of the book of the law which demands the observance of all commands, not that which relates anything about Abraham. But this error of thought would be easily concealed from a mind with the rabbinical training of Paul's. Such offences against strict logic, nay, contradictions even, are found frequently in the chief epistles. Perhaps previous exegesis has been too little concerned about many of them. But whoever makes the sweeping assertion that they are collectively impossible to Paul overrates the accuracy of his thought, and runs a risk of doing him the greatest injustice and denying him his proper place in history.

It is of no avail to employ the general idea of a "rational being," and to lay down the standard: "Paul was rational and the Romans were rational." Rather should we try with intelligent psychology to fathom the nature of the contradictory religious ideas which, working in a man who at the time of his conversion from one religion to another was exposed to the most varied influences, made so deep an impression upon him that he could not dispense with either set of ideas, but harboured both in unstable equilibrium. Equally must we try to comprehend the position of such a man when, perhaps in the midst of his handicraft, he dictated on difficult matters in which his thoughts pressed one upon another, in order to judge truly to what a degree he would be likely to fail in good connection and orderly progress of thought. I cannot refrain from confessing that I should be loth to submit my own letters to so severe a censor as Professor Smith. I should be sadly afraid he would often find that heterogeneous elements had been laboriously combined in them by an editor.

10. The whole of chapter iv. except verses 24 b, 25 Professor Smith explains as a Jewish fragment, as well as i. 18-32; ii. 1-16, 17-29; iii. 1-4, 5-8; v. 12-21; vii. 7-25; viii. 1 ff. (at least as far as verse 27; Professor Smith gives the end indistinctly) and others. The view is not thereby excluded, however, that some such fragment is not itself a united whole; besides,

he discovers in them short Christian interpolations. I mention in passing that he can regard vii. 7-25 as Jewish only for the reason that he views verse 25a as an insertion (p. 327), though verse 25b has long ago been recognised as such.

The important point is the danger to which this search for Jewish fragments (Professor Smith has it in common with Pierson and Naber) is liable. On the one hand, it entices us into denying connection which really exists, although somewhat loosely, and into regarding such passages in isolation. Thus, to quote but one example, ii. 17-29 is "apparently a defence of secret converts, devout Gentiles, who yet hesitated to profess Judaism openly and receive the seal of circumcision. It is not 'the Jew in the open,' but 'the Jew in secret,' that counts and receives praise, not of men but of God" (p. 323). We see that Professor Smith's interpretation is prompted by verse 28 f. But how could these converts manage to make such violent charges against the Jews, whose religion they would embrace, as we find in verses 17-27? This can happen only from the Christian standpoint.

And further, the search for Jewish fragments leads us to attribute ideas to Judaism which, according to the theory of rectilinear development, even primitive Christianity could not yet have had. Thus, according to p. 328, c. viii., the doctrine of the spirit (*πνεῦμα*), that is to say, one of the passages in which the Pauline Epistles depart furthest from the Christianity of the first apostles, is "the lucubration of a 'Pneumatic,'" namely, of a Jewish one. Also with reference to c. iv. it is said (p. 320): "The controversies about Faith and Works and the Justification of Abraham were centuries old." Spitta, in spite of his extensive reading and his interest in proving James to be a Jewish writing, has not been able to produce the first faint traces of the question whether Justification rests on Works or Faith earlier than from the (Syrian) Apocalypse of Baruch, and from the iv. Book of Ezra, *i.e.* between 71 and 96 A.D. (*Zur Gesch. und Lit. des Urchristenthums*, ii., 1896, pp. 72-75, 206-209); and Bousset also (*Religion des Judenthums*

im neuest. Zeitalter, 1903, pp. 175-179) gets no further. Discourses on Faith by itself or allusions to Justification by Works may be pointed out earlier, but in no sense do they suffice to prove the assertion of Professor Smith.

11. One more question I may perhaps touch: With what purpose did Romans originate in the second century? The answer is simpler for Professor Smith than for Steck, for example. While the latter regards large portions of the epistle, though not the whole, as a unit, the former holds it to be a mere mosaic made of little stones of various origin. Perhaps he means that they were put together because they already existed, without anybody being entitled to inquire with what purpose each fragment was incorporated. We find in his essay only one remark bearing upon the origin of Romans, p. 321: "The struggle between Pauline and Jewish Christianity," which the letters of Ignatius attest. But at what period does he place these? According to p. 314, "at least after 115 A.D." But am I to believe that one who contests the authenticity of the chief epistles of Paul regards that of the Ignatians as possible? Does he put the date, with the critical school, at 170-180? He does not touch upon the mention of a Jewish-Christian direction in Justin (*Dial.* 47, about 155 A.D.). Does he place Romans later? Here I must again lament that he has not declared himself on so many vital questions. If we were quite certain that he thinks Corinthians arose under about the same conditions as Romans, we should have still more to ask: How came it to pass that anybody in the second century gave detailed directions in regard to "speaking by tongues" while even the author of Acts had never heard of it; otherwise he would not, as he does in ii. 1-13, have been able to believe that it consisted in speaking the languages of foreign peoples? How came it to pass in the second century that anybody put in the mouth of Paul a hope that he would live to see the second coming of Christ (1 Cor. xv. 51 f.)? Etc., etc.

12. But we must break off. Not only in regard to this

last point, but also in regard to those mentioned earlier, I must leave much important matter untouched, especially one whole leading point which cannot be briefly treated, the question, namely, whether to regard the Roman community as Jewish-Christian, or Gentile-Christian, or as mixed; or whether, as Professor Smith thinks, Romans permits us to form no opinion on the subject? On the one hand, therefore, I must beg that my attitude towards the assertions of Professor Smith be not judged on the principle, *qui tacet consentit*. On the other, I must beg as urgently that it may not be supposed that I regard the subject as exhausted in these few observations. I know very well that much earnest and difficult work is necessary in order to clear up the question—even if that question were only this, how men of such learning and acuteness could come to a view which seems to me so erroneous, and where the relative truth lies, which is doubtless to be found on their side? I have been able to deal with the subject only so far as to exhibit certain principles, observance of which is, in my opinion, important for its further treatment, while their neglect must place serious obstacles in the way of a mutual understanding.

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ZÜRICH.

AUGUSTE SABATIER AND THE PARIS SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY.

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IT may not be generally known how large and varied were the services which Sabatier rendered to his time. To the world at large he was known only as an academic teacher and writer on philosophical and theological themes. I, at least, had no conception of the breadth of his career and influence until, after his death, I read the story of his life-work in the journals of Paris. Not only was he one of the most influential men in the councils of his University, and in the work of higher education generally, but he had made himself powerfully felt as a literary critic and as a writer on public and political questions. As a regular editorial contributor to *Le Temps*, perhaps the leading daily journal of Paris, he had long exercised an unrecognised but potent influence on behalf of high standards and good morals in art, literature and life.

This versatile spirit in Sabatier, issuing in its multiform activities, supplies the key to his work as a theologian. For him the study of theology was no cloistered pursuit, but a work of wide and living human interest. He aimed to conceive and expound its truths in such a way as to touch and inspire, not merely the minds of a few special students, but the mind and heart of his age. He felt that he had a message for France with her mingled unbelief and superstition, and he

longed to reach the people with his evangel of faith and freedom. He deeply felt what Harnack expresses in the preface to his lectures on the Essence of Christianity: "This I know: the theologians of every country only half discharge their duties if they think it enough to treat of the Gospel in the recondite language of learning and bury it in scholarly folios."

Sabatier's theological writings are at once personal confessions of faith and defences of religion as he conceived it. "I wished," he says, "to tell the men of my time, and to make them understand, why I, for my part, remain religious, Christian and Protestant." This he has done in his *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion* with a clearness and felicity of style, a brilliancy of presentation, and a breadth of thought and sympathy which entitle this work to rank among the products of religious genius. It is the ripe fruit of a long life devoted to studies to which "nothing human was alien," and the product, no less, of a sincere and earnest spirit, and of a profound religious experience.

Like Ritschl in Germany, Sabatier became the founder of a school of thought in France. In the formation and development of this so-called "Paris school," Sabatier's friend and colleague, Ménégoz, has also borne an important part. Though Sabatier represented the Reformed Dogmatic, and Ménégoz the Lutheran, the two men worked in the closest harmony and sympathy. Together they stand sponsors for that new Protestantism, or, as I would call it, French Ritschlianism, which has received the rather cumbrous and enigmatical name of *Symbolo-fideism*. We shall now consider in order—

1. The Origin and Import of this name.
2. Sabatier's theory of Theological Knowledge.
3. His view of the Origin and Nature of Religion.
4. His attitude towards Theological Dogma.

It may be said, in general, that the first half of this compound term expresses a characteristic note of Sabatier's thought, while the second emphasises the great contention of

Ménégoz. We may speak, as Lasch does, of the Symbolism of Sabatier and of the Fideism of Ménégoz. For Sabatier, "Symbolism" denotes the formal inadequacy of all our religious conceptions, and the figurative character of all the terms in which we express them. In Sabatier's own words: "All the ideas which the religious consciousness forms and organically combines, from the first metaphor which religious feeling begets, to the most abstract concept of theological speculation, are unavoidably inadequate to their object, and can never avail for its completely equivalent expression, as is the case in the exact sciences." The "Fideism" of Ménégoz is expressed in the formula: "We are saved by faith, independently of beliefs." The meaning is that faith is not an opinion or a set of opinions, but an act of trust, or self-surrender to Christ. In these two principles,—the symbolic, pictorial character of all the concepts and terms of religion, and the distinction just mentioned between faith and belief,—we have the germs of Symbolo-fideism.

The name appears to have been given to the school by an anonymous writer in 1894. Sabatier had already characterised his theory of religious knowledge as "critical symbolism," and the term seemed less objectionable than "new school," "consciousness theology," and "Paris theology," which were in occasional use. Despite the fact that the term was characterised as "inelegant" and "wooden," and even "horrid" and "barbarous," Sabatier and Ménégoz adopted the name as well expressing their common fundamental principles. If it was cumbrous, it was also expressive, was free from the misconceptions and disturbing associations which soon grow up around party-names in theology, and, more important than all, represented very well the characteristic ideas of the school.

It will thus be observed that neither part of the designation has reference to novel or peculiar views of Christian doctrine such as the terms might suggest. "Symbolism" does not refer to the symbols or creeds of Christendom, but to the symbolic, that is, pictorial and figurative, character of all

theological terms and definitions. Nor does "Fideism" denote what the term might suggest, a believing or submissive attitude towards Christian doctrines, in contrast to rational inquiry or speculative thought. It is a name for the doctrine of justification by faith, religiously interpreted, and cleared of those associations by which the dogmatic conception of Christianity has surrounded it. The difference, then, between the two terms is this: "Symbolism" expresses the formal principle of theology—the basis and bounds of religious knowledge—the nature and limits of revelation. "Fideism" denotes the material principle—the nature and conditions of salvation through Christ. The two conceptions thus supplement each other, though Symbolism deals more with history, Fideism more with psychology; Symbolism is concerned more with the philosophy of religion, Fideism more with religious life and experience. The representatives of both ideas assert the inadequacy of mere speculative judgments in theology, make use of historical, critical and philosophical methods, and assert that obedience and communion with God are the indispensable conditions of a truly religious knowledge of Him.

We are thus brought to the consideration of Sabatier's theory of knowledge. He rejected as untenable the theory of a primitive revelation, holding that it was not only destitute of proof, but inherently unpsychological, and baneful in its effects on account of the support which has been derived from it for tradition and dogma. The theory of Plato he regarded as too *a priori* and remote from experience. The Hegelian speculation he considered to be a play of logical concepts, empty of content, and unable to reach and interpret reality. The sensation theory of Locke and Hume, which sought to derive all our ideas from sense-impressions, he regarded as utterly inadequate, and as leading only to philosophical scepticism.

Sabatier's philosophy of religion is kindred to that of Kant. With Kant he held that there are two elements which necessarily enter into the structure of all knowledge, an *a priori* and

an *a posteriori* element. The former is determined by the very nature of thought; the latter arises from experience. The *a priori* factor prescribes the form, while experience supplies the matter of knowledge. Experience thus marks the bounds of the subject-matter of knowledge.

Of Kant's conception of the *Ding an sich* Sabatier makes no use. He declares that it is an *Unding*. Pure being is pure nothing. That which has no content for thought has no existence for thought. The term is useless and needless. For Kant himself it did not denote, as many seem to think, a concrete somewhat lying behind phenomena. It was a *Grenzbegriff*—a sign to warn us of the limits of thought and knowledge. It can serve no useful purpose, and has long been a bugbear in philosophy. It encourages contradiction and confusion—like the unknowable Power of Spencer, of whose existence, nevertheless, we are, of all things, most certain, or Mansel's negative knowledge of the Infinite, which is really the negation of knowledge, that is, no knowledge—or else is not negative.

Like Ritschl, Sabatier asserts the independent rights of religion and theology as distinct from metaphysics. He goes so far as to maintain that metaphysical theories of the universe, speculations upon the world-problem, are properly dependent upon religion and morality, although there have been systems which would in no way recognise this dependence. I suppose his meaning is, that the final tests of philosophical truth must be ethical—that no rational interpretation of the world is possible which does not proceed upon the assumption of the sanity and trustworthiness of the universe, and apply, in all efforts to determine its meaning, the tests of worth or value. This conviction that cosmic faith rests on moral faith, one is continually meeting in the philosophical writings of the day. As it is a point of capital importance, and quite germane to our present subject, I will present a few examples of the ways in which I have found it presented.

“Originative cause,” says Professor Campbell Fraser, in his

Philosophy of Theism, "is reached through conscience, and in a finally ethical conception of the universe we have a deeper hold of reality than when it is treated only as a scientifically interpretable system of sense-sequences" (page 151). "Human experience of real existence," he says in another place, "is, at last, moral faith, or optimist trust. All fruitful reasoning presupposes reason, that is, final rational trust in the reasonable; and nothing can be reasonably accepted that is inconsistent with the faith that we are living in a universe in which active Moral Reason is supreme" (p. 162).

In a similar strain Lotze speaks of "our longing to find in that which has supreme reality, supreme worth also," and says that it would be intolerable for us to suppose that our best and highest ideals have no correspondence to reality.

Professor Bowne, in his *Metaphysics*, has stated the point with his accustomed clearness and vigour. He says: "One general assumption is necessary to save the mind from pessimism. We must assume that the end of the system is such as to justify the system, and this compels us to put the end in the ethical realm. If ever a sufficient interpretation of the system is found, the basal principle of the system will prove to be an ethical one. No analysis of our metaphysical notions will ever reveal why the system is as it is. Such insight is even formally possible only as we rise above the plane of ontology and formal thought, and come to the conception of purpose. And in determining which of many purposes shall be adopted, we must rise to the conception of the fitting and the perfect. But this again can be determined only by appeal to our æsthetic and moral insight. If what *is* shall ever be understood, it will be only from the side of what *ought to be*" (p. 530). Again he says: "The grounds of objective certainty in our knowledge of the finite lie neither in psychology alone, nor in metaphysics alone, but also, and chiefly, in our moral convictions concerning what ought to be. There is nothing deeper in mind than these; and if they fail, then logic can only declare that there is no longer any warrant for regarding our world-vision,

with all that it contains, as more than our private dreams” (p. 533).¹

The meaning of all these statements is, that in any elaborate philosophical endeavour man is obliged to consult his moral nature, and to believe regarding the meaning and end of the world what that nature presupposes and demands. What is this but a faith which may fairly be called moral—an undemonstrable trust in our faculties and in the law and order of the world as not deceiving us, but as amenable to interpretation? Only in the field of morality and religion do we meet with those interests which men call the higher values, the supreme goods of life. If anything has validity, if anything corresponds to reality, these do. They are the verdicts of the highest court of our nature. They issue the final judgments by which speculative philosophies must be tested. So say the philosophers themselves. Men like Ritschl and Sabatier were only availing themselves of this admission, or, rather, contention, of philosophy when they maintained the primacy of our fundamental ethical and religious judgments, our “judgments of value,” and their independence of all purely logical or theoretic processes and conclusions.

Let me next briefly indicate the course of thought which Sabatier pursues in explaining the origin and nature of religion.

The most important category with which we have to do in the world is that of cause. Science construes all things under its law, and is therefore strongly deterministic in tendency. But in ourselves we find a higher power or law; it is consciousness, freedom. As Sabatier strikingly expresses it: “The activity of the ego returns upon the centre, and heats it like the axle of a wheel in motion. Sparks soon fly, and the inner life of the ego is lit up. This is consciousness.” By the light of this self-knowledge we know our action to be teleological and responsible. Now here arises an apparent conflict. Science would draw our free, moral action into its causal nexus,

¹ See also William James, *The Will to Believe*, pp. 22 sq., 55 sq.

while the soul in its consciousness and freedom repudiates and negatives this determinism. Knowledge and conscience, physical and moral law, thinking and action, stand in opposition to each other. Keeness of thought impairs the energy of the will; intelligence paralyses its power within us. Everywhere man is conscious of being hemmed in by limitations. Joy carries in its bosom the instrument of its own destruction. In our strivings after righteousness we are constantly hurled back into sin, where we sink beneath the sense of our helplessness.

Here, then, is where man finds himself in the conflict of life, or would find himself, but for religion. It is religion which provides the solution of the contradiction which we have described. It is a moral act—an act of trust, by which the soul transcends the contradiction in which it finds itself placed, and rests in One who is the Origin and Goal of its life. In religion man, conscious of his absolute worth, flies from his apparent fate and grasps the Principle on whom his being depends, that is, establishes connection with God. Religion is thus the supreme realisation of the instinct of preservation—an expression of the longing of every being for continued life. Thus religion springs out of the contrast between self-consciousness and world-consciousness, and brings the two to Unity in the higher, more comprehensive consciousness of God as the highest Being, on whom the ego and the universe are alike dependent as their common Ground and End. In a word, religion is, primarily, as Schleiermacher maintained, the consciousness of dependence upon God. It is the recognition of the relation in which we stand to the Ground of the world on whom we know ourselves to depend, and to the world with which we see ourselves bound up as parts of a great whole.

These condensed statements of Sabatier's views may be illustrated by a single paragraph from his discussion of the subject. After describing the weakness and monotony to which, under the pressure of external things, it is so natural and so common for men to yield, he asks: "Must one give up thinking, then, if he would retain the courage to live, and re-

sign himself to death in order to preserve the right to think?" "From this feeling of distress," he answers, "from this initial contradiction of the inner life of man, religion springs. It is the rent in the rock through which the living and life-giving waters flow. Not that religion brings a theoretical solution to the problem. The issue it opens and proposes to us is pre-eminently practical. It does not save us by adding to our knowledge, but by a return to the very principle on which our being depends, and by a moral act of confidence in the origin and aim of life. At the same time, this saving act is not an arbitrary one; it springs from a necessity. Faith in life both is and acts like the instinct of conservation in the physical world. It is a higher form of that instinct. Blind and fatal in organisms, in the moral life it is accompanied by consciousness and by reflective will, and, thus transformed, it appears under the guise of religion."¹

Let us next consider our author's attitude towards theological tradition and ecclesiastical dogma. In so doing I shall avail myself of certain suggestions contained in Ménégoz' commemorative address, and shall briefly illustrate the points to be noted from Sabatier's own words.

There are two great themes which should engage the mind and heart of every religious thinker. These are *truth* and *salvation*. The quest for truth is the counterpart of our liability to error; the desire for salvation arises from our consciousness of sin. These two things, then, doctrine or truth, and salvation or life, are the two foci of the theologian's interest and work. But on which of these his mind shall chiefly centre its attention will depend upon his native endowments and disposition. We may say of these two friends and colleagues—Sabatier and Ménégoz—that the former was chiefly occupied with the first, the latter with the second standpoint. At any rate, Sabatier's interest in truth, in theological theory, was intense and absorbing. Hence he spared no pains in searching out and applying the facts of psychology, of history

¹ *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 21.

and of science which seemed to illustrate and support religious truth. He was profoundly convinced of the congruity of the truths of science and of philosophy with religion, and it was the great effort of his life to exhibit their unity and harmony.

He approached the subject of dogma in the light of the maxim: Christianity is a historical religion. Now in this very idea are inevitably involved two distinguishable elements—a changeless and permanent and a changing and transitory element. In its essence religion is divine and eternal, but in its historical form, as it appears at any given age, it is subject to change, because subject to the law of evolution. Now the great error of orthodoxy—Catholic and Protestant alike—is that it cannot see, or is unwilling to apply, this distinction. It is, indeed, almost essential to orthodoxy, the maintenance of a fixed and authoritative system of opinion, to deny the distinction. Protestant orthodoxy has been accustomed to maintain that the form of Christianity, including its various incidents, as it appeared in the apostolic period—at any rate as it was conceived by all the men who contributed to our canonical New Testament—was supernatural and infallible. Roman Catholicism has applied the same principle, only more thoroughly and consistently, and has maintained the direct, divine authorisation of all the forms of doctrine and practice which have been developed under its own superintendence.

Over against this error stands the error of rationalism, which consists in overlooking or denying the divine and permanent factor in religion, and in regarding it as merely the product of human reflection. Both these positions—that of orthodoxy and that of rationalism—Sabatier repudiated. He attacked the infallibility and authority of traditional dogma by showing how dogma arose and developed in the Church. Its development was part of that general movement whereby a spiritual religion was transformed into an official, political system under the shaping power of ideals drawn from the world-dominion of Rome. Thus grew up the *jure divino* conceptions of the ministry, the canon and the official opinions

of the Church, and each of these was appealed to in support of the others. An official Church guaranteed an official ministry, and an official ministry an official system of definition and dogma. Each guaranteed the others, and the circle in argument, though a large one, was complete. Thus developed the system of ecclesiastical authority, with its despotic power over the human conscience. Thus arose a system of dogmas which was declared to be pure, divine and unquestionable, the acceptance of which was essential to salvation.

Protestantism, indeed, modified in an important way the application of this principle of an external, prescriptive authority in religion;—but it was the same principle. It denied the necessity to salvation of believing the decrees of Popes and councils. It repudiated the doctrine that these were infallible guides to religious truth, but claimed, instead, that the writers of the New Testament were such. It changed the motto “an infallible Church,” into “an infallible book,” and a very considerable part of the official dogma of Catholicism was retained because it was held to be derivable, either directly or by legitimate inference, from the authoritative writings of the first age. Thus the bondage of traditional dogma was perpetuated, though in a modified form.

Sabatier maintained that the old Protestant principle of a formally infallible Bible, from which could be deduced an authoritative system of church order and religious opinion, was as untenable as the Roman Catholic principle, of which, indeed, it is but a modification. The one is as contrary to fact as the other. The old Protestant conception of the Bible is discredited, and the persistent determination of some to maintain it will prove as futile as an effort would be to rehabilitate the Ptolemaic astronomy. Criticism has shown us that the Bible had a historical genesis, and has been subject to the law of historical evolution. Its books were composed, copied and printed under the same conditions as other books.

What then? Two conclusions are common, both of which Sabatier rejected. The first is that of a mitigated or mediation

orthodoxy. It virtually says: We must, indeed, surrender the principle of infallible authority, but we will save what we can from the general wreck which follows. Certain concessions, which the facts obviously compel, are grudgingly made, but what is left is still maintained on the tacit assumption that so much, at least, is guaranteed by the principle of external authority. Sabatier regarded this position as unclear and untenable, because resting on no well defined and consistent principle. He considered it but a half-hearted orthodoxy, which, though inwardly hating Biblical criticism, felt no zeal in trying to refute it. He thought this attitude cowardly. He had no sympathy with that reticent but persistent conservatism which seemed anxious to give the impression that it still stood on the ground which it was compelled to admit had been cut away. Toward the method of hushing up the consideration of fundamental questions he felt a strong repugnance.

Shall we, then, leap to the rationalist's conclusion? This conclusion is that religion is the product of human reason alone; what can be deduced from reason is true, what cannot is false. Sabatier admitted that this position has the advantage of clearness and consistency, but he denied that it was adequate. Rationalism seeks to transform religion into a philosophy. Our author will not admit that a religion adequate to the needs of man can be drawn out from speculative philosophy by dialectic and demonstration. To him religion was a matter of revelation. For him, therefore, the chief question was as to the nature and method of revelation. He held that revelation is the inner witness of the Spirit of God in the soul of man. God is present and operative in the human spirit, and it is His action upon our consciousness which gives rise to the religious sentiment. *Quid interius deo?* was the motto of his treatise on the Philosophy of Religion. The highest certainty is that of God's presence in man. The primary utterance of this conviction is prayer. The God within man is the vital power of religion, and

its voice is prayer. This is, in a word, Sabatier's philosophy of religion. He believed that this conception was the essence of the teaching of the prophets, apostles, reformers, and of Christ.

This internal witness—this *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*—is the ultimate ground of our religious convictions. But we control and complete these convictions by the witness of the Spirit in the believing community. The individual must not mature his religious beliefs in pure subjectivity, but in the light and by the aid of the collective religious consciousness and experience. In this respect religion is like the artistic sentiment. By virtue of it, men produce works of art; but this production, in turn, reacts upon, nourishes and develops the artistic sentiment. Religion can develop healthily only by a similar reciprocity.

We come now to the question as to the expression of religious sentiments and beliefs—a question which involves the philosophy of dogma.

When one wishes to express in words the religious sentiments, he has recourse to the terms of his daily life. He calls God a Father, a King, a Judge, a Fortress, for example. But a little reflection serves to show that these terms are but images and symbols—not accurate and adequate expressions. They do not tell us what God is in Himself; they merely voice the impression which the idea of God produces on us. Such language is figurative or analogical. All religious formulæ are symbolical. Dogma itself is a system of symbols. Now it is just here, in this symbolism, which belongs to the very nature of dogma, that we find the variable and developing element in Christian doctrine. This inevitable symbolism belongs to the order of contingent things, enters into the movement of history, and is subject to the process of evolution. “On what ground,” asks Sabatier, “can man rest the notion that dogmas are necessarily stationary? Are they not, as history presents them to us, in a perpetual course of transformation? If they have altered in the past, what is to prevent them from being

modified in the future?" That dogmas are not immutable, he shows by pointing out the difference between dogma and religion. "Men come to believe," he says, "that dogmas constitute the very essence of religion, and from that moment they equally imagine, in all good conscience, that to destroy the one is to destroy the other. This error arises from the strange idea still prevailing among us, though it is refuted a hundred times over by a careful psychology, that religion is essentially a metaphysical theory, a branch of erudition. It is said that dogmas produce religion, and that, when the cause is taken away, the effect must disappear; and men forget what religious history teaches most clearly, that it is religion, on the contrary, which produces dogmas, and that it produces them naturally as a tree produces flowers and fruit. In life the awakening of feeling always precedes that of thought. And so religion exists as emotion, or sentiment, or vital instinct, before it is transformed either into intellectual notions or into rites. The primary and inner emotion is so truly the life of religion, that where it no longer exists, be it in the most correct dogmas or the most magnificent worship, there is no longer any true religion."¹

It is easy to see how on these principles the Protestant churches may regard themselves as emancipated from the reign of dogmas which were natural and useful enough in the past, but which are now outgrown and superseded. It does not follow that if the dogma is abandoned, the underlying religious truth which once gave rise to it is also abandoned. A religion which is truly alive gives rise to new forms of thought and expression as reflection proceeds and develops. An unchanging theology means religious stagnation and intellectual death. For Protestantism to take up the defence of a changeless and authoritative system of dogma, would be to show to what an extent she still remains under the yoke of bondage from which she professes to be free. Let Sabatier state the case in his own words: "Whence comes the great

¹ *The Vitality of Christian Dogmas*, pp. 15-17.

historic system of Roman Catholic dogmas?" he asks. "The Roman Church declares that it all comes from the Bible. This is a great illusion. Origen and Augustine, the theologians of the time, no doubt did find it all in the Bible, but it was by means of the allegorical interpretation, the same by which Philo found it possible to read the Platonic and Stoic philosophy into the books of Moses. Unfortunately this marvellous kind of alchemy, which made possible and even easy the transmutation of all the various modes of expression into each other, has, for the thought of our time, lost all authority and all power. The expedients which it supplied for Dogmatics can no longer be of any use to us. The philosophical substructure of the Catholic dogmas has remained as thoroughly Greek as was the language in which they were first of all drawn up.

"Such, then, being the case, by what right can we proclaim eternal and immutable a system of Dogmatics, the origin and particular character of which are revealed so clearly by history? This system suited the Greco-Roman world, no doubt, and it is also, doubtless, to this very suitability that it owes its triumph. Is not this just a reason why it can no longer suit our own, unless it be admitted that our civilisation and our philosophy have no right to differ from the civilisation and the philosophy of the last centuries of the Roman Empire? Do you not see what the Church has done by proclaiming the infallibility of the ancient dogmas? It has not only decreed the immutability of the gospel; it has decreed the infallibility of Aristotle's logic and Plato's philosophy. It was quite natural in the Middle Ages that Aristotle should be deified and placed on a level with the prophets and the apostles. Let Roman Catholicism, if it will, remain faithful to this tradition; we will not dispute with it; but that Protestantism, whose principle has been to break this very tradition, and to come back from human opinions to the Word of God, should be subjected to this tradition, is a thing which we can only recognise as a posthumous revenge, in the bosom of the Protestant churches

themselves, of the Roman principle from which they thought that they had escaped for ever.”¹

Sabatier proceeds to remind us that he intends no general onslaught upon traditional beliefs. Beneath these are important permanent truths, ever to be conserved and cherished. But they are not identical with the forms in which they have been conceived in the past. For example, the Christian certainty regarding the religious value and power of the Bible is not dependent, as Traditionalists insist, upon the old Protestant theories of verbal inspiration and a divinely fixed canon. Three great revolutions have transformed the world—the religious revolution which we call the Reformation; the scientific revolution which has opened to us a new and larger view of the world; and the development of the historical method of study. To ignore these events, and still to adhere to the modes of thought current in antiquity or in the Middle Ages, is preposterous. “It is as impossible for us to think in Greek as to talk in Greek.” For Protestantism to resist the law of change and progress in theology is to resist the law of life.

Such, in partial outline, was Sabatier’s view of the origin, development and value of dogma. It will be apparent that he undertook two tasks: (1) critically to ascertain the historic truth about Christ, the apostolic age, and the primitive Church—to determine the essence of Christianity at its fountainhead; and (2) to distinguish the essential substance of religion from the changing and contingent forms which it has assumed in the varying historic conditions under which it has developed. Who can question that these were legitimate and lofty aims, and that they were pursued by Sabatier with clearness, candour and courage?

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¹ *The Vitality of Christian Dogmas*, pp. 53–55.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

PROFESSOR GARDNER ON "THE BASIS OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1902, p. 5.)

It is perhaps due to Mr Boutwood that I should make a brief reply to his criticism of my position as regards the basis of doctrine, though I feel that to discuss such root-questions in a brief letter is of very little use.

Mr Boutwood says that the experience of divine influence in the will is not a fact, but the interpretation of a fact. Well, of course, in every experience there is a subjective element, an element of interpretation. In just the same way in the experience of the hardness of matter or the anger of a friend there is an element of interpretation. If one would reject all interpretation, one must fall back on solipsism, or even on absolute agnosticism. Every man who determines to think things out for himself must face this problem. My own solution runs in the line of neo-Kantianism, as Mr Boutwood will be aware, since he cites my *Exploratio Evangelica*. I cannot here sum up the view in a page.

Does Mr Boutwood suppose that he can find a basis for religion free from "interpretation"? By no means. He thinks the assurance of the truth of religion "can come to man only from without, by some declaration to his understanding." "This declaration, whatever form it take, must of necessity be an event or process in history. Christian thought finds such a declaration in the Incarnate Life." But Mr Boutwood goes on to say that events in history can only have this efficacy when *interpreted*.

I also think, as I have abundantly shown in my paper, that events of history when interpreted may be the basis of doctrine. But the experiential basis is the more immediate by far, and through it alone can facts of history be interpreted with any advantage.

I will ask your readers to judge between me and Mr Boutwood which is the safer and more immediate basis of belief, whether experiences of consciousness, familiar to thousands, repeated in every age of the world's

history, the guiding principles of innumerable saintly lives, or a historic account of events which happened nineteen hundred years ago, events as to the exact nature of which no two modern critics are wholly agreed, and which rest on the testimony of men who, however honest, were under the dominion of all sorts of prepossessions and distorting fancies.

In Christianity as it exists now there are elements derived both from experience and from ancient history. But Mr Boutwood will scarcely persuade anyone who has carefully studied ancient history that facts vouched for by ancient historians rest on a safer basis than facts which he can feel and observe every day of his life.

PERCY GARDNER.

OXFORD.

CATASTROPHES AND MORAL ORDER.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1902, p. 104; and January 1903, p. 360.)

THE only rejoinder that seems necessary from me to Mr Cohen's eager attack on what Dr Horton and I wrote in the *Hibbert Journal* for October last on "Catastrophes" is a re-statement of the question to which my brief paragraphs were addressed. That question was not the general problem of evil or suffering in a world governed by a moral and intelligent Being. It would indeed have argued a singular lack of the sense of proportion in the editor to propose, and in the contributor to undertake, that that problem should be treated in five pages of the luxurious type of this publication. The question was whether there were in what were described as "Catastrophes" elements which rendered them unamenable to the treatment which an intelligent man may regard as adequate in his intellectual dealings with the problem of evil or of suffering generally in a universe believed to be divinely guided. For my part, I addressed myself exclusively to an attempt "to show that the problem of catastrophes is not a separate problem loaded with special difficulties, but only one small part of that universal and enduring problem, the existence of pain and suffering in a world alleged to be under the control of infinite Love" (p. 124).

Mr Cohen therefore contributes nothing relevant to the discussion when he brings general charges against the beneficence of God, whether in regard to "Catastrophes" or to phenomena of a more familiar order. The whole problem of pain in God's world is sufficiently raised by the breaking of a butterfly's wing.

In like manner, Mr Cohen misapprehends the scope of the discussion when he implies that Dr Horton and I give our case away when we "plead that very many worse things than the destruction of St Pierre are constantly occurring" (p. 361). On the contrary, we are establishing our case beyond rejoinder; for our case is that "Catastrophes" do not constitute a new, separate, and uniquely formidable argument against belief

in the goodness of God. It is precisely part of our case that "very many worse things" happen.

Mr Cohen is again off the track when he declares that the vital issue is why Catastrophes should occur at all. Dr Horton and I, it appears, are both "clearly under the impression" that unless it can be shown that no good whatever comes out of "Catastrophes," the "case against Theistic belief breaks down" (p. 360). I venture to pledge Dr Horton to join me in disclaiming an impression so foolish. Perhaps I may also be allowed to say for him, as well as for myself, that our theism is strong enough not to need to take shelter in minimising, distorting, or ignoring the anti-theistic argument; and that we are ready to accord to its exponents the respect which they on their part do not always render to the advocates of theistic faith.

Now it would, I repeat, have been conceited folly for any man to attempt to deal with the problem of evil at large in the limits assigned to each writer in the triple treatment of "Catastrophes and the Moral Order," in the first number of this *Journal*. And, for my part, I hold that I did well to abstain from that attempt then, and, still more, that I do well to decline to be exasperated into it, by the proddings of Mr Cohen's lance, on the present still more circumscribed arena. But that is by no means to say that I do not recognise that every thoughtful religious man is bound to face the problem raised by the existence of pain—and still more of sin—in the divine order. However high the heart may habitually be lifted by faith, no true man can for ever sing Pippa's song without striving to sound the abyss which Pippa passed over with gaily tripping feet. And so every religious man has laid hold of some solution, reasoned well or ill. Such solution as serves me personally for the working purposes of life I have tried to state with simplicity and directness in my little book, *God and the Soul* (Philip Green, London). Let Mr Cohen patiently refute solutions of the whole problem put forward by men incomparably more competent than I am, rather than hastily assume that an occasional note, such as those recently written by Dr Horton and myself, is offered as covering the field.

RICHARD A. ARMSTRONG.

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MR CONYBEARE'S TEXTUAL THEORIES—Second Part.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1902, p. 96.)

We turn now to Mr Conybeare's most important discovery, that Eusebius had before him a reading of St Matt. xxviii. 19 different from that of the *Textus Receptus*, although this has here the practically unanimous support of all MSS. and versions. It is a strange fact, reflecting upon the receptivity of English scholarship, that this remarkable discovery should have been first published in the pages of a foreign magazine.

No one who has worked through the mass of evidence which Mr Conybeare has collected in that article can doubt for one instant that he has proved up to the hilt his point that Eusebius, when writing his earlier works, at all events, had before him a MS. of St Matthew, with the reading *πορευθέντες (οὖν) μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου*. But Mr Conybeare has not proved, as he imagines, that this MS. omitted the words *βαπτίζοντες (or βαπτισαντες) αυτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος*.

These words are not, indeed, quoted in those passages of Eusebius that Mr Conybeare has collected, for the simple reason that they have nothing to do with the argument of Eusebius. In each case, Eusebius is commenting on verses of the Old Testament that foretell, as he thinks, the universal empire, power, and glory of Christ. He quotes, therefore, only so much of St Matt. xxviii. 19 as illustrates his argument and enforces his teaching. In each case of quotation, the words containing the baptismal formula will be found to be not only unnecessary, but their introduction would have disturbed the writer's train of thought.

I will instance only one of these passages, the one which in its form most favours Mr Conybeare's contention that Eusebius did not find the baptismal formula in the MS. from which he quotes. It runs as follows:—*ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ καὶ κύριος ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐνενόησε μὲν, οὐ τετόλμηκε δέ . . . ἐνὶ δὲ ῥήματι καὶ μιᾷ φωνῇ φήσας πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ μαθητὰς “Πορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου, διδάσκοντες αὐτοὺς τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν,” ἔργον ἐπήγε τῷ λόγῳ.*

The argument of the context is directed against certain persons who maintained that our Lord worked miracles as a magician. Eusebius answers these with the question, To what magician's mind has it ever occurred to found a nation in his own name, to establish laws throughout the world contrary to the ancient customs of all nations? What magician has ever attempted to carry out such a plan? We will not speak of success in carrying it out. Jesus, however, not only imagined and attempted such a plan, He also succeeded in fulfilling it. He gave one single command to His disciples to found a universal society in His name with new laws. The giving of the command was immediately followed by its successful fulfilment. One sees that in such an argument the words containing the baptismal formula would be omitted not only naturally but even necessarily.

One, however, of the passages quoted from Eusebius by Mr Conybeare distinctly proves that Eusebius read in St Matt. xxviii. 19 the words “baptising them into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.” It is taken from the Syrian Theophania, Lee, p. 225:—

“And on this account He commanded his disciples, not from the first, but now, that they should go round and make disciples of all nations. But of necessity he added the mystery of cleansing. For it was right that those who should be converted from among the heathen should be cleansed by His power from all pollution and uncleanness; because they

had been defiled by the error of demons, and had been holden by the worship of idols, and by uncleanness of all sorts, but had now first been changed from that life of abomination and lawless practices. These very persons, then, did He admonish to teach—after this cleaning which is by the mystery of His doctrine—not that they should observe the precepts of the Jews nor yet the law of Moses, but all those things which He commanded them to observe. He necessarily therefore stirred them up and made them readily to confide—to undertake the circuit of all peoples, and to make disciples of all races of men through the promise by which he counselled them, saying: Behold I am with you always.”

With reference to this passage Mr Conybeare writes, “At first sight the comment upon this citation, when it speaks of ‘the mystery of cleansing,’ seems to involve the presence of *βαπτίζοντες* in the original Greek; but the definition which immediately follows of this cleansing as being by the mystery of His doctrine precludes the idea that the writer has in view the cleansing by the water of baptism, and rather suggests the exorcism at the use of the name which preceded baptism, and were especially a cleansing by His power from the pollution of demons” (*sic*).

In face of the fact that this passage of Eusebius is a continuous comment upon St Matt. xxviii. 19 ff. quoted *in extenso*¹ in accordance with the *Textus Receptus*, it is difficult to understand what Mr Conybeare means by his remarks. Has he any right to strike out of this quotation the words in question, which Eusebius’ comment “at first sight seems to involve,” simply because it suits his (Mr Conybeare’s) theory of what the text ought to be? As for the term “mystery of His doctrine,” it is interesting to note that Eusebius in a later writing² speaks of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity as in a peculiar sense the gospel of Christ, and quotes as his authority St Matt. xxviii. 19. He is arguing indeed against a famous Anti-Arian Marcellus of Ancyra, but can we imagine that in a controversy he would have laid such stress upon this quotation if the received reading of the text had only lately been established by ecclesiastical censure?

I maintain, therefore, that the form of text in St Matthew xxviii. 19, presupposed in these writings of Eusebius, ran as follows:—

πορευθέντες οὖν μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου βαπτίσαντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.

But though I venture to differ from Mr Conybeare in the interpretation of the results of his investigation, it seems to me that he has by it thrown a gleam of light upon the history of the composition of the canonical St Matthew.

Let us paraphrase the whole passage St Matthew xxviii. 19 ff., adding the words “in my name” and omitting the words “Baptising into the

¹ This quotation has no doubt been conformed, as Mr Conybeare says, to the text of the Syriac Vulgate, hence we do not find in it *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου*. These words and the words *βαπτίσαντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα κ.τ.λ.*, seem to be implied in Eusebius’ comment, “should be cleansed by His power from all pollution and uncleanness.”

² *Contra Marcellum*, p. 3, C.

name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost," as Mr Conybeare would have us. Our Lord declares to His disciples that all power is given Him in heaven and earth; He commands them therefore, in virtue of this power with which He is endowed, to go forth to all nations, and in His name, by His authority, in His stead, to make them His disciples, teaching them all things that He had already taught and commanded them. He then adds the encouraging promise that Himself (with His almighty power) would be with them for ever. Our Lord Himself, His universal power and presence, is the theme uniting the whole passage. We see at once that the unity of thought would be broken by the insertion of the words containing the Baptismal formula; we see at once how wonderfully and yet how subtly the addition of the words "in my name" has strengthened the unity and given force to the thought of the passage. These words cannot but be original—here one goes wholly with Mr Conybeare—only the question is whether they are original in the canonical gospel.

In the face of the strong testimony of MSS. and versions,¹ I hold to the view that "in my name" did not appear in the original text of our St Matthew, but I believe that Mr Conybeare has discovered again textual evidence of the truth of Soltau's theory. We have here a passage belonging neither to the Markan tradition or the Logia, a passage which Soltau has, however, assigned on grounds of literary criticism to the pre-Matthean gospel postulated by our St Matthew. I maintain that it was no mere copyist or corrector that introduced the baptismal formula here, but the compiler of the canonical gospel himself—the same that altered the form of the verse in the genealogy, that inserted the conversation between the Baptist and our Lord into the story of the baptism, the same that recounts for us the gift of the keys to St Peter, and orders the discipline of the church in the case of an offender, the same that interpolates the miracle of the didrachma and the story of the soldiers at the sepulchre—one, in short, who has transformed an original gospel and brought it into harmony with the dogmas and practices that were becoming current in the Christian church of his day, with an eye also to the Jewish critics of the gospel history.

In this particular instance the procedure of the canonical evangelist is easily traced. He wrote at a time when the ancient custom of baptism in the name of Christ was being superseded by that of baptism into the name of the Holy Trinity.² This change could not but have aroused some debate and opposition among conservative people, and it would be necessary to declare plainly in the gospel the validity of the new practice, which was regarded, we may be sure, as a tradition deriving from our Lord Himself.

¹ Mr Conybeare omits to mention that St Matthew xxviii. 19 ff. is preserved in the famous Old Latin codex Palatinus (*e*), a very constant friend of Syrus Sinaiticus.

² This ancient form of baptism is implied in Acts ii. 38, etc.; 1 Cor. i. 13; Rom. vi. 3. These passages alone would afford ample ground for the contention of Pope Stephen against Cyprian.

Though originally the words "making disciples of them in my name" had nothing to do at all with the rite of baptism, we can understand that the canonical evangelist, at a time of controversy, would regard them as affording support to the older baptismal practice; hence he suppressed the words, adding in their place "baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."¹

This, however, is just one of those cases in which one might foretell before looking at a critical apparatus that the words would creep back into the text even without any conscious purpose on the part of a copyist who was familiar with the language of the ancient source. In this way was formed the conflate reading, for which we have the testimony of Eusebius, a reading analogous to that of St Matthew i. 16 in Syrus Sinaiticus. It is interesting that this testimony again comes from the Syrian land. We may conjecture that when the ancient Syriac version of St Matthew xxviii. 19 ff. is discovered, it will be found in the form "go ye then into all the world and make disciples of all men in my name, and baptise them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."

Proceeding to the discussion of the third text that Mr Conybeare deals with, St Matthew xix. 17 = St Mark x. 18 = St Luke xviii. 19, we are told that the original reading of our Lord's answer to the rich man was in the form *μή με λέγε αγαθόν*, and that this original reading of our gospels has been modified by doctrinal censure in all three gospels, the correction in St Matthew being quite independent of that in St Mark and St Luke.

I would make two remarks upon this theory.

(1) The canonical evangelist that inserted the discourse between the Baptist and our Lord at the baptism could never have allowed *μή με λέγε αγαθόν* to pass into his text.

(2) If, as Mr Conybeare says, the present text of this verse in our gospels is due to independent correction, how comes it that the form of a question is adopted in each case? Surely St Matthew's text is most simply explained as a doctrinal modification of the Markan text presupposed by our St Mark and St Luke; and the correction is just such a one as we should expect from the canonical evangelist.

Again, the Markan form of the text—"Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one (that is) God"—surely implies that our Lord refused to be called good. It certainly is so understood by the ordinary reader; indeed the verse is felt to be a stumblingblock by many thoughtful persons, as one's experience of parish work teaches one. Certainly the difference in meaning between the received text and the reading "Call me not good" is so slight that one can scarcely speak of doctrinal modification in this connection.

And yet Mr Conybeare brings forward very strong testimony to the existence of a reading *μή με λέγε αγαθόν* known to Marcion, Origen, and

¹ This substitution took away the full force of *οὖν* after *πορευθέντες*, hence in many manuscripts of St Matthew this particle falls out.

Athanasius. The testimony points to the conclusion that this variant existed originally in the gospel of St Luke, a regular storehouse of various readings new and old, and is closely connected with the history of the origin of that gospel. The discussion of this most intricate problem would, however, extend beyond our limits.

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PROFESSOR HENRY JONES ON "REFLECTIVE
THOUGHT AND RELIGION."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1903, p. 228.)

WHEN first I read Professor Henry Jones' remarkable article on *Reflective Thought and Religion* in the January number of the *Hibbert Journal*, I rubbed my eyes and could hardly believe them. It was difficult not to regard the complete inversion of the actual facts of the philosophic situation implied in Professor Jones' article as a subtle form of satire, but as I read on I was gradually driven to the conclusion that he had merely misread the signs of the times, and was unconsciously misleading the readers of the *Hibbert Journal*. Instead of being worse than usual, the philosophic situation is more hopeful than for many years. The alarming symptoms, which Professor Jones describes, either do not exist at all, or are the products of the decay of the dominant sect of British philosophers, while the heretics to whom he ascribes the dissemination of wholesale distrust in truth and reason, are really initiators of constructive systems destined to deliver philosophy from the slough of obscurity and barren verbiage in which it has been left for years by "the older school of English idealists."

Let us consider a few facts. For twenty years Mr F. H. Bradley's brilliant scepticism has reigned triumphant and defied contradiction. But what have those doughty champions of absolute truth, the "older school of English idealists," done to counteract his baneful influence? Have they not treated their prodigal offspring with the utmost tenderness, with the most meticulous respect? Has a voice been raised in deprecation of his audacious feats of dialectical destruction? These guardians of Pure Reason, these watchdogs of Timeless Truth, gave no tongue even when they were so directly challenged as by Professor Stewart recently in *Mind*.¹

"Let them show that the ascription of Thought and Will to their ultimate Spiritual Principle or Absolute, as to a Personal God in the Christian sense, is not, as Mr Bradley contends, out of the question, but follows logically from their philosophical principles. Mr Bradley is the really dangerous enemy. Let them make it their business to dispose of him

¹ N.S., No. 43, p. 376.

in their rear before they advance further against Lord Kelvin and the agnostics. As it is, they seem to think it enough to express mild regret, in passing, that Mr Bradley should not happen to see his way to ascribing personality to the Absolute; but they are unwilling to come to close quarters with him."

One cannot but wonder why Professor Stewart's hint was lost upon Professor Jones. Why does he set out to harry pariah dogs without his fold, and leave his lambs to the ravings of the wolf within? Can it be that the older English idealists think Mr Bradley too formidable to attack, but hope that the innovating "pluralists" and "personal idealists" will fall more facile victims to their prowess?

If so, it is time that someone should explain to Professor Jones that he has once more mistaken his foes. And that in twofold-wise. They are no sceptics, nor do they rebel against the sweet sway of reason. They have suffered as sorely, if not as silently, as the older English idealists under the tyranny of the scepticism and agnosticism which sprang up when the withered trunk of the transplanted German idealism was kissed by the genius of Mr Bradley. If they have revolted against a tradition of approved and tested sterility, it was to confront it with a doctrine designed to pull philosophy out of the mire, and to effect a radical reconstruction of the spiritual cosmos. And they are doing what the older English idealists seem never to have dared to do. Dr Stout has been the first to sink a searching probe into the vitals of Bradleian logic.¹ And Dr Stout stands first among the contributors to *Personal Idealism*. His essay is a protest against Mr Bradley's notion that complete truth is unattainable. How maladroit, then, is the charge of scepticism brought against such men!

About "Pragmatism," Professor Jones goes still more curiously astray, though I must confine my comments to his fundamental error. He takes it as an *attack* on Truth, and talks as though a rejection of *intellectualism* were a repudiation of *intellect* and an outrage upon reason. In point of fact Pragmatism is a new analysis of "truth" inspired by the recent progress of psychology. The very nature, therefore, of the question which it puts precludes the danger of a sceptical reply. For whatever its analysis results in, *that*, it contends, will henceforth be what "truth" must mean. Professor Jones may be put out to find that "pure thought" is a fiction, and mere intellection quite impossible. That all our actual thinking is purposive and selective, and therefore conditioned in every fibre by desires, emotions and volitions; that, in a word, logic can no more be treated in abstraction from psychology. But his annoyance does not entitle him to fling about the charge of scepticism.

But even this is hardly so astounding as his appeal to the working of the sciences (pp. 235-40). For the essentially pragmatismal character of the scientific modes of ascertaining "truth" is precisely one of the chief props of pragmatism, and, curiously enough, I had myself been closely paralleling Professor Jones' argument in a contemporaneous review of an

¹ Cp. also his articles in the *Proceedings* of the Aristotelian Society.

American pragmatist.¹ Professor Jones thus tries to turn the evidence for a pragmatist interpretation of the reason into a reason *against* pragmatism.

But a desperate case demands desperate remedies, and I am not surprised that in the end Professor Jones, in his anxiety to make out a case against the progressive movement which he misrepresents as scepticism, arrives at flat self-contradiction. On page 245 he had asserted that "the intellectual sceptics have carried the war into the enemy's country," nay, that "the inmost stronghold of modern thought is being assailed, and with a force and persistence to which there has been no precedent." By page 251 he has persuaded himself that the ranks of Science are "closing around the spiritual nature of man," that "no scepticism arrests their triumphant progress," and that he beholds the "rout of the speculative defenders of the spiritual interests of man," and an obvious "instance of *sauve qui peut*." Was Science, then, and not "Scepticism," the aggressor? It seems as difficult to make out the origin of this war as the strategy of a campaign conducted wholly in the imagination of Professor Jones.

But it is not so difficult to see that his wish to believe his foes in trouble has conjured up this whole alarming situation. For as regards Pragmatism, the facts seem wholly different. It is unconscious of any conflict with the ways of science. For it alone, perhaps, of all philosophies, can be wholly and equally friendly to both Science and Religion. It notes with an impartial approval how entirely the practical value of a conception dominates its scientific status, and how much more than mere reasoning goes to the making of religious faith. And while it is in no haste to press for reconciliations until both Science and Religion have cast away some of the intellectualist lumber which impedes their progress, it can contentedly foresee in the common type of their fundamental postulations, in the oneness of their methods, in their ultimate dependence on the same experience, the happiest omens of their final concord.

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¹ In *Mind* for Jan. 1903, N.S., No. 45, p. 114. Cp. *Hib. Jour.*, pp. 229, 234.

REVIEWS

Adolf Harnack. — *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten.* — Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1902.

THE problem set to the historian of early Christianity by the ante-Nicene period is to explain how and why and where, within less than three centuries, an Oriental movement which was originally a mere ripple on a single wave of dissent in the wide sea of paganism, had risen itself into a wave which swept before it the vested interests, prejudices, traditions, and authority of the most powerful organisation that the world hitherto had known. To exhibit adequately in one volume the course and causes of this transition, requires exceptional skill as well as scholarship. And it is bare justice to say that in the present monograph, the outcome of his preliminary studies in the Berlin Academy's Transactions for 1901, Harnack has once more brilliantly shown his power of combining verve and learning, mastery of salient detail and an outlook upon the broad movements of the period in question. The *Ausbreitung* forms a sequel and supplement to works like his own *Wesen* and Weizsäcker's *Apostolic Age*. It is a diagnosis rather than a story, yet an analysis in which eloquent facts lose little or nothing of their eloquence. Thus, whilst incorporating some of the author's previous essays (*e.g.* on the medicinal element in early Christianity, pp. 72 f., on *φίλοι* as a Christian title, pp. 300 f., and on early Christian names, pp. 304 f.), it will serve by its very limitations as a useful pendant to the earlier volumes of the *Dogmengeschichte*. But the book stands by itself. It has unity, speed, completeness, and artistic self-restraint. Even had it not been the first monograph specially devoted to the subject, it would have possessed distinction on the score of historical imagination and penetration, suggestiveness, and a lucid disposition of ramified and often highly technical materials. Read it, and the stir of three centuries around an Eastern sect is at your eye and ear.

At the same time I am bound to say I regret the resolve to leave aside (p. 62) catechetical instruction and doctrine as a factor in the extension of the faith. A reference to the *Dogmengeschichte* is not sufficient. One could readily have spared, for example, the excursus on the legendary council at Antioch (pp. 52–60), and welcomed a rapid outline of the

aggressive and commanding rôle played by definite beliefs or the defining of belief. As it is, some of Harnack's pages unwittingly leave the impression that the success of the church was due to the Protean qualities of a vague theism as much as to anything else, nor is adequate emphasis laid on the reasons why older religions, such as Judaism and the cults of Æsculapius and Mithra, withered or proved sterile in the same rich soil of contemporary syncretism. Perhaps for the same reason, or owing to a historian's dread of appearing to docket the elusive in life, one feels now and again, even more upon a second and third perusal than at first, that in comparison for example with Semeria and Loisy, despite the *souçon* of the seminarist which clings even to the best catholic investigators, Harnack is apt to show unfavourably in point of philosophic grasp. His treatment, at several important stages, tends to be descriptive, brilliantly descriptive, rather than analytic; lucidity rather than completeness characterises the discussion of the interaction between the religion and its varying environment, and such discussion is incidental. This was by no means inevitable. Wealth of detail need not have excluded such suggestive generalisations as the reader finds throughout Baur's *History* or in Dr Caird's *Evolution of Religion* (ii. 244 f.). It is a pity, too, that more attention was not paid to the contemporary religions of paganism. This might have been done without prejudice to the perspective, and with certain advantages to the sketch. In Gnosticism, to take only a single instance, the Oriental background is almost as essential as the Hellenic, and Harnack *more suo* is preoccupied with the latter. Whether it was due to his penchant for Hellenism or not, I deplore especially the omission—for it amounts practically to an omission—of eschatology as a factor in the ante-Nicene development. It is far from satisfactory to plead, as the author has just done in a notice of his own book, that the eschatological interest waned in the post-apostolic age, except in periods of persecution. Why, the very retribution-idea, rightly emphasised by Harnack himself (pp. 70–71), was bound up with an intense conception of the future, to say nothing of such beliefs as those in demons and in Jesus the Judge! Surely, stamped all over early Christianity, we find that one powerful source of its attraction and impressiveness consisted in the vivid, varying presentation of rewards and punishments in a world to come. The future was a strong lever of the faith, and the non-recognition of this constitutes, I think, a serious defect in what is otherwise a most competent and comprehensive piece of historical research.

Although the introductory matter of the first three chapters in book i. covers well-worn ground, they pave the way for those later sections in which Harnack makes great play with the idea of early Christianity as a *complexio oppositorum* (e.g. p. 359), definite yet versatile, exclusive yet comprehensive, simple and sublime, a religion whose success was largely due to its power of adaptation, its fertility of resource, its variety of appeal, and its capacity of uniting the simple essentials of its own belief to varied coefficients in the contemporary situation of morals and religion. Syncretism was the

characteristic of the latter. Its interests and instincts were at once heterogeneous and fairly uniform. And in this syncretism of culture and belief, where cosmopolitanism, with its attendant individualism, had stirred unusual sensitiveness to the deeper needs of life, the new religion found its opportunity, furnished alike by Judaism and by the state of the Roman empire. "The transformation of a national into a universal religion may take place in two ways: the religion either simplifies itself to its main essentials, or incorporates a number of new elements from other religions. Both of these processes occurred simultaneously in Judaism. But it was the former which proved the most important preparation" for Christianity, as may be gathered (p. 11) from a passage of such significance as Mark xii. 28-34, to which the nearest approach is Paul's speech at Athens. The wider conditions were as favourable to this cosmopolitan temper of religion, since the political decomposition and the blending of Orientalism and Hellenism in the world-culture of the day gave an opening for the development of denationalised religion upon fresh lines to meet the vague longings of the period. "The soul, God, knowledge, expiation, asceticism, redemption, eternal life—these were the sublime ideas which were living and operative, partly as the precipitate of deep inner and outer movements, partly as the outcome of the labours of great souls, partly in consequence of the sublimation of all cults during the Imperial age. Wherever vital religion existed, it was in this circle of experience and ideas that it drew breath. The actual number of those who lived within it, is a matter of no moment. *All men have not faith.* And the history of religion, so far as it is really a history of vital religion, always runs upon a very narrow line" (pp. 22-23).

So much for the currents setting in towards the change. One is reminded of Newman's paragraph (*Development of Doctrine*, ch. vi. sect. 3), and of the curious parallel furnished by Burke's famous sentences in his *Thoughts on French Affairs*. But what of the religion which seized the opportunity and threw itself upon the transition? Partly owing to its contents, partly to its omissions, Harnack's chapter (bk. i. ch. 4) on the universal outlook of Jesus is at once the most controversial and perhaps the least convincing in the volume. It is not merely that difference of opinion exists upon exegetical details—though, for example, one might argue that the *first* of Mark vii. 27 is at least to be reckoned with (in the sense of Rom. i. 16, ii. 9-10, ix. 24); that Matt. xxi. 43 does *not* allude to the people as distinguished from the official Israel; that Mark xiii. 10 is hardly to be dismissed as a theologoumenon put into the mouth of Jesus, and that it is not, upon critical grounds, necessary to exclude a universal mission from the horizon of Jesus if one is prepared to accept (as Harnack rightly does) the genuineness of Matt. x. 23. The defect of the chapter is that it is disproportionate. Instead of exhibiting the criterion of Christianity's extension, either as an idea or as an organism, it concentrates the reader's attention too exclusively upon questions which cannot be solved apart from a severe critical treat-

ment of the whole gospel-problem, and which are after all subordinate (for the purpose of this volume) to the "intensive universalism" of Christ's teaching (p. 30), with its implicate of an individual and denationalised religion. Now this is really the point at issue for a history of ante-Nicene extension (see on this Heinrici's *das Urchristenthum*, 1902, pp. 36 f.). The divergent traditions preserved *e.g.* in Mark and Matthew, if they required notice at all, might well have been reserved to the following chapter upon the apostolic transition from the Jewish to the Gentile mission (pp. 30-52).

The latter seems to have been present to the mind of the primitive church almost from the outset. It did not begin with Paul, for he had predecessors in the field (Acts viii. 4 f., xi. 19 f.); the point is that he began with it, and lifted it on to quite a new plane. Thanks in the main to his efforts, as well as to the men who worked for the same end along different lines, the new faith had shaken itself clear of particularistic Jewish tendencies by the year 140 A.D.; which offers a significant illustration of the further fact (p. 45) that Christianity has never rooted itself so deeply in Jewish or Semitic soil as elsewhere. Harnack's whole discussion of this change (pp. 30-52) is keen and fertile. But again some of the details challenge criticism. Surely, *e.g.*, after the martyrdom of Stephen, who (like Huss) died for a cause whose consequences he did not foresee (p. 36), the notice that the apostles alone remained in Jerusalem (Acts viii. 1) might mark the pragmatism of the author, instead of being a subtle indication that they were not at one with the martyr on the question at issue. In view of Col. iii. 11, is it right to say (p. 46) that Rom. xi. 25-29 was Paul's last word on Judaism? And is it not precarious (p. 44, after *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1902, 604-605) to adduce Porphyry's remark (*Mac. Magnes*, iii. 22, *ιστορεῖται μὴδ' ὀλίγους μῆνας βοσκίσας τὰ προβάτια ὁ Πέτρος ἐσταυρῶσθαι*) as valid evidence for Peter's stay and martyrdom in Rome? Evidently, also, Harnack still inclines (pp. 30 f.) to trust the old tradition which kept the apostles at Jerusalem for twelve years after the crucifixion. Here, as throughout the volume, there is rich spoil for the New Testament student (*e.g.*, Paul's collection for the saints, pp. 133-4; early Christian communism, 109 f.; the imitation of Christ, p. 64, etc.), which might have been made more accessible by an index of passages.

The cardinal feature brought out by the long discussion in book ii. upon the missionary preaching of the church, is its spontaneity. Expansion was taken as a matter of course.

Light is light which radiates,
Blood is blood which circulates,
Life is life which generates ;

and the primitive church was essentially light, blood, and life within the ancient world. To judge from Tertullian's pungent remarks (and Harnack, who insists that Tertullian is not to be undervalued, agrees

with him on this point), whilst among the sectaries, as indeed among bodies like the Plymouth Brethren of our own day, interest in the evangelisation of the outside world was generally subordinated to the passion for preying upon those who were already members of the Christian church, one note of the true church, upon the contrary, was devotion to the spread of the gospel among outsiders. Faith flowed and overflowed. As for the contents of this propaganda to pagans, summarised in 1 Thes. i. 9-10, 1 Cor. xii. 2, they were rich as well as simple; definite and yet capable of varied presentation, they consisted of the four notes, "the one God, Jesus as Saviour and Judge, the Resurrection, and self-control or moral purity" (pp. 69 f.). The tinge of asceticism or unworldliness attaching to this quintessence of the faith, with its correlate in the idea of retribution, Harnack explains as due to the historical exigencies of the situation. "Revolutions are not accomplished by means of rose-water, and this was a revolution; it meant the overthrowing of polytheism, and the enthroning of God and goodness in the world—for those who believed in them, as well as for those who did not. This could not have taken place, had not men emphasised the vanity of the present world and practically shaken themselves clear of it." And indeed, as Lichtenhan has shown, Gnosticism itself, from slightly different premises, reached the same ascetic opposition to the world, in spite of its monistic cosmogony. The necessary complement to such tendencies Harnack finds in the conception of Jesus as a Saviour and of the gospel as a healing power (pp. 72-91, with an important excursus on the warfare against demons, pp. 92-105), as well as in the preaching and practice of Christianity (pp. 105-148) as a religion of the love that gives and forgives, in which the social element of service was not accidental but essential. Upon the former line, where the new faith had the cult of that *deus clinicus* or humane physician, Æsculapius, as a formidable rival—how formidable, readers of Pater's *Marius* and Usener's *Götternamen* (1896, pp. 147 f., 350) will recollect—the preaching of Christianity as medicinal for soul and body (*cf.* 1 Pet. ii. 24; 3 John 2; James v. 14-15; Mark xvi. 17, etc.) brought success, reproach, and peril. The success lay in its power of meeting the yearnings for a Divine healer or physician of the soul, of exorcising demons (pp. 95 f.), and of bringing a panacea to the sick and wounded in life's conflict. The attack of Celsus alone is sufficient to indicate the obvious causes of reproach which attached to this aspect of the faith. And the perils were threefold: an exaggerated repulsion, in certain circles, to æsthetics, or even to beauty and health (a point afterwards urged by Julian); the transformation of the sacraments into magical or cabalistic processes, as early as Ignatius with his *φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, ἀντίδοτος τοῦ μὴ θανεῖν* (of the Lord's Supper); and, finally, a too theoretical conception of health or salvation as the knowledge of God (pp. 85-86, *cf.* 74), which (as in Clemens Alex.) approached to the Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge. Side by side with this, however, ran its corrective in the strong current of practical mutual love, that flooded previous channels of charity, and made fresh ones for itself through the soil of

ancient society. Think, for example, of all that lies behind a single taunt such as that levelled at Christians by the pagan Cæcilius: *amant mutuo paene antequam noverint!*

The attractiveness of this social love was enhanced by other aspects which also appealed strongly to the age. One was the moral earnestness and holiness of Christianity as a gospel of spirit and power (pp. 148-161), a feature which up to the third century successfully resisted the prejudicial influence of hierarchical and ritual tendencies. Even more influential, perhaps, was the combined appeal of the gospel to the instincts of authority and of reason (pp. 161-177). The peremptory demands of the episcopate, invaluable as a factor in the consolidation and preservation of the religion, came to involve what afterwards blossomed into the antithesis between Evangelic and Catholic, viz., a claim for obedience to revelation as vested in sacred books and in a sacred order; at the same time, by a strangely parallel movement, apologists could freely claim Christianity as the true philosophy, courting inquiry and discussion in a spirit of pure religious rationalism (p. 168). The point of union between these extremes Harnack finds, dexterously but somewhat too narrowly, in their attitude towards the sacraments (pp. 168 f.). "Paul was the first and almost (for Marcion and his disciples do not seem to have been sacramental theologians) the last theologian of the early church with whom sacramental theology was held in check by clear thought and purely spiritual considerations. After him all the sluices were flung open; in poured the mysteries—and with them their philosophy" (p. 171, *cf.* 228). Their admission certainly contributed to the success of the faith in many quarters, nor (as Harnack protests) must we apply a puritan standard to such phenomena, since religion has to reach people in every age through some accessible medium or other. Nature, said Goethe once, tells man *Take all but pay*; and this principle, that success has its penalties, may be traced in operation throughout early Christianity. The new faith took all. But she had to pay for it; and as usual, the gains were felt before the disadvantages became apparent.

The sixth chapter (with an excursus, pp. 197-204) is devoted to the propaganda of Christianity as a new people, or as *the* people of God, with a religious citizenship all its own (pp. 177-197), a self-consciousness which was ultimately worked out into the famous triple division of mankind into Pagans, Jews, and Christians. Curiously enough, the Old Testament was on this account, as well as on others, in some respects more useful than the New Testament as a missionary book (pp. 204-210). Although a source of considerable perplexity to early Christians (pp. 46 f.), it was no incubus; it sanctioned, under their interpretation, not simply hierarchical and ritual irrelevancies, but the church's claim to the privileges and destiny of God's people, throwing light upon the present history of Christians as the fulfilment of ancient prophecy. Besides, it commended itself independently on the score of its monotheism, its ethical precepts, and (in the controversy with Gnostic cosmogonies especially) the creation-narrative. These elements

lent it great prominence in the mission and organisation of the church; for, while the Gospels contained the words of Jesus, and Acts was in effect a history of missions, the New Testament as a whole—however we estimate its apologetic element—was written directly for the inner circles of the church (pp. 210, 277). It was with the Old Testament in her hand that the early church went out to persuade and win the world.

And the enemy which tried her power was polytheism and idolatry (pp. 210–225), in all the social and political ramifications of the period. No quarter was given in the conflict. The condition of the church's victory was the exclusiveness of her demand, which tolerated no comparison whatever upon this point, whilst, even over the burning question of the imperial cultus, where religion and patriotism seemed at hopeless feud, the early Christians managed to dissociate loyalty from worship of the emperor, and to vindicate the distinction. Yet the elimination of idolatry was, it must be granted, only partial. Back came the old superstition, baptised under the name of what afterwards developed into the adoration of saints and martyrs, even of apostles (216 f.).

In book iii., devoted to an account of the methods, agents, and opponents of the new propaganda, some useful points are made. The Jewish order of "Apostles" is emphasised (*cf.* p. 239), as well as the existence of "prophets" and "teachers," in the Judaism out of which early Christianity arose. Their co-ordination in this order of merit, however, and the particular development of the apostolate, are reckoned peculiar to Christianity. After the Montanist controversy the prophets naturally were discredited and suppressed, as were the teachers (real missionaries of the early church, p. 265), owing to the danger of their speculations compromising the church with secular philosophy. But behind both movements lay the jealousy felt by the rising episcopate, which aimed to have the authority and activity of the church in its own hands. Further, it is serviceable (pp. 245 f.) to point out that, according to Acts (vi. 2, etc.), Paul, Hermas, and the Didachê, the highest rank in the early church was assigned to those who "spoke the word of God" (*cp. e.g.*, 1 Pet. iv. 11, Heb. xiii. 7), whether apostles, teachers, or prophets, and that these—although their later names and labours are obscure, with the partial exception of people like Pantaneus, Papylus and Thekla—seem to have belonged to no individual church but to Christendom as a whole. "The notion that the professional preachers in the church were elected by the different congregations is as erroneous as the notion that they received their office through any kind of human succession." (At this point, in an elaborate excursus, pp. 319–342, Harnack examines and rejects Duchesne's argument for the existence of provincial bishoprics.)

But indeed the success of the church in winning adherents depended as much, if not more, upon the tenacious loyalty shown by its martyrs and the efforts and life of those who occupied no official position (including women, but seldom soldiers); whilst, especially after the Montanist controversy, which heightened the catholic consciousness, it was the church itself that

formed the main factor in the expansion of Christianity (pp. 63, 279, 285, 311, 314, 358). Henceforth, like the eagle of Apuleius, *tota mole corporis labitur*. Its size, its very existence, attracted and impressed. Certainly, from the third century, one may say that advance was materially accelerated by the completeness of the church itself, with a firm organisation, polity, worship, sacraments (particularly baptism, from the standpoint of evangelisation), priests, philosophy, and an atmosphere all its own (see Lecky's *History of European Morals*, i. pp. 387 f.). The variety of its functions and the multiplicity of its energies and appeals, proved and manifested its vitality.

This finds expression in the various names and titles of the church and its members (pp. 286–299). Round *ἐκκλησία*, which originated neither with Paul nor with Jesus but with the primitive Palestinian churches (p. 292), the correlative ideas of authority and comprehensiveness rapidly gathered, whilst the transcendental idea (*i.e.* the church as a heavenly body, of which the adherents, like colonists, sojourned upon earth) naturally tended to fade as the third century progressed. So did the primitive title of *saints* (p. 290), and for much the same reason; “holy” or “saintly” became an aristocratic title in the church, no longer applicable to the general body of the people. One title, however, had more vogue than is generally realised, and that was *soldiers of Christ* (pp. 297 f.)—a designation of Christians which amounts almost to a technical term. In Tertullian and Cyprian the church often becomes quite a Salvation army. Christ is the *imperator*, with his *sacramentum*, *milites (dei or Christi)*, and life of *militia*; so much so that Harnack even inclines to follow Zahn's suggestion that *pagani* acquired much the same connotation as attaches to the modern “civilian” upon the lips of a military man. Were this so, it would be a remarkable instance of the reliant Christian self-consciousness. Pagans are mere outsiders! They have not enlisted with God! Consequently they have no right to participate in the *sacramentum*!

Incidentally, there is an admirable defence of the genuineness of Acts xi. 26 (pp. 294–296, *cf.* 346), with a fresh discussion (pp. 296–297) of Tacitus, *Ann.* xv. 44. Harnack, who has no doubt that Christians were persecuted by Nero, and persecuted as Christians, agrees with Blass that the original reading was *Chrestianos*. By using the imperfect (*appellabat vulgus*), he suggests, Tacitus may have meant to indicate that this vulgar and barbarous form of the name was no longer employed; by the time he wrote, the more correct *Christiani* had become familiar to all. Which is ingenious and even plausible. Harnack further agrees that the Neronian persecution of the Christians must have sprung largely from the malignity of the Jews (pp. 41, 343), whose synagogues then, as in Tertullian's day, were *fontes persecutionum*. But the later opposition, with an account of which his third book closes (pp. 342 f.), came from paganism, and broke on the church in a double wave of persecution and of calumnies. Harnack has some acute pages on the latter topic (pp. 340 f.). No temper is less historical than that to which, in the ante-Nicene period, or indeed in any other, a St. is a saint,

and a heretic a heretic. Much information may often be gathered from those who did not accept the new propaganda, and the historian, in this spirit, proceeds to analyse the resistance offered, not by coarse prejudices but, with almost unanimous persistence, by the world of culture to Christianity. That Mezentius of the second century, Lucian, he dismisses as an easy-going, clever journalist, who simply trifled with the question. The serious opponents were "only Celsus and Porphyry; only two, yet they were a whole army in themselves." It must be counted a distinct merit of this volume not simply to have called attention, as Wendland recently has done, to Porphyry's influence and significance as a philosopher, but to have recognised frankly his critical ability and the deeply religious nature which marked him off from Celsus. The latter was an agnostic, interested in religion merely as a political necessity. Harnack unhesitatingly identifies Porphyry with the heathen philosopher of Macarius Magnes' *Apocriticus*, and even goes so far as to describe some of his arguments against popular Christianity as unanswerable except from a modern and critical standpoint.

The fourth book, describing the statistical and geographical spread of early Christianity, is useful rather than readable upon the whole, the larger part of it being occupied by invaluable lists of places throughout the Roman world where Christian churches are known to have existed previous to Constantine. A certain heterogeneity was perhaps inevitable at this point. But with some re-arrangement, such as Harnack has himself indicated (pp. 539 f.), the survey might have been rendered at once more coherent and less technical, instead of suggesting occasionally that the contents of various notebooks have been somewhat fortuitously pieced together, with the result that (for example) the movement of Christianity in Phrygia or the Hauran is left blurred. Apart from this defect in form, the discussion brings out very succinctly the varying degrees of progress and lines of advance in the extension of early Christianity. I regret that the author did not carry out his original intention of supplying the volume with some maps, and the English reader will do well to procure the serviceable map of the early Roman empire just issued by Mr G. B. Grundy in *Murray's Handy Classical Maps* (price 1s. net). With a map of this kind the student is sure to win information from almost every page of the closing section.

Slow, horses, slow,
As through the wood we go—
We would count the stars in heaven,
Hear the grasses grow.

Harnack is too sane and acute a scholar to essay the task of letting his readers hear the grass of Christianity grow throughout the provinces of the empire. But if the reader goes with him patiently and slowly through the forest of evidence—not always very closely planted—he will find himself ultimately in a position to judge why and where the new faith sowed and reaped, sometimes thirtyfold, sometimes sixty, and sometimes a hundredfold, during the first three centuries of its activity. By 325 A.D. Christianity had won superiority in numbers and influence throughout

Asia Minor (upon the whole), Thrace (the part facing Bithynia), Armenia, and Edessa. Progress there seems to have been swift and deep. Asia Minor, of course, was in the pre-Constantine period (461 f.) the Christian land *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, where "all the great developments of the Christian religion began, and all its great conflicts—that of the itinerant against the local organisation, that of Gnosticism, that of Christology (for Praxeas, Theodotus, Epigonus were Asiatic), that of Montanism (which did not elsewhere become a national question), and so forth—were primarily waged." The Balkan peninsula seems hardly worthy of being ranked by Harnack in this first class. But there is no doubt possible as to the high Christian level of Armenia and Edessa; the former was officially Christian at the opening of the fourth century, thanks mainly to the efforts of Gregory, whilst as early as 190 A.D. the new faith (associated with the names of Tatian and Bardesanes) spread in and round Edessa, penetrating shortly afterwards into the court itself (440 f.). Upon the other hand, Christianity found itself here and there upon more equal terms with the rival religions of the period; as, *e.g.*, in Cyprus, Antioch (the great predecessor of Ephesus as a station of the faith), and Coele-Syria generally (430 f., "from Antioch the Hellenistic Christian propaganda operated on the West, as the Syrian Christian from Edessa on the East"). The same holds true of Egypt, where a powerful church first leaps to light under Demetrius and Clement, evidencing its vigour (among other traces) by the rise of the Coptic versions a century later (448 f.; Harnack, by the way, will not follow Bardenhewer in taking the Gospel *κατ' Αἰγυπτίου* as the Gospel of the provincial Egyptians in contradistinction to "the Alexandrian"). Rome too (pp. 270, 493 f.) falls under this second category (its Christian population in 250 A.D. exceeded 30,000), and much more Italy as a whole—so much so indeed that one would be inclined to reckon Italian Christianity in Harnack's third, instead of in his second class. The latter is completed by proconsular Africa, with its rich development of Christian Latin literature, martyrs, and controversy, during the second and third centuries (573 f., "from Gallienus to 303 A.D. the numbers of the African Church must have increased by geometrical progression"), together with Numidia, Spain (528–533), and portions of the coasts of Achaia, Thessaly, Macedonia, and Southern Gaul. In a third class Harnack arranges districts where Christianity made little headway. These included Palestine (413 f.), which, with the exception of some Greek cities, was not Christianised in the pre-Constantine period, and which (even so far as it was Christian) displayed affinity with Alexandria rather than with Antioch and the North. Add Phœnicia¹ (427–430, where, apart from a few Greek cities on the coast line, Christians were found, for the most part, only at Damascus, Paneas, and Palmyra), Arabia, certain tracts of Mesopotamia, the interior of Achaia, Macedonia, and Thessaly, together with places like Epirus and the surrounding districts (*e.g.* Pannonia), and

¹ See Harnack's additional citations from Chrysostom, in *Theolog. Literaturzeitung* (1902), 642.

Mauretania. The harvest was as yet scantiest in a fourth class, including the ancient Philistine cities, the north and north-west shores of the Black Sea, districts like Piedmont, Gaul (middle and northern), and Rhaetia, to say nothing of Britain (which, however, was rather in advance of Germany).

From this mass of details one or two general conclusions emerge, such as the success of Christianity in the towns, the slow rise (hardly till the reign of Marcus Aurelius) of what may be termed Latin Christianity, and the fact that, subsequently to Paul, the two periods of rapid extension were (a) the years of Commodus and his successors (pp. 378 f.), and (b) the epoch 260-303 A.D. The channels along which the general current flowed were mainly fourfold. It made its way with increasing, though not unchecked, advance into the circles of culture and rank, oozing even into the imperial court itself. It penetrated the army, as the Diocletian persecution shows, although Christianity was never propagated by soldiers, as (for example) the Mithra-cult seems to have been (pp. 268, 388, 535-536). And, from the first, it succeeded with women, till its sheer success involved it in a number of tangled problems upon the relation of the sex to the church's organisation as well as to marriage under the conditions of ancient society (pp. 395-407).

This success, and the causes of it, recommended the new faith as an ally to Constantine. "He did not require to raise it from the dust; had that been necessary, the politician would hardly have moved a finger. Nay, bleeding from many a wound, yet unbending, vigorous withal, the church confronted him" (pp. 348-349). For all its more or less latent drawbacks, the episcopate, standing for unity, continuity, and the vital discipline of authority, had the relative value of helping to win a historical success. "The Christianity that won the day," says Harnack (p. 165), surely with undue severity, "was the Christianity of blind faith depicted by Celsus. When would a State ever have shown any positive interest in any other sort of religion?" "It is idle to ask if the church would have won the day apart from Constantine. A Constantine was bound to come. Only, every decade made it easier for a Constantine to appear. All that was wanted was an acute and energetic politician, *who at the same time took an interest in the inward religious situation*; and such a man was Constantine. Thanks to his genius, he clearly recognised and as firmly grasped the inevitable. He employed no arbitrary or artificial means to lay the basis of the imperial State church. All he did was to give the leading provinces the religion they desired; the other provinces had simply to follow suit" (p. 545). The italics are Harnack's.

So the volume ends. By 325 A.D. early Christianity had assimilated enough gnosticism and superstition to enable her to overcome gnosticism and to defeat the superstitions of cultured and popular paganism on their own ground. Her power of assimilation or adaptation was obvious. Not so obvious, owing to circumstances, was her corresponding power of recuperation, by which, without prejudice to the essential continuity of the

faith, she could react against herself and generate new life from contact with the truths and trust of Jesus. It was the former function that came specially into play during the ante-Nicene development. Then the church realised her ability and call to take up elements in contemporary life, and employ them as media for expressing and impressing her inner self. The institutional and administrative genius of Christianity became her salvation; "born of the Spirit," as Harnack remarks, "she learned to consecrate the earthly," and to mould materials furnished by her environment. Wherever this plastic function predominates, no matter how the church be named, catholicism is the result. The recuperative power, with its duty of protest and repudiation, comes into play when such adaptation has passed (or is likely to pass) into compromise, to the deflection of principle, or where such modes of self-expression have become anachronistic, if not antagonistic to the unfettered development of the faith. *La force est aux sources.* Harnack is too great a scholar to make pictures or polemic out of history. He refuses to be wiser than the event. But as he reads it—and the essential features of his reading are not disputed by most of those who are competent to judge—to be deep in ante-Nicene history is to be convinced that many forms of organisation and doctrine, which afterwards came to be tacitly accepted as classical, were but temporary means of adaptation to environment; whilst upon others, as (for example) a clerical priesthood and a magical sacramentarianism, the verdict of history is not that they are liable to corruption, but that they are themselves corruptions of the Christian faith and church.

Even to those who disagree with Harnack's historical and religious views, this volume will prove an opportune, unique, and indispensable handbook. I hope some enterprising publisher will arrange shortly for an English edition—at a reasonable price. The last four words, let me add, are not idly written.

DUNDONALD, N.B.

JAMES MOFFATT.

Religion und Kultus der Römer.—Von Dr G. Wissowa, Professor an der Universität Halle.—*Handbuch der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. Iwan-Müller, vol. v. pt. 4, Munich, 1902.

Die Religion der Römer.—Von Emil Aust.—*Darstellung aus dem Gebiete der nichtchristlichen Religionsgeschichte*, vol. xiii., Münster, 1899.

THE religion of the Romans is a most perplexing subject. If we take it in its proper sense, as the religion of the Roman City-State, we are at once confronted by three great difficulties. First, it has no mythology, like that of the Greeks, Celts, or Teutons; nor were its deities conceived as being like men, needing house-room, capable of being represented in iconic form; nor, again, can we closely associate them with natural agencies such as sun, moon, wind, etc. Thus some of the most obvious clues by

which in most cases we can attempt to interpret the religious ideas of a people are here wanting. Secondly, at no time in Roman history can we feel sure that foreign influences had not been long at work on this religion. The geographical position of Rome laid her open to such influences from the first, and especially to Greek; at a very early period we know that the west coast of Italy was visited by Greeks, bringing with them works of art in which their own mythology was depicted. Then the Etruscan people, themselves an unsolved problem, spread over the same region and added to the confusion. Next came the Roman career of conquest, and the consequent absorption of foreign cults and deities; and so great a change was thus brought about, that the genuine Roman religion may be said to have expired almost two centuries before the end of the Republic. Thirdly, the actual data are, as might be expected after what has been said, of the most meagre description, and at the same time most baffling. The evidence of myth and of works of art is either wholly absent, or where it is forthcoming, is at once suspected of being non-native. The Romans of the literary age were quite incapable of distinguishing between native and foreign elements, and had no proper apparatus for recovering the meaning of rites and deities which had long ceased to interest the Roman world. Our one piece of good fortune is the survival of the *Fasti*, *i.e.* the religious calendar of the earliest Rome, and this is all the more valuable since the religion was clearly one of rites rather than of ideas. On this one priceless possession all scientific inquiry must be built.

So much it has been necessary to say in order to mark clearly the importance of the first of the two works indicated at the head of this article. Twenty or thirty years ago, he who would attempt a systematic study of the subject found himself soon in almost hopeless confusion. He had indeed great works to help him; the material had been brought together by a long series of German scholars, who had done their best to interpret as well as to arrange it. But of these, Marquardt alone, by limiting himself strictly to the cult, had produced a clear picture of what the Romans actually did in their worship; and as they were always more a doing than a thinking people, this, together with Mommsen's edition of the *Fasti* in vol. i. of the *Corpus Inscriptionum*, may be said to have revolutionised the study, and laid a sound basis for future inquiry. But meanwhile the comparative mythologists had been putting out theory after theory; it was impossible that these theories should not be applied to the Roman religion, and the result was usually disastrous. More recently the folklorists have been at work on all sides, and have not refrained from using and interpreting the Roman material open to them. But all things Roman demand a special study; and even with the help of Preller, Marquardt, and others, it was almost impossible for one not trained in that study to avoid mistakes as to fact, or misleading conclusions based on actual fact. The *Mythological Lexicon* edited by Roscher showed this clearly during the first years of its gradual appearance; many Roman articles need already to be re-written. One writer at least in this *Lexicon* never allowed himself

to be led astray from the safe but narrow Roman path; all the articles signed by Dr Wissowa will be of permanent value. Neither mythology nor folklore could tempt him to wander; and in compiling these articles and others in the new edition of Pauly's *Real-encyclopädie*, and in re-editing Marquardt's work, he laid the foundations of pure Roman material on which the volume before us is based. It is not too much to say that this volume is the most complete and the most trustworthy account of the Roman religion now in print. Though without the literary charm of Preller, it is more sound and stable; without the lucidity of Marquardt, it covers far more ground. It is the work of a truly honest and conscientious scholar, who states what he believes to be the truth and no more, and who almost invariably admits the fact when his subject-matter is such as to suggest no sure solution.

This excellent result has been attained not only by rigorous condensation and admirable balance of parts, but chiefly by steady adherence to the self-denying ordinance indicated in the last paragraph. The book is what it professes to be, an account of the religion and cult of the Roman State; that religion is explained by itself alone, without any comparison with other forms of religion; the still uncertain theories of mythologists, folklorists, and students of comparative religion are left altogether out of account. We cannot altogether regret that this is so; we cannot but feel that we are here at least on safe ground, and that if we do not learn much from this volume that may help us in the study of comparative religion, we do at any rate learn all that is at present to be known about the religious practice of the Romans.

Yet Dr Wissowa's plan, it must be said, has its drawbacks. One who deals with the religious conceptions of a particular people will do his work better if he be to some extent conversant with the religious history of the world. To Dr Wissowa the Roman deities are "Gottheiten," but in what sense conceived as such he does not clearly inform us; he is not greatly interested in the various ways in which the supernatural has been conceived by different peoples, or in the genesis and growth of ideas to which the names of deities became attached. It is a significant fact that the word *numen* is not to be found in his index; yet none expresses so well the Roman's idea of supernatural agency. His treatment of Mars, the characteristic Roman deity, affords a good example of the limitations which he has set to his sphere of work; to him Mars is the god of war, and only of war, because within the Roman State this is what the cult indicates; to Mars in other capacities he either shuts his eyes, or explains them in a way which we cannot hold to be scientific, because it uses the phenomena of a higher form of civil development (that of the State) to explain those of an earlier (that of the agricultural community). Even the extraordinary restrictions imposed on the Flamen Dialis are explained from the point of view of Roman cult only, and without any reference to the now famous chapter in Dr Frazer's *Golden Bough* on "Royal and priestly taboos." Other instances might be given of the same tendency, which for many

readers will rob the work of the interest which so authoritative an exposition of the subject should naturally arouse. But, as has been already pointed out, things Roman require a special training, and it is hardly possible to combine that training with a comprehensive knowledge of the history of religion. It is better, on the whole, that an account of the Roman religion should be written by a thoroughly trained scholar, than by a student of comparative religion who is an amateur in Roman antiquities. We cannot have everything; and we may be profoundly grateful to one who has spent so many years of conscientious and judicious labour in providing us with a thesaurus of well sifted material, which we may safely use in wider and more nourishing studies.

Dr Aust's book, which preceded that of Dr Wissowa by more than two years, and is modestly described in the preface as merely the herald of that work, is not so much designed to assist specialists as to provide the student of religions with a synoptic view of the Roman religion as a whole; details, discussions, and reference to authorities are here for the most part omitted. The author is heartily to be congratulated on the skill with which he has contrived to picture the most essential features of Roman ideas and practice in little more than 200 pages, and in language which is unusually attractive for a German work of this kind.

Though announced as a herald only, this book is in fact a very useful complement to that of Dr Wissowa. In the main, the division of the subject-matter is the same, and the treatment is on the same lines; but Aust, not writing only or chiefly for the learned world, has allotted a larger portion of his space to general characterisation, and his chapter on "Das Wesen der Römischen Religion" is perhaps the best sketch of the kind that has as yet been published. It is the work of a man interested not only in the forms of the religion he is describing, but in the religious conceptions of primitive peoples generally. Though space is not consumed by comparison with other religions, it is easy to see that he has them in his mind; and this enables him to bring out the characteristics of the one he is handling with greater clearness and force.

It may be possible to give an idea of the value of this chapter by extracting from it a few pregnant sentences, all of which ring true to one who has studied the subject carefully. "Among all Italian stocks the oldest forms of worship show the features of a rural Nature-worship." The life of the herdsman is the oldest to which the survivals in Roman cult point; and archæology indicates the essential identity in civilisation of the oldest inhabitants of the site of Rome and the primitive tribes of northern Italy. But passing quickly from this obscure region, Dr Aust brings us to the earliest Roman city life, and here at once strikes the keynote of the whole story,—the practical sense of the Roman as applied to his religion, which moved him to begin subjecting it to organisation from the very outset, identifying State and Individual in one comprehensive *pietas*,—a code not of belief but of ritual. "Worship is the duty of the Roman *qua* citizen The administration of religion is a part of civil administra-

tion: the *jus sacrum* is a part of the *jus civile*." As Marquardt pointed out, it is not a prophet or a poet to whom the Romans ascribed their religion, but a king. So tenacious were they of this principle that even when their belief in the objects of their worship failed them, their priest-statesmen still maintained that worship as an essential part of the life of the State. So thoroughly organised were the forms of the cult that they both obscured and survived the *numina* they were originally intended to propitiate.

Dr Aust next proceeds to explain this victory of forms over ideas by reference to the peculiar character of the Roman's conception of his deities. They cannot be dissociated from the cult; they had no human form, and as he very happily puts it, "they had no human heart, with its virtues and vices." They were colourless, cold conceptions—*numina*, the word which should be continually in the mind of the student of this strange religion. Each had his own functional activity, corresponding to the active life, the daily work of his worshippers, but it is difficult to see how they had any influence upon conduct and morality. Yet Dr Aust is probably right in asserting (p. 30) that even the Roman religion contained the germ of an awakening of an inner religious life, and that this germ was stunted and eventually destroyed by the quasi-legal organisation of the cult.

Lastly, Dr Aust explains why the old Roman religion at last became merged in a congeries of the religions of the civilised or semi-civilised world. What the Roman deities really represented was not the experience of an inner life, but the experience of the Roman agriculturist, warrior, or citizen in his struggle for existence. When Rome advanced to the conquest of the world and created an empire, it was inevitable that these deities should cease to correspond with that experience. Some of them were deserted and forgotten, others were transformed into the likeness of foreign gods and goddesses. This process can be traced from the beginning of the Republic and the building of the great Capitoline temple, to the age when the worships of Magna Mater, Bacchus, Isis, Mithras, and of the Cæsars indicate a permanent and melancholy struggle to make religion correspond with experience. In the history of the life and death of the old Roman religion is mirrored the history of the life and death of the Roman City-State; the two rise and fall together; and in the cosmopolitan age of empire that follows, both State and individual look for new religious forms, and eventually also for new religious faiths.

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Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau.—By Henry Sidgwick.—Pp. xli, 374. London: Macmillan & Co., 1902.

THE friends of the late Professor Sidgwick have made a wise use of their discretion in choosing to publish his lectures on the systems of Green, Spencer, and Martineau. Though the subject of these lectures was dealt with by Sidgwick in a number of scattered articles in *Mind*, the bulk of the material of which the present volume consists will be new, except to those who were privileged to hear the lectures as they were originally delivered. It must be said at once that the editorial work of Miss E. K. C. Jones has been most creditably performed. Though, as the Preface informs us, the lectures were never prepared, and possibly not designed, for publication by their author, there are very few perceptible traces of incompleteness or want of final revision, except, perhaps, in the section dealing with Green, where the transitions occasionally strike the reader as a little abrupt. The section on Spencer, which fills nearly half of the book, is an admirable example of Sidgwick's style at its best,—lucid, unadorned, and forcible, and frequently pervaded by a grave and happy humour. It is hard to believe that this part of the book, at any rate, would have been substantially improved had the author been spared to put his final touch to it. The serious student, let me hasten to add, will be especially thankful to the editor for the very full Analytical Summary of Contents. The mechanical execution of the printer's and proof-reader's tasks is almost uniformly good,—though one or two slips (*e.g.* the misspelling *Nichomachean*, on p. 97, and the substitution at p. 300 of Ireland for Iceland in the proverb about the non-existent snakes) remain to attest the adage that no human work is perfect.

The present work cannot, it is true, be said to contain any fresh contribution to its distinguished and lamented author's positive ethical doctrine. In his ethical work, at any rate, Sidgwick was pre-eminently a *homo unius libri* in the sense that he aimed at putting all he had to say on questions of principle into one complete and comprehensive book, and not leaving his system, so far as he had one, to be laboriously collected from a comparison of several independent volumes. Hence readers of the *Methods of Ethics*, who have failed to extract from it an ultimately coherent and satisfactory point of view, as some of us think that we have failed after repeated study, will probably not get much new light on their difficulties from these lectures. But there are many of us who think Sidgwick's capacity for criticism far more considerable than his power of construction. We may have failed to be impressed by his attempted conciliation of Intuitionism with Benthamism, but our dissatisfaction has not lessened for us the value of the criticism, at once minute, unsparing, and absolutely kindly and fair, to which the *Methods of Ethics* mainly owes its extraordinary value as a training in the spirit and method of philosophical reasoning. Perhaps it is not too much to say that we may reasonably

expect to see a new constructive moralist of first-rate originality sooner than such another master of the art of philosophical criticism as Professor Sidgwick. And in all the qualities which make fine criticism, the present volume forms a worthy pendant to the more important work, while it has a special charm of its own in the sallies of bright and absolutely unmalicious wit with which it abounds, particularly in the lectures dealing with Spencer, whose knack of inferring from a theory of cosmic evolution such consequences as that it is bad policy to overpay a cabman, and doubtful taste to use a silver butter-knife when a steel one would do as well, seems to have afforded Sidgwick an unfailing source of innocent philosophic hilarity.

As I have said, it is chiefly in the lectures devoted to Green that one is made to feel that one is dealing with work not revised for publication by its author. There is less evidence of a clear insight into the merits and defects of Green's view of life as a whole than of acute perception of particular difficulties, and it is not always possible, even for one who like myself finds many of the same difficulties in the *Prolegomena to Ethics*, to agree that the critic has the best of the argument. In some instances, indeed, Sidgwick's victory is palpable. Thus he makes it quite clear in the opening paragraphs of the seventh lecture that Green, in spite of the time he had given to the editing of Hume, had never discovered that neither Hume himself nor the predecessors to whom he owed his general conception of the moral good, accepted the Psychological Hedonism of Hobbes and, subsequently, Bentham. Green's misrepresentation of Hume's view on this fundamental point will perhaps seem less surprising than Sidgwick evidently found it to readers who have taken the trouble to compare the even more misleading account of Locke, which fills between one and two hundred pages of the *Introduction to Hume*, with the text of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. I doubt, however, whether Green is open to the charge of misconceiving the Aristotelian doctrine to anything like the extent which Sidgwick maintains in the preceding lecture. It is, of course, true to say that Green's account of the Aristotelian ideal is so far Christianised as to lay comparatively little stress on those "theoretical" excellences which the Stagirite regarded as the supreme flower of human goodness. But it is, I submit, mistaken in principle to deny that the ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ of the *Ethics* is much what Green means by the "good will." To argue that, with Aristotle, it is not the mere will, e.g., to know what is true, or to make what is beautiful, but the *exercised faculty* that is important (p. 89 ff.), is surely not to the point, unless Green is to be credited with the view that mere inoperative good intention is the same thing as the actual moral will, an identification I suspect he would have disclaimed. I may incidentally say that I find in these lectures, as well as in the *Methods of Ethics* itself, one constant source of difficulties in the absence of a clear distinction between volition and intention. Thus the *Methods of Ethics* maintains that morality is a matter of the *intention*, and this is in the main the doctrine of the present work; yet at p. 336 Sidgwick says that he agrees with Martineau that the common object of moral judgment is

a volition or choice. If this means that intention = volition = choice, it seems to me singularly bad psychology; and if it means that an intention which is not an actual volition is not an object of moral judgment, I think it is contrary to all ordinary experience. It seems probable to me that I may be morally almost free from imputability for some formal choices, and certain that I am liable to imputation for much that is neither choice nor volition. *E.g.*, I may indulge in revengeful, licentious, or envious thoughts under conditions which altogether preclude their issuing in actual volition, as, *e.g.*, if I merely dwell with pleasure on the recollection of a past sin, or the imagination of one which it is physically impossible for me to commit. Common opinion, rightly as I think, holds this "morose delectation" to be in itself ground for moral censure.

To return to Green. It seems over-subtle when Sidgwick complains that Aristotle is represented by Green as finding the essence of courage in endurance of pain and fear in the service of the State, whereas his real ground for approving it is the moral beauty of the brave act (p. 90 ff.). No doubt Aristotle simply says that death in battle is the typical exhibition of courage, because it is the *κάλλιστος θάνατος*. But on what ground did current Hellenic opinion regard such death as "noble"? Tyrtaeus may answer for his countrymen generally: *τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλόν . . . ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν περὶ τῆ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον*. So Aristotle himself says that the *citizen* soldier proves himself braver in extreme danger than the professional, *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν*.

In the polemic against the metaphysical basis of Green's ethical doctrine which runs through the first three lectures, there are some very telling points. Thus it is, I think, fair to object, as Sidgwick does in his first lecture, that the eternal consciousness of which we read in book i. of Green's *Prolegomena* has been described in such purely cognitive categories as to leave it a mystery how an ideal of any perfection other than perfection of insight into the system of relations which make up nature is to be extracted from it. And it is a sound point that is made in the third lecture (p. 40 ff.) when Green is charged with confusing the view that it is in seeking particular objects that this non-natural consciousness, as reproduced in man, obtains satisfaction, with the very different view that its satisfaction lies in the attaining of the objects sought. I think it must be further conceded that Prof. Sidgwick is successful in following out the consequences of this confusion, and showing that Green never clearly faces the question whether the performance of moral duty always issues in the completest actualisation of the agent's own capacities. His demonstration that the "good," unless limited, as Green is not consistently willing to limit it, to the mere acquisition of the will to be moral, is never entirely non-competitive, and that the problem of self-sacrifice is thus a genuine one, on any tenable view of the moral end, seems to me to be unanswerable (Lecture 5, p. 67 ff.).

On the other hand, there are places where the polemic seems to me to fail, and that largely for want of an adequate psychology. Thus, in the

second lecture, Prof. Sidgwick has no difficulty in showing that Green's doctrine is determinism, if once you accept his critic's view as to the nature of moral freedom. But is it really contrary to what common-sense moral persons with no metaphysical theories believe, to hold with Green that a man's effort to better himself depends at any moment on his particular past? (p. 22). I cannot see that Sidgwick has produced any evidence to justify this conclusion, and in any case there is surely, from the common-sense point of view, a great difference between this doctrine and the current deterministic view, rejected by Green, that the effort is determined by a past which is not in any intelligible sense "mine" at all, because it implies the production of my character as a mere resultant of external circumstances. Green may, I think, fairly be charged with a want of clearness, due to imperfect psychological equipment, but to say that he tries "to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds" seems to me to go beyond the mark. And in any case I do not see that his psychology is more confused than that of Prof. Sidgwick when he goes on in the same lecture to discuss the "conflict of desires," without any preliminary investigation into the all-important question whether such a conflict between actual desires is even psychologically conceivable.

In Sidgwick's defence of Hedonism against Green, as presented in the seventh and eighth lectures, he appears again to be successful on some of the counts. Thus I think he is right in complaining that Green never fairly considers Ethical Hedonism apart from the special psychological doctrine of Mill and Bentham, according to which pleasure is the only desired as well as the only desirable thing, and again in defending the possibility of a summation of pleasures. But I cannot see that he has met the really formidable difficulty which arises from the non-progressive character of the Hedonist's good. And his own favourite argument, that the good, because "goodness of conscious life," must be pleasure, appears only tenable if you are allowed to pass from the proposition that consciousness would not be desirable if it were not pleasant, to the very different proposition that it is desired solely for the sake of its pleasantness.

On the long and lively examination of Mr Spencer's ethical theories I propose to say little, both because the main points of the criticism, the uselessness of Mr Spencer's Utopia as a criterion of ethical values for the actual world, his failure to escape, by his array of biological principles, from the necessity of basing his actual ethical precepts upon the same sort of empirical considerations as those of the earlier Utilitarianism, his tacit substitution of "happiness" for "quantity of life" as the end whenever he comes to draw specific conclusions from his formulæ, and the exceeding triviality of many of the conclusions themselves, are largely familiar to all readers of the *Methods of Ethics*, and because Sidgwick seems to me to win on almost every important issue. In the present state of popular opinion, the incidental polemic, kept up throughout the lectures, against Spencer's persistent ascription of nearly every existing form of immorality to "militancy," ought to render a real service to the cause of clear thinking.

(Sidgwick does not dwell on what is perhaps the most curious of these deductions, the remarkable argument that the chief cause of lax conceptions of the duty of chastity is the belief that a numerous family is a blessing, and that this belief again can only have arisen from the need of filling up the gaps in population caused by war.)

The discussion of Martineau's views is comparatively brief, and its main point—the impossibility of drawing up a scale of the relative worthiness of “motives” which would adequately represent the actual moral experience of everyone—is already made in the third book of *Methods of Ethics*. It is singular that Sidgwick should not have gone further, and asked the prior question how far such an immediate knowledge of one's own “spring of action” is ever possible. It has always seemed to me that, while it is not always easy to know exactly what one intends to do, to know accurately what are the precise feelings by which one is actuated in doing it is almost impossible, and I own I have been surprised that this should not have been felt by Martineau, a distinguished minister of the religion which insists so strongly on the deceitfulness of the human heart.

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Pierre Batiffol: Études d'Histoire et de Théologie positive.

Deuxième édition. Paris: Lecoffre, 1902.

M. BATIFFOL is rector of the Catholic Institute of Toulouse, and his work bears the imprimatur of his archbishop. But the English reader need not on that account shun the work as that of a partisan. On the contrary, M. Batiffol is open-eyed, candid, and profoundly versed in the early Christian literature. In his preface he claims to be “of the number of those who deem it right to read ancient texts with scrupulous attention, to do one's best to seize their strict and literal sense.”

Surrendering himself fully to the documents, he reaches unusual conclusions in his essays on the *Disciplina Arcani* and the *Agapé*, namely, that neither the one nor the other ever existed, at least to the extent and over the range allowed by nearly all ecclesiastical historians to these two institutions. He denies that in Acts the phrase “breaking of bread” refers to the Eucharist; and he holds that Paul in the epistle to Corinthians clearly insists on the duty of the faithful to eat their meals at home, and not in the house of God. In Jude, verse 12, he would read with the Alexandrine codex ἀπάταις, not ἀγάπαις, as is read in 2 Pet. ii. 13, which is a citation of Jude 12.

In the Teaching of the XII. he argues that the words μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐμπλησθῆναι, like the prayers which follow, refer to the Eucharist alone; and that Ignatius, *Sm.* viii. 2, by coupling with baptism the holding of the agapé, and declaring it, like baptism, to be a rite not performable without the bishop, implies that the rite in question is an eucharist, and not a love-

feast. Similarly, he declares the *cibum promiscuum et innoxium*, the joint partaking of which, according to Pliny's letter, constituted the Christians of Bithynia an illegal *sodalitas*, to have been the eucharist pure and simple. As to Justin and Irenæus, he maintains that they had never heard of an eucharist, and here he occupies a strong position. Tertullian's *caenula* called *agapé* or *dilectio* was equally the eucharistic meal and nothing else. Clement of Alexandria also knew nothing of a liturgical *agapé*, and in the third century fathers there is no trace of it.

M. Batiffol concludes that the *agapé* as a solid meal ending with an eucharist never existed. In the fourth century the *agapé* was a charity-dinner given to the poor by the rich, often in memory of the dead.

I cite M. Batiffol's conclusion: "Nous voilà loin du grand rôle que théologiens et archéologues attribuaient aux agapes. Réproduction de la dernière cène l'agape aurait été le rite primitif de l'eucharistie. Puis, à un moment impossible à déterminer, l'agape aurait été dissociée de la fraction du pain: la fraction du pain, dûment stylisée, serait devenue la messe, et l'agape aurait disparu diversement. De Bingham à Renan, de Suicer à Kraus et à Zahn, l'affirmation était unanime."

M. Batiffol defends his thesis with ability, but has he taken account of all the evidence? Thus Basil, *c.* 350, and Socrates the historian (*H.E.*, ch. 5, 22), *c.* 440, testify that the Egyptian Christians outside Alexandria partook of the eucharist at eventide, after a feast in which all sorts of victuals were consumed. Such an *agapé* ending with fraction of the bread is represented in the Armenian canons of Sahak, *c.* 425. And long before Bingham and the other modern writers named by P. Batiffol, the Armenian Catholicos John, *c.* 700, retained the memory of such an *agapé* followed by an eucharist, for he writes thus:—

"If we are to exactly imitate all that was done by Christ . . . we must communicate in the sacrament after supper at eventide . . . but *nowadays* we interpose several hours between the fleshly and the spiritual table."

Surely these words imply a memory on the writer's part of an age when the fleshly meal immediately preceded the spiritual. And in the summary of old-fashioned practice and teaching adduced by the renegade Armenian Catholicos Isaac, *c.* 1150, as embodying all that must be reckoned out of date and impossible, we have thus:—"It was after supper, when His disciples were already sated with the Jewish sacrifice, that Christ gave them to eat of His own body. Therefore let us first eat meats and be sated, and then let us partake of the mysteries."

This document is preserved in Combefis, *Hist. Monothel.*, Paris, 1648, col. 347. I cite it according to the Vatican codex No. 1101.

In the African church also it was allowed by a canon of a council held in Carthage to take the eucharist immediately after the eating of the lamb on the anniversary of the Lord's institution of the eucharist. And Walafrid Strabo, *c.* 850, testifies that this custom still endured in Europe. He denounces it, however, as a "Judaic superstition," and "a vestige of the old time."

I suspect, therefore, that in the outlying parts of Christendom there survived a liturgical conjunction of agapé and eucharist, which disappeared in Rome and Antioch and Alexandria early in the second century.

Two other of M. Batiffol's essays are equally revolutionary. In his first essay, entitled *L'Arcane*, he searches in the fathers of the first three centuries for the *disciplina arcani*, that is, for the mystic silence with which the early church is believed to have shrouded from unbelieving ears and eyes all knowledge of its essential rites, sacraments, formulæ and teaching, particularly that of transubstantiation. He finds, however, no trace of it, except among the gnostics. He concludes that it was a conceit of the fourth century fathers, which flourished most about 400 to 450. Clement alone of the second century fathers allowed himself to use of the sacraments the slang terms of the Greek mysteries. This slang, however, was freely indulged by the great fathers of the fourth as a kind of Christian "*Belletristique*." The whole idea of a Christian mystery only to be divulged to the initiated was a mirage due to the growth of the Christian catechumenate.

M. Batiffol's position in this matter seems a strong one. Is it credible that a *credens* had no inkling of the Lord's prayer until in the formal *traditio precis*, which was part of baptism, it was committed to him?

Surely the import of this rite was this, that the *credens*, having received in baptism the spirit which cries *Abba* in the heart, was entitled to use this prayer as never before, because he was now re-born a son of God.

If M. Batiffol's contentions are valid, it is difficult to acquit S. Basil of a charge of bad faith when in his tract "On the Holy Spirit" he maintains that none of the Christian rites of baptism, of eucharist, of epiphany, etc., had ever been written down, and that they had, from the Apostles on, been handed down as an oral tradition, jealously guarded in silence, lest it come to the knowledge of pagans. M. Batiffol rather jumps the evidence of Justin. If the eucharist was not in secret, why did it need the devil to learn how it was conducted, and to reveal its features to the Mithriacs, so that they might parody it?

M. Batiffol's third essay is about the primitive hierarchy. In it he sets aside the idea of the monarchical form of the episcopate being the most ancient. There were several bishops, he concludes, in an early church, who formed a committee of governing presbyters. But the presbyters as such fulfilled neither governing nor liturgical functions. "We priests," he writes, "are the successors of the primitive bishops, and not of the presbyters."

Thus M. Batiffol reaches the same conclusion as Dr John Wordsworth, but by a rather different road. It is odd that he makes so little of the fact, so impressive to Dr Wordsworth, that in the canons of Hippolytus the charismatic ordination of bishop and presbyter is one and the same form. This was also the case in the Armenian church, of which the earliest MSS. of the euchologion have no separate rite of ordaining a bishop. It also agrees with the conclusions of both these scholars that in the oldest codex (in the Bodleian) of the *Constitutiones Apostolicæ*, a bishop visiting another church than his own takes his seat *ἀμα τοῖς συνεπισκόποις*, and

not ἅμα τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ, which is the reading of all the other MSS. The implication is that there were several *co-épiscopos*—to use M. Batiffol's own word—in a single church. It is strange that in all the discussions of the origin of the hierarchy, every one has appealed to the example of pagan *thiasi*; but no one to the clearly defined order of presbyters, arch-presbyter, and deacons, testified to by Philo, as existing among the Therapeutæ.

In his second and longest essay, M. Batiffol deals with *Les origines de la pénitence*, and labours to prove that the later penitential system of the Roman Church is a modification of, though not a departure from, the primitive treatment of post-baptismal sins. Incidentally he shows how strong was the prejudice of the early church against the idea of such sins being condoned, and against the lapsed being re-admitted into communion at all. M. Batiffol sketches out clearly and firmly from the sources the history of penance. The fault of his essay is that he takes so little account of the cathar usages of the tenth to thirteenth centuries. For these undoubtedly reacted on the church, and helped to shape its penitential system. It might interest M. Batiffol to learn that the Armenian old believers of Thonrak deny that sins after baptism, or at any rate after election, are forgiven. A sacrament of repentance, but only of the repentance which precedes baptism, is specified in their book, *The Key of Truth*.

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L'Évangile et L'Église.—Alfred Loisy.—A Picard et Fils, Paris, 1902.

THE name of the Abbé Loisy is little known in England at present. Certainly it ought to be better known. A writer of fine method and brilliant perspicuity, one who is particularly fond of quoting Newman and Caird, has a special claim on us. But beyond that, his views constitute a very striking and attractive form of neo-catholicism; and there is something strangely pathetic in his devoted advocacy of the claims of a church which has refused to allow him to teach.

M. Loisy's book on the Gospel and the Church is in form an attack upon Professor Harnack's *Wesen des Christenthums*.

It can scarcely be denied that the objections brought by M. Loisy against some parts of Harnack's position are serious. But it appears to me that the book before us, though sometimes effective as a criticism, altogether fails as a justification of the Roman Church. The ideas of development, of the experiential basis of doctrine, of the justification by fruits, are more fully grasped by M. Loisy than by most religious writers. But he blinds himself to those faults and weaknesses of the Roman Church which are but too conspicuous to the impartial student.

I will briefly sketch the polemic of the Abbé. What he finds fault with in Harnack is especially his fixing upon a particular doctrine—that of the Fatherhood of God—as the very essence of Christianity, as the kernel of which doctrine and cultus are but the husk. "Why," he says, "should the

essence of a tree be found in a particle of the seed whence it grew? Why should it not be as exactly and more perfectly realised in the tree itself than in this particle?" "It does not belong to a critic to seize religion at a given moment, to analyse it, to pick out one particular element and to place it by itself as the essence of Christianity. Let us look on the Christian religion as it lives; and after observing on what it has been nourished from the beginning and its source of life, let us discern the chief traits of that existence." This attack sounds formidable, but when one turns to Professor Harnack's book one realises that it is largely a beating of the air. It is not true that he starts from a single principle. He makes much of the message of the kingdom, of the higher righteousness, of the value of the human soul, and does not dwell at all exclusively on the doctrine of the divine Fatherhood.

I fear that the charge of schematising may be brought with more justice against M. Loisy himself. He, in his turn, seeks the essence of the teaching of the Founder, and finds it in his proclamation of a kingdom of heaven on the earth. He vigorously opposes the notion of the Protestant theologians that the kingdom of heaven is invisible, comes without observation, is within us, and finds his key text in the saying "Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." And he thinks that in the thought alike of Jesus and his disciples a visible church, an organised spiritual kingdom, was predominant. Here I must certainly part company with M. Loisy. The text cited is put by Matthew in the mouth both of John the Baptist and of Jesus, but it seems more properly to belong to John. In the case of those parables of the kingdom which can be most confidently interpreted, the reference is to the progress of the word in the heart, not to the rise of a visible society; and the only certainly authentic interpretation of one of those parables by Jesus himself, the explanation of the parable of the sower, is made on those lines.

There is a parallel conflict of opinion between Harnack and M. Loisy in the interpretation of the phrase "Son of God." M. Loisy thinks that it is used as implying Messiahship; and he boldly challenges Harnack's view that it expresses Jesus' consciousness of a special relation to the Father. Harnack had relied especially on the verse of Matthew xi. 27, "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him": and this quotation M. Loisy boldly meets with the assertion that this verse owes its origin to the early Christian consciousness rather than to the Founder. He may probably be right, but the line of defence for a Catholic apologist is bold. Boldness M. Loisy seldom lacks. The moderate school of New Testament critics would be rather startled by his assertion (p. 72) that Mark adapted his text to a passage in a Pauline epistle. "The narrative (of the Last Supper) in Mark seems to be founded on an account similar to that of Luke, in which what is said of the 'blood of the covenant' was added in accordance with the teaching of Paul." And M. Loisy is rigidly historic in regard to the corporeal resurrection,

which he thinks cannot be proved to the satisfaction of a historian, to whom the fact of the apparitions will seem incontestable, but the nature of these and what they prove must remain doubtful.

When he passes on to deal with the early church, with the rise of doctrine, of organisation and of cultus, M. Loisy seems on some points to have a more strictly evolutional view than that of Harnack. The great German theologian is too apt to see in the early adaptation of Christianity to its surroundings a process of degeneracy and perversion. In finding in that adaptation a necessary growth, and a proof of the inspiration of the church, M. Loisy takes not only a less pessimistic, but a more correct line. Of course this line has been taken by many writers, especially M. A. Sabatier in France, and Bishop Lightfoot in England. M. Loisy, however, is sometimes led astray by his desire to show unbroken continuity of development in the church, which is fanciful. For example, he writes (p. 91), "The twelve form a sort of directing committee, with St Peter at its head." It was not Peter but James who was at the head of this committee. And he is certainly not justified in his attempt to find the germs of the organisation of the church in the sayings of the Founder. Historically, it is certain that there is a break between the directorate of the Apostles and the directorate of the Bishops. And the outward organisation of the church was taken, not from any directions of the Founder, not from Judæa at all, but from the Greek cities of Asia Minor. As to the necessity of the rule of the Bishops we need have no doubts, and the expediency of the Papal supremacy was fully allowed by Lightfoot. But why try to conceal the pagan origin of these things? Is it not the best proof of the vitality of the spirit of Christ in the church that it could thus lay hold on its surroundings, and wrest from paganism its most efficient weapons? But in all earthly things, even the visible church as its first enthusiasm died down, good and evil were mixed. M. Loisy says (p. 110), "To reproach the Catholic Church with the development of its constitution, is to reproach it for having lived." This is scarcely fair. No one reproaches the church for living; but we may reproach it for living at a lower level than it might have reached, for encouraging superstitions which by an effort it might have exterminated, for calling in the aid of the world when it might have trusted to its own inspiration, for using evil passions on which it might have trampled. Not, of course, that we should have done better under the circumstances, but that we can, after the event, see what would have been better. M. Loisy praises the power of adaptation which the Roman Church shows in our day. Certainly it has that power in some respects. It seems to know how to make terms with physical invention, with triumphant democracy, with modern sentiment in many fields. But can it make terms with the progress of natural and of human science, with historic criticism, with the Northern conscience? It is strange to say of a church which degrades or ejects all who dare to think differently from the Roman curia that it can adapt itself to modern conditions.

In his fourth chapter, which treats of Christian dogma, M. Loisy takes as scientific a view as the author of the great *Dogmengeschichte*. He sets forth with the greatest lucidity the two views, that the basis of doctrine is experience, and that its expression must vary from age to age with the intellectual surroundings. "In dogma the historian sees the interpretation of religious facts, acquired by a laborious effort of theological thought. If dogmas be divine in origin and substance, they are human in structure and composition." So low does M. Loisy rate the merely intellectual side of dogma, that he is quite ready to hold that contradictory statements in doctrine may both be sides of the truth. "There is but one eternal God, and Jesus is God: there is the dogma of theology. Human salvation is altogether in the hands of God, and man is free to save himself or not: that is the dogma of grace. The church has authority over men, and the Christian is only responsible to God: that is the dogma of the church. Abstract logic would demand the suppression in each case of one of these strange pairs of statements. But attentive observation shows that one could not do so without compromising the living balance of religion."

To an Englishman all this sounds very much like the teaching of Maurice clarified and brought up to date. And in fact the view of doctrine which it implies is one which is prominent now in the teaching of some religious writers of all the churches.

As might be supposed, when in the fifth chapter M. Loisy comes to the subject of cultus, he is less in sympathy with the English mind. He is unfamiliar with the facts of the Reformed Churches, and he defends many things which to us seem to admit of no defence. The pure Christianity of which Harnack speaks seems to him to exclude all outward cult. But why say *exclude*? It regards forms of cult as unessential, but quite allows the useful purpose of some of them. They, like doctrine, externalise the Christian experience, and like doctrine need to be constantly modified to meet the needs of a new age. Like most Roman Catholic writers, M. Loisy thinks that without a strongly organised external cult Christianity cannot be kept alive. Facts are against him. Take the Boers, for instance. Their cult is of the simplest conceivable, and they are unlearned and narrow-minded. But no one can deny among them the vital force of a religion which makes them every inch men and Christians, and this religion has lasted unchanged for centuries. And one certainly cannot follow M. Loisy when he defends prayers to saints, the veneration of relics and the like. We need not condemn these things because their origin is pagan or Buddhist rather than Christian. If they are good, it was well to take them from whatever source. Nor can anyone deny that they came in because they met a human need, and at the time of their introduction probably worked in some ways for righteousness. Historically, they may often be justified. But can it be said that the Church of Rome has never clung to what is superstitious and materialist in cultus because it makes her way easier, or that she has not sometimes been ready to take men at their lowest

and use their weaknesses for her own advantage, rather than to try to raise them to a higher level?

An interesting passage on the last page of the book will sum it up. "A great religious crisis has everywhere arisen, affecting churches, orthodoxies, and forms of cult. The best means of meeting it does not appear to be the suppression of all ecclesiastical organisation, all orthodoxy and all traditional cult, a line of action which would divorce Christianity from life and humanity, but to make the best use of what exists in reference to what ought to be; not to repudiate the heritage which the Christian ages have handed down to us; to appreciate as it deserves the necessity and utility of the immense development which has taken place in the church, to collect its fruits and to continue it, since the adaptation of the Gospel to the changing condition of humanity befits us now as ever, and more than ever." There is here nothing to which a liberal Protestant theologian would object. He would only add that the history of the church is not merely the history of the Roman branch of it. In Western Europe there is an undivided stream until the sixteenth century. But we have just as much right to include in church history Luther and Jeremy Taylor, and Wesley and Fox, as to include the Council of Trent. To exclude from the history of Christianity the great Teutonic revival is a course which cannot be justified historically, nor according to the principles which M. Loisy has so eloquently advocated.

If it be a merit in the church to adapt its life to fresh surroundings, why should not the Roman like the Anglican branch accept the principle of nationality, or, like the Presbyterian branches, accept the principle of representative government, or, like the Independent bodies, welcome a pure democracy? Is it because the institution of Bishops is of perpetual authority? The modern spirit asks the historic source of that authority. Is it because a fresh organisation would be fatal to the principles of Christianity? Here the appeal is to the test of fruits; and on this ground all the churches meet in their competition for existence. In the seventeenth century it was a question of armed efficiency. Now the field of battle is removed to the realm of conduct.

Whatever Protestants may think of the views of M. Loisy, they have failed to commend themselves to the Roman curia. For his attitude in Biblical criticism he has been removed from his important teaching post, his book has been suppressed, and he is now delivering a *cours libre* at the Sorbonne, in the Institution of which M. Albert Réville is the head.

P. GARDNER.

OXFORD.

The Origin and Significance of Hegel's Logic.—

By J. B. Baillie, B.A., D.Phil.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1901.

LIKE two bleak and austere peaks embracing a fertile valley, the philosophies of Kant and Hegel dominate the romantic movement. Kant had transformed the concept of spirit from the passive receptacle of sensation into a creative force, manifesting itself in the unification of knowledge and the self-positing activity of will; Hegel appeared as the dictator, imposing its final form upon the revolution which this proclamation of spiritual freedom had brought about. He saw that the lawless repudiation of system was involving philosophy in ruin; to system it must be reduced, if it was to be saved from its friends and reconciled with the scientific spirit of the new era. Prof. Baillie tells us that Hegel sought to establish the necessity for science and its absolute validity by showing that, if knowledge is to be absolutely objective, "it is necessary to show that the reality within which knowledge is found, namely, self-conscious life, is the Ultimate Reality of Experience." His logic may be "considered as simply the attempt to systematically connect the ultimate notions by which self-consciousness, in its process of reflexion upon the various aspects of experience, reveals itself. Its object-matter is as possible as any other matter of knowledge," and its method of construction may be defended as the attempt to combine in the movement of a single process the continuity of self-consciousness with the different ways in which it expresses its activity. His "faith in the power of mind" emancipated Hegel from a preliminary inquiry into the nature of human knowledge and its possible limitations; all the same, his work was a continuation of and professed to complete Kant's investigation into the thought-determinations of reality. But there is one important difference: Logic ceases to be a subjective human apparatus and becomes a "metaphysical" Logic, exhibiting the ground notions of *all* reality, since, for Hegel, Reason is the ground Identity, the Absolute Reality. Prof. Baillie considers that Hegel went too far by reducing Experience to a process of Logic and identifying our knowledge with the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit; but believes he has established the objectivity of knowledge.

The most valuable part of Prof. Baillie's work is his discussion of the relation of the Phenomenology to the Logic. Very briefly, the following is his account of how each arose in the development of Hegel's system.

Hegel was not, at the outset, a systematic thinker. He makes his appearance rather in the character of a mystic, who was impelled to philosophy by his effort to reconcile the objectivity of the Greek ideal with the subjectivity of the Kantian principle. Prof. Baillie distinguishes three stages in the development of his philosophy, the general character of which was determined from the beginning. That Ultimate Reality is Spirit is, from first to last, the starting-point of his system. His general point of view is the same as in his latest system. The three

fundamental forms of supreme reality, the purely Ideal, Nature, Spirit, are interpreted from the standpoint of the Absolute, of which, however, Religion is regarded as a more complete realisation than philosophy. At this stage he distinguishes between logic and metaphysic. Logic deals with the formal character of being and thought viewed abstractly and generally, as elements in one total Reality, and ceases at their relation. Metaphysic deals with the conceptual nature of that which reflects and relates itself to itself. In so far as logic did not deal with thought only, in opposition to being, but of what is constitutive of *all* reality, it is Transcendental Logic in Hegel's sense.

In his first stage, Hegel's interest in the object of philosophy had been a religious interest; in his second stage, he has a purely philosophical interest in the object of religion. The object is, in each case, the same. He shows more anxiety to determine the connection of the aspects of reality in the interests of complete system; but neither now nor at the last is there any attempt to evolve one from the other. There is a gradual identification of logic and metaphysic, the latter becoming more formal, the former more concrete. Metaphysic furnishes the most universal and essential determinations of reality, not in any particular aspect, but as it is in itself. The distinction between logic and metaphysic falls within metaphysic itself as a distinction between reason as primarily negative, and reason as both positive and negative. The business of philosophy is to reduce all appearances of the Absolute, since these are limited and finite expressions of it, set over against it and each other, to the one true and only reality. It accomplishes its task by means of Reason, an activity of the Absolute, having two moments, Reflexion and *Anschauung*. "Reflexion," concerned with finite opposition as such, and applicable to everything except the Absolute Identity itself, is not as yet the Dialectic, because it does not have a positive side conserving the negated factors, and because the negation is produced by relating each to the absolute identity, *i.e.* by what is external to the process of reflexion itself. *Anschauung*, concerned with the identity *per se*, furnishes the positive side of philosophical knowledge. Finally, we find Hegel desirous of establishing his system by means of a method of "Development" of which he attempts no complete exposition.

Hitherto Hegel had, in general harmony with Schelling, conceived the Absolute as the "indifference point" of subject and object; he now came to see that Mind was higher than, and not on a level with Nature, and that the changed conception of the relations of the opposed elements in the Absolute necessitated a change in the interpretation of the Absolute itself. For Mind holds more directly of the subject than the object. Not that the Absolute has ceased to be the unity of both, as of all opposites, but the question arises, which most accurately and completely expresses the nature of the Absolute. Logic had hitherto been the negative assertion of an Absolute, resulting in the wiping out of all content, and leaving the Identity to be asserted by Metaphysic a characterless blank. To obtain a

more satisfactory result, it was necessary to alter the purely negative character of all finitude. The finite opposites should not be entirely negated, they should be posited as well. If so, the relation between Reflexion and *Anschauung* must cease to be so external, the one must share the nature of the other, must be found with it; they must become one activity with two inseparable moments. For the construction of his system unity of method was absolutely necessary. The principle which is henceforward the basis of his system is, that the primary reality is Mind. It was to establish the validity of his principle that Hegel wrote the *Phenomenology of Mind*. It must be shown that wherever subject is brought into relation with object, the essential character and content of an object is mind-constituted, that its being as an object for consciousness is the same as its being for itself. The whole content of experience would thus appear as modes or moments of the ground reality of experience, Mind. The Absolute, because essentially Mind, is primarily subject, a unity containing and revealing all its diversity to itself, and possessing it as its self, and thus containing nothing but what it reveals,—the whole content of experience. The method which can alone meet the demands of system consists in the systematic connection of all the forms of experience, brought about by the reference of the actual content to the ideal of all experience. The whole then forms an organic development. Its moving vital principle is namable as Dialectic. Now, if the unity of subject and object is the one essential reality in all experience, and if the modes of this unity are just the modes of experience, then does not the problem suggest itself to state in systematic connection the inner identities as such, the modes of unity *quâ* unity, which have been the ground reality throughout the whole of the Phenomenology? Can we not extract or abstract from the concrete relations of subject and object the inner kernel of ultimate truth, namely, the identity or unity which is the ground of their connection in each case? Such an inquiry will give us only the abstract, formal conceptions, stripped of all direct reference to the diversity and tangibility of existing experience, and these will be expressed in the form determined by their own character. The method followed by this new science will be the same as the Phenomenology. Such a science, as dealing with notions, will be just what has hitherto been known as Logic. But if Logic is this ultimate and absolute science, it ceases to lie outside Metaphysic, or to be divisible into Logic of Understanding and Logic of Reason; will cease to be a "Negative Logic of Reflexion," and will become the all embracing science, with a single absolute method—Speculative Philosophy in its truest form. Thus it was that the transformation of Hegel's principle and the systematic establishment of its content led to his epoch-making reformation of Logic. Every form of knowledge is different from every other in the degree of the identification of the object in itself with the object for consciousness, and the only resting-place for knowledge is where the agreement becomes absolute. Now, if knowledge deals solely with the self which knows, it is entirely

self-constituted, self-determined, self-contained. To be completely self-sufficient, however, is precisely what is meant by being absolute. With this ideal all other forms of truth can be compared. Absolute knowledge is the presence to consciousness of its own self,—thought.

The obscurity which has gathered round the relation of the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature and Mind, Prof. Baillie attributes, in no small degree, to Hegel's "own wavering and insufficient statements." Hegel is not, we are told, describing an actual process, and he does not pass from the last notion of Logic to the first notion of Nature; but is simply attempting to describe the connection between the constitutive elements of Ultimate Reality, by a principle held to be universally valid. The Absolute in its bare Identity, its naked universality, implies the Absolute in mere difference, mere particularity. Then the discrete moments collapse into their primal unity, which is both the inwardness of Notion and the outwardness of Nature,—self-reference, or concrete Mind.

But Prof. Baillie does not believe that Hegel's system only requires to be cleared of obscurity: it must be purged, as well, of downright error. "The *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of Hegel's philosophy was," we are told, "the identification of knowledge and reality," and this was due to his assumption that, because knowledge deals with the "immediacy whereby we are fused with the very being of the world," the immediacy of experience was the immediacy of science; the mediation constituting experience, the mediation of science, and Reality in its essence a process of knowledge.

Thought, as the immediate of the experience we call knowledge, is not, protests Prof. Baillie, the only immediate. Because what Prof. Baillie calls the "immediacy of fact peculiar to the diverse forms of experience" is eliminated from the notions, their different degrees of concreteness does not, he thinks, alter their essential abstractness, nor the fact that they form a system make them real, "unless we confound objective for knowledge with existence in fact." And we cannot produce reality from them. Their so-called movement is brought about by the deliberate activity of the concrete individual self which Hegel sought to eliminate. Of course, Prof. Baillie does not require to be told that the business of philosophy is to think the world, to transform reality into a system of thoughts, which can neither make reality nor extend it; all he insists upon is, "simply that the process of science must not for a moment be taken to be equivalent to the fulness of the life of Experience itself, and therefore the complete realisation of the nature of the Absolute must remain for knowledge, even at its best, an impossible achievement." Finally, Hegel's system stands on a paradox. Because absolute, it contains its own criterion of truth, and so either cannot be judged to be true at all, or cannot claim to be the absolute truth. For Prof. Baillie, the claim is baseless. No system of knowledge can determine the conditions under which it shall be accepted as truth. The claim itself is due to the spurious identification of knowledge and Reality. Prof. Baillie sums up his own position in the words: "Knowledge is not construction, but reconstruction of Experience."

I have considerable sympathy with Prof. Baillie's objections, but I do not like his formula at all. For Hegel at least, as Prof. Baillie very well knows, truth was not identical with systematic knowledge in the narrow sense of science, but a thing of forms and degrees. And without some degree of knowledge, he would have held there can be no experience. Sensation must be incorporated in our coherent system of reality, under some form of knowledge, or we might as well not have had it, like the drunkard who said, "he must have had a glorious time of it last night, judging from what the policeman told the magistrate." The "single immediacy of experience" which Prof. Baillie says "we simply cannot have in knowledge," we simply cannot have without; as he himself recognises when, on the very page following that in which he gives us the above formula, he talks, without any apparent sense of inconsistency, of the "process of knowledge by which we *construct* Experience." It all comes to this: What are we to understand by "Experience"? There has got to be such unfortunate ambiguity about this word that before we can accept such a formula as Prof. Baillie's we must ask for more precise definition. Are we to understand by "Experience," *ἐμπειρία*, ineffable "religious experience," or reality? I am not holding a brief for Hegel; I am not seeking to identify knowledge and reality, and I have no sympathy with Hegel's claim that Science is the final outcome of experience, the goal at which it aims; but I think that knowledge may quite properly be called the construction of Experience, although only the reconstruction of Reality. This would prevent anyone from forming the kind of *Vorstellung* of Hegelianism that Lotze did, as if the reason of man were made central in the universe, which came to be in the act of thinking it. That in fact reality is compounded exclusively of our thoughts, and took shape along with them.

Adverse criticism of Hegel is ultimately based upon his manipulation of the concept of Spirit. He was unwilling to identify it, like Kant, in its self-determining moral nature only, with absolute reality, since the divorce between science and religion appeared to him pusillanimous. But how did religion come out of his efforts at identification? It was *apparently* reduced, and with it the whole moral life, to an expression of spirit inferior to speculative thought. I say *apparently*, because Hegel was not preaching a gospel, as some of his disciples seem to have imagined. He did not wish to disturb the good citizen and convinced Lutheran; he is talking to men with a speculative vocation.

There is one other point. Prof. Baillie thinks Hegel's identification of the objects dealt with in religion and philosophy "too perilous to be left unnoticed," since to religion the transcendence of its object is essential. This cannot be said without qualification. The fundamental doctrine of the Vedanta is the identity of the individual soul with God, not as a part or as an emanation of Him, but as the whole indivisible Brahma. What Prof. Baillie says is true of Western religious thought as a whole; and we are apt to think that religion can only mean what it means to ourselves.

I thank Prof. Baillie for the pleasure and instruction he affords, and warmly commend this strong, self-reliant and experienced guide to all engaged upon the "struggle to Hegel."

DAVID MORRISON.

WORMIT-ON-TAY.

Die Urchristlichen Gemeinden.—By Ernst von Dobschütz.—Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1902, pp. xiv, 300.

THIS is an opportune book. It is epoch-marking rather than epoch-making. It sums up a good deal that has been done in a more partial fashion, while yet conceived in a similar spirit. Thus, if there is perhaps not very much in the body of the work which will be new to careful students of primitive Christianity, yet few even among *Fachmänner* will fail to gain a good deal from a fresh synthesis at once so sane and so suggestive. It is singularly free from onesidedness (*e.g.* any overdoing of the "enthusiastic" side of the picture) and from straining after novel effects, won by running an idea to extremes. Its author has an attentive eye for most, if not all, of the varied sides and interests of the first generations of Christians, because he has a heart large and deep enough to sympathise with all genuine religion. *Nil Christiani a se alienum putat.*

The special emphasis of his work is indicated by its sub-title, *sittengeschichtliche Bilder*; and though it is impossible to maintain a uniform line of demarcation between the ethical and other aspects of the life under study, on the whole a wisely inclusive sense has been given to the phrase. Thus we get many suggestive side-lights thrown on things more remote from the central theme. The preface frankly recognises the large "enthusiastic" element in primitive Christianity, but denies that it is the determinative one. This position he assigns rather to the ethical, which emerges spontaneously with growing clearness, as reflection enables the subjects of the new impulse to apprehend more exactly that of which they had been so mightily "apprehended" (Phil. iii. 12). And as Jesus, the Christ of their enthusiastic trust, was Himself supremely ethical; so Christians realised assimilation to His moral image to be the essence of their calling, in proportion as that image came home to them through an ever completer record, oral or written, of their Master's life and words. But the specific aim of our author is not to vindicate the ethical worth of the Christian ideal, but rather to inquire how far that ideal was realised by the primitive Christians in concrete living, so as to prove itself divine indeed "not in word only, but also in power and in holy Spirit and in much assurance." For his purpose he takes the "primitive" age to cover the century from the Day of Pentecost to the time of Hadrian, when national Judaism came to a final end, and when Græco-Roman culture began to make its influence on the form in which the Christian faith was realised in thought and life more apparent and determinative.

Of course the handling of the subject just defined involves certain literary judgments as to the sources and their chronological order. Here

our author must expect to divide his readers; and it is here also that he seems to the present writer at his weakest, and most under the spell of current opinion about him. But in any case he has exemplified a vital and concrete method of approach to these very literary problems, which has as yet hardly been seriously applied, but with which must really lie the last word in certain cases, when it comes to positive construction of the Apostolic Age as a whole. For this reason, among many others, this sketch is to be heartily welcomed. It is full of the breath of life, and must help or force all its readers to essay a vital and unifying interpretation, instead of the artificial and piecemeal study which has blighted so much written on this crucial period.

The central problem—How far did primitive Christianity, as realised ethics, actually transcend the ethical ideals and practice current in the society in which its lot was cast, and so evidence the specific *power* at work within itself?—implies constant reference to the environment in its different forms. Here the distinction between Judaism and Hellenism is fundamental, and Jewish and Gentile Christian communities must, for the most part, be studied separately. For obvious reasons of scientific method, von Dobschütz treats the latter first, starting from the vantage-ground of the Pauline epistles. In a brief review, however, it seems best to pursue the other order, that of logic and history, and to begin with the subject of his second main heading, *Die jüdische Christenheit*.

Our author's picture of Judæo-Christianity is on the whole discriminating. He recognises more shades of opinion in the *Urgemeinde*, answering to the varieties within Judaism itself, than has been the fashion in more critical circles since Baur created imaginary antagonisms by assuming too uniform an ideal and attitude among the Palestinian leaders. He perceives the great significance of the Hellenists as a mediating factor between the extremes of Pharisaic legalism and Pauline liberty; he allows for the impression left on immediate disciples of Jesus, like Peter, by the twofold attitude of Jesus himself towards the Law; and finally he speaks of the growth of a new and semi-independent type of Christianity in Antioch as arousing in Jerusalem itself a reaction towards stricter views, a reaction which became more and more conscious, among those in particular who had never belonged to Jesus' disciple-circle, and so were untouched by His freer spirit. "These persons stand deliberately for the unconditional obligation of the Law; the Pharisaic ideal is also the Christian; perfected holiness in communities loyal to the Law prepares the way for the Lord's return" (p. 110). Such was the notion of those who first appear with distinctness in Acts xv., the critics of the Antiochene community, "certain of those belonging to the sect of the Pharisees, believers." But men of this stamp formed only "a very small part of Jewish Christendom. This we should not judge onesidedly by its extremes" (p. 121).

In so saying, and in his view of Peter, our author simply adopts distinctions present in Acts though ignored by Baur. But he stops short at this, and throws Acts over, when he comes to James and the Jerusalem

Concordat, on what seem totally inadequate grounds. Overlooking the difference between James' scruples about table-fellowship between Jewish and Gentile believers, in Gal. ii. 12, and the contention of the Pharisaic Christians at Antioch, in Acts xv. 1, that circumcision was needful to salvation itself, he calls James "the chief representative" of the latter party of reaction (p. 110). This is to confuse the piety of a Christian Nazirite (as reflected alike in the historical kernel of Hegeppus' account and in James' Epistle), who naturally extended his ideal of Jewish duty even to Jews living outside Palestine, with Pharisaic zeal for turning all into Jews by circumcision. Then, touching the Abstinenances enjoined on Gentile Christians in matters of common heathen practice liable to prejudice the Gospel in Jewish eyes, what has our author to say? He puts their occurrence in Acts xv. 20 aside with the quiet remark that, "according to the *unmissverständlichen Notiz* in Acts xxi. 25," they originated with "James and his folk" long after Paul had left the Syro-Cilician mission for regions beyond. This dogmatic method awakens the same mistrust as an unsupported *ohne Zweifel*, and makes us suspicious of our author's whole reading of Acts xv. in relation to Gal. ii. It is a strange thing that all those who identify the visits recorded in these two passages, whatever general view they take of Acts, are driven at some point to desperate devices. And no wonder, when they have to face so flat a contradiction as Gal. ii. 6, 10, Acts xv. 20, where all evasion—as if Paul's "nothing" meant only "nothing *ad rem*"—is excluded by his adding a qualifying clause, but one with no reference to "abstinenances," only to a prized element in the Judæo-Christian ideal of piety (*cf.* Acts iv. 34). What, after all, does this identification rest on, save an exegetical tradition and our ignorance of Paul's movements while at Antioch? Why not admit a journey otherwise unknown, of a strictly private nature and so standing outside either the scope or the knowledge of the writer of Acts? If this be allowed, Galatians may well be the earliest of Paul's letters, and can perhaps date from the eve of Paul's visit in Acts xv.

But we must hurry on to *Die Paulinischen Gemeinden*. Here von Dobschütz begins with Corinth, as the church about which most is known. The drawback of this is that it sacrifices the striking lesson as to the special horizon and perspective of primitive Christianity afforded by the Thessalonian Epistles, in which the reaction of the Parousia Hope upon feeling and conduct is brought home as nowhere else. Yet the manysided Corinthian church really presents the best introduction to the concrete life of the Pauline churches. This it does in virtue both of the numerous problems which here come to the surface, and of the depth below the surface to which the Apostle takes us in solving them. Our author, with sure instinct, seizes upon the central divergence of moral type seen in the "strong" and the "weak" in faith. Behind which we discern on the one hand the Greek, liberty-loving and egoistic, and on the other the Roman and the Jew, agreeing in moral seriousness and instinct for order, but less alive to the spontaneity and emancipation from merely external standards

latent in the new message of "power" and "life." With the former spirit went the feeble corporate consciousness (as contrasted with that visible in 1 Thes. iv. 9 and v. 14) which lay at the root of several of the abuses, both of temper and practice, laid bare in the Epistles. To the latter were perhaps due not only most of the revulsion against sins of the flesh, especially the case of "incest," but also the scruples as to constructive idolatry, and possibly those touching marriage, both mixed and other, and the more ecstatic "spiritual gifts" as savouring too much of heathen religious frenzy and disorder. Still our author seems to do no more than justice to the partisans of liberty when he says that their harping on the maxim "All things are allowable to me"—caught, it seems, parrot-wise from Paul himself—meant to them "rather a *doctrinaire* maintenance of the unlimited right of freedom, than a levity bent on promoting immorality. But these Christians were deceived about themselves." Involuntarily their attitude of abstract liberty, unguided by clear perception of the end to which it was means—the type given in Christ—led them the more easily into "defilement of flesh and spirit," *i.e.* into sensuality and self-sufficiency in their own "insight" (*gnosis*). They had not really grasped the full scope of Christianity as a religion which, unlike the pagan cults, claimed to determine every act and give it a moral meaning. "It was a necessary part of life; but it did not determine the life itself." All this is well brought out, while yet it is justly argued that the defects of the Corinthian church as a whole were those of crude immaturity, analogous to those of childhood. Their attitude, whether to their Lord and their calling in Him, or to their Apostle, was one of almost childish inconsistency. That Paul's wonderful hopefulness towards them as having after all the root of the matter, grateful trust and loyalty to Christ as Redeemer, was actually justified by events, is shown not only by their changed tone as reflected in 2 Cor., but also by the good witness borne to them in the opening section of 1 Clement, some forty years later.

It is noteworthy that one so fully in touch with German opinion as von Dobschütz does not fall in with its dominant tendency in at least two matters¹ of criticism touching these Epistles. He does not see in 2 Cor. ii. 5-11, vii. 8-12, reference to any other affair than that dealt with in 1 Cor. v. 1; he does not believe in a lost letter (though he assumes an unrecorded visit, 2 Cor. xiii. 1, xii. 14) between our two Epistles, and so holds to the unity of 2 Cor. as it stands. This he can do the better, that his view of the innocent sense in which many held the doctrine of "liberty" will explain how "painful" even 1 Cor. would be to the bulk of the church. For it rather implies that Paul felt himself isolated in his feeling as to the case of incest, as if the church really condoned it—a suggestion which is cordially corrected in 2 Cor. ii. 5.

As regards the churches of Macedonia, it must suffice to note that an interesting parallel and contrast is drawn between the Thessalonians and

¹ See *Erläuterung* 3, which, however, contains the dubious view that παραδοῦναι τῷ Σατανᾷ εἰς ἕλεθρον τῆς σαρκός means invocation of sudden death on the offender.

Philippians, as churches of kindred type seen at different stages of maturity. The result confirms the general view finally emerging from the book as a whole, namely, that Christianity did evince amid the hard realities of life its unique vital power, by making its moral ideal prevail (*cf.* p. 101). The special features of the chapter on Paul's letter to Rome are (1) acceptance of the salutations at the end as really addressed to Rome; (2) consequent emphasis on the fact that they imply the existence of *Hausgemeinden* of various types, rather than a single church; (3) the special contrast between "strong" and "weak" faith in respect to Vegetarianism on principle and Sabbatarianism—the former, at least, probably connected with a widespread tendency in heathen (especially Orphic) circles, rather than with Judaism; (4) discrimination between what in the letter was generic to Paul's Gospel (stated in terms of his experience so far, especially at Corinth), and what was strictly relative to Roman conditions. The exhortations in chh. xii.—xiv. fall under the former head, though, as is proved¹ by the fulness of treatment given to the scruples just referred to (3), Paul had probably certain local facts specially in view.

Romans is taken as coming between Galatians and Colossians. Whether we are right or not in believing that such a date for Galatians (*c.* 57, 58) is a good deal too late, we are pretty sure that it is a mistake to view it as addressed to North Galatia. Yet this is quietly assumed in spite of Ramsay's notable work on the subject (particularly in his *Historical Com. on Gal.*), which is never even alluded to. This is as unfair to the reader as it is to Ramsay, who, *pace* Schürer and others, cannot be thus lightly ignored. Our author says Galatians and Colossians "lie not far from one another in time," and would assign Colossians to Paul's stay in Cæsarea, 58–60. This may have schematic convenience for the exposition of their kindred features, which he is inclined to overpress;² but to some it will simply make his reading of Galatians less plausible, certain contrasts in theological maturity being what they are. In any case, in Colossians the motive for abstinence is different. He holds it due in the main to Oriental dualism, though the sanction of the O.T. was also sought. In view of Heb. ix. 10, Judaism can explain scruples as to "drink," ii. 16; see Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, 117 ff. A syncretism of Jewish-legal and Oriental-dualistic elements, parallel to Essenism in Palestine, may well have existed in Phrygia and elsewhere, and have produced such reactions upon the moral stimulus afforded by the Gospel as are implied in Colossians. The ethical earnestness of this reaction (asceticism) witnesses to the power of the new stimulus; while greater still must have been the moral power which overcame the misguided form of that earnestness, and "turned it back into the paths of positive Christian morality."

¹ Von Dobschütz says also by xvi. 17; but that is doubtful, *cf.* Phil. iii. 18–20.

² *E.g.* in assuming that Gal. ii. 11 implies scruples among its readers as to clean and unclean foods. But, as we read on p. 87, "the Pharisaic ideal of the Galatian agitators was an exotic growth . . .; the Asceticism and speculation of the Phrygian errorists was here (in Colossæ), if not native, still long acclimatised."

With a good discussion of Paul's attitude to slavery, particularly as seen in the letter to Philemon, our author ends his survey of the Pauline churches; for to him both the Pastorals and Ephesians are unauthentic. The latter he treats, along with 1 Peter, as evidence for the Christianity of Asia Minor, under the general heading "the communities still under Pauline influence." Under it, too, he returns to the Roman community—using the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as 1 Clement; also to the Corinthian church, addressed in the latter. This is the weakest part of the book, owing to the precarious nature of its literary judgments. For as to Ephesians, his negative view is already weakened by acceptance of Colossians; and one doubts whether he has really reckoned with the strong constructive case stated, *e.g.*, by Hort in his *Prolegomena to Ephesians and Romans*. The like may be said of 1 Peter,¹ where better exegesis might lead to another result, to judge from the fact that von Dobschütz connects iii. 19 and iv. 6 with "that superstitious notion of the effect upon the dead of a vicarious baptism," met with in 1 Cor. xv. 29. Finally, one may be allowed firmly to question the too confident assumption, now fashionable in certain quarters, that Hebrews was addressed to Rome. An equally good case, to say the least, can be made out for some community (or communities) in the more Hellenistic part of Palestine, and for a date prior to 70 A.D.² To have excluded "Jerusalem" is not to have proved "Rome," even on the strength of the fact that Hebrews is used in 1 Clement. But subject to these serious deductions as to time relations in particular, our author brings out the features of the ethical situation implied in all the documents just named with real insight. Thus he calls attention, on the one hand, to signs of a large infusion of impure elements into the communities; and on the other to the presence of a stock of seasoned Christian characters, who serve to keep a definite and pure moral standard before their churches as a whole. The average morality, the common ethical consciousness, has even risen and consolidated, though the religious motive has lost something of intensity and innerness (see p. 126).

Space prevents our following out the discussions on "The Johannine Circle," with the mysterious non-apostolic (?) John as its animating spirit at Ephesus, and with Ignatius and Polycarp as leaders in the next generation: on "The Beginnings of *Gnosis*," classified as (a) Unfruitful Intellectualism, (b) Dualistic Asceticism, and (c) Antinomian Libertinism: and on "The Communities in the age of transition to Catholicism," where notable use is made of Hermas, as giving the opposite picture to that presented in the Apology of Aristides. Gladly would we have cited many excellent points in all these, as well as whole sentences from the final "Retrospect," in which our author defines the sense in which his survey

¹ Cf. Hort's masterly fragment on i. 1–ii. 17, and the excellent Commentary by Jean Monnier (Paris, 1900).

² The present writer would refer the curious to two forthcoming papers in the *Expositor*, arguing for Cæsarea as the most probable destination, and for 62–63 A.D. as a likely date.

proves that Christian faith did actually enable its subjects ethically to "overcome the world." Here are a few of his closing words. "But that artisans and old women should live a truly philosophic life, as the Apologists triumphantly style the realisation of the ethical ideal by Christians of all ranks—this the former (*i.e.* Greek philosophy) did not manage to secure. That belonged to the power which went forth from Jesus Christ, and has actually transformed humanity."

A very valuable part of the book is the Appendix of *Erläuterungen*, on Statistics of Population; Slavery in the Roman world; the case of Incest at Corinth; James the Lord's brother; Ancient Vegetarianism; and the Ethical Terminology of primitive Christianity. Its richness of materials and of ideas is such, that it is equivalent to a separate volume of essays. The most important of these discussions are the last two, the best part of that on James being due to what is found in the one in which emphasis is laid on Orphic influences as contributing to a widespread ascetic tendency. It is also laid down that "vegetarianism on principle is not found on Jewish soil," not even among the Essenes. The latter point is dubious, *e.g.* in view of what Josephus tells us of Banous, a Jewish hermit, as is also the suggestion that Hegesippus' words touching James, οὐδὲ ἐμψυχον ἔφαγε, only exaggerate the fact of his abstinence from "things strangled" (which would hardly call for special notice in a Jew). But von Dobschütz rightly emphasises the non-Jewish tendency to "Encratism" on Pagan soil, which appears specially in Gnostic Christianity. Again, his recognition of various motives—religious, philosophic, dietetic—as leading to like results, is surely well-grounded; as is also his observation that abstinence from wine did not always go along with vegetarianism (*e.g.* the Rechabites and Nazirites).

The study of Ethical Terminology forms "a chapter in the early history of the Christian language of edification." Here the Greek O.T. is a notable link with the Greek moralists, the influence of whose tradition, however, is qualified and modified increasingly by the terminology native to Jewish Christians and by the tradition of the Lord's sayings. Where these were least operative, as among the Gnostics, the non-Biblical or Græco-philosophic conceptions were most marked. In this sphere, also, Paul's creative influence is again apparent. But as time goes on, freshness and reality in the use of this terminology fades away; what had been "edifying" becomes "grandiose." In dealing with the special topic of moral instruction, our author lays stress not only on the Jewish "Wisdom" literature, which colours the "Two Ways," but also on the Orphic pictures of Hades as helping to give form to the lists of Vices and their implied penalties found in early Christian writings. He sums up as follows: "There is a wonderful richness in forms of moral instruction and expression. One may well derive from this, also, an inference as to the richness of the moral power which was bestowed on the primitive Christian communities in the Gospel."

This book ought soon to appear in an English dress. It is well

written, interesting, and full of a genuine religious feeling which should make it appeal widely to men of all sorts engaged in the Christian ministry of life. As its author well says, "every pastor ought, in order to estimate aright the conditions of the community entrusted to his care, have formed to himself a clear picture of the relations of the early Christian communities. Certainly these were no ideal communities. But just because they were not, they can be typical for us." And this applies to the missionary even more than to the pastor of a church at home.

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The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith.—By Charles Carroll Everett, D.D., LL.D., late Bussey Professor of Theology in Harvard University. Edited by Professor Hale.—The Macmillan Company, New York, 1902.

THOSE acquainted with Dr Everett's numerous writings will welcome this posthumous addition to the series. It contains the first of his two courses of university lectures, and gives us his *Philosophy of Religion*; the second and complementary course, which has not yet been published, being devoted to the special content of religious faith. As Dr Everett left no manuscript, and, indeed, seems never to have committed his lectures to writing, the only material available was the notes taken by students. The work of putting this material into shape was entrusted to Professor Hale of the Harvard Divinity School, and has been accomplished by him in a wholly satisfactory manner. Although the lectures necessarily appear in "a condensed and sketchy form," they have by no means lost the qualities, either in style or matter, that made them so impressive to those who heard them. One feels throughout the stimulating touch of an earnest, open and acute mind; and here and there we come upon passages of great beauty, the chapter dealing with the relation of religion to morality being particularly notable in this respect.

The method followed by Dr Everett is to begin with the elements that are common to all forms of religion, and from this abstract conception to advance to those elements that give their character to the higher religions. Religion is defined in turn as feeling, as a feeling towards the supernatural, and, finally, as a feeling towards a supernatural manifesting itself in truth, goodness and beauty. The first two definitions are inclusive; the last is no longer inclusive, but typical or normative.

Following Schleiermacher, Dr Everett finds the subjective basis of religion, not like Rationalism and Idealistic Philosophy in thought, nor like Kant in the will, but in feeling. Although in normal cases all three elements will be present, yet religion varies, not with variations in thought—clear theological ideas do not make a man religious—but with variations in feeling; and that feeling is the essential as against will is proved by the fact that a man may be religious in situations where no action is possible,

as on a sick-bed. The primacy of feeling in religion is only a particular case of its primacy in life generally: what we do we do to gratify feeling of one kind or another. At this point Dr Everett discusses the relation in which feeling stands to the intellectual concept, and maintains the view that religious, as well as moral and æsthetic, feeling is in advance of intellectual recognition. It is not, however, till the second half of the book that his theory of knowledge appears in its developed form.

The second of the two elements which must be included in a general conception of religion is some reference to the supernatural, the term supernatural being used in its broadest and vaguest sense, as that which stands in antithesis to the world considered as a composite whole, and disturbs the usual relation of its parts. That there is this reference in the higher religions is evident—the feeling towards truth, goodness and beauty is not regarded as religious unless these ideas are connected with the supernatural—and even the savage conceives the object of his worship as influencing his life for good or evil without the medium of the physical organs through which such influence is ordinarily exercised.

Dr Everett's method of starting from an enumeration of common elements, apart from the fact that it leads him to a good deal of unnecessary repetition, does not seem calculated to facilitate our understanding of religion, whether we wish to consider it from a philosophical or from a historical standpoint. The radical motive of religion is not to be reached by such a process of abstraction; it can be reached only by an analysis of religion as it exists in its highest form, and only from the standpoint of the highest can we judge what there is in the lower forms of religion that is entitled to the name. And further, it is doubtful whether the supernatural, in any intelligible sense of the word, can be regarded as an element in, say, Fetichism. If there is anything common to Christianity and Fetichism, it is nothing more than a consciousness of external powers that are able to hurt or to help us. All religion has at least a practical character; and it is another defect in Dr Everett's definition that it fails to bring this out. And his method is equally objectionable if our object is to understand the historical development of religion. It leads him to speak of the lower religions as if what we had there was the bare "form" of religion, or the form with no more than a "negative" content, and as if the evolution of religion consisted in filling this form with a positive content. The application of such categories tends rather to obscure than to elucidate the subject.

We come now to those elements that are distinctive of the higher religions, and that would, in their perfect development and recognition, constitute the ideal religion. The history of religion is described as an attempt to fill the idea of the supernatural with an ever higher content. In the lower religions the supernatural is conceived in a merely negative way, as that which breaks in on and disturbs the relation in which the parts of the world aggregate stand to each other. It is the characteristic of the higher religions that they advance to the conception of the

supernatural as positive. This positive content is found in the three great ideas of truth, goodness and beauty.

How do we come by these ideas? Already in an earlier part of the book, Dr Everett brought considerations to show that religious knowledge is rooted not in thought but in feeling. The subject now receives fuller treatment. The three ideas are not indeed the product of religious feeling, for they grow up independently of religion, and are only taken up by it at a late stage in its history. But they are based on feeling none the less. Take the idea of truth. Truth does not mean the mere phenomenal existence of any particular fact; it means that a fact is related to other facts in an all-embracing system. "If we knew the absolute truth, we should see the Universe as a great organic whole, the manifestation of a principle in and through which all things exist." Now this idea of unity is not a product of experience or reflection, but the presupposition which makes experience possible. "As soon as we begin to think we *assume* that there is a relation between each new element and our intellectual or experimental world." The idea of unity is based on feeling in the sense that it springs from an "instinct of belief" of which we can give no further account. The two remaining ideas are treated by Dr Everett as but different expressions of the first. Goodness and beauty are concrete manifestations of the unity of the world-whole. Dr Everett reaches this position in the case of goodness by reducing all morality to altruism. "As the law of causality was found to be, not the mere sequence of events, but an inner connexion between cause and effect, revealing a unity which underlies all experience . . . so the principle of obligation, the principle of the moral law, is found to rest in the love and sympathy which manifest the same great unity in society." The sense of guilt is explained as the feeling of having separated oneself from others.

But if the three ideas do not originally belong to religion, how does religion come to appropriate them? Dr Everett's answer is neither clear nor satisfactory. He traces the development of religious feelings from those that are self-related, the worshipper seeking the help of the Deity merely for the attainment of his private ends, up to those that are God-related, when disinterested love enters, and worship is rendered as to one worthy of worship; and he adds that the higher feelings imply a new content in the Divinity. And still further, he subjects to analysis the higher religious feelings of trust, love and worship in order to show that unity, goodness and beauty must be assumed in their object. The point which Dr Everett fails to make clear is whether the impulse to interpret the supernatural in terms of the three ideas comes from these ideas themselves, *i.e.* from our sense of the world as the manifestation of a single principle, or from such feelings as love, trust and worship. At one place he shows how the three ideas are fitted to give rise to the higher religious feelings; but then, on the other hand, he repeatedly makes the assertion that these ideas have already reached maturity before they are connected with religion, and that, when they do come to be connected, it is because

religious feeling has arrived at a point in its development when it demands the highest conception as essential. If the latter be taken as Dr Everett's view, it is difficult to see how feeling could develop in any other way than by having a higher object presented to it. The higher feeling presupposes the higher object; not *vice versa*. It is not in fact possible from Dr Everett's standpoint to reach a satisfactory theory of knowledge. Even were love and sympathy a sufficient basis for morality, which they are not, it is not possible to reduce these feelings to a mere sense of the unity of society. The moral idea cannot be expressed in terms of unity. Moral judgments are essentially judgments of value, expressing the worth which the moral good possesses for our feeling, willing self. And not less so are religious judgments. They express the worth of moral personality and its ends as against the natural impulses that are within, and the mechanical necessity that reigns without. Only on the ground of a judgment of value can the good be seated on the throne of the universe. Dr Everett is right in recognising with Schleiermacher the peculiarity of religious knowledge as based not on the theoretical reason, but on feeling. But it is not in the feeling or instinct of unity that such a basis can be found. The idea of unity provides no ground for judgments of value; each element will have its own place in the whole, but no element will possess a higher worth than another.

Dr Everett's conception of religion does not differ in any essential respect from that of Schleiermacher. When interpreted through the idea of truth, the supernatural becomes "the non-composite unity in and through which the composite whole exists," and the ideas of goodness and beauty are added as concrete manifestations of this unity. It follows that religion must be at bottom a sense of the oneness of the universe, and of our place in it as members of an infinite whole. Dr Everett indeed criticises Schleiermacher on the ground that of the three ideas that form the content of the supernatural he recognised only unity, thus depriving many of the religious feelings of their support, and narrowing down religion to the sense of absolute dependence. In adding goodness and beauty he claims that he is amending Schleiermacher's conception. But this criticism rests on a misunderstanding. The feeling of absolute dependence does not, in Schleiermacher's system, attach itself to being in general, but always appears in connexion with some specific content of our consciousness of the world. As much as Dr Everett, he recognises the good and the beautiful as expressions of the absolute spirit.

Although Dr Everett emphatically rejects the Pantheistic view of the world, it is doubtful if the fundamental principles of his philosophy will support anything higher. The idea of personality, the idea of purpose, the Christian ideas of a kingdom of God and of an approach of God to men in history, receive no recognition, and can receive none from his standpoint. A supernatural that is "the non-composite unity in and through which the composite whole exists," even if there be added to it the predicates of goodness and beauty, is not the supernatural of Christianity,

or, indeed, of any ethical religion. It is nothing else than the Absolute of speculative philosophy; and it corresponds, not to the religious impulse and need, but to the demand of the theoretical reason for an ultimate unity. Religion too has its idea of unity, but that unity is moral, not metaphysical. Religion reaches unity, not by finding in the manifold of the world a common ground—no attempt in this direction has ever been successful or ever will be successful—but by bringing all the forces of the world under the control and direction of a Supreme Will and Purpose.

Although these lectures are less satisfactory on their philosophical than on their literary side, we can cordially recognise that there is much in them that is stimulating and suggestive. It is no small matter that they call the attention of English readers to Schleiermacher's epoch-making system, and that they lift up a banner against the intellectualism that dominates the bulk of current philosophy. It is to be hoped that their reception will be such as to justify the editor in publishing the supplementary course.

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Untersuchungen über die Entstehung des vierten Evangeliums.—Von Julius Grill.—Theil 1. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1902. Pp. xii + 408, M. 8.

THIS is a contribution of the very highest value to the solution of the Johannine problem. The author appears to be a new-comer in the field of New Testament criticism, but comes armed cap-à-pie with a sound biblicotheological method, applied with accurate and exhaustive scholarship.

This is certainly the most serviceable method of approach, beginning, as it does, with a truly historical exegesis, and a tracing of the dominant ideas of the writer to their affinities in earlier literature. The cumulative force of such an argument on the question of authorship is very great when skilfully conducted; but apart from moot-points of criticism, no student who follows this careful and discriminating analysis of the thought of the Johannine writer can fail to gain fresh insight into the meaning of the book, and such, after all, is the prime consideration.

As against Harnack, Grill finds the Logos idea, which the prologue emphasises, to be not alien to, or superimposed upon, the general Christology of the gospel, but to furnish its real key-note. Baldensperger's theory of an anti-hemerobaptist *tendenz* also receives but slight consideration. On the contrary, Grill finds Gnostic, or more strictly Docetic, ideas to be the background of false teaching, against which the author's development of Pauline Christology on the lines of Philo may best be understood. Moreover, the work is thoroughly a unit. Recent attempts to distinguish more than one hand at work in the gospel are justly regarded as premature until the standpoint of the work as a whole is appreciated. Scholars will welcome the advent of this new and great reinforcement in an arduous field.

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RECENT DANTE LITERATURE.

I. *Dante and the Divine Comedy*.—By W. J. Payling Wright.—
Lane, 3s. 6d. nett.

ANY record of the direct impression produced by the study of Dante on an intelligent reader must have interest to those who know Dante, and may have value to those who wish to know him. Judged from this point of view, the first seven sections of Mr Payling Wright's book might well take their place among the slighter introductions to Dante. In this, as in other works on Dante, there are inaccuracies. They range from such a trifle as the statement that Dante only once smiles, and then in scorn (*Par.* xxii. 135),—whereas few readers, one would have thought, could fail to remember with delight how the sight of Bellaqua "moved his lips a little unto laughter" (*Purg.* iv. 122)—to the really amazing assertion (p. 25) that, with the unlikely exception of the *De Monarchia*, the *Vita Nuova* is all that Dante gave to the world during the first thirty-five or forty years of his life. What, then, of that superb series of *Odes*, almost all of which fall within this period, and which would alone suffice, had Dante never written a line of the *Vita Nuova* or the *Comedy*, to make him by far the greatest poet of an age rich in poetry?

For the rest, Mr Wright's matter (barring the notes, the subjects of which seem to be taken at random) is well selected and clearly presented. He generally shows direct contact with the original, and a wise selection of guides. His style is restrained and vigorous, and there are several points (such as the interval between Dante's 9th and 18th year in the *Vita Nuova*, and the relation, or rather absence of relation, between the formation of the Mount of Purgatory and the formation of Hell) as to which almost the whole "guilty world" of Dante expositors "wrenches its head awry," on which Mr Wright has "kept the straight path." But, alas! "all this availeth him nothing," for it is the eighth and last section, dealing with the "motif" of the *Comedy*, which Mr Wright himself would doubtless regard as the only real justification for the publication of his volume; and of this we are reluctantly compelled to say that it not only completely fails to establish a case, but that the argument includes statements so demonstrably false as to be barely excusable, and so baseless as hardly to escape the charge of flippancy.

Briefly, Mr Wright argues that the wolf of *Inferno* I. represents *Death*; that Dante at one period of his life, having probably lost faith in the immortality of the soul, was overwhelmed by the physical horror of death; and that the motif of the *Comedy* is to be found in the history of his overcoming this terror and regaining his faith.

By way of making it probable that Dante had at one time lost, at any rate, all vivid realisation of a future life, Mr Wright declares—

"It is a noteworthy fact that in the sorrow portrayed in the *Vita*

Nuova he draws no consolation from religion. Beatrice, it is true, is in high heaven, but Dante's bereavement seems irreparable. She becomes a memory, and at last an inspiration, but re-union with her is not the aim of his striving. There is no sure and certain hope founded on faith in the resurrection. Had Dante during those dark years no clear vision of a future life?"

Where does Mr Wright find recorded, or how does he divine, this "noteworthy fact"? The obvious sources of information as to the state of Dante's belief at this period are the *Vita Nuova* itself and the *Convivio*. Now, at the end of the *Vita Nuova*, having dedicated his life to the task of writing of Beatrice "what ne'er was writ of woman," Dante goes on, "and then may it please him who is the Lord of all courtesy that my soul may have leave to go to behold the glory of its lady, to wit, of that blessed Beatrice who gazes in glory upon the face of Him who is blessed throughout all ages." Again, in the ninth chapter of the second book of the *Convivio*, after a passionate denunciation of the stupidity of all such as deny the future life, Dante concludes—

"And I so believe, so affirm, and so am certain, that I shall pass to another better life after this, where this lady liveth in glory."

And towards the end of the fourth book (cap. 27), in speaking of the contemplations of the closing period of life, he says that the soul, "having already surrendered itself to God, and withdrawn itself from the business and thoughts of this world, seems to look upon those whom it believes to be with God"; and he goes on, in illustration of this, to quote Cato's words in Cicero's *De Senectute*, wherein he says to his younger companions, "I uplift myself in the utmost yearning to see your fathers whom I love, and not only them, but those of whom I have heard speak."

In the face of these passages, Mr Wright's assertions and suggestions furnish a curious example of the lengths to which a preconceived theory will carry a man in overlooking the most obvious and pertinent facts.

Nor is Mr Wright's case much better when he attempts to revive the vanishing belief in Dante's general alienation from Christian ways of thought at this period of his life. There, indeed, he can plead a certain excuse, for, where so great an authority as Witte gives a wrong lead, one must not be too hard on Mr Wright or any other beginner who follows him. It remains the fact, however, that no authority can give real weight to an argument which is based on a palpable error; and it is now high time for that unhappy assertion to be dropped, that Dante was once in doubt "whether the original matter of the elements had been created by God." The passage on which the assertion is based is contained in the first chapter of the fourth book of the *Convivio*, where Dante explains that he was baulked in his philosophical studies, "especially in those places wherein I considered and searched whether the first matter of the elements was understood by God." By mistranslation of the phrase "da dio intesa," this passage has been made to give evidence that Dante regarded as open, matters which the Church had decided, and that he hovered between the doctrine of

Averroes and the Catholic truth. This rests on a double error. First, the word "intesa" cannot, by any stretch, be made to mean "created." In scholastic terminology the *form* is the intelligible principle, and the *material* is the individuating principle of a thing. Now "first matter" is formless, and therefore without the intelligible principle. In what sense, if any, can God himself be said to understand that which lacks the very principle of intelligibility? The question, it will be seen, depends on the use of terms, and has nothing to do with the creation of first matter, or with any point of faith. And secondly, the form of words "I was considering whether," does not imply any doubt. The heading of the chapter in proof of the existence of God, for instance, in St Thomas's *Summa*, is "Whether God exists." When he wrote that chapter, therefore, Thomas was considering and searching "whether God exists," but he was not in doubt as to the answer. A "question" in common scholastic usage means a "subject" merely, or sometimes an argument. I take it to be, the usage that has survived in our Parliamentary "The question is," where the "question" may be a direction or an assertion.

In matters capable of less rigid demonstration, we should surely hesitate to follow a guide who thus ignores or distorts the clear facts; and therefore we need have no hesitation in dismissing Mr Payling Wright's attempt to disturb the well-established interpretation of the wolf in the first Canto of the *Inferno*. Dante's contemporaries, one and all, understood it to represent Avarice. Boethius expressly speaks of the wolf as the type of the avaricious, and the lion as the type of the proud man; and more important than all, Dante himself in the *Purgatory* apostrophises avarice as the "ancient wolf," and dwells, in this connection, upon the very attribute of insatiability upon which Mr Payling Wright insists in favour of his novel interpretation. Nor is there the slightest evidence in Dante's works that the abject terror of death, which Mr Wright supposes, ever possessed him. The language of the great ode "Doglia mi reca" (which falls within Mr Wright's reign of terror) is perfectly characteristic. Virtue, we are told, "joyfully performs its august service; preserves, adorns, increases what it finds [in the human soul], and is so counter to death as to *take no heed of it,*" *morte repugna si che lei non cura.*

II. *Dante Studies and Researches.*—By Paget Toynbee.—
Methuen.

THE essays and notes collected in this volume were written at different periods, and their main results have already been incorporated in the *Dante Dictionary* published in 1898, which has earned the gratitude of all students of Dante. Mr Toynbee did well, however, to reproduce the more important articles at greater length than was compatible with the form of the Dictionary.

The article on Ugucione of Pisa, for instance, which occupies about two columns in the Dictionary, covers 18 pages in the volume of essays, and every word of it is interesting and valuable. Similar remarks would apply to the particularly important article on Dante's obligations to Alfraganus. For the substantive part of this article we cannot be too grateful, but the bibliography is incorrect and disappointing. It is incorrect, for the twelfth century translation of Alfraganus by Johannes Hispalensis (Avendath) is misdated by a hundred years. Mr Toynbee cites Jourdain's authority, but this is because he has mistaken a misprint in that scholar's *Recherches* (p. 115) for a deliberate correction; and this he could hardly have done if he had read Jourdain's remarks, still less if he had made any independent enquiries. And it is disappointing, because it does not in any way follow up the clue furnished by Jourdain and insisted on by Schiaparelli (in Lubin's *Dante e Gli Astronomi Italiani*), which gives us *prima facie* evidence that the version of Alfraganus used by Dante was that of Gerard of Cremona, who died in 1187, not that of Johannes Hispalensis. But where so much ground is covered, inaccuracies are almost inevitable, and where so much is given, it seems ungrateful to complain of omissions. Whatever qualifications we are disposed to make, it remains true that the volume establishes not a few facts by which, if future editors do their duty, the understanding of Dante will be permanently advanced.

III. *The Troubadours of Dante*.—By H. G. Chaytor, M.A.—
Clarendon Press.

It was a happy inspiration to edit, in the original Provençal, a selection of the poems of the Troubadours mentioned by Dante, and Mr Chaytor has carried out the idea most admirably. Students who have already made some little progress in the study of Provençal will be inclined to say that this book has achieved perfection in the introduction, the notes, the grammar, the glossary, and above all, perhaps, the phonetics. The selection of poems, too, is all that could be desired. We have only one word of qualification. Mr Chaytor evidently thinks that his book is suited to the beginner; to make it so, he should have added a complete translation of the poems. It is true that he has given much help, but in such difficult productions as those of the Troubadours the beginner should be told everything. It is no use trying to divine the points at which he will find a difficulty; to him there are nothing but difficulties.

The book, unpretentious as it is, richly deserves to be accepted as a standard work; and we would respectfully suggest to its author that when it reaches a second edition, room should be found for a translation, and some indication should be given of the easier texts, which the beginner should be recommended to attack first.

IV. *The Teachings of Dante.*—By Charles Allen Dinsmore.—
Constable, 5s. nett.

MR DINSMORE'S book is an avowed attempt to determine the positive religious value of the *Divine Comedy*, and its relation to the best religious life of our own day. Granted that Horace Bushnell is the representative of the latter, and that standards in such matters are absolute, Mr Dinsmore has done his work well. He will certainly have many grateful readers. But from the point of view of impartial students of religion, his analysis cannot be regarded as successful. Dante's theism is of the type which receives its classical expression in the *Confessions* of Augustine. The sense of awe and of mystery is never lost in familiarity. The soul of the devout reader may be appalled by the austerity of what looks like Pantheism, but will not be repelled by Anthropomorphism. Nowhere is there a more fervent sense of Deity than in the *Comedy*, but no one would say of Dante, as was said of Moses, and as their admirers would say of many Christian saints, that God spake with him "face to face, as a man speaketh with his friend." Now this characteristic of Dante's theism, which some may find cold, and others sublime, from which some may seek refuge in the intimacies of naiver devotions, and to which others may flee for refuge from them, Mr Dinsmore (with what we cannot but regard as a complete misnomer) describes as the "absence of Christ" from the *Comedy*. The phrase needs some unriddling. We gather that what it really means is the absence of a certain "sweet sense of personal communion," or, as we should prefer to put it, a sense of personal *intimacy* with the Divine, however named. Now to call the absence of this note the "absence of Christ," in speaking of a poem which is full of Christ as the second person of the Trinity, seems to betray a curious confusion. It seems to imply, in the first place, that the worshipper should distinguish between Christ and God, and therefore should not really be a Trinitarian; and in the second place, that the special characteristic which Mr Dinsmore misses in Dante's religion is only to be found in connection with some form of Christolatry. Neither of these curious implications throws any but indirect light upon Dante, but both of them throw considerable light upon modern Evangelicism. Again, Mr Dinsmore thinks that Dante attempted to fill the supposed void by the companionship of Beatrice. Surely this is gratuitous. We have not to look far in order to find the being who takes in Dante's scheme the place that Jesus takes in the scheme of modern liberal Evangelicism. According to Dante, the man who seeks grace, and hath not recourse to Mary, is striving to fly without wings. It is she who so ennobled human nature that the Creator did not disdain to become His own creature. It is she who, in her tender compassion, anticipates our very prayers, whose name upon the dying sinner's lips is the passport to heaven, whose example on earth should be our constant guide, and whose intercession in heaven is our constant stay. Whatever witness the "Christian consciousness" of the modern evangelical bears to the

historical identity of Jesus of Nazareth with the spiritual Christ, that evidence the Christian consciousness of the mediæval Catholic bore to the identity of Mary, once the exemplar of all virtues upon earth, with Mary, now the "meridian torch of love" in heaven. Dante and the modern Evangelical are alike in believing in a being "beloved and venerated by God," yet condescending to converse in equal terms with the weakness of man; they are unlike in the name they assign to this being, and unlike in this also, that Dante formally as well as practically distinguishes between this being and God, whereas the modern Evangelical identifies them in his theology, but distinguishing them in his devotions.

V. *Dante and the Animal Kingdom.*—By Dr Holbrook.
London: Macmillan, 1902.

WE have seldom seen a more forcible illustration of the value of the adage "Ne sutor ultra crepidam" than is furnished by Dr Holbrook's book. He has made a contribution of real and permanent value to a corner of Dante study which had been curiously neglected. Even Witte, whose researches on almost every field of Dante lore were striking and original, lost every note of distinction, and became little better than commonplace when he spoke of the animal world in Dante's writings. Yet the field is ample and tempting. Dr Holbrook has shown what ample illustrations of Dante can be drawn from the mediæval natural histories, and has discriminated admirably between his direct observations and the imaginative or traditional traits that alternate with them. Dr Holbrook's contempt for the Middle Ages, however, is as great as his ignorance of them; and whenever he steps beyond the narrowest limits of his field as a specialist, he is untrustworthy. An instance of his careless and confident generalisation may be found in the statement, "Nevertheless, the ancient Hebrews have not manifested in their surviving literature any heartfelt affection for sheep or any other animal" (p. 179). This in the face of such a passage—to name one only—as Hosea's comparison of Jahweh's love to that of the husbandman removing the yoke from the jaws of the wearied ox, and spreading its fodder before it, as a parallel to the love of a husband for his wife or of a parent for his child!

As specimens of the numerous minor inaccuracies, we may note that, on page 73, Vergil is said to have fastened hold of one of the shaggy wings of Satan. This, of course, is an error. And in the beautiful description of the lark's flight and ascent, quoted from Bernard (p. 267), the characteristic touch of the lark's losing consciousness in its rapture "que s'oblida" is dropped from the translation.

VI. *Dante and his Time*.—By Dr Karl Federn.
 London: William Heinemann, 1902.

DR FEDERN'S work requires no elaborate notice; it aims at providing the student of Dante with the historical propædeutic which so many readers have desired; but the author has neither the accurate knowledge nor the fine insight which are required for the task, and he cannot be regarded as having performed it with even approximate adequacy. His treatment of Dante's own work has considerable vigour, and has the merit of covering the whole area, not confining itself to the Comedy, but it has not sufficient merit to compensate for its numerous inaccuracies and the unwarrantable liberties which the author takes with the texts which he professes to quote. What, for instance, are we to think of "I opened them not—it was virtuous to cheat such a beast" (p. 283), as a translation of

"ed io non gli ele apersi,
 E cortesia fu in lui esser villano"
 (*Inferno*, canto xxxiii. line 149.)

P. H. WICKSTEED.

WANTAGE.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES.

OUTLINE OF CLASSIFICATION.

Prefatory Note.—The following classification consists of the sections relating to Religion, Theology, and Philosophy, in the Alphabetical Classification, printed here in an abbreviated form. The Scheme is based upon Dewey's Decimal Classification, and was prepared for the Library of the Liverpool Diocesan Church House. In the quarterly lists of books and articles only those classes represented by several titles will usually be mentioned in the headings. But the marginal number or letter forming the class-mark will in any case direct attention to a fresh division of the subject-matter. The Outline, taken in connection with the Subject Index following, will not only serve to direct readers to the subjects that interest them in the present and future lists, but may be of use to owners of libraries in arranging and cataloguing their books, and to students in classifying their own notes and memoranda, so as to bring together all material relating to the same subject.

It is hoped that it may be found practicable to issue, at intervals of three or five years, a Bibliography in volume form, containing the titles in the quarterly lists, collected and minutely classified under their proper heads, with copious cross-references and an author index.

A RELIGION

- 2 Philosophy of Religion
- 8 Christianity
- 10-19 Natural Religion, Theism

B † BIBLE

- a-z General and introductory
- 1 † Old Testament, 2 Historical Books, 3 Poetical Books, 4 Prophetical Books
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C † CHURCH

- 21 Ministry, 25 Councils, 27 Law
- 31 Sunday, 35-37 Feasts and Fasts
- 40 Worship, Liturgies, 43 Prayer Book
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- 60 Church Work, Missions, &c.

D DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY

- h History, 10 God, 20 Christ, 30 Man, Sin, 40 Grace, Salvation
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E EDIFICATION. * ETHICS

- 1-9 Edification
- 5 Hymns, Poetry
- 6 Christian ethics, 7 Mysticism
- 10 Ethical theory, general works
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F PASTORALIA

- 1 Preaching, 2 Sermons

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English

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H HISTORY

- v Eastern, w Western Churches
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I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS

(Editions of Fathers, Divines, &c.)

- C Fathers to 476 A.D.
- 2 Western (R.C.) Church
- 3 Church of England
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M MYTHOLOGY. RELIGIONS

- 3 Teutonic and Northern
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Wilson (J. M.) Influence of Scientific Training on the Reception of Religious Truth 17p. Cont. R., Mar.
- B BIBLE** *Gen. Works* 1 *Old Test.* 5 *New Test.* 9 *Apocrypha.*
- Davidson (A. B.)* Biblical and Literary Essays 332p. 6/. Hodder.
Carleton (J. G.) The Part of Rheims in the making of the English Bible demy 8vo, 259p. 9/6 n. Frowde.
- g *Findlay (G. G.)* The Interpretation of Holy Scripture, Ancient and Modern 23p. Lond. Q. R., Jan.
- k *Moulton (J. H.)* Notes from the Papyri 17p. Exp., Feb.
[Lexical Notes, chiefly from the Tebtunis Papyri.]
- q *Smith (G. A.)* Studies in the History and Topography of Jerusalem. A general view of the City 21p. The Name Jerus. and other Names 13p. (The etymology and history of the name.) The Waters of Jerus. 21p. Expositor, Jan., Feb., Mar.
Wilson (Sir C. W.) Excavation of a Levitical City—Gezer 12p. Monthly R., Mar.
- x *Cheyne (T. K.)* Critica Biblica Pt. I. Isaiah and Jeremiah swd. 2/6 n. Black.
- 1 *Kent (C. F.)* Messages of Israel's Law-givers: Laws of the Old Test. codified, arranged in order of growth, and freely rendered in paraphrase 420p. 3/6 (Messages of the Bible.) J. Clarke.
Matheson (G.) Representative Men of the Bible 378p. 6/. Hodder & S.
Redpath (H. A.) The Present Position of the Study of the Septuagint 19pp. Amer. J. Th., Jan.
Sweet (H. B.) Intr. to Greek Old Test. App. Letter of Aristeas 2nd ed. 7/6 n. Clay.
- 1a *Sayce (A. H.)* The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia (Gifford Lectures) T. & T. Clark.
[Review follows.]
- 1h *Budge (E. A. Willis) and L. W. King* (Ed.) Annals of the Kings of Assyria. The cuneiform texts, with translations, transliterations, etc., from the original documents in British Museum, vol. 1 14 plates 20/. Longmans.
Conder (C. R.) The First Bible 252p. 5/. Blackwood.
Goodspeed (G. S.) History of the Babylonians and Assyrians Map, plans 434p. 6/. Smith & E.
Johns (C. H. W.) The Code of Ham-
- murabi: Fresh Material for Comparison with the Mosaic Code 12 p. J. Th. Stud., Jan.
- 1h *Lagrange (M. J.)* Le Code de Ham-mourabi 25p. R. Biblique, Jan.
Macriady-Bey Le Temple d'Echmoun à Sidon 18p. (With Plates of Objects discovered in the Excavations.) R. Biblique, Jan.
Pinches (T. G.) The Old Test. in the Light of the Hist. Records and Legends of Assyria and Babylonia 520p. 7/6. S. P. C. K.
- 1k *Ley (Prof. J.)* Die metrische Beschaffenheit des zweiten Teils des Jesaya 47p. Th. Stud. u. Krit. 1903 b.
- 1r *Charles (R. H.)* Rise and Development in Israel of the Belief in a Future Life Exp., Jan.
[Sermon before the Univ. of Dublin.]
- 2 Midrash Hag-Gadol: a Rabb. Hom. to Pent. Ed. from Yemen MSS. by S. Schechter Genesis 4to, 468p. swd. 30/ n. Clay.
- Blake (B.)* Joseph and Moses, in Light of Oldest Writings 290p. 4/. T. & T. Clark.
Carpenter (J. E.) Composition of the Hexateuch. Appendix on Laws and Institutions by George Harford 554p. 18/ n. Longmans.
- 4 *Driver (S. R.)* Translations from the Prophets Jer. iv. 3—vi. 30; vii. 1—ix. 22; ix. 23—13, Jan., Feb., Mar.
Thackeray (H. St J.) The Greek Translators of Jeremiah 21p. J. Th. Stud., Jan.
- 5 *Cone (O.)* Rich and Poor in the New Testament 254p. 6/. Black.
Gwilliam (G. H.) Stud. Bibl. et Eccl., vol. 5, Pt. 3. Place of the Peshitto version in the App. Crit. of the Greek New Test. 2/6. Frowde.
New Testament. Tr. from Syriac. Intr. and Notes by J. Cooper and A. J. Maclean demy 8vo, 234p. 9/. T. & T. Clark.
New Testament Criticism 38p. Q. R., Jan.
Pallas (Alex.) Η ΝΕΑ ΔΙΑΘΗΚΗ. Κατα Το Βατικανο Χερογραφο. 257p. L'pool Booksellers Co.
[This modern Greek version of the Gospels contains the version of St Matthew which caused the disturbances in Athens.]
Richards (F. T.) The Eve of Christianity 100p. 2/6 n. Richards.
Sanday (W.), &c. Criticism of the New Test.: St Marg. Lectures, 1902 240p. 6/ n. Murray.
- 5s *Batiffol (Mgr.)* L'Église naissante. Le Canon du Nouveau Testament 17p. R. Biblique, Jan.
Encyclopædia Biblica and the Gospels. A. N. Jannaris 4p. [reply by] E. A. Abbott 16p. Cont. R., Jan., Feb.
Jannaris (A.) An ill-used Passage in Ignatius (ad Philad. 8. 2) Class. R., Feb.
- 5x *Weiss (B.)* Die Perikope der Ehebercherin 17p. Z. f. wissensch. Theol., Jan.
[A Textual Discussion of the Passage.]

- 6 *Dallus (H. A.)* Gospel Record interpreted by Human Experience 5/ n. Longmans.
- Hilgenfeld (A.)* Der mysteriöse Marcus und der reactionäre Jacobus 40p. Z. f. wiss. Th., Jan.
- [Discusses the priority of Mark, and the attitude of James to the Gentile Christians.]
- Ramsay (W. M.)* The Education of Christ 139p. 2/6. Hodder.
- Walker (W. L.)* Cross and the Kingdom. As viewed by Christ and in Light of Evolution demy 8vo, 338p. 9/. T. & T. Clark.
- 6r *King (J. M.)* Theology of Christ's Teaching Intr. by Jas. Orr 508p. 10/6 n. Hodder.
- Swete (H. B.)* The Teaching of Christ 23p. Exp., Feb.
- 6G *Jannaris (A. N.)* The Fourth Gospel and John the Apostle 15p. Monthly R., Jan.
- Lock (W.)* A Partition Theory of St John's Gospel 13p. J. Th. Stud., Jan.
- [A criticism of Wendt.]
- Stewart (G. W.)* Wendt on the Fourth Gospel. Exp., Jan., Feb. 16p., 12p.
- 6I *White (N. J. D.)* The Virgin Birth 10p. Exp., March.
- Zimmermann (H.)* Evangelium des Lukas Kap. 1 u. 2 44p. Th. Stud. u. Kritik., 1903 b.
- [An attempt to find a middle way between Hilgenfeld and Harnack.]
- 7A The Credibility of the Acts of the Apostles 18p. Ch. Q. R., Jan.
- 7E *Dürselen (P.)* Die Taufe für die Toten 1 Kor. xv. 29 18p. Th. Stud. u. Kritik., 1903 b.
- 7N *Albani (J.)* Die Bildersprache der Pastoralbriefe 19p. Z. f. wiss. Th., Jan.
- [Notes on the chief words used metaphorically.]
- 8 *Calmes (Th.)* Les Symboles de l'Apocalypse 17p. R. Biblique, Jan.
- [A Babylonian origin is claimed.]
- 9 *Charles (R. H.)* Book of Jubilees. Tr. from the Editor's Ethiopic Text, and Ed. with Intr., Notes and Indices. demy 8vo 368p. 15/ n. Black.
- Lewis (Agnes Smith.)* Apocrypha: the Protevangelium Jacobi and Transitus Mariæ. With Texts from Sept., Coran, Pesh., and a Syro-Ar. Palimpsest. With App. of Palestinian Syr. Texts. Studia Sinaitica, No. xi. cr. 4to. 15/ n. Clay.
- C CHURCH** 2 *Unity*, 21 · *Ministry*, &c., 40 · *Worship*, *Liturgies*, 53 · *Eucharist*, &c.
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- [Deals with the period Edward VI.—Elizabeth.]
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- [The Hulsean prize essay, 1900.]
- Funk (F. X.)* L'Agape. R. d'Hist. Ecclés. iv. No. 1.
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- Mackintosh (H. R.)* The Objective Aspect of the Lord's Supper 18p. Exp., Mar.
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- Bouvier (Aug.)* Dogmatique Chrétienne 2 vols., ed. by E. Montet 646p. Paris, Fischbacher.
- Gottschick (J.)* Die Entstehung der Losung der Unkirchlichkeit der Theologie 17p. Z. f. Th. u. Kirche, Jan.
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- Travb (Fr.)* Kirchliche u. Unkirchliche Theologie 38p. Z. f. Th. u. Kirche, Jan.
- 1 *Clausen (O.)* Die Theologie des Theophilus von Antiochen 60p. Z. f. wiss. Th., Jan.
- 10 *Edgar (R. McC.)* The Blessed Trinity 9p. Lond. Q. R., Jan.
- 11 *Lidgett (J. S.)* Fatherhood of God, in Christian Truth and Life 450p. 8/ n. T. & T. Clark.
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- 29 *St Clair (G.)* Will Christ come? The Delayed Millennium: An Historical Inquiry and Record Harrison.
- 32 *Turmel (Joseph.)* Le dogme du péché originel après S. Augustin dans l'Église latine 24p. R. d'Hist. et de Litt. Rel., Jan. 1903.
[3rd article: the theories of Anselm and Catharin.]
- 34 *Moberly (R. C.)* A Religious View of Human Personality. J. Th. Stud., Jan.
[A sermon before Univ. of Oxford.]
- 60 *Adams (Estelle Davenport.)* This Life and the Next: Impressions of Notable Men and Women, from Plato to Ruskin 295p. Richards.
- Down (E. A.)* Our Life in Paradise 304p. 5/ n. Rivingtons.
- M'Taggart (J. Ellis.)* Some Considerations relating to Human Immortality 19p. Int. J. Eth., Jan.
[Discusses objections to immortality based on certain results of physical science. (1) The self is not an activity of the body: neither my body nor its death can exist except as events in some mind. (2) It does not follow, because a self which has a body cannot get the data of its mental activity except in connection with that body, that it would be impossible for a self without a body to get data in some other way. (3) The self is complex, but not a compound. It has parts, but it is not built up out of them. It cannot therefore cease by the separation of its parts, which is what we mean by the transitoriness of material objects.]
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- Shipley (O.)* Carmina Mariana, 2nd Series. An English Anthology in Verse in Relation to the Virgin Mary 2nd ed. Burns & Oates.
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- 6 *Cunningham (W.)* Gospel of Work: Lectures on Christian Ethics 158p. 2/ n. Clay.
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- Elsenhans (T.)* Theorie des Gewissens, ii. Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit. cxxi. Heft 2.
[In this second article, author discusses the meaning of a public conscience, or the conscience of community.]
- Irons (David.)* A Study in the Psychology of Ethics 176p. 5/ n. Blackwood.
[The moral law "is the manifestation in consciousness of the principle of order which necessarily exists in the cosmos."]
- Landry (A.)* La Superstition des Principes. Revue Méta. et de Mor., Jan.

- 10 *Maudsley (H.)* Life in Mind and Conduct 444p. 10/6 n. Macmillan.
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 [“St Augustine’s doctrine of right” . . . “is . . . the soundest ethical theory that I know.” It is regarded as based on man’s nature, as made in the image of God.]
Rauh. Du Rôle de la Logique en Morale. Revue Phil. xxviii., 2 Feb. 121p.
Schopenhauer. Basis of Morality, trans. by A. B. Bullock 4/6. Sonnenschein.
Sidgwick (H.) Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau 418p. 8/6 n. Macmillan.
 [See p. 595.]
Sturt (H.) Happiness 15p. Int. J. Eth., Jan.
 [No one makes it his direct and primary aim to be happy, nor is happiness the usual moral criterion. It cannot, therefore, be the essential feature of moral experience. There must be some principle more central, and this, in author’s view, is a form of benevolence.]
 20 *Koigen (D.)* Einsamkeit: ein Social-philosophischer Entwurf. Archiv System. Phil. viii. Heft. 4.
Steinmetz (S. R.) Die Bedeutung der Ethnologie für die Soziologie. Vierteljahrssr w. Phil. und Soz. xxvi. Heft 4.
Welldon (J. E. C.) (Bp.) Consecration of the State 59p. 2/ n. Macmillan.
 21 *Stewardson (L. C.)* The Moral Aspects of the Referendum. Int. J. Eth., Jan.
 22 *Jacob (P.)* La crise du Libéralisme. Revue Méta, et de Mor., Jan.
 23 *Bosanquet (Helen).* Strength of the People: a Study in Social Economics 358p. 8/6 n. Macmillan.
 27 *Durkheim (É.)* Pédagogie et Sociologie. Revue Méta. et de Mor. xi. 1, Jan.
 [Opening lecture of the course on the Science of Education at the Sorbonne, Dec. 1902.]
Pijper (F.) Beperkte autonomie der Universiteit, een toekomst-ideaal Th. Tijd., Jan.
 31 *Robinson (M. E.)* Marriage as an Economic Institution 14p. Int. J. Eth., Jan.
Gardner (Alice). The Conflict of Duties, and other Essays 307p. Unwin.
 [Review follows.]
F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons.
Furse (Ven. C. W.) The Beauty of Holiness: Meditations and Addresses 256p. 7/6 n. Murray.
 [Mainly addresses to ordination students.]
Newbolt (W. C. E.) Priestly Blemishes, or Some Secret Hindrances to the Realisation of Priestly Ideals 157p. 3/6. Longmans.
 [Five lectures to clergy, delivered in St Paul’s Cathedral in Lent 1902, on Vanity, Sloth, Despondency, Impatience, and Self-neglect.]
Savage (H. E.) Pastoral Visitation 192p. 2/6 n. (Hbks. for Clergy.) Longmans.
 2 *Davidson (A. B.)* The Called of God. Biog. intr. by A. Taylor Innes 342p. 6/. T. & T. Clark.
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in St Margaret’s, Westminster, during Coronation Year 200p. 3/6. J. Clarke.

- 2 *Sinclair (W. M.)* Words from St Paul’s 2nd series 294p. 5/. Richards.
 4 *Kelly (H.)* England and the Church 207p. 4/ n. Longmans.
 [On supply of clergy.]

G BIOGRAPHY

- Capey (E. F. H.)* Erasmus (Little Biographies) Methuen.
Fairbairn (A. M.) James Martineau Cont. R., Jan.
Mackintosh (R.) Dr Martineau’s Biography Prim. Meth. Q., Jan.
 2 *Wedgwood (Julia).* James Martineau and the heterodoxy of the Past 15p. Frederick Maurice and the Broad Church 20p. Expositor, Jan., Mar.

H HISTORY 1 *Religious Orders* 2 *England.*

- Hegler (A.)* Kirchengeschichte oder christliche Religionsgeschichte? 38p. T. f. Th. u. Kirche, Jan.
Moncrief (J. W.) Short History of the Christian Church 458p. 5/ n. Oliphant.
Richard (P.) La légation Aldobrandini et le traité de Lyon 24p. R. d’Hist. et de Litt. Rel., Jan.
 [A Study in pontifical diplomacy in the time of Clement VIII.]
 e *Creighton (M.)* Historical Essays and Reviews Ed. by Louise Creighton 364p. 5/ n. Longmans.
 x *Gottheil (R. J. H.)* The Jews and the Spanish Inquisition (1622–1721) 69p. Jewish Q. R., Jan.
 [Lists of the names of persons examined before the Inquisition.]
 C *Bright (W.)* Age of the Fathers; chaps. in Hist. of Ch. during 4th and 5th cent. 2 v. 1158p. 28/ n. Longmans.

H Barry (W.) Papal Monarchy, from St Gregory the Great to Boniface VIII., 590–1303 464p. 5/. (Story of the Nations) Unwin.

- 1 *Aquinas (St Thomas).* Apology for the Religious Orders Ed. with intr. by J. Procter 6/ n. Sands.
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 2 *The Life and Times of Giraldu Cambrensis, Churchman and Historian* 22pp. Ch. Q. R., Jan.
Nolan (E.) and Hirsch (S. A.) The Greek Grammar of Roger Bacon and a Fragment of his Hebrew Grammar. Clay.
Pollen (J. S. J.) The Passing of Elizabeth’s Supremacy Bill 20p. Dub. R., Jan.

- 2T *Overton (J. H.)* The Nonjurors, their lives, principles, and writings 512p. 16/. Smith & E.
[A thorough investigation.]
The Church and the Clergy after the Restoration 22p. Ch. Q. R., Jan.
- 2U *Wesley (John)* Journal abr. by P. L. Parker; intr. by H. P. Hughes; appreciation by Aug. Birrell 544p. 3/6 n. Isbister.
- 2·7 The Three Churches in Ireland 21p. Church Quar. R., Jan.
- I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS.** C *The Fathers* 2 R. C. Church 3 Anglican, &c.
- C *Clement of Alexandria* Miscellanies, Book 7. Greek Text, with intro. tr. Notes, diss. indices by the late F. J. A. Hort and J. B. Mayor 548p. 15/n. Macmillan.
- Dräseke (J.)* Zum Syntagma des Hippolytos 24p. Z. f. wiss. Th. Jan.
- Gibson (Margaret Dunlop)* Horæ Semiticæ. No. 1. The Didascalia Apostolorum in Syriac. No. 2. The same in English. 15/ and 4/. Clay.
[This work has not hitherto been translated into English. The present edition is from a Mesopotamian MS. discovered by Professor Rendel Harris.]
- Sharpe (A. B.)* Tichonius and St Augustine 9p. Dub. R., Jan.
[Draws a parallel with relations of Anglicanism to Roman Church.]
- 2 *Leo XIII. (Pope)* Text (in Latin) of the Apostolic Letter constituting the Commission for the furtherance of biblical study. Revue Biblique, Jan.
Voces Catholicae. The Abbé Loisy and the Catholic Reform movement 27p. Cont. R., Mar.
- 3 *Hooker (R.)* Ecclesiastical Polity, fifth book. New ed. with proleg. and app. by Ronald Bayne 862p. 15/n. Macmillan.
- Russell (G. W. E.)* The Household of Faith, portraits and essays 425p. 7/6. Hodder.
- 4 *Réville (Jean)* Le Protestantisme libéral: ses Origines, sa Nature, sa Mission. Paris, Fischbacher.
- M MYTHOLOGY. RELIGIONS**
7 *Judaism* 12 *Occultism, &c.* 20·· *Semitic.*
- Achelis (T.)* Ethnology and the Science of Religion. Intern. Q., Jan.
- Hall (H. F.)* Soul of a People 4th ed. 314 p. 7/6 n. Macmillan.
- Mills (L.)* Comparative Claims of the Avesta and of the Veda 7p. Asiatic Q. R., Jan.
- Arnold (E. V.)* Recent works on the Rig-Veda 3p. Class. R., Feb.
- Harischandra (N.)* Reincarnation 7p. 19th Cent., Mar.
- 5 *Tisdall (W. St Clair)* Noble eightfold path: James Long Lect. on Buddhism for 1900-2 240p. 6/. Stock.
- 7 *Bethencourt (C. de)* The Jews in Portugal from 1773 to 1902 24p. Jewish Q. R., Jan.
- Mauerberger (I. J.)* A Voice from an Asylum: Treatises on the Jewish Social and Philosophical questions vol. 1. 6/n. J. Hodges.
- Montefiore (C. G.)* Liberal Judaism: an Essay 3/n. Macmillan.
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- Podmore (F.)* Modern Spiritualism: a History and a Criticism 2 v. 26/n.
- Sturge (M. Carta)* The Truth and Error of Christian Science 160p. 6/. Murray.
[A genuine effort to understand the movement by a thoughtful independent student.]
- 20 *Curtiss (S. I.)* Primitive Semitic Religion of To-day in Syria, Palestine, and Sin. Pen. 288p. 6/n. Hodder.
- 26 *King (L. W.)* The Seven Tablets of Creation; or, The Babylonian and Assyrian Legends concerning the Creation of the World and Mankind, v. i. Eng. tr. etc. v. 2 Suppl. texts 18/ & 15/n. Luzac.
- 51 *Knox (G. W.)* The Orthodox Philosophy of the Chinese 20p. Amer. J. Th., Jan.
- P PHILOSOPHY** h *History*, 10·· *Metaphysics*, 21·· *Theory of Knowledge*, 40·· *Psychology*, 60·· *Logic*, 80·· *Philosophers.*
- Baldwin (J. M.)* (Ed.) Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, including many of the principal conceptions of ethics, logic, æsthetics, philosophy of religion, etc., and giving a terminology in English, French, German, and Italian, vol. 2 908p. 21/n. Macmillan.
- Baldwin (J. M.)* Fragments in Philosophy and Science demy 8vo. 380p. 10/6. Nimmo.
- Pringle-Pattison (A. S.)* Man's Place in the Cosmos, and other Essays 2nd ed. revised and enlarged Blackwood.
[In this edition two new essays are included, "The Venture of Theism," being a review of Fraser's Gifford Lectures, and "The Life and Opinions of Friedrich Nietzsche." Account is also taken of Münsterberg's new presentation of his theory in the essay dealing with his psychology.]
- h *Cornelius (H.)* Einleitung in der Philosophie. Teubner.
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- Monahan Ed. by H. Jones 2 v. 420, 400p. ea. 10/ n. Macmillan.
[In 4 pts., psychology, ethics, metaphysics, theology.]
- h *Windelband (W.)* Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einleitung in der Philosophie 2te verm. Aufl. J. C. B. Mohr.
- v *Tufts (J. H.)* On the Genesis of Aesthetic Categories. Phil. R., Jan.
- 10 *Bergson (H.)* Introduction à la Métaphysique. Revue Méta. et de Mor., Jan.
[A knowledge of the Absolute only possible in intuition, which is a kind of intellectual sympathy, whereby we are transported into the interior of an object. From intuition we can pass to analysis, but not vice versa.]
- Wartenberg (M.)* Das Problem des Wirkens und die monistische Weltanschauung, mit besonderer Beziehung auf Lotze 256p. Haacke.
- Boutwood (A.)* The Primacy of the Individual 23p. Lond. Q. R., Jan.
- Adamson (Robert)*. The Development of Modern Philosophy, with other Lectures and Essays Ed. by W. R. Sorley 2 vols. 688p. Blackwood.
A most valuable attempt at philosophical construction on the basis of a criticism of the Kantian theory of knowledge. In vol. ii. is an elaborate discussion of the psychology of thinking, with special bearing on ultimate philosophical questions. There is also contained a thorough examination of the province of psychology and its relation to epistemology. Review will follow.]
- Haldane (R. B.)* Pathway to Reality: Gifford Lectures, 1902-3 336p. 10/6 n. Murray.
[Review follows.]
- MacLennan (S. F.)* Existence and Content. Mind, Jan.
[Admitting with Bradley that meaning realises itself in symbols and cannot constitute reality, author differs from him in regarding meaning as essentially regulative, projecting in our minds (a) the anticipations of certain definite experiences, and (b) the conditions under which these experiences may be realised.]
- Rogers (A. K.)* Professor Royce and Monism. Phil. R., Jan.
[The ultimate concept for the understanding of the universe is not self-consciousness, but a *society of selves*. In this God stands for that ultimate self in whom there are centred consciously the conditions of all reality whatsoever, and by whom the whole universe, and so all truth, is consciously realised throughout all time.]
- Rogers (A. K.)* The Absolute as Unknowable. Mind, Jan.
[To take all known realities, with Bradley, as mere ingredients of a larger world of experience, in which they are transformed and swallowed up, is to abandon Hegel's Absolute for an Unknowable. In any conscious act of a non-discursive kind, we have an indication of a type of experience which overcomes the difficulties that Bradley finds in thought.]
- Schwartzkopff (P.)* Nicht Metaphysik sondern Empyrisik. Archiv System. Phil. viii. Heft 4.
- 12 *Whittaker (T.)* A Compendious Classification of the Sciences. Mind, N. S., Jan.
- 13 *Reynolds (O.)* On an Inversion of Ideas as to the Structure of the Universe. Rede Lecture, 1902 44p. 1/6 n. Clay.
- 17 *Kolbe (F. C.)* Ultimate Analysis of our Concept of Matter Dub. R., Jan.
- 18 *Perrin (J.)* Le principe d'équivalence et la notion d'énergie Revue Méta. et de Mor., Jan.
Stern (L. W.) Der zweite Hauptsatz der Energetik und das Lebensproblem. Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit. cxxi. Heft 2.
[An attempt to bring the theory of energy and the theory of life under one general law.]
- 21 *Smith (Walter)*. What is Knowledge? Archiv System. Phil. viii. Heft 4.
[Knowledge of the self is given in every part of conscious experience, and knowledge of the not-self, when it is possible, in the reproduction of the experience of the not-self.]
- 23 *Galloway (G.)* The Distinction of Inner and Outer Experience Mind, Jan.
[Outer experience has the special character which attaches to it, because directly implying that the subject is influenced by realities other than itself. The subject creates the distinction, but it does so as its interpretation of a real difference within the whole of its experience.]
- 30 *Olston (A. B.)* The Mind and its Curative and other Powers over the Body 12mo. 7/6. New York.
- 31 *Spiller (G.)* The Mind of Man. A Text-Book of Psychology 552p. Sonnenschein.
- 39 *Ribéry (C.)* La Phrénologie en Amérique Revue Phil., Feb.
- 40 *Morgan (C. L.)* The Beginnings of Mind Intern. Q., Jan.
Wundt (W.) Outlines of Psychology Translated by C. H. Judd 2nd ed. Engelmann.
[The additions and revisions of the fourth German edition are incorporated, the former consisting mainly of a selected bibliography.]
- 42 *Lang (A.)* Human Personality after Death 16p. Monthly R., Mar.
- Myers (F. W. H.)* Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death 2 v. 700p. 42/ n. Longmans.
[Founded mainly on evidence collected for the Society for Psychical Research. An article dealing with this work will follow.]
- Stoops (J. D.)* The Real Self Phil. R., Jan.
- Tower (C. V.)* An Interpretation of some aspects of the Self Phil. R., Jan.
- 49 *Piéron (H.)* La Rapidité des Processus Psychiques Revue Phil., Jan.
- 50 *Kozlovski.* La Psychogénèse de L'Étendue ii. Revue Phil., Jan.
[Continuation. Representation of an extended world, the result of a synthesis of (a) ideas of mass arising from tactile sensations of resistance, (b) consciousness of force, which is the subjective side of movement, and (c) ideas of form, determined qualitatively by colour as produced in vision.]
- Schneider (O.)* Die Schöpferische Kraft des Kindes in der Gestaltung seiner Bewusstseinszustände bis zum Beginn des Schulunterrichts Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit. cxxi. Heft. 2.
[A contribution to Child-psychology on the basis of the observations of two children.]

- 50 *Smith (W. G.)* Antagonistic Reactions. Mind, Jan.
- Sollner (P.)* L'Autoscopie Interne. Revue Phil., Jan.
- Volkelt (J.)* Beiträge zur Analyse des Bewusstseins. Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit. cxxi. Heft 2.
[In this third section of his article, author discusses the æsthetical feelings in their relation to perception.]
- 51 *Binet (A.)* La Pensée sans Images. Revue Phil., Feb.
[Account of experiments leading to result that thought without images is possible, although complete absence of imagery is rare.]
- 54 *Paulhan (F.)* Sur La Mémoire Affective, ii. Revue Phil., Jan.
[Continuation of art. in previous No. as to reproduction of feelings in memory, and discussing the question as to the relative intensity of the remembered and original feeling.]
- 57 *Rageot (G.)* Sur Le Seuil de la Vie Affective. Revue Phil., Feb.
[Examination of the primitive states of feeling in the human subject.]
- 60 *Twardowski (E.)* Ueber sogenannte relative Wahrheiten. Archiv System. Phil. viii. Heft 4.
[In so far as we are concerned with judgment, we cannot speak of relative and absolute truth; for every judgment is either true, and then it is always and everywhere true, or it is not true, and then it is never and nowhere true.]
- 63 *Turner (F. Storrs.)* Certainty and Probability 13p. Western R., Mar.
- 76 *Buchner (L.)* Last Words on Materialism. Life by his Brother. Tr. by J. M'Cabe 334p. 2/6 n. Watts.
- 84 *Taylor (A. E.)* On the First Part of Plato's Parmenides. Mind, Jan.
- 85 *Hammond (W. A.)* Aristotle's Psychology: a Treatise on the Principle of Life 428p. 10/6 n. Sonnenschein.
[Translations of the *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia*, with Introduction and Notes.]
- 88 *Epictetus.* Discourses. Tr. by George Long 2 vols. 25/ n. Bell.
[A reprint.]
- 90 *Couturat (L.)* Le Système de Leibniz d'après M. Cassirer. Revue Méta. et de Mor., Jan.
cp. E10 Duff on Spinoza.
- 92 *Bosanquet (B.)* Philosophy in the United Kingdom for 1901. Archiv System. Phil. viii. 4.
Hicks (G. Dawes). Professor Huxley as a scientific and philosophic thinker 32p. Essex Hall.
- Darwin (F.) and Seward (A. C.)* More Letters of Charles Darwin. 2 vols. Murray.
- 93 *Goetz (H.)* War Herder ein Vorgänger Darwin's? Vierteljahrssr. w. Phil. u. Soz. xxvi. 4.
[Author replies in the negative.]
- Nietzsche (F.)* Dawn of Day Tr. by Johanna Volz 420p. 8/6 n. Unwin.
- 94 *Fouillée (A.)* The Philosophy of Taine and Renan. Intern. Q., Jan.
Guggenheim (M.) Beiträge zur Biographie des Petrus Ramus. Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit. cxxi. 2.
Smith (Norman). Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy 290p. 5/ n. Macmillan.
[A very able monograph upon the Method and Metaphysics of Descartes and the influence of Cartesianism in subsequent philosophy.]
- Koenigsberger (L.)* Hermann von Helmholtz. Band 1. Vieweg und Sohn.

G. D. H. ; G. H. ; and J. H. W.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE CHARACTER OF JESUS CHRIST.

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THE most conspicuous aspect of contemporary Christian thought is the renewal of popular interest in the character of Jesus Christ. Never was there a time when plain people were less concerned with the metaphysics or ecclesiasticism of Christianity. The construction of systems and the contentions of creeds, which once appeared the central themes of human interest, are now regarded by millions of busy men and women as mere echoes of ancient controversies, if not mere mockeries of the problems of the present age. Even the convocations of the Churches manifest little appetite for discussions which were once the bread of their life and the wine of their exhilaration, and one of the leaders of a great Christian communion has been led of late to say: "What conclusions these discussions may reach is of small concern; the only really important thing is that they should come to an end." Under these very conditions of theological satiety, however, the mind of the age returns with fresh interest to the contemplation of the character of Jesus Christ. "Back to Jesus"; "In His Name"; "What would Jesus do?"; "Jesus' Way"—phrases like these, caught up by multitudes of unsophisticated readers, indicate the force and scope of the modern imitation of Christ. To follow

Jesus even though one does not understand Him ; to do the will even if one has not learned the doctrine ; to perceive through much darkness that the life is the light of man ;—these are the marks of the new obedience. Questions of criticism, of authority, of divinity, may be insoluble ; but the Sermon on the Mount, the parables, the teaching, the character of Jesus, are left ; and the practical Christ is enough to satisfy a practical age.

The working-class movement of the time represents the same view of the Gospels. Nothing could be more bitter than the antagonism of the social agitators to the institutions and methods of organised Christianity. They are regarded as bulwarks of the capitalistic system. "They will supply us with a religion," said Felix Holt, "like everything else and get a profit on it . . . but we offer to change with them ; we will give them back some of their heaven and take it out in something for us and our children in this world." Yet this unmeasured hostility to priests and churches is for the most part hushed to reverence as it approaches the character of Jesus Christ. No supernatural halo is left by the social agitators round the person of Christ, yet behind what they conceived to be the patronage and mediævalism of the Church they still discern a character which arrests their criticism and commands their loyalty. Decline as they may all entangling alliances with organised Christianity, the ideal of manhood still seems to them to have been anticipated by the carpenter of Nazareth, the friend of the poor, the victim of the ruling classes. "We used to think that Christ was a fiction of the priests . . . but now we find that He was a man after all like us—a poor working man who has a heart for the poor—and now that we understand this, we say—He is the man for us."¹

It will, of course, be answered that in this detachment of ethical example from religious interpretation we get no just impression of the mission of Jesus. He was not primarily a

¹ *The Kernel and the Husk*, American edition, 1887, p. 334.

teacher of ethics, but a revealer of God. His ethics were rooted in His religion. He was a seer, a mystic, the conscious child of His Heavenly Father. Behind His teaching lay His faith. The ages of Christian theology have not erred in believing that in attempting to interpret this interior consciousness of Jesus Christ, and to penetrate through His conduct to the mystery of the Divine Life which to Him seems so plain, they were following the highest instincts of the human reason and dealing most directly with the central problem of the Gospels. Such criticism is wholly justified. Yet, of the many ways by which one may approach the person of Jesus, it may be for the present best to follow the indications of His ethical character. Here, in the first place, is where the mind of the age happens to be. The ascent to a complete view of the Gospels might, perhaps, be made by a broader road with nobler vistas, if one should begin by traversing the field of theology; but none the less, to pass from the temper of the present age to the method of metaphysical interpretation is at least to go a long way round. The commanding interest of modern thought happens to be humanitarian, industrial, social, ethical. Whatever method appears to withdraw attention from the practical issues of the life that now is, appears for the moment to many minds remote and unreal. To derive the sanction of Christian ethics, as other generations have done, from the doctrines of Christian theology, is to reverse the order of procedure in which the inductive habit of mind is trained, and it is for this reason the earlier textbooks on Christian ethics have been by most students removed from the list of "live" books, and stored in those unfrequented shelves which hold their "dead" literature. The ethical instinct of the time turns inevitably from a system to a person, from Christian ethics to the ethics of Christ; and to great numbers of modern students it is like the joy of a new discovery when there emerges from behind the complexity of Christian doctrine the simplicity of the character of Jesus, and when a new way—even if it be a steep and narrow way—opens upward through the under-

brush of life toward the larger view, and a trustworthy guide is heard to say: "Follow me: I am the way, the truth, and the life."

This, however, is not a complete statement of the new situation. It is not only true that theological sanctions have largely lost their force, while the ethical summons, "Back to Jesus," receives a new obedience; it is also true that this same way of approach was the path originally followed by those who actually listened to Jesus. By degrees, indeed, they were to be led into deeper surmises concerning His nature, such as are reported in the fourth gospel and in the theology of Paul. When, however, we turn from these interpretations of the nature of Jesus to the narratives of the Synoptic Gospels, the change in atmosphere is nothing less than climatic. We come upon a teacher whose purpose does not appear to be primarily theological or metaphysical, but personal and ethical. We feel the contagion of personality, the persuasiveness of character. Never was a teacher less concerned with definitions or propositions, or more undisguised in his hostility to the system-makers of the age. Others might collect and analyse his promises, as a botanist collects and analyses the flowers of the field, but the teaching of Jesus blooms in a spontaneous and fragrant growth, where the beholder is invited not so much to study its system as to feel its charm. It was the character of Jesus which, first of all, drew men to obedience. He was a person whose first claim was for personal loyalty. His rewards were offered for growth in character. "Blessed are the meek; the poor in spirit; the pure in heart." His highest commendation was for those who accepted His tests of character. "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these least, ye have done it unto me." Drawn, then, to this Person, as He thus lived and taught, impressed by the character He commended and illustrated, the first disciples were led on, through obedience to knowledge, through conduct to faith. It may be the same

to-day. Beyond this first impression of the character of Jesus Christ there remain, no doubt, further glimpses of the Eternal which it was His mission to disclose; but the path to these heights of discernment may lie for the present age, as it did for the first disciples, through the recognition of His ethical authority. Doing the will, one may come to know the doctrine. The return of the mind to the contemplation of the character of Jesus does not, as some apprehend, involve a permanent re-action from theological interest, or a permanent substitution of ethics for religion. On the contrary, it may indicate the natural sequence of Christian conviction. Out of the new appreciation of the moral leadership of Jesus may issue a new era of theological confidence. A movement which begins in attachment to a character may end in richer philosophical discriminations and broader religious visions. The Christian theology of the future may not improbably be a process of induction from the character of Jesus Christ.

What, then, was the nature of this character which so immediately impressed itself upon its own age, and to which the present age with unjaded interest returns? May it not be that this ethical reverence is as vague and undetermined as much of the metaphysics of Christianity? May it not even be that a kind of character has been assumed in Jesus Christ which has led many minds to a misdirected discipleship, and for many other minds has made discipleship impracticable? Dismissing for the moment the inquiries which concern themselves with the interior nature of the person of Jesus, and approaching Him, as one might have done when He taught the people on the Galilean hills, or faced the Roman governor in Jerusalem, what is the main impression which His character naturally creates? It is obviously an impression which varies as His many-sided personality meets the various temperaments and problems and needs of different men. Jesus has been called the light of the world; but the light has been broken as though passing through a prism until each colour of its spectrum has seemed to some minds the complete radiation.

He had, it has been variously urged, the character of a fanatic, an anarchist, a socialist, a dreamer, a mystic, an Essene. Out of these scattered conceptions of His character, however, there have issued two of exceptional permanence, each of which represents to many minds the special traits of His moral personality. One view interprets His character in terms of asceticism, the other in terms of æstheticism. One contemplates the suffering of Jesus, the other His joy. One is the view of ecclesiasticism, the other is the view of humanism. Tradition perpetuates the first, imagination welcomes the second.

On the one hand is the prevailing tradition which associates Jesus with the Messianic prophecies. When the Second Isaiah writes of the servant of God: "He is despised and rejected of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief; he hath no form or comeliness, we did esteem him smitten of God and afflicted"; whom, it is asked, could these passages prefigure if it was not Him who expressly claimed to fulfil the Messianic promise? Thus the character of Jesus becomes a historical necessity. The New Testament type is the answer to the Old Testament demand. He was the Lamb of God, the patient victim, the willing sacrifice. The ethical type, therefore, which shall reproduce His character can be none other than a resigned, self-mortifying, ascetic type. The Hellenic character of harmony, symmetry, virility, is supplanted by the Hebraic type of patience, pathos, pain. The Christian character, un-Hellenic and other-worldly, utters the poignant note of suffering Israel. This tradition of the character of Jesus was early accepted by the Church. The Christian life—it was taught—could be indeed attained in a certain degree under the conditions of the secular world; but the *Vita Religiosa* was a product of the asceticism of the monastic cell. It was intended, as Strauss has said, "to depict as strikingly as possible the contrast between the *μορφὴ θεοῦ* and the *μορφὴ δούλου*."¹ Here, also, is the dominant ideal of mediæval Christian art. With

¹ *Life of Jesus*, translated by Marian Evans, 1856, p. 202.

but few exceptions the Christ of the masters is the Man of Sorrows, whom it hath pleased the Lord to bruise, and who is stricken for the transgressions of His people. One of the most eminent of living German philosophers¹ has set forth in detail this conception of the character of Jesus. The Christian character, says Professor Paulsen, is marked by abnegation (*Weltverleugnung*), the Greek character by affirmation (*Weltbejahung*); the one represents the scorn of the natural, the other the development of the natural. The Greeks prized intellectual development, the Christians distrusted it. To the Greeks courage was a cardinal virtue; the Christians were taught to resist not evil. All Greek virtues were, therefore, in the light of Christianity "splendid vices." "For a Greek to become a Christian it is necessary that the old man should die and a new man be born." Thus the Christian character, self-effacing, ascetic, contrary to nature, admirable though it may have once appeared, becomes impracticable for a healthy-minded man in the modern world.²

On the other hand is the interpretation of the character of Jesus in terms of æstheticism, as the type of gladness, graciousness, spiritual peace and joy. According to Renan, a young Galilean peasant is entranced by the vision of the Divine life, and gives himself with delight to its expression. "An exquisite perception of nature furnished him with expressive images." "A remarkable penetration, which we call genius, set off his aphorisms." "Tenderness of heart was in him transformed into infinite sweetness, vague poetry, universal charm." "His lovely character, and doubtless one

¹ Friedrich Paulsen, *System der Ethik*, Berlin, 1889, S. 50 ff., *Die Lebensanschauung des Christentums*.

² The same conclusion is drawn by many socialists; (e.g., L. Stein, *Die Soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, 1897, s. 344: "Christianity has a certain dark and monastic quality (etwas mönchisch finsternes) which is hostile to social and philosophical inquiries based on confidence in human nature"; and by many philosophers; (e.g., F. H. Bradley (*Int. J. of Ethics*, October 1894): "We have lived a long time now the professors of a creed which no one consistently can practise, and which, if practised, would be as immoral as it is unreal").

of those transporting countenances which sometimes appear in the Hebrew race, created round him a circle of fascination." In the same spirit Strauss remarked: "Jesus appears as a naturally lovely character (eine schöne Natur von Haus aus) which needed but to unfold and to become conscious of itself."¹

It is interesting to recall the many incidents in the life of Jesus which tend to confirm each of these impressions of His character. On the one hand there is a quality of self-sacrifice in His experience which removes Him from all positive relation with Hellenism.² A whole series of virtues—humility, self-forgetfulness, the bearing of burdens not one's own—appear in Jesus for which no room is found in the Greek ideals

¹ *Leben Jesu, für das Deutsche Volk bearbeitet*, 2te Aufl., 1864, s. 208. So Hase, *Geschichte Jesu*, Leipzig, 1876, § 53. "Jesus defends human life from the asceticism which so often allies itself with religious earnestness. . . . He shares freely in the good things of this life. He is as a bridegroom among his companions. Never did a religious hero shun so little the joys of life." So also, though in less unmeasured words, Keim, *Geschichte Jesu von Nazara*, i. 458: "Is not the primitive description of Him as being gentle and joyous (seine Herzlichkeit und milde Heiterkeit)—the character which Strauss assigns to Him—justified by the record?" One of the most curious illustrations of scholarly candour is the somersault of conviction performed by A. Wünche in his *Der Lebensfreudige Jesu*, Leipzig, 1876. In 1870 he had published his *Leiden Des Messias*, describing with much erudition the Messianic ideal of lowly suffering in its fulfilment through Christ. Six years later Jesus appears to him in a wholly opposite character, joyous, triumphant, with a delight in life in which the Talmudic teachers could find no satisfaction. See also the essay of I. Zangwill (*Dreamers of the Ghetto*, 1879, p. 480), "I give the Jews a Christ they can now accept, the Christians a Christ they have forgotten, Christ, not the tortured God, but the Joyous Comrade, the friend of all simple souls . . . not the theologian spinning barren subtleties, but the man of genius protesting against all forms and dogmas that would replace the Divine vision and the living ecstasy, . . . the lover of warm life and warm sunlight and all that is fresh, and simple, and pure and beautiful." So in many popular studies of the Gospels, e.g., the fresh and thoughtful narrative by W. J. Dawson, *The Life of Christ*, 1901, p. 87 ff. "He became the incarnation of the spirit of joy, the symbol of the bliss of life. . . . Christ's gracious gaiety of heart proved contagious."

² A. Harnack, *What is Christianity?* (transl. Saunders, 1901), p. 37: "The picture of the life and discourses of Jesus stands in no relation with the Greek spirit. . . . That he was ever in touch with Plato or the Porch . . . it is absolutely impossible to maintain."

of *σωφροσύνη* and *μεγαλοψυχία*. Such a saying as "He that will be chiefest among you shall be the servant of all," would have seemed, as St Paul said of the crucified Christ, "Unto the Greeks foolishness." On the other hand there is heard throughout the ministry of Jesus an underlying note of tranquil and lofty joy. He is quick to note the beautiful in nature and in character. He detects qualities worthy of love even in unlovely lives. In His teaching the instinct for spiritual principles is met by the instinct for artistic expression. The universe is picturesque and eloquent to His sensitive mind, and at the end of a short career, abounding in misinterpretations and disappointments, there still lingers the happy tradition of His spiritual joy.¹ "These things have I spoken unto you," says the Fourth Gospel, "that my joy might remain with you, and that your joy might be full."

Striking, however, as are both these traits of the character of Jesus, it is far from probable that they touch its deepest note. The asceticism of Jesus, however un-Hellenic it may be, and His delight in life, however un-Messianic it may be, are obviously not ends in His teaching, but incidents along His way. They are by-products thrown off in the development of His career. The problem of the character of Jesus first comes into view, when behind His sufferings and His joy there is observed a quality of spiritual life which makes these varied experiences so subordinate and contributory that they become the mere rhythm of His step as He moves steadily toward His supreme desire.² The ethics of Jesus are not those

¹ The responsiveness of the mind of Jesus to the suggestiveness of the world is beautifully described by Principal Fairbairn: *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, 1902, pp. 383 ff. See also Ehrhardt: *Die Ethik Jesu*, s. 110, note: "In Jesus the Messianic idea is rather a means than an end (mehr ein instrumentaler als ein Zweckbegriff). He used its form for the expression of his ideal. The ascetic element in the ethics of Jesus is its transient, the service of God its permanent element." See also Strauss, *Leben Jesu*, ss. 34: "This joyous, continuous conduct of a lovely soul . . . may be described as the Hellenic quality in Jesus."

² So Keim, *Geschichte Jesu*, 1869, i. 445: ". . . A Galilean in the freshness and susceptibility of His sense of nature in all her forms, with contem-

of a mediæval saint or of a Galilean peasant ; but of a teacher whose pains and pleasures are but the scenery and environment of the soul. And what, then, was the first impression of this Teacher, which seized upon His hearers with such extraordinary compulsion, that when He said, "Follow me," men left all to follow? The answer to this question concerning the original and general impression of the teaching of Jesus seems beyond dispute. The immediate effect of the teaching of Jesus was an effect of power, of authority and mastery, the commanding impressiveness of a leader of men. It is striking to notice how often this word "power" is applied in the New Testament to the influence of Jesus. "The multitude glorified God," says Matthew, "who had given such power unto men." "The kingdom of God comes with power," says Mark. "His word was with power," says Luke. "Thou hast given Him power over all flesh," says John. "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with power," says the Book of Acts. "The power of our Lord, Jesus Christ," says Paul. His ministry, that is to say, was first of all dynamic, commanding, authoritative. When He announced the principles of His teaching, the impression first made upon its hearers was, we are told, not so much of the message itself as of the messenger. The people were astonished, not primarily by the contents of the discourse, but by the authority with which it was delivered. The preacher did not demonstrate, or plead, or threaten like the Scribes ; He swayed the multitude by personal power. It was the same throughout His ministry. He called men from their boats, their tax-booths, their homes, and they looked up into His face and obeyed. He commends the instinct of the soldier who gives orders to those below him because he has received orders from above. What is the note of character which is touched in such incidents as these? It is the note of strength. This is no ascetic, abandoning the world ; no dreamer, no joyous

plative seriousness and the depth of power of His life with God. . . . Let us at the same time confess that humanity can elsewhere hardly exhibit the even balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces."

comrade, delighting in the world ; here is the quiet consciousness of mastery, the authority of the leader, a confidence which makes Him able to declare that a life built on His sayings is built on a rock. Jesus is no gentle visionary, no contemplative saint, no Lamb of God except in the experience of suffering ; He is a Person whose dominating trait is force ; the scourger of the traders, the defier of the Pharisees, the commanding Personality whose words are with the authority of power.

From whatever side we approach the character of Jesus this impression of mastery confronts us. On the one hand is the distinctly ethical aspect of His strength. It may still be debated whether the religious life is fundamentally an expression of thought, or feeling, or will ; but the point at which the teaching of Jesus first touches the religious sentiment seems quite beyond debate. It is obviously not at the point of intellectual satisfaction ; for Jesus repeatedly accepts as disciples persons whose theological convictions would satisfy few modern churches. "O woman, great is thy faith," He says to the Canaanite ; "I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel," He says of the centurion. The measure of knowledge, as Schleiermacher said, is plainly to Jesus not the measure of piety. Nor is it to the emotions that Jesus offers His teaching. Solemn exaltations of moods, experiences of prolonged temptation, moments of mystic rapture happen, indeed, in His career ; but when we consider what a part these emotional agitations have played in the history of religion, one is profoundly impressed by the sanity, reserve, composure and steadiness of the character of Jesus. He is no example of the "twice-born" conception of piety, which has been of late presented to us with such vigour and charm.¹ His

¹The captivating lectures of my distinguished and beloved colleague, William James (*The Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902) abound, it is needless to say, in illuminating suggestions concerning the expansion of life through the religious emotion ; and, in spite of his startling pluralistic theism, the conclusion that "the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come" makes an epoch in psychology. The sweep and charm of the discussion cannot, however, obscure the fact that

“Religion of Healthy-mindedness” is not a psychopathic emotionalism, but a normal, rational, ethical growth. His method is not that of ecstasy, vision and nervous agitation, issuing in neurological saintliness; it is educative, sane, consistent with wise service of the world, capable of being likened in an infinite variety of ways to the decisions and obligations which every honest man must meet. In short,

among the varieties of religious experience which come under consideration, no place is found for a character like that of Jesus Christ. The “once-born” are dismissed as an imperfect type, in whom “optimism may be quasi-pathological,”—a type which culminates in Walt Whitman, and in which the great names of constructive and rational religion hardly appear. St Theresa is, to Professor James, an important “document,” and St John of the cross, and Mr Ratisbonne and Mr Dresser; but Luther is interesting only when he is recalling his spiritual tortures while a monk; and Schleiermacher’s “Discourses on Religion” are unaccounted for, and, while the coldness of Channing’s bedroom gets attention, the warmth of his religious life is unexplained. One of the most curious of the copious footnotes in this monumental study of human documents is the allusion to an evangelical estimate of Channing (p. 488). He was, it is reported, “excluded from the highest form of religious life by the extraordinary rectitude of his character.” No wonder that Professor James remarks in comment, that “the twice-born look down upon the rectilinear consciousness of life as not properly religion.” A religion rendered imperfect by perfectness of character seems to present a paradox which American slang would describe as “the limit.” This sense of lack reaches its climax when we observe the almost complete absence of reference to the character of Jesus Christ. Among the “varieties of religious experience,” here, it would seem, was one which deserved consideration; yet it is noticed in a single footnote, where Harnack is cited as suggesting that “Jesus felt about evil and disease much as our mind-curers do.” It is open to some question whether Harnack would regard this as a just inference from a passage where he says:—“He (Jesus) calls sickness sickness, and health health”—which is precisely what many mind-curers do not admit. However this may be, it is evident that the character of Jesus is not a document to Professor James’s immediate purpose. What Strauss has said is too obviously true to give Jesus a place among the “twice-born” saints. “In all those natures which have been purified through struggle and violent resolution of nature—as in Paul, Augustine, Luther—there remains something hard and bitter throughout life; but of this quality there is in Jesus not a trace. . . . He does not have to be converted and to begin a new and different life” (*Leben Jesu für das Deutsche Volk bearbeitet*, 1864, s. 208). Many a cordial admirer of Professor James’s genius is eagerly hoping that his promise “to return to the same subject in another book” may be happily fulfilled, and that he may be led from this fascinating discussion of the pathology of religion to the interpretation of its normal, heroic, rational, dynamic types.

the appeal of Jesus is primarily to the will. He calls for a moral decision. He assumes in men a capacity for righteousness, and expects from men a moral initiative. "Follow me," He says repeatedly, "sell all that thou hast and follow me"; "Take up thy cross and follow me." "He that doeth the will of my Father" is accepted. "Whoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother and sister and mother." "Be it unto thee even as thou wilt." The discipleship He desires is not sentimental, emotional, occasional; it is rational, ethical, a form of obedience, a direction of the will.¹ When He is sure of this inclination of the will, He welcomes persons of the most unstable morals and the most imperfect convictions; for He perceives in them the possibilities of growth. His unmeasured rebukes are reserved, not for the sinners with weak wills, but for the self-righteous and the self-sufficient with wills strongly and wrongly set. The determination of the will is, as the Fourth Gospel says, the way to established conviction. "He that willeth to do the will, shall know of the doctrine" (John vii. 17). Intellectual satisfaction must be attained through ethical loyalty. The blessing of the pure in heart is that they shall see God.

Beyond this specifically ethical expression of the character of Jesus, there is also to be observed an intellectual aspect of this quality of power; a strength of reasoning, a sagacity, insight and alertness of mind which contribute to His authority. It has often been assumed that Jesus was an untutored peasant, an inspired working man, whose intuitions were His only guide; and it is undoubtedly true that His

¹ It is interesting to observe that this teaching of Jesus is not remote from the maxims of modern psychology and physiology. So Percy Gardner, *Historic View of the New Testament*, 1901, s. 37: "In the nature of man the supreme element is will, which dominates alike feeling and thought"; and, quoting W. James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 114: "'The willing department of our nature dominates both the conceiving department and the feeling department.'" So p. 80: "According to the teaching of the founder of Christianity, the will of God is revealed to man in two ways—in the external and visible world as law, in the moral world as ideal." "The religious view of the will is set forth in the Gospels as it is taught nowhere else."

intellectual gifts had not been trained in Rabbinical schools of academic legalism. "How knoweth this man letters," asked the Pharisees, "having never learned?"—learned, as they probably meant to say, as a student from the masters of the law. Yet, on almost every page of the Gospels there are indications that the new master was neither unlettered nor untrained, but equipped with intellectual as well as spiritual authority. When at the beginning of His work, Jesus is solicited by the temptations of a misused ministry, He meets them all with the weapon of the scholar; confronting His adversary with the testimony of the scriptures, and quoting to him, "It is written; it is written." When the time arrives to set forth the principles of His teaching He expounds them through their contrast with the teachings of the past: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, but I say unto you." When He returns to Nazareth where He had been brought up, there is delivered unto Him the book to read. He is addressed in more than forty passages of the Gospels as Teacher or Master. When His enemies would entangle Him they assume His familiarity with the literature which they cite, and He in His turn does not hesitate to use against them their own weapons of dialectic, so that they dare ask Him no more questions. Yet, sufficiently equipped as Jesus was to adapt His teaching to the learning of His age, it was not His scholastic wisdom which most impressed His hearers. There was perceived in Him a quality of insight which, instead of being akin to the learning of scholars, was distinct from it, and was seen to be an original endowment, a spiritual gift. When the boy Jesus met the wise men of Jerusalem it was this untaught wisdom which startled them. He lingered among the doctors, eager to hear and to ask them questions; and when His parents sought their child, He turned to them with one of those deep, strange sayings with which other children sometimes perplex their parents, as though they were listening to another voice and heard a command their parents had not given. From that time on, as it is written, Jesus increased not in stature

only and in charm, but in wisdom. He was a teacher, but the authority of His teaching was not that of the scribes. His wisdom was not erudition. It left, not an impression of academic acquisition, but of penetration, discernment, grasp. It was one aspect of His central quality of power.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of this intellectual mastery was a certain lightness of touch which Jesus often employed in controversy, and which sometimes approaches the play of humour, and sometimes the thrust of irony. His enemies attack Him with bludgeons, and He defends Himself with a rapier. No test of mastery is more complete than this capacity to make of playfulness a weapon of reasoning. The method of Jesus pierces through the subtlety and obscurity of His opponents with such refinement and dexterity that the assailant sometimes hardly knows that he is hit. Instead of a direct reply, the immediate question is parried and turned aside and the motive which lies behind it is laid bare. People come to Him with an inquiry about the division of property, and Jesus first seems to decline jurisdiction in the matter. "Who made me," He says, "a judge or a divider over you?" Then, however, looking round at the faces of the crowd who are seeking His guarantee for their greed, He penetrates to the thought which the economic problem has disguised, and answers, not their inquiry, but their hearts: "I say unto you all, keep yourselves from covetousness." His disciples ask for the reward of their loyalty: "Lo, we have left all and have followed thee"; and Jesus answers: "Ye shall receive an hundredfold, houses and brethren, sisters and mothers, and children and lands"; and then, as if with a playful sense of the little that all this tells them of that which should happen, He goes on: "Yes, houses and lands indeed, with persecutions." He opens the Book in the synagogue, and with the familiarity of one versed in the Scriptures, selects that passage which is fulfilled in Him, "He hath anointed me to preach the acceptable year of the Lord"; but then, while the minds of His hearers run on into the next phrase of the Prophet's saying,

Jesus abruptly closes the Book in the middle of a sentence and gives it back to the attendant, leaving it for the congregation to perceive that He declines to appropriate the ancient threat, "and the day of vengeance of our God."¹ Here is intellectual insight matching spiritual authority. Here is no recluse, or peasant, or passive saint, but an intellectual as well as moral leader, who may be rejected indeed, but who cannot be despised. The picture of the historic Jesus which would reproduce this type of character, and which is still left for Christian art to paint, is not of the pallid sufferer, stricken by the sins of the world, but of the wise, grave Master, whom to meet was to reverence, if not to obey. Tempted He may be, but His are the temptations which come to power. Confronted by learning He must be, but the weapons of scholarship are His also. Thwarted by the kingdoms of this world He will be, but He remains a king in the empire of the truth. Suffer He must, but it is the suffering of the strong. He dies as if defeated, but His power asserts itself commandingly even when He is gone; and the very memory of it brings to His cause men who could resist His teaching. Nicodemus, the scholar, returns to care for the body of Jesus; and Judas, the betrayer, hangs himself for shame.

This central quality of moral and intellectual power becomes still more impressive if one goes on to consider the habits of life and ways of conduct which are its natural expressions. There are two ways in which the conduct of Jesus discloses a character whose dominant note is strength, and both of these habits of life increase the pathos and impressiveness of such a character. The first is the prodigality of the sympathy of Jesus; the second is His solitude of soul. The first mark of power is its self-impartment. It gives itself lavishly because there is so much to give. It feels no need of thrift. This is what impresses one in the conduct of Jesus. He is extravagant and unthriftly in His teaching. On one

¹ This incident is noted by S. M. Crothers, in a Sermon on the Simplification of Life, Boston, 1901.

occasion only does He seem to gather an audience about Him and address to them any formal announcement of His mission. For the most part He lavishes His teaching on a few, and sometimes charges even these to tell no man what He has taught. He takes three friends apart from their companions and shows them His glory. His parables are flung out into the world with little care for their interpretation. Those who have ears to hear may hear them ; but many shall hear and not understand. His favourite symbolism is that of the sower's work, with its broad, free sweep of arm and its widely-scattered seed. What matter was it if much seed be wasted, if that which falls on good ground has such reproductive power? There is the same prodigality in His relation with the diverse types of people who came to Him. It is often asked whether Jesus should be classified with reformers or with working-men, with the proletariat or the poor. The fact is, however, that the ordinary social classifications are inapplicable to Him. He is equally at home with the most varied types. He moves with the same sense of familiarity among rich and poor, learned and ignorant, the happy and the sad. What does this range of sympathy, this prodigality of method mean? It has been sometimes regarded as the sheer manifestation of an appreciative and responsive mind. This is the trait which has encouraged the æsthetic interpretation of the character of Jesus. This lavish offering is, it is said, a mark of His delight in life. But delight in life is robbed of its significance when it has no background of rational justification. Sympathy to be effective must be the expression of power. To give, one must have. To give one's life a ransom for many is of no avail if the ransom is insufficient. To say that the Son of Man comes not to be ministered unto, but to minister, is to utter no great truth, unless the Son of Man has the capacity for ministering. To dig a channel for the water-power of one's mill is no wise investment if the stream has run low. The sympathy of Jesus is the channel through which His power flows, and the abundance of the stream testifies to the reserve of power at the source.

The second mark of the conduct of Jesus is His spiritual solitude. Give Himself as He may to others in lavish word and deed, there remains within the circle of these relationships a sphere of isolation and reserve. Eager as He is to communicate His message, there are aspects of it which, He is forced to see, are incommunicable, so that His language has sometimes a note of helplessness. Men see but they do not perceive; they hear but they do not understand. "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." There is profound pathos in this solitude of Jesus. The very ideals which He cherishes estrange Him from many a hearer. The throng that presses about Him seems to drain His strength, and He seeks the solitude of the hills or of the lake to recover poise and peace. Here is the meaning of those passive virtues which appear to give the note of asceticism to the Gospels. Meekness, patience, forbearance, silence—these are not the signs of mere self-mortification, they are the signs of power in reserve. They are the marks of one who can afford to wait, who expects to suffer, who need not contend; and all this not because He is simply meek and lowly, but because He is also strong and calm. Consider, for instance, the relation of Jesus to His family. Christian art has here again misled the sentiment of the devout, and has pictured the mother of Jesus as continuously aware of His profoundest hopes, from the time of His boyhood, when she "pondered these things in her heart," to the time of the Cross when she stood near by, leaning on the disciple whom Jesus loved. The fact is, however, that in every glimpse of the domestic relations of Jesus we see Him separated from an undiscerning, if not an alienated, home. When His parents find their boy in the temple they keep His sayings indeed in their hearts, but they do not open their minds to those sayings. On the contrary, it is written that "they understood not the saying which He spake unto them." Even when His teaching had gained many other followers, His own kin had no ears for His message. What infinite pathos is in that scene at Capernaum,

when the people crowd upon Him so that He and His friends cannot find time to eat, and His mother and His brethren cannot "come at Him for the press." They come, it is plain, to take Him from the dangers which beset Him. Perhaps they see the political peril that threatens Him; perhaps they lament His break with the sacred law; perhaps they even doubt His sanity. At any rate, they come not to listen but to deter, and Jesus is smitten with the poignant realisation that a man's foes are of his own household. If He is to go on, it is to be alone. Those who should know Him best are the last to comprehend Him. With a look of profound sorrow, yet of undeterred resolution, He turns from those who are dearest to Him and gives Himself to that larger sympathy, which is at the same time personal solitude. And He looked round on them which sat about Him and said: "Behold my mother and my brother; for whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my mother and my brother and my sister." Here, indeed, is the pathos of the character of Jesus; yet here also we approach the source of His strength. It was in this detachment of nature, this isolation of the inner life, that Jesus found His communion with the life of God. At this point His ethics melt into His religion. The crowd press round Him and He serves them gladly, and then it seems as if His nature demanded solitude for the refreshment of His faith. The tide of the spirit ebbs from Him in the throng, and when He goes apart He is least alone, because the Father is with Him. Thus, from utterance to silence, from giving to receiving, from society to solitude, the rhythm of His nature moves; and the power which is spent in service is renewed in isolation. He is able to bear the crosses of others because He bears His own. He can be of use to men because He can go without men. He is ethically effective because He is spiritually free. He is able to save because He is strong to suffer. His sympathy and His solitude are alike the instruments of His strength. The type of character directly derived from Him—the Christian character—is not a survival of monastic or sentimental ideals, inapplicable to

the conditions of the modern world ; it is a form of power made effective through strength of soul. Its force flows down like an unstinted river among the utilities of life because it is nourished among the eternal hills. It has its abundance and its reserves, its service and its solitude ; and the power which moves the busy wheels of the life of man is fed in the deep places of the life of God.

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ARE INDIAN MISSIONS A FAILURE ?

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AT the invitation of the Editor of the *Hibbert Journal*, I offer a few remarks on Dr Oldfield's article in the April number entitled "The Failure of Christian Missions in India."

The first point in any profitable discussion of such a subject is to determine what is meant by *failure*. Dr Oldfield appears to think that if it were not for the faults of missions and of missionaries "the Master Jesus would at once be followed by His millions" in India, and that "the missionary Saint of the Gentiles would be as powerful to transform men's minds in the East as he was to sway the thought of the Western world in his day." Now, if everything that falls short of this standard of success is to be reckoned failure, it must be admitted that missions to India, as well as to other countries which possess an ancient civilisation and ancient faiths, have failed. Dr Oldfield's article, or the visit to the East which has produced it, was hardly needed to bring home the failure of missions *in this sense* to those who take any interest in them. But this is hardly the sense in which the word is ordinarily used. Most people understand by it that either absolutely nothing, or nothing at all commensurate with the effort put forth, is being done towards the end in view, and that such effort ought at once to be given up. Dr Oldfield appears to accept this meaning when he urges, in summing up, that in place of the varied instrumentalities used

at present by the different churches and societies, "it would be better to send a dozen spiritual men, who would, living at one place, emulate the saintly lives and ascetic practices of the early fathers of the Christian church."

It is only in this ordinary meaning of the word that I undertake to show that Indian missions have not failed. That they have not yet attained their end, and are not likely to attain it easily or soon; that there are many drawbacks on their successes, that many mistakes have been made, some of which are still uncorrected—all this is obvious. But that Indian missions, in spite of errors and imperfections, have effected much—and much that tends to the attainment of their object—that they ought neither to be given up nor continued in some wholly revolutionised fashion, but ought to be increasingly sympathised with and upheld by everyone who is in any sense a Christian—this it will not be difficult to show.

It deserves to be remarked at the outset that the standard of success set up by Dr Oldfield is not warranted by anything in the history of the Christian Church, certainly not by its earliest and most rapid triumphs. It is admitted on all hands that there was special preparation for those triumphs in the condition of the Roman world when Christian missionaries were first sent out from Antioch. In spite of this, there is nothing to show, but much to disprove, that the Master was in those days "followed by His millions." We have indeed no full information on the point. Paul and Barnabas, Silas, Timothy, and the rest drew up no tabular statements by means of which the number of their converts may be compared with the population of the countries which they visited. But the evidence is ample that Paul's letters were addressed to but small companies of believing men and women in Corinth or Philippi, in Thessalonica or Ephesus, and that the general life even of those cities where the gospel had taken firmest hold was going on, when the Apostle wrote, very much as it had done before his visits. Also we are distinctly told that

“not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble were called.” The companies of the called were not only small, but made up mainly, though not exclusively, of slaves and other members of the lowest classes of society, that is to say, of those who stood by no means high either in moral character or social influence at the time when they obeyed their call. In the main, it was upon what Dr Oldfield would regard as most unpromising materials that Paul and his fellow-missionaries laid the foundations of the Church. Moreover, the Apocalypse is a proof that the lapse of a generation had not brought unqualified success even within the limits of those small companies. When that book was written, some at least of the churches in Roman Asia were going backward in earnestness of spirit, and therefore losing whatever power they exercised at first in moulding the mass of the world around them.

It is true, no doubt, that Paul “swayed the thought of the Western world”; but the question is pertinent whether he did so, as Dr Oldfield thinks, in his own day? Paul’s missionary life began, one may roughly say, in A.D. 50. Half a century thereafter, the slight acquaintance of Tacitus with what he regarded as a new sect among the Jews shows how little the thought of Rome was swayed at that date by the message which the Apostle had long before sealed by his blood. And if Pliny, writing a few years later, shows a better acquaintance with the workings of Christianity in Bithynia, still to him, as plainly as to Tacitus, it would have appeared a mere absurdity that Western thought would ever be influenced by what any Christian might speak or write. Even after the day when men like Tacitus and Pliny showed some acquaintance with the existence of Christianity, generation after generation passed during which the leaders of thought throughout the empire, as certainly as the aristocratic and conservative Hindus on whose opinions Dr Oldfield relies, would have “all agreed that Christianity was quite an unimportant factor, so far as the conversion of the upper classes was concerned.” It took full

two centuries and more after Paul began the work of foreign missions before he could be said in any real sense "to sway the thought of the Western world."

Now, what are the corresponding facts in India? Missions have been at work there for about a century. I refer to Protestant missions only, because it is these alone that Dr Oldfield has in view, and because they were not based upon and did not in any sense arise out of the work of the Roman Church, which dates from the fifteenth century, or that of the Syrian Church, which dates at latest from the sixth. It is with Protestant missions alone that the article before me deals, and to them alone that I need refer.¹ Now, the number of avowed Christians connected with those missions, according to the census taken two years ago, is 964,000; and the number is steadily increasing. While the growth of the population of India in the last ten years has been at the rate of 1.52 per cent., that of the Christians connected with Protestant missions has been at the rate of between 50 and 51 per cent.

Personally, I care little for statistics in discussions like the present, because there are still many elements of uncertainty about census-taking in India, and much more because things moral and spiritual can be gauged even by correct figures only in the rudest way. Still there must be some starting-point in every discussion, and a tolerably accurate statement in figures is at least not altogether nebulous.

To my mind it is not without deep significance that 964,000 of the people of India are now within the Protestant churches, whereas a hundred years ago there was practically not even one, and that the change has been effected through the efforts of men who at the beginning had everything to learn, and who

¹ Of course, by including the important but isolated work of the mission which had its first centre at Tranquebar, the history even of Protestant missions may be made to stretch a good deal farther back. But considering that missions were not so much as officially tolerated within British India until 1813, and that the great majority of mission agencies did not come into being till much later, a hundred years is a more than ample period to assign for the duration of the work which has been pronounced a failure.

accordingly made blunder after blunder in their methods.¹ Now that experience has brought more wisdom to the workers, there is reason to hope that the work will go on at an accelerated pace. But even as things stand, the result is in every way encouraging. If all the circumstances be taken fairly into account, I doubt whether anything more encouraging has taken place on so large a scale in the history of the Christian Church. It would be hard to prove that the number of avowed Christians bore a greater proportion to the inhabitants of the Roman world in A.D. 150—that is, a century after missionary work began—than the fruits of Protestant missions do to the inhabitants of India to-day. Of course, there are no materials for exact comparison. Some indications of the facts may, however, still be traced. Justin wrote about the middle of the second century. Though born and brought up in Palestine, he seems scarcely to have come in contact with Christians till he had more than reached maturity; and all that he says appears to show that, though important enough to be objects of persecution, the followers of Christ were still numerically obscure. Tertullian, indeed, writing about half a century later, speaks of how Christians were in his day to be found in numbers everywhere. It is often suspected that his African rhetoric led him to the utmost limits of fair statement; yet, taking his words even as they stand, they prove that even a hundred and fifty years after Paul started on his first missionary journey, Christians formed but a minute proportion of the entire population. If the signs of the times are not wholly deceptive, the fifty years immediately ahead will see a numerical development of the Indian church, at least as great as that of the church in the Roman empire in the time that elapsed between Justin and Tertullian.

The fact is, that they who compare the results of Indian

¹ The census gives 1,129,000 Christians connected with the Roman and 571,000 with the Syrian Church, though, for the reasons given above, these are left out of account in the present article. Strictly, Indian Christians of all sects are thus 2,664,000 in number, and form close on 1 per cent. of the population.

with those of apostolic or other early missions need to lay to heart the spirit of the advice to "study large maps." To one who does not take the trouble to think things out, a century, of which his own lifetime takes up a part, seems immensely long, while a century in some distant age dwindles almost into nothing. In point of fact, a century at one period is as long as a century at another. Such men have equal need to bear in mind that in all ages changes which are great and destined to be lasting take place in a way which appears slow, and call for patient, long continued, and to all appearance inadequately rewarded effort on the part of those appointed to effect them. If history, especially the samples of it contained in Scripture, bears any lesson, this is an essential feature of the divine plan.

I am aware of the replies that will be made to this appeal to the number of those whom Protestant missions have brought within the Christian fold. Those who insist that the work of missions is a failure will call the modern expansion an artificial and the ancient a natural process. They will point to what they will term the immense outlay of money on organisation in the one case and the absence of organisation and payment in the other. The reply to this is—Other ages other manners. Whether for good or evil, organised effort, and the use of money which it necessarily involves, is as much a characteristic, as much an instinctive tendency, of this age, as effort more individual, more spontaneous, more sporadic was of that. Not only in regard to endeavour to extend the Kingdom of Heaven, but in regard to everything that men set themselves to do, it is natural in our age to form associations, to trust to "division of labour," to set men apart for doing definitely and consciously the things which in other ages were done, less definitely and less exclusively, by everyone who cared for the object aimed at. My opponents are welcome to the admission that the churches at work in India (and elsewhere) have given way too much to the natural tendency of our times. They have depended too largely on organisa-

tion, and have unintentionally lessened, in those newly become Christians, that sense of personal responsibility for the health and growth of the Christian society which, if all things were as they ought to be, would be as active now as in earlier times. It is one of the errors for which allowance must be made when a novel work is entered on. The way to remedy the error, without foregoing the benefits of formal association, will be gradually disclosed as greater experience is gained in the coming generations and the coming centuries. But if the results attained in an age of organised, and therefore necessarily of more or less paid effort, be as solid as those arrived at in an age whose natural method of work is different (and this is a point to which I shall return), the question of the immediately instrumental cause of those results is of secondary importance.

Another thing which is certain to be said is, that those 964,000 persons alive at present who are the visible outcome of the labours of Protestant missions are drawn from outcast races or from "poor wretches who have nothing to lose and perhaps a little to gain by becoming Christians." Dr Oldfield goes so far as to hint, by no means obscurely, that it would be better if not one of them had been won over. The sweeping statement on which his opinion rests is far from true. In not a few regions a very appreciable proportion of the native Christians belong to classes which both by birth and intellect stand high in the social scale. It is granted that the great majority of them originally belonged to the lower classes, and not a few to the lowest of the low—to classes as low comparatively as the slaves who bulked so largely in the churches of the earliest days. But to Dr Oldfield and the critics who agree with him, the proportion of the entire population made up by the classes from which the native Christians are mainly drawn is probably unknown. In census returns they are set down as Hindus—which in a sense they are. The line of demarcation between the lower and the higher castes is so ill-defined that no attempt at an exact division has hitherto been made.

Nevertheless, though set down as Hindus, those lower castes are for practical purposes outside the pale of caste and Hinduism. By the higher castes they are in most cases oppressed, while they are universally regarded with that contempt of which the article under review contains such abundant evidence. But those lower classes, whom it is proposed severely to let alone for the sake of conciliating the higher, form a large fraction of the people of India. I believe this fraction to be not smaller than a sixth or a fifth, and perhaps it is far larger. I admit that, for the reasons just adduced, this estimate is little more than a guess; but if it be anywhere near the mark, it implies a total of not less than forty millions. To establish a living church in the midst of so vast a number would be a mighty work, even if the higher classes remained as absolutely untouched as Dr Oldfield imagines that they are.

I shall not either affirm or deny that the churches and societies have given an excessive share of their attention to this lower section of the Indian community. That question can be decided by those alone who are qualified by personal contact with all classes, and by deep thought and long experience. But that forty millions of people should be totally uncared for—they being the very ones whose need of every kind of elevating help is greatest, and to whom access is at the same time easiest—is a proposal which no Christian with the plain facts before him will entertain.

This is but a sample of Dr Oldfield's imperfect knowledge of the condition of India as a whole. Another may be found in the stress he lays on the division of Christian workers into sects and denominations. Certainly this division is to be regretted, but no cultured race is better prepared than the Hindus to make full allowance for subordinate divisions within a great society. As regards both number and violence of opposition, the sects and parties of Christendom are less than those of Hinduism. Every thoughtful Hindu recognises the essential solidarity of all Protestant missions, and sees no

tremendous stumbling-block even in the differences between them and the missions of the Roman Church. In the details of mission effort, difficulties certainly arise from the multiplicity of sects; but in the broad and general way affirmed in the article, such difficulties are of small importance.

While all this is true, it is also true that criticism which is fair in intention, however ill-informed, ought always to be welcomed. It is undeniable that missions have made many and great errors in the past, and are making many still, especially in their attitude to those sections of the community who, according to this article, ought alone to be taken into account. The article points out several of those errors, and the truths which it contains ought not to be overlooked. It often happens that the "onlooker sees most of the game."

Not indeed that Dr Oldfield's criticisms are so novel as he thinks. Probably, every one of the faults he dwells on has received serious consideration from some missionaries, and from at least a few of those at home who sympathise with missions. Still, it is well that faults not yet corrected should be pointed out again and again. At the same time I must dissent from the general principle on which even the most valuable of Dr Oldfield's criticisms appear to be based. He holds that missionaries must conform to the ideas of those with whom they deal; and since Brahmins wholly, and the other higher castes in part, live what Europeans would regard as an ascetic life, it is imperative on missionaries to be ascetics. He implies that success is impossible so long as Hindus can say—"We allow no dead body to touch our hands; your missionaries do not scruple to put them within their lips." Paul, however, was no ascetic. Neither was his Master, who "came eating and drinking." Everyone knows how Paul protested when his friends in Galatia were tempted to regard Jewish customs regarding meats and drinks as *necessary* for Christians. When a proper occasion called for it, he was ready to make any and every personal sacrifice; but to base the whole life and action of the Christian Church on outward observances, or on the

prejudices of those for whose good it laboured, was a view to which he would "give place by subjection, no, not for an hour."

At the same time, though their basal principle be wrong, not a few of Dr Oldfield's strictures deserve attention. That there is need of a higher spiritual standard among all workers for Christ in India—need for a greater number of "saintly men of high intellectual capacity and childlike charitable faith"—few missionaries will deny. And many will grant that much harm has been done "by arrogant denunciation of Hinduism," and by forgetfulness "that the sacred books of the East are full of sublime teaching." This, however, is an error of the past rather than the present, though the need for dwelling on it has not entirely passed away. Again, Dr Oldfield is right in saying that Hindus and their religion are too often "maligned in missionary reports"; and in tracing the evil, not to deliberate misrepresentation, but to a pandering to mere effect, by dwelling upon tales which, though true in themselves, are not really typical of Indian life. This, again, is an error from which the missionary cause has begun to work itself free, but from which it needs to be made freer still.

Once more, Dr Oldfield is at least partly right in what he says as to the line of social demarcation being so deep and sharp that one "can hardly be a social comrade of the Indian people and retain social intercourse with the English official class." This difficulty is seldom sufficiently emphasised. To get into close touch with the "conservative Hindu" is hard for anyone, but particularly hard for the "missionary" who is "in touch with Anglo-Indian official life . . . and therefore at once comes on to the other side of the road." There is a regrettable amount of truth in the remark that "there is the strongest belief throughout India that Indians who are independent thinkers will sooner or later become marked men, and will be made to suffer in some way or other, on the plea that their loyalty is doubted." The actual warrant for this widespread belief is immensely less than the excessive sensitiveness

of our Hindu friends leads them to suppose, but that facts give *some* warrant for it cannot be denied.

This leads to consideration of the question about missionaries sharing in the amusements of their countrymen, of which so much is made in Dr Oldfield's article. For myself, I sympathise with the views propounded. As a rule—though a rule with very numerous exceptions—missionaries, in places which are Anglo-Indian centres, tend to become merged in ordinary society more than is expedient, if not more than is right,—at all events, to an extent which does something to accentuate their being foreigners rather than of one blood with those for whose benefit they labour. Thus it happens that, unintentionally and to a large extent unconsciously, missionaries seldom bear themselves towards Hindus of good social position as in my opinion they ought to do. Here again, however, the sensitiveness of the Hindu and the extreme suavity of his own manners make him reckon the evil as more than double what it actually is. The whole question is replete with difficulty. Besides dangers which I have not space to mention, too rigid a separation of missionaries from their natural associates would involve the danger of their being regarded as—and by and by of their becoming—a mere official class, saying and doing not what their hearts dictated, but what routine prescribed. A priestly caste, isolated from ordinary life, has rarely exerted much of really beneficial power. Thus there are dangers on both sides. How to shun both sets of dangers is a problem which, like the due apportionment of effort between the higher classes and the lower, needs wisdom gained by long experience for its solution. No weight attaches to the views of one who has been but a few months in India, and has come in contact with those classes only who stand most aloof from Christian effort, and even with them only in those parts of the country where least has been done to bring East and West into any kind of sympathetic relation. For in almost every place which Dr Oldfield tells us that he visited, missions are comparatively new, and have made less way than elsewhere with the classes

to which his observation was confined. I do not admit that even in those regions the outlook is so dark as he describes; but I can testify from long experience that in Southern India—that is, in the Presidency of Madras and the native states surrounding it—things are entirely different. If Dr Oldfield will come to the South, he will find missionaries who not only do not “drop their h’s or put them in the wrong place,” but who do not overlook “what is good in Hinduism.” I have a shrewd suspicion that if he had looked for them he would have found such missionaries elsewhere, but he will certainly find them here. He will find, moreover, that a Christian of Brahmin or other higher caste, “who has had nothing to gain by his conversion,” is by no means an unexampled prodigy. He will also find, speaking generally, “that Christian missions” “always command respect and reverence, even from those who are unable to accept the Gospel of Christ.”

Without fear of contradiction from anyone who knows the facts, I affirm that the influence of missions is felt to-day through the length and breadth of Southern India in every class, from the highest to the lowest. I affirm, further, that there is a great and growing reverence for Christ even among “conservative and aristocratic Hindus,” and that the most outstanding religious tendency, at all events of their younger men, is to try how much of the teaching and the spirit of Christianity they can read into the forms of the ancient faith. It is true that vast masses of the higher castes remain untouched and inert, but there is life, and thought, and movement among no inconsiderable part of them. Many causes have contributed to awaken this new life, but among the chief of them is the influence of Christian missions, while it is due almost exclusively to missions that existing movements are taking a religious rather than an anti-religious turn. All this is not everything, but it is still something, and something important with reference to the end in view. I claim that the leaven is most visibly at work, though not that the whole is leavened.

I should run far beyond my limits if I were to discuss all the things that have helped to make the outlook in the South so hopeful. I shall advert to only one of them. I choose it because a brief statement of the case will show how different is the state of matters here from that which Dr Oldfield represents as universal.

The native church of Southern India has more than enough of defects and faults. At the proper time, I am willing to join in giving them all due emphasis. Nevertheless, there is something at work in it of that life which gave power to the churches of the early centuries, in spite of faults which in their case also were not few or small. I am ready to use Dr Oldfield's own words in this case. Hindus of all classes are beginning to think, if not yet very often to say, "these Christians are better, are gentler, are more honest, are more truthful, are more self-sacrificing" (I would insert "more purposeful and strenuous"), "and live in all things at a higher level than we do." The native church is visibly growing in vigour, and purity, and cohesion.

The existence of spiritual power within a community can hardly, indeed, be forced home on the conviction of such as do not directly come in contact with it. Some examples, however, of how it works may dispose even the unwilling to accept such testimony as many in South India can bear. The churches here are composed, not exclusively, but largely of those who belonged originally to the downtrodden and illiterate classes. It is some proof of how Christianity has wrought on them that already in point of education, and of all the influence which education brings even more in India than elsewhere, Christians have begun to take a foremost place. In proportion to the population from which they come, Christian graduates of the University are far more numerous than in any other section of the people except Brahmins; and if the progress of recent years be maintained, they will soon equal or surpass even them. In other educational lines they are equally or even more progressive.

Or, to take another sign of the times, one may point to the rapidly increasing measure in which the native churches are becoming self-sustaining and self-propagating. Those connected with a single mission, in a single one of the twenty-two districts of this Presidency, contributed last year Rs. 53,340. This does not include a single gift from any European, or any gift by which the giver profited. School fees, for example, are excluded. It is the contribution of purely native churches to purely religious objects. In 1892 the corresponding sum was Rs. 29,586. Christians have indeed increased during the ten years, but not very greatly in this particular district. The number in those churches has risen in ten years by 5 per cent., but their contribution, as shown by the figures, by 80 per cent. Of course, I have taken the most favourable instance that happens to be known to me. But even if the churches of this mission in this district stand first—of which I am not certain—there are others which are excellent seconds. Moreover, there are few among the churches which are not very creditably following in this respect the examples which the foremost ones have set them.

Such things do not, of course, put the existence of moral and spiritual life beyond the possibility of cavil, but at least they support the affirmation I have made, and throw the burden of proof on those who deny it. Among the causes which, no doubt with some things that are discouraging, make the prospects of Christian missions undeniably most hopeful in the whole of that large part of India for which I can speak with some authority, this increasing purity and power of the native churches may be reckoned as one of the most important.

If allowance be made for the length of time involved in work which is to endure as long as the world endures, as compared with work to be completed within the lifetime of a man, I do not know any better illustration of the whole condition of Indian missions than may be found in one of the best known warlike operations of the bygone century. When the British

army was compelled to embark at Corunna, there was what might well be reckoned a total failure of the attempt to deliver the Peninsula from the grasp of Napoleon. The attempt, however, was renewed. There were gleams of success from the beginning of Wellington's command. Ere long he had secured a fairly safe basis of operations in Portugal. Still, for year after year, it seemed that no real advance beyond it could be made. Even after world-renowned victories, he was once and again driven back, so that his task was pronounced impossible by those who judged only by the immediate present. There were multitudes of those at ease in Britain, there were critics by the score who had paid flying visits to the field of operations, ready to declare that the whole undertaking was a failure, and that the army ought to be withdrawn. If their counsels had been listened to, the attempt would have been the failure they predicted. But Wellington remained undaunted. He received support which, though too often vacillating and half-hearted, proved to be sufficient. The time came, after much disappointment and delay, when the final advance could be wisely made. It is said that the great captain, as he crossed the frontier of Spain, yielded, as he rarely did, to the love for theatrical effect, and turning his horse and taking off his hat exclaimed, "Farewell Portugal! I shall never see you again." Whether the story be true or not, the issue showed it to be appropriate. Within one short year thereafter, though even yet not without desperate effort and temporary failure, the Peninsula was free.

The condition of Indian missions in our generation is like that of the army of Wellington after his second or his third retreat to Portugal. Great things have been done—great in the judgment of those who are able to estimate moral forces rightly. Errors are being corrected. Experience has been gained. No small preparation for the final advance has manifestly been made. No doubt, if counsels like those of the articles before me should prevail, the whole attempt may prove a failure still. But if there be even such moderate amount

of steady perseverance and support as was given to the forces in the Peninsula, the time of full success may not be distant—not distant, that is to say, if the reckoning accord with what all history shows to be the method by which divine purposes are gained, and the rate of speed at which they are wrought out. When the full fruit of what has been done in the bygone century is gathered, not only will India acknowledge Christ, but it will be found that the thoughts which have been strong in her for millenniums will be as important a contribution to the health and vigour of the Christian Church as that which has been made by the gathered thought and long preparatory training of Greek and Roman and Teuton, and of every other race whom that Church has been the instrument of bringing into living contact with the God who is “the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe.”

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

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THERE is an interesting passage in Martineau's Biography in which the attitude of that great thinker in relation to his disciples is contrasted with that of the Unitarians of an earlier generation. These older champions of the principle of "private judgment" appear to have regarded that principle as so sacred that they refrained from exercising any influence whatever on the religious opinions of their pupils, and maintained an attitude of "extreme impartiality, which sometimes cast a chill upon the ardour of youth." Martineau, on the other hand, "did not think it his duty to withhold from the student that clear expression of belief and that personal guidance amid conflicting systems which the bewildered inquirer finds so helpful and stimulating."¹

Later on in the same volume we have his own words, at once explaining the principle on which he acted, and limiting its application. A minister, he writes, should "not hide the light that is in him, but impart to his people, and more especially to the young, the knowledge which he may acquire and the conclusions to which his investigations conduct him." But in this work the minister himself "can receive no aid from the authority of any man or any church. His most valuable guides are his own mind and his own conscience."²

¹ See *Life of Martineau* (J. Nisbet & Co.), vol. i. p. 29.

² *Loc cit.*, p. 57.

These passages appear to me to open up a very interesting inquiry on the philosophy of Authority in its relation to religious belief. Martineau's partial concession to the principle of Authority is, as perhaps he would have admitted, difficult to justify theoretically—for the minister is but an individual, just as his hearers are individuals. Even allowing for the implied distinction between the mature judgment of the minister and the immature minds of his average disciples, there would appear to be a further question. He himself speaks elsewhere of "the attitude of mind constituting religious *discipleship*, which implies, not that we have been convinced by the reasoning of an equal, but that we have been subdued by the authority and possessed by the intuitions of a higher mind." That the individual minister should never have this attitude towards any great religious teacher is a proposition which it is not likely that Martineau would have consistently maintained. What I think haunted him, in his own protest against Authority in religion, was the idea that individual religious genius was called upon by the advocates of Authority simply to defer to the "officialism" of which a church, as he conceived it, was the embodiment, to quench the flame that was in him, and to bring down his thought and teaching to that lower level which "officialism," as corresponding to the common measure of many minds, necessarily represented. This idea he could not brook.

I propose here very briefly to consider a different view of Authority from this. I doubt whether among the more comprehensive thinkers who have accepted the principle of Authority, as exhibited in the Christian Church, that principle has ever been regarded as tantamount to the absolute reign of "officialism." Rather the living Church has been viewed more or less distinctly as embodying the intuitions of the great saints, and the labour of the great theologians, exercised by them in the consideration and analysis of the Christian revelation. Of this body of thought and meditation the official organs have been in some departments but the mouthpiece.

It is for them to proclaim formally the teaching which the saints and doctors have deduced from Scripture and Tradition. This interpretation is presupposed, I believe, in the thought of the best Roman Catholic and the best Anglican exponents of the principle of Authority. St Augustine, and not any infallible teacher, formed the theological intellect of Western Christendom, as a great Catholic authority has reminded us.¹ St Thomas Aquinas stood in a somewhat similar relation to the theological thought which prevailed in the age of Dante. Individual genius within the Church has for the most part suggested the successive developments of the primitive revelation and its intellectual illustration and setting: although it has been for official authority to enunciate formally in the end what has approved itself as at once assured and essential. Genius has indeed been called upon to respect the constitution of the *Ecclesia*, to refrain at the bidding of official authority from speculations which subverted instead of developing the principles of revelation, or from utterances which were upsetting to the average mind. But, far from original genius being simply determined in its thought by Authority, it has been itself in the long run a main factor in determining the theology which official authority guards.

I will set down in briefest outline an account of the functions of religious authority which would appear to be in conformity with this view of the case, and which, however insufficiently it may be realised at any particular epoch, or in any communion, would seem to be more in accord with the nature of the human mind than the theory of private judgment, long upheld by so many earnest believers, but now less and less defended in an unqualified form.

I will begin by glancing at the place of Authority in determining not only religious beliefs, but all beliefs for the individual.

I suppose that no one now holds the crude private judgment theory, never consistently acted on, but which had its theoretic-

¹ See *Apologia*, p. 265.

cal advocates from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth—the one-man-one-vote theory of the philosophy of belief;—the theory that the intellect of one man has as good a right to its opinion as that of another on every subject. We all now believe in the authority of experts. We all believe that the individual should accept as in some degree authoritative the results of the reasoning of the race, and provisionally the authority of general consent; that the uneducated should accept the authority of the educated; children that of adults; laymen that of specialists in their own science; painters that of musicians in their own art, and *vice versa*; even Englishmen that of Frenchmen as to the manners and customs of their own country. I give these as obvious instances of an obvious principle on which it is needless to enlarge.

The conception of the human race as an organism—a conception which Herbert Spencer's philosophy has made so familiar to us—helps perhaps to make clear some of these functions of Authority. The hand acts on the report of the eye and the ear, and neither eye nor ear can perform the functions of the other. This is no mere metaphor, but a practical analogy, based on difference of function and of possible experience.

The organic union between the parts of a living organism is so far similar to the interaction on each other of members of a living company, that division of labour is normal in both cases.

And the analogy, if pressed one step further, will help us still more fully to appreciate the philosophy of Authority. That step further is the conception of the human race, not only as an organism with difference of function, but as a growing organism, with gradual increase of experience and advance in accuracy of perception. The long experience of the race is to a great extent the basis of the authority of the educated (to whom its acquirements are known) over the uneducated. Personal experience contributes to that of adults over the young, and to the practical wisdom of an aged Polonius. But further, men are the more developed successors

of living beings with simpler sensitive endowment, and consequently less accurate sensitive perception than their own. Biologists can trace with tolerable accuracy the growing definiteness in the consciousness of external objects, right up the series of animal life—the gradual differentiation and development of touch, hearing, taste, smell, sight, and muscular sensation. Man represents the highest point yet reached in this gradual development of structure and correlative advance in the extent and accuracy of sensible knowledge. Not only in the existing community of mankind does one individual learn from another, not only is there division of labour and distribution of the parts in present knowledge, but in the long process of the development of sensitive life, the fittest to survive, as having more highly developed relations with their environment, have been the pioneers of *further* knowledge.¹ They have been the first to exhibit the favourable variations which have ultimately become general. And as it has been in the past, so it is likely to be in the future. That is to say, special endowment in the individual is another instance of Authority; for it points the way to the higher and fuller knowledge which the future has in store for the race.

In the early stages of evolution, long before the appearance of man, the first sensitiveness to light—the phenomenon which Darwin tells us used to give him a “cold shiver,” and which was presumably, to begin with, the prerogative of a few gifted individuals—was a fresh perception, bringing the sentient being into relationship, at first dim, with a world practically incommensurable with that of which the primitive sentient beings had been aware. Let us think for a moment of the distance between the world known to the lowest animalcules, an infinitesimal portion of our own planet, and the world of which the developed sight of the mammal is aware. However little its possessor may understand what it sees, sight means some contact with that universe with which the

¹ I do not, of course, mean to imply that there have been no other forces at work in the evolution of species besides the struggle for existence.

astronomer is familiar. Rudimentary sight was the pioneer—the sense whose development has, in the course of ages, led up to our knowledge of this practically infinite new world. Dim and inaccurate though that sense was—for example, in the earth-worm, with its eyespots—from the first it had the claim of Authority; and the nature of that world of sight with which it brought the sentient being into a contact at first so dim, was gradually made clear by further developments, each of which had its pioneers, whose more distinct perceptions were in their turn authoritative, and explained the significance of what was vague and obscure in the rudiment. Thus the further development of rudimentary sight verified its *prima facie* claim, while it corrected its imperfections. Let me endeavour to make these points clear.

(1) We have first the authority of the reasoning and experience of others, and the authority of the race; the latter being the generally ratified conclusions, the former the conclusions of those whose knowledge in the particular subject-matter is, owing to special opportunities or special labour, more reliable than our own.

(2) We have next the authority of those pioneers whose *perceptions* are unique, being either new in kind, or carrying to further clearness and definiteness perceptions only rudimentary in ourselves; appealing to us as heralds of higher and further knowledge for the race, conveying to it those outlines which must precede the rational analysis of that further knowledge.

As I understand it, Theism and Christianity appeal to both these kinds of authority. And I take the second first.

Theism is based on conscience. Conscience is a prerogative of the rational animal. It is the first vague consciousness or perception of the “beyond” of which religion afterwards professes to tell us more, as the eyespots are the dim informants of the existence of the “beyond” of which the eye of the mammal afterwards tells us so much. By all its greatest champions the testimony of conscience is regarded as the turning-point, determining belief in a personal God having direct relations with

man. "It is far from being the clear and acute intellect," writes Martineau, "but rather the pure and transparent heart that best discerns God." His biographer adds that he believed "conscience and the moral sense" to be the only internal revealers of God.¹ This language is very similar to that of such Catholic thinkers as Cardinal Newman in our own time, or of St Augustine in the fourth century of our era.

Conscience in its highest manifestation is thus, to use James Ward's phrase, "God consciousness"—the sense of a relation with God. And that sense is most vivid where conscience is most developed.

The sense of the command of God in conscience, in its "categorical imperative," dim in most of us, claiming greater distinctness where there is religious genius, is the development of a perception new in kind as compared to the sensible perceptions which we share with the lower animals. Its interpretation by those in whom it is most developed brings out the issue between the Agnostic and the Theist. The Agnostic, adhering to reason only, and rejecting Authority, regards the supposed Theistic implication as illusive. The Theist claims the analogy of evolution in the past, in the course of which each new perception, each further insight into the real, begins as dim and partly uncertain, and is explained and made clearer by the pioneers of its further evolution. He holds conscience to be a new and dim perception of reality, as *prima facie* itself an authority which should be acted on, and thus tested and developed. And the men of religious genius are, again, looked to as *prima facie* authoritative exponents of its true line of development.

Then comes the further step to the Authority of Christ. This is—still speaking on philosophical grounds only—the prerogative of One whose experience is special, who claims to see much further and more truly in those dim regions, to develop and make precise the implications of conscience—the spiritual rudimentary eyespots of the average man—who carries further

¹ See *Life of Martineau*, i. p. 114.

and announces with more conscious authority the developments of conscience already apparent in prophet and sage, who reveals still more clearly than they the Unknown God of which conscience is vaguely aware.

And finally we have the authority of the Christian Church. This society has treated the Theistic implication of conscience and its development by Christ as authoritative, and thus may be held to embody the highest spiritual *perceptions* known to man. But it has also contained the theologians who have long striven further and further to analyse (under pressure from the thought of each age) the implications of the primitive religious sense and of revelation. It thus (in idea) embodies not only the highest *perceptions*, but the persistent reasoning and experience of the Christian community. Consequently it represents Authority under both the aspects I have indicated. And the blending of the two—of spiritual perception and of rational analysis—is secured by the rulers who preserve the organic unity of the Church, who protect the revelation from rationalistic assaults, and thus endeavour to keep theology spiritual as well as rational.

The Church may, then, be regarded as a growing organism preserving the normal authoritative sources of truth as the growing body preserves the sources of life. It has been continuously one from the time when the revelation was imparted to it. It has contained saints who have caught the primitive Christian spirit and kept it living; theologians who have done their best to appraise the bearing of revelation on our detailed knowledge of fact, and its relation with our intellectual life; and the appointed succession of rulers whose duty it has been to guard the revelation entrusted to them and to pass it on unscathed and still living. It has been for these official "guardians" to expel "heresy"—that is, the speculations of those who have asserted individual reasoning or "choice" on lines inconsistent with the revealed teaching, and with its normal development.

It is in the theological or intellectual department (that in

which reason is most important) that the fallacy of private judgment is perhaps most apparent in our own day. Theological controversy nowadays comes in contact with nearly all the sciences. Our attitude must be defined towards Welhausen, and towards Darwin; towards Renan, and towards many another. When the decision of the average man has to be made on problems of philosophy, of biblical criticism, of physical science, of historical research, in each of which department the best specialist endowment and education is needed for a really trustworthy judgment, the attempt of the unaided individual reason to come to a conclusion is obviously a futile one. This does not mean, as we shall shortly see, that the individual is necessarily to maintain a passive or wholly uncritical attitude; but in intellectual as in social life it is essential for utility and success that everyone should know his own place, and not attempt to deal single-handed with a sphere which is not within his competence. On the other hand, the specialists, in so far as their theories infringe upon principles which have been committed to the guardianship of the rulers of the Church, or prove a danger to that corporate faith which is the corporate life of religious bodies, may and must be warned off. They must not tamper with Christian interpretation of the world and of life, thereby invading territory in which they are not the normal authorities. That territory remains the possession of the saint as its witness and of the ruler as its guardian. Thus the saint, the Christian theologian or specialist, and the official ruler of the Church, is, each in his own way, a representative of the corporate Authority abiding within the Church. In a healthy state of things the ruler would naturally use the saint and the thinker as his two invaluable guides, one as to the genius of Christianity itself, the other as to the intellectual necessities of the hour. His position, in matters far more sacred, resembles that of the head of a government department who would inevitably fail to keep abreast of the needs of the times if he did not avail himself of the best expert knowledge.

But it may be said,—after all it is for the individual reason to find these authorities and to test their credentials. Yes ; but reason in the Theist and in the Agnostic involves a very different attitude and process, and correlatively different tests for such credentials. Reason in the Theist, to use Tennyson's phrase, "follows the gleam," and in place of *waiting* for complete rational proof, follows in the first instance the most hopeful clue whereby it may find the line of its own true development and approach nearer to the Highest Reason. The Theist finds this clue in an authority which appears to explain and supplement his own deepest perceptions. He does not wait for complete proof, which he regards as *dependent* on and subsequent to the initial trust. *Crede ut intelligas* is an old and significant saying of a Christian saint. A Christian believes in order that he may know. He trusts in order that he may be assured. He trusts at first uncritically and until his belief is, in this or that detail, disproved, as the condition of not losing any of the material for knowledge.

He may be sure that much of what he at first accepts will eventually be modified. A boy learns his religion at first on broad lines, and the exceptions to general statements are only gradually apprehended. And a similar advance comes to us all with growth of culture. Again, it is of the nature of a new faculty, as it applies its dim perceptions to the world of fact, that it should convey new error as well as new truth. The sense of vision in its earlier manifestations gave inadequate and partly erroneous ideas, in place of no idea, of the visible properties of external objects. So, too, religion, in its first form superstitious, may give at first a partly *erroneous* idea of a world of religious mystery beyond our present senses, in place of the absence of all idea of such a world, which characterises the Agnostic. Sight in its rudimentary stages conveyed (according to the biologists) an inexact image of external objects—probably, at first, no image at all, only a dim gleam of light, a vague resulting sense of the proximity of objects, without any idea of their shape. But the constant

use of dim and imperfect sight brought, in the course of evolution, gradual diminution of its imperfections. And habit and practice may correct optical illusions even in the individual. So, too, with religion as with sight; the believer stumbles on in each generation, gradually correcting errors, but ever also gaining fuller assurance from his enlarged and developing perceptions that his faculty is a real one, acting on real information, though both the faculty and the revelation are imperfect, and he sees "through a glass darkly."

The Agnostic, on the other hand, is deterred, by the imperfection of the faculty and of the knowledge, from trust, and thus loses the diminution of imperfection which exercise and experience ever bring. Sight would be, on his principles, pure illusion unless it is perfect. Religion is to him pure illusion unless free from superstition and anthropomorphism. He is therefore debarred from the very course of trustful action which is needed to correct the defects of which he complains.

Thus the *first* critical difference between the philosophy of the Christian and that of the Agnostic concerns the true starting-point. Do we start normally, in the search for knowledge, from plain and unmistakable avouchments of reason, or do we start from those authoritative intimations the ground of which our rational nature imperfectly discerns, accepted at first as assumptions, and afterwards confirmed by their fruitfulness and their necessity? Is our *organon investigandi* in the first place simply the analysis of what is distinctly grasped by our own rational nature, as in accepting the axioms of Euclid; or is it the stretching out of its tentacles (as it were), the feeling after all such reality as may be within our reach to touch, though perhaps not yet within our grasp to hold?

I reply, that in the ultimate analysis not only of religious knowledge but of nearly all knowledge of what is objectively true, knowledge not merely of what is *consistent* but of what is *real*, it is practically admitted to be the latter. The trust

in conscience is, *mutatis mutandis*, paralled to the assumptions made in applied mathematics or in physics. In geometry itself we trust in the reality of space for the objective validity of its propositions, as distinguished from their truth as hypothetical results of certain axioms. In physical science an objective material world and the uniformity of nature are necessary postulates which we accept on the authority of the spontaneous unanalysed decision of that rational nature which is highest in man, and not as warranted by self-evident intuition or complete logical proof.

The difference between such cases and the case of religion is that, as the fundamental ideas of religion have come later in evolution, we have not that authority of universal consent as to their substantial significance, which we have for the existence of an external world, or for the objective character of space. Men are very unequally endowed with spiritual insight, and we have to follow the lead of genius and sanctity. Religious knowledge is in the position not of the world known to senses which are almost equally developed in all, but of what we might imagine the world of sight to have been to sentient beings at former stages of evolution, when to only a favoured few it was known with approximate accuracy.

Thus the second critical difference between the philosophy which looks to Authority and that which looks only to reason lies in the former supplementing its own imperfect perceptions and interpreting them by the higher perceptions of others whom it regards as the pioneers of further conceivable evolution. In mathematics and in science, indeed, this holds to some extent, inasmuch as lesser minds may with advantage follow the lead of greater in the reasoning processes themselves. Most of us can understand, but few could have discovered, the process whereby logarithms were invented or that whereby the theory of gravitation was established. But in religion there is *superadded* the great difference of endowment in regard of our grasp of the fundamental assumptions—the differences between man and man in the matter of spiritual perception. There is no

wide difference among individuals as to the grounds on which they may accept the objective reality of space or of an external world ; but the theistic implication of the human conscience is a matter in which men of religious genius have claimed a keenness and certainty of perception which differs greatly in degree from the vaguer, though corresponding, sense of law and obligation in the average consciousness. This contrast stands of course in far stronger relief when to the perceptions of the saint is added the revelation of the God-man Himself. The Church, which gradually embodies, or should embody, in its theology the contributions of the best thought and highest spiritual insight in analysing and applying the revelation which was given to it by One who, though man, had also Divine knowledge, thus contains a machinery which, on the principles I have indicated, embodies in itself the normal authorities. Heresy—that is, private judgment which makes its choice without regard to authority—is in principle agnostic.

Yet the very admission that we see “through a glass darkly” involves the fact that the individual reason, where it is competent to do so, must help in the corporate work of *correcting* the details of a theology whose fundamental assumptions it accepts as authoritative. In the case of revelation as in that of vision, the power of applying it to the world of fact grows in accuracy. But in contributing to this work, the individual’s own powers are directed and increased by following largely the lead of greater thinkers and holier souls, much as those of the student of astronomical science are stimulated and directed by following Newton’s lead. In either case the lead of Authority makes reason itself fruitful, while the individual reason alone may lose its time in a barren and wandering quest.

If an individual thinker fails in contributing his own share of active thought, he loses intellectually a large part of the benefit to be gained from Authority. For Authority is a “talent” which should be used productively and not buried. If, as at some times and places in the course of church history,

there is a general marked inactivity and hyper-conservatism among Christians, though corporate faith in what is most fundamental may remain, the gradual elimination of superstition may not keep pace with the times. And a battle may subsist between deep and reasonable (though not reasoned) faith accompanied by superstition, and even partly hostile to science, and scientific truth in alliance with an agnostic philosophy, which is confirmed in its rejection of religion by witnessing the antiquated company which religion not only keeps but holds in close alliance. Thus, in the case of the more thoughtful and gifted, an ever living and active reason, accepting the claims of Authority, but alive to its own unceasing duties, appears to be the philosophical instrument best adapted to an adequate and discriminating appreciation of religious truth. And their vigilant labour helps to keep in due repair the machinery of the recognised theology—the living intellectual Authority on which the less thoughtful and less gifted must depend.

Such may, I say, be the duty of thinking minds. But, as in every other branch of knowledge, the mass of the non-thinking must, as I have just intimated, trust simply to Authority. The average day labourer can no more appreciate or improve the philosophy of religion than the proofs of Copernicanism. And many able and educated men of practical ability are, so far as speculative thought is concerned, in a like position. Such men must choose between simply trusting the experts or knowing nothing. Their good sense and rudimentary knowledge may lead them up to the recognition of the expert guides, but no further. In the case of religious knowledge they must choose between trusting those who have wrought out religious thought on the basis of its reality, and an agnosticism which would come not from searching criticism but from individual incompetence. For the mass, unguided judgment,—judgment which is simply independent of Authority,—is ever a large measure of ignorance, whether in the matter of secular knowledge or of religious.

I will set down, in conclusion, the main positions I have attempted to outline:—

(1) The special knowledge of experts in history, physical science, and other departments forms a corporate authority to which the individual should defer, and the lead of which he should follow, devoting his own reasoning powers rather to the detailed correction and development of the corporate reason of the society than to independent inquiry.

(2) Individual genius contributes an important element to this corporate reasoning of the society.

(3) Conscience—like rudimentary sight at an early stage in the evolution of conscious life—has a *prima facie* claim to representing new relations with reality on the part of the sentient conscious being, for the whole story of the evolution of consciousness from the first dawn of sentient life is that of ever growing knowledge of reality; and conscience, like reason, first appears in *man*—that is, at the highest stage yet reached.

(4) It tells us all dimly of a vast unknown world—as the eyespots of a worm tell dimly of a world which to the developed sight includes the universe of the fixed stars. The question is to us now—What *is* the true development of conscience? What can we know of the reality it dimly perceives?

(5) That development is seen imperfectly realised as the God-consciousness of holy spirits (the men of genius in religion), and far more fully in the revelation imparted by Christ—Christianity declaring the unknown God of conscience.

(6) The Christian Church *preserves* this traditional revelation and declaration. It ever contains the saints who have caught its spirit, and thinkers who have applied its mysterious doctrines to the world of fact, as known to each successive age, and the rulers whose office it is to keep alive the revelation—to prevent its destruction by rationalism or by fossilism. It thus combines all the authoritative elements—namely, the

corporate reason of the society exercised on the highest existing knowledge in the particular subject-matter.

(7) Although the revelation of the unknown God of conscience by Christ is the highest point attained in directly spiritual knowledge, its application by the corporate reason of the theologians to the world of fact is an ever continuing process, in which the earlier *prima facie* applications, made in prescientific times, are constantly corrected. Somewhat similarly does experience correct the optical illusions of imperfect sight. A theology in which this process is arrested, though it may be *fundamentally* true, must be at variance in detail with the scientific knowledge of the time ; just as sight which is imperfect reveals some broad features of a real world, though it suggests false details.

(8) For the many, the authorities thus combined by the Church have a claim far beyond that of their own individual reason ; and while the individual thinker should help on the work of development according to the measure of his capacity, the average unspeculative mind, in religion as in science, is likely to be able to find the expert authority or authorities, but is not likely to be in a position effectively to criticise them.

DORKING.

WILFRID WARD.

DO WE BELIEVE IN THE REFORMATION?

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THE present condition of English Christianity is so anomalous and unstable as to fill any believer who has found "the secret of Jesus" with the most profound astonishment. He notes the pride which swells the patriot's heart when he boasts in public of belonging to a Christian country, but he notes also the complete absence of all that is vitally Christian in his view of the world and in his life-ideal. He is told by a publishing authority that no book approaches the Bible in the number of its annual sales, and yet he is quite sure that no book is so little read. As Charles Spurgeon once said, in his racy way, the Bible is in every house, but in many the dust on it is so thick that you might write on it "Damnation." He hears read the precept not to resist him that is evil, and finds his fellow-countrymen appointing themselves judge, jury, witness, and executioner over another Christian country across the seas. He is assured on all sides that Jesus Christ came to give the Truth which should make men free, and yet his ears are deafened with the noise of the angry disputants as to where and what it is, and how it is to be secured. And what is most extraordinary of all, he is surrounded by a dozen different forms of Christian organisation; and after patient study of them all, he can find no reason why there should be more than two at the very outside.

All these contradictions and absurdities are characteristic

of the age we live in, and have to be reckoned with somehow. Nobody who takes his religion earnestly can fold his hands and let things slide from bad to worse, with the belief of easy optimism that all will come out right somehow. "That evil is half-cured whose cause we know," is the first truth to recollect when we have once discovered that there is an evil at all. The second is to set to work to remove the cause.

It may seem audacious on anybody's part to rush in with a diagnosis which at the best can be but partial, and at the worst may be wholly superficial. In extenuation of the offence the present writer would plead only that by temperament, training, and the accidents of life he has been blessed with exceptional advantages for the sympathetic study of varying forms of religion. Of Scotch birth, and therefore a mystic, with yet a dour love of metaphysic; educated in a home where personal religion was throned as the queen, and worshipped with that good old-fashioned austerity which marks the true Evangelical; put to school with the sober and historic school of High Churchmen, to which our home religion owes so much; thrown into daily intercourse with good men of the "catholic" school, made a confidante of their ideals and a witness of their service for the Master; touched—ah! how many years ago!—by the glamour of Rome, as through her great thinker she offered a compact philosophy of religion—a *Weltanschauung*—such as the English Church cannot boast of; with many a friend among Jews, Nonconformists, Agnostics, and all sorts and conditions of belief,—the present writer can claim that he possesses at least one requisite for his task—that of a broad sympathy with the many minds which in their several ways are striving to body forth the great enigma of life. He hopes that he is as unbiassed as anybody can be who is under the dominion of a few deep-laid and all-penetrating principles.

With this egotistic but, under the circumstances, not altogether impertinent preface, I would proceed to jot down the impressions made on such a mind as has just been described by a study of religion as it is to-day.

In the first place, it may be said without any hesitation that the present is an age of Faith. It is often perplexed and self-isolated, but its faith is there all the time, and very often in spite of the Churches. The National Secular Society's attacks on Christianity which we may hear any Sunday afternoon in Hyde Park are belated and rather vulgar, and, anyhow, ineffective. People who have given up the Bible still believe in Providence, and hold that social evolution demonstrates the existence of a power which makes for altruism. Creeds perhaps are of little count where it is whole-hearted activity that is wanted, but character is still demanded as the one sure test of religion. People feel that the ground has been knocked from under the miraculous. They decline to say whether the Eternal can work miracles; they are only sure that, as a matter of fact, He does not. They maintain a not unhealthy agnosticism about heaven and hell, about Christology, and the dogmas which belong to theology proper; and they believe as well in freewill as in destiny, while confessing their total inability to conceive how they can both be simultaneous facts. In short, they are anxious and troubled about many—perhaps most—of the intellectual problems of religion, but they hold fast to "Unseen Goodness,"—that is, they live by faith.

The fact that they do is the more gratifying because the Churches have not yet seen their way to give much help towards a clear vision. In this impotence they have been confirmed by the ecclesiastical movements of the last seventy years. The Oxford Movement has conferred an immense debt on our religious life, a debt which may be admitted even by one who sees the *per contra*. It has taught us reverence for the past, satisfied our sense of beauty, kindled the fire of poetry, and given a plausible view of history. But it has never taught the lesson which Newman's subtlety was quick to grasp, viz., that (to quote his words) "the *Via Media* was as a doctrine wanting in simplicity, hard to master, indeterminate in its provisions, and without a substantive existence in any age or country." Its enemies call it Popery without

the Pope; its advocates identify it with Catholicism before the birth of Popery. The Pope is, however, an accident, not of the essence of what is called Catholic. If he be left out of the reckoning, what is common to Catholicism, both Anglican and Roman, is greater than what is peculiar to either. The common factor is the determining one, and it is this: The belief that the spirit of religion is reached best, and ordinarily reached only, by the use of fixed forms given from God, whether in church, sacraments, or creeds. The more logical minds among Catholics hold the above proposition explicitly. The less daring qualify it with a tincture derived from another laboratory, and affirm, with more humanity but less clarity, that yet, somehow, personal piety may be equally valid with formal correctness. It is in this mental confusion that the disservice done by the Oxford Movement to religious lucidity is most perceptible. The real fact is that all the controversies which rage around us may be reduced to that between two opposed and mutually exclusive explanations of the origin and nature of religion. One may be called the Protestant and the other the Roman. The former affirms, over against the Roman—or Catholic—definition given above, that religion is piety; that it is the immediate effect of the awakening in the soul, whether by the spirit within or by stimulus without, of its inherent capacity for God. It says that the individual is converted; then follows man's gregarious habit, and under its impulse he forms or joins a church; then uses inherited forms, or invents others of his own, but is not bound to either course, as he is bound to follow the still small voice within.

The Catholic, on the other hand, while admitting the work of the Spirit as essential, yet maintains that He works normally through given forms, to reject or neglect which, therefore, is an impiety. One maintains that the Spirit breathes from within where He listeth. The other that He has tied Himself down to certain set forms, and that they, therefore, are on an equal footing with His actual working.

Anglo-Catholicism tries to combine these two contrary, yes,

contradictory principles, and so has obscured the real issue, which is that between Protestantism and Catholicism. It may be as well to add that when the Church of England calls herself "catholic," she only means that she is in the historic line of that organised Christianity which has been Protestant—in the sense defined above—from the beginning.

It is a matter of deep regret that the champions of Protestantism have seldom risen—seldom do rise—to the height of their calling. They bawl when they ought to pray; denounce when they should try to persuade; display "a furious ignorance" when they should be humble; are bigoted and intolerant to a degree which is unpardonable in men who profess to believe in private judgment; and in general they outrage all the finer feelings of those who are meek and quiet in the land. Orangemen and professional Protestants are much more deadly foes of the Protestant religion than all the Catholics in the country, because they are making it to stink in the nostrils of the pious.

It is impossible to believe that the Protestant agitator is a fair representative of the piety of the Free Churches, or of the Evangelical party in the Established Church. No doubt agitation is more pleasing to the natural man than quiet work unseen among individuals, and the fascination of it tends to grow. It is easier to point out to your neighbour—and especially if he is felt to be a rival—how he should rule his house than to set your own in order, but the easier duty is generally the lower, and in the case before us we may well question whether it is a duty at all. A Church lives by the spirituality of its members and adherents, and not by its genius for finding fault with its neighbours. The failure to act on this elementary principle has done more harm to pure religion than any of us can perhaps estimate.

If now we turn to the Church of England, it will be with the hope that she may furnish some first aid to the victims of modern unfaith. In spite of the ambiguity of her utterances, and the irreconcilable opposition of her two rival parties, she

wields that subtle and penetrating influence which is one of the most precious fruits of a long-drawn historic life. The fact that she is the butt at which Roman Catholics and Free Churchmen shoot impartially is evidence both of her strength and of her weakness. Her social and political influence is great—greater, very often, than her religious—and is an asset on her credit side which is by no means to be despised or lightly thrown away. But, after all, a church of Christ—unless the teaching of Jesus has been misconceived by the Reformers—exists to preach the Gospel, to continue His work, and to prepare the way for His return. No social and political services can be accepted in lieu of the religious work which is hers by right.

To do the Church of England justice, however, it cannot be said of her, speaking generally, that she is tempted too strongly to neglect her spiritual character, or to depend upon an arm of flesh. Some of the most active of her members, many who exercise deservedly great influence over her councils, are in a state of open or veiled hostility to any attempt to make Establishment do duty for spirituality. The Establishment exists only so long as its terms are not inquired into too curiously, or are not enforced with the rigour of a criminal code. Where people are wise and self-restrained, they are agreed tacitly to treat the Act of Uniformity as Free Churchmen do their trust-deeds when they leave them unread.

The real danger which lies in the path of the Church of England is not in Establishment or Disestablishment, but in her intense Conservatism. She is not the slave of her past as is the Roman Communion, but she is unduly, wrongly, and helplessly weakened by her abiding disposition to rest on her past for guidance or direction. Let me give a simple proof.

Five years ago some foolish persons on both sides of the Church exalted the use of incense into an *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiæ*. Its use spelt Popery; its disuse to others meant the de-catholicising of the Church of England. The matter was referred to the Archbishops for decision. The force of the arguments against its use (as well as of those for

it) was derived entirely from musty old documents ranging over fifteen hundred years, of which none were dated during the past two hundred and fifty. The Archbishops in their decision brushed nine-tenths of them on one side as irrelevant, and narrowed down the issue to the interpretation to be put on an Elizabethan ordinance. But the most significant feature of the "hearing" was that all parties felt themselves obliged to take into account, as decisive, documents of a legal character, and to neglect, as completely as if they were non-existent, the spiritual needs of living and struggling souls. No one can blame the Archbishops for acting as they did. Folly forced the issue, bigotry sharpened it, and the Judge was but a legal person, shorn of all spiritual character.

The Church of England has stood out ever since this "Lambeth Hearing" as a legal institution holding religion in Chancery. There is nothing to prevent some harebrained person from appealing again to Cæsar to say whether a minister of the Church of England may lawfully teach the piety of prayer for a dead mother, or may help others to bring into harmony Piety and Truth, or may observe Egg-Sunday, or use extempore prayer at a mission service, or maintain that Satan is a personification rather than a person, or may apply the principle of evolution to the New Testament, or in short do or say a number of things which he is forced into every day of his life. What is certain is that, if ever living issues came up for decision, they would be interpreted by dead formulæ. The Church of England is soaked through and through with legalism. She has no power at all to deal in a living way with present problems—except so far as she is able to induce the authorities over her to connive at a disregard of her fetters. The position is so humiliating and so untrue to her claim to be a Christian Church, that nothing but a salutary fear of the unknown prevents her loyal sons from agitating for a repeal of the laws which were passed by the dead hand of the Tudors.

Perhaps this state of slavery is less dangerous than the inert spirit which loves to have it so. Like the unhappy

prisoner in the Bastille, who begged to be allowed his prison again because he had got so used to it, so we seem to hug our chains the more closely because we lack imagination enough to think life to be possible without them. Yet the spirit of Jesus Christ is the spirit of progress towards greater holiness, truth, freedom and love, abolishing all barriers between class and class, between man and God, forgetting the past and reaching forward to the future, working for the destruction of that greed of self-indulgence which lies at the root of Trusts, ca' canny tricks, and capitalism and anarchy alike. Woe be to that Church which thinks that her salvation is to be worked out by lectures on church history!

In truth, the Church of England stands to-day at the parting of the ways. At the Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries she set herself a task which was nobly conceived but incapable of realisation. She tried to put her new wine into old bottles. The wine has been fermenting ever since, and the bottles are now ready to burst. The work of Hooker is a possession for ever of which the Church of England may well be proud. No work could have done better service at the time, any more than any creed could have been adopted in A.D. 381 with more benefit to the development of the Church. But it does not follow—it cannot possibly follow in the light of to-day—that any form of sound words of any age has finality about it. Not fixedness but movement is now seen to be God's method with us, and theology cannot free herself from the law of progress. Not even the words of Holy Scripture are free from the necessity of re-statement and re-interpretation, and this not merely in spite of, but because they enshrine truths of deathless significance. To *see* those truths, to commit ourselves to them, to find for them vessels of gold to-day—that is the task set us. On our loyal discharge of it depends the future not only of the Church of England, but also of England itself.

One who realises this truth may be forgiven if he feels sometimes impatient at the hypocrisies of Protestantism. It

is a cheap form of service which consists in erecting the Protestant banner and flaunting it in the face of the world; cheap, because it is a sure method of winning the applause of the ignorant man in the street. It is very well to describe ourselves at diocesan conferences and church congresses as sons of the Reformation. Such definition costs nothing. But let any teacher assert in public that the *principles* of the Reformation are not to be tied down to the *doctrines* of the Reformation, but must march forward, even though they trample underfoot their forms of belief, then an outcry is raised, not merely on the side of those who are galvanising—if they can—mediævalism into life, but also, what is more strange, on the side of those who are loudest in asserting their Protestantism. What humbugs we all are! Protestants inveigh against Sacerdotalists, and are double-dyed Sacerdotalists themselves in spirit and outlook. A Wesleyan professor, for example, has the courage to carry out the Reformation principle of the right of reason in religion, and to inquire in a very inoffensive manner into the Biblical teaching about immortality, and immediately the Wesleyan Sacerdotalists are up in arms to defend Wesley's sermons. A Northern Dean ventures to say that there are certain difficulties in the accounts of the Biblical miracles, and the religious newspaper, in its panoplied ignorance, falls foul of him, and throws in his teeth the xxxix. Articles. It then has the effrontery to proclaim itself the champion of Protestantism, in spite of the fact that it is violating the fundamental principles of the Reformation, viz., the right of the individual to think for himself. If it be said that these offenders were teachers, and a religious society would stultify itself if it did not compel its teachers to stick to a certain definite form of sound words, I reply, firstly, that the Christian Church has already stultified herself sufficiently by the exaggerated emphasis she has laid for sixteen hundred years on creed as distinct from conduct; and that, secondly, there is still little sign of the Congregationalists having stultified themselves by agreeing to do without a fixed form of belief.

If the contention be that the Church has laid down certain outlines of doctrine for her teachers because it is a principal part of her mission to teach the catholic faith once delivered to the saints, then this assertion must be met by a direct negative. It is no principal part of her mission to fetter the intellect with any rigid creed, but her business is to make disciples by persuading people to change their lives and live for God, His kingdom and righteousness. The truth really is that doctrine is valuable only for the kernel it contains, and the kernel wants every now and then a new shell. The Incarnation is a dogma which asserts the saving efficacy of God in Jesus Christ. The Atonement affirms God's holy love in forgiveness. The Resurrection is an effective sign of our immortality, and of the continued activity among us of Jesus Christ. The sacraments are social rites, and symbolise our oneness in Christ. Every miracle is a parable, and every creed is the fingerpost to a life.

But my present point is that new presbyter is old priest writ large, and that many who boast of their descent from the Reformers are illegitimate sons. Whatever the Reformation did in detail, it certainly stood for one principle in the Church, the principle of St Paul and of Jesus Christ—the liberty of prophesying; the right of the individual to think for himself. With what face, then, can anybody claim to be a son of the Reformation while he neither thinks himself nor allows others to think?

The sole logical position for our bastard Protestants (if they do not fall back on the Roman ground of ecclesiastical authority) is to listen respectfully to what professors and deans have to say, and to meet reason by reason, instead of denunciation and threats. If they do appeal to authority, whether of the Bible, the xxxix. Articles, or Wesley's sermons, or what not, they are Sacerdotalists, whether they know it or not, and have forfeited all right to the grand old title of Protestant. They have little respect for reason, or they would rely on it to silence the gainsayer; they do not reverence truth with any

sincerity, or they would be less ready with their musty old guns to keep off her worshippers.

One who reverences truth with a passionate worship, and believes that the worst service done to her majestic presence is to buttress up her temple with the debris of ancient controversies and old-world theology, will hail with relief anything which helps to clear the way to a recognition of the deep and far-reaching cleft between Protestantism and what is popularly meant by Catholicism. The former is a trumpet call to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free. The latter entangles us again with the yoke of bondage. Between the two stands the Ritualist (as he has developed lately), whose most congenial home is a church where ecclesiastical authority does his thinking for him, and that hybrid creature halting between two opinions, who declines to submit to authority, and is too timid to trust to truth and reason. Whether he appeals to a Catechism, Longer or Shorter, to a Westminster Confession, to articles of religion or sermons, or even to the Bible, makes no difference. He appeals to authority, and is therefore a Sacerdotalist, even if he fancies himself a Protestant. It is time that he came from behind his earthwork and fought in the open.

This is the decision which events are fast forcing the Church of England to make; and upon her decision her future depends, so far as man can see. She may either elect to take her stand on the authority of the past, in which case her fate will be that of the Church of Rome, that of an intellectual derelict; or she may face the cataract with a clear eye and a dauntless heart, knowing the dangers, but knowing too that through them lies the way of her duty. Faith in God the Father and in the risen Lord will steer her bark safely.

Has she the courage to commit herself to that, without weakening it by an infusion of ancient authorities? She has the new wine: will she be wise enough to see that it requires new bottles?

W. F. COBB.

THE LIBERAL CATHOLIC MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND.

PHILIP SIDNEY.

THE Roman Catholic Church in England has, of late, been quietly passing through an important crisis. But only those sufficiently well placed behind the scenes have been enabled to perceive how many and how grave are the difficulties with which that Church is closely threatened. Various causes, most of them unknown to the Protestant world, have conduced to this. The progress of free education, the residence of Roman Catholics at the chief Universities (a practice forbidden by Cardinal Manning), the steady encroachment of the regular clergy upon the privileges and the position of their secular colleagues, the immigration of foreign monks, the anti-national spirit of a certain portion of the Catholic press, the sale of bogus relics, and the growth of the nefarious traffic in masses for the dead, form a variety of these. That the times have been moving too fast to suit the Papal Curia it is easy to recognise, whilst the authorities at Westminster have hitherto shirked all attempt to face the music, and accept the inevitable, by taking into serious consideration the remarkable development in the situation of English affairs.

In direct opposition to the conservative and anti-English Curia and its representatives at Westminster we have arrayed a large body of intelligent men, among the laity and clergy, determined to strive their utmost to obtain reforms. Those supporting this movement may be generally entitled "Liberal

Catholics," constituting, as they do, a school of thought in opposition to the party commonly called the "Ultramontane," and it is the aim of the present article to enumerate and describe briefly the principal items in the programme of reform, as to the desirability of the adoption of which the great majority of those supporting this forward movement are unanimously agreed. That Liberal Catholics do not meditate effecting any radical repeal in the matter of the defined articles of faith or other received dogmas, it need hardly be explained. The quarrel, indeed, is more political than doctrinal, and relates, *inter alia*, to financial maladministration on the part of the hierarchy, and to the invasion of England by monks and Jesuits, thoroughly "Italianated," and eager to seize upon every opportunity of subjugating the English secular clergy.

Liberal Catholics, first of all, repudiate the doctrine of the Temporal Power of the Pope, and look upon the Bishop of Rome solely as spiritual head of the Universal Church, but not as its political ruler. They accept the arrangement effected in 1870, whereby the people of Italy put an end, of their own free will, to centuries of misrule, and gave the crown of an undivided monarchy into the hereditary possession of the house of Savoy. At the many schemes and intrigues manufactured by agents of the Vatican to create mischief between the British Government and the Quirinal they are profoundly indignant, and regret the occasion of such a speech as that uttered at an audience of pilgrims with Leo XIII., in the spring of 1901, when British subjects were seriously compromised by the secret introduction of words insulting to the Quirinal, in their address to the Pope.

Liberal Catholics hope to institute a new system of education for Catholic children of the upper classes—an education, that is to say, which shall be conducted more and more on the disciplinary lines carried out at our great public schools. In the establishment of such a scheme of education, it is scarcely necessary to state, the Society of Jesus can have no place. With Cardinal Manning, Liberal Catholics do not want to see

“the Jesuits capture our young people,” and are resolved to dispense with the notorious detective system of discipline obtaining at the Jesuit schools. They wish to check the immigration of foreign monks and friars, whose domestic habits, as well as their Anglophobia, alike render their presence distasteful to English congregations. Among such orders we have only to mention, as a type, that of the Assumption, which carried on a campaign of calumny against Great Britain at the time of the Dreyfus agitation, if not also at the Fashoda crisis. They reprobate strongly the false impressions given to the Protestant world of the Catholic body by the assumption of authority usurped by the Society of Jesus, whose power in England is now far wider and more penetrating than ever it has been since the flight of James II. They desire perfect liberty for the individual layman to vote, as he may prefer, at all elections; that is to say, he may give his vote by ballot according as he may choose, without previously receiving direction from his parish priest, in or out of the pulpit, after the fashion that obtains in southern and western Ireland.

Of the scandalous financial administration of the English dioceses; of the secrecy practised in the matter of the collection and distribution of Peter's Pence; of the iniquitous traffic in requiem masses and indulgences; of the sale of bogus relics, scapulars and pardons; of the multiplication of small religious houses, unable to maintain themselves, Liberal Catholics are fully cognisant and heartily ashamed. But, with Wolsey of old, they are fully alive to the absolute necessity of reform, and look forward to seeing their Church in England reformed from within, not from without.

One of the chief obstacles hindering the path of the reformers lies in the mode of electing the English bishops. The present system is little short of farcical. In the election the laity have no voice whatever as regards selecting a suitable candidate, whilst the views of the diocesan clergy are subservient to the veto of the Vatican. It is true that the Chapter of a diocese, on the death of a bishop, selects three

names for transmission to Rome, marking them respectively as "dignissimus," "dignior," and "dignus," but how seldom does Rome choose any member of the popular trio, unless he is known to be retrogressive, and an Ultramontane! In a word, a bishop appointed to an English see is expected to renounce his nationality, to become the subject of a Foreign Power, and a sworn advocate of the decadent policy of the political supremacy of the Roman Pontiff. To quote all the instances when the Papal authority has over-ridden the decision of the Chapters since 1850, the year of the restoration of the hierarchy, would be tedious, but two more flagrant cases have not often occurred than the recent appointments of the present Bishops of Clifton and Nottingham. In neither of these instances, it must be admitted, was there the very faintest personal objection to the candidate selected by the Vatican. In fact, both the bishops are men of high character and ability, but each diocese naturally expected to obtain a representative familiar with the territory included therein, and not one who was a stranger to that part of England, its clergy, and the special nature of the work required. It is imperative, therefore, that each individual diocese should have the exclusive right of electing its bishop, irrespective of any casting vote awarded by the Vatican, to which England is, and always has been, to quote from the words of a well-known Roman Catholic writer, "a puzzle."

Another impediment is the vexed question of the relations, not only that exist, but also that ought to exist between the Ritualistic Party in the Anglican Church and those responsible for the government of the Roman Catholic Church in England. The extraordinary advance all along the line effected by the High Church Anglicans was never anticipated properly at the period of the restoration of the hierarchy. Indeed, even at the present date it may be doubted whether there is more than a mere handful of intelligent observers within the Roman Communion which realises the real strength of the Ritualistic position. If the propagation of Catholic doctrines and practices,

carried to a limit beyond anything dreamed of by the pioneers of the Oxford movement, has tended to catholicise a formidable proportion of the Anglican Church, it must, at the same time, be acknowledged that the growth and success of a creed, not in alliance with the Holy See, but professing, nevertheless, to hold and teach all the Roman Catholic doctrines, must be counted as a dire source of danger to the power, present and future, of Rome in England. The position is, in truth, one of much perplexity. With the High Anglican, Rome has never quite known how to deal. Since the reign of Charles I. there have always been two schools of thought among Roman Catholics concerning the High Church Party; the one favourable to it, as seeing in it the secret construction of a golden bridge from Canterbury to Rome, the other thoroughly jealous of, and alarmed at its prosperity. In the opinion of the Liberal Catholic, the occasion is at hand when some definite and judicious choice between these rival schools must be arrived at, and a clear conclusion reached as to how negotiations with the Anglican party favouring reunion are to be carried on. In this respect, it is constantly repeated that Rome must take the initiative in forwarding the needful concessions in favour of High Anglicans anxious for reunion. Such concessions, owing to the steady spread of Ritualism, would be far easier to make now than of yore. The day has gone by when the High Church claims could be ridiculed or ignored. The Ritualists are daily gaining ground, whilst the Romanists are losing it. The stream of secessions from Roman Catholicism in England is prodigious, and, what is more, is steadily increasing from day to day among all classes of "the faithful." The attitude of the Holy See towards the High Church party is almost comic. Rome looks on in amazement at the Ritualists' shameless Mariolatry, at their introduction of "Benediction" among their services, at their use of the Confessional, at their reservation of the Sacrament, at their recommendation of the Rosary. At these and other audacious innovations Rome simply laughs, and declares that "Imitation is the sincerest

form of flattery!" Never does it seem to dawn upon the Holy See that here in England has sprung up a Cultus which is hindering thousands of souls, holding tenets practically identical with those of Rome, from offering themselves for reconciliation with the ancient Faith. This new Ritualism is no "Via Media," and Rome appears blind to the fact that it is the Ritualist, and not the Papist, who is undoing the work of the Reformation. The claims of the High Anglicans are too strong, therefore, to be scorned, and unless conciliatory measures are adopted soon, the opportunity will be lost.

Much of the troublesome uncertainty which tends to raise a barrier between England and Rome is due to the doubts entertained in many quarters as to the exact terms of the Papal Bull proclaiming the invalidity of Anglican orders. A great number of Ritualists seem to cherish the idea that the Pope's verdict was not delivered *ex cathedra*, that it was not designed to be taken as an infallible utterance, and that in consequence the bare possibility exists of the whole question at stake being reopened. Surely about so important a matter there should be no room for doubt, and the question of the infallibility of the Bull should be cleared up at once and for ever! In this and other similar issues Liberal Catholics are fully alive to the importance of the High Church position and its claims, and are anxious for the establishment of a peaceful and permanent settlement of the present rivalry.

In the judgment of nearly all Roman Catholics sufficiently well informed as to be able to decide fairly, the invitation to reunion must come from Rome. It is for Rome to open the ball, and not England. Such a book as the much-discussed *England and the Holy See* can carry no influence with it inside the Roman Church, and its fulsome flattery of the Jesuits only created amusement in quarters that might, perhaps, have evinced sympathy with its author's aims. What is wanted is a book dealing with the possibilities of reunion, to be written by one familiar with the work of the Church of Rome from the inside. So far, all efforts in this direction—as witness the suppression of a

most excellent essay on this special subject lately written by a Kentish priest—have been received with the greatest disfavour at Archbishop's House, whose methods of procrastination and oppression recalls Newman's bitter retort to Manning: "I hardly know whether I stand on my head or my heels when I enter into active relations with you!" Such a deplorable state of things demands the creation of another Archbishopric, to be established in the North of England, and ruled by a primate of English birth and education, drawn from the ranks of the secular clergy. The creation of this arch-diocese would, it is known, create wide satisfaction in Lancashire, the stronghold of the Faith in England.

But no material good can, or will, come to remedy the present troubles until strong measures are taken to check the illegal encroachments of the regular priests, who are striving to usurp, in many respects, the proper position and privileges of the seculars. The poor seculars have, at present, much reason to complain, for they are constantly being thrust aside in favour of the monks. Benedictines and Jesuits, hereditary rivals, have split Catholic England into two hostile camps. Mitred Abbots of the older order claim, in the provinces, equal rank with bishops, and the Society of Jesus is all-powerful in London. To such an extent have the Benedictines helped themselves to superior dignities and titles, that they have elected two of their monks Abbots of St Albans and Glastonbury, regardless of the fact that they have had no monastery in either town since the Dissolution in the reign of Henry VIII., whilst the diocese of Newport is actually under their exclusive charge, with a member of their own order acting as Bishop. One of the chief complaints raised against the encroaching regulars is that they are too lavish in their selection of candidates for Holy Orders. The custom, which now obtains among the regulars, of endeavouring to induce every monk of good education to study for the priesthood is quite a modern practice and is opposed to the teaching and the custom of antiquity. In connection with "the advisability of having only one house

of any order in each ecclesiastical province or in each country," the learned author of *Steps Towards Reunion* protests that "Priests should not be multiplied among the religious orders, except as among the secular clergy, viz., in accordance with the decree of the Council of Trent that a priest's work should in some way be found for a man before Holy Orders are conferred upon him. . . . Religious superiors decide now how many priests they want to have. But this is a matter that affects many interests besides those of the Order itself. . . . It is commonly thought most natural now for all monks, or nearly all, to be priests. But in the beginning it was not so. St Benedict was never a priest. And for ages it was usual to have only one priest in each monastery."

In spite of the difficulties and dangers that block the road towards reform, the Liberal Catholics have, so far as England is concerned, not lost heart, and are confident as to the future. They recognise that unless some of these needful concessions be granted by the Vatican, their Church in these islands will be left behind, whilst all the other creeds progress in popularity and power, that the High Church revival will supersede the place of Rome, that secessions will multiply enormously, that a real revolt will occur among the secular clergy, and that a discontented laity will no longer submit to be governed by the little band of Ultramontane clericals at the Vatican. Face to face with such an alternative, therefore, they profess to have good grounds for trusting that the necessary concessions will be granted, and that the Barque of Peter will steer clear of the shoals ahead, and after a stormy voyage glide into the smoother waters of the harbour, triumphant and unscathed. Such optimism must, however, seem inclined to be somewhat rash and delusive to the observant outsider, to whom the inherent difficulties in the way of the reformers appear likely to prove as perilous, if not as fatal to them, as to all their predecessors in England, or in other countries, who have been defeated in trying to accomplish the terrible task of cleansing the Augæan stables. Schemes for reform, moreover, are made no easier of

conception by having to deal with the definition of the dogma of Papal infallibility. Before the year 1870, there was always hope. Now, it is futile to anticipate a wholesale change for the better in a system whose Head declares, not only that he cannot err, when speaking *ex cathedra* in matters of faith or morals, but that all previous Popes likewise never erred, notwithstanding the fact that amongst the Popes have been both heretics and lunatics, to say nothing of consummate scoundrels. The uneasy feeling created by the Council of 1870 has not died away. In England it is more pronounced than ever. Nine priests out of every ten think that "a mistake has been made," although they have not the courage to publish their opinions. The Catholic catechism (Father Keenan's) is still in circulation, whose first edition (running into many thousands of copies) answers, in reply to the query, "Must not Catholics believe the Pope in himself to be infallible?" "No; it is no article of the Catholic faith; no decision of his can oblige under pain of heresy, unless it be received and enforced by the teaching body, that is by the Bishops of the Church."

The results, therefore, of this hopeless entanglement, created by the decision of the Vatican Council of 1869-1870, clearly grow more pronounced as time goes on, especially in England, where Liberal Catholics abound, and where the dogma of the Papal Infallibility is almost universally condemned, and must be regarded as a stumbling-block in their way even by the least scrupulous members of that undisciplined party in the Anglican Church so anxious, at all costs, for reunion with Rome.

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LONDON.

THE GROWING RELUCTANCE OF ABLE MEN TO TAKE ORDERS.

P. S. BURRELL, M.A.

“I wish the Bishops were alive to the great and increasing evil of the want of ability among young clergymen.”—JOWETT, 1861.

OF all the questions which agitate the Church of England, none is more important, though the fact is by no means fully realised, than that of the supply of candidates for ordination. And its importance lies in the fact that the solution of this problem would, *ipso facto*, solve many other questions which at first sight seem more prominent. The problem has perplexed and is still perplexing the minds of churchmen, primarily, of course, the bishops and beneficed clergymen. The former find themselves embarrassed in “their choice of fit persons”; the latter find that their titles go a-begging. The difficulty of the bishop is to maintain the standard of his examination, while the vicar is handicapped in ministering to the most ordinary parochial needs. This state of things would be sufficiently deplorable if the population remained stationary: but it is increasing, so it has been estimated, at the rate of three hundred thousand a year, while the number of ordination candidates is diminishing with rapidity enough to cause serious alarm. In short, the harvest is more plenteous, but the labourers are not only few, but fewer. Now, in spite of the undoubted advances made by the Church in the last century, it is certain that a considerable portion of the population has remained almost entirely outside her influence. Therefore, unless the growing demand cease to be met by a diminishing supply, clearly a steadily increasing section of the people will

grow up without shepherds and remain spiritually uncared for—a prospect which cannot be regarded with equanimity, either by the clergy themselves, or by any thoughtful persons who believe that the best interests of the country are bound up with the maintenance of religion, and that Christianity, especially in the form of a flourishing Established Church, affords the best guarantee of that righteousness which “exalteth a nation.”

Much speculation has been expended in order to find the causes of the failing supply, and not a few remedies, wise and unwise, have been prescribed. Nevertheless the “curate” question appears still to be a bugbear as familiar to clerical as the “servant” question to domestic circles. The net result is that the difficulty is increasing and ought to be diminished, and that the only solution likely to be tried is of at least questionable expediency. Such being the case, it is high time that the subject should be dealt with at full length and looked at from all sides. For it is much greater than is generally recognised, and will never be satisfactorily treated in occasional letters to the press or even by the subscription of money. When the citadel is in danger, nothing is more suicidal than a policy of drift, except, perhaps, the policy actually in process of adoption—the recourse to seminaries. The seminarist system will be discussed later: here it is sufficient to say that seminaries will always supply curates in plenty, but will not provide a satisfactory answer to the real question which faces those churchmen who can rise to a statesmanlike view. “If things go on at the present rate, what will the Church of England be like, say, twenty years hence?” or “What is the personnel of the clergy going to be in the future?” Stated in this form, the question at once assumes first-rate national significance, especially to those who cherish the connection between Church and State.

In order to clear the ground, it may be well, first of all, to say something of views already expressed.

1. It is all a matter of £ s. d. Compared with other professions, the prospect of a curate's income, or of a benefice, which is frequently little better and sometimes worse, does not offer

strong enough inducements to enter the clerical profession. Parents, it is said, are unwilling to pay for a costly education which leads to such a paltry result. Or else it is the young men themselves, who prefer to seek their fortunes in more lucrative careers. If this explanation were true (which it obviously is not, ignoring as it does the idea of "a vocation" and ascribing ordination to purely mercenary motives), the diminished supply of clergymen would be an unmixed gain and a matter of rejoicing: it is always an advantage to separate the dross from the pure metal. But such a paradox will hardly satisfy a short-handed vicar in search of a curate. And it has been pertinently pointed out that the financial difficulty does not apply to the army.

2. There is a greater choice of professions open to young men nowadays. This explanation is no doubt partially true, but does not answer the awkward question why the Church of England does not get its fair share of the most capable men. Why, for instance, should the Church get so small a percentage of University men who have taken high honours? Surely it would be strange if the best material for ordination should form a kind of sedimentary deposit in University class lists. Of course it is not so.

3. The recent Church controversies are to blame: and the hope has been expressed that, when the strife was allayed, more men would come forward. This, if not the whole cause, is a *vera causa*. Indeed, it would be strange if such unseemly squabbles about trivialities should not give pause to the serious, who might well despair of promoting the essentials of religion amid such a turmoil. Besides, the strife was not allayed, only shelved. What really stopped the strife was the outbreak of the late war—a grim reality, which threw the pitiful ecclesiastical differences into the shade.

4. Bishop Creighton once suggested that the falling off was due to the fact that younger sons of the gentry no longer took orders in the same numbers as they did when they had a fair income of their own, adding that the capitalist class had not as much sense of public duty as the old landed class. No

doubt the growth of capitalism, together with the decay of the landowning class, has adversely affected the Church: but one might ask, "Why is the Church no longer regarded one of the most natural careers for the well-to-do classes?"

5. Again, it is said that men are more earnest, and do not enter the ministry so light-heartedly as before. This is an agreeably optimistic view, which turns what is commonly considered a curse into a blessing in disguise. The cause does certainly operate, but does not encourage hopefulness. At any rate, it will scarcely be proposed to solve the problem by discouraging conscientiousness.

6. It is commonly urged that the defect would be easily supplied from the class of men who have a "vocation," but cannot afford to pay for the necessary training. There is undoubtedly some truth in the statement, and every step ought to be taken to remove financial obstacles from the path of suitable candidates. But it is idle to suppose that the indiscriminate foundation of theological colleges, providing an abbreviated training at a cheap rate, will afford a satisfactory solution. It is a proceeding eminently characteristic of the English mind in a flutter, involving as it does the raising of money, the erection of buildings, the construction of a curriculum. Something, it is felt, must be done, and the provision of new machinery is a short and easy way of doing something. Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of such a scheme would not only be a confession that the real problem is insoluble, but would be distinctly disastrous. The result would be the creation of a half-educated priesthood: half-educated, because an education which costs less time and less money must be necessarily inferior: a priesthood, because a seminarist training in an isolated artificial atmosphere tends to raise a wall of partition between clergy and laity. The effect of such a system is too well known and detested by the healthy English mind to call for further comment; and already there are signs that post-graduate training at a theological college is by no means an unqualified benefit. No

doubt the tendency to insist on such training is only one aspect of the general demand for specialised instruction for special careers. But, on the other hand, it might be asked whether the growth of theological colleges, so far from being a remedy, is not rather only one of the symptoms of our present difficulties, and one sometimes feels inclined to suspect that extra training is required, precisely because the material is inferior. Further, it is morally certain that the products of a purely seminarist system, such as is advocated sometimes, would tend to lack those indefinable qualities which are summed up in the term "gentleman," a term which, of course, is "soiled with all ignoble use," and often made to express accidentals rather than essential qualities. But as a definite proposal has actually been made to cut the knot by the substitution of something else for "gentlemen," no apology need be made for making such invidious predictions. The Church cannot afford, any more than any other profession, to lose the best type of self-made men owing to the accident of poverty. But it is earnestly to be hoped that everything will be done to prevent any decline in the numbers of clerical "scholars and gentlemen."

7. The nearest approach to the solution of the problem is the theory that the general unsettlement in matters of belief acts as a preventive to taking orders. Shallow optimists and those who refuse to read the signs of the times speak as if they expected this unsettlement to move away gradually like a passing cloud, and consequently advocate a waiting attitude. Others, again, dimly realise the situation, but, in their reluctance to face it, seem to act on the motto "*non quieta movere?*" A consideration of these views brings us to the root of the question; and the object of this paper is to show that both are mistaken; that the unsettlement will not pass away, or, at least, that men's views will not be settled in the way desired by the advocates of a waiting policy, and that the sooner the situation is really faced, the better. In short, what is wanted is a new Reformation in order to adjust the Church to its new environment.

The real danger, then, of the Church at the present time is,

as it has been aptly described, "the repulse of thoughtful men from the ministry." And as men are loth to acknowledge its existence, it is necessary to prove it at some length.

Now it might be argued that the conscientious objection to taking orders, *i.e.*, the reluctance to make certain declarations, is no greater, or, at least, need be no greater, than it ever has been. The answer is that a great many things have happened in the last half-century, which have quite altered the case. So many of the ideas upon which the formularies were based have been definitely given up by the educated classes that their obsolescence is more glaring than ever. Indeed, the change in men's views of God, nature and man amounts to an intellectual revolution almost as great as that which occurred at the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation, as a glance at the most remarkable developments of the nineteenth century will show. The progress of physical science has produced a belief in the reign of law, which has seriously affected the conception of the miraculous. The growth of philosophy, especially German philosophy, has created a demand for the unification of all knowledge and an interest in ultimate problems which have made a separation between metaphysics and theology impossible. Popular opinions about ancient documents, and especially the Bible, have been revolutionised by the adoption of new critical methods in history and literature. The question of man's origin and his place in the universe have been considered afresh in the light of the theory of evolution. Textual criticism has delivered from bondage to the letter of scripture and rendered untenable old-fashioned ideas of inspiration. The relation of Christianity to other religions has been quite altered by the comparative study of religion. The preceding enumeration is, of course, commonplace enough; but its relevance to the present argument consists in the fact that the reconciliation between the intellectual standpoint thus established and his nominal creed is more difficult for an Anglican clergyman than for anyone else. And his difficulty has been enhanced by the parallel growth of intellectual

honesty, which has made men more scrupulous about making statements in which they do not believe, even although there is general understanding that such declarations are in many cases a mere form. Ever since Huxley's famous protest at Oxford there has been a growing desire to avoid even the appearance of "employing authority to stifle truth."

What attitude, therefore, must be adopted towards men who, while responsive to the claims of both religion and modern thought, feel most acutely the glaring discrepancy between the Church formulæ and their private beliefs? It is blindness to deny their difficulties; it is trifling to make light of them as a kind of intellectual measles, which will pass; it is obscurantism to contend that such men are little better than agnostics and have no right in the Church. A far better attitude is that of Dr Rashdall, who more than five years ago, in a reply to the late Professor Sidgwick on "The Ethics of Religious Conformity," in the *International Journal of Ethics*, while acknowledging the discrepancy in its full extent, argued that it presented no insuperable obstacle to taking orders. That article contains the ablest and most ingenious attempt yet made to deal with the situation; and as the situation has not altered, it seems desirable to consider his argument somewhat fully.

To begin with, the very existence of the article is significant. It surely bodes ill for the Church of England when a long and ingenious argument is required to justify the ordination of men holding liberal views in theology, more especially concerning miracles, against the deliberate judgment of one who was not only a distinguished moralist, but sacrificed a fellowship to the claims of conscience. "To those," in Dr Rashdall's words, "who are anxious to maintain the comprehensiveness of the Church of England by a liberal interpretation of its formulæ, it must be a matter of profound regret that the judgment of such a man as Professor Sidgwick should be, on the whole, against them." Nevertheless Dr Rashdall addresses himself with courageous frankness to his ungrateful task of answering in the negative the question which, he says, presents

itself to each man's conscience in regard to taking orders. "The actual state of society being what it is, will this non-natural use of language do more harm by weakening the respect for truth and sincerity among people who cannot understand the reasons for what I am doing than I shall do good by accepting the office of a clergyman on these terms, and contributing to a further step in that process of religious development which has proved so beneficial in times past?" The answer may be summarised as follows.

The claims of truth are not absolute, but may be sacrificed on a fitting occasion to the common good. Strict, literal veracity, indeed, is pedantic and impracticable in ordinary affairs, and a mere formal assent, *e.g.*, to the thirty-nine articles, is no more dishonest than the use of such phrases as "Dear Sir," etc.; while literal truthfulness in theological subscription is impossible. Further, laxity of interpretation and subscription is justified by the general understanding that the formulæ must be used in a new sense; and as there is no general consent as to the precise limits of such laxity, each man must "take the law into his own hands" and draw the line for himself, though there are certain limits which must not be crossed. Neither the High Churchman who puts a non-natural sense on many articles, nor the believer in the "Higher Criticism," can consistently complain of the ordination of men who reject the miraculous element in the Gospels, and, in particular, the miraculous birth of Christ. They are, in fact, all honest together. A man who shrinks from the whole responsibility himself may relieve himself by explaining his position to the Bishop who ordains him, the incumbent who gives him his title, and (in a general way) to the congregation. If it is objected that many people are thereby deceived, and that the "public morality is shocked by the making of untrue statements by authorized teachers of religion and morality," it is replied that the impossibility of deceiving nobody necessitates the practice of mental reserve, and that, if it were necessary to consider those who objected to clergymen disbelieving that

Socrates is damned, as Article XIII. implies, "long before the impossibility of getting men to take orders had overcome the intense conservatism of all religious organizations, the clerical profession would consist of none but men who were *ex hypothesi* below the average standard of intelligence or of scrupulosity." Once ordained latitudinarians should do their utmost to modify and re-interpret traditional Christianity beliefs in order to "make Christianity possible to men who have thoroughly appreciated the consequences of modern historical criticism." Such a process can only go on inside the Churches, and not outside them, and is absolutely essential to the highest spiritual interests of the world. For otherwise, the English Church will be drained of educated laymen, like the Church of France. The test question on which the possibility of honestly taking orders depends is "the question of the nature and historical position of Christ"; and therefore "the non-natural interpretation of a clause or two here and there in the formularies with which they feel a general sympathy" should not deter from ordination men who believe that the best interests of the world are served by maintaining and extending the Christian *κοινωνία*. Finally, it is not suggested that the "wide divergence between the accepted formulæ and the actual teaching of the more progressive section of the clergy is in itself a desirable state of things," and a modification of certain declarations is advocated, but a revolutionary change in the actual doctrinal standards is deprecated as only tending to disruption.

Dr Rashdall's article must have been startling to any ordinary churchman who may chance to have read it, and the above summary may to many seem to reveal a shocking state of things. It is, however, not imaginary, and whatever may be thought of the situation disclosed and the validity of the argument, one thing is clear, that it has been answered in the negative by those to whom the appeal was addressed. Five years allows a sufficient interval for it to produce an effect. But the suggested accommodation of the claims of truth and conscience has not been widely adopted by thoughtful men,

who have preferred to take the line of the plain man and Professor Sidgwick. In a genuine case of conscience like this, in which the principles—truth and ecclesiastical welfare—and the authorities—the judgments of Dr Rashdall and Professor Sidgwick—are so evenly balanced, the individual cannot yield up his right of private judgment, for in the moral sphere no man can, in Sir Thomas More's phrase, "pin his faith to another man's back, not even the best man living." And the important thing to note is that the decision has on the whole gone against ordination. The situation, then, is an absolute deadlock: thoughtful men will not strain their consciences, the "powers that be" will not modify the formularies. The issue is clear, and concession on one side or other is the only way of bringing relief. It is therefore worth while to state the case for the modification of the formularies. There is a *prima facie* ground for such a concession, for, apart from a fear of disruption, it would be welcomed by almost every section of the Church. Hence the maintenance of the formularies in their present form rests on grounds of expediency, not of principle. The question then is, "How long will the expediency hold good?" Can we look forward to some more fortunate occasion, when a change can be effected without fear of disruption? If we cannot, surely it is better to take the bull by the horns without delay, and put an end to a state of things which is now intolerable and will remain intolerable. The crisis is too serious to admit of a temporizing policy, and too much mischief has already been done. Rather, the danger is that the change may be put off, till it is too late. The Church of England (it is necessary to repeat this) offers impossible conditions to some of its best intending recruits; they refuse to accept them. It will be the object of the concluding remarks to explain and justify their attitude.

Now, first of all, the men in question cannot accept either the premisses or the conclusion of Dr Rashdall's argument. If assent to the formulæ either does not or ought not to involve a strain on the conscience, or, if the straining of the conscience is a trifling evil compared with the mischief caused by a general

refusal to be ordained, then obviously it is obligatory on men, who otherwise feel a vocation for the ministry, to take orders. But that is just what is not granted. The discrepancy between their real beliefs and the nominal creed of the Church is so much wider than ever that an entirely novel situation has been created, and the holders of liberal views in theology not only find the required strain on their conscience too severe, but are also unwilling to perpetuate the scandal caused by the practice of formal unverity on the part of authorized teachers of religion and morality. They feel, in short, that the end does not justify the means. The evil of deviating from the truth is obvious; the importance to religion of their taking orders is not so plain. At any rate, the feelings exist, and must be reckoned with: the attempts to stifle it by reasoning seem something like sophistry.

But even if they were prepared to make the compromise, experience has shown that the compensating advantages predicted are at least dubious. A clergyman's usefulness is scarcely promoted by a reputation for heresy, and his energies are diverted from their proper object—the spread of the gospel—in order to defend his position in the Church. The argument that the cause of religious emancipation is best forwarded within the Church overlooks the futility of the struggle for freedom on the part of such men as Maurice, Stanley, and Jowett. Their efforts, no doubt, have done much to purify religious thought and to popularize liberal opinions about theological matters, but have quite failed to break down the barrier of the formularies. If their efforts have assisted the deliverance of the laity, the ecclesiastical fetters of clergymen remain nominally, at least, almost as strong as ever. Is it strange that the emancipation should now be regarded as well-nigh hopeless? Broad-minded churchmen have always been regarded with suspicion both inside and outside the ministry. But the reception of the views tolerated by Dr Rashdall, and the cold welcome accorded to such books as *Contentio Veritatis*, in clerical circles, seem to suggest that men holding such opinions would be regarded as absolute traitors. In fact, their position in

the Anglican ministry is generally felt to be a false one, and in such matters, no less than in politics, the state of public opinion cannot be disregarded. If a man avows his offensive opinions, he is accused of mendacity by the ignorant and narrow-minded. If he practises mental reserve, he has to perform a kind of egg-dance to avoid hurting the susceptibilities of others.

But, consequences apart, there is a growing dislike to putting an obsolete label on one's back, or, as the phrase goes, confining the mind, even in appearance, in the strait-waistcoat of dogmatic theology; and it is all the more objectionable, when the wearing of such a label obviously diminishes the confidence both of the average man and of the man who adopts the views of Professor Sidgwick. Besides, it seems illogical to ask a man to first fix a label on his back and then proceed immediately to rub it off. The process is really neither honest nor dignified, and its difficulty has been considerably accentuated by the recent ecclesiastical controversies. These have shown conclusively that the ecclesiastical authorities are determined to stick to the old standards, *e.g.*, the Prayer Book and the Reformation; that under existing arrangements a large part of a clergyman's energies must be frittered away on trivial disputes, which do not affect the essentials of religion: and that, if a trifling alteration in ritual or teaching exposes a man to the charge of lawlessness and disobedience to his ordination vows, a clergyman, who is known to hold the theological position contemplated by Dr Rashdall, is likely to exhaust the vocabulary of ecclesiastical vituperation.

More and more men are becoming disgusted with the absurdity of keeping up the sham of assenting to propositions which they neither believe nor are expected to believe. When neither the bishop believes them, nor the person who takes orders believes them, the plain man must be pardoned if he regards the transaction as a piece of solemn trifling, or thinks of the augurs in Cicero's day, who could hardly keep from laughing when they met each other. To swear to formulæ and then promptly disavow them is conduct which, however

reconcilable with that strange moral phenomenon, "the clerical conscience"—the sinister offspring, perhaps, of the present anomalies—seems to the ordinary Englishman, whose point of view cannot safely be ignored, very like running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Some men, of course, of great intellectual distinction, *e.g.*, Dr Rashdall himself, are able to make the compromise with the purest motives. All honour to those who can do so. But the preceding remarks may be taken as a fair representation of the attitude assumed by the majority of those to whom the question of ordination arises in an explicit form.

But, secondly, it is probable that many good men are deterred who are not explicitly confronted by the question; it has been decided before it has fairly reached the threshold of consciousness. One cause of this is, pretty certainly, the force of example. For one of the most marked features in the world of higher education, the chief recruiting ground of the Anglican clergy, has been the steady decline of the clerical don and the clerical schoolmaster. That is to say, the men who control the liberal education of the country set the example of not taking orders, while at the same time their moral earnestness has, at least, not diminished. Further, it is pretty well known that they could not do so without sacrificing their intellectual freedom, and, stated briefly, the fact of their remaining laymen and the breadth and non-dogmatic character of their teaching must foster the opinion that the Church is, from an intellectual point of view, a profession of the second rank, and tend to discourage the outward acceptance of absolute formulæ. A good deal might be said on this point which has not received much consideration in this connection, but space forbids. The significance of their example lies in the fact that it is not merely a cause, but a consequence, representing as it does the direction of modern thought, which, whatever men say to the contrary, and however much it is disliked, has definitely got beyond the standpoint of old-fashioned dogmatism.

Now this impatience of dogma, which is characteristic of

the modern world, is not based on ignorance or contempt or hatred. Perhaps there never was a time when the meaning, history and value of dogma was so clearly understood. Neither is there any objection to definite teaching or clear expression of truth as such; clear and distinct ideas in matters of the highest moment are as much cherished now as ever they were. What the ecclesiastical authorities have to recognise is that the formulated expositions of truth produced by bygone ages have lost their prestige, and cannot either be resuscitated or adapted by a series of recognised fictions to the modern spirit. A trifling alteration here and there, the non-natural interpretation of this or that clause, the dropping of one or two particular doctrines, or even an understanding that the formularies are not binding, will not suit modern requirements. It is idle, again, to plead for their retention on the ground either of a general sympathy with the truths underlying them, or a desire for the preservation of historic continuity. The whole atmosphere of thought, in which "these little systems had their day," has been superseded, and cannot therefore command real sympathy or arouse enthusiasm. It is not so much a question of truth or falsity, as of difference of mental outlook. For good or evil, the modern mind thinks in its own categories, not in those of the past, and men are becoming more and more convinced of the folly of regarding the conclusions of the fourth century binding on all time, or of tying the nineteenth century to the apron-strings of the sixteenth.

There is no desire to break with the past or to despise either the Fathers or the Reformers, or to make light of tradition; but men refuse to resign the right, exercised by their predecessors, of seeking and expressing the truth in their own way. It is illogical and useless to attempt to impose, even in appearance, a particular construction of Christianity belonging to a particular period on all future generations, and the example of reform set by the reformers is more significant for the present time than the particular reforms they made. They, at any rate, had the sense to see

that new wine could not be kept in old bottles, and had the pluck to put it into new ones ; and the same right is claimed to-day.

After all it is only a question of expediency, and, in a world like this, some risks must be run. The question can only be decided by making the experiment, and the time is ripe for the attempt. The danger of breaking rudely with the past is exaggerated ; Englishmen do not wantonly destroy continuity. Moreover, the difficulty is unduly magnified, for the modern world has shown itself fully competent to deal with religious problems ; it is constructive as well as destructive, and while it sweeps away the ideas which are built on the sand of human theory and invention, it will set in stronger relief those which are founded on the rock of truth. Further, the credit of the Church would be immensely strengthened by its preference of truth to ecclesiastical expediency. In the long run the interests of truth and religion must be identical, and the Church would be rescued from its false position. The clergy would be strengthened by the accession of the best qualified to make current the highest religious thought of their age and to accommodate the claims of the old and the new : the educated classes would overcome their estrangement and cease to hold aloof. The leaven of intelligence would revive the ancient prestige of the Church ; and the Church of England, "firm to its mark, not spent on other things," might in its preoccupation about greater matters sink all minor differences, and, in a spirit of true comprehension, become a rallying-ground for "the religion of all good men," and, in a more than conventional sense, approximate more closely to the ideal of the Catholic Church. If this is impracticable idealism, it at least opens up to view a more fruitful outlook than the otherwise dismal prospect of a Church shrivelling into a sect with

"Folly revived, refurbished sophistries,
And pullulating rites externe and vain."

P. S. BURRELL.

PHYSICAL LAW AND LIFE.

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THE conception of the uniformity of Nature doubtless began when our ancestors first realised that they would suffer a repetition of former experience or could repeat former actions when their surrounding conditions were repeated. As mind has grown and experience has widened, so has the belief in this uniformity strengthened, till now it is almost recognised as an axiom that event follows event in orderly sequence, that Nature works by Uniform Laws.

Probably some form of the axiom could be found to which everyone would assent. But while we may agree on the form, agreement will certainly end when we begin to discuss the meaning and extent of each term, when we define what we mean by Law and when we draw or refuse to draw the boundaries of the Nature which works by Law. Behind the mere form of words are ideas which differ as widely as do our outlooks on the Universe and our inlooks on the human mind. In examining these ideas we find ourselves at once brought face to face with the great problem which has been discussed ever since man first attempted to formulate his knowledge and turned his thoughts to philosophy.

I propose in this paper to give some account of the meaning which, as it appears to me, we must ascribe to the term "Physical Law," and to enquire how far and in what sense Law is universal in Nature. These are no doubt very ancient

questions. Yet they are ever requiring restatement in the light of new knowledge, and our answers are ever needing revision as the questions change their form. I shall try to put the questions as clearly as I can in the form in which they present themselves to the student of Physical Law.

Scientific knowledge as embodied in laws is now generally recognised as being purely descriptive. The aim of science is to formulate in as concise a form as possible an account of *how things happen, how event follows event*. We seek to frame our formulæ so that, if we know the conditions prevailing at any one time, we can describe the conditions which will follow. We seek to frame them so that we can forecast the future.

Our descriptions are embodied in laws, which are neither more nor less than statements of similarities or likenesses which we have observed in the happening of events. These laws are not fixed—are not promulgated by Nature herself. They are *our* descriptions of the likenesses which we think we observe when we watch her actions. They are our accounts, not hers, our accounts, if you like, of her ways and habits.

A Law may fail or cease to be true, not because Nature has changed her ways, but because we have failed in our statement of likenesses, or because we learn new details with which our old description does not tally.

Let us take some of the more familiar laws and see how they bear out the statement that they merely describe observed likenesses.

The Law of Gravitation as applied to the planets asserts that they are all like one another in that their rate of change of motion towards the sun multiplied by the square of their distance from the sun gives the same result. Or the law in its most general form asserts that we can assign to each piece of matter a constant number, called its mass, and that the rate of change of velocity of any one piece A towards another piece B is proportional to the mass of B multiplied by the square of their distance apart. The different cases of gravitational motion of bodies towards each other are like each other, and

this law expresses the likeness which we find, whether we observe bodies in the laboratory, or out in the solar system, or even (we believe) among the stars unimaginable distances away. So far, whenever we have observed motions which do not fall in with this description, we have always found some other conditions present which may have masked but have not destroyed the likeness.

Or take the law of interchange between heat and mechanical work. So far as we can observe, every such interchange is like every other, in that if we divide the work done by the heat produced, the quotient is the same wherever and whenever the observation is made, and the statement of the likeness is known as the law of the mechanical equivalence of heat or as the first law of thermodynamics.

Again the law of constancy of chemical composition asserts, to take a single case, that wherever or whenever we decompose eighteen parts of water we obtain sixteen parts of one gas and two parts of another. The heavier gas obtained in any one case is like the heavier gas obtained in any other case in every quality, and we always call it oxygen. The lighter gas in any one case is like the lighter gas in any other case, and we always call it hydrogen. Any specimen of water is like any other in yielding these like products, and the law of constancy of composition expresses the likeness.

Now let us turn to a case in which a law fails. Boyle's Law asserts that if we keep a gas at one temperature and alter its volume by altering its pressure it will be like itself and like all other gases, in that the pressure multiplied by the volume will be constant throughout the change. But though this law sufficed to describe the observations and experiments of physicists for nearly two hundred years after its first statement by Robert Boyle, yet when more exact means of measurement were devised it was found to be an inexact and so far an untrue description. A much more complicated relation has now been devised to express the likenesses we find in squeezing up different gases. It is not a change in Nature but a change in

our statement of what is observed, now that we can observe and measure more carefully.

As our study widens, so too does our perception of likenesses widen, and new physical laws are ever being formulated.

But not only do we find new laws. We are constantly finding that some newly-observed process is like one already known, so that a new law is needless, the new observation falling under an old law already registered. Then we say that we have *explained* the newly-found process.

We are, in fact, always seeking to shorten our descriptions of Nature by classifying our observations according to their likenesses, that is, by formulating laws, and we are always seeking to reduce the number of laws by explanations, that is, by recognising new, less obvious, likenesses.

We may put this in another way, by saying that we are always trying to find typical cases to which others may be likened, and from this point of view our laws are statements of typical cases. We are always trying to reduce the number of typical cases by showing that some of them are like others and need no separate statement.

But this process must stop somewhere. Obviously we cannot go on reducing the number of typical cases till none are left. We must have at the least one to which all others may be likened, one which cannot be explained. At present, indeed, we have many which we cannot liken to any other. And when we come to a typical case unlike any other, that must be taken as a simple fact, simple or unique in the sense that it is unresolved, unlike any other. Thus we may show that events X Y Z are cases of, or are like events A B C, already known and registered. We may perhaps go further and show that C is like A or B. But sooner or later we are brought up against cases simple at least for the time being, and ultimately we must have something permanently simple. If we explain X and Y and Z by A and B and C, we cannot turn round and explain A and B and C by X and Y and Z, and then say that all is explained. That is only repeating in

a more subtle form the fallacy of the islanders who sought to make a livelihood by washing each other's clothes.

In seeking, then, to reduce the number of typical cases, some must remain which can be no further analysed, which remain to us simple facts. Our explanations liken other cases to these but do not explain, do not account for the simple cases themselves. These simple cases are the raw material, as it were, out of which the complex pattern of the garment of Nature is woven.

I suppose that we may put down the list of most general laws or most widely prevalent likenesses somewhat as follows:—

1. We can assign to every piece of matter a constant number denoting its mass, a number always the same, whatever chemical or physical changes that piece of matter undergoes. This is the law of constancy of matter.

2. In any mutual action between two pieces of matter, the one hands on to the other, unchanged, the momentum it loses, so that the sum total of momentum in any direction is unchanged. This is the law of constancy of momentum. We have made some progress in formulating the laws of interchange of momentum between different pieces of matter or the forces with which they act upon each other, but the only case thoroughly worked out is, I think, that of gravitational force. These two laws deal with motion alone.

3. But when we come to investigate all the other ways in which our senses are affected by matter, we have a third law. This states that we recognise several measurable qualities or conditions of matter which we call forms of Energy or Energies. Thus we have Energy of motion, Energy of position, Heat, Light, and so on. We observe that when one of these disappears some other form appears, and in each case there is a fixed rate of exchange from one form to another. If we lose so much energy of position and heat alone appears, the position energy lost divided by the heat evolved is constant. Or if we use chemical energy to produce heat, the number of

heat units obtained for each unit of chemical energy lost is constant. If, then, we follow up any group of energies and note all the interchanges, we find that all the cases which we watch resemble each other in that, when we reckon up the sum total in terms of any one form as standard, that sum total is constant. It is somewhat like the constancy of the sum of money in the possession of the man at the change-giving counter at an exhibition or a theatre. He may change pence for shillings, silver for gold, gold for notes. Yet if he does his work accurately, the sum total reckoned in, say, shillings will always be the same, though at one time it may all be pence and shillings, at another all gold and notes. This is the law of constancy of energy.

4. We have a group of laws expressing the conditions under which the interchanges or transformations of Energy take place, and stating the amounts which will be transformed under given conditions. These laws form the latest born of the physical sciences, the science still often called Thermodynamics, the name of its childhood. But it is rapidly attaining maturity and strength, and is coming to be called by the more dignified name of Energetics.

Under these laws and groups of laws we can arrange all our knowledge of the actions and processes going on in the world of non-living matter. The laws describe what is evident to our senses—what we see, hear, feel, touch. They state how sensible event follows sensible event, and assuming that the future will be like the past, they enable us, at least to some small extent, to foretell the future. They embody our list of typical cases.

But we are not content with what we see, hear, feel and touch, with likenesses which can be verified by our senses. We are always trying to reduce our list of typical or simple cases by imagining likenesses which we cannot directly perceive—in other words, by framing hypotheses as to the constitution of things, beyond the reach of direct verification by our senses.

The most conspicuous of these hypotheses is the atomic hypothesis of the constitution of matter. We imagine that bodies, however continuous they appear to our sense of sight or to our touch, are really made up of small particles called atoms, with separating interspaces. The mutual actions of these atoms across the separating spaces are supposed to be like the mutual actions which we observe between big, evident masses.

If we believed that a piece of matter is as continuous as it seems to the eye, we should have to suppose that contraction and expansion are simple facts, facts unlike any others. This supposition was characterised by Principal Sir Arthur Rucker, in his British Association Address at Glasgow, as unintelligible and absurd in that it leaves expansion and contraction unexplained. This appears to me to be carrying the passion for explanation to excess. To say that any simple fact, any fact which so far stands by itself and is unlike others, *must* have hidden likenesses, *must* be explicable, and that the contrary is absurd, is an *a priori* mode of dealing with Nature which she may at any time resent and refute by bringing our so-called explanations to nought.

But still Sir Arthur Rucker's statement well illustrates our unwillingness to be brought face to face with the simple and ultimate type, and I have no doubt that the atomic hypothesis was first imagined to escape the necessity of taking the expansion and contraction of solid and liquid matter as simple, inexplicable, ultimate facts. Were matter continuous, they would have to be so taken. But imagine that matter consists of a group of separated atoms, and contraction is merely a drawing together of the members of the group, expansion is merely a separating out. We have explained them by likening them to what we observe every day in a crowd of men or a flock of birds.

Further, we know that matter in thin films or in fine streams does not behave like matter in bulk. New properties are observed which are not to be accounted for by the reduc-

tion of the old properties in proportion to the scale of reduction. If the structure is atomic, we can imagine how these new properties will come in when the films or streams are but a few atoms thick. If matter is continuous, we have as yet no kind of explanation of such properties.

But the hypothesis is, of course, extended far beyond its use to explain these mechanical phenomena. Long before the law of constancy of energy was put into exact form, the observed interchanges of energies had led to the idea that some of the observed forms might differ from each other only in their effects on our senses. The differences were thought to be in us and not in Nature. If we could only sharpen our powers of observation, magnify our scale of vision, and make our perception of time more minute, the differences in kind would vanish. Here the atomic hypothesis came in to provide explanations or likenesses. When kinetic energy gave way to heat, it was supposed to be only a transfer of motion from big masses to little atoms, and so heat was explained as a mode of motion. When the atoms clashed together in this motion, they were made to vibrate and send out waves, and so light was explained in some degree by being likened to the waves sent out by jangled bells.

One form of energy after another has thus been reduced to energy of motion, or energy of separation of the atoms, and so has been likened to the observed energy of motion, or energy of separation of big masses.

The chemist, above all, has made use of the hypothesis to explain chemical energy as energy of separation of the atoms, so likening it to the energy of separation of a planet from the sun. Imagining some eighty or a hundred different types of atom, he has sought to explain chemical facts by the configurations and mutual actions of groups of these elementary types. He has likened chemical compounds to solar and stellar systems.

Many chemical and physical facts long ago suggested the idea that we may go still further in our explanations by sup-

posing that the atoms are themselves built up of still smaller bits of matter, or corpuscles, all like one another. This idea has been brought very much to the front by recent electrical researches consequent on the discovery of the Röntgen radiation, and now Professor J. J. Thomson is teaching us that one atom differs from another merely in the number and grouping of the finer "corpuscles" of which each is composed. At the present time, then, the aim of the atomic hypothesis is to show that we need assume only one type of matter, the corpuscle, and give it only one type of action on its fellows, and that we may then explain all the phenomena of physics by the grouping, motions, and mutual actions of these primordial bits of matter.

Thus physics would be a sort of microcosmic astronomy. In place of the telescope we should need a microscope a million times more powerful than any yet made. Instead of a seconds clock, we should need a timekeeper making billions of beats per second. Instead of an astronomer, we should need a being to watch the corpuscles to whom a second seemed a million years.

The celestial astronomer finds that if he knows the masses, positions and velocities of the heavenly bodies at any instant, and if he watches them long enough to measure the variation of their mutual action as their distance varies, he can then retire to his calculating room, and not only describe their positions in the past but also prepare a "Nautical Almanac" foretelling their positions in the future. Similarly, the atomic astronomer believes that if he knew the masses, positions and motions of the atoms or corpuscles at any instant, and that if, further, he knew the change of mutual action with change of distance apart, he too could prepare an atomic "Nautical Almanac." Not only could he give an account of the universe in the past, but he could reach forward into the future.

As Laplace put it in his celebrated idea of the Perfect Calculator (Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. p. 41):

"An intelligence who for a given instant should be acquainted with all the forces by which nature is animated, and with the

several positions of the beings composing it, if, further, his intellect were vast enough to submit these data to analysis, would include in one and the same formula the movements of the largest body in the universe and those of the lightest atom. Nothing would be uncertain for him; the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes."

But let us consider what must be the actual method of the Laplacean calculator when dealing with atoms and corpuscles and those data which are altogether beyond the range of our senses. First he will take the data in the form given by his senses, the positions, motions, actions and conditions as to light, heat, electricity and so forth, of the visible or otherwise sensible bodies in his universe. But these bodies are far too large for his atomic calculating machine. Then he must grind up all his data to powder of atomic or even corpuscular fineness to suit the calculating machine. This powder he will put into the machine. He will turn the handle and extract the product. But it is still in atomic form, and so is useless as far as telling him what his senses will perceive. He must build up the atoms once more into gross matter, translate the atomic energy into the recognised forms which affect our senses, before he can verify his results by sight, or feel or touch. Our senses know nothing of molecules, atoms or corpuscles, of heat as a mode of atomic motion, of waves of light spreading out from clashing molecules. We want to know what hotness we shall feel, what colour we shall see, what matter we shall touch.

And so we see that the ultra-sensible atomic hypothesis is but an imagined bridge to connect one set of sensible events with another. We can see kinetic energy. When it disappears against friction we can feel the heat which takes its place. We connect the two by imagining the atoms which take up the disappearing motion.

There is a growing school of physicists who claim that the trend of science is to do away with such hypothetical bridges, who regard atoms and molecules as needless suppositions. Or at most they regard the hypotheses as merely temporary

structures which may perhaps have done good service in their time. Now, they say, we should seek to describe the sensible in terms of the sensible only, we should investigate the laws of the transformation of energy as we actually see it going on, and we should refrain from introducing atoms and the like imagined things whose existence we can never directly verify.

I have no doubt whatever that our ultimate aim must be to describe the sensible in terms of the sensible. But I see, too, what gulfs there still are separating one part of our knowledge from another, and I see no harm in throwing temporary bridges of hypothesis across these gulfs to connect what would otherwise be detached regions. They allow us to pass to and fro with ease, and have been and are of enormous help to us in our exploration of Nature. But we must bear in mind that we may have many types of connecting bridge, many forms of hypothesis, all perhaps equally serviceable. All perhaps to be broken down and abandoned when we have filled in the gulf which they crossed, and have made firm roadways built of sensible fact.

Whether, however, we accept the creed of the atomic philosopher, or whether we agree with the disciples of this newer school, the school of Energetics, the main aim of science is the same, to obtain a description of Nature as concise as possible by classifying all observed likenesses. Here we must distinguish between the method of science—that of classifying likenesses—and the result which has followed that method in its application to physics—viz., the reduction of phenomena to typical cases whose actions we can describe. It is this result which enables us to forecast, on the assumption that the typical cases will remain like themselves, in the future as in the past. Wherever, in what at any rate for the present we may call lifeless matter, this method has been applied it has led to similar results, and the wider and more complete our knowledge has become, the more possible has it been to foretell the future from the past. Now the question rises whether the results will still be the same when the method is applied to all Nature,

living as well as non-living, whether it will still give us typical cases of known behaviour when applied to the affairs of life and mind, and whether prediction will be just as possible here as in the motions and actions of non-living matter.

In stating this problem it does not signify whether we use the language of the atomic hypothesis or whether we state it in terms which could be used by the newer school who will have no dealings with atoms. The problem is just the same from either point of view. I shall state it, therefore, in the more familiar language of the atomic hypothesis.

Let us suppose that the Laplacean calculator has been found, and that he has been set to work. He has studied, we will say, all the atoms, and knows all their mutual actions. In his laboratory he has found exactly how hydrogen, carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and the rest, behave. He has found the conditions under which they group together to form compounds, he has learned the shapes of the atomic groups, and he knows under what conditions they will fly apart to form new groups. Suppose that he watches certain groups, and that then from their positions and surroundings he calculates their future course. Now let him watch that course. He finds that they enter certain plants and help to build them up. Later they are taken in by some animal, and later still they are taken into the system of a man, and ultimately they find their way to his brain. Would Laplace's calculator find all his predictions verified as his atoms came in contact with living matter and were themselves concerned with life? Suppose the man into whose brain the atoms entered were Laplace's friend and chief, Napoleon. If the calculator took into account every atom in Napoleon's frame, would he be able to calculate all the motions of Napoleon, all his actions on the similar surrounding groups of atoms which we call his generals? Could the calculator foretell the eclipse of Waterloo as surely as the astronomer foretells an eclipse of the sun? Is man, in fact, from the physical point of view, a group of atoms, each of which behaves as it would with the same

neighbours were it part of a non-living system? Leaving out of account thought and feeling, which obviously do not come within the range of observation of the physicist as physicist, can a man's motions and actions all be classed under the general laws which sum up our knowledge of the matter of which he is made, when those laws are formulated from the study of non-living matter? Are the typical cases the same? Could the calculator write, even before Napoleon's birth, a complete physical biography of him from the first to the very last phase, stating where he would go, how he would move, what energy he would emit in the form of sound or reflect in the form of light? Could he say how these energies would affect the motions of his surroundings? It may, by the way, be admitted that such a history would make very poor reading.

But let us now ask ourselves another question. Suppose our calculator not only great as a physicist and mathematician, but equally great as a psychologist and moralist. Could he write down in parallel columns a double account of his Napoleon, in the one column a history of him regarded as a group of atoms, in the other a biography of him, setting forth an account of his thoughts and feelings, his intentions and will? And assuming that he could, would he find correspondences in the two columns, such a thought corresponding to such a set of molecular groupings, such a volition to such a set of molecular motions? Would he find the correspondence so complete that he could at any time fill in a gap on what we will call the psychical side from his complete knowledge of the physical side?

Or confining himself to psychology, would he find that mental condition followed mental condition according to laws which he could formulate? Would he be able to make a list of typical cases of mental conditions of which he could state the consequents, so that, resolving Napoleon's mind into these conditions, he could foretell how he would feel and think, as well as act?

If so, he could proceed along either line, the physical or the psychical, and he might use his psychical knowledge to fill in gaps on the physical side.

We have some suggestion of the Laplacean calculator in our great physicists, some suggestion of the perfect psychical calculator in our great mental philosophers. But we have hardly any suggestion as yet of the combined perfect physicist and perfect psychologist who could point out the correspondences between the two sets of conditions, physical and psychical. Our knowledge of such correspondences as may exist is hardly more than beginning. Some progress has been made in showing physical conditions corresponding to disease, when the mind is disordered, when life is impaired, when decay and return to non-living matter are in progress. The pathologist can tell us something of the morbid conditions of the tissues corresponding to pain, he can show that degeneration of the brain corresponds to idiotcy, that intrusion of foreign non-living matter ends in death. But of the physical correspondences to vigorous life, and thought, and will, he can only give the most general and vague account.

Is this ignorance to be set down to want of experience, and to want of proper means of investigation, ignorance which we may naturally expect in the infancy of a science? Or may it not rather be ascribed to the non-existence of the correspondences? May not our knowledge and ignorance just correspond to the facts, knowledge where life is ceasing and is giving place to ordinary physical actions, ignorance where life is in full sway and the actions are different in kind from those studied in non-living matter?

I believe that the latter is the true view, and it appears to me that its truth is borne out by the want of analogies between mental conditions and physical conditions, analogies which we should expect to find were there complete correspondence between the two.

At first sight there may appear to be analogies. We may, for instance, think it possible to connect desire with physical

attraction, dislike with physical repulsion. But only at first sight. When closely examined the analogy breaks down. For the physical law states that if A attracts B, B equally attracts A, whereas everyone knows that while A may like B, and seek his company, B may be unutterably bored by A, and seek every means to avoid his company.

Or note how utterly without analogy in the physical universe is admiration for the good, hatred for the bad. It is true that we frequently describe qualities of physical objects as good or bad; but this very mode of description proves the point, for when we examine the meaning, we find that the good is serviceable to the describer, the bad unserviceable: the good falling in with his wish or purpose, the bad running counter to it. When we speak of a good conductor of electricity or a bad reflector of light, it is not the physical quality at all, but the adaptability to the desires of the user which we are connoting by the terms. To speak of a praiseworthy molecule or a wicked wave would be utterly ridiculous.

Then observe how different is the relation of past and present and future in the two cases. In physical phenomena we deduce the future from the past. The present and future are, as it were, pushed into being by the past. But on the mental side the present is drawn into being by the future. Indeed, we might almost distinguish the living being from the non-living system by saying that while the latter lives on and by its past, the former lives by trying to realise its future.

And above all the choice of action which is implied in our attempt to realise an imagined future has no correspondent, no analogy whatever in physical actions. Our sense of responsibility when that choice is made is utterly unlike anything in the physical world.

An attempt is made to save the situation, to liken choice to physical action, by saying that our acts are determined by motives, that deliberation is but the competition of all the motives operating, and that ultimately we yield to the

strongest as certainly as a body moves under the strongest force. Our will is like a feather fluttering through the air, swayed hither and thither by successive puffs, and finally borne off by the strongest current. Perhaps it is worth while pointing out that even with this idea of motives the analogy fails. A body does not yield to the strongest force. It moves in the direction of the resultant of all the forces from the greatest to the least, every one counting and having its full effect. The will finally takes one course with one aim and the motives prompting to other courses all drop out of action.

But there is yet a greater contrast between physical action and mental action. In a physical system we can make previous observations and experiments, assign quantitative values to the different conditions, and foretell the resulting motion from their combination. In the mind we have no method of measuring motives. We can only judge, after deliberation has resulted in action, which motive was the strongest by assigning strength to that which prevailed. We can, if we like, assign unit value to this and zero to all the rest which have failed to act, but there is no kind of physical measurement.

I hold that we are more certain of our power of choice and of responsibility than of any other fact, physical or psychical, unless it be indeed that we are still more certain of the power of choice and of the responsibility of someone else who does us what we regard as an intentional injury. We are certain, all of us, in everyday life, that this power of choice exists, whatever conclusion we may come to in the quiet of our studies. It appears to me equally certain that there is no correspondence yet made out between the power of choice and any physical action, and there does not seem any likelihood that a correspondence ever will be made out. The freedom of choice, then, is unlike anything else in Nature, it is a simple fact.

Holding this view, I am bound to repudiate the physical account of Nature when it claims to be a complete account. I

am bound to deny that the Laplacean calculator can be successful when he takes man and the mind of man into his calculations.

It is not that the scientific method is inapplicable or that it fails. It is still *the* method. We must still classify according to likenesses, whether we are dealing with physical or with psychical, though the results are different in the two cases. In physics we seek to reduce phenomena to a few simple types, of which we know and can foretell the actions. If we adopt the corpuscular hypothesis, we seek to reduce to one single type and its assumed action. But in mind we are, I believe, in each individual life brought up against an individual type which we can no further resolve. Instead of the single corpuscle, or the eighty or one hundred atoms of the chemist, we have as many types as there are conscious beings—perhaps as many as there are living beings of any kind. If, further, we accept our own mental experience, we must grant that we do not and cannot know the conditions and actions of these innumerable simple types. Every time an intention is formed in the mind and a deliberate choice is made, we have an event unlike any previous event. Freedom of will is a simple fact, unlike anything else, inexplicable.

In our search for likenesses we are brought face to face with unlikenesses, and it is just as much a duty of science to recognise these unlikenesses as to catalogue the likenesses.

While, then, the scientific method still applies in the psychical region, in so far as it consists in classing together likenesses and in recognising and separating unlikenesses, the material dealt with is utterly different from that in the physical region, in that no similar quantitative measurement can be made and no explanation in the sense of complete reduction to types of known behaviour appears possible. If we explain our actions by purpose we use the word "explain" in a sense different from that which it has in physics, where we describe the present in terms of the past, rather than in terms of a hoped-for future.

We must recognise that this view of life will bring us into conflict with the fundamental laws of non-living matter. Undoubtedly, will results in physical motion. To his fellows a man is a portion of matter which can only act on them, so far as we know, through their senses. How, then, do the physical actions going on in him differ from the physical actions going on in non-living matter ?

It has often been pointed out that the will may act as a guiding power changing the direction of motion of the atoms and molecules in the brain, and we can imagine such a guiding power without having to modify our ideas of the constancy of matter or the constancy of motion, or even the constancy of energy. We may suppose, for example, that two molecules are making straight for each other in the brain and that the will in some way introduces a constraint which pushes them always at right angles to their direction of motion. So they may be guided to glide past each other instead of clashing together. This constraint will not change the mass, and we can imagine it so put in that it introduces equal and opposite momenta and so does not affect the total motion. The change of direction implies a slight change of spin, which may be compensated for by a slight opposite spin put on the rest of the body. The energy will not be changed, since a merely deflecting force does no work. But the interposition of the guiding power *does* affect the transformation of energy; instead of the clash which the physicist would foretell there would be a new configuration as the molecules glided past each other in their new directions. The resulting transformation would not fall in with those formulated in the science of energetics. To bring in the Laplacean calculator once more before we banish him to the realm of impossibilities. If he is watching the dance of atoms in the brain, he will see every now and then changes of direction of motion, not calculated in his system of transformations of energy, not provided for in his forecast.

I do not lay any great stress on this conception of the physical action of the will as a guiding power, which does not

alter the sum total of energy but only alters its transformations. Still the laws of constancy of matter, motion and energy do appear to be more fundamental than those of the transformation of energy. For while the former will hold whether we go forward or backward in time, the latter are essentially affairs of time, they take time to be effected, and if time could be reversed, or if all the motions in the universe could be suddenly reversed, all the transformations would be reversed, and some, at least, of the laws would, I think, require restatement. But it may be said that after all this is only an attempt to evade the point at issue by saying that some physical actions are not so certain or so constant as the rest. It is better to face the situation boldly and claim for our mental experience as great certainty as that which the physicist claims for his experience in the outside world. If our mental experience convinces us that we have freedom of choice, we are obliged to believe that in mind there is territory which the physicist can never annex. Some of his laws may still hold good, but somewhere or other his scheme must cease to give a true account.

BIRMINGHAM.

J. H. POYNTING.

PRESSING NEEDS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT STUDY.

REV. CANON T. K. CHEYNE, D.D.

WE stand at a turning-point in the road to the full historical truth respecting the Bible, and progress depends on our recognition of this fact. It is with pain that I gather from the language of many scholarly reviewers of the *Encyclopædia Biblica* that they are wedded to the old critical methods, and that their highest aspiration as students of the Old Testament is to carry on the work of the older generation, only perhaps giving more weight to the results of Assyriological and Egyptological research, and to the later apocryphal and pseud-epigraphic Jewish literature. I have tried to do them justice; loyalty is everywhere deserving of sincere respect. But nothing that they have said has as yet convinced me that their point of view is the right one, and none of them can reasonably censure me because I desiderate on their part a very much fuller study of the facts of the case. The polemical spirit is uncongenial to me, and I will not turn aside to examine their statements. I have no wish to answer either Professor Peake, or any other reviewer,¹ save by still applying new methods as well as old to problems which, if treated at all by former scholars, have been treated inadequately, and by using my results in constructive work, which will at any rate, I hope, deserve mature consideration. Life, however, is too uncertain for me to wait till my programme shall have been

¹ See, however, the *New Liberal Review* for December 1902.

realised. I cannot evade the duty of giving some preliminary sketch of my point of view, and communicating both to scholars and to the lay public something that may help them, not only to sympathise in some degree with me, but also to prepare for a possible change in their own point of view. In so doing, I may perhaps, to adopt a phrase which Mr Peake, in no unkindly spirit, once applied to me, commit a tactical mistake. But in the long run I do not think that this will prove so, and in any case I think that anyone who has the vocation of a seeker after fresh truth is bound to dare bravely. He must not either conceal or weaken his results, to please either his friends or his foes. Compromise, so legitimate in the sphere of practical politics, is not permissible in historical investigations into the form, meaning, and origin of the Scriptures.

A recent lay writer has well expressed all that I could wish to say on this head, with a lucidity and candour against which there is no appeal. I refer to a notice of a work on New Testament criticism, to which various scholarly lecturers have contributed, and which is prefaced by Canon Hensley Henson.¹ In his preparatory note the latter writer tells us that "the condition of sound interpretation of Scripture is honest and thorough criticism," but he qualifies this by the statement that "criticism must not be allowed to take an esoteric character, but, at all hazards, must be held closely to the current teaching of the church." On this the literary critic of the *Monthly Review* (for December 1902) makes the following remark:—"What is meant by the next sentence, 'criticism must not be allowed,' etc. ? Criticism, if it is to be 'honest and thorough,' cannot be 'held closely to' anything but its own methods, and has nothing to do with 'current teaching.' We presume that what is meant is that critics who approach the subject from outside must not be allowed to ignore Christian tradition and ecclesiastical history. Criticism and 'the

¹ *Criticism of the New Testament* (1902). See *Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1903, pp. 412-414.

current teaching of the church' are to throw light on each other, keeping clear of the eccentricities of the Tübingen school, of Renan, Strauss, and other dogmatists, which have retarded the growth of a sober estimate of evidences, no less than the desperate efforts of orthodox writers to prove the finality of the old learning."

The moderate language of the *Monthly* Reviewer is more to my own taste than the sharp rebuke which would doubtless have been administered by a writer in (say) the *Literarisches Centralblatt* or the *Deutsche Rundschau*. Criticism of the ancient literature of Judaism and Christianity cannot, without injury to truth, either hold itself, or be held by non-experts, to anything but its own methods, nor has it anything to do with "current teaching." It will not, of course, "ignore Christian (or Jewish) tradition," for a part of its office is to explain the historical appearance of that very tradition, which, it is quite conceivable, may not always be in accordance with the average church teaching of the period. To "current teaching" it has only a secondary relation; and if Canon Henson means that it has to look for "light" to this "current teaching," and so to keep itself in a different circle of thought from "Renan, Strauss, and other dogmatists," it is a friendly critic's duty to point out that the implied restriction deprives the generous words of the opening statement of all their value. Whether F. C. Baur was or was not "eccentric" will be determined by the history of criticism. Whether sobriety is a better quality in a critic than that radicalism which is but another name for thoroughness and resourcefulness, will also be decided by facts at a later stage of investigation. And whether a Biblical critic is self-condemned by assuming that criticism is not an end in itself, but must have, and ought to have, theological consequences, will not be proved until English theology has become thoroughly insular, and the English Church has definitely disowned all liberal aspirations.

A timid criticism, therefore, which asks at every step, "How will this result be received by the current orthodoxy?"

is in urgent need of apology. Radical (*i.e.* thorough) criticism, on the other hand, has no apology to make, for its adherents recognise themselves to be bound "by the everlasting law of honour to face fearlessly every problem that can fairly be presented to it." Can we venture to say that critics as a body, even when dealing with the Old Testament, do fearlessly face Biblical problems? Take up our Hebrew lexicons, our commentaries, our critical introductions, our histories of the people of Israel, and how many are the queries we have to put in the margin—how few comparatively are the conclusions there expressed which can unhesitatingly be accepted! A beginning has no doubt been made in the reconstruction of the Old Testament group of subjects. The text-books which are written to-day are both more accurate and critically more progressive than those of yesterday; but taking an average, the improvement in critical insight is comparatively slight. To read these learned books is a mixed pleasure, because the critical statements in them require constant examination. And hence, great as the demand for improved aids to study may be, I think that time would be gained if we were to stop writing for the various series of text-books, and to devote ourselves to a testing of the basis of the new critical tradition which our text-books represent. Should any younger scholar listen to this appeal, I would beg him to consider further that much that traditionalists of the new school pronounce incredible may nevertheless be true, and may only appear incredible because of antecedent educational prejudice.

There are two specially serious omissions in our older commentaries: the first is that of a sufficient command of Assyriological and Egyptological material bearing on Israelitish literature; and the second, that of a sufficiently keen and methodical textual criticism. It is no doubt by this time a commonplace to say that much light is thrown on the Old Testament by Assyria and by Egypt. But it is not yet a commonplace to say that we have to read the Assyrian records (which are by far the most important) in the spirit as well as

in the letter, so as to understand the state of mind and of society which they represent, and that we have also to apply a keen criticism not only to the Hebrew but also even to the Assyrian documents. This demand does not, of course, imply that there is a uniform analogy between the circumstances, historical, social, literary and religious, of Assyria and those of Israelitish Canaan, but it does imply that the latter country was within the sphere of influence of the former, and that this influence was so deep and pervasive that traces of it could not but be manifest in many parts of the Israelitish history and literature.

Now, can we venture to say that British or even German Old Testament scholars have adequately recognised this pressing requirement? In our answer it is desirable to avoid exaggeration. If we were to be guided by the *Journal of Theological Studies*, which professes to represent the older English universities, I fear that our verdict would not be very satisfactory. It is well known, however, that there are a few British scholars who have proved by publications the keenness of their interest in the Assyriological side of Old Testament study, and perhaps I may add, of their desire to use the new material critically. In Germany, too, a great improvement is now becoming visible in some of the learned works which issue from the press on the Old Testament, and this would probably be still more evident but for the extremely varied contents of a conventionally complete commentary. Gunkel, in his recent work on Genesis, has set a good example in emphasising that which he rightly considers the principal thing, viz., the meaning, and especially the religious meaning, of the narratives of Genesis. And this will be still easier both for him and for others in the future if it should become possible for commentators to refer to complementary works in which subordinate points in the Old Testament literature are treated on an adequate scale and with use of the most critical methods. At present, however, all that we can demand is that some practical recognition should be given to the pressing require-

ment just mentioned, *i.e.* that in handbooks, and especially commentaries, the new Assyrian and Egyptian material should at least to some extent be critically used; and that in special investigations what is unavoidably left incomplete should be filled up on the basis of a thorough study of (at any rate) translated Assyrian texts, and with the co-operation, so far as is requisite, of Assyriologists.

The author of an article in the *Archives for the Science of Religion*¹ takes a more optimistic view of the actual state of things in Germany. He says, "The science which has to do with the Old Testament is as far from standing in an exceptional relation to the other sciences as its mother, Theology, and is thankful for any stimulus offered to it from outside. . . . It also owes much to Egyptologists and Assyriologists. That which has been offered to it, this science has willingly received and tested; and so far as it regards it as fit for use and as correct, has allowed a determining influence on its own investigations. The work of testing this material, with a view to finding out how far investigations and results belonging to other branches of science may correct its own conclusions, it has never resigned to others. For indeed the Old Testament belongs in the first instance to this science, and not to Arabic, or Egyptian, or Assyrian scholars."

I fear I must confess that, considering the lightheartedness with which, till quite lately, the average German commentator was wont to refer to Schrader's useful collection of Assyriological notes on passages in the Old Testament, I find it difficult to endorse this statement altogether. I think that it is much too soon, on the ground (I suppose) of the study which some German scholars have given to the collection of transliterated and translated Babylonian and Assyrian texts known as the *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, to speak of the *Wissenschaft* of the Old Testament as having deliberately tested

¹ "Die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft und die keilinschriftliche Forschung," by Dr Aug. Freiherr von Gall, in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, vol. v. pp. 289-339.

and, so far as was right, allowed a determining influence to Assyriological data. And even Dr von Gall, who would not have written this article unless he had himself made a discriminating use of Assyriology, does not appear to me to have read the writings of Assyriologists, or of those Hebraists who have co-operated most with Assyriologists, with a thoroughly open mind. A suspicion of this comes upon me when I find him stating, in agreement with Wellhausen and Stade, that the narrative in Genesis i. is the product of "the religious reflection of a cultured Jew who lived in the Exile period." And when this same writer frankly states the opinion that "in 1895 Gunkel was put in fetters by the Assyriologist Zimmern, as his *Schöpfung und Chaos* clearly shows," I become fully conscious that in spite of Dr von Gall's welcome to Assyriology, he is not in the same company in which I at least, not less than Professor Gunkel, find myself.

Had I space enough, I might easily justify the opinion that German Old Testament critics as a rule are not as much at home in Assyriology as the progress of our study requires. That there are some notable exceptions may once more be cordially admitted. But, not to refer to some of the more recent commentaries, I may at least remark with surprise on the flood of pamphlets and articles of professorial origin produced by a mere popular lecture of Professor Friedrich Delitzsch, called *Babel und Bibel* (1902). It is my hope to return to this subject in connection with Winckler's views and my own on another occasion. But what I have to mention now is so grave and far-reaching that all my remaining space must be devoted to it.

I ventured to say just now that a second serious omission in our older commentaries was that of a sufficiently keen and methodical textual criticism. Without denying the merits of Klostermann, Wellhausen, Cornill, Perles, T. K. Abbott, C. J. Ball, and (among others) the self-denying editor of the *Sacred Books of the Old Testament* (Professor Paul Haupt), I cannot help saying that the scholar who combines the

clearest consciousness of the corruption of the traditional text with the greatest energy in dealing with it is an Assyriologist. Scholars will at once guess whom I refer to—Dr Hugo Winckler, in his various works from the *Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen* (1892) onwards. I am of opinion that Dr Winckler has a specially keen eye for neglected textual problems, and that the only way for his many opponents to refute him would be to solve the same problems better. Among these opponents I do not reckon myself, but I must admit that his textual criticism is not all that could be wished—that he has not a full command of the old methods, and that he is not yet feeling his way towards new ones. And what I have to say now, after much thought and prolonged investigation, is, that until the text of the Old Testament has been carefully revised, with the help of new methods as well as old, it is but little comparatively that either a critical Assyriologist or an Assyriological critic can do for the explanation of that precious though fragmentary literature.

The necessity of method in the criticism of the traditional text is now very generally admitted. It is true, many purely conjectural emendations are still made, but only as a last resource, when in the opinion of the critics the existing methods have been altogether baffled. To counterbalance this in some degree, there are the cases in which the methods employed by Lagarde, Wellhausen, and others have been conspicuously successful. Certainly those who plead for the application of newer methods do not undervalue, or themselves cease to employ, the old familiar ones, chief among which is the critical use of the versions. But they hold that there are many more cases in which these methods are either inapplicable, or lead to highly artificial and unsatisfying results. In my own judgment the only way to escape from a deadlock is to study the recurrent types of corruption in the received Hebrew text, and in that presupposed by the Septuagint, and the habits of the ancient editors in their manipulation of corrupt words, and so to be guided quite simply and naturally to new methods; and (2)

to allow ourselves to receive suggestions in the application of our new methods from the theory that the peoples by which the Israelites as known to us were most directly influenced were those of the North Arabian borderland—peoples called (as textual criticism can show us), in the Old Testament at any rate, by the names Mišrim, Aram or Jerahmeel, Cush or Cushan, and Asshur or Ashhur.¹ The course here indicated could not have been taken at an earlier period. It is only on the ground of corruptions already treated by previous workers that we could ever have begun to detect types of corruption, and it is only Winckler's unrefuted theory that there was not only a North Syrian but also a North Arabian region called Mušri, and of his discovery in 1893² of the name Misrim (the North Arabian Musri) in a limited number of Old Testament passages, soon increased by himself and by the present writer,³ which could have given us as great a sense of security in our textual work as we may now, if we will, enjoy.

To write a handbook on the art of applying the new methods would at the present moment be impossible; it is only in the *Seminar* that such instruction could be attempted. For the public and scholars in general it will be necessary to wait till several books of the Old Testament have been revised with some thoroughness from an advanced point of view, for only then will each student be enabled to collect for himself examples enough of the different types of textual corruption, and of the corresponding types of correction. It is such a

¹ The key to the passages containing these names has been used most abundantly by myself. But the example was set, so far as Misrim and Cush are concerned, by Dr H. Winckler, and for the "South Palestinian" Asshur by Hommel (*Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, pp. 239–246). Professor Hommel's later suggestions of references to Mošar, Kôsh, and Ashur (*Aufsätze*, iii. 1, pp. 277 ff.) appeared subsequently to my own investigations, and the same may be said of Dr Winckler's later suggestions as to Mušri and Kûsh. My own field of work is necessarily wider.

² "Das nordarabische Land Mušri," in *Altorientalische Forschungen*, first series, vol. i. pp. 25 ff.

³ See Winckler, *Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft*, 1898, part iv. (sometimes referred to as *Mušri* II.), and Cheyne, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, art. "Mizraim" (published in 1902, but written long before).

revision that, in the interests of progress and to avoid wasting our energy, I venture to recommend. Professor Kittel has lately, with much learning and judgment, argued for "the necessity and possibility of a new edition of the Hebrew Bible";¹ his object is to recover as far as possible the Hebrew text in general use about 300 B.C. Certainly this would be very useful and interesting, but I maintain that there is something far more pressing and important, viz., to go behind the traditional Hebrew text (whether the Massoretic, or that of Aquila, or that of which we have a specimen in Mr W. F. Nash's unique Hebrew papyrus,² or that used for the Septuagint), and recover, so far as may be, the original. That this is a practical object will most probably be denied by the majority, but without their having given a sufficiently thorough study to the phenomena of the text. Even critics who are regarded as progressive will probably say that Lagarde and Wellhausen have marked out the lines on which alone we can advance, and will supplement this by an exhortation to concentrate energy on critical editions of the versions, especially the Septuagint.³ But the truth is that the value of the textual work of Lagarde and Wellhausen has been vastly overrated. Sometimes indeed these critics have been successful, but I fear much less frequently than their too loyal disciples have supposed. That some of their corrections have met with considerable approval proves little. If you laboriously train young scholars in the mechanical application of certain rules, you will of course ensure their approval of those corrections which arise most readily from such a process. But whoever tests these corrections from a wider point of view

¹ *Über die Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit einer neuen Ausgabe der Hebräischen Bibel, Studien und Erwägungen*, by Rudolf Kittel (1901).

² Mr S. A. Cook in *Proceedings of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology*, Jan. 1903; *Exp. Times*, Feb. 1903; and Mr F. C. Burkitt in *Jewish Quarterly Review*, April 1903. The papyrus now belongs to the Cambridge University Library.

³ Cp. Strack in *Hastings' Dict. of the Bible*, vol. iv. p. 732 a. Lagarde, too, was never tired of preaching this, but he at least was not prevented thereby from attempting a more methodical criticism of the Hebrew text.

will have to declare that some of the most plausible of them are just as impossible as the unmethodical conjectures which preceded them. And with regard to the much-praised Septuagint, I must regretfully complain that our work (*i.e.* the work summed up in commentaries and periodicals) has a tendency to be much too mechanical. It is my conviction that we ought to treat the text which underlies this version precisely as we treat (or at least ought to treat) the Massoretic text. To defend such and such a reading on the ground that it has been arrived at by retroversion of the Septuagint appears to show that we have hardly yet dug down much below the surface, or adequately realised our problem. I am very much afraid that as long as the Hebrew text itself is criticised so inadequately, there is but little hope of much progress being made in the deeper study of the Septuagint.¹

It is no doubt a hard piece of work to which I invite critical students. The traditional text of the Old Testament is in very many places conjectural; *i.e.* redactors have, of course in perfect good faith, manipulated texts which were already incomplete or imperfectly legible, in accordance with their uncritical views of historical, geographical, and religious propriety. What we have to do is to decipher the words which underlie the present text. This is, of course, not always altogether possible, but it is generally possible in some degree, and, we can be confident, much oftener than might be supposed, of having really got very near indeed to the true text. Mistakes are, of course, unavoidable. This need not discourage us, for what critic is there, whether reckoned as sober and moderate, or as wild and extravagant (*i.e.* original), who has not made countless mistakes? It is at any rate certain that the longer our discipline continues, the greater will be our skill in applying our new methods, and the surer we shall be that even our mistakes will be on the line of truth. I should

¹ In the general spirit of Dr Redpath's recent article in the *American Journal of Theology* (Jan. 1903) I heartily concur, but I venture to think him not strict enough in some of his requirements.

heartily welcome the assistance of comrades in the work which I have undertaken.¹ But I must not conceal the severity of the demands that I should make upon them. Such scholars would not indeed be called upon to make a complete break with their past; the piquant contrast drawn by one recent reviewer between my own criticism and what he supposes to be "the higher criticism" is a failure, for this among other reasons—that it ignores the duty of ever pressing on to a higher stage of critical progress. But they certainly would be summoned to scorn the popular virtue of unbending consistency, to be willing to change their minds, and even to re-write many parts of their own books. They would be asked not to be in a hurry to criticise what the new methods are said to dictate after a few minutes' reading or a few days' deliberation. In this age of hurry and of thirst for popularity, these demands are, I am well aware, not small; they touch the very foundations of a scholar's character; they test the purity of his moral ideal.

If the work is hard, it is at any rate urgently necessary. I spoke at an earlier point of the necessity of becoming more at home in Assyriology and Egyptology. But I must venture to warn younger scholars that unless this be combined with a much more progressive textual criticism than is at present fashionable, Assyriology and Egyptology will be often only too likely to prove misleading lights. I am most unwilling to say it, not because it involves a confession of errors into which I have fallen, but because it means a check to the enthusiasm of able fellow-workers like Winckler, Zimmern, and Gunkel, but it has to be said. Until we have before us a much more thoroughly and methodically revised text of the Old Testament, the details of Assyriology and Egyptology should only be used by the commentator with critical caution.

¹ The results of the present writer's revision will be found in the periodically issued parts of *Critica Biblica* (A. & C. Black, part i., Isaiah and Jeremiah; part ii., Ezekiel and Minor Prophets; part iii., 1 and 2 Samuel); and *The Book of Psalms* (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., in the press).

The work is also very pressing in view of the increased minuteness of the analytic literary criticism of the Old Testament. A writer of deserved reputation for learning and honesty—Professor H. L. Strack—has lately made this statement:—

“The circumstance that we are still in a position to analyse, in the main with perfect confidence, most sections of the Pentateuch, *i.e.* to separate from one another the sources from which these sections have been composed, is a convincing proof that even the sum of all the changes in question has been far smaller than one might be disposed to think, and far smaller than critics like Aug. Klostermann have held it to be.”¹

With much respect I venture to question this, on the ground that the more minute details of the critical analysis are specially dependent on the trustworthiness of the Masoretic text, and that this text, in many parts of the non-legal portions of the Hexateuch, is not free from serious corruption. I am sure, too, that the “higher criticism” of the other books will have to be much modified on the basis of a methodically revised text. I may perhaps specially refer to the psalms and to the prophetic writings, the very late dates proposed for which by some of the ablest recent critics derive all their plausibility from bad corruptions, which these critics have either not even observed, or when they have observed them, have not been able satisfactorily to heal.

Need I add that grammar, lexicon, history, archæology, geography, etc., are all bound to gain greatly in security and critical accuracy from a thoroughly revised text of the Old Testament? Most of us do not half realise that we have in many things simply exchanged one tradition for another, which is better grounded only in outward appearance. A new conservatism has sprung up, against which an earnest warning is not perhaps out of place. I could not venture to ask for

¹ Art. “Text of the Old Testament,” Hastings’ *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. iv. p. 732 a.

space to show this in detail. But perhaps, out of an abundance of instances, I may be allowed to select four, which prove the critical and exegetical importance of the study of recurring types of textual corruption, viz., Gen. xv. 13; 1 Kings xviii. 19, 22; 1 Kings xxii. 6; 2 Kings xv. 25. The points from which we start are, (1) that ארבע 'four' is not unfrequently miswritten for ערב 'Arabia'; and ארבעים 'forty' for ערבים 'Arabians' (see *Enc. Biblica*, col. 3072, note 2; 'Moses,' section 11; and among other passages, Judg. v. 31 *b*, xiii. 1). And (2) that מאה (like מאל) is one of the possible corruptions of ירחמאל (col. 3860, note 6). Turning (*a*) to Gen. xv. 13, we see that the four hundred years of the Misrite (Egyptian? N. Arabian?) sojourn of Israel may be due to textual error; ארבע מאות may come from ירחמאל and be a correction of ארץ לא להם in verse 13 *a* (להם לא should be ירחמאל; ערב has dropped out). If so, Ex. xii. 40 *b* may be a very late secondary passage; it was written at any rate after Gen. xv. 13 had become corrupted. This is of some importance for the critical analysis of sources. (*b*) 1 Kings xviii. 19, 22. Why such particularity as to the number of the prophets? At any rate, we have a right to choose '400' in preference to '450,' and the passages favour the reading ארבע מאות; [מ]ערב ירחמאל; אבלי which follows may spring from ירחמאל (so elsewhere, *e.g.* Is. lxv. 4; lxvi. 17). Thus the narrative states that the prophets of Baal were to be summoned from different parts of Jerahmeelite Arabia. (*c*) We now cease to be troubled by the apparent (but not real) circumstance that the prophets of Yahwè summoned by Ahab, according to 1 Kings xxii. 6, were "about 400 men." בארבע מאות should rather be מערב ירחמאל "from Jerahmeelite Arabia" (cp. *Enc. Bib.*, "Prophet," sect. 7). (*d*) In 2 Kings xv. 25 the most recent commentators agree that there is no clear correction or explanation of ארבע מאות ואת האריות. Stade (see *Enc. Bib.*, col. 298) can only suggest "Argob and the tent-villages of Jair," which may conceivably be a gloss on verse 29. But G here steps in to help us; that this has not been discerned arises from the backwardness of

our study of the textual phenomena. The Septuagint's rendering of verse 25 (central part) is *μετὰ τοῦ* (or *μετ' αὐτοῦ*) *αργοβ καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀρεια* (or *αριε*) *καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ πεντήκοντα ἄνδρες* (or *ἄνδρας*) *ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων*. Klostermann thinks that we may gather from this rendering that the true text of verse 25 made some reference to 400, and that instead of *ואת-האריה* and *את-ארנב* we should read *מאות גבריו*—*i.e.*, Pekah and his 50 Gileadites overpower Pekahiah and his 400 warriors. This is ingenious, but the true starting-points, mentioned above, have been neglected. Placing the Septuagint's rendering in the light of the facts referred to, we see that *מֵאַרְבַּע מֵאוֹת* (pre-supposed by *ἀπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων*) represents *מֵעֶרְב יַרְחֵמָאֵל*, "from Jerahmeelite Arabia." It now becomes easy to account for *ארנב* and *האריה*; the former word is a corruption of *ערב*, the latter of *ירחמאל* (*cp.* *אריה* in Is. xv. 9, and *אראל* in 2 Sa. xxiii. 20); *את* (*bis*) is an editorial insertion. Thus we get an explanation, otherwise unattainable, of a seemingly hopeless passage in the Massoretic text and of a very difficult rendering in the Septuagint. Of course the *Αργοβ* and *Αρεια* of the existing text of the Septuagint are a later addition. The text thus becomes, ". . . and smote him, etc., and on his side were 50 men from Jerahmeelite Arabia" (v. l. "of the Gileadites)."

I can imagine, however, that some reader may object that I am destroying what has been constantly regarded till now as the true text. I do not think that this is an accurate representation; strict conservatism in textual matters has long ago been abandoned by Protestant scholars. But the objector forgets one other very important fact, *viz.*, that the Bible in the early ages was in the fullest sense a living book, susceptible of even great adaptations and transformations. The Old Testament in the form and in the sense in which it was read at the Christian era has a life of its own, and the study of the traditional text and its interpretation as then current is of the utmost interest, not only to the special historical student, but to every intelligent Christian. None of the old Bibles is lost;

we are but supplementing them by the discovery of the oldest. And if in the course of explaining what I mean I have unintentionally startled any of my readers beyond what he can bear, let him accept my sincere regrets. I have indeed been driven of late to suppose that, like Lao-tse, the Chinese philosopher, I must be descended from a family in the village of Bitterness. But this is not my fault; and in the end, truth is sure to heal the wounds which it has made. In this connection I would ask leave to refer to the postscript to the editorial preface in vol. iv. of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, and by way of illustration to the article "Servant of the Lord" in the same volume (especially § 6), where it is shown how Is. liii. is a record both of a less and of a more advanced conception of the Jewish religious ideal. "The ardent universalism which distinguishes (the four passages on the Servant of the Lord) in their present form is due to a later editor, who had before him a text which was already corrupt, and which, apart from this, did not answer to his own spiritual aspirations. Let us continue to read them as they stand in the Massoretic text and the Septuagint as monuments of the loftiest pre-Christian Jewish piety." And to those who abhor changing their minds, and who more than almost anything else fear a reputation for instability, I would quote the truthful words of a recent philosophical writer: "The wisest of critics is an altering being, subject to the better insight of the morrow, and right at any moment only 'up to date' and 'on the whole.' When larger ranges of truth open, it is surely best to be able to open ourselves to their reception, unfettered by our previous pretensions."¹

T. K. CHEYNE.

¹ W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 333.

ZOROASTRIANISM AND PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY.

THE REV. JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

“IT is pretty generally suspected,” wrote Keats to his brother and sister, in the April of 1819, “that the Christian scheme has been copied from the ancient Persian and Greek philosophers.” To the poet the world seems no vale of tears, but ‘the vale of Soul-making,’ and after expounding this creed in a coloured mist of words, he adds: “Seriously I think it probable that this system of Soul-making may have been the parent of all the more palpable and personal schemes of Redemption among the Zoroastrians, the Christians, and the Hindoos.” Unpoetic scholars, it must be confessed, have seriously thought otherwise; and Keats on comparative religion or the philosophy of religion, is not, to put it mildly, a first-rate authority. *Non hoc ista sibi tempus spectacula poscit.* But the wide, fertile field over which the author of *Hyperion* ranged thus airily has been explored and excavated with some thoroughness during recent years, and it seems now feasible, as well as desirable, to attempt a brief survey of the main directions in which Zoroastrian thought, at least, may be taken with more or less reason as an influence upon, or an illustration of, the golden core in primitive Christianity. It is needless to premise that the latter owed nothing of its essence to any foreign source, or that any shaping or colouring due to Zoroastrianism is confined to the circumference of the faith, where it came to express itself on eschatology and angelology.

The scope of the present paper is necessarily limited to the New Testament, that is, to the early Christian literature rising from the new religion's classical and creative period. In and after the second century, the relations of Parsism and Christianity became more obvious and involved. Like contemporary Judaism, the latter at once affected and reflected Mazdeism in fantastic phases. Writings like the Testament of Abraham, the Apocalypse of Paul and its fellows, and the Hymn of the Soul (which Hilgenfeld and Cumont actually take as Persian), to say nothing of Manichæism (a debatable example), are sufficient to indicate the varied assimilation or imitation of Iranian conceptions, whilst in some forms of Gnosticism¹ the Mazdean religion, like that of Babylonia, may be said in a real sense to have won for itself a new lease of life. Zoroaster, by a turn of anti-Persian polemic, was adopted in some circles as a prophet of the Gospel. The sect of Prodicus is said to have cherished sacred secret books bearing his name (Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, i. 15), and, in a less welcome aspect, Mazdeism's cognate cult of Mithra, with its festival on 25th December, its expiation of sin, its eschatology and sacra-

¹ The Parsi hypostatizing of wisdom and development of dualism were features which naturally kindled unseen fires in Gnostic circles. See, for Valentinus, Hilgenfeld's *Ketzergeschichte des Urchrist.* (1884), pp. 311 f., 315; and for Basilides, *ibid.* (pp. 219 f., 229); on the pseudo-Zoroastrian literature, Harnack's *Geschichte der altchristl. Litteratur*, Erster Theil, pp. 173, 662, 932, etc.; *die Chronologie*, pp. 537-538; and Lichtenhan in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift für die neuest. Wissenschaft* (1902), pp. 223 f. The wider relations of Zoroastrian eschatology are handled, for this period, by Brandt in the *Jahrbücher für protest. Theologie* (1892), pp. 405-438, 575-603. Hübschmann (*ibid.*, 1879, pp. 203-245), after a long examination, had already concluded that the resemblances between Mazdean eschatology and Judaism or Christianity were mostly specious and external; "si duo faciunt idem, non est idem." Which is rather too narrow a verdict, in view of recent investigations such as those of Pfeiderer, in the new edition of his *Urchristenthum*, or of Prof. J. Réville on "de la valeur du Mithriacisme comme facteur religieux du monde antique" in *Études de Théologie et d'Histoire* (Paris, 1901), pp. 323-341. Since the present essay was written, a popular account of Mithraism has been given, in a lecture on *die persische Mysterien-religion im römischen Reich und das Christenthum* (Tübingen, 1903), by Dr Julius Grill, rector of Tübingen University, who promises to write a further study of the relations between this cult and Christianity.

ments, proved one of the most powerful rivals of Christianity throughout the empire.¹ Nor, unless the evidence be misleading, was a reflex influence entirely wanting, for the Parsi literature itself, if we may judge from its later contents, did not prove impervious to modes of Christian thought. Cross-fertilization prevailed; intercourse promoted a certain reciprocity of influence; and it is demonstrable that the reaction of Christianity (as of Judaism in Babylonia) upon the older faith has not left the latter's sacred volumes wholly unaffected.

This raises the important preliminary question, how far may the Avestan writings be employed in an enquiry of this kind? The answer depends upon the critical results of enquiries into that literature which may be readily summarized. The extant Avesta (a mere torso of the original) consists, in the main, of the (*a*) Yasna, or hymns of praise, including five archaic Gáthas (Yasna, xxviii.—xxxiv., xliii.—xlvi., xlvii.—l., li, liii.; see Darmesteter's *Ormuzd et Ahriman*, pp. 311 f.); (*b*) some twenty-five additional pieces (Visparad); (*c*) the Vendídád (a corruption of the Iranian term for "the anti-dæmonic law"), or code of religious purification, in twenty-two Fargards; and (*d*) twenty-four Yashts or religious chants, together with two invocations or Sîrôzahs, and some smaller pieces of subordinate importance. Of these the Gáthas, with their practical piety and ardent zeal, form the oldest part.² The latest date to which they can reasonably be assigned is the end of the seventh century B.C. (see the discussion in Gilmore's *The Persika of Ctesias*, 1888, pp. 29–36, 95–96), and Zend experts (*e.g.*, Tiele, Geldner, Moulton, Mills) often throw them back several centuries. A number of the Yasna also are of great antiquity, and a pre-Christian breath blows up and down many of the Yashts.

¹ See Dill's *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Roman Empire* (1898), pp. 67 f., and Harnack's *Ausbreitung des Christenthums*, pp. 534–536.

² See the literary estimate in Horn's *Geschichte der persischen Litteratur* (1901), pp. 5 f.; also Dr Mills in *Critical Review* (1899), 329–337; (1900), 411–425; and H. O. Taylor's *Ancient Ideals*, i. pp. 120 f. "For the first time perhaps in human history we see a soul feeling its way into the inner temple of spiritual insight" (Mills, 424).

On the other hand, some liturgical parts of the litanies, and the mythical surveys of Iranian history which recur, together with post-Christian or even anti-Christian allusions, in the Vendîdâd, prove that the Avesta, as a whole, dates, in its present form, from the Sassenian period, when a revolution, partly also a Zoroastrian revival, had upset the Parthian suzerainty.¹ At the same time, this gives no reason for pessimism or retreat in a critical enquiry, based necessarily on the Avestan literature for the most part, into the relations between Mazdeism and Judaism, much less between it and primitive Christianity. We possess independent evidence to prove not only that a Mazdean literature was in existence during the third century B.C., but that portions of the Avesta were probably widely known during the Arsacidæ-era, whilst the cardinal doctrines of Zoroastrianism were in circulation long before Christianity (so Darmesteter, in *S. B. E.*, iv. pp. xxiii, xxxvii, xli f., liii f.). The suspense and dubiety, which are still necessary in regard to the higher criticism of the Avesta, as regards its origin, exegesis, and philology, do not therefore interdict a cautious use of the greater and more characteristic part of these scriptures as substantially authentic evidence for pre-Christian Mazdeism. Besides, there can be no question of direct literary influence. I do not recollect any passage of the Avesta which verbally modifies or colours a primitive Christian document. The relationship is one of ideas rather than of expressions; the contact of the two religions is a matter, not

¹ Cp. Casartelli's *La philosophie religieuse des Mazdéisme sous les Sassanides* (1884), de la Saussaye's *Lehrbuch d. Relig.*, ii. 11 f., 43 f., and E. Lehmann: "Zur Charakteristik des jüngerer Avesta" (*Archiv für relig. Wissensch.*, 1902, pp. 202-218). Persian tradition attributes the almost total destruction of the Avesta to Alexander the Great, and the collection of the surviving fragments to a king Valkash, who may have been Nero's contemporary, the Parthian Vologeses I. After the revolution of 212-227 A.D. the Avesta was published by the arch-magus Ardâ Virâf; subsequently under the Sassenian dynasty (310-628 A.D.), which did for Mazdeism what Constantine effected for Christianity, it received its final shape. I shall quote the Avesta as a rule from the Oxford translation in the *Sacred Books of the East* (*S. B. E.*, iv., xxiii., xxxi.) by Darmesteter and Mills, with occasional modifications taken from the French and German versions.

of quotation or verbal coincidence, but of conceptions in the main; and, certainly upon the side of primitive Christianity, literary filiation is as much out of the question as any conscious reproduction or imitation of Iranian theologumena. Such stray snatches of melody as the new faith caught from this or any other quarter of the older world were set to its own key and woven into the unique symphony of its own life. A comparative study of primitive Christianity and Mazdeism suggests, at least upon the side of the former, impressions won half unconsciously from a transient environment, and little else.

Greater reserve must be practised in the use of parallels drawn from the Bundahis,¹ the Bahman Yast, and the Shâyast-lâ-shâyast (Horn, pp. 37 f.). These Pahlavi texts, with their developed dualism, are all late (see West's translation in *S. B. E.*, vol. v.) in their present form. The Bundahis date from a period not anterior to the Mohammedan invasion of Persia in A.D. 651; the Bahman Yast (a composite work) may be placed anywhere between the sixth and the tenth century, whilst the Shâyast (incorporating earlier fragments and traditions) rises from the seventh century A.D. It is not denied, and indeed it is heartily maintained by a consensus of experts, from Windischmann to West, that these texts may, and probably do, preserve material of considerable antiquity, and that the dominant features of their eschatology were pre-Christian. But unless it can be shown that their ideas have a reasonable affinity to pre-Christian Zoroastrianism, or are independently corroborated by earlier evidence, as they sometimes are, it is generally safer to avoid arguments based solely upon the hypothesis of their independence and originality. As a matter of fact, the evidence occasionally points to the marginal influence of Christianity upon the traditions of these scriptures (*cp.*, *e.g.*, the argument on the resurrection-body,

¹ German versions in Windischmann's *Zoroastrische Studien* (pp. 56 f.) and Justi's edition (1868). For Buddhistic parallels see Seydel's *Das Evang. von Jesu in seinen Verhältnissen zu Buddha-Sage und Buddha-Lehre* (1882), pp. 263 f.

Bund. xxx. 4-6, with 1 Co. xv. 35 f.). Thus the parable of Luke xvi. 19 f. seems echoed in Bahman Yast ii. 12: "Thus spoke Zaratûst: 'O Aûharmazd, righteous creator, I have seen a celebrity with much wealth, whose soul, infamous in the body, was hungry and jaundiced and in hell . . . and I saw a beggar with no wealth and helpless, and his soul was thriving in Paradise.'" Further on (*ibid.*, ii. 30), the apocalyptic idea of Mark xiii. 12 (*cp.* Micah vii. 6, and the Babylonian parallel cited in *Encycl. Biblica*, iii. 3063-4) is echoed in the Parsi description of the perplexing latter days, with their physical and military woes, when "all men will become deceivers, great friends will become of different parties, and respect, affection, [hope ?] and regard for the soul will depart from the world; the affection of the father will depart from the son; and that of the brother from his brother; the son-in-law will become a beggar from his father-in-law, and the mother will be parted and estranged from the daughter." Yet, with such reservations and qualifications as have just been noted, certain ideas of these late books and a large part of the earlier Avestan scriptures may be quite fairly employed as evidence for the Mazdeism which existed throughout the East during the first century of our era, provided that it is borne in mind not simply that Mazdeism had its varieties and "was never the generally accepted faith of all the Iranians" (Tiele, *Encycl. Biblica*, iii. 3666), but that we cannot speak exactly of Zoroastrianism any more than of Hellenism, even at this period, as a perfectly homogeneous system. The one was, like the other, a conglomerate or complex. Consequently, in using the term "Zoroastrian influence," one has to recollect that it has a wider reach than what would be covered by "Avestan," implying the action of that underlying Iranian faith which could throw off movements like Mithraism, Magism, and possibly Manichæism from its teeming life.

Further, Avestan influence is visible before as well as after the age of primitive Christianity. Here, too, the environment is significant. Details apart, there is some agreement upon the

fact, though not yet on the precise extent, of Zoroastrian tenets in post-exilic Judaism, particularly as regards eschatology, demonology and angelology. Some threads in this mingled yarn were woven in from Persia. "It is acknowledged that some specifically Zoroastrian beliefs ultimately filtered into Judaism, and were gradually assimilated. The frequent communications which passed and repassed between Judæa and the various settlements of the Diaspora could carry fructifying germs of Zoroastrian doctrine from east to west, and secure for them a final acceptance in the official religion of Jerusalem."¹ Any scepticism upon the extension and assimilation of Zoroastrianism is, however, melted when we pass on to survey the immediately pre-Christian Jewish literature, such as the romances of Esther, Ahikar and Tobit,² and the series of apocalypses from Enoch³ downwards. Here the reality and range of Mazdean influence are indubitable. Recent investigations in this field show that Parsi conceptions lie, like Lord Avebury's rocks, "anywhere"; and the results of sober criticism made accessible by Stave's luminous efficient monograph (*über den Einfluss d. Parsismus auf d. Judentum*, 1898),⁴ and summarized afresh by Bousset (*die Religion des Judenthums im neutest. Zeitalter*, 1903, pp. 453-458, 461 f.), indicate a broad indebtedness for stimulus and guidance upon the side of the later Jewish apocalyptic to Zoroastrian folk-lore and theology. For example, by common consent it is now recognised that behind the "seven first white ones"

¹ Montefiore, *Hibbert Lectures* (3rd ed., 1897), p. 373; see Cheyne's *Origin of the Psalter*, 401 f., etc.; and J. H. Moulton in *Hastings' Bible Dictionary*, iv. 990 f.

² See Prof. Moulton's study on "The Iranian Background of Tobit" (*Expos. Times*, xi. 257-260), and Erbt in *Encyc. Biblica*, 5128.

³ See especially Beer's edition in Kautzsch's *die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des A. T.* (1899), ii. 217 f.

⁴ This holds true even after Stave's data are checked, as by Söderblom (*Revue de l'hist. des religions*, 1899, pp. 260 f.); a further essay by the Swedish savant is translated by de Coussanges in *Annales du Musée Guimet* (1901). More recently a large quantity of more or less relevant material has been dredged up by Böklen in his *Vervandtschaft der jüdisch-Christlichen mit der Parsischen Eschatologie* (1902). See Cheyne in *Encyc. Biblica*, 5438 f.

(En. xc. 21 f., *cp.* Lueken's *Michael*, pp. 32 f.), or "seven holy angels" (Tobit xii. 15), reproduced in Rev. i. 4, iii. 1, iv. 5 (*cp.* Jubil. ii. 2 f.; Berachoth, 32 b), ultimately there lies the Iranian conception of the Amshaspands or arch-angels of the deity (*cp.* Mills, *S. B. E.*, xxxi. 300; Ezra vii. 14; Ezek. ix. 2). The rich Mazdean belief that the soul of the righteous was welcomed and escorted after death to paradise has also modified passages like Test. xii. Patr. (Asher 6, Naph. 8), to say nothing of later Christian apocalyptic and the Mandaean religion; whilst an echo of it may be heard even in the lonely poetic allusion of Luke xvi. 22 (the beggar carried *by the angels* into Abraham's bosom). The latter passage might, however, refer to Michael and his angels (Marshall in *Expos. Times*, xi. 390-391), one of whose functions in rabbinic and early Christian tradition was to convey pious souls to heaven. It would be in virtue of this office, of course, that Michael had his famous bout with Satan (Jude 9) over the corpse of Moses—a contest analogous to the Iranian strife of heaven and hell over the departed, except that in the latter the dispute refers not to the body but to the soul (*cp.* M. R. James, *Camb. Texts and Studies*, ii. 2, pp. 14 f.). Further, Heb. xi. 37 ("they were sawn asunder") is an allusion to the rabbinic legend of Isaiah's death, which in its turn forms one of several reproductions, rabbinic and Arabic, of the fontal Persian tale of Djemchid (*cp.* R. H. Charles, *Ascension of Isaiah*, 1900, pp. xlv-xlix; Beer-Kautzsch, ii. pp. 122-123), who, like the good Yima (*S. B. E.*, xxiii. 297), was sawn in twain.

It is by no means irrelevant to emphasize the presence of such Zoroastrian threads in the parti-coloured texture of pre-Christian Judaism. In not a few instances, such as the conceptions of heavenly books, heavenly clothing, the renovation of the universe, etc., what are apparently direct echoes of Zoroastrianism in the early Christian writings turn out to have been derived more or less directly from beliefs, developed it may be from Mazdean sources, but already current in contemporary Judaism or the syncretistic civilization of the East

during the first two centuries of our era. At any rate the possibility of such a medium has usually to be reckoned with. Take, for example, the Mazdean doctrine that the death of the body, as in capital punishment, somehow involved the salvation of the soul. An offender ("a false cleanser," or "a carrier of a corpse alone") against the two sacred rites of the Iranian faith (Fargard iii. 20, ix. 49-50) was put to death, with this formula pronounced by the executioners: "The man here has repented of all his evil thoughts, words, and deeds. If he has committed any other evil deed, it is remitted by his repentance; if he has committed no other evil deed, he is absolved by his repentance for ever and ever." Darmesteter thinks a confession of guilt and the recital of the Patet, or formula of repentance, must have been also required. But, whatever the co-operation of the offender, atonement for his sin was only reached through suffering and death. The soul at least was saved for the next world. Traces of this action evidently survive in 1 Cor. v. 5 (in semi-ecclesiastical fashion also in 1 Tim. i. 20), where "to hand over to Satan" (the lord of death, Heb. ii. 14) is roughly equivalent to the punitive infliction of death. Mere excommunication does not satisfy the context. A mortal stroke is supposed to follow the solemn curse, which operated (as in the case of Ananias and Sapphira) almost like a divine $\mu\eta\nu\varsigma$.¹ Only, this widespread conception of disease and even death as the punishment for transgression, and as a punishment to be inflicted by one's fellow-men, is allied to the persuasion that in some way it released the soul from the temptations of a world that had become too strong for it. The only chance for "saving the spirit" is to let Satan do his worst upon the flesh; the physical penalty issues somehow in ethical

¹ This is excellently enforced by von Dobschütz (*die urchristlichen Gemeinden*, 1902, pp. 271-272), who illustrates the idea from Jewish, classical, and early Christian literature. The "awful cursing thought of the wise" (e.g., *Sîrôzah* i. 30, *Yasht* x. 9, 66) is, according to Zoroastrian theology, especially operative; "the awful and swift curse of the wise" (*Yasna* iii. 17), being the counterpart of his pious blessing, which "pushes forward" the cause and chariot of Mithra the Truth (*Yasht* x. 68).

good, and punishment becomes a real, the only real, mercy. Yet this notion must have already passed into some circles of Judaism, to judge from Enoch lxvii. 8 f. (*cp.* 1 Pet. iv. 1), so that one cannot speak of Avestan contagion in a direct sense.

At the same time, a historical contact of primitive Christianity is also credible, even though the available evidence is scanty. Whilst we cannot speak of anything like the impact of Parsi religion on Judaism after Cyrus' defeat of the Medes had brought the Jews under the Iranian sway, yet the historical situation in the first century A.D. permits the conjecture that in certain directions and along certain lines there were circles of primitive Christianity which may have occupied no insulated position in regard to the Zoroastrian religion. Partly, the connection must have been mediated through Judaism. The latter during the early Christian era was strong in the Parthian realm, which at that time (see Josephus, *Antiq.*, xviii. 9) "dominated Babylonia," stretching from the Euphrates to Bactria. The numbers and influence of the Jewish diaspora in Babylonia are well known as the Adiabene history itself witnesses; and foremost among the Jewish proselytes at Jerusalem, who first entered the Church, Acts (ii. 11) names "Parthians and Medes and Elamites" (*i.e.*, from the plains north of the Persian gulf). Besides, the Parthian impact on Syria and Palestine since the middle of the first century B.C. must have familiarized the Jews (see Rev. ix., xvi. 12 f.) with their religious as well as with their military spirit, and for all their phil-Hellenic tendencies and corruptions of Mazdeism, they were not "lukewarm Zoroastrians."¹ Nor was the spread of Zoroastrian ideas limited to the Parthian domain. It shared the contemporary Oriental propagandism. Strabo (xv. 3, 15), *e.g.*, vouches for the Magian hold of Cappadocia, where Christianity afterwards won early (1 Pet. i. 1; Acts ii. 9-10) triumphs. The cult of Mithra, which developed ideas of morals and monotheism partially akin to those of Maz-

¹ *Cp.* von Gütschmid, *Encycl. Britann.*, xviii. 592, and Darmesteter (*S. B. E.*, iv. p. xxxv).

deism,¹ was spreading as rapidly as ever at this period through the Roman Empire, thanks mainly to the propaganda of soldiers, nor was its sway confined to the North and West.² Even apart from the medium of Judaism, the seeds of Iranian religion were in the air during the first century, and Light-foot is well justified in concluding that abundant indications exist to prove that "Palestine was surrounded by Persian influences during this period, when the Persian Empire was in abeyance" (*Colossians*, pp. 386-387). It is possible that Philo himself not merely knew but drew upon Mazdean conceptions in the leafage of his system, and at least one Parsi feature (*Encycl. Biblica*, ii. 1399-1400), the wintry dark hell, is visible among the foreign elements incorporated by the Essenes, open (for all their exclusiveness) to outside ideas.

The proximity of that strange "league of virtue" (as Keim calls them) to Jesus, suggests the enquiry whether Iranian influence is discernible within the gospels. One or two minor references seem worth attention.

The Eastern *magi* (μάγοι ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν) who, in one of the Christian birth-stories (Matt. ii. 1-12), arrive in Judæa to worship Jesus, are almost certainly priests of the powerful Mithra-cult³ or of Mazdeism.⁴ Primitive tradition held this view, and it seems corroborated by such internal evidence as the name, the conception of a new star (the *fravashi* of a newly-born hero), the function of dreams (verse 12), and the offerings (verse 11)—for "the use of fragrant woods and vegetable per-

¹ "Les mystères qui se sont répandus dans l'empire romain sont les héritiers directs du mazdéisme, tel qu'il était pratiqué à Babylone sous les derniers rois Achéménides," Cumont: *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra* (1899), i. 11. A new and revised edition of this standard work is just announced.

² Antiochus of Commagene, for instance, had been an adherent of this cult, as were the pirates of the Eastern Mediterranean. Cilicia, and especially Tarsus, was one of its strongholds, though Western Asia Minor, like Greece, seems to have remained impervious to its fascinations.

³ So after Cumont, Kuhn, and others, Dieterich in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift* (1902), pp. 4-5.

⁴ So L. C. Casartelli, excellently qualified to speak on this subject, in the *Dublin Review* (1902), pp. 362-379. See the later Persian development of the tale in Bratke's monograph, *Texte u. Untersuchungen* (1899), pp. 157 f.

fumes has always been a characteristic of the Zoroastrian religious cult" (Casartelli, p. 370). It is immaterial for our present purpose whether the story be regarded as historical proof of an initial and picturesque contact between Persian religion and Christianity in its Judæan cradle, or as a later semi-mythical representation of the relationship between Jesus and the rival cults that were to bow the knee to his authority. But, by an attractive hypothesis, the character of the *māgi* has been used to throw a ray on the composition of the story. It suggests a tendency. Pliny (*Hist. Nat.*, xxx. 16) applies the term *magus* to the Parthian prince Tiridates and his followers, who in 66 A.D. made a famous journey through the Asiatic townships to do homage before Nero; and, whether Matthew's gospel was composed in Asia Minor or not, it is just possible that this event may have coloured with an anti-Mithraic tinge, though it can hardly have originated—as Dieterich and Soltau (*Geburtsgeschichte Jesu Christi*, 1902) plead—the Matthean story. Hypotheses aside, the fact remains that, according to Matt. ii. 1-12 (a tradition not recorded much earlier than 70 A.D.), nascent Christianity was, or was conceived to have been, once in contact with Persian bonzes from the Parthian realm east of Syria and the Euphrates.

A second fringe of contact, in idea, not in fact this time, is suggested in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* (vol. iv. 4957 f., article "Temptation of Jesus"), where a seductive if partial analogy to the temptation-narrative has been adduced from a Persian ceremony or process of imitation which was supposed to introduce a man to the control of the Jinnis or dæmons. Alone for forty days in the desert, in a practical fast, the devotee is visited by a lion and other bestial apparitions. But if he holds his ground until the fortieth day he wins mastery over the evil spirits. This analogy (suggested by Professor Bevan) has some traits of obvious interest; notably among these one must reckon the victory over dæmons in the shape of wild beasts, which (as I have tried to show in the former part of the above article) is the meaning of Mk. i. 13. But the antiquity of the custom

seems too uncertain to permit definite conclusions being drawn from it in the meantime. One would require ampler data to form a valid judgment on the subject, and I doubt if such an origin is really necessary. The wider parallel of Zoroaster's temptation, with an assault of demons upon his faith and courage, presents more telling features of resemblance to the evangelic story, which have been often noted (*e.g.* by Dr L. H. Mills, *Nineteenth Century*, 1894, 52-53; in Carpenter's *First Three Gospels*, pp. 171-174, and by Seydel, pp. 160 f.), but the question whether such parallels are more than a coincidence falls to be decided on the ground of Gospel criticism, where the data are still ambiguous, and in particular on the orientation of the Palestinian sources whence the Temptation-tradition was derived. Meanwhile such efforts are like straining one's eyes back into a fog.

In the closing narrative of Christ's trial, semi-Persian reminiscences have been also detected by some critics. An analogue to the mock coronation which preceded the execution of Jesus is found in the Babylonian feast of Sakæa, a sort of grotesque and sensual Saturnalia—celebrated also throughout Asia Minor in connection with the worship of the Persian deity Anaitis—at which, in the course of other orgies, a condemned prisoner was arrayed in royal attire, “only in the end to be stript of his borrowed finery, scourged and hanged or crucified” (*The Golden Bough*, 2nd ed., vol. ii., 24 f., 253 f., iii. 150 f.). It is more than precarious (see Andrew Lang's *Magic and Religion*, pp. 76 f., 200 f.) to connect Purim with Sakæa and infer that Christ thus perished as a Haman at this Jewish festival (*ibid.*, iii. 188 f.). But independently of Dr Frazer's theory, there is some pith in the hypothesis that the treatment of Jesus may have been due to a rude reminiscence or reproduction of some features familiar to Herod's Syrian troops,¹ or

¹ So Luke xxiii. 11, preserving at this point a divergent tradition. Wendland doubts its historicity, and prefers to follow Matthew and Mark in assigning the mockery of Jesus to Pilate's troops. Notice that, according to Luke, Jesus is not scourged or mocked or stripped by the Romans, but (apparently) goes to the cross in Herod's bright raiment like an Oriental victim of sacrifice.

to Roman legions who had been quartered on the Euphrates or in Asia Minor, although certainly it required no coarse pagan festival to stimulate such an outburst of military horse-play against a would-be monarch and a condemned criminal. Wendland, who, in his paper on Jesus as a Saturnalian king (*Hermes*, 1898, pp. 175-179), alludes to the similar incident related by Philo (in Flacc. 5-6), prefers to think of the Roman soldiers ridiculing Jesus in the farcical garb of Saturn, as at Durostorum. But there is some curious, though slender, evidence (displayed by Mr W. R. Paton, in Preuschen's *Zeitschrift*, 1901, 339-341), suggesting that the further trait of a triple crucifixion reflects the ancient custom, in use among the Persians also, of crucifying a pretender or usurper upon three crosses (like Inarus, Ctesiaë *Persica*, 36) and of employing three victims for a human expiatory sacrifice. It is of course possible that two robbers were crucified with Jesus, simply because they and no others¹ happened to be lying at this time under the capital sentence, so that their enforced companionship was another mark of indignity (Luke xxiii. 32, *two other criminals*). Yet other murderers probably (Mark xv. 7) were in the hands of the local authorities; there is no proof that Pilate thus emptied the prison of condemned criminals; and, in view of the ancient Persian custom, it seems not unlikely that the number of the victims, like the mock homage previously paid to one of them, was determined by some hazy notion of imitating a familiar pagan rite. The un-Jewish character of these accompaniments of the crucifixion would perhaps lend additional relish to the soldiers' contemptuous enjoyment of crucifying a Jewish royal pretender, a caricature of a king.

As it happens, one later trace of the triple human sacrifice in Persia has been adduced in support of this attractive view. Although later martyrologies show a tendency on the part of

¹ A similar coincidence might account for the number in the tale of the three royal princes of Persian blood sacrificed by Themistokles before the battle of Salamis (Plutarch, *Vit. Themist.* 13).

Christian scribes to conform a saint's death to that of Jesus, Mr Conybeare, who accepts the above theory of the triple crucifixion, inclines to admit an instance of Persian expiatory sacrifice in the Acts of the Persian martyr Hitziboukit, who in A.D. 574 was crucified, along with two non-Christian malefactors, facing the sun ("by way of a sacrifice to the god of light and warmth," *Monuments of Early Christianity*, 2nd ed., 1896, pp. 257 f.).

A further coincidence falls to be noted at this stage. It is curious to find that during the three days which elapse after death (*cp.* John xi. 39, Mark xvi. 2, etc.), the soul according to an ancient belief, developed by (but not peculiar to) Mazdeism, lingers beside the corpse; not until the fourth day does it finally pass away to heaven or hell. This is elaborated in the impressive 22nd Yasht, where the *sadis* or *sidos* are explained as a period or interval between death and the last journey of the soul. Especially with Mark xvi. 2; Matt. xxviii. 1 f. (the connection of the dawn and the resurrection) is Fargard xix. 28 f. to be compared: "when the man is dead, when his time is over, then the hellish, evil-doing, Daêvas assail him; and when the third night is gone, when the dawn appears and brightens up, and the sun is rising: then" the soul rises to heaven or is carried off to hell (*cp.* Yasht xxii. 7). Γραφαί like 2 Kings xx. 5, Jonah i. 17, and Hosea vi. 2, are perhaps enough to explain the New Testament language in 1 Cor. xv. 4, etc.; but passages denoting belief in a period of three days during which resuscitation was considered possible are cited from rabbinic and early Christian literature by Böklen (28 f.), who also notices that the Chinese Boxers seem to have died in the firm belief that they would rise again after three days. English readers will remember the sixth and seventh last stanzas of Browning's *Jochanan Hakkadosh*.

Such fragments of evidence might suggest that the situation of primitive Christianity rendered an acquaintance with certain features of Persian life and belief not impossible, even to residents in Syria and Palestine. The probabilities of this

become slightly clearer when we pass to a consideration of the primitive Christian literature, where the traces of Zoroastrianism, if still indirect and secondary, are at once more numerous and visible.

Consider, for example, the cardinal Mazdean tenet of the *fravashis*. Reverberations of this conception occur at least three times in the New Testament: (a) twice in connection with individuals, and (b) once with reference to communities. (a) *Despise not one of these little ones*, said Jesus (Matt. xviii. 10), *for I tell you that their angels in the heavens look ever on the face of my Father who is in the heavens*—a poetic logion in which οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτῶν are the guardian angels or heavenly representatives of the “little ones,” just as in the story of Peter’s release from prison (Acts xii. 15) the exclamation of his startled friends, *It is his angel* (or, his double), echoes a similar belief, evidently current in local Judaism, corresponding somehow to the Eastern conception developed in Parsism, which regarded the *fravashi* or *genius* of one individual or community as at once a vital part of the personality, and also protective or tutelary in a sense, pertaining to the human being, and also present with God.¹ Like Horace’s *Genius*, “*natale comes qui temperat astrum, naturæ deus humanæ, mortalis in unum quodque caput,*” the *fravashi*’s fortunes are bound up with the man’s. On his lapse into vice, it apparently ceased to be (*cp.* Rev. ii. 1, 5?).

Further (b) the angels of the seven churches (Rev. i. 16, 20) are now admitted upon all hands to be a poetic and imaginative counterpart of the *fravashis*. As heavenly representatives of the churches upon earth, they are more than guardian spirits or patrons, although the latter idea also was taken over by the early church from Judaism. The conception of them is due

¹ The ancient evidence for the Christian doctrine of the *fravashi* is carefully put by Prof. Moulton in *Journ. Theol. Studies*, 1902, 514–527; and for the Greek and Roman belief in guardian-spirits, one may refer to Usener’s *Götternamen* (1896), pp. 295 f. Christian tomb-inscriptions from Thera and Melos (not later than the second century apparently, *cp.* Achelis in *Preuschen’s Zeitschrift*, 1900, pp. 87 f.) show the angel guarding the tomb.

to this Iranian doctrine of semi-ideal *genii* or *fravashis*, at once inner principles of life and heavenly prototypes, a belief which operated on post-exilic Jewish speculation, till, as in Daniel, angelic princes were assigned to the nations. Mazdeism developed the *fravashi* of the community out of the original *fravashi* of the individual. The former seems to have come first in Judaism, and early Christianity assimilated both in its own naïve way.

It is seldom, however, that the ultimate Zoroastrian root of an idea in primitive Christendom can be dug up thus easily. As a rule, the question of origin, if not of historical mediation, is rather complex, and a plausible example of this conflate class of influence is offered by Rev. xii. The messianic source or tradition incorporated at this point by the Jewish Christian prophet rests upon reminiscences of a mythological cycle, which was associated in Egyptian belief with the red dragon Typhon and the birth of Horus, or in Hellenic lore (familiar especially to Ephesus and Hierapolis) with Leto and the young Apollo, persecuted by the dragon Pytho. But to the formation of the vision in its present state, Zoroastrian influence has also contributed, as is obvious to anyone acquainted with the old Iranian Azi myths, which arose on the south coast of the Caspian Sea (Darmesteter, *S. B. E.*, xxiii. 60). Yima, the good shepherd, is represented as a primitive champion of God and God's people, who nourishes and guards the world (Fargard 5, *cp.* Rev. vii. 16), saying, "While I am king, there shall be neither cold wind nor hot wind, neither disease nor death." During the reign of this shepherd-king "there was neither cold or heat, neither age nor death nor demon-like envy" (Yasna ix. 4-5); his successful prayer was that he might take away these, with "hunger and thirst" from Mazda's world (Yasht ix. 9-10), bringing immortality (Yasht xv. 16, xvii. 29 f., xix. 31 f.). Originally a solar deity, Yima becomes subsequently an earthly monarch. Like Adam, however, he fell and lost his glory. And, by a corresponding change, Azi Dahâka, from being the fiend-like serpent of the

storm-cloud with its hostile coils, becomes semi-historical, associated (Yasht v. 29, xv. 19), as a usurper and persecutor with Babylon, the hereditary foe of Persia. Thus we have a pre-Christian cycle of eschatological tradition answering exactly to Rev. xii.-xiii., xvii., in these three notes: (a) the evil one represented both as a supra-natural and a quasi-historical foe, (b) the hostile serpent connected with Babylon, and (c) the enmity of the serpent against humanity, his fruitless prayer (in the Yashts) being that he may empty the earth of men (Rev. xii. 12, 17), and his first act, after his bonds are broken, being to rush on the world and "swallow down one-third of mankind," etc. (Bahm. Yasht iii. 57; *cp.* Stave, p. 176).

(To be concluded.)

DUNDONALD, N.B.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE PURPOSE OF EUSEBIUS.

WALTER R. CASSELS.

Two very interesting articles by Professor Jannaris appeared in the *Contemporary Review* for January and April, directed against articles in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, by Dr E. A. Abbott and Professor Schmiedel. Although those eminent scholars are well able to defend themselves, I find myself reluctantly dragged into the quarrel, for I am charged by Professor Jannaris with the singular crime of having, by a mistaken interpretation of the statements of Eusebius, misled Dr Lightfoot, and through him also Dr Abbott, into the adoption of erroneous views as to the purpose of that historian.

Professor Jannaris asserts that my argument in *Supernatural Religion*, in 1874, against Tischendorf, on the external evidence for the fourth Gospel, misrepresented the statements of Eusebius, and he concludes his indictment in the following words:—

“Here we find the original sinner in the misrepresentation of Eusebius. Soon after the appearance of Mr Cassels’ book, Dr Lightfoot came forward to review it in a series of able articles in the *Contemporary Review*, but in the chaos of startling questions raised by that book, the Bishop overlooked the irrelevant character of the quotation, an oversight possibly due to the presence in it of the term *γραφαί* (writings, epistles), which he, like his opponent, mistook for *Scriptures*. This circumstance naturally placed the Bishop at a disadvantage, and led others to the belief that Mr Cassels’ bold

assertion was unassailable. Dr Abbott seems to have accepted (as he *now* tells us) Bishop Lightfoot's authority—an authority mistaken on this point—and not going back to Eusebius to make sure of his point, fell into the trap with the results now before us.”¹

In finding that I am the “original sinner” in the misrepresentation of Eusebius, Professor Jannaris does not seem to be aware that, so far from being the first who gave the rendering of the words of Eusebius, to which he now objects, it is the interpretation which has apparently been his own till quite recently, and which has, so far as I remember, been adopted without exception by every writer who has referred to the passage. Of course I now speak of the words of Eusebius, apart from the inferences which may be drawn from them, which alone formed the substance of Dr Lightfoot's argument with me.

This is not only clearly so, but I venture to assert that the change in the opinion of Professor Jannaris regarding the passage first took place in the interval between the composition of his two articles in January and April. In his January article, Professor Jannaris writes as follows:—

“All these weighty and portentous conclusions Dr Abbott bases upon one passage of Eusebius (*H. E.*, iii. 3. 3), in which that writer is supposed to explain his object in writing his famous ecclesiastical history. Now the real purpose and plan of this writer are clearly set forth in the preface, where Eusebius says: ‘My object being to record in writing the successions of the holy apostles, along with the times elapsed from our Saviour's down to the present, and how many and great events are reported as having been enacted in ecclesiastical history; how many of its men most eminently led and ruled in the foremost centres; furthermore, what men in each generation professed the holy word either verbally or by writings I shall begin from nowhere else than from God's first dispensation, in accordance with our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ.’

¹ *Contemp. Rev.* 1903, p. 538 f.

“To the principles so laid down, Eusebius returns in chap. iii. 3. 3, where he speaks of Peter’s disputed ‘2 Peter, Acts, Gospel,’ *Κήρυγμα*, ‘Apocalypse,’ and of Paul’s ‘fourteen canonical epistles,’ his disputed ‘Hebrews, Acts,’ then of ‘Hermæ Pastor.’ Here then (*H. E.*, iii. 3. 3), and between the two groups of writings, Eusebius inserts the statement which Dr Abbott regards as the *locus classicus* for his argument: προιούσης δὲ τῆς ἱστορίας, προὔργου ποιήσομαι σὺν ταῖς διαδοχαῖς ὙΠΟσημῆσθαι, τίνες τῶν κατὰ χρόνους ἐκκλησιαστικῶν συγγραφέων, ὁποίοις [ὁποίοις?] κέχρηται τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων, τινὰ τε περὶ τῶν ἐνδιαθῆκων καὶ ὁμολογουμένων γραφῶν, καὶ ὅσα περὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων αὐτοῖς εἶρηται.

“That is in English: ‘As the narrative proceeds, I shall deem it expedient, along with the (apostolic) successions, to intimate (or suggest) who are among the ecclesiastical writers of each time, which of the disputed books they have made use of, moreover *some things about the canonical and acknowledged writings*, and the things that have been said by them concerning those (writings) that are not such (*i.e.*, concerning the non-canonical writings).’”¹

Then Professor Jannaris adds the following important comment: “So far, then, Eusebius is concerned primarily with the apostolic successions, then, by the way (ὙΠΟσημῆσθαι) with the ecclesiastical writers and their use of uncanonical texts, then last and least of all with their statements about the canonical Gospels, evidently because these last books were already too familiar to the Christian world. Indeed, had Eusebius attempted to collect and record all that had been said about the canonical Gospels by all the writers who had lived before 315 A.D., when he was writing his church history, if at all possible, such a task would have resulted in a prodigious digest of many volumes.”²

Now here, far from any denial that Eusebius referred to Gospels as well as Epistles, we have exactly the statement of

¹ *Contemp. Rev.*, January, p. 38. The italics are those of Professor Jannaris.

² *Contemp. Rev.*, January, p. 38.

Dr Lightfoot's argument. No one can read this translation of the passage in Eusebius, and the remarks he appends to it, without seeing that Professor Jannaris has very carefully rendered what he believes to be the sense of Eusebius. The theory of his April argument is not only unrepresented even in germ, but it is contradicted by the adoption of the very arguments which he subsequently condemns. The translation of the words of Eusebius with which we are more immediately concerned is varied in the April article to suit the new idea. There he gives the passage as follows, and marks it by italics: "*But as the narrative proceeds, I will make it a point, along with the successions (of Peter and Paul), to intimate who of the occasional church writers have used any writings, and which (ὁποίαις), then certain things concerning the canonical and acknowledged epistles (γραφῶν, letters) and the things (ὄσα) said by them concerning those not acknowledged as such (ὄσα περὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων αὐτοῖς εἶρηται).*" Here, it will be observed, he suppresses the wider application of the words of Eusebius adopted by Dr Lightfoot, and endeavours to "convince every reader, perhaps even Dr Abbott, that not one sentence, not one word, can possibly refer to the *Gospels*. Far from speaking of the Canon of Scripture, or our canonical Gospels," he adds, "Eusebius, in this part of his Church History, is concerned wholly and exclusively with the *Petrine and Pauline writings* (epistles)." ¹

Doubtless the heading of the chapter: Περὶ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν τῶν ἀποστόλων may have suggested to Professor Jannaris his very original discovery, and it does not give him for a moment pause that in this very chapter, which he thus asserts to be exclusively concerned with the Petrine and Pauline Epistles, Eusebius actually writes of the so-called Acts of Peter and the Gospel named after him, his so-called Preaching (Κήρυγμα) and the work called Apocalypse, the Acts of Paul, as well as the Shepherd of Hermas; but into this it is not necessary to go further at present.

¹ *Contemp. Rev.*, April, p. 537.

Professor Jannaris seems to have a very poor opinion of controversialists, and it is strange that I should have to defend a great and earnest scholar like Dr Lightfoot from the charge of having allowed the mistaken interpretation of an opponent to mislead him in so grave a matter. As it happens, however, no one can read what Dr Lightfoot himself says in his article on "The Silence of Eusebius," without seeing that he is not open to the charge of such careless and foolish indifference. He says, before coming more directly to the passage we are discussing: "Eusebius made it his business to record notices throwing light on the history of the Canon. The first care of the critic, therefore, should be to inquire with what aims and under what limitations he executed this portion of his work." He presses the supreme importance of "investigating what Eusebius himself says, and what he leaves unsaid," and he proceeds: "In the land of the unverifiable there are no efficient critical police. When a writer expatiates amidst conjectural quotations from conjectural apocryphal Gospels, he is beyond the reach of refutation. But in the present case, as it so happens, verification is possible at least to a limited extent; and it is important to avail ourselves of the opportunity. In the first place, then, Eusebius himself tells us what method he intends to pursue respecting the Canon of scripture." After a general statement of the tenour of Eusebius, Dr Lightfoot goes on to translate the principal passage of his chapter iii. "But, as my history proceeds, I will take care (*προϋργου ποιήσομαι*), along with the successions (of the bishops), to indicate what Church writers (who flourished) from time to time have made use of any of the disputed books (*ἀντιλεγομένων*), and what has been said by them concerning the Canonical (*ἐνδιαθήκων*) and acknowledged Scriptures, and anything that (they have said) concerning those which do not belong to this class."¹ Dr Light-

¹ *Contemp. Rev.*, 1875, to 172 f. This is not the place to state my argument regarding the inferences I draw from the words of Eusebius, and how little my main contention is effected by Dr Lightfoot's arguments. This will be found in my *Reply* to his *Essays*, p. 45 ff.

foot then refers to the statements of Eusebius regarding the Acts of Paul and the shepherd of Hermas, and resumes his quotation of Eusebius: "Let this suffice as a statement (εἰς παράστασιν . . . εἰρήσθω) of those Divine writings which are unquestionable, and those which are not acknowledged among all." He thus comments upon the passages he has just given from the history: "This statement, though not so clear on minor points as we could wish, is thoroughly sensible and quite intelligible in its main lines. It shows an appreciation of the conditions of the problem. Above all, it is essentially *straightforward*. . . . The exact limits of the Canon were not settled when Eusebius wrote. With regard to the main body of the writings included in our New Testament there was absolutely no question; but there existed a margin of *antilegomena* or disputed books, about which differences of opinion existed, or had existed. Eusebius therefore proposes to treat these two classes of writings in two different ways. *This is the cardinal point of the passage.* (The italics are mine.) Of the antilegomena he pledges himself to record when any ancient writer *employs* any book belonging to their class (τίνες ὁποίαις κέχρηται); but as regards the undisputed Canonical books, he only professes to mention them when such a writer has something to *tell about them* (τίνα περὶ τῶν ἐνδιαθήκων εἴρηται). Any *anecdote* of interest respecting them, as also respecting the others (τῶν μὴ τοιούτων), will be recorded. But in their case he nowhere leads us to expect that he will allude to mere *quotations*, however numerous and however precise."¹

This is not the treatment of a man who is willing to adopt the representation of an adversary and be misled by his mistaken or interested statements. I may here add that Dr Westcott, a close friend of Dr Lightfoot and a cultivated scholar, adopted the same views regarding the passage in Eusebius, and clearly stated them in his work on the Canon.²

¹ *Contemp. Review*, 1875, p. 173.

² *On the Canon*, fourth ed., 1875, p. 229 f., and elsewhere.

Was he equally misled by the book which he was discussing? I may further point out that my argument, which Professor Jannaris quotes, was directly against Tischendorf, as the extract shows, and that he took precisely the views of Dr Lightfoot and Dr Westcott regarding the statement of Eusebius. It is almost certain that both of these writers referred to the work of the German Apologist, and had their own views confirmed.

Tischendorf says: "But as the opponents of the Gospel of John rely so much upon this silence, we cannot withhold from our readers proof of the great error into which they have here fallen. In fact they entirely mistake the intention which Eusebius had in what he wrote. As to this intention he himself speaks clearly enough, iii. 3. 2, in which he explains that in regard to church writers he will note 'which of the Antilegomena of the New Testament they have used and what they have said of the Homologoumena.'" (Here he quotes the Greek passage from *ὁποίαις* to *εἴρηται*.)¹

To show further how distinguished critics of another school give the same interpretation to the Greek of Eusebius, although they draw different inferences from the passage, I may quote a few lines from Hilgenfeld. He says: "Eusebius himself tells us expressly that in regard to Church writers he will especially note what writings amongst the Antilegomena of the New Testament they use, and what they have said regarding the Homologoumena (and he quotes the Greek of *H. E.*, iii. 3), and this promise he remembers precisely there, where he finds the canonical four gospels mentioned by Irenæus (v. 8. 1)."²

In the passage in question, although Eusebius may not state his intention to mention when early writers merely make use of the Canonical books, he distinctly promises to record anything which they may "tell about them," and as, in the case of Papias, he does quote what he says about Gospels by Matthew and Mark, the inevitable inference is that, had

¹ *Wann wurden unsere Evangelien verfasst?*, 1866, p. 113 f.

² *Zeitschr. Wiss. Theol.*, 1865, p. 334.

he written anything about the fourth Gospel, Eusebius would certainly have recorded it. The only escape from this dilemma is altogether to get rid of the declaration of Eusebius, and this feat Professor Jannaris has, better late than never, heroically performed by giving a hitherto unthought of limitation to his words. In this, however, he stands at present in "splendid isolation." But even if successful in converting some readers to his view, and convincing them that he is a surer guide in April than he was in January, he would not gain much, for whatever may have been the intention of Eusebius, his practice is unmistakable, and the only evidence which could be extracted from him in support of the supposition that Papias knew the fourth Gospel is the very inscrutable testimony of—Silence.

WALTER R. CASSELS.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"JEWISH SCHOLARSHIP AND CHRISTIAN SILENCE." A REJOINDER.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1903, p. 335.)

MR MONTEFIORE'S paper, in the second number of the *Hibbert Journal*, on "Jewish Scholarship and Christian Silence" has naturally excited great interest. Anything he writes on such a matter is entitled to the most respectful consideration; and as to the question now raised by him, there are many who feel that if the Synoptic Gospels bring false accusations against the Scribes of the time of Christ, the fact ought to be acknowledged by Christians. Hard as it would be to confess that the Gospels are untrustworthy in the picture they draw of the social relations of that period in Galilee, still, if clear evidence is brought that the Scribes did not act as the Gospels say they do, or that they never could have acted in that way, our love of these books would have to yield to our love of truth. It appears to me, however, on considering all that Mr Montefiore says in the paper mentioned above and in his Hibbert Lectures, as well as the various writings of Dr Schechter to which he refers, that it is not necessary, at least not yet, to conclude against the Gospels as he urges. The Gospels furnish the only direct evidence on the matters in question, and we shall see that Mr Montefiore in his Hibbert Lectures accepts and makes use of that evidence.

The other evidence to which he appeals seems to me to be indirect, uncertain in its date, remote at any rate from the facts at issue, and connected with a very different situation of affairs. As I am mentioned among these commentators who refuse to attend in this matter to the remonstrances of Jewish learning, I venture on a few lines of reply lest my silence should be misinterpreted. I do not presume to defend Schürer or Holtzmann from the attack made on them, and shall limit myself to the two passages in Mark of my treatment of which in my recent book on that Gospel (*The Earliest Gospel*, Macmillan, 1901) Mr Montefiore complains.

On Mark vii. 4, I say, of the efforts of the Scribes to enforce the laws of ritual purity, that "the heavy burdens imposed on the people in this attempt were what drove publicans and sinners to despair." This Mr Montefiore apparently denies; for he enters on an argument to prove that the laws of purification were not applicable to the laity at all. He quotes his own definition of ritual cleanness, which is, I think, correct in point of principle, that it consists in "being in a condition to visit the temple," and says that a layman might contract uncleanness without scruple. These ordinances, he holds, did not apply to the life of the ordinary layman at all. (Is Acts x. 28 a misrepresentation also?) "The whole burden, for the neglect of which the poor sinners and publicans are so much pitied and applauded, is an absolute myth. It was only obligatory upon priests during their time of service, or upon laymen during the rare and brief occasions when they visited the temple. The country yokel or citizen had no more to bother his head about these laws than Professor Schürer himself." This, our author asserts, is what he said in his Hibbert Lectures in 1893, and Christian scholars ought to have attended to it.

But Mr Montefiore said other things besides these in his Hibbert Lectures in 1893. In his ninth lecture, on "The Law and its Influence" (p. 475), after saying that purely priestly enactments, such as the rules about clean and unclean, might have been lightly regarded by the Scribes who were not priests in the Persian period, he goes on: "but the opposition to Hellenism probably quickened the growth . . . of an opposite tendency. . . . The Scribes took up and worked out the laws of clean and unclean with the greatest zeal and zest. It would seem as if the ideal of the rigorists among them in the age of Christ was, as it were, to transform the layman into a priest, or even to transform him, for his whole life, into the condition of a priest when performing the functions of his sacred office."

Again, pp. 477-8, "Nevertheless, the existence of a large priesthood who were bound to follow out the rules of clean and unclean to the utmost of their knowledge and capacity, and the existence of an extreme section of Rabbis who even sought to outdo these professional observers, were grave evils. These puerile prescriptions not only interfered with social intercourse, but tended to set up a false ideal of external sanctity. Their baneful influence in helping to drive a certain section of the community outside the recognised pale and limits of the common religion will come before us again."

P. 489. We are told that there is not enough literature to enable us to obtain an extended idea of the moral ideas and practices of the period before Christ; and when the writer comes (p. 497) to speak of the "out-cast" class "who violated the law through ignorance or indifference, and regarded its teachers with feelings of hatred or contempt," he relies on the evidence partly of the New Testament, partly of the Talmud.

P. 501. "From the Mishnah and the older traditions of the Talmud it is, however, tolerably certain that the agrarian laws and the laws of clean

and unclean were, on the one hand, looked upon with exaggerated and fanatical reverence by the rigorists, and, on the other hand, comparatively or occasionally neglected by some of the more careless, ignorant, or independent elements of the people. The neglect of the law in one particular would lead to the neglect of it in others; and, in addition to those who fell far short of the rigorists' standard in those two sections, there were some others who dropped out of the general mass of the law-abiding population. A few there were, such as the tax-farmers, whose occupations made them hateful to the bulk of their fellow-citizens. An outcast class of 'sinners' exists in every state; and Rabbinic religion was perhaps even less inclined than other religions to show regard or compassion for those who had put themselves quite outside the pale of religious conformity. But the real 'Am ha-Arets' was probably the creation of the burdensome agrarian and purity laws."

I leave it to the reader to say if the sentence Mr Montefiore quotes from my "Earliest Gospel" is not amply borne out by the statements of his own Hibbert Lectures.

On Mark vii. 11 (Corban), Mr Montefiore blames me for not referring to Dr Schechter's Essay, appended to the same volume of Hibbert Lectures, on "Legal Evasions of the Law." As I did not rely on any Rabbinical corroboration of Mark's statement that a vow to the temple was held by certain Scribes to free a man from his duty to his parents, but simply accepted that statement of the Evangelist, I was not called on to refer to Dr Schechter's article; but, if an opportunity occurs, I shall gladly insert such a reference. I should not, after reading him, assert that the treatise Nedarim confirms Mark's statement. But is it the case, as Mr Montefiore urges, that if Dr Schechter is right, "whoever put Mark vii. 11 into the mouth of Jesus made him guilty of a grave error and a groundless charge"? Religious temper was higher in Christ's time than in the days of the Mishnah, and may have led the Scribes into excesses which were not perpetuated. The controversy with the Christians must also have influenced the Rabbis by showing them the weak points of their own system. Is it not possible that the Scribes of Galilee may have given decisions which did not pass into the code?

The question as to the degree of weight to be allowed to Rabbinic literature in the interpretation of the New Testament is a difficult one. Few are qualified to deal with it thoroughly, but one who has spent a good part of his life in teaching the New Testament may perhaps offer a few notes from his experience. When one sets out on this study, one naturally wishes to obtain some trustworthy and independent knowledge as to those Scribes and Pharisees with whom Jesus has so much to do, so that, if possible, no injustice may be done to them. Along with the histories of Israel, one reads what is accessible of the Mishnah, but there the student finds himself very much at sea in the measureless mass of undated, unrelated, unexplained conversations and decisions of which it is composed. Is there a guide who can initiate the student into the conformation of this

continent? who can set forth the leading principles of the legislation and the stages of its development, if it had any development?

Weber at first sight promises much; and he does yield much. But it is found that he cannot in very many cases be used with any confidence, as he mixes up together statements from every century of Rabbinism, and offers an arrangement of the Rabbinical teaching which the Rabbis never suggested to him. It is greatly to be hoped that Dr Schechter will put his articles in the *Jewish Quarterly* into a book; then we shall have a book written from another point of view to place beside Weber. It is good of Dr Schechter to acknowledge that Jewish scholars might do more than they have hitherto done to assist Christian science. When we examine his own articles, we find them to a certain extent occupied with the same mixture of various periods as Weber's; as if Jewish scholarship could not escape from this condition. He confesses also that the view he has to give of Rabbinical religion presents a blank at the important period—that of the Gospel. We are driven back therefore on the Gospels themselves, and have to make up our mind that they are the principal source of information about the Scribes of Christ's time. We need not on that account read them uncritically; we must strive to do justice to Jew as well as Christian, to the opponents of Jesus as well as to his disciples, and it must, of course, be recognised that the account the Gospels give of the Rabbis and their religion is not sympathetic: in the circumstances that could scarcely be expected. The traditions were formed not in the leading circle of Judaism, but in a circle outside that one and in opposition to it, and which had more to do with those who had "dropped out" than with the priests or Rabbis. Statements about the Scribes and Pharisees in the Gospels are therefore to be regarded with caution, as we have no narrative from the other side. In my book on Mark I have carefully guarded myself at xii. 41 against accepting the denunciation of the Jerusalem Scribes as true of the whole class or of the Scribes in Galilee as well as those in Jerusalem.

At the same time, the evidence afforded by the Synoptic Gospels appears irresistible, and Mr Montefiore in the main accepts it, that in Galilee, in Christ's time, religion was administered by the Scribes in such a way as to make it more difficult and more of a burden than from its nature and history in the Old Testament, to which Christ called their attention, it should have been, or than it was with the later Rabbis, and that many were driven away from it altogether. An appeal to the principles of the religion as set forth in the Old Testament and in the Mishnah cannot prevail to discredit the facts making in this direction which are recorded in the Gospels.

ALLAN MENZIES.

ST ANDREWS.

DR MARTINEAU'S "THEORY OF FREEDOM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1903, p. 441.)

IN his interesting article Prof. Pringle-Pattison criticises adversely the doctrine of Free Will held by Dr Martineau. Prof. Pattison's theory of freedom, so far as one can gather from his necessarily brief statements, is based on Kant. Yet the Kantian doctrine is perplexing and not always consistent; and I fail to see how "the obscurely worded distinction between the intelligible and empirical character" casts a helpful light on the subject. Kant may suggest to us that the *noumenal* is somehow the ground of the *phenomenal*, but how the intelligible self can be realised in the empirical character he could not show; and after all it is freedom under conditions of space and time which mainly concerns us. Prof. Pattison says we cannot "predicate agency" of a characterless self. Yet how can specific acts be referred to and owned by an intelligible self which has no concrete content? Again, we may admit that the fact that I make the moral law my motive is a pledge that what I *ought* to be I *can* be. But does not this ultimately involve a freedom to choose between possible alternatives?

In its insistence on the latter point it seems to me that Martineau's view is sounder than his critic allows. Yet few will deny the justice of some of the strictures. Martineau no doubt exaggerates the importance of "a selecting power" between "open alternatives." In any case this is not the whole of freedom. And as a psychological fact, many of our acts to which moral value attaches are not the fruit of a definite selection. The idea passes into action without conscious deliberation. In others, though the alternative is present, it remains in the background of consciousness, and does not assert itself seriously. But there remain, of course, cases where the need to choose is urgent, and the self hesitates between A and B. Possibly "the unsophisticated conscience" makes no "report" that the alternative is an open one, but surely it assumes it. Nor does it seem to meet the case to say, as has been done, that this is simply because the self does not as yet know which course it will carry out. The point is that whether your determinism be hard or soft (to use Prof. James's phrase), naturalistic or spiritualistic, the alternative will not be an open one. For even on the spiritualistic view choice can never mean more than the making clear by the self what *has* to be consistently with its total character. And though that character be no mechanical product but developed by the spiritual principle in man, it none the less excludes contingency from the personal history. The present is the necessary outcome of the past. On this view remorse and repentance must rest on an illusion. We regret we did not act otherwise; but this does not show we could have done so, it only means there is a discord between our present and our past state of feeling. The artificiality of the explanation is striking; and

it is curious that the late Prof. Green, whose statement of Determinism is very able, could persuade himself it was quite compatible with this doctrine to maintain that the attitude of a man to his past might be one of conscious revulsion, and that he was capable of morally reforming himself. Of course an individual's reaction against his former character is not intelligible apart from his past: to say it is the necessary outcome of the past is another matter.

Prof. Pattison argues that Martineau's theory implies a characterless self whose power to determine itself "at will to either branch of an alternative" means the liberty of indifference. Of liberty of indifference so called, all that need be said is that choice if moral is not indifferent, and man is not proved responsible by being made unaccountable. Martineau hardly laid sufficient stress on the fact that an act to be moral must have a connection with character: it must represent the man in some aspect. Repentance itself would be meaningless if the act repented did not refer to a development of the inner life, and so must be owned by the individual as his. Is it possible to conserve the truth for which Martineau contended, and also to do justice to the aforementioned fact? I would venture to state the case thus. Character is a condition of personality, and so of freedom, while the presupposition of character is the self without which memory and recognition would be impossible. So man is an object to himself, and reflects upon himself. In its temporal development character is formed out of the unorganised: conative tendencies and desires are not harmonised, and the self contains diverse possibilities. But when the self has shaken itself loose from the life of mere impulse, and reflects, it finds itself free to act on different conceptions of itself; for a motive is only an aspect of the self, and in will the self so conceived is realised. In the temporal development of the individual, then, diverse conceptions of self as object are present, though each has its connection with the inner life, and represents the man in some degree. These alternatives presented by the inner life are real, and choice between them is possible. For character has not become a unified whole, so that only one course of action is prescribed by it. Thus we say of a particular act that it was "so characteristic of the man"; of another, it was "so unlike him." Which means that the one act was more in harmony with the main current of aspiration and endeavour than the other, although both refer to the content of the self. From this standpoint the self which *acts* is not characterless.

Against this it will be urged that, if the self which acts has character, the self which chooses is an abstraction. What really chooses, we may be told, is the self already qualified by some idea of itself. Yet here the problem of choice is only removed a step further back. And if it be true that the self *owns* its ideas, and not the ideas the self, we do not get beyond the fact that the self, as subject in the first instance, identifies itself with one idea of the self as object in preference to another. We may perhaps add that the self which deliberates and selects is at least negatively defined by its relation to the alternatives presented. Our claim, then,

amounts to this. We credit the self with power to initiate conduct (subject to limitations imposed by its own inner history) which is not the necessary outcome of the past, though related to the past. The point of view raises difficulties, but it commended itself to Lotze as well as to Martineau. I venture to think its difficulties are less than those of Determinism in any form.

One further point. We must distinguish between the freedom of the "open alternative" and freedom in the larger sense. The latter means the actualisation of all personal capacities for good, and would imply a perfected social system. As such it is an ideal, and for us at all events freedom in the narrower sense is one of the conditions of progress towards it. The distinction corresponds to that drawn by theologians between *posse non peccare* and *peccare non posse*. Prof. Pringle-Pattison appears to have the higher freedom in view when he speaks of man as "not a punctual or self-contained unity, but in virtue of his reason a sharer in a universal life." But the temporal endeavour after this ampler freedom is significant and testing just because of the real alternatives involved. And when Prof. Pattison speaks of "the absolute claim of the moral ideal, and its infinitely regenerative power in breaking the yoke of the past," he must postulate a specific act of freedom by which the individual accepted the ideal as his end, though it was open to him to choose a lower end. A like postulate is necessary in the case of religious faith. Finally, it is quite in harmony with the view I have indicated, that the more character becomes unified and consolidated in experience, the less open does the alternative presented to choice become. Were perfect freedom realised and goodness the living and immanent law of the soul, evil could exercise no appeal to the inner life. And in the degree that a man becomes consistently bad, his power to choose the good diminishes. But for us the way to perfect freedom or to perfect bondage is made possible by the exercise of a liberty to choose, limited but real, the liberty for which Martineau contended.

GEO. GALLOWAY.

CASTLE-DOUGLAS, N.B.

DID PAUL WRITE ROMANS?

I.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1903, p. 309, and April 1903, p. 532.)

1. It is a grave error in classification when Prof. Schmiedel writes me down a "rectilinear theorist." Far be it! Early Christianity looks to me least of all like a palm, far more like a banyan. Distinctively "Pauline" ideas and locutions seem to have been widely disseminated many years before Paul. But on this point I prefer not to enlarge, in anticipation of the

critical grounding of my notions by the publication of researches now undergoing final preparation for the press.

In this connection, however, I must be allowed to protest against the phrase employed by Van Manen (doubtless quite innocently) in the *Ency. Bib.* that the new criticism had "been adopted by" me. The fact is that my present position with respect to the chief epistles was attained under the guidance of the critical German School, particularly of Holsten, Volkmar, Lipsius, Klöpper, before I had learned to read Dutch, in ignorance even of Steck, while Loman was but a name. On perceiving the irresistible trend of my studies, undertaken seventeen years ago wholly in the spirit of Holsten, towards the "radical criticism" known to me only as a vague report and as everywhere spoken against, I resolved to withhold myself from contact with that criticism and to allow my mind to play undisturbed over the Greek text until my opinions were definitely formed. This course seemed to be necessary, if my opinions were to have any independent weight. Not until after my Analysis of Romans was committed to writing (1896-8) in a volume, *Argumenta Interna*, which I have not yet published, did I study Dutch and learn to read Loman and Van Manen. This statement seems important, as showing that minds proceeding independently, from premises very wide apart, have been forced, even against their wills, to the same conclusion. But as to the more general problem of Early Christianity and Christian Literature, my own opinion resembles Steck's and Van Manen's as little as Schmiedel's or Harnack's, and departs at right angles from any with which I am acquainted.

2. Regarding the connection or want of connection between chapters iii. and iv., Prof. Schmiedel would save the unity by sacrificing the logicality—a questionable service to the Paulinity. Vainly, however; for not only is there no hint of any such "change" or process, not only is the text of iv. 1 in the last degree uncertain, but—and this is *decisive*—the locution *τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν* cannot introduce a *reason* for the foregoing assertion, "we establish law,"—that would demand "for" or "because,"—but only a *consequence* of the foregoing; such is the force of the whole phrase, especially of the "accordingly" (*οὖν*). Now it is perfectly clear that only a *reason* and not a *consequence* is in order.

3. We grant Prof. Schmiedel that it would be an improper use of a probably interpolated verse, to adduce it in evidence of the date of the whole. *But nothing of the kind is done* in the January memoir. We grant that every verse, except of course where the connection is plainly indissoluble, must stand on its own feet; it need not involve its neighbours. Nevertheless, the multiplication of such interpolations soon becomes formidable. Many mites make a mickle. The surgeon may boldly excise a single tumour; it may be fatal to excise them in number.

4. I have not inferred sutures *solely* from the existence even of notable variants, but only from the co-existence of such variants with equally notable discontinuities in structure, or in sense, or in both. Even if the probability of failure of any one of many such independent inferences were

large, the probability of the simultaneous failure of all would still be vanishingly small—a consideration of capital importance.

5. Similarly, if each of the successive if's by which Prof. Schmiedel would seek to account for the absence of *Ρωμη* were individually likely enough, instead of being very unlikely, such a superfetation of hypothesis would still have nothing to recommend it.

Kindred reflections continue to suggest themselves, but enough; the general fairness and open-mindedness of this "reply" should move any one to gratitude, to admiration, and even to emulation.

In conclusion, let me emphasise beyond all else this axiom: No rebuttal of any or even of every one of my contentions *severally* can be decisive or satisfactory; it is only *the collective judgment upon the whole body of facts* that must finally prevail.

WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH.

NEW ORLEANS.

II.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1903, p. 544.)

THE hypothesis set forth by Professor Schmiedel in his article "Did Paul write Romans?" in the April number of the *Hibbert Journal*, pp. 544-546, is very suggestive. On one point it curiously coincides with some remarks in the introduction to Professor Menzies' *The Earliest Gospel*: viz. on "The strange fact that it was not a matter of pressing importance to the first Christians to be acquainted with the details of the life of Jesus on the earth" (pp. 8, 9). The argument of the hypothesis might be put more clearly—to some minds at least. As to mine, I should put it thus. Paul the Pharisee, being a thoughtful and serious man, became conscious, by personal experience, of the futility of earning salvation by means of a perfect fulfilment of the Law. He looked around for a remedy, and observed the Christians. Their chief tenet was, "that God had put His Son to death to make the salvation of men possible," or that salvation was to be had by faith in the crucified Jesus. Thereupon he argued within himself: if Christianity was true, it must be God's will that all shall accept faith in the crucified Jesus, but not that they should observe the Law. Here he was met by the difficulty that he observed that the Christians, in spite of their tenet, still insisted on the observance of the Law. Upon inquiry regarding this difficulty, he appears to have been told by them that "Jesus himself had lived upon earth in general obedience to the Law." He now argued thus: either Christianity is not true, or the Christians are inconsistent. Distracted by this disjunction, he refused acceptance of Christianity, till he had the vision which solved the difficulty: Christianity was true, but the Christians were inconsistent. Thoroughgoing as he was, Paul at once accepted the solution, and acted on it. He became at once a convert to Christianity as well as a reformer of it. He eliminated the inconsistency.

This explains why Paul takes little notice of Jesus' life on earth (the death on the Cross and the resurrection excepted). He only knew the heavenly Jesus of the vision; the earthly Jesus he had not known; and the account of Him, as given to him, that he lived in the observance of the Law, he did not accept, because it appeared to him inconsistent with the heavenly Jesus whom he knew. His view of Jesus and of the doctrine of Jesus, Paul impressed on the Christians of his making. Hence it was that those Christians felt no need of a "Gospel," *i.e.* a story of Jesus' earthly life. When later on, by reason of the practical needs of Church government and practices, the need of a "Gospel" was felt, that need was supplied, but in the "Gospel," as now written, Jesus was represented as living consistently with His doctrine, *i.e.* as rejecting the observance of the Law; see, *e.g.*, Matt. xii. 7-8; xv. 1-20, etc.

A query suggests itself: May there not have been a written "Gospel" among those (Jewish) Christians who were not of Paul's making? If there was such a "Gospel," how did it represent Jesus? On the hypothesis, one would suppose, that it represented Jesus living in the observance of the Law. If so, the "Gospel" of Pauline Christians (*i.e.* the Gospels as we now have them), if it was founded on an earlier Gospel of the other (Jewish) Christians, must have altered it considerably. That is, if there ever was, *e.g.*, a Hebrew original of Matthew's Gospel, it must have been, in its presentation of Jesus' earthly life, very different from the Greek recension now existing.

Professor Schmiedel's hypothesis brings out into strong relief the surpassing importance of Paul's vision. Without it, Paul would never have embraced Christianity; and but for Paul's conversion there would have been no Christianity in our sense. Pre-Pauline Christianity would have been but a Jewish sect, and in all probability would soon have died out.

The hypothesis leads to another reflection. If Paul's view of Jesus' earthly life, based on his vision of the heavenly Jesus, is right, Jesus never succeeded in making his Apostles thoroughly grasp his central doctrine implying the incompatibility of legal observance with faith in Himself. Considering the illiterate class from which the Apostles were drawn, that fact is perhaps not surprising. From the literate class, perhaps, the only convert he had was Nicodemus, but he, evidently, was a timid and retiring character. If he understood the truth, he was not the man to propagate it. But that there existed some believers in Jesus who had rightly understood Him, is apparent from the very narrative of Paul's vision in Acts ix. It was not the heavenly Jesus Himself who solved the difficulty for Paul, but the latter was directed by the vision to apply for the solution to Ananias. Ananias, therefore, must have understood the truth. But he, clearly, was a man of a similar character to Nicodemus, and but for Paul's applying to him, perhaps the truth would never have come out.

A. F. RUDOLF HOERNLE.

THE FAILURE OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN INDIA.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1903, p. 487.)

WHILE disposed to agree with Dr Oldfield both in his main contention that Christian missions in India have proved a failure and in the first of the reasons which he assigns for this, namely, that Christians are too slow to recognise and acknowledge what is good in Hinduism, I cannot assent to the second theory which he advances to account for this failure. Though at first sight it may seem plausible enough to maintain that it is the absence of asceticism and the disregard of ritual in the lives of our missionaries which causes the failure of Christianity to strike the imagination of the people of India and revolutionise their spiritual life in the same way as that of the ancient world, yet, in the first place, it is not in accordance with fact to deny that a large number of our missionaries, more especially the Roman Catholics, do live lives as ascetic and devoted as any Brahmin priest; and in the second place, the theory leads Dr Oldfield at once into a manifest inconsistency. He has not written a dozen lines before he says, "the Master Jesus would be followed by His millions if he appeared in human form in the great land of Hindustan"; and yet the plaint of the high caste Brahmin must recall to every mind that of the Pharisees about Christ, "behold a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners"! And again, "the disciples of John fast often, and make supplications; likewise also the disciples of the Pharisees; but thine eat and drink." In the same way Christ offended the susceptibilities of the Pharisees by eating with unwashed hands and breaking the Sabbath. And yet Jesus Christ's mission was no failure. He appealed to no narrow caste, hide-bound in trivial formalism, but to the poor and suffering, the meek and lowly, the great masses of the people. And these are the classes which our missionaries endeavour, and rightly endeavour, to reach to-day. Dr Oldfield appears to have contented himself too much with studying the Brahminical "Pharisee."

Comparatively easy, therefore, as would be the solution of the problem were Dr Oldfield's explanation of what that problem is correct, one is forced reluctantly to seek elsewhere the reason for our failure. I say "reluctantly," because, did the remedy lie in a more punctilious observance of outward forms, nay, even in our sending out as missionaries men in whose breast still burns the lamp of mediæval asceticism, the task would not present any insuperable difficulty. But the evil is not one to be so easily got over.

The difficulty which faces us is, I take it, not to exemplify Christian doctrine by sufficiently saintly lives, but to make the truths of Christianity appeal to the Indian as they did to the world two thousand years ago. This Christianity at present fails to do. It strikes no chord in the Indian's heart, awakes no sense of sin, presents no avenue of escape from pain and death.

The worse type of Indian is ready to accept Christianity for the material benefit it brings him, the better is ready to discuss it from an intellectual standpoint, but neither goes further and welcomes it as a solution of the problem of life. Here is what the Rev. G. Longridge says in his history of the Oxford mission to Calcutta, with regard to the attitude of mind of the average educated Bengali :—

“The Bengali is always ready to talk about religion—nothing is easier than to get him on to a religious subject ; but then one discovers, to one’s great disappointment, that his interest in it is merely intellectual and superficial, and that nothing is further from his thoughts than to accept any responsibility for such truth as he is led to acknowledge.”

Here is food for reflection indeed. Admittedly the Indian mind is ripe for the reception of a new religion, but the religion offered does not apparently meet the want. The mind hungers for spiritual sustenance, but what we give is not “bread.” We have destroyed the Indian’s belief in his own religion, we offer him our own instead, and to our surprise he declines it as no more satisfactory than his own. And yet the circumstances are closely parallel with those under which the Christian religion first spread with such miraculous rapidity. It is true we have not in India the expectation of a coming Messiah, but, after all, the Messianic idea was the birth-right of but an insignificant part of that ancient world which Christianity leavened and transformed in a few decades. Substantially the position is the same. As in the pagan world, so in India the old religion has grown powerless to affect men’s wills, the forms of religion have become mere irksome trammels, clung to perhaps in some cases the more closely because they are all that is left, in others cast off altogether, and the best minds are seeking for something new to replace the old and outworn. “There is no more tragic event under the sun,” writes a native gentleman, “than the death of a nation, and this consists in the destruction of the beliefs, institutions, and national peculiarities that give it an individual character. This awful tragedy is now going on in India. The old religion is dying ; the old morality is dying ; the bonds of custom and tradition, which are the bones and sinews of the social organism, are dissolving ; there is death and decomposition all around.” How closely this description corresponds with the state of the pagan world at the introduction of Christianity, and yet how different the effect produced ! And why ? What prevents Christianity appealing to the Indian to-day with the same magic force as it did to Jew and Pagan two thousand years ago ? This is the question we must answer before we can hope to get further towards evangelising India, and it is one which admits of two answers, and—unless human nature is different from what it was two thousand years ago—two only. Either Christianity is and has always been essentially unsuited to the Oriental mind, or we have made it so ; either the truths which awakened such immediate response in the hearts of the varied races of the Roman empire touch no responsive chord in the Indian heart, or our Christianity of to-day is not the Christianity of Jesus Christ. Whatever modicum of truth the first of these sug-

gested answers may contain, we cannot accept it as completely accounting for our lack of success in proselytising India. The peoples among whom the gospel first took root were essentially Orientals—the Jews themselves, the people of Antioch and Alexandria, for example. The second answer, however, seems to offer a complete explanation, namely, that what we are proclaiming to the heathen is not the evangel of Christ, but the elaborate structure of European theology into which we have woven much that was Jewish—some of which was, in turn, got from Egypt—much that was derived from the philosophy and the mysteries of Greece, much that was Roman, much even that was barbaric. For a great part of our Church doctrine there is no warrant in the writings of St Paul, much less in the words of Jesus Christ. Even in its earliest stages Christianity underwent rapid changes, changes which it would be out of place, indeed impossible, to analyse here; but briefly put, they consisted in the development of what Professor Harnack has called Christology and the absorption of Hebraism and Hellenism. Christology is largely founded upon the Hebraistic idea of the Messiah, from which were developed the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection and the divine nature of Jesus Christ, and finally the doctrine of the Trinity. Then from Hellenism Christianity drew first the philosophical conception of the “Logos,” and in the third century the ideas of the “Gnostics,” but most important of all, the idea which changed the character of Christianity more than anything else, that religion consists in *doctrine*, the old Socratic idea that virtue is knowledge. Introduced originally from the philosophers, the idea was strengthened and made permanent by the struggle with Gnosticism which drove the Church to creed-making. And all this in less than three hundred years. The wonder is that to-day Christianity presents any resemblance at all to the original message of its Founder. But should we be surprised that, when we attempt to cram into the Eastern mind the product of two thousand years of Western thought, we awaken no response? When we get away from the bed rock of Christ’s teaching, can we be certain that we are dealing with living truths which will appeal to men the world over? That, on the other hand, the fundamental ideas of Christianity do appeal to the Eastern mind is shown by the words of Keshub Chunder Sen, one of the leaders of the theistic sect of Hinduism, the Brahma Somaj :—

“If you wish to secure that attachment and allegiance of India, it must be through spiritual influence and moral suasion. And such indeed has been the case in India. You cannot deny that your hearts have been touched, conquered, and subjugated by a superior power. That power, need I tell you, is Christ. It is Christ who rules British India, and not the British Government. England has sent out a tremendous moral force in the life and character of that mighty prophet to conquer and hold this vast empire.”

And yet we refuse to acknowledge such men as Christians because, forsooth, they are unable to accept ready-made the theology of Europe.

Who shall say that in so refusing we are guiltless of that crime for the committer of which it were better that a millstone were hanged about his neck and he were cast into the sea?

GEORGE F. DEAS.

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GREEN'S ACCOUNT OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1903, pp. 595 *seqq.*)

MR A. E. TAYLOR'S review of Professor Sidgwick's Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau is both able and appreciative. There are, however, some points in it having reference to Green, and chiefly to Green's view of Greek Ethics, on which I would beg to be allowed to say a few words. It is as editor of the lectures, and thus having a somewhat close acquaintance with them, that I venture, though not indeed without much hesitation, to ask permission to do this.

Mr Taylor complains that Professor Sidgwick shows rather "acute perception of particular difficulties" than "clear insight into the merits and defects of Green's view of life as a whole." But in recognising (as he does recognise) the soundness and fairness of Professor Sidgwick's contentions (1) that Green's description of the "eternal consciousness" has been "in such purely cognitive categories as to leave it a mystery how an ideal of any perfection other than perfection of insight into the system of relations which make up nature is to be extracted from it"; (2) that Green confuses the view that a self-conscious agent obtains satisfaction in *seeking* particular objects, with "the very different view" that his "satisfaction lies in the *attaining* of the objects sought"; (3) That Green wavers between the view (a) that *good* should be limited to the mere acquisition of the will to be moral, and is thus non-competitive, and (b) that *good* is competitive, including the completest actualisation of the agent's capacities (scientific, artistic, etc.)—in recognising all this, Mr Taylor does certainly admit the validity of very sweeping and fundamental criticisms of Green's general view. The inadequacy of his metaphysical basis of ethics, his uncertainty whether it is in *seeking* or in *finding* that man is to obtain *good*, his conflicting assertions as to the character of *good* as regards its competitiveness or non-competitiveness, are not merely "particular difficulties"; they are confusions which emphatically affect the "view of life as a whole"—which, in fact, as it seems to me, entirely prevent our being able to say what Green's view of life as a whole really is.

Again, Mr Taylor doubts whether Green is open to the charge of misconceiving Aristotle's doctrine to anything like the extent which Professor Sidgwick maintains, and holds that it is "mistaken in principle to deny that the *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* of the *Ethics* is much what Green means by

the 'good will,' to argue that, with Aristotle, it is not the mere will, *e.g.* to know what is true, or to make what is beautiful, but the *exercised faculty* that is important (p. 89 ff.), is surely not to the point, etc." As regards "the will to know what is true" of which Green speaks, it may be noted that this would come rather under the head of *theoretical* than of *practical* excellence; and it seems indisputable, as Professor Sidgwick indicates, that in Aristotle's theoretical excellence "the exercised faculty of knowing what is true is the important point"—that Aristotle would not have regarded "a ridiculously unsuccessful researcher" as possessing theoretical excellence, however set he may have been upon knowing the truth, however much he may have had the "will" to know it. As regards "the will to make what is beautiful," to produce objects of artistic value, Mr Taylor would probably not refuse, on reflection, to admit that it is, as Professor Sidgwick says, "quite un-Aristotelian" to reckon this as a part of *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*. And though, no doubt, *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* is Aristotle's name for virtue or moral excellence, and *the good will* is Green's name for moral excellence, it does not follow that this excellence is conceived or defined in the same way by the two thinkers—that they each give to it the same content. In fact, as we have seen, Mr Taylor himself allows that Green leaves us in bewildering uncertainty as to what he means by *good*; and as long as we do not know what the *good* is, we do not know what the *good will* is, and are obviously unable to identify this with Aristotle's *ξέλις προαιρετική*, which, as he elsewhere explains, is "that by which we are habituated to feel pleasure and pain at the proper objects."

And even supposing that the difficulty about the meaning and character of *good* has been overcome, and even, further, that we could say exactly what we mean by *will*, we have still to ask whether the man who has a good will is one who, *purely for right's sake*, wills what he thinks right (which is what Kant intends by having a good will), or simply who wills what he believes to be right (or good), or whether he wills the really right end, or both the right end and the right means to it. It cannot be affirmed that Green meets and clears up the difficulties of this further problem, though he does say (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 295) that "there is no real reason to doubt that the good or evil in the motive of an action is exactly measured by the good or evil in its consequences as rightly estimated,—estimated, that is, in their bearing on the production of a good will, or the perfecting of mankind." That motive and result are always precisely correspondent in this way seems indeed to be a monstrous assumption; but even if we make it, we are as much in the dark as before, since both "motive" and "consequence" have to be estimated by reference to good will (or perfection); and as pointed out above, Green cannot tell us even whether *good* is competitive or not. "Hitherto I have urged you forward and still urge you," he seems to say, "without the slightest idea what is our destination."

Mr Taylor (p. 597) further criticises Professor Sidgwick for complaining that Green represents Aristotle as "finding the essence of courage

in endurance of pain and fear in the service of the State, whereas his real ground for approving it is the moral beauty of the brave act"; and he puts forward two reasons in support of his criticism: (1) Tyrtæus says, *τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν · ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν περὶ τῆ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον*, and he (Mr Taylor thinks) may be taken to represent "current Hellenic opinion," and "answer for his countrymen generally"; and (2) Aristotle holds that "the citizen soldier proves himself braver in extreme danger than the professional."

Now, though Tyrtæus may have represented the national sentiment of the period of the *Ethics*, still we should require independent evidence to show this, and the appeal to him certainly seems a little far-fetched, for he flourished in the seventh century B.C., and current opinion had at any rate had time to become modified in the intervening three centuries, even supposing the Athenian poet and schoolmaster to have been, ever so truly, representative of the common moral opinion of his own age. Moreover, his stirring lyrics, composed to encourage the dispirited Spartans to vigorous effort in the Second Messenian War, may very possibly, in that crisis of national existence, have magnified the average popular estimate of good patriots fighting against the enemies of their country. And Professor Sidgwick would allow that "if we are examining the causes of the special admiration given by Greek common-sense . . . to valour in war . . . we are right in connecting it with the social importance of this quality in an age when an individual's welfare was more completely bound up with that of his State than is now the case." Still it seems true that in Aristotle's analysis of Common-sense Morality in the *Ethics* (which is what is under discussion) we "can find no trace of this view," and that Aristotle "simply conceives the brave man as realising moral beauty in his act"; according to him, "the beautiful (*τὸ καλόν*) is the end for the sake of which the brave man endures and does whatever is brave." That endurance of pain and fear for the sake of the State, that self-devotion for a worthy end, that willingness to endure even unto complete self-renunciation, which Green talks about, are surely very far removed from Aristotle's ideal of courage or valour. "To the brave man his bravery is a noble thing (*καλόν*). Such then will be the end which his bravery as a whole has in view" (*Eth. Nic.*, iii. 7). Bravery ought to be "a free act prompted by desire of what is noble (*καλόν*)." "Bravery is a mean state . . . leading us to choose danger and to face it, either because to do so is noble (*καλόν*), or because not to do so is base (*Eth. Nic.*, iii. 7).

And when Aristotle speaks of the courage of the (volunteer) citizen contingent, who face death from fear of disgrace or hope of reputation, exalting them above veteran soldiers, the comparison is, I think, not (as Mr Taylor appears to suggest) between two forms of courage, but between a form of courage and the lack of it; for we are referred to a case in which the citizen soldiers died at their post because for them flight would bring disgrace, whereas veterans sometimes play the coward and run away because they understand how desperate their position is. "Citizens," Aristotle tells us, "seem often to face dangers because of legal pains and penalties on the

one hand, and honours on the other" (*Eth. Nic.*, iii. 8). No doubt the man who stays at his post is braver than the man who, running away in order to escape death, does not exhibit even a semblance of bravery; but this "civic courage" of the citizen soldier (the same which Tyrtæus extols) proceeds from fear of disgrace, or from regard to honour and reputation, the due pursuit of which latter is in Aristotle's view the province of a different virtue from courage; and though this civic courage is the best of the five counterfeits or semblances enumerated by Aristotle, it is not, according to his account, valour of the true and noblest sort—the valour of the man who acts for the sake of the moral beauty of bravery itself—*τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*, just as in the case of other kinds of really virtuous actions. And in fact, in the very chapter from which Mr Taylor quotes, Aristotle expressly points out the inferiority of the citizen soldier's civic or political courage,—courage inspired by the anticipation either of legal pains and penalties or of honours. However near this best of the five "semblances" is to the courage that comes up to Aristotle's ideal of virtuous action—and it cannot perhaps be denied that, though as I believe distinct, it does come near—Green's account seems quite inadequate. It could surely not be maintained that either Aristotle himself or the current morality of his day would have dreamt of affirming that true courage could *only* be exhibited by a citizen enduring pain and fear in battle, in the service of his State.

The psychological and metaphysical views which Mr Taylor incidentally advocates or indicates in his review, the question of the conciliation of Intuitionism with Benthamite Utilitarianism, and the charge of non-progressiveness brought against "the Hedonist's good," are problems too large to be entered upon in this note.

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REVIEWS

The Development of Modern Philosophy, with other Lectures and Essays.—By Robert Adamson, M.A., LL.D., sometime Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Edited by W. R. Sorley, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. 2 vols. Pp. xlvi. 358, xv. 330.—Edinburgh and London: Blackwood & Sons, 1903.

IN the preparation of these volumes Prof. Sorley has done a great service to philosophical thinking. They are a very valuable contribution to the history of modern philosophy by one of the most learned and thorough of its teachers, and they enable us to understand the general lines of Prof. Adamson's thought in the later years of his life. They also make us feel more keenly than ever the loss we have sustained in his untimely death, the loss of the history of psychology, "on which he had been occupied for many years," and which "does not seem to have been written out in any part," and of the history of modern philosophy, "which he had had in view for an even longer time." The total amount of Prof. Adamson's publication was considerable, but, with the exception of his valuable little books on Kant and Fichte, almost all his published writings were articles in encyclopædias and reviews. The issue of those substantial volumes will do much to make his position as an author commensurate with his reputation as a wonderfully erudite and acute thinker. Prof. Sorley, in his preface, referring to the previous publications of lectures by Scottish Professors of philosophy, such as Thomas Brown, Sir Wm. Hamilton, and James Frederick Ferrier, justly remarks that "in the range and accuracy of his learning Prof. Adamson was probably at least Hamilton's equal, and in his own thinking he was as little swayed by the authority of any great name as was Brown or Ferrier." It may be added that the lectures contained in these volumes include matter as permanent in value as any that has been left to us by these teachers of former generations. In the case of Prof. Adamson, however, the difficulty of editing has been greatly increased by the absence of manuscript. "I wrote all my lectures the first year" at Owens College, he once told the editor; "re-wrote them the second; and burned them the third." Consequently, says Prof. Sorley, "it was not altogether a surprise to me, on examining his manu-

scripts, to find that there was no scrap of his handwriting bearing on his work as a Scottish Professor." Yet his "whole course had always been thoroughly thought out, and each portion of it was carefully prepared." "Long practice had made him a master of the rare art of slow, consecutive, and lucid speech. His method was not conversational but systematic, and what he said could not be fully appreciated unless written out and considered at leisure." The lectures, which form the greater part of these volumes, have thus been taken from students' notes, one set of which has been found so full and accurate that "the manuscript written in the lecture-room was used as copy for the printer." In spite of the absence of original manuscript, the lectures read as if they had been written for publication.

Prof. Sorley deserves the reader's gratitude for the remarkable editorial skill with which he has prepared the work for the press. In addition to a brief but admirable memorial introduction on the life, character, and opinions of Prof. Adamson, he has divided the lectures into chapters and provided the book with a bibliography of the author and a valuable analytical table of contents. He has also supplied many references, and the whole work has been carefully indexed by Mr. Lobban.

The first volume consists of lectures on the history of philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, and on "suggestions towards a theory of knowledge based on the Kantian." The first half of the second volume contains several "occasional essays and addresses," hitherto unpublished, on a variety of topics mainly philosophical, while the second half is made up of lectures on the principles of psychology, with special reference to the psychology of thinking. Regarding the lectures on the history of modern philosophy it is not necessary to say much by way of discussion. Occupying comparatively small space, they cover a very large ground, and they show the skill of a master in selecting essential principles for exposition, dealing with great difficulties briefly but forcibly and acutely, and clearly indicating the historic continuity of thought and the logical filiation of the various systems. The philosophies of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant are treated much more fully than those of Malebranche, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and the post-Kantian idealists. The account of Descartes lays stress upon the view that his method is essentially a generalisation of mathematics, and it very clearly shows the implication of Occasionalism in Descartes' fundamental principles. In the discussion of Malebranche the most important feature is the exposition of his view of "ideas" as distinct from "modalities of the soul," as having a kind of independent existence, a view corresponding to "the so-called 'representative' doctrine of sense-perception." This question of the existential character of truth is, in Prof. Adamson's opinion, a question of fundamental importance, and in expounding his own position he discusses it in various forms. To make truth existential, to regard "objects of intellectual apprehension as constituting a realm of existence over against which the world of concrete facts stands in inexplicable opposition," is to be "driven along the line of

that philosophical speculation which begins with Plato and which we might call Rationalism, or Mysticism, or Idealism." On the other hand, to insist "that truth has significance and meaning only in reference to the thinking mind, that the term 'truth' names not an existing thing but the way in which a thinking mind organises its experience," is to leave "no antithesis between the worlds of essential reality and of phenomenal appearance" and to follow "the line of speculation which historically may be named the Empirical or Naturalist." The second of these views is that which Prof. Adamson himself adopts, and the conception of Idealism which he here indicates should be remembered in considering his criticism of idealistic positions.

The account of Spinoza is suggestive as regards some of the chief difficulties of the system; but it is very brief and slight. It is taken from notes of lectures delivered much earlier than the others, and one is inclined to think that it does not altogether express Prof. Adamson's later views. The philosophy of Leibniz, on the other hand, is expounded and discussed with great fulness and lucidity, doubtless in view of its importance in relation to the exposition and criticism of Kant, as well as on account of its influence in stimulating thought, and its development of the principles of Cartesianism so as to "suggest, at all events, the kind of supplement they need." The lectures on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, are in many ways suggestive; but, though they deal with all the main points of doctrine, they are comparatively slight in treatment. As might be expected, the account of Kant's philosophy is much more elaborate and thorough than that of any of the other systems. Nothing was more characteristic of Prof. Adamson than his interest in Kant, and his systematic discussions in these volumes of epistemology and psychology have as their centre the Kantian theories. "Throughout his career," says Prof. Sorley, "the authors whom he read most constantly were Aristotle, Kant, and Lotze; but Kant was the only one of the three with whom he can be said, at any period, to have been in fundamental agreement. And from first to last he looked upon the Kantian criticism as the stage from which the next advance in philosophical thought must be made." His general attitude towards the Kantian position is indicated at the beginning of the lectures on Kant. The lines of speculation represented by Locke and Leibniz, both "issued in the severance of mind from reality." "The general note of the Kantian system is the reinstatement of mind as in vital and essential relation to reality." Yet Kant to some extent fails, owing to his retention of some of the presuppositions of Locke and Leibniz. "Like Locke and Berkeley, he is inclined to regard ideas as somehow a medium between mind and reality, and with Leibniz he is too much inclined to regard the ideal of completed knowledge as a state in which the one relation is identity, and he is therefore precluded from bringing mind into more than a problematical relation to reality." These defects, however, do not represent the general drift of his work. It is hardly necessary to say that in these lectures, as a whole, we have a

masterly exposition of Kant's theory of Knowledge. The chapters on "the transition to the critical method," and on "the forms of intuition" give a specially clear and illuminating account of one of the most difficult parts of Kant's work. In the valuable chapter on "four points of Kantian doctrine," and especially in the section on the "thing-in-itself," we have a very acute analysis and criticism of some fundamental positions of Kant and an indication of Prof. Adamson's own view, which is fully developed in the lectures on epistemology and psychology. In particular, there may be noted the contention that "we cannot with Kant accept the objective unity of self-consciousness, the representation of the unity of self, its continued identity in the manifold of experience, as a primary datum," and, in close connection with this, the argument by which it is maintained that Kant fails completely to overcome Subjective Idealism. Kant's position, in brief, amounts to this, that "in the long run the real object to which we attach intuition is never more than the necessary representation of order requisite as the counterpart of self-consciousness," regarded as a primary datum. Kant unsuccessfully endeavours to discriminate between this view and Subjective Idealism by "pointing to the difference between external and internal intuition, regarding these as certainly still phenomena, and therefore only complexes of representations, but as possessing an ultimate and irreducible difference." But Kant does not consistently adhere to "the representation of a twofold order of objects, outer and inner." In the long run he admits that the only objects are the outer, and this leaves his position indistinguishable from Subjective Idealism, and at the same time seems to Prof. Adamson to confirm the view that "the highly abstract distinction of subject and object is not a primitive datum but a derivative," emerging gradually "through the much more concrete oppositions between self and not-self, and, in the long run, from the opposition between the least determinate of such correlations, that which we indicate by the terms 'feeling' and 'space-occupying.'" On the other hand, Fichte and the later German Idealists seek to overcome the implications of Subjective Idealism in the philosophy of Kant, by regarding the self-consciousness which is constructive of experience as in no sense individual but as infinite and absolute. It is clear that this method of solving the difficulty was not regarded by Prof. Adamson as satisfactory, but his brief and lucid accounts of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are in the main expository rather than critical.

Prof. Adamson's own position is developed in the lectures on theory of knowledge (vol. i.) and on psychology (vol. ii.). The foundations of his view are laid in three of the occasional essays and addresses printed in vol. ii., viz., the Glasgow "Inaugural Address," and the papers on "Psychology and Epistemology" and on "Kant's View of Psychology." As I have already indicated, the starting-point of Prof. Adamson's constructive theory lies in the problem of Subjective Idealism. The subjective idealist position, in greater or less degree, is characteristic of the whole

movement of thought from Descartes to Kant—both of the Continental Rationalism and of the English Empiricism. Kant's critical method affords the beginning of a way of escape from it, but Kant's own theory is still vitiated by it, and, as we have seen, neither his solution of the difficulty nor that of the later German Idealists is satisfactory. Prof. Adamson was averse both from the extreme Realist and the extreme Idealist view, both from the reduction of thought to physical reality and from the merging of reality in thought. In the concluding pages of his book on Fichte he definitely rejects the view that "thought as a thing or product" can "explain the nature of thought as self-consciousness," or that "reflection upon self" is "explicable through the notion of mechanical composition." On the other hand, he declares (vol. i. p. 347) that "it is evidently a hypothesis for which no definite grounds can be offered, that the real core of existence, admitted as a factor in the presentation of the material [of sense], is of the nature of consciousness." Lotze's position, again, he regards as "after all only a half philosophy" (vol. ii. p. 12). His own endeavour, then, is to find, on the basis of the Kantian method, a middle way between the extremes, a middle way which he would rather describe as naturalism than as idealism. His method is to get behind the "hard-and-fast distinctions in which Kant delighted, the antitheses between sense and understanding, between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, between necessary and contingent," by a careful inquiry into the development of knowledge. This inquiry is carried out with great analytic skill and genuine scientific caution, in the lectures on psychology and epistemology. The cardinal defect of Kant's position is the separation between the form and the matter of experience, and the main ground of this separation is, in Prof. Adamson's view, the treatment of self-consciousness as an independent principle, a primary datum without a history. "From Kant's mode of approaching the question and stating the solution, the conclusion is inevitable that it is because of the unity of mind that subjective facts of sense-impression are organised into the orderly form of determined knowledge. But in truth, as it appears to me, the emphasis might, with more justice, be laid on the other side of the antithesis. It is in and through the organisation of experience in the form of knowledge of objective fact that mind becomes self-conscious, aware of its own unity; nor has its unity any significance other than what it obtains in and through the contrast with objective facts which is given in knowledge. The conditions of the possibility of experience are not forms imposed by the action of mind upon the chaotic material with which it is furnished from without, but the general characters of the experience wherein and whereby mind becomes possible at all" (vol. ii. pp. 15, 16). Accordingly, the representation of nature (or of experience) as a systematic whole, including both the order of the external world and the unity of self-consciousness, appears in our consciousness only "by gradual development from the simple primitive distinction between the sentient subject and an order of fact distinct from his perceiving and feeling, though devoid of the element of universal or general law" (vol. ii.

p. 282). Similarly, thinking is "a name for either a set of processes of the inner life or a set of modifications of the content apprehended through that inner life, based upon the simpler facts of perception, and constituting, therefore, not an isolated faculty or power in mind but a higher grade of what is given in simpler fashion in the primitive distinction between self and not-self" (*loc. cit.*).

It is not possible in a review even to indicate the rich variety of discussion on all the main problems of psychology, logic and epistemology, with which Prof. Adamson develops his position. Evidently in such a theory there is no place for Subjective Idealism. Ideas are not "in mind," but "of mind"; they have no independent existence. Again, the difference between perception and thought is only one of degree. The uniformity of nature is involved in perception as well as in thinking, and timelessness is not a special peculiarity of the content of thought, but a characteristic of our subjective apprehension of existence in all its forms. Similarly, "in the long run, in ultimate analysis, fact and truth coincide": the necessity of thought is ultimately of like kind with the necessity of fact. And further, as regards the relation of mind and body, such theories as occasionalism and parallelism fail, owing to their initial assumption of the independence of mind. These are but a few of the most interesting points, and I cannot refrain from mentioning also the luminous and suggestive discussion of space, time, and change in the lectures on theory of knowledge, the criticism of Lotze, and the account of the forms of judgment and of the relation between thought and language in the psychology lectures, and the valuable paper on the relations between psychology and epistemology.

Prof. Adamson's insistence on the derivative character of self-consciousness has important consequences as regards his view of development in psychology and of the value of the notion of "end." In the lectures on psychology, he sets aside the faculty theory as without significance for modern psychology, criticises with great acuteness the various forms of psychical atomism, and accepts the view that mental life is a development; but, as against Aristotle and Hegel, he contends that the notion of development, as applied to the mental life, must be freed from the implication of end or purpose. The notion of end in nature is not objectively valid; it is of subjective validity only, and it has no consistent application except within the limits of our practical experience. The view of "writers more or less of the Hegelian school" is "that the essential character of development is that nothing arises in it *de novo* which is not in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning. If pressed for an explanation of what is to be understood by this term 'preformed' or 'anticipated,' the adherents of the view respond, so far as I can make out, with only the equally general and difficult terms 'implicit' and 'explicit.' Development, in their view, would be expressed most briefly as making explicit what is already implicit" (vol. ii. p. 186). Now it is manifest that if the notion of development involves the existence of a "preformed plan" or "the doctrine that the final stage of realisation,

the ultimate end, is known beforehand," self-consciousness cannot be derivative, but must be primary. And it is not difficult to show that, in the case of the human mind, for instance, we have no clear anticipatory knowledge of the final end. Prof. Adamson's view seems to be that we make our ends and modify them as we go on, but that nowhere do we have anticipation of anything final, objective, and universal. Thus in the essay on "the basis of morality" he recognises that the formation of ideals "is the common characteristic of all exercise of reason, theoretical or practical." In morality, however, we cannot form the idea of an absolute best. "We are not in possession of any representation of completed morality, nor is it easy to avoid the conclusion that any such representation is self-contradictory. But it does not therefore follow that we are without the means of distinguishing degrees of excellence, of recognising a better" (vol. ii. p. 113).

As I have said, this is an inevitable conclusion from Prof. Adamson's main position. But I cannot regard it as doing justice either to the idealistic position or to the facts of the moral life. To take the latter point first, it is undoubtedly true that, in our reflective judgment upon any moral ideal, we cannot regard it as final, as the absolutely best. Yet in our actual devotion to a moral end, we do conceive it, not as better, but as best. We conceive it as absolute in the circumstances. Of course, we do not conceive it as unconditionally absolute: such a conception is self-contradictory. But from the admission that there is no unconditional absolute, no absolute which can be conceived without reference to any particular circumstances, it does not follow that there is no absolute at all, that the notion of end has only subjective validity. Again, Prof. Adamson's criticism of the idealist position is, I think, conclusive only against what might be called a monadologist idealism, an idealism that is, after all, essentially subjective. The view that all idealism is fundamentally subjective seems to me to underlie all the main arguments of these volumes. Prof. Adamson is discussing throughout the finite self-consciousness. He tacitly rejects the notion of an infinite self-consciousness; but it is nowhere explicitly discussed. And the absence of such a discussion leaves his theory incomplete. I cannot appraise too highly the value of what he has given us: it is eminently sound, thorough, and original. Yet I do not despair of reconciling it with an idealism on the lines of the Hegelian movement. And, in particular, it seems to me that Prof. Adamson's account of the meaning of "implicit" (a term with which he is exceedingly impatient) calls for supplement on idealist lines, and yet in harmony with his own view. "Its only legitimate meaning in the development of thought is that, under due conditions, the first less elaborated view of what is given may be supplanted by a more complete, which would have been impossible without the first, and which is therefore actually dependent on and conditioned by the first" (vol. ii. p. 297). The "implicit" thus conditions the "explicit," but does not completely condition it. From whence do the remaining conditions come? Another

passage in the same volume indicates Prof. Adamson's reply. "The development of what is implicit, even if we admit for the moment that ambiguous notion, is by no means to be regarded as dependent solely on the activity of some inner process: it is equally conditioned by the character of the matter presented in our perceptive experience" (p. 282). Why, then, should the term "implicit" be regarded as applying only to the one set of conditions and not to the other? Are we not entitled to say that the later stages of the development are implicit in the whole experience? Prof. Adamson seems to me practically to admit this when he says, regarding the distinction between consciously voluntary action and impulse, that "the higher does not involve the introduction of a new factor: in the lower there is involved what renders possible, by increase of such acts, the advance to the relatively higher" (p. 194). It is, I think, his pre-occupation with Subjective Idealism that leads him to limit the reference of the term "implicit" to the "inner" side of experience. He continually insists on the correlation of the inner and outer sides and their unity in experience. But the nature of this unity remains to be discussed, and I do not see that his argument as a whole precludes an idealist solution of the problem. The idealism, however, will not be one which regards "objects of intellectual apprehension as constituting a realm of existence over against which the world of concrete facts stands in inexplicable opposition."

Whether or not we can accept Prof. Adamson's position as a whole, this book is one to be very carefully read and pondered by all who are concerned in the living problems of philosophy. Not only is it conspicuously powerful in analysis and criticism, but on its constructive side it is highly original and suggestive. No brief discussion can do it justice, and any future idealist speculation must reckon with it.

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Letters from John Chinaman.—4th Edition. London:
R. Brimley Johnson, 1902.

THESE truly remarkable letters have now been before the public for some time, and, in their present form, have already run through four editions. This was only to be expected, both on account of intrinsic excellence and from the universal interest of the matters of which they treat. They form the most striking indictment of our modern civilisation that has appeared for a considerable time. From the standpoint of the fundamental contrast which is to be found in the life of the Far East the writer contemplates our Western aims and ideals in perspective. Each of the main departments of our national life is reviewed in order, and from them a common inference is made, that the people of Europe, and more especially

of England, have, in the rush and stress of competition and the selfish anxiety to succeed, lost the greatest of all arts, the true art of living. By a misdirected activity and an undue complication of life they have arrived at a point where life has become a caricature of itself. It no longer deserves the name, since the real life, the life of freedom and of thought, has been sacrificed for a feverish unrest in which there is no time for thought and men are the slaves of the monster which they had raised for their own service, the monster of civilisation.

The chief charge brought against our civilisation is its materialism, its pursuit of false ends to the neglect of those which are most essential to life, and its hypertrophied complexity. As the writer views it, our modern life is shorn of all those dearer relations which add the chief and most enduring charm to everyday existence. Home life is sacrificed in order that our sons may take the earliest opportunity of striking out a line for themselves in the world. They are sent away to school, and soon become independent of those influences which a home should never cease to exert. In so far as they succeed and make money speedily, the end of their existence is secured. Children, in fact, are investments, the means of a potential wealth. Our life, for a simpler reason, is not concerned with the present; it is a "cupidinous ravishment of the future." Everywhere there is ambition—an ambition not to fill most completely the place to which each man has been called by birth, but to win another and quite different place which shall be more lucrative; in fact, to "better his position." Since the hunt for wealth is purely individual and selfish, the structure of society has consequently become loosened. The individual, no longer the community, has come to be the first consideration.

As a contrast to this the writer adduces the life of the Chinese. In China each man is content with what he receives from fortune, and does not seek to add to his material prosperity at the cost of the higher elements of his nature. The community comes first, the individual second; and the nucleus of the community is the family. "Among us," he says, "it is a rule that a man is born into precisely those relations in which he is to continue during the course of his life. As he begins so he ends, a member of his family group, and to this condition the whole theory and practice of his life conforms. He is taught to worship his ancestors, to honour and obey his parents, and to prepare himself from an early age for the duties of a husband and a father. Marriage does not dissolve the family; the husband remains, and the wife becomes a member of his group of kinsmen. And this group is the social unit." The real point of contrast here lies, not so much in the existence or non-existence of the family affections in the two cases, as in the fundamental antithesis between the respective reactions on life. In the one case life is a continual activity; in the other, it might almost be called a state of passivity. If one feature might be selected as characteristic of the Chinese nation, it would be this lack of change or progress, this inertia and conservatism. As the writer truly says, Chinese civilisation is the oldest in the world; but it is also the one

which has courted change less than any other that the world has known. The whole problem which the letters of John Chinaman have sought to decide might be resolved into the ultimate question of progress as against conservatism, of a desire to advance, in whatever direction so long as some advance be made, as against a passive contentment with the actually existing. The decision must depend, in a great measure, on temperament. Both views of life can bring forward many philosophical arguments to support them. On the one hand, contentment with the world, as it is, and with the circumstances which fate has ordained, has a claim to respect on ethical grounds. On the other hand, the desire for progress seems to be, psychologically, more general, and on philosophical grounds more rational.

Psychologically it represents one of the deepest springs of action, a source, in fact, to which all human activity may be referred. Philosophically, or, more accurately, from the point of view of metaphysics, it reconciles itself with a purposive view of life. The striving after an end, even though this end be often misconceived, or, sometimes, not present to consciousness at all, is a necessary accompaniment of all rational functioning. The writer seems to have come to a somewhat hasty and unphilosophical conclusion when he condemns in so summary a manner this almost universal attribute of mankind. He makes the mistake, as in other places in the course of these letters, of judging ideas by their practical realisation. That activity is more likely than inactivity to offer subject for criticism is sufficiently obvious from the fact that the one is positive while the other is negative. With an activity which is continually pressing forward towards something new there is clearly more room for error; life becomes complex, and, at the same time, tentative. Instead of a formed experience there is continual experiment. Consequently there is, and always will be, much that will seem unsatisfactory in a civilisation whose watchword is progress. But this practical failure need not be employed as an argument against the *idea* of progress. It simply means that the activity has become perverted, or that side issues have been mistaken for main ends. Wealth, for instance, has no philosophical claim to be considered an end of life. It is merely a part of what Aristotle called the *ἐκτος χορηγία* of well-being. Of course, the adoption of a wrong end leads to entanglement along the whole line of activity which makes for that end. In this way the writer is correct in attributing the many evils of our Western civilisation to its materialism and its consecration of wealth as the ultimate object of life, since it is by their ideal, or their end, that any nation or community must be judged. In the same way he is right in calling attention to the dislocation of the mechanism of society as one of the results of our so-called progress. The inability of our government to settle economic grievances, to provide for the poor, the sick, and the aged, to secure a proper distribution of rights among the various classes, is due to the fact that our civilisation has been developed with a speed that is more than natural. The present moment is one of those times when the mass of inchoate material is being produced too fast for the governing body to deal with it. Settlement is always a

longer process than production, and so long as production proceeds at its present pace, order and stability must lag behind.

At present, however, we need not conclude that the over-activity of the moment precludes all possibility of a future disposition of those elements which at present appear incapable of resolution. The most serious danger seems to lie, not in the Material, but in the Final cause of our civilisation. If the making of money is to be the chief end of our life, it is true that all those other departments of life which our reason acknowledges to be the noblest, must die from atrophy. This result the writer already conceives to be attained. Religion, morality, art, and refinement, he considers, are now extinct in England. The writer turns from one illustration to another in his effort to show the falsehood and rottenness of our boasted institutions. Our average man, "the man whom we admire," is described in unflattering outline, and with a power of satire which would be more telling if it were true that we really admired this sort of man. Our lack of art and refinement are illustrated in various ways, but mostly from what may be observed in our Metropolis. London of course has, in one sense, a claim to be taken as characteristic of our nation. But it must also be remembered that London is a huge and complex community, the estimate of which must depend on which of its innumerable facets catches the light at the moment. A complete judgment on London would be a judgment on our entire civilisation; but such a judgment is impossible. Material and industrial activity, which may be taken broadly as characterising the English nation, brings in its train many unpleasant results, the misery and squalor of the poor, the enrichment of the least deserving, the dedication of human life to mean and mechanical employment, and the entire lack of much which makes life noble, and, in short, worth living. These are the things that strike a nation which, like the Chinese, can view our institutions from a distance. In these the better elements of our civilisation, its real culture, its devotion to high ideals, and its unceasing efforts in philanthropy, are lost to sight: in the first place, because they are more quiet and are drowned by the din of machinery; secondly, because they belong to the minority. No civilisation can really be embraced in one sweeping judgment. Its leading characteristics, even, are hard to delineate, and this for the following reason: that in order to obtain a comprehensive view of any civilisation a person must go to a considerable distance, and, in going thus far, he is apt to lose sight of elements which, though not obtrusive, are yet of real and essential importance.

There is but one thing more which calls for mention, and that is the very interesting contrast which is drawn, in the seventh letter, between Christianity and Confucianism.

Here the author seems to make two capital errors. In the first place, he falls into the same mistake of judging ideas by their realisation; in the second place, he seems to have a wrong conception of the nature of an ideal. The gist of his remarks is as follows:—Christianity he finds to be unpractical. Though we profess it with our mouths, yet we fail to practise

in our lives. This is because to practise it is impossible. In those times, when it most nearly realised itself in Europe, numberless evils, ignorance, bigotry, prejudice, and strife, followed in its wake. Since that time we have given up the attempt. The reason for this impracticability is that the teachings of Christ afford no rule of life which can possibly be of use to the world. They are the Gospel, not of this world but of another. Life is a "drama whose centre of action lies elsewhere." Hence any attempt to graft Christianity on to actual life must prove ineffectual.

This is the practical side of Christianity, to which, we think, it is illegitimate to appeal in forming a judgment on its theoretical merits. No religion, as such, can be estimated by the attempts which its followers have made to realise it in practice. The higher the ideal to be attained, the harder it is to bring that ideal into conformity with actual life.

According to the present writer, however, this is not the case. The ideal of Confucianism, which he defines as Brotherhood and Work, is, to him, superior, and yet it is part of, and, in fact, arises out of, the actual life of the Chinese. To this an easy answer might be made, that the ideals of brotherhood and work are to be found in Christianity also, but that Christianity goes beyond, and gives an entirely new meaning to, those ideals which in China are both ultimate and essentially mundane. The ideal of Confucianism might almost be characterised as an *ex post facto* ideal. It is a consecration of the actual, not an indefinitely receding end, which draws the actual into the realm of the unrealised. Here lies the great distinction between the two attitudes of mind. The Eastern mind rests on the past, which it strives rather to preserve than to improve. The Western mind rejects the past and grasps at the future, and thus lays itself open both to greater achievements and to greater failures. In connection with religion this characteristic has led to a marked disparity between theory and practice in the West, for the simple reason that the theoretical ideal of Christianity must ever be unattainable; at least, so far as the mass of the people is concerned. Perhaps Western life has suffered somewhat from the plethora of interests and the corresponding complication of activities. And thus far, it is obnoxious to such criticisms as have been passed upon it in these letters.

But in a consideration of ideas, practice must be left out of account. That Christianity has not yet been brought to bear upon social and economic problems is due to men's failure to realise it first in their individual lives. Such a complete application to the circumstances of life cannot come till the time is ripe. At present, Christian social ethics are somewhat impotent, from the fact that modern philosophy and science are not as yet sufficiently developed to include ethics as a branch of one all-embracing science, such as Plato conceived to be the final end of philosophy. So long as the various branches of intellectual activity remain separate, those departments which reward their inquirers by the speediest advance, and by the continual discovery of something new, will receive the greatest share of

attention. Practically speaking, a scientific ethics, in the face of what may be called common-sense or unscientific morality, fails to commend itself as an essential part of life to the ordinary mind. The metaphysical unification of the laws of morality with the other laws to which mankind is subject is, of course, an end which appeals to the philosopher and scientist. But so far as practical morality is concerned, there is little new to discover. It is to this cause that we attribute the lack of interest which ethics inspire at the present moment. As long as there is something still to be discovered, the men of a progressive age will seek to make that discovery. At present physical science offers a wider field for discovery, and hence it is more eagerly pursued in the search for knowledge.

We hold, then, the author of the *Letters of John Chinaman* to be perfectly right in the facts which he singles out for criticism, but wrong in the conclusions which he draws from them. He seems to look to the practical evidences rather than to the underlying principles of our Western activity. He fails, as might be expected in a person writing from an assumed Chinese point of view, to recognise the value of activity in itself. So long as there is movement, there is a chance of remedying mistakes. That our civilisation reveals many mistakes which are due to its rate of progression, advancing, as it does, almost blindly, and too swiftly for that proper adjustment which can only come with time and thought, is not for one moment to be denied. But of the two ideals, which we find in the East and the West respectively, the ideal of activity and the ideal of passivity, the former is both truer to man's nature and more likely to help him to the attainment of the final cause of his being, if such cause exist.

E. ARMINE WODEHOUSE.

GENEVA

Das Urchristentum: seine Schriften und Lehren in geschichtlichem Zusammenhang.—By Dr Otto Pfeleiderer. Second edition. Two vols.—Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1902.

THE great practical problem of our age, says Dr Pfeleiderer, is to reconcile the claims of scientific thinking and critical investigation with the pious recognition of the abiding truth of Christianity, and its value, beyond all price, as the basis of our common culture. The second edition of his valuable work, rendered necessary by the theological advance of the last decade, is offered as a contribution towards the solution of this problem. In it we find the expression of the unshaken conviction that Christianity originated in no miracle, but was the perfectly natural expression of the moral and religious life of a particular time; that the Christian spirit is the evolution and realisation through historical experience of the divine endowment of our natural soul. Dr Pfeleiderer does not belong to the shallow race of myth-slayers scorned of Nietzsche. He directs no attack against ecclesiastical symbolism, content to leave truth its veil of phantasy,

myth and figure, provided only it is a living force in the heart. His great learning is patiently devoted to showing how the veil was woven, his rare charm and unction in commendation of the truth as he conceives it.

The last authentic utterance of Christ, Dr Pfleiderer maintains, was his cry of despair. He did not, and could not, foresee that his ideal of a social and religious reorganisation of the Jewish people had been destroyed only to give his spirit wider dominion; that round his moral personality, with its tragic fate, there would crystallise the dominant ideas of a period of religious ferment. Jesus neither was nor could be a law-giver for all time. He was, it is true, a preacher of rational morality, but he was also a prophetic enthusiast who ignored the concrete content of social ethics. The preaching of Christ is misunderstood, his heroic enthusiasm becomes unintelligible, when we substitute our modern, ethical, evolutionary concept of the kingdom of heaven for his own apocalyptic vision of an impending catastrophe: while to make his eschatological prophetic enthusiasm the lasting authority for social ethics would be as wise as to cook one's soup in a volcano. Jesus never claimed a son's relation to God in any special, metaphysical sense, did not even regard sonship with God as a universal and natural predicate of humanity. Involuntarily ascribing to God as highest what he felt as most divine in himself, a fatherly towardness, he saw himself the prototype of what we should all become through likeness of mind with the perfected ideal of goodness in God. Of the doctrine of an atonement to be effected by his death, Christ knew nothing.

The first Christians, unconscious of forming a new religious community separate from Judaism, had in common a high degree of religious enthusiasm, culminating in ecstatic visions and external evidences of profound emotion, conceived generally as the operation of the risen Christ, who would soon come again, to establish a new order of things, anticipated as far as could be effected by mutual love and support. The socialism of the primitive Christians, the blessedness of the literally poor, was undoubtedly founded on the historical Christ, unreal as had become his outline in many ways, under the reflected radiance of the heavenly Messiah.

The transformation of this primitive enthusiasm and vague hope into the faith and morality of the Church is the turning-point in the history of early Christianity, always misunderstood when that due to a later evolution is credited to its origin. It was the work of Paul. He broke the bonds of Jewish traditionalism; he placed the enthusiasm which had such dangerous kinship with orgiastic emotion in the service of a lofty ethical ideal; he made the Christian faith the religion of mankind. Paul rested with sublime confidence on that immediate revelation, which, while it subjected his authority as a teacher to grave suspicion, was the condition of his success. The thoughts of Paul cannot be reduced to logical unity, their sole unity is the religious personality of the Apostle; they are the experiences of his faith, the states of his soul; feeling become an object of reflection that it might be grasped in thought and exhibited as the truth. These he expresses, now in terms of

Jewish theology, now in the language of poetical allegory; he combines the animistic phraseology of vulgar metaphysics with the symbolism of the heathen mysteries or the turns of speech familiar to popular Stoicism. The great historical importance of Pauline theology was its possession of two aspects, one specifically Jewish, one turned to the world of Greek culture. In the Græco-Roman world there was wide-spread religious feeling, and a way of thinking akin to the Christian, but no lasting and universal religious community had been established until Paul established it on the neutral ground of faith in God and desire for salvation, on which pious Gentiles and hellenistic Jews met. It is true that the pharisaic and hellenistic streams flow together without uniting, and that, in reducing the abstract ideas of the Greek world to a concrete and visible world of faith possessed of power over man's motives, he added foreign elements to the gospel of the kingdom, but these were historically and psychologically inevitable. The conception of the atonement was a development of Pharisee theology. It was in accordance with the ancient Animism, which hypostasised conditions of consciousness to spiritual beings and opposed them to the natural ego, that Paul expressed his Christian enthusiasm—subduing yet heightening the natural life—by regarding the pneuma of the Christian as a supernatural spirit coming from above, and identical with the person of Christ, which might become one with the natural ego. By identifying the source of religious emotion with the historical Christ, and holding that the working of his spirit was manifested rather in the constant life of thought and action than in spasmodic phenomena, however extraordinary, Christianity was placed on the path of continuous historical evolution. For Paul, the contradictions of the world, the reprobation of nations—he did not teach that of individuals—were but the conditions for the temporal manifestation of eternal love. Predestination was an emotional, not a speculative, belief that the bond of love to God, as being the expression of His will, could not be broken.

The Pharisee theology of Paul begins with 2 Cor. v. 1-8, to take a definitely hellenistic turn, the consequences of which, although never drawn by Paul himself, can scarcely be over-estimated, akin as it is to the spirit of John. The true historical background of John is not so much recollection of the life of Christ as experience of the life of the Church in the second century. The pseudo-historical is only the transparent allegory of religious and dogmatic thoughts. If Christianity was to persist, the preservation of the relatively historical tradition of the first century was as necessary, on the one hand, as the assimilation of a Gnosis and mysticism on the other, which should respond to the idealistic needs of the new age. To come to an understanding with the Gnosis, to combat its dangerous extravagances, whilst absorbing its valuable ideas and reconciling them with the Messianic faith, was the great task of the Church in the second century, in the course of which much that was worldly and sensuous in that faith was raised into the spiritual and supra-mundane. What distinguishes the Christology of John from that of the

Gnostics is, that the higher spirit bound up with that of Jesus was not one out of numerous intermediate beings, but the essence and fulness of every divine spirit, and, that it was inseparable from Christ, enduring even beyond the grave. This overcame the Gnostic dualism, and established the ecclesiastical concept of divine humanity, the deep truth and central importance of which cannot be depreciated because built upon Gnostic premises and restricted to the person of Christ. The modern tendency to lay stress on the apotheosis rather than the incarnation gives up the kernel of the dogma, without getting rid of its supernaturalism. Should it not rather be regarded as merely the dogmatic presentation of the universal truth that man in general was an incarnation of the divine Logos, and therefore fitted and destined to attain divine perfection, freedom and blessedness? We close on the deep note which Dr Pfeleiderer here strikes. It will linger gratefully on the ears of many, resolving the first discordant sense of loss and perplexity.

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WORMIT-ON-TAY.

The Composition of the Hexateuch: An Introduction, with Select Lists of Words and Phrases.—By J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A., and an Appendix on Laws and Institutions, by George Harford, M.A.—London · Longmans, Green & Co., 1902.

IN the year 1900 Mr Carpenter and Mr Harford (then Mr Harford-Battersby) published an edition of the Hexateuch, according to the revised version. Partly by distributing the translation into different columns of print, partly by the use of a variety of types, the editors aimed at giving visually the results of a literary analysis of the Hexateuch. By means of notes below the text and an elaborate system of marginal references, the evidence, especially the linguistic and stylistic evidence, for the analysis was given in a very convenient form and with exceptional fulness. In an introductory volume, the history of the criticism of the Hexateuch, the general arguments in favour of its composite origin, the evidence for the dates of the several documents and annotations incorporated in it, and other kindred subjects, were fully discussed.

Mr Carpenter and Mr Harford have now republished the whole of this introductory matter (including the chapter (xv.) on "Criticism and Archæology," which was contributed by Dr Cheyne), together with some of the longer notes that accompanied the text, and some new discussions, relating chiefly to the most recent critical work.

This republication is, then, in effect an introduction to the Hexateuch, and as such it will fill, for the English student, the place that has been so well filled for some years past in German by Holzinger's *Einleitung in den Hexateuch*. Thorough, lucid and eminently readable, it handles broadly, and with a praiseworthy sense of perspective, the leading features of the

subject: at the same time, it allows few even of the minutest details to remain unnoticed.

A detailed criticism of what is practically a second edition of a work of proved value is not called for. But it will be well to draw attention to certain characteristics of the original work which affect it in its present form, though they are now less conspicuous, and, in consequence, in some danger of being overlooked.

The analysis of the text was the foundation of the original work: it remains, though unseen, the foundation of the present republication. That analysis was exceedingly minute: but the minuter the analysis of a work like the *Hexateuch* becomes, the more uncertain also does much of it become. Still, so long as the tentative and uncertain character of the analysis is kept well before the student, such minuteness has its advantages; it is only when the uncertainty involved in it is forgotten that it becomes dangerous and misleading. The briefer as well as the longer notes in the text volume of the original work were constant reminders of the uncertainties of the analysis. The reader of the present work should use it, remembering that he is working without these safeguards, and he should, if possible, refer, at least occasionally, to the analysed text and the annotations thereon.

The works of the three main schools represented in the *Hexateuch*—the Prophetic (J E), the Deuteronomic (D), and the Priestly (P)—can be distinguished in almost all cases with ease: the style as well as the stand-points are strikingly different; numerous words and expressions are characteristic and distinctive of each. These characteristics of style are presented in a series of word lists (pp. 381–425), which are very full. But further, the work of each of these schools contains the work of several writers. Yet, although this can be clearly proved, it is by no means easy to carry out this minuter analysis; consequently it is difficult to determine the *differentia* of style as between the several writers of the same school. This is true of J E, and many of the words and expressions collected on pp. 384–389 as distinctive of J, and on pp. 389–391 as distinctive of E, are in reality very uncertain *differentia* as between J and E, though they may be (and in most cases are) sufficiently distinctive of J E as compared with D and P. Previous analyses have left much of J E unanalysed: the present editors have analysed it throughout, in many cases necessarily (as they themselves recognise) on quite inadequate and inconclusive grounds, with the result just indicated to the value of their lists of words distinctive of J and E. A similar criticism applies to the note (p. 297) on the expressions characteristic of P^s (the secondary strata of P).

Among the more valuable features of the discussion of the origin of the *Hexateuch* is the way in which the great complexity of P is brought out, and in particular the clearness with which it is argued that many of the laws classed as P had received a fixed form prior to the date of the great Priestly history of sacred institutions (P^s). Such older laws have long been recognised in the Law of Holiness; to another group of older

laws the title of Priestly Teaching (P^t) is given by the present writers. That P^t ever possessed the same kind of unity as the Law of Holiness is open to question; and not all of the laws so classed can be regarded with equal certainty as prior to P^s. The varying degrees of probability in the several cases are brought before the reader in the analytical notes of the former work; the general facts that there are these various degrees of probability should be borne in mind by the student of the new work.

The admirable analytical tables of laws (pp. 429-468) drawn up by Mr Harford deserve a special word of commendation. They should be of value, not only to the Biblical student, but also to students of comparative law. If in a subsequent edition the laws in Ezekiel, and more complete references to those incidentally mentioned throughout the Old Testament, could be added, the value of the tables would be even enhanced.

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The Pathway to Reality (Gifford Lectures, 1902-3).—R. B. Haldane.—Pp. xix. 316. London: Murray, 1903.

THOUGH Mr Haldane's Gifford Lectures will hardly vie with those of Professors Ward and Royce for original metaphysical acumen, or with those of Professor James for brilliant and sympathetic interpretation of human emotion, yet they are as a whole interesting reading, and contain incidentally much sound philosophical criticism. The book is divided into two parts, each with its sub-title, "The Meaning of Reality," and "Criticism of Categories." In the first part Mr Haldane presents in a clear and concise form an interpretation of the Hegelian conception of reality, and an argument in support of it, which are substantially identical with those of T. H. Green. To adherents of the school of which Mr Haldane is a prominent member this re-statement of their central doctrines cannot fail to be welcome, while even non-members of the school will be profited by study of the arguments which carry conviction to the author's mind, if not to their own. The general impression left on me by the perusal of this part of Mr Haldane's lectures is that they confirm the verdict passed by Green himself at the end of his life on Hegelianism: "It will all have to be done over again." Though not seriously doubting that the main conclusions of modern idealism are in substance sound, I should, I own, like to see them supported by less treacherous methods of argument than many of those on which Green and Mr Haldane rely; nor can I help suspecting that, when the next great constructive philosophy appears, it will have to disentangle the substantial truths of Idealism from a good many accretions of bad psychology and epistemology. As a preliminary step towards the reconstruction for which we all hope, I am tempted to think it might be well for students of metaphysics to sit a little looser to

the text of the Hegelian writings, and to turn more constantly than Mr Haldane seems to consider advisable to the great pre-Kantian philosophers who have, for our purpose, the advantage of not seeing their problems perpetually in the partially distorting light of the *critiques*. Mr Haldane may, no doubt, retort that Hegel's own importance for us is that he emancipated himself from narrow fidelity to the critical tradition, and in doing so taught the modern world the way to read Aristotle. But I fancy the student of Plato and Aristotle needs rather at present to be warned against the danger of seeing too much than too little resemblance of doctrine between antique "Begriffsrealismus" and modern "absolute idealism," and the strained exegesis Mr Haldane offers at p. 99 of the Aristotelian doctrine of the "imperishable intellect" serves to confirm me in this prejudice, if prejudice it is.

There are other points than this of the exact degree of coincidence between Hegelianism and Aristotelianism as to which Mr Haldane seems to me to minimise unduly the difference between an ultimately satisfactory idealism and the idealism actually worked out by Hegel. His defence of the unlucky *Naturphilosophie* of his master is courageous and ingenious, but surely misses the mark. He pleads, in effect, that Hegel could not fairly be expected to anticipate Darwin and Helmholtz and Joule. True; but the real complaint is that Hegel *did* try by dialectic to prejudge scientific issues, and often prejudged them wrongly. If the oracle had kept discreet silence, all might have been well, but in evil hour it spoke, with results that we all know. The unailing method not only failed to bring out a good many true results, but it sometimes brought out false ones, and this is surely a point to be borne in mind in judging of its worth. And if Hegel had not Helmholtz and Joule, he had Newton, and the world may read with what intellectual presumption he disposed of Newton's hypotheses, and with what unmannerly insult he spoke of Newton's name. Even within the sphere of logic proper, the dialectic has again been exposed to criticism, *e.g.* at the hand of Lotze, which seems to require more serious examination than is afforded by the sentences in which, to put it bluntly, Mr Haldane informs us that Lotze's "heart was sounder than his head."

About Mr Haldane's main argument for idealism, which is, in fact, that of Green, I feel, as I have hinted already, that though the conclusion may be sound in the main, the premises are largely dubious, especially in respect of the psychology they involve. The main thesis to be established is that God = Reality = Self-conscious mind. The first of these two positions is (p. 19) simply assumed in a way which I can hardly believe Mr Haldane's readers will find satisfactory. Most of us mean by "God" something we can worship with whole-hearted self-devotion, and though we may not be prepared to deny that this something may turn out to be "that into which all else can be resolved," many of us can see that the identification presents difficulties which need to be faced and overcome. The second point is proved much in the manner of Green, by reasoning from the Berkleyan premise that the *esse* of material things is *percipi*, and that therefore the

existence of the physical world implies a universal percipient subject. It does not appear that Mr Haldane has really grappled with the difficulty that the premise, if sound, ought to lead to solipsism. Surely if the physical world is more than a complex of "presentations to my consciousness," that must be precisely because its *esse* is not *percipi* or even *intelligi*, but rather *percipere* or *intelligere*—a doctrine, by the way, which some good authorities believe to be nearer than the other to the real meaning of Hegel. It is for want of a sounder psychology of perception than Green could supply that Mr Haldane seems, to me at least, to waver, in the fashion of Green himself, between subjectivism, when he is dealing with the problems of pure Metaphysics, and a "naïve realism" when he approaches cosmology.

The second part of Mr Haldane's book takes us into a region where he owes less to Green, and less also, I think, in respect of detail at any rate, to Hegel, in spite of his own modest assertion that all he has to say has been taken or adapted from his master. In four lectures we are presented with a brief sketch of some of the leading concepts of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Psychology, which aims at showing how the categories of physics are less abstract and thus nearer reality and truth than those of mere number, those of chemistry than those of physics, those of life again than those of chemistry, and those of mind than those of life. For the most part, all adherents of an idealist way of thought must sympathise with Mr Haldane's object, and in the main with the way in which it is executed. Particularly suggestive is the exposure of the false metaphysics by which we are deluded when we imagine that because we can detect no specific "vital force," life must really be a mere complicated mechanism. If I find it harder to follow the author in the details of one part of his criticism than in another, it is where he is dealing with the categories of Psychology. Too often Mr Haldane seems to me to acquiesce in current popular beliefs about Psychology which will not stand serious examination. For instance, it is, I submit, a grave mistake to identify selective attention with volition, as Mr Haldane does, apparently without even suspecting the presence of a difficulty. To attend voluntarily, to me at least by no means seems the same thing as to will to attend. Similarly, I doubt if the author has seen the serious difficulties that beset the current notion of self-consciousness as a mental state which has itself for its object.

There is a slight slip, by the way, at p. 206, which might be corrected. The Euclidean postulate of parallelism is not that "parallels never meet," but that "*being produced never so far*" they do not meet, which is not quite the same thing.

A. E. TAYLOR.

La Question Biblique chez les Catholiques de France au XIX^e Siècle.—
Par Albert Houtin.—Paris, 1902.

THE current view about the Latin Church is that it is immobile as a rock and undisturbed by the currents of doubt and enquiry with regard to the age, origin, and composition of the Scriptures familiar to Protestants as the higher criticism. M. Houtin's book contradicts this view, and shows that in France also a conflict between geology and the traditional understanding of Genesis invaded the ranks of the clergy as early as 1800. The breach in the old orthodoxy was further widened by Hebrew scholarship and Assyriology; and at the present moment there is a school among the French clergy which accepts all that Science can demonstrate with regard to the age of the globe and the antiquity of man, even his descent from the lower animals; which has ceased to believe that Moses wrote the Pentateuch; which resolves the Hexateuch into several documentary layers, posits two Isaiahs, if not more, and brings down the date of Daniel and the Psalms. What is even more striking is that the Vatican is beginning to "hedge," and that the Pope has thrown his ægis over several of the advanced critics, when their own bishops tried to suppress them, not excepting the Abbé Loisy, the boldest and most popular of them. A perpetual commission of prelates and scholars has also been appointed by the Pope to watch over and assist the progress of biblical studies. In short the Roman authorities have discovered that the old policy of spiritual fulmination and *index expurgatorius* will no longer do; for, as M. Houtin observes, "in the case of most priests interested in biblical controversy, the question is not what answer they shall make to the objections of free-thinking parishioners, but what they shall believe themselves." The Vatican hopes to be able to guide a modern movement of opinion which it can no longer curb. This century will show with what success.

The words in which M. Houtin takes stock of the progress of the nineteenth century deserve to be reproduced. On page 1 he writes thus:

"At the beginning of the nineteenth century the usual belief of Catholics, nay, of Christians, about the origin of the world, was that it was created about forty centuries before Christ, and that man had an antiquity of about 6000 years. The history of certain peoples fills up, well or ill, this period; they were the Greeks, the Romans, three or four Eastern races not so well known, that entered into Jewish history. But nothing was of any importance save in so far as it furnished predictions or 'types' of the Saviour's life and prepared for his advent. So after his advent. History merely consisted of the conquests made by his teaching, of the evolution of the societies that had accepted it. If there were peoples outside this divine plan, they were pagans, and were in quantity and quality regarded as unworthy of consideration."

But beginning his last chapter he says:

"At the end of the nineteenth century . . . numerous traditional conceptions which the apologists have obstinately defended are irremediably

condemned. Nevertheless the French clergy has not modified its teaching to any great extent, and perhaps this attitude of theirs is big with future events. For example the Paris *gamin* when he says his Catechism, is obliged to repeat that the world was made 4000 years B.C. But he knows, for he has learned it in the primary school, that his Catechism is not true. So it results that at the very moment when the Church is trying to lay down in his mind the foundations of faith, it also furnishes him with data of a kind to bring it home to him that faith is in conflict with science."

In the secondary courses of ecclesiastical instruction, goes on M. Houtin, it is the same. Here "apologetic courses are organised. But the manuals used as text-books are full of theses of which the expounders are no longer sure, or which seem to them broken down by criticism. These books insist above all on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and this is represented as the very basis of religion. With what result? This, that the student when he leaves the college and opens casually any ordinary book of reference, such as the *Grande Encyclopédie*, realises at once that the pretended basis is mined and sapped all round."

It is a sign of the times that the English journals most read by the better sort of English clergy—I refer to the *Pilot* and the *Guardian*—have reviewed M. Houtin's book with enthusiasm. And yet it may truly be said to the English clergyman: *Fabula de te narratur*. In a diocesan meeting of the Oxford clergy, for example, out of fifty incumbents and curates barely ten or twelve are to be met with who have struggled out of the Serbonian bog of traditionalism, or who would have the courage to avow to their parishioners that the stories of the creation in six days, of the garden, the fall, the flood, and the rest, are "myths." It was felt to be a world-shaking event a few years ago when Mr Gore, in *Lux Mundi*, admitted the existence in the Old Testament of an element of "idealisation,"—for so he termed the mythoplastic element,—and threw out the idea of "progressive revelation." How much he thereby shocked the older clergy is notorious; and an aged country rector almost with his last breath lately warned me, as a resident in Oxford, to be on my guard against this "dangerous man!" And if four-fifths of the English clergy are strangers to the new learning, and fulminate against the "higher criticism," and the other fifth are too timid to grapple with its problems save in lecture-room and study, what can be said of the army of teachers to whom the religious instruction is left in our primary schools? Assuredly the picture which M. Houtin draws of the Paris *gamin* is true of the London or Liverpool one.

It remains to be said that M. Houtin writes the most perfect French prose, that every page contains citations of writers justifying his remarks, that his facts are marshalled in a lucid manner, that he adds as appendix a valuable bibliography, that his work is full of a most delicate irony,¹ and

¹ M. Houtin's humour characterises even the summaries of contents which head his chapters, as witness the following at p. 179, ch. xii.: "Variations sur un grand miracle

withal instinct with enthusiasm for truth. It has reached a second edition, in which he prints as a second appendix, and without comment, the virulent attacks levelled at him in the obscurantist journals edited or patronised by the French bishops. He is himself a Benedictine; and a "Catholic," writing in the *Pilot* of Feb. 21, 1903, informs us that M. Houtin's Ordinary, the Bishop of Angers, has declared his book to be "dangerous and annoying," to "contain offensive criticisms and rash allegations, touching not only Catholic authors, but bishops, councils, and popes." The work, moreover, was issued without the bishop's *imprimatur*. Laymen and priests alike are therefore warned to avoid it; and it is said that it will shortly be placed on the index. We can only hope that M. Houtin will not submit, and withdraw his book, as M. Loisy has recently been weak enough to do with the work he had written, ostensibly in refutation of Prof. Harnack's book, *What is Christianity?*

FRED. C. CONYBEARE.

OXFORD.

The Apostles' Creed, Its Origin, Its Purpose, and Its Historical Interpretation.—By Arthur Cushman M'Giffert, Washburn Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary, New York.—1902, pp. 206.

PROF. M'GIFFERT outlines his conclusions in the first thirty-five pages, and in the rest of his work cites textually and discusses the passages of Ignatius, Irenæus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Rufinus, and other writers which bear them out. The whole is a work exhaustive, lucid, and convincing. He argues that the old Roman symbol of which this creed is a development originated in Rome between 150 and 175 as a baptismal confession. He dwells on the difference between the apostolic age, when "Peter at Pentecost said to his converts simply, 'Repent and be baptised,'" and the later age when an elaborate expression of intellectual belief, such as that embodied even in the earliest form of this creed, could be demanded of the candidate for admission into the Church. Such a demand argues the prior existence of divergent forms of belief which the Church rejected, and these must be inferred from the positions on which the creed lays stress. "The structure of the creed, its omissions as well as its assertions, the date at which it arose, and the contrast between its use at baptism and the earlier biblique, 'le vrai miracle,' le déluge universel.—Le déluge un peu restreint: Deluc, Cuvier, Wallon, Darras, le père Brucker.—Le déluge plus restreint: d'Omalius, Motais, Charles Robert.—Le déluge très restreint: MM. Suess et de Girard.—Un peu plus de déluge: M. de Kirwan.—Pas de déluge du tout: MM. de Lapparent et Loisy.—Du déluge selon les classes."

M. Houtin quotes with approval M. Salomon Reinach's criticism of M. de Kirwan's work, which was as follows; "It is better after all to defend an absurdity, even if you must invoke a miracle, than, in the interest of a puerile desire to harmonise, to defy, all at once, science, grammar and evidence."

custom . . . make it certain that the old Roman symbol, like most of the great historic creeds, arose as a protest against error." And this error the writer shows to have been that of Marcion. For example, the clause with which the creed begins: "I believe in God the *Father Almighty*" (or rather all-controlling; Gk. *pantokratôr*), is aimed straight at Marcion's dualism. So with regard to the clauses about Christ. In these "nothing is said about the baptism of Christ, of which so much is made in the gospels, and which we know was emphasized in many quarters in the second century; nothing is said of Christ's teaching, or of his works of mercy and power; nothing of his fulfilment of Messianic prophecy . . . nothing is said of the salvation brought by Jesus, and nothing of the purpose of his life or death." Of all this the creed has nothing. It merely declares against Marcion that Jesus Christ was the son of the all-ruling creative God, and follows this declaration up with assertions of the reality of his earthly life, all equally denied by Marcion, by assertions, namely, of his human birth, historic crucifixion, burial, resurrection, final judgment. The docetes denied all these; and with much penetration Prof. M'Giffert points out that this creed omits to mention the baptism just because the docetic sects made so much of it, "holding as they did, that it was at the time of the baptism that the heavenly Christ came down upon the man Jesus to abide with him during his public ministry, and to leave him again just before his crucifixion. It was found difficult, in view of the account of the baptism in the gospels, to meet the arguments of the docetists; and so the tendency arose to minimise the baptism, and the result was that it found an entrance into none of the historic creeds. As the baptism received less emphasis, the virgin birth received proportionately more."

On one point Prof. M'Giffert indirectly justifies the Marcionites, that, namely, of the resurrection of the flesh denied by them. For he points out that in this particular they were the genuine scholars of Paul, who never regarded the resurrection of Jesus as a resurrection of his corruptible flesh.

In pp. 175-186 Prof. M'Giffert discusses the relation of the old Roman symbol to the baptismal formula, and he adduces many weighty reasons for regarding the triune formula in Matt. xxviii. 19 as no utterance of Christ, "even if it be assumed that the words constituted an integral part of the gospel." "The collocation, 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit,'" he writes, p. 179, "sounds strange on Christ's lips, and suggests a conception of baptism entirely foreign to the thought of his immediate disciples, and equally foreign to the thought of Paul, whose idea of baptism seems in harmony only with the use of a single name, the name of Christ, in the formula. There is, moreover, no sign that the triune formula was ever employed in the apostolic age." Accordingly the writer concludes that the formula in Matt. xxviii. 19 is a late development of an older intermediate formula, such as we have in 2 Cor. xiii. 13, and Justin, M. Apol. ch. lxi., in which were collocated 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit.' And on this older and intermediate formula the Roman symbol was based

rather than on Matt. xxviii. 19. Prof. M'Giffert wrote in ignorance of the simpler forms of Matt. xxviii. 19, preserved in Eusebius and Aphraates. "There is," he writes, "no support in textual criticism for the omission of the triune formula in Matt. xxviii. 19." *Dies diem dicit*. It must be gratifying to him to see his conjecture so completely borne out in ancient texts.

FRED. C. CONYBEARE.

OXFORD.

Le Protestantisme Libéral.—Par Jean Réville.—Paris, 1903. Pp. 182.

THIS work embodies lectures delivered in 1902 before the Swiss Union of Liberal Christianity, and like all that the author writes, is clear, eloquent, but free from fine writing. In the preface he tells us that his ambition has been to bring together and group in a true perspective the principles and leading conceptions of critical Christianity in regard to matters that touch most closely the religious and moral life of contemporary society. The following passage from p. 81 illustrates the attitude of the writer to Catholicism on the one hand, and on the other to orthodox Protestantism :

"In the Gospel of Jesus there are no sacraments. Baptism and the Holy Supper, which alone go back to the cradle of the religion, bear therein neither the character nor the importance of church sacraments. All who are acquainted with the works of critical historians are aware of this. And as to the dogma of vicarious satisfaction, not only is it foreign to the Gospel, but in contradiction with its leading principles. In the Gospel of Jesus, God is the Heavenly Father who pardons the repentant sinner, for the very reason that the Divine Justice is superior to that of human societies, just because it is full of pity and not of harshness. Before he can pardon the prodigal son, the Father in the parable does not need to crucify the eldest son. The sacraments of Catholicism are nothing more than magical operations that in the eyes of reason have no value whatever, and a God who can only forgive men their sins by inflicting infinite sufferings on an innocent person substituted for them is a monster whom we cannot worship, inasmuch as the humblest of human beings that has any delicacy of conscience is morally superior to him."

But the purport of the work must not be supposed to be mainly controversial; and it is well summed up in the following from p. 174: "The profession of faith of Liberal Protestants, or of Liberal Christians—for the two professions merge in one another—consists wholly of the single precept: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself. Liberal Protestants feel that they are here at the heart of the true and original Christianity, are in spiritual communion, deep and living, with Christ; for it was Jesus himself who summed up the Law and the Prophets, that is to say, the rule of life and the principle of moral inspiration, in this supreme commandment. They equally feel that they

are in spiritual communion with the masters of the religious and moral life of the past, and with the legion of those who have traversed this earth, humble and unknown, yet have penetrated athwart the doctrines and rites of their times to the very inmost sanctuary of the Gospel; with all those who have truly loved God as they knew him, lived the divine life as they understood it, and cherished humanity as it was put before them under the conditions of their age. Their dogmas, their metaphysical doctrines, their rites, their sacraments, their ecclesiastical regulations were of various kinds; and the dust of history is made up of the débris of these widely opposed institutions and theologies. Yet all were agreed in professing the same moral Gospel. There you have the higher unity which across time and space binds together all pure and holy souls, all those who have striven against evil and have aspired to lead a better life."

I earnestly hope that M. Réville's work may find an English translator.

FRED. C. CONYBEARE.

OXFORD.

Félix Pécaut. Quinze ans d'Education.—Paris: Delagrave [1902], pp. 407, with Index.

THIS is a selection from the meditations written down day by day, while the author, already an old man, presided at Fontenay over a training college for female teachers in the normal school of the department. It was his custom every morning to jot down, before he joined his pupils, notes of the remarks he intended to address to them. They may be termed lay sermons, and range over a great variety of topics—literature, ethics, politics, family, and country. Their author is too little known in England, and in France he occupied an isolated position, resembling in his detachment from churches based on dogmas and sacraments, in his intensely devout and spiritual life, in his worship of duty, our own Dr Martineau, whom he also recalled in his exterior. Intensely religious, he was yet never propagandist, and in this valuable little book every subject he touches upon is raised, in a manner, to a higher level. In France the pressing difficulty of this age is to educate the young, and to impart seriousness of character, a lofty ideal of duty, reverence and true spirituality, all this, and yet guard them from superstition and fanaticism. To keep them liberal, tolerant, faithful to the larger ideals of a genuine republicanism, and yet protect them from naturalism in its brutal and cynical aspects. This was the task which M. Pécaut set himself to fulfil; and he succeeded, because he had the requisite moral qualities of detachment from all lower interests, of enthusiasm for truth and goodness. All who knew him bear witness to his vast and salutary influence over them, an influence not passing away when they quitted him, but shaping their whole lives.

Félix Pécaut was very conscious of this difficulty in modern French education, due largely to the obscurantism of the ruling church, and writes thus of it in memorable words :

“There is a weak point about our lay education, as regards religion, as regards the religious feeling implicit in things. Not that I would aver there to be any incompatibility between the secular and the religious spirit. For the former claims to find an utterance for nature, for human nature in especial, and in its entirety ; and nature is full of God, and the human soul tends Godwards along all the paths of its activity, through knowledge, will, love. . . . Nevertheless, just because the lay spirit starts from and returns upon man and his energies, because it makes the natural life its domain, and among us ranges itself over against positive religion, it is too apt in morals as in science either to drop out the religious idea or to reduce it to an abstract notion unconnected with the rest. The result is the teaching of a morality which lacks any far-off perspective, has no window open towards the Infinite, no background so to speak to rest upon, a dry ethic which cannot take hold of the soul in its depths, nor respond to that presentiment, that deepest instinct of us all, that sense of a mystery of life and destiny, through which man feels himself bound up with the great whole of reality, with its very principle.

“Religion remains the greatest power in the world. I say religion ; I do not say this or that religious confession. It alone moves man and transports him with sorrow or joy, and with an authority that governs his inmost self. Religion alone touches and warms him in that part of him which is akin to the Infinite, the Eternal, the Perfect and unchangeable.”

FRED. C. CONYBEARE.

OXFORD

Le Langage Martien, étude analytique de la Genèse d'une Langue dans un cas de Glossolalie Somnambulique.—Par Victor Henri, Professeur de Sanscrit à l'Université de Paris. Paris, 1901, Maisonneuve ; pp. 152.

MISS HELEN SMITH is a medium of repute in Geneva, and the vehicle in her trances of several subconscious or subliminal selves. In one of her dreams, which recurred for year after year, she was an inhabitant of the planet Mars, with the landscape and look of which she is familiar, and also with the language, from constantly overhearing which she knows it well enough to write it down or dictate it to listeners. No less than forty sentences of this unknown tongue, comprising over 300 distinct words, are reproduced by M. Henri, from a work of M. Flournoy, the psychologist, who first drew attention to this remarkable modern instance of Glossolaly in a work entitled *Des Indes à la Planète Mars*, published by Alcan at Paris in 1900.

The medium herself translated into French these subliminal utterances, sometimes on the day she uttered them, sometimes after intervals of one, two, or three months. With the help of this translation, which Miss Smith owed to another subliminal self called Esenale—for of the Martian tongue she herself understands not a word—Prof. Henri has made an analysis of it, a grammar, a dictionary and a classification of the sources, that is, of the real tongues and knowledge of which suggested to the medium most of the words. The structure or syntax of the whole is French, and 110 of her words belong to that language, much disguised, of course, and altered, though not arbitrarily, but according to a systematic scheme which her subconscious self applies with a certain logic and uniformity. M. Henri detects a German origin for twenty-five of the other words employed, a Magyar for fifty-five, an English for three, an Oriental, chiefly Sanscrit, for five. These last she seems to have picked up in a translation of an Oriental romance. For her knowledge of the other tongues it is easy to account. Here is a short specimen of the Martian tongue: “Véchési têsée polluni, avé métiche; é vi ti bounié, séimiré ni triné.” Translation: “Let us look at this question, old man. 'Tis thine to enquire, understand and speak.”

We seem here to have a phenomenon before us similar to the *ecstasis* of the early Christians, when, under the influence of holy or unclean spirits, they spoke with tongues. And no doubt the gift of discerning spirits was analogous to that which Miss Smith exerts when she becomes the vehicle of Esenale. The case of Miss Smith seems to be quite a *bona fide* one, and throws a most interesting light upon similar facts, as recorded by ancient writers. In addition to the Glossolaly with which we are familiar in Paul's Epistles, we have the ecstasy of the Montanists. Clement of Alexandria speaks of a language of the demons, as if the idea were familiar to his readers, and a fifth century Hagiologist reports the existence of a Church near Bethlehem about the year 450, in which the *Daimonizomenoi* or *Energumens* prayed in their own language.

In another of her moods Miss Smith was an Arab princess and talked Sanscrit. M. Henri does not analyse her “Sanscritoïd” dialect as he does her Martian, but he recognises at least forty genuine Sanscrit words in it and a rudimentary knowledge of Sanscrit grammar. It is noteworthy that the medium never uses the consonant *ʃ*, which Sanscrit lacks, in her Sanscritoïd, and only seven times in her Martian. M. Henri explains this as an attempt of her unconscious self to hide the fact that the chief basis of her inspired languages is French, which begins with *F*. I should rather ascribe it to a peculiar paralysis of certain muscles of the lips which may beset her in her abnormal states of consciousness.

FRED. C. CONYBEARE.

OXFORD.

Life and Letters of Friedrich Max Müller.—Edited by his Wife.
Two vols.—Longmans, Green & Co.

THE life of a scholar is often one which does not bear to be written. His thoughts are best read in his books, and his adventures are confined to his study; there is therefore little to record in a biography. But this does not apply to a scholar like Max Müller. He knew too many people who were interesting, and came into touch with the intellectual life of Europe at too many points, for his life when written to be anything but rich in interest. And Mrs Max Müller has presented it to readers in so admirable a way that where there was much to give, the most has been made of it. Written with that intimacy of knowledge which results from her relation to the subject, and with that farther insight which long years of close association with Max Müller's work and ambitions produced, it never transcends the due limits of reserve; so that sympathy and admiration enrich these pages everywhere without warping the story or obtruding the feeling which should be private.

A man who was on terms of close friendship with persons so eminent and so various as Bunsen, Froude, Stanley, Jenny Lind, Renan, Pusey, Kingsley, Gladstone, and Keshub Chunder Sen—to mention some only of the names met with in the long list of old friends—could not fail to be worth knowing better to all men than he could be through his own publications alone. And anyone who reads his life and letters will feel that he knows much more of a noble mind and character, whose natural courtesy endeared him as much as his intellectual capacity won for him respect. Max Müller's life was, moreover, one of more than ordinary completeness. In early years he fixed his ambitions, and even his plans, with a definiteness that is uncommon, and the long span of seventy-seven years (1823–1900) enabled him to carry them to their conclusion with a success that is still more infrequent. In his opening manhood the Sanskrit literature of India was an almost unknown field, save to the native pundits, while the science of comparative philology was unfamiliar to all except its pioneers, and may be said to have been first made known in England by Max Müller. But he left behind him not only the complete edition of the Veda, and the long series of the Sacred Books of the East, together with many volumes on Language, all which witness to the progress made in these directions, but also a whole generation, or perhaps one should rather say two generations, of scholars who had entered the regions in which he had been an explorer, and were gathering on all sides the stores of knowledge for which he had once hungered with little to guide him to their treasures.

The early years of Max Müller's life were years of poverty and struggle, for his father died when he was young, and through his school and student days Max had to depend on his own exertions, and even his own earnings. He soon saw the importance of Sanskrit in the study of language, and resolved to make it his own special field. So little was there available in

the way of either teaching or literature in this field, that Max Müller had to seek his subject in several German universities, and go on thence to Paris, where he studied under Burnouf. Those were days of strenuous work and single-minded ambition, through which loneliness, penury, and hunger were alike unable to distract the young scholar from his purpose, or blight the happy disposition which nothing soured through a life which did not want hardships and annoyances sometimes, in spite of its general success. And it was at this period that the main ambitions of his life were formed. Of these the first was to publish an edition of the Rig-Veda with its voluminous commentary by Sâyana, to which were added the desire of becoming some day a member of the French Institute, and winning the *Ordre pour le Mérite*, which he looked upon as the blue ribbon of literature in his own country. All these hopes were realised in the end. Curiously enough, the last two of them were fulfilled almost together; for while he was elected to the Institute of France in 1869, he received the coveted Order, and completed the publication of the Rig-Veda within a month, in the summer of 1874, after some thirty years of close and arduous work.

It was the need of Sanskrit MSS. for the Rig-Veda which first brought Max Müller to England, intending, as he afterwards said, to stay here only for a few weeks. But the acquaintance with Bunsen, who showed no little kindness to the eager young scholar, followed by the arrangement made by the East India Company for the publication of the Veda under his editorship, led to a lengthened stay, which ended by England becoming Max Müller's home for life. His first connection with Oxford was due to a like cause, for it was only in the University Press there that he found the necessary means for printing this work. Before long this somewhat accidental connection was exchanged for one more lasting. "The year 1851 was the determining point of Max Müller's future life. Forced to continue his stay at Oxford to print the Rig-Veda, he found it necessary to have some other means of support than the Veda alone, in order to live the rather expensive life of a young man in Oxford society. This was found for him in the invitation to lecture in his friend Trithen's place. At first he was only asked to give two courses of lectures, but they were so well attended, and made such an impression, that he was invited to continue his task, and was appointed Deputy Professor as soon as it became apparent that Trithen was hopelessly ill, and on his death was elected to succeed him in the Taylorian Professorship" (i. p. 118).

Work steadily went on, and from time to time new lines were opened out. When the Crimean War began, Max Müller, at the request of the Government, wrote a small volume on the "Languages of the Seat of War," which both proved of much use and drew attention to him. In 1853 he had met his future wife, but his marriage did not take place till six years later, shortly after he had been elected to a Fellowship at All Souls'. Through this time his letters give many expressions to an unsettlement and restlessness of feeling which was connected with residence in a land that was not native to him, and in a university where he found himself an

alien, although other causes also contributed no doubt to the result. Still the ties with England and Oxford were really increasing, and that more steadily than he realised himself.

When the Franco-German War broke out Max Müller took the keenest interest in its course, and in the attitude of English feeling. He carried on a correspondence both with Dr Abeken, then Bismarck's secretary, and with Gladstone, in the hope of bringing about a better understanding between the party of the latter and the leaders in Germany. In other ways, too, he tried to influence English opinion, and alleviate the sufferings of the war.

In 1876 Max Müller came very near leaving England. His own constant hankering after his native land, coupled with the sense that he must now decide whether England or Germany was to become the mother-country of his children, gave rise to a long and painful anxiety. Several efforts were made by German universities, and also by that of Vienna, to secure Max Müller; and his own imperfect health at the time added to his longing for a change. In January he did not hesitate to write, "I have finally made up my mind to leave Oxford"; but five weeks later Convocation passed a decree, under the influence of Dean Liddell, allowing "Prof. Max Müller to devote himself without interruption to the studies on the Ancient Literature of India, which he has hitherto prosecuted with so much success and with so much honour to the University," while a deputy was appointed to carry out his professorial duties. This decided him to remain; "nor did he ever afterwards regret this decision," adds Mrs Max Müller.

From this time forward a large part of Max Müller's time was occupied by editing the Sacred Books of the East, and by carrying out his long-cherished intention of unfolding what he had to teach on the subject of religion. His studies in Oriental language, and in mythology, were in a real sense preparatory to this, and this it was which lay nearest to his heart. The occasion for taking up this work was found in the offer made to him of the first Hibbert Lectureship. These were delivered in 1878, and at once produced a marked impression. They opened up for most hearers a new vein of religious truth, although, like all the greater religious teachers, Max Müller would have been the first to disclaim novelty for the truth he taught, and to point to the greatest of the Greek Fathers as his spiritual masters. Ten years later he worked the same vein far more thoroughly in the four series of Gifford Lectures, given between 1888 and 1892. Together these formed a very noble exposition of religion, tracing it from the gropings of man's mind in the dim past, to its culmination in Christianity. There were times in his life when Max Müller was subjected to a good deal of dislike and persecution for his want of orthodoxy, or even for his want of religion; yet it is hard to see how anyone can read these lectures without being impressed by his essentially religious nature, and by the strong devotion of his Christian faith. Of course his ideas and his beliefs differed widely from the pattern of those which some Christians

hold, but none the less were they loyally Christian. And it is one of the merits of his *Life and Letters*, that his constant interest in missions is clearly brought out. There is no more interesting letter in the collection than one written the last year before his death to P. C. Mozoomdar, a leader in the Brahma Somâj, on the true relation of this spiritual movement in India to the Lord Jesus Christ. It was with real spiritual insight that an Indian Yogin (the pathetic story of whose visit to England is related under the year 1900) said in his bewildered disappointment, that while in this country "no one wanted to understand knowledge, only in Max Müller's house had he found a good man, and *one who knows*." The influence which Max Müller exercised as a religious teacher, to whom many of the more thoughtful among us look back with gratitude, may be traced to this real spiritual character, coupled with the hopefulness and lucidity of his teaching. This was always characteristic of him, and cannot be better expressed than in his own words—"I cannot help thinking that there is nothing that cannot be made clear, and bright, and simple, and that obscurity arises in all cases from slovenly thinking and lazy writing."

E. P. BOYS-SMITH.

HORDLE VICARAGE, BROKENHURST.

The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia. The Gifford Lectures on the Ancient Egyptian and Babylonian Conception of the Divine, delivered in Aberdeen. By A. H. Sayce, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Assyriology, Oxford.—Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1902.

THE subject of these lectures is the conception of the divine among the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians. The method followed by the lecturer is announced in the "Introduction" in the following words: "It is not my intention to give a systematic description or analysis of the ancient religions of Egypt and Babylonia. . . . Indeed in the case of the ancient religion of Babylonia, the details are still so imperfect and disputed, that a discussion of them is fitted rather for the pages of a learned society's journal than for a course of lectures. What the lecturer has to do is to take the facts that have been already ascertained, to see to what conclusions they point, and to review the theories which they countenance or condemn. The names and number of the gods and goddesses worshipped by the Egyptians and Babylonians is of little moment to the scientific student of religion: what he wants to know is the conception of the deity which underlay these manifold forms, and the relation in which man was believed to stand to the divine powers around him. What was it that the civilised Babylonian or Egyptian meant by the term 'god'? What was the idea or belief that lay behind the polytheism of the popular cult, and in what respects is it marked off from the ideas and beliefs that rule the religions of our modern world?"

This passage at once marks the limitations of the lectures. The details of Babylonian religion are "imperfect" and "disputed," but as the discussion of details is outside the range of the lectures, and the lecturer cannot claim that his interpretation of "ascertained facts" is accepted by all scholars, we must remember that the results are also imperfect and disputed. The "facts" of the lectures are not the statements of the Babylonian texts in their simplicity, but the lecturer's interpretation of these statements. Indeed, considering the many readings and interpretations of texts already copied and translated, and the fact that "a considerable proportion of those texts which have already been stored in the museums of Europe and America are still undeciphered," and also that, as we hope, there are thousands more still buried, which will yet be brought to light, little more than very tentative results can be reached as to the nature of Babylonian religion. Professor Sayce is himself most ready to acknowledge this. He repeats a dozen times his warning that our knowledge of Babylonian is and must long be incomplete, and in one passage says: "The advances made in our knowledge of Babylonian religion since I lectured upon it some fifteen years ago, are consequently not so great as the inexperienced student might be tempted to believe." Special attention needs to be given to these admissions, for after these general warnings have been given, the discussion proceeds in a tone of confidence, which may easily mislead the reader who is unacquainted with the present state of Babylonian scholarship.

The lectures on the Babylonian religion are entitled—(1) Introductory. (2) Primitive Animism. (3) The Gods of Babylonia. (4) The Sun-god and Ishtar. (5) Sumerian and Semitic Conceptions of the Divine: Assur and Monotheism. (6) Cosmologies. (7) The Sacred Books. (8) The Myths and Epics. (9) The Ritual of the Temple. (10) Astro-theology and the Moral Element in Babylonian religion. The order adopted shows that Professor Sayce regards the office of lecturer as different from that of a teacher. Serious students of religions naturally ask first what *material* there is for forming a judgment as to the nature of the early religion. Such a desire is not gratified here. When the Babylonian literature is treated in the seventh and eighth lectures, it is discussed, not as the source of our information as to the religion, but only as one of the outward expressions of it. The lecturer proceeds at once after an introduction to give the results of his own study of and inference from the sources.

The great task which Professor Sayce sets himself in these lectures is that of distinguishing between the Sumerian and Semitic elements in the Babylonian religion. Agreeing with most (though not all) Babylonian scholars that Babylonia was inhabited by a non-Semitic people, known as Sumerians before the Semites came into the country, the lecturer rightly insists that it is necessary to distinguish between the ideas contributed by each of these two races to the religion as it appears in the texts. The necessity of such a distinction seems clear, and the student of religions must thank Professor Sayce for emphasising this point. The *methods* used

to distinguish between the two are not always so obvious. The second lecture begins with the statement that "Deep down in the very core of Babylonian religion lay a belief in what Professor Tylor has called animism. It belonged to the Sumerian element in the faith of the people, and, as we shall see, was never really assimilated by the Semitic," and again "It was through animism that the Sumerian formed his conception of the divine." Here we are led to expect an answer to two questions. 1. What information have we as to the nature of the Sumerian animism? 2. What were the characteristics of the Semitic religion that modified that animism? The answer to the first question brings out some of Professor Sayce's most interesting material. Most writers on the subject treat first of the many nature-gods, and in the long lists of these (mentioned earlier in a somewhat depreciatory manner by the lecturer) find the simplest expression of animistic beliefs. Reference to these deities will be found in the third lecture; but under the heading of "Primitive Animism" we find a treatment of what seems to us a secondary stage in the development of animism, the result of reflection on the nature of man himself. The Sumerian *zi* is defined as "the counterpart of an individual object, which endowed that object with the power of motion, and gave it a place in the animate world" and as "the imperishable part of man, which made him a living soul while he was in this world and after death continued to represent him in the shadowy world below. The *lil* on the other hand was a ghost," a being with an independent existence of its own, "essentially a spirit of darkness," whose lord and ruler was En-lil, the god worshipped at Nippur. These spirits and ghosts are the chief characteristic of Sumerian religion. But we learn that the definitions of the two classes of spirits are only apparently satisfactory. Later on in the book we read that the "*lil* must once have meant that immaterial part of MAN which after death had its home in the underworld from whence it issued at night to satisfy its cravings for food with the garbage of the streets." Also "by the side of the *Zi* there must also have been the *lil*, but we must wait till more monuments of Sumerian antiquity are discovered before we can define the exact relationship between them."

These demons or ghosts could be controlled by magic. Organised bodies of magicians arose, and the demons accordingly were organised. The old unorganised animism (rather this phase of it) passes into shamanism.

This brings us to the second question. For having brought Sumerian religion to this point, Professor Sayce feels it can go no further. He frankly confesses that the development of such a religion into the theism of the Babylonian inscriptions seem to him "contrary to the facts of psychology as well as to those of history."

The "higher Semitic faith with its gods and goddesses, its priesthood and its cult" is therefore to be found in all that remains, when the shamanistic element is subtracted from what we have in Babylonian literature.

Such are some of the most interesting speculations rather than results as

to the nature of the two component parts of Babylonian religion, for which we are indebted to the Gifford lecturer. We are content to take him at his word and wait for further evidence before attempting to define more accurately the nature of Sumerian animism. The inconsistencies mentioned above seem to show that accurate and detailed knowledge is impossible with the present material. As to the Semitic faith, we know even less of its earliest form, which may have had much in common with the Sumerian animism.

The lectures of Professor Sayce are full of stimulating suggestiveness, but the "scientific student of religion" mentioned in the introduction will feel that his wants are not yet answered. At the present rate of working it will be reserved for a future generation to find those results which can only come from much further discovery of texts and much patient and often dry work expended on their decipherment and interpretation.

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Franciscan Literature.

THE publication of early Franciscan texts with elaborate critical introductions is so rapid, and the relation between the various documents is becoming so intricate, that an analytical guide or *Wegweiser* will soon be necessary for the student. In the space at our disposal we can only indicate very briefly the importance from the historical point of view of some of the recent work, without any attempt at critical discussion.

Actus Beati Francisci et Sociorum ejus, edidit Paul Sabatier.

This is the latest volume in the *Collection d'Études et de Documents*. The text has been printed from the Rosenthal MS., which has passed recently into the hands of the Faculty of Protestant Theology at Paris. The divergent readings given by the Liège MS. are printed in the notes. A full description of the latter was given in Vol. I. of the *Collection*. Its date is 1408. The Rosenthal codex is described by Sabatier as the best of all the MSS. in this series which have come under his notice. Both MSS. evidently depend upon a common original. These facts diminish some of the force of Sabatier's modest contention that the present edition has only a limited value from the point of view of scientific criticism. For most readers the Latin *Actus* derive their chief interest from their relation to the *Fioretti*, for which they supply us approximately with the original text; though the presumption is that a longer document, which may be discovered some day, lies behind both of them. This is borne out by an analysis of their contents. There are six chapters in the *Fioretti* which have no parallel in the *Actus*, and twenty-two chapters of the *Actus* which

have no parallel in the *Fioretti*. Latin parallels from other sources for five of these chapters of the *Fioretti* are given in Appendix II. of the present volume. Chapter 37 of the *Fioretti* is the only one for which no Latin original has been found. Sabatier's preface is as usual a searching and luminous piece of literary criticism. He fixes the date of the work, which he believes was compiled by Hugolin of Monte Giorgio, shortly before 1328. But the question arises at once, what are the possible earlier sources for the narratives? The clue is found in the two different hands whose work can be traced in the *Actus*. In the chapters which deal with St Francis and his companions there is a true feeling for fact, "l'humble réalité, le détail précis, ce qui fait l'originalité d'une figure." In those which describe the saints of the March of Ancona the atmosphere is quite different. They are all of one type. Hugolin, when he was left to himself, only knew how to paint one figure. The conclusion is that as an historian he is more accurate when he is describing events that happened fifty or sixty years before. He was probably using earlier documents, and Sabatier makes the not improbable conjecture that he was dependent for this part of his work upon Leo. It is this which gives historical value to the *Fioretti*. It cannot be treated in a summary fashion as a document that is either true or false. It must be traced, so far as possible, to its sources. To this process of critical sifting Sabatier has made a contribution of real importance.

We have also before us the first five numbers of the *Opuscles de Critique Historique* as follows:—

FASCICULE I.—Regula Antiqua Fratrum et Sororum de Poenitentia, seu Tertii Ordinis Sancti Francisci, nunc primum edidit Paul Sabatier.

FASCICULE II.—Description du Manuscrit Franciscain de Liegnitz (Antiqua Legenda S. Francisci), par Paul Sabatier.

FASCICULE III.—S. Francisci Legendae Veteris Fragmenta. Quaedam edidit et notis illustravit Paul Sabatier.

FASCICULE IV.—Les Règles et le Gouvernement de l'Ordo de Poenitentia au xiii^e Siècle, par le R. P. Pierre Mandonnet, O.P. Première Partie (1212–1234).

FASCICULE V.—Description du Manuscrit Canonici Miscell. 525 de la Bibliothèque Bodléienne, par A. G. Little.

This new series has more than justified its existence already. It serves to bring the results of recent research to a focus, and to make the special labours of scholars like Sabatier and Professor Little available for students. A great deal may depend upon the accurate description of MSS. at a time when so many primitive documents have been discovered embedded in later compilations. The Bodleian MS. described by Professor Little is one of exceptional interest, for it contains the text of the *Speculum* and the greater part of the *Actus*. It was written at Ragusa in 1384–85. But it is the two *fasciculi* dealing with the Order of Penitence which are of special

interest for the historian. Sabatier has again made a discovery of capital importance, this time in the Franciscan Monastery at Capistrano in the Abruzzi. It is a rule for the Third Order earlier than the one known hitherto which was incorporated by Nicholas IV. in the bull *Supra montem*. Sabatier's tentative criticisms upon it have been superseded by the masterly essay by Father Mandonnet. It is fairly obvious that chapter xiii. in the text as published by Sabatier is not part of the original document, and this conjecture has been confirmed by an entry in the catalogue, made by Bérardelli in the eighteenth century, of the library belonging to the Dominicans of St John and St Paul at Venice. By this happy find Father Mandonnet has placed it beyond doubt that the Rule existed at one time without the addition, and thus he has justified his argument that it is in all probability the earliest Rule of the Order written in the lifetime of St Francis himself. His conclusions briefly are as follows: That the first twelve chapters of the Rule as discovered by Sabatier belong to the year 1221, and were the joint work of St Francis and Cardinal Hugolin; that chapter xiii. is an addition of the year 1228 with the object of bringing the confraternity into closer organic connection with the Franciscan Order; that the second Rule, printed by Wadding and other writers, is to be attributed to Gregory IX. and Elias of Cortona, and belongs in all probability to the year 1234. It will be seen at once how the new discovery and the use which Father Mandonnet is able to make of it invalidates in some important respects Müller's account of the early history of the Third Order in his *Anfänge des Minoritenordens und der Bussbruderschaften*. But apart from its special interest to the student of Franciscan origins, this short treatise is of capital importance for the historian, for it contains a new chapter in the history of the lay communities of the thirteenth century and their gradual annexation by the hierarchy. This is a subject which Sabatier has with some justice described as perhaps the least familiar and the most important in the ecclesiastical history of the Middle Ages. We have noticed an unfortunate error of date on p. 222, which introduces some confusion into the argument. John of Parma was Minister-General from 1247 (or 1248) to 1257, and not from 1257 to 1267, and the change of policy inaugurated by his deposition belongs to the former and not the latter year. This mistake runs through a whole paragraph, and is quite unaccountable, as elsewhere, *e.g.* on p. 196, the dates are given quite correctly.

WM. HAMILTON DRUMMOND.

BELFAST.

Short Notices.

THE Hulsean Lecturer for 1901-2, Mr F. R. Tennant, approaches his theme—"The Origin and Propagation of Sin"¹—with an apology for possible discomfort to readers prepossessed with the doctrines ordinarily taught on the subject. His first three lectures deal successively with the treatment of this problem by Christian theologians, by speculative philosophy, and by those who accept evolutionary theory. His own sympathies are with the last named. He would "assign the rise of evil itself simply to the difficulty of the task which has to be encountered by every individual person alike, the task of enforcing his inherited organic nature to obey a moral law which he has only gradually been enabled to discern" (p. 81). Mr Tennant's concluding lecture deals with the conceptions of theodicy which are consonant with this view of moral evil. He accepts the doctrine of the separateness of human wills from the divine, and indorses Martineau's view of "incidental" evils arising from "the self-limitation of Omnipotence." He concludes by a defence of the evolutionary system, which he espouses, from extravagant charges of unscripturalism; but also claims the right to disagree with Pauline dicta, if facts and reason compel. A good third of the book consists of notes and illustrative quotations. The author's style is scholarly but simple, and his presentation of the different theories reviewed is fair and lucid. As a contribution in a department of study singularly neglected by modern English writers, this volume, small as it is, is distinctly noteworthy. Special service is rendered in exposing the ambiguities too often connected with the term "sin," even in works of repute.

The influence of the East upon the West, which is made evident in numerous essays in philosophy to-day, finds remarkable illustration in the career and writings of Theodor Schultze (1824-1898), "Oberpräsidialrat" and speculative thinker, of whom a brief biographical sketch² by Arthur Pfungst has recently appeared in an English translation. Schultze, son of a chemist, entered the civil service after leaving Kiel University, and was counsellor to the government of Holstein in 1863. With characteristic integrity he begged King Christian IX. to release him from his oath of allegiance, as a condition precedent to continuing in office under Prussia, which had annexed the duchy. For reward he was dismissed by the new government, but a few years later he was appointed to a fresh office, and remained in the service till his death. Extremely modest, abstemious, patient and industrious, he appears eminently fitted to mediate between the meditative sages of India and the bustling citizens of Europe; but it was not till he was fifty-five that he began to study

¹ *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, Hulsean Lectures, Univ. Camb., 1901-2, by F. R. Tennant, M.A., B.Sc. One vol., pp. 231. Univ. Press, Cambridge.

² *A German Buddhist*, by Arthur Pfungst, M.R.A.S. (trans. by L. F. de Wilde). One vol., pp. 79. Luzac & Co., London.

philosophy at all, and three years later he plunged into the Indian studies to which he devoted the rest of his life. He translated the "Dhammapada" into German from Max Müller's English version, and in the year of his death he published another translation from the English, viz., Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding. His chief original works were "Vedanta und Buddhismus, als Fermente für eine Künftige Regeneration des religiösen Bewusstseins innerhalb des europäischen Kulturkreises," and "Die Religion der Zukunft," in which he severely criticises Christian story and doctrine, and points to the oriental metaphysic as a refuge from the crude conceptions of orthodox theology. Mr Pfungst's pamphlet—it is little more—is written with enthusiasm, and expounds the "master's" ideas, perhaps, with more emphasis and sanguine expectation than he would have approved; but it is useful as a "sign of the times."

Another volume translated from the German, but very different in character, is Professor Zimmer's¹ discussion of the problems connected with the earliest Christian churches in these islands. This essay is concise, clearly expressed, well-grounded, and—in spite of a few slips, apparently of the press—carefully issued. The author vigorously attacks the popular legend of St Patrick, and identifies the real Patrick, an ignorant and deservedly repudiated enthusiast, with the Palladius of the "Chronicle" of Prosper Tiro (A.D. 431). The arguments in support of this view are reinforced by philological research, which goes to show that the Christian vocabulary extant in early native Irish literature passed from the Latin through a British (Welsh) medium, and not through that of a continental mission. Professor Zimmer finds collateral evidence in the "Pelagian" or other heretical symptoms observable in this literature, and so connecting it with the characteristics of Welsh Christianity (Conybeare). Brief as it is, the book teems with matters of highest importance, not only (though pre-eminently) to the ecclesiologist, but also to the student of the history of thought and conduct.

Dr Selwyn, of Uppingham, boldly advances some striking suggestions in his two books on Christian "prophecy."² He holds that Jewish prophecy slid into Christian prophecy without a break, and devotes much space to a comparison of Jewish apocalyptic literature, e.g. Book of Enoch, Fourth Esdras, etc., with the Apocalypse in the Christian canon. Many of the parallel usages and expressions have been noticed before, but the author's diligence and suggestiveness afford a much more vivid view of the whole than we have met before. His conclusion that the Apocalypse is "the fullest and ripest fruit of Christian prophecy" must, however, be weighed with

¹ *The Celtic Church in Britain and Ireland*, by Heinrich Zimmer, Professor of Celtic Philology in the University of Berlin (tr. by A. Meyer). One vol., pp. 131. Nutt, London.

² *The Christian Prophets and the Prophetic Apocalypse*, by Edward Carus Selwyn, D.D., Head Master of Uppingham School, 1900. One vol., pp. 277. Macmillan, London. *St Luke the Prophet*, same author and publisher, 1901. One vol., pp. 388.

the hypothesis that the Apocalypse is an adaptation of a Jewish (non-Christian) writing. Dr Selwyn unhesitatingly rejects the theory of the identity of the "John" of the Apocalypse with John of the Fourth Gospel; indeed, he puts the arguments against this identification with a force leaving nothing to be desired. "The Fourth Gospel is designed to represent a non-prophetic aspect of the original facts of the Saviour's life." Its acceptance, as the second century advances, "coincides with what to the prophets was the rival growth of church order and episcopal organisation." But probably the most original of the author's suggestions is that "the elder" to whom the Apocalypse is traditionally ascribed was really a member of the Jewish Sanhedrim, and that 2nd and 3rd John also came from his pen. The evidence appears far too shadowy to support this hypothesis, and yet it is an interesting addition to the possibilities that flit to and fro across the field of critical vision. The author's courage is even better attested by the later of his two volumes, where, not content with the fairly large task of proving "St Luke" to be numbered among the prophets, he makes him the author of 2nd Peter! In fact, however, it is the author of Acts chiefly whose relation to Christian prophecy is considered. This writer, identified by Dr Selwyn with Silas, is accordingly a much more definitely visible person to him than to most modern critics of Acts. No difficulties daunt such an author; and of course a meeting of St Peter with St Paul in Rome is as easy to believe in as the historical character of "Luke's" second "treatise." Coincidences of style enable him to look upon 1st Peter as written by Luke-Silas for the apostle, and, by a pretty human touch, the amanuensis of the first epistle becomes the actual author of the second, which is devised to bring about a personal reconciliation between the two great leaders of the church, and not at all to effect a better understanding between parties late in the second century. That the external authority for the epistle is so slight and so late is due to suppression by the "orthodox majority," who feared lest it "might countenance the errors of Montanism." So vigorous an attempt to reverse the currents of criticism is at least refreshing. It would have been more welcome in the open court of scientific inquiry if it were not introduced with an appeal to defenders of the church's canon to justify their "proficiency," and not to admit that an area of "agnosticism" lies within the two covers of the New Testament.

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Int. J. Eth., April 1903.

[Although an agnostic cannot teach and explain to children a creed, which he feels to be the truth, he can explain in a spirit which says, "this is what many people believe to be the truth; to them it is sacred; try to understand the power belief has been and can be, for a world is shut to you if you do not make the effort to understand and feel the beliefs of mankind."]]

Faunce (W. H. P.) Moral Education in the Public Schools. Educ. R., April 1903.

Forrest (E. F.) Co-operation and Commercial Morality. Econ. R., April 1903.

Keckewich (G. W.) The Church and the Education Bill. Cont. R., June 1903.

Koenig (X.) De La Sincerité dans L'enseignement de l'Histoire sainte de L'Ancien Testament aux Enfants.

68p. Fischbacher, 1903.

Lyon (G.) L'enseignement d'État et la pensée religieuse.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1903.

[A defence of the science of Education against the attacks of those who assert that it is practice alone which makes the expert in the art of teaching. Author advocates an impartial neutrality with respect to the various religious beliefs about which information should be given in secondary schools.]

Marti (K.) La science de l'Ancien Testament dans l'instruction religieuse.

8p. R. du christianisme social, May 1903.

65 *Social Evil*, with Special Reference to Conditions existing in the City of New York. 3/6. Putnam, February 1903.

70 *Benz (G.)* Les devoirs sociaux de l'étudiant. 18p.

R. du christianisme social, March 1903.

[A plea that student life and professional studies should be carried on under a sense of social responsibility.]

81 *Holland (A.)* L'alcool est-il un aliment? 9p. R. du christ. social, March 1903.

[Answer to M. Duclaux, of the Pasteur Institute, who claims alcohol has a food value.]

84 *Western (F. J.)* The Moral Principles of Compensation in Temperance Reform.

Econ. R., April 1903.

85 *Maneval (Solomon H.)* Prohibition of Intoxicating Liquors the Enemy of Church and State. \$1.50. 1903.

98 *Sandlands (J. P.)* Fallacies in Present-day Thought. 324p. Elliot Stock, 1902.

F PASTORALIA 2 Sermons.

Davidson (J. P. F.) Retreat Addresses to Clergy. 208p. 3/6 n. W. Gardner, 1903.

Wilson (J. M.) Six Lectures on Pastoral Theology; with Appendix on Influence of Scientific Training on Reception of Religious Truth. 274p. 3/6 n. Macmillan, 1903.

2 *Creighton (M.)* University and other Sermons. Ed. by Louise Creighton.

280p. 5/ n. Longmans, Mar. 1903.

Martineau (J.) National Duties, and other Sermons and Addresses.

470p. 6/ n. Longmans, Mar. 1903.

Welldon (J. E. C.) Youth and Duty: Sermons to Harrow Schoolboys.

256p. 3/6. Rel. Tract Soc., Apr. 1903.

G BIOGRAPHY 2 English.

Chadwick (John White) William Ellery Channing. 463p. Philip Green, 1903.

Schaff (D. S.) St Bernard of Clairvaux.

Princeton Th. R., April 1903.

Davies (T. Witton) Heinrich Ewald, Orientalist and Theologian. A Centenary Appreciation. 146p. Unwin, 1903.

Joly (H.) Saint Teresa, 1515-1582.

Tr. by Emily M. Waller. 278p. 3/.

(*The Saints.*) Duckworth, 1903.

King (Bolton) Mazzini. (The Temple Biographies.) 380p. Dent, 1903.

[Contains an able treatment of the Religion, Ethics and Social Theories of Mazzini.]

2 Arch. Temple. 16p. Ch. Q. R., Apr. 1903.

Armstrong (Sir Walter) Life and Art of Turner; with 100 Illustr. Agnew, 1903.

Brooke (Stopford A.) J. M. W. Turner.

Pilot, May 16th and 23rd, 1903.

[Review of Armstrong's Work.]

Cairns (John) Principal Cairns.

157p. Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1903.

Dictionary of National Biography Index and Epitome; ed. Sidney Lee. Roy. 8vo.

1464p. 25/ n. Smith & E., 1903.

Osborne (C. B.) The Life of Father Dolling. Arnold, 1903.

Ward (B.) St Edmund, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life, as told by Old Eng. Writers. 310p. 6/ n. Sands, Feb. 1903.

Westcott (A.) Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott, sometime Bishop of Durham.

2 v. 932p. 17/ n. Macmillan, 1903.

H HISTORY C Christian M Mediæ-val R Modern 2 English.

3A *Harper (Rob. Francis)* Assyrian and Babylonian letters belonging to the Kouyunjik collections of the Br. Mus. Pt. 8.

158p. \$6 n. Chic. Univ. Press, 1902.

Messerschmidt (L.) The Hittites. (The Ancient East.) 1/6. Nutt, Mar. 1903.

C *Alzog (Johann Baptist)*. Manual of Universal Church History; tr., with add., from the 9th and last German ed., by F. J. Pabisch and T. S. Byrne. In 3 v., v. 1, per set, \$10.

Cincinnati, Robert Clarke Co., 1902.

Neuman (Albert Henry). Manual of Church History.

\$1.75 n. Amer. Bapt. Pub. Co., 1903.

Selwyn (E. C.) The late Canon Bright on Montanism. 14p. Exp., April 1903.

M *Willson (T. B.)* History of the Church and State in Norway. From 10th to 16th Century. 394p. 12/6 n. Constable, 1903.

[Covers ground not hitherto adequately dealt with in English.]

- Workman (H. B.)* Curious story of Papal Fallibility. 16p. Lond. Q. R., April 1903.
[An account of the "Heresy of John xxii., in regard to the retardation of the beatific vision," as illustrated from an unprinted Cambridge MS.]
- R *Casartelli (L. C.)* Oxford and Louvain. 24p. Dub. R., April 1903.
- Lilly (W. S.)* Christianity and Modern Civilisation. 374p. Chapman & Hall, 1903.
[Some chapters in European history, with an introductory dialogue on the Philosophy of History.]
- Müller (Karl)*. Luther's römischer Prozess. Z. f. Kirchengeschichte, xxiv. 1, 1903.
- 1 *Carmichael (Montgomery)* The Gospel read to St Francis in transitu. 15p. Dub. R., April 1903.
[Argues that not merely the story of the Passion, but the whole of John 13-21, was read to the Saint in *commendationem animæ*.]
- Lake (K.)* The Greek Monasteries in S. Italy, I. 25p. J. Th. St., April 1903.
- 2M *England and Rome in the Middle Ages.* 23p. Ch. Q. R., April 1903.
[Maintains that the mediæval English Church was completely dependent on the Papacy.]
- 2T *Kellett (E. E.)* The Nonjurors. 16p. Lond. Q. R., April 1903.
- 80 *Brown (H. W.)* Latin America: Pagans, Papists, Protestants, and the Present Problem. 308p. 4/n. Revell, Feb. 1903.
- I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS.** C *Fathers* 2 R. C. *Church 3 Anglican.*
- A *Van Loon (J.)* Veldhuysen's De brief van Barnabas. Th. Tijdsch., March 1903.
- C *Butler (E. C.)* An Hippolytus Fragment and a word on the Tractatus Origenis. 9p. Z. f. N.T. Wiss., 1st No. 1903.
- Crum (W. E.)* Texts attributed to Peter of Alexandria. 12p. J. Theol. Stud., April 1903.
- Harris (J. R.)* Dioscouri in the Christian Legends. 64p. 4/. C. J. Clay, 1903.
- Meyboom (H. U.)* Tatianus en zijne apologie. Theol. Tijdsch., May 1903.
- Preuschen (E.)* Bibelcitatie bei Origenes. 8p. Z. f. N.T. Wiss., 1st No. 1903.
[A theory as to Origen's manner of quoting.]
- Schwartz (E.)* Zu Eusebius Kirchengeschichte. 20p. Zeitsch. f. neutest. Wissensch. 1st No., 1903.
[A philological analysis of the text in the passages relating to the martyrdom of James the First, and the Abgarus legend.]
- Souter (A.)* A New View about 'Ambrosiaster.' 14p. Expositor, June 1903.
[Supports Morin's view that the author was Hilary, pro-consul of Africa in 377, and Prefect of Rome in 408.]
- 1 Hymns of the Holy Eastern Church; tr. from the Service Books, with intro. Chapters on the History, Doctrine, and Worship of the Church, by John Brownlie. 142p. 3/6 n. Paisley, A. Gardner, 1903.
- 2 *Gooszen (M. A.)* Jubeljaar en Jubelafaat. Theol. Tijdsch., March 1903.
- M'Cabe (J.)* Church Discipline: Ethical Study of Church of Rome. 278p. 3/n. Duckworth, April 1903.
- M'Cabe (Joseph)* The Church of Rome in Spain. Cont. R., June 1903.
- Ziekursch (Johannes)* August der Starke und die Katholische Kirche in den Jahren 1697-1720. Z. f. Kirchengesch. xxiv. 1, 1903.
- 3 *Coleman (L.)* History of the American Ch. to Close of 19th cent. (Oxf. Ch. Text-bks.) 116p. 1/n. Rivingtons, 1903.
- Martin (T. F.)* The Position and Constitution of the Anglican Church in New Zealand. 72p. 2/. Low, 1903.
- Newbolt (W. C. E.)* and *Stone (D.)* The Church of England: An Appeal to Facts and Principles. 49p. Longmans, 1903.
- 5 *Horne (C. S.)* Popular History of the Free Churches. 462p. 6/. J. Clarke, 1903.
- 6 *Bax (E. Belfort)* Rise and Fall of the Anabaptists. 407p. Sonnenschein, 1903.
[Third vol. of "The Social Side of the Reformation in Germany."]
- 7 *Pike (G. H.)* Wesley and his Preachers: their Conquest of Britain. 318p. 7/6. Unwin, 1903.
- 8 *Cooke (G. Willis)* Unitarianism in America: a history of its origin and development. 474p. \$2 n. Boston Amer. Unit. Assoc., 1902.
[Treats of the practical side of Unitarianism—its organisations, charities, philanthropies and reforms. The author has kept in mind those not educated as Unitarians, and has aimed to state concretely what Unitarianism is. He retired from the active ministry in 1899.]
- Davison (W. T.)* Martineau and Modern Unitarianism. Lond. Q. R., April 1903.
- 9 *Price (Mrs Annie D.)* History of the Formation and Growth of the Reformed Episcopal Church. J. M. Armstrong, 1903.
- M MYTHOLOGY. RELIGIONS.** 5 *Buddhism.* 7 *Judaism.*
- 1 *D'Alviella (Goblet)* De quelques Problèmes relatifs aux Mystères d'Eleusis. 33p. R. de l'Hist. d. Rel., Jan.-Feb. 1903.
[Third part, dealing with Orphism and its relation to the Mysteries.]
- G. (E. E.)* The Makers of Hellas: a Critical Inquiry into the Philosophy and Religion of Ancient Greece; with Intro., Notes, and Conclusions, by F. B. Jevons. 711p. Griffin & Co., 1903.
[Attempts to show that religion played a much more important part than is usually supposed in the development of the Greek mind and spirit.]
- 3 *Chantepie de la Saussaye (P. D.)* The Religion of the Teutons; tr. fr. Dutch by Bert. J. Vos. 504p. Ginn, 1902.
[Review follows.]
- 4 *Jones (J. P.)* India's Problem: Krishna or Christ. 370p. 5/n. Revell, 1903.
- Guérinot (A.)* La Doctrine des êtres vivants dans la religion jaïna. 17p. Rev. de l'Hist. d. Rel., Jan.-Feb. 1903.
[A classification of beings, quoted from *Uttaraj-jh yana* and the *Jivavijaya*.]
- 5 *Rhys Davids (T. W.)* Christianity and Buddhism. Int. Q., April 1903.
(*Hearn Lefcadoc*) Le Nirvana: Étude de Bouddhisme synthétique. Rev. de Méta et de Mor., May 1903.
[Translated into French by M. and Mad. Garnier.]

- 7 *Adler (E. N.)* Auto da Fé and Jew (concl). 28p. Jewish Q. R., April 1903.
Dubnow (S. M.) Jewish History: Essay in Philosophy of History. 182p. 2/6 n. Macmillan, April 1903.
Montefiore (C. G.) Liberal Judaism: an Essay. 222p. 3/ n. Macmillan, Feb. 1903.
Goldziher (I.) The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah. Jewish Q. R., Ap. 1903. [Philological and other notes.]
Philipson (D.) The Beginnings of the Reform Movement in Judaism. 47p. Jewish Q. R., April 1903.
Hirschfeld (H.) Index to the Descriptive Catalogue of Hebrew MSS. of the Montefiore Library. Jewish Q. R., April 1903.
Kirkpatrick (A. F.) Christianity and Judaism. 18p. Exp., April 1903.
Mead (S. R. S.) The Talmud Ben Stada and Balaam Jesus Stories. Theosoph. R., Mar.—April 1903.
Mielziner (M.) Introduction to the Talmud; App.; Key to the Abbreviations used in the Talmud and its Commentaries. 2d rev. ed. \$2 n. 309p. N.Y., Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1903
 [A clear and concise explanation of the Talmud, describing what it is, who its authors were, and epitomizing its ethical conceptions, etc. The first edition of the work was published eight years ago. Dr Mielziner is Professor of Talmud in the Hebrew Union College of Cincinnati.]
Thackeray (H. St J.) Tr. of the Letter of Aristeas. 55p. Jewish Q. R., Ap. 1903.
 8 *Macdonald (Duncan B.)* Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory (Semitic ser., no. 9). \$1.25 n. Scribner, 1903.
Nicolas (A.) A propos de deux manuscrits "babis." 15p. R. de l'Hist. d. Rel., Jan.—Feb. 1903.
 [One MS. is a complete work—a history of the Babis sect, the second is a fragment of the former.]
 9 *The Supernatural in 19th Century Fiction.* Edinb. R., April 1903.
 12 *Daniels (Cora L.)* Ed. Encyclopædia of Superstitions, Folklore, and Occult Sciences. 3 v. \$9. Yewdale, 1903.
 26 *Code of Laws (the Oldest) in the World, promulgated by Hammurabi, King of Babylon, b.c. 2285—2242; tr. by C. H. W. Jones* 100 p. 1/6 n. T. & T. Clark, Feb. 1903.

P PHILOSOPHY 10 .. *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33 *Psychical Research*, 40 .. *Psychology*, 60 *Logic*, 70 .. *Systems, Philosophers.*

- Bain (Alexander)* Dissertations on Leading Philos. Topics. 277p. Longmans, 1903. [Essays in Logic, Psychology and Ethics, mainly reprinted from *Mind*, including a discussion of Descartes' "Cogito."]
Descaveer (Shobal V.) Evolution of Man and his Mind. \$5. 1903.
Gardiner (H. N.) Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 1903. Phil. R., March 1903.
Hibben (J. S.) Relation of Philosophy to Graduate Studies. Educ. R., Mar. 1903.
Meuffels (H.) Un Problème a résoudre

(En quelle Langue doit être donné l'enseignement de la philosophie dans les séminaires?) Rev. Néo.-Schol., Feb. 1903.

Ormond (A. T.) Philosophy and its Correlations. Phil. R., March 1903.

[Philosophy can vindicate itself against scepticism of its claims (1) by occupying the intra-conscious point of view, (2) by adopting the method of interpreting the world in terms of reason and purpose, and (3) by recognising reasonableness as its ultimate criterion of truth. The scientist, occupying the mechanical or extra-conscious point of view, tends to become agnostic about the inner or real nature of things; the philosopher, occupying the inner or supra-mechanical point of view, tends to become sceptical as to the reality of the phenomenal world. Both forms of doubt are unwarranted.]

h *Külpe (Oswald)* Die Philos. der Gegenwart in Deutschland. 115p. Teubner, 1903.

h *Riehl (Alois)* Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart. 258p. Teubner, 1903.

10 *Russell (Bertrand)* The Principles of Mathematics, Vol. 1.

534p. C. J. Clay & Sons, 1903. [An extremely valuable philosophical investigation of the fundamental Concepts of Mathematics.]

13 *Weiss (Berthold)* Gesetze des Geschehens.

Arch. f. system. Phil., ix, 1, 1903. [An exposition of Spencer and Comte's conceptions of Evolution. Author enunciates ten laws of cosmic process. Modern philosophy is suffering from an over-estimate of the value of analysis and an under-estimate of the value of synthesis.]

14 *Poincaré (H.)* L'espace et ses trois Dimensions.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1903.

18 *Hibben (T. G.)* The Theory of Energetics and its Philosophical Bearings.

Monist, April 1903.

Stern (L. W.) Der zweite Hauptsatz der Energetik und das Lebensproblem, ii.

Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxii., Heft 1, 1903. [The phenomena of life require for their explanation the assumption of active teleological factors, and the laws of Physics do not militate against this assumption.]

21 ("Criton") Dialogue philosophique entre Eudoxe et Ariste.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1903.

Marucci (Achille) Saggio critico della dottrina della conoscenza.

Arch. f. system. Phil., ix, 1, 1903.

[The fundamental canon of modern epistemology is the relativity of knowledge, which is not limited to the field of theory or abstract speculation, but applies to the whole realm of practical human activity.]

Moore (Addison W.) Existence, Meaning, and Reality in Locke's Essay and in Present Epistemology.

4to. 25c. n. Univ. of Chic. Press, 1903.

Welby (V.) What is Meaning? Studies in the Development of Significance.

321p. Macmillan, 1903.

29 *Nys (D.)* L'individu dans le Monde inorganique. Rev. Néo-Schol., Feb. 1903.

32 *Duprat (G. L.)* La Negation: Étude de psychologie pathologique.

Rev. Phil., May 1903.

33 *Bell (Clark Ed.)* Spiritism, hypnotism and telepathy as involved in the case of

Mrs Leonora E. Piper and the Society of
Psychical Research.

171p. \$1. N.Y., Clark Bell, 1902.
Carrington (H.) Discussion of the Trance
Phenomena of Mrs Piper.

Proceedings S.P.R., xvii. 45, Feb. 1903.
[As against Hyslop, author endeavours to explain the phenomena in question by the theory that the great majority of the bare facts in the sittings could have been obtained by the medium through means of telepathy from the *subliminal* consciousness of the sitter. Hyslop replies (p. 360), contending for the spiritistic interpretation.]

"Edward Greenwood." Some Experiments in Hypnotism.

Proceedings S.P.R., xvii. 45, Feb. 1903.
[Experiments were made with "M," a young man of considerable literary gifts, engaged in teaching. Subject was capable of being thrown into various "moods," and experimenter is of opinion that in the hands of an unscrupulous operator he might have been induced to act upon suggestions which in his normal state would have been highly repugnant to him.]

Harrison (Frederic) From this World to the Next. 19th Cent., April 1903.
[A propos of Myers' *Human Personality*.]

Johnson (Alice) Podmore's "Modern Spiritualism."

Proceedings S.P.R., xvii. 45, Feb. 1903.
Lang (Andrew) The Poltergeist, historically considered.

Proceedings S.P.R., xvii. 45, Feb. 1903.
[Author disputes Podmore's interpretation of the Tedworth Case, of the Wesley Case at Epworth, and refers to the Willington Mill Case and others to support his contention that the extraordinary uniformity in the hallucinations in question amongst every age, country and class of society is the problem to explain. Podmore replies (p. 327), and there is a rejoinder by author (p. 333).]

Mallock (W. H.) The Gospel of F. W. H. Myers. 19th Cent., April 1903.
[Severe adverse criticism of *Human Personality*.]

Podmore (Frank) Prof. Hyslop's Report on his Sittings with Mrs Piper.

Proceedings S.P.R., xvii. 45, Feb. 1903.
Author wholly disputes Hyslop's interpretation, and maintains that the indications of disembodied spirits are so slight and shadowy as to be hardly worth consideration.]

Skeat (Walter) Malay Spiritualism.
Proceedings S.P.R., xvii. 45, April 1903.

35 *Rousseau (P.)* La Mémoire des Rêves dans le Rêve. Phil. Rev., April 1903.

40 *Bastian (Adolf)* Die Lehre vom Denken. Zur Ergänzung der naturwissenschaftlichen Psychologie in Anwendung auf die Geisteswissenschaften.

Teil 1, 211 S. Dümmler, 1903.
Brough (J.) The Study of Mental Science. 129p. Longmans, 1903.

Busse (Ludwig) Geist und Körper, Seele und Leib. 488p. Dürr, 1903.

[Maintains as against the doctrine of Parallelism a thorough-going interaction between mind and matter, the ultimate unity of which is not to be found in their nature but in the fact of their interaction.]

Eisler (Rudolf) Prolegomena zu einer philosophischen Psychologie.

Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxii. 1, 1903.
[Psychology falls into two parts; descriptive and explanatory psychology. In the first place, the empirical material must be collected, and

when the general laws of psychical processes have been inductively determined, then one can proceed deductively from the assumption of the psychical ego to explain the multiplicity of conscious states.]

Forester (George) Mr Syme on "The Soul." West R., June 1903.

Isserlin (Max) Eine neue "Lösung des Raumproblems," i.

Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxii. 1, 1903.

Sanford (G. C.) Psychology and Physics; *Bonser (F. G.)*, The Relations between Mental Activity and the Circulation of the Blood; *Ladd (G. T.)*, Direct Control of the Retinal Field. Psychol. R., March 1903.

Syme (David) The Soul: A Study and an Argument. 234p. Macmillan, 1903.

[Mind is a real substance and not a product or function of some other substance; the brain is the chief but not the sole organ of sensation and consciousness.]

Villa (Guido) Contemporary Psychology; rev. by author, tr. by Harold Manacorda. [Lib. of Phil.]

412p. 10/6 n. Sonnenschein, 1903.

[Treats of the origin of the problems of contemporary psychology, their genetic relation to general philosophy, natural science, and the social and moral sciences, and the different aspects they assume in the various systems of the present day.]

41 *Volkelt (J.)* Beiträge zur Analyse des Bewusstseins (Schluss).

Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxii. 1, 1903.

[The fundamental basis of consciousness is the immediate experience of self, the feeling of the living ego, as the dark inner undifferentiated whole or background of the mental life. All feelings are ultimately special modes of this primitive *Selbstgefühl*.]

42 *Hovison (G. H.)* In the Matter of Personal Idealism. Mind, April 1903.

[Mainly a reply to M'Taggart's criticism of *Limits of Evolution*. It is contended, also, that in the vol. *Personal Idealism*, not a single trait of systematic Idealism is present; the heart of real individuality, of real personality, is not reached at all, and even the serious attempt to reach it is foregone.]

48 *Darroch (Alexander)*. Herbart and the Herbartian Theory of Education.

148p. Longmans, 1903.
[Lectures in the University of Edinburgh, discussing the philosophical and psychological basis of education.]

Judd (Charles H.) Genetic Psychology for Teachers (Int. Educ. ser., 55).

\$1.20 n. N.Y., Appleton, 1903.

Super (Charles W.) Wisdom and Will in Education. \$1.25. R. L. Myers, 1903.

49 *Müller (Robert)* Ueber die zeitlichen Eigenschaften der Sinneswahrnehmung.

Vierteljahrssr. w. Phil. u. Soz., xxvii. 1, 1903.

50 *Bos (C.)* Contribution a l'étude des sentiments intellectuels.

Rev. Phil., April 1903.
[Investigates the feeling-tone connected with the work of thought, e.g., the feeling of identity (James' feeling of sameness), of contradiction, of causality, of resemblance, etc.]

Meyer (Max). Contributions to a Psychological Theory of Music.

75c. Univ. of Missouri, 1901.

Schneider (O.) Die schöpferische Kraft des Kindes in der Gestaltung seiner

- Bewusstseinszustände bis zum Beginn des Schulunterrichts, ii.
Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxii. 1, 1903.
 [Continuation of study of child-psychology based on the observation of two children.]
Thomson (J. Arthur). On Growing Old. 25p. Lond. Q. R., April 1903.
 [Examines the facts as to, animals, wild and tame, and distinguishes between inevitable senescence and avoidable senility.]
- 53*3 *Ribot (Th.)* L'Association des Idées. Rev. Phil., May 1903.
 [An examination of Claparède's recent work.]
- 59 *Bradley (F. H.)* The Definition of Will, ii. Mind, 1903.
 [Volition having been defined as the self-realisation of an idea with which the self is identified, the attempt is made to show what is meant by an identification of an idea with the self. In volition, I must be conscious of an object not-self, and also of an object idea, which is in opposition to the existent not-self. Then, when the idea realises itself, I perceive myself also as moving in the same sense, and up to a certain point in this movement, I am an object to myself. And my self again in many cases, before the idea has even partly realised itself, is contained as an element in the content of the idea. But at the beginning of the act my self is not always so contained. The idea of agency is usually present in will, but it is not essential, and in some cases it is absent. So, too, choice, implying always that one object is rejected, does not constitute the essence of will.]
- Le Dantec (E.)* Instinct et Servitude. Rev. Phil., March and April 1903.
 [A discussion of the relation of instinct to intelligence and will upon a strictly deterministic theory. Instinct is the whole of the faculties of an animal which depend on the functioning of the inherited parts of the nervous system; intelligence is the whole of the faculties of an organism which depend upon the functioning of the modifiable parts of the nervous system. A conscious being is "free" when the working of its nervous mechanism is not interfered with either by the nervous mechanism of another individual or by impediments in its environment. It would appear that absolute freedom would thus only be possible for a creature living in isolation, but in a society like that of bees, in which each is perfectly adapted to the function it has to fulfil, such freedom may also be reached, and in that case results from a slavery prolonged enough to render the slave temperament hereditary.]
- Mourre (C.)* La Volonté dans le Rêve. Phil. Rev., May 1903.
- 60 *Husserl (Edmund)* Bericht ueber deutsche Schriften zur Logik in den Jahren 1895-99, 1^{ster} Art. Arch. f. system. Phil., ix. 1, 1903.
 [A discussion of Bergmann's *Grundprobleme der Logik*, which is characterised as a work of great originality and penetration.]
- Schultz (Julius)* Ueber die Fundamente der formalen Logik. Vierteljahrssr. w. Phil. u. Soz., xxvii. 1, 1903.
- Wihan (R.)* Zur Feststellung des Begriffes der Wahrheit. *Z. Phil. u. Phil. Krit.*, cxxii. 1, 1903.
- 71 *Von Hartman (Alma)* Zurück zum Idealismus. 213p. Schwetschke and Sohn, 1902.
- 73 *Cantecor (G.)* La Philosophie Nouvelle et La Vie de L'esprit. Phil. Rev., March 1903.
 [Criticism of Le Roy's Intuitionism from the point of view of a modified Kantianism.]
- 84 *Roeholl (D.)* Platonismus in deutschen Mittelalter. Z. f. Kirchengesch., xxiv. 1, 1903.
- 88 *Davis (C. H. Stanley)* Greek and Roman Stoicism and some of its Disciples: Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. 269p. \$1.40 n. Bost., Herbert B. Turner & Co., 1903.
- 89 *Schmitt (E. H.)* Die Gnosis, Grundlagen der Weltanschauung einer edleren Kultur. Bd. 1, Die Gnosis des Altertums. 627p. Diederich, 1903.
- 90 *Challaye (F.)* Un philosophe japonisant: Lafcadio Hearn. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1903.
Moisant (Xavier) Une Philosophie de l'Imitation. Rev. de Phil., April 1903.
 [An exposition of the philosophy of Tarde, attempting to show that it is compatible with a theology which Tarde himself does not accept.]
- Russell (B.)* Recent Work on the Philosophy of Leibniz. Mind, April 1903.
 [A discussion of the treatises of Louis Couturat and of E. Cassirer, the first on Leibniz's Logic, the second on the philosophical system of Leibniz.]
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
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